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2048

RECEIVED

THE GOVERNMENT OF THE
STATE OF NEW YORK
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
ALBANY, N. Y.
JANUARY 1, 1908
TO THE COMMISSIONERS OF THE
LAND OFFICE
SIR:
I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 27th inst. in relation to the above captioned matter.
In reply to inform you that the same has been forwarded to the proper authorities for their consideration.
Very respectfully,
J. B. CROSSLAND, ATTORNEY GENERAL.

[illegible][illegible]

The only thing the State is interested in, when you get into it, is to have the use of these things to keep water in the Channel. You would prefer, then, the more the Government, this would still maintain the same water in the main case, but make it a part of the compulsory system!

...I understand your idea, Mr. Tolson. I would expand the National Guard under the

THE JOURNAL OF THE

...And I understood that...

... Col. Davis's ...

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...the ...



...the National...


...the ... of ...

Text: The [illegible] [illegible]

... ..



Figure 1. The effect of the concentration of the *Agrobacterium* suspension on the transformation efficiency of *Agrobacterium* strains.





REORGANIZATION OF THE ARMY

HEARINGS

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE COMMITTEE ON MILITARY AFFAIRS UNITED STATES SENATE

SIXTY-SIXTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

ON

S. 2691

A BILL TO PROVIDE FOR UNIVERSAL MILITARY, NAVAL, AND VOCATIONAL TRAINING AND FOR MOBILIZATION OF THE MANHOOD OF THE NATION IN A NATIONAL EMERGENCY

S. 2693

A BILL TO CREATE A DEPARTMENT OF AERONAUTICS, DEFINING THE POWERS AND DUTIES OF THE DIRECTOR THEREOF, PROVIDING FOR THE ORGANIZATION, DISPOSITION, AND ADMINISTRATION OF A UNITED STATES AIR FORCE, CREATING THE UNITED STATES AIR RESERVE FORCE, AND PROVIDING FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF CIVIL AND COMMERCIAL AVIATION


S. 2715

A BILL TO REORGANIZE AND INCREASE THE EFFICIENCY OF THE UNITED STATES ARMY, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES

PART 17

Printed for the use of the Committee on Military Affairs

WASHINGTON
GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
1919



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REORGANIZATION OF THE ARMY.

THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER 25, 1919.

UNITED STATES SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON MILITARY AFFAIRS,
Washington, D. C.

The subcommittee met pursuant to adjournment at 3 o'clock p. m. in the committee room, Capitol, Senator James W. Wadsworth, jr., presiding.

Present: Senators Wadsworth (chairman), New, Sutherland, Frey-linghuysen, Chamberlain, and Thomas.

STATEMENT OF MR. GEORGE HARRISON HOUSTON, OF THE AIR-CRAFT COMMISSION.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Houston, you are a member of the commission that went abroad with Secretary Crowell?

Mr. HOUSTON. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Will you describe to the committee the purpose of that commission, the object it had in view.

Mr. HOUSTON. The purpose of our commission was to study aeronautical conditions in France, Italy, and England, and with the information gained by our observations in those countries, coupled with our knowledge of conditions existing in America, to formulate a report to the Secretary of War a plan that we believed would be proper for the development of aeronautics in America, including the form of Government organization necessary for the control of such development, and ways and means for stimulating civilian aeronautical development, if such development was found desirable.

The CHAIRMAN. What general observations have you to make on this problem, Mr. Houston?

Senator FLETCHER. Would you mind stating, if I do not interrupt you there, about the nature of your observations, where did you go to make your observations at the plants and in the field, so as to lay the foundation so as to say to what extent your observations reached, then get to your conclusions?

Mr. HOUSTON. The commission divided itself into three parts, one giving particular attention to the study of governmental organizations for the control of aeronautical activities; second, giving attention to all phases of commercial aeronautical development, and, third, giving attention to all phases of technical development in aeronautics.

I was made chairman of the subcommittee on aeronautical development. The observations of the commission as a whole included interviews with the chief government representatives in control of

the governmental aeronautical organizations in France, Italy, and England; in the interviewing of the leading representatives of the aeronautical industries in each of these countries; in visiting many of the factories, aerodromes, and flying fields in each of these countries, and in discussing the whole problem of commercial aeronautical development with some of the leading financial interests in France and England. Does that cover it?

Senator FLETCHER. That covers the questions.

Mr. HOUSTON. The conclusions of the commission may be stated briefly as follows:

First, aeronautical transportation constitutes the fastest means of transportation over long distances known to man, and as time goes on, as the art is perfected, it will become of vast commercial value; that the speed with which this development takes place and the time at which commercial aeronautical transportation will become self-supporting, depends entirely upon the encouragement and stimulus that may be given or can be given to it during its infancy.

Second, that aeronautics will be found in the future to be a much more vital factor in our national defense, so much so, in fact, that in the opinion of higher military authorities in both France and England it will be almost a dominating influence in the future, particularly in the initial activities of a war.

Third, that the chemical problems connected with the development of air craft for both commercial and military purposes, that the problems connected with the commercialization of aeronautical transportation and problems connected with the development of aircraft for military and naval purposes, and other purposes of national defense, such as a separate aerial army, are so complex and so intimately intertwined and interdependent that it will be quite impossible to keep apprised of the development of foreign countries unless these various activities can be coordinated and correlated and properly balanced, one portion with the other under one single executive control.

It is realized that the development of this single control embodies many difficulties and breaks down many precedents, but in the opinion of the mission there are no impossible problems involved in the development of such a single air service, and it has unanimously recommended that this be done.

I believe that covers the ground in general.

The CHAIRMAN. Were there any questions that anyone would like to ask?

Senator FLETCHER. Was your mission primarily and more emphatically concerned in the commercial aspects of the question?

Mr. HOUSTON. No. The personnel of our mission was made up of the Assistant Secretary of War, two Army officers, one naval officer, and four civilians.

Senator FLETCHER. You might put the list in the record if there is no objection.

Senator NEW. It is already in the record.

Mr. HOUSTON. The commission gave the most careful thought and made the most careful investigation of aeronautical activities in France, England, and Italy, having to do with military and naval affairs. I do not mean by this that it gave consideration to the types of the aircraft or the kind of service to be rendered by such

aircraft for military and naval purposes, but it did make a most careful study as to the necessity in general for the use of aircraft in military and naval observations, and as to the kind of government organization in general that was needed to obtain and use such equipment.

Senator FLETCHER. What are your business connections, Mr. Houston?

Mr. HOUSTON. I am an engineer by profession, a member of the firm of Geo. W. Goethals & Co., and president of the Wright-Martin Aircraft Corporation, which has been engaged since 1916 in the manufacture of aeronautical motors for the French and American Governments.

Senator NEW. By whom was this mission organized; was it by the Secretary of War?

Mr. HOUSTON. The mission was organized by Mr. Crowell, the Assistant Secretary of War, under orders issued or in accordance with orders issued by Mr. Baker, Secretary of War.

Senator FRELINGHUYSEN. Mr. Houston, this mission visited France, England, and Italy, did it not?

Mr. HOUSTON. Yes.

Senator FRELINGHUYSEN. Was the universal sentiment over there in those countries in favor of a unified control?

Mr. HOUSTON. Personally I did not visit Italy; I was engaged in some work in France and England in connection with commercial development, but I did participate in the investigation on this subject in France and England, and I would say that both France and England are very much of the opinion that a unified control of all aeronautical activities is necessary. There is some difference of opinion as to the extent to which a central air service should be permitted to supervise and control the activities of aeronautical equipment required by the army and navy for their military operations.

In England a plan has been developed whereby the central air service has entire control of all aeronautical personnel and material except when in actual service, at which time it is assigned temporarily to the command of the army or naval units with which it serves, and France does not contemplate going so far as this, but in general plans to permit the army and navy more control over such aeronautical material and personnel as it needs, to the extent of the army and navy permanently holding such personnel and material under their own control after it had once been turned over to them by the proposed centralized air service.

Senator FRELINGHUYSEN. Have they unified control in France now?

Mr. HOUSTON. When we were in France it was just beginning to work out a separate air service. During the war it had to all practical intents and purposes a unified control in that the French naval activities were of very minor importance and there were no other aeronautical activities except those of the army, therefore the French Army aeronautical department was practically the French air service. Now that peace has come, the commercial use of air craft and other governmental uses of air craft, such as mail

carrying, are developing rapidly, and France realizes that its army control, as it existed during war times, will no longer answer.

Senator FRELINGHUYSEN. They are going to have unified control, are they?

Mr. HOUSTON. The French Government was planning when we were there to develop as rapidly as possible a unified central air service.

Senator FRELINGHUYSEN. Were you present at the interview with Marshal Foch?

Mr. HOUSTON. No.

Senator FRELINGHUYSEN. Did he express himself in favor of unification of the Air Service?

Mr. HOUSTON. I understood Marshal Foch expressed himself very emphatically as in favor of a unified Air Service.

Senator FRELINGHUYSEN. And Gen. Duval?

Mr. HOUSTON. I was present at two conferences with Gen. Duval, and he expressed himself as being very heartily in favor of a unified Air Service; in fact, he went further, and stated that whereas during the war the Air Service had been 100 per cent military, yet this condition would not continue to exist very long, but that in the relatively near future commercial aeronautical interests would overbalance military interests, and that in all probability by the time another war would come that the military interests would be in a very small minority.

Senator THOMAS. Did he think another war would come?

Mr. HOUSTON. He certainly did.

Senator FRELINGHUYSEN. This was Gen. Duval?

Mr. HOUSTON. Yes, sir.

Senator FRELINGHUYSEN. Did Marshal Foch express himself on that subject?

Mr. HOUSTON. I was not present at the interview with Marshal Foch.

Senator FRELINGHUYSEN. And you do not know?

Mr. HOUSTON. No.

Senator FRELINGHUYSEN. Did you interview Premier Clemenceau?

Mr. HOUSTON. No; I was not present at that interview.

Senator FRELINGHUYSEN. Was he interviewed?

Mr. HOUSTON. I think he was, as I remember.

Senator FRELINGHUYSEN. Did he express himself as in favor of the unification of the various aeronautical activities?

Mr. HOUSTON. Let me have that just a moment [indicating].

Senator FRELINGHUYSEN. You mean the letter to President Wilson? Just answer yes or no.

Mr. HOUSTON. It is my understanding Marshal Foch is most emphatically in favor of a unified Air Service.

Senator FRELINGHUYSEN. No; Premier Clemenceau?

Mr. HOUSTON. That Premier Clemenceau is most emphatically in favor of a unified Air Service. I understand he has expressed himself as considering the development of the air service in France of equal importance to the development of its army or navy.

Senator FRELINGHUYSEN. In your investigation in England, was there any suggestion that they might return to divided control, or was it the sentiment generally that the present unified control should continue?

Mr. HOUSTON. There was some little criticism of unified control among the subordinate officers of the navy, but I was told by a number of British officers that this feeling of antagonism was rather disappearing, and I will say that of all the British army and navy officers with whom I came in contact, there was no expression of the thought that divided control would be returned to, but there was a constant reiteration of the thought that the unified air service was in the British Empire to stay, and would grow stronger rather than weaker as time went on.

Senator FRELINGHUYSEN. Did I understand you to say that it was at the instigation of Assistant Secretary Crowell that this mission was organized and sent to France, or was it at the suggestion of Secretary Baker and Secretary Daniels?

Mr. HOUSTON. This mission was organized and went abroad under a letter of instructions from Secretary Baker to Assistant Secretary Crowell.

Senator FRELINGHUYSEN. I want to find out where the inspiration for the mission came from.

Mr. HOUSTON. I do not know. I was asked to be a member of this mission by Mr. Crowell, and upon its organization he presented to the mission a letter of instructions from Secretary Baker embodying the range of our activities.

Senator FRELINGHUYSEN. The findings of your mission, which recommend a unification of the Air Service, have been opposed, have they not, by the Navy?

Mr. HOUSTON. I understand that there is some general opposition, but since my return to America I have been so engaged with my own affairs that I have given it very little attention, and, as a matter of fact, have not discussed the matter with any naval officer other than Capt. Mustin, who was a member of the mission.

Senator SUTHERLAND. Is it not also opposed by the Army?

Mr. HOUSTON. I understand that there is general opposition to the plan in certain quarters in the Army, but I have not cared to discuss it with Army officers at the present time.

Senator NEW. In other words, you went over there and investigated the subject and came back and made your report on it, on conditions as you found them, with such recommendations as you cared to base on those observations and as a result of your study, and then quit talking about it?

Mr. HOUSTON. Yes, sir; except that in addition to the observations we made abroad I was able to include some three years' intimate association with the Air Service of the War Department of the United States.

Senator FRELINGHUYSEN. During the war you were engaged in the manufacture of engines for airplanes, were you not?

Mr. HOUSTON. Yes, sir.

Senator FRELINGHUYSEN. You were building the Hispano-Suiza motor?

Mr. HOUSTON. Yes, sir.

Senator FRELINGHUYSEN. Of what horsepower?

Mr. HOUSTON. Of 150 or 180 horsepower, depending upon the amount of compression given to the motor, and later we developed and put into production a modification of the French 300 horse-

power Hispano-Suiza motor, carrying on the production of both the sizes for a period.

Senator FRELINGHUYSEN. How many 150-horsepower motors did you put out?

Mr. HOUSTON. We built 450 of the 150-horsepower Hispano-Suiza motors for France, delivering the majority of them during the latter part of 1917. We delivered to the United States Government about five thousand two hundred and fifty 150 or 180 horsepower motors plus about 25 per cent spares during our period of production.

Senator FRELINGHUYSEN. Now, the 300 horsepower?

Mr. HOUSTON. We did not put the 300 horsepower into production until the summer of 1918, and at the time of the armistice were just completing our first motors. We finished 500 of these motors plus about 25 per cent additional for spares before we shut down this factory.

Senator FRELINGHUYSEN. Are those motors in the possession of the Government at the present time?

Mr. HOUSTON. All of these motors were delivered to the Government, and I do not believe they have sold any of them up to the present time. Some of them were shipped abroad, and probably a considerable number have been destroyed in use in America.

Senator FRELINGHUYSEN. Now, the durability test on that motor showed what? I mean, did it stand up with the other motors and the French Hispano-Suiza?

Mr. HOUSTON. The Hispano-Suiza motor was the great motor of the French Army during the period of the war. The service rendered far surpassed that of any other motor produced in France. It was essentially a motor for high-speed planes, being of very light weight and of very high technical development. It was so perfectly designed, having been first developed by a Swiss engineer of international reputation, that it developed remarkable endurance under reasonably good treatment.

Senator FRELINGHUYSEN. Do you believe that the present Hispano-Suiza motors, which are now in the possession of the Government and not installed, will be available for service in the Army within the next five years and will not become obsolete during that time?

Mr. HOUSTON. I was told abroad that the 300-horsepower Hispano-Suiza motor was the most perfect expression of aeronautical motor design put into production by any of the European countries during the period of the war, and will be of considerable use to France in its after-war work. The small motor was originally developed early in 1915 and was rated at about 120 horsepower. By perfection of detail it has been developed to the place where it will deliver 180 horsepower, due entirely to engineering research. In my opinion, both of these motors will be of use for military purposes for a reasonable length of time. I am confident, however, that within two years from now both of these motors will be far behind the latest development as it will then exist.

Senator SUTHERLAND. What did you get for those 150-horsepower motors that you shipped to France?

Mr. HOUSTON. I am frank to say that I do not remember, except that it was considerably less than their cost.

Senator SUTHERLAND. Do you not know approximately how much?

Mr. HOUSTON. I do not remember the exact figures, although I can send them to you if you wish. The cost of these early motors was very high, and I do remember that the Wright-Martin Co. lost a very considerable sum of money in the production of those 450 motors for France. As I remember, our sales price was in the neighborhood of \$3,000, but I was told by the engineers who negotiated our license with the Hispano-Suiza Co. that this very high price was a part of the consideration for which the Government of France was willing to have the license of those motors go abroad.

Senator FRELINGHUYSEN. Do you mean to say that you had to furnish these motors to the French Government at a very low price in order to obtain permission to manufacture them in this country?

Mr. HOUSTON. That is my understanding of the negotiations. At the time this license was obtained, I was not associated with the Wright-Martin Co. and my only knowledge of the situation is what I have gained by hearsay.

Senator FRELINGHUYSEN. In other words, they compelled you to deliver to the French Government in order that you might have a license to manufacture for the United States Government. Is that so?

Mr. HOUSTON. No; because this license was taken and the Wright-Martin Co. entered into an obligation to deliver these motors in January, 1916, or nearly 16 months before the United States went into the war, and at that time there was no expectation that the United States would enter the war. The license was taken and the low price was accepted with the expectation that the company would develop a capacity for the production of these motors which would lead to future orders from France. The company experienced enormous difficulty at first in getting this motor into production and made many mistakes in undertaking it, and in that way undertaking a line of engineering that was entirely new to America. As a result they were nearly a year behind in their initial deliveries, and when the United States entered the war, they still had the greater part of their French order to deliver. Due to the United States entering the war, we were not permitted to sell our motors direct to the French Government after the completion of this first order.

Senator FRELINGHUYSEN. What did you get for these motors of the same design and same horsepower, delivered to the American Government?

Mr. HOUSTON. The first contract paid us \$5,500 per motor, and enabled us to recoup a portion of the losses we had experienced in developing the production of this motor. All of our other production has been on a cost-plus basis.

Senator NEW. Who imposed these conditions; from whom did you obtain this license?

Mr. HOUSTON. The license was obtained from the Hispano-Suiza Co., with its headquarters in Spain, but through its French company, and was given by the Hispano-Suiza Co. only with the consent of the French Government.

The CHAIRMAN. Have you any further questions to ask Mr. Houston about the second problem of aeronautics?

Senator NEW. You probably have brought out everything I want to know, before this, as I came late.

The CHAIRMAN. We are very much obliged to you, Mr. Houston.

STATEMENT OF MR. HOWARD E. COFFIN.

The CHAIRMAN. You were a member of the mission, were you not, Mr. Coffin?

Mr. COFFIN. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Please give your business connection.

Mr. COFFIN. I am vice president of the Hudson Motor Car Co., of Detroit, a member of the advisory commission of the Council of National Defense and of the Naval Consulting Board.

The CHAIRMAN. What general observations have you to make about this problem?

Mr. COFFIN. Well, in listening to Mr. Houston's presentation of the work of the mission, it occurred to me that it would be largely repetition for me to go into generalities. He has covered the object and methods of the mission, and I agree in practically every detail with the statement he has given.

You asked certain questions of him, his replies to which I would like to amplify a bit.

You asked as to the origination of this mission. I believe that it was initiated because of a realization upon the part of the administration that some definite and decisive action was necessary in the control of aeronautics and that this feeling prompted the Secretary of War to suggest or to direct Mr. Crowell to form this mission. As you know, I came into the work here in Washington in 1915, at Mr. Daniels's invitation, in connection with the Naval Board work. Then, in the fall of 1916—because, I think, of the work done in connection with the Industrial Inventory, President Wilson asked me to become a member of the Advisory Commission of the Council of National Defense. I received notification of appointment while at Gen. Pershing's headquarters in Mexico.

The first meeting of the advisory commission was held December 11, 1916, and from that time on those of us who were members of the commission were active in a dozen different directions. The manufacturing and industrial side of fitting the country for war naturally fell within my province, and I was made chairman of that division of the work.

Aircraft, of course, entered only incidentally into the work under the general advisory supervision of that body, and I had merely general contact with the subject until a month, or some such time, after war was declared, when, as you know, I was asked to become the chairman of the subcommittee of the council known as the Aircraft Production Board. This board was organized to draw together the activities of the War and Navy Departments and to get the industrial resources of the country in some kind of shape to act with the War and Navy Departments in connection with their plans for the production of aeronautical material. It was necessary to dissolve this board at about the same time the other advisory committees were dissolved, in the fall of 1917; and it was at the urgent request of the officers representing the War and Navy Departments that the bill was drawn under their direction creating the Aircraft Board. It was desired to perpetuate the work of the Aircraft Production Board but not to amplify it; and, as you know, the Aircraft Board continued in an advisory clearing-house capacity only, exactly as had the Aircraft Production Board previously. In

short, in accordance with the limiting terms of the bill creating it, no body was built up under the Aircraft Board which in any way duplicated the already existing governmental administrative machinery.

The executive direction and control of all aircraft activities remained from start to finish vested in the executive branches of the Government, namely, the War and Navy Departments and their various bureaus. During this entire period the training of men, the engineering work, and the purchase and production of equipment, matériel, etc., was controlled by the military and naval authorities.

In all this experience, which, as I say, was merely one of many points of advisory contact with the War Department activities, I was able to formulate pretty definitely in my own mind the difficulties of the situation and visualize the problems which would sooner or later confront us as this new art of aviation developed.

So, after having spent several months on the other side, and getting very closely in touch with the progress which was being and had been made there, I was very much pleased to have the opportunity of going across again as a member of the Crowell mission. It was to some extent covering ground with which I was already familiar, and I felt that I might be of considerable real aid to the mission because of my previous experience over there.

Leaving any addition to the general statement for incorporation later, Mr. Chairman, you asked Mr. Houston as to the views of the British, French, and Italians upon the question of a separate air service. I visited with Mr. Crowell and two or three other members of the mission all three of these countries and was present at nearly all interviews. I believe that France, England, and Italy will soon agree upon a very similar general policy. England, in the first instance, probably went rather too far. But she has realized the difficulties and the mistakes of her actions and is in process of revising her policy on a basis which will bring her more nearly in agreement with the French and Italian proposals. England has had more experience and has gone further than any other nation in the development of aircraft.

Senator FRELINGHUYSEN. Further than France?

Mr. COFFIN. Yes, sir. Certainly in a more orderly way. France has "starred" spectacularly, if I may use the term, in aviation, while England, true to the characteristics, I think, of the British Nation, has plodded ahead more slowly, with less spectacular effect but much more solidly and permanently.

Senator FRELINGHUYSEN. Thoroughly?

Mr. COFFIN. Thoroughly; yes.

In England, as will be brought out before you, I think, very definitely by some of the British representatives, they are in the position of having centralized too much. In the first effort to unify the Air Service everything was put into a department of aeronautics, with a head in the ministry. There was included within the direction and administration of this department both personnel and matériel for army and navy and an independent air force. As a result, due partially to the confusion and hurry of war time, and partially to the fact that the losses in personnel were so severe that the problem of replacements was a very serious one, it developed that men of no naval experience, for instance, were assigned to the fleet for

operation with the naval forces. Inasmuch as a man on shipboard should first be a seaman, must live nearly all the time on shipboard, and must be amenable to naval regulations and associate continually with naval officers and seamen, it was peculiarly unsatisfactory to assign what I may term landlubbers for service in naval aviation. If a man were sent up to observe a fleet formation, for instance, unless he had a thorough knowledge of things naval, his wireless advice as to what the enemy might be doing would be of questionable value.

Similar comments might perhaps be made to a less marked extent in regard to the army.

So, through experience, England is coming to the point where, without disturbing her separate department for aeronautics, with its head in the highest organization of the Government as a minister, she is taking steps to insure that all men educated for and assigned to the navy are first and foremost naval men——

Senator SUTHERLAND. You mean of the naval air forces?

Mr. COFFIN. Yes. In short, taking to ourselves a practical application of what she is planning, we would establish the procedure that before a man could in peace time elect to enter the air service, with the view to training for navy work, he would first have had a naval education or its equivalent and would have spent three years with the fleet. At the end of this period of time he is, by present naval procedure, as I understand it, in position to elect a specialty. He may either elect aircraft or submarines or torpedo boats or any one of the naval activities. He would therefore at this time elect aviation and would then be assigned to the department of aeronautics or the national air service, if we may use such a term for convenience. He would then be assigned to the air college for training in this highly specialized art. Here he would get the technical training, both theoretical and practical, and would be taught practical flying in all its general applications. At the end of perhaps three years' time, unless for some particular reason he were assigned permanently to the national air service and continued on in that service, he would be "graduated" and returned to the navy and would there take his specialized practical training in connection with actual fleet maneuvers and operations.

He would thus be coming back into a berth with which he was thoroughly familiar and where he would be received as a member of the family and not as an outsider coming into a new service and having a great deal to learn, both as to fundamentals and traditions. Much the same thing would apply to the army work. I would like to give you some idea of the distance to which England is looking and the thoroughness with which she is planning by repeating to you, not word for word, but in effect, a conversation lasting for an hour and a half between Mr. Winston Churchill, Mr. Crowell, and myself.

We asked Mr. Churchill to put into words his views of the present situation and of the future of aeronautics as seen through British eyes. Mr. Churchill, as you know, is the minister for air and also the minister for war, of England. Mr. Churchill facetiously remarked that he had a separate compartment in his brain through which he administered each of these services, and that we must not assume the existence of any relation between the war department

and the air department because the ministries happened to be centered in one and the same individual.

Senator THOMAS. Kind of a Pooh Bah?

Mr. COFFIN. Mr. Churchill asked, as I understand it, that he be given the ministry for air in addition to the ministry for war, because he felt that through the proper employment of air forces he would be able to displace a considerable portion of the far-flung military organization, particularly in some of the colonial or outlying territories, patrols, and that sort of thing.

Mr. Churchill's general statement was about as follows: That in the upbuilding of the scheme for the future defense of the British nation there were three great factors involved, namely, operations upon the sea, upon the land, and in the air; that it was only toward the close of the war that any just appreciation of the possibilities and importance of aircraft came to be felt, and that had the war gone on for a very brief period of months the air service would have occupied a much more dominant position than the British had ever previously conceived that it could. Therefore, they believed that in looking toward the future they were taking a logical step in creating three coequal divisions of the national defense—the army, the navy, and the air service. That it was, of course, logical and to be hoped for that these three services might, sooner or later, be so correlated in a single ministry of defense that there would be a closer coordination of the three factors involved in the national defense than had been possible during the present war, or had ever been had before.

Of course, it was only in the present war that the third element, the air service, had come into being. Being firmly convinced that the development of the air service was necessary to the national defense, a most important consideration immediately presented was the matter of personnel. That under present conditions of life, peculiarly those conditions which have maintained since the latter days of the war, of high wages and of great influence brought to bear upon the part of industry to absorb the best brains of the nation, a reasonably satisfactory career must in some way be assured the men entering the air service. And, inasmuch as the pay could probably never approximate the pay to be had in civil life, that it must be provided that a reasonable advancement in rank be assured them. I might emphasize the point that in this service particularly the highest type of mind and education is required, because, to a greater and greater extent, the movements of fleets and of armies will be made dependent upon the calculation and the abilities of the men in this service.

If the proper caliber of men is to be attracted, then assurance of a reasonable career through promotion must be given.

Mr. Churchill pointed out, further, that one of the great difficulties in the war just past has been the lack of understanding of the possibilities of the air service. That is particularly true of the air service, because it has been a new and a very intricate service, and very few of the men of advanced military rank and of age in the high commands have had any definite or fundamental knowledge of this service in all of its ramifications and developments.

Mr. Churchill feels that in any future war in which England may become involved, perhaps in 10 years or 20 years, or whenever it

may come, they can no longer risk a lack of coordination in the forces of defense, and that steps must be taken to insure in the minds of both the army and navy high commands the most thorough understanding of the uses and possibilities of aircraft and of the air service generally. To do this it is proposed to institute a "circulating system," as he termed it, by means of which the young officers of the war and navy departments will be circulated through the royal air force and will be graduated after a term of service in that department and automatically returned to their original services. The young officers of to-day will constitute the high commands of the military and naval forces of to-morrow, and when it becomes necessary to use these three great services again as coordinated elements of national defense there will be insured to a much greater extent than in the past a thorough understanding of the problems involved.

Another thing accomplished by this circulating system is the solution of the question of advancement in rank. As Mr. Churchill illustrated the system, we may consider the question of the national defense as involving three pyramids—one the army, one the air service, and one the navy. In the constitution of these three services the numerical relation of the officers of lower rank to the higher command is, in the case of the air service, which, for convenience, I have placed in the center here [illustrating by drawing three pyramids on a slip of paper] in much higher proportion than is the relation to the high command in the other services. The base of the air service triangle is much broader than that of war and navy departments. In short, the lower officer personnel in the air service has much less chance of a career through promotion than he would have in the other services. We have, as you know, a larger number of lieutenants and captains, the observers and the pilots, etc., in proportion to the total officer personnel.

If a young man is to be attracted to the Air Service in time of peace—and, as Mr. Churchill point out, these young men must be of the very highest type—if this kind of man is to be attracted, he must feel reasonably sure that he has some future ahead of him. So under this "circulating" plan men may come into the Air Service, either from the Army with the intention of returning to the Army and gaining rank there, or they may come in from the Navy, with the intention of returning to the Navy and winning a career there.

They may come from high schools and enter the primary courses of the Air College direct. In the case of these civilians, they must be turned out with an education equal to that of a first-class technical school, such as the Boston Tech., and if they elect at the end of their period of service to go back to civil pursuits they must be equipped to take up life on an equality with men who have gone through college in other lines. If any of these men, due to requests from the Air Service, or by personal preference, with the permission of the Army or Navy services, elect to remain in the National Air Service, they must do so with a clear knowledge of what their possibilities for advancement will be. After all, every man has ambition and must be given recompense, either in rank or in a financial way—a mark, at least, during time of peace to set for his life.

Senator FRELINGHUYSEN. May I ask you one question there?

Mr. COFFIN. Certainly.

Senator FRELINGHUYSEN. If they are going to train men for special service in the air through one department, will it not be necessary for them to give them a very comprehensive education in order that they might be used for both the Army and the Navy, a technical knowledge of both branches being so diverse and so varied?

Mr. COFFIN. The probabilities are, and I think almost the certainties are, Senator, that except in exceptional cases, there will be little effort to train a man as a general jack of all trades, as you might term it. The air service will specialize, in so far as possible, in the training of navy men for the Navy and army men for the Army; and any man entering the air college will probably have made up his own mind, as presumably he has made it up when he has entered a civil college, as to what his ambition in life is, whether he wants to remain permanently in the air service, or whether he wants to return to the Navy, the Army, or to civil life.

Senator SUTHERLAND. Are they going to have an aerial West Point over there?

Mr. COFFIN. Yes; that is exactly the basis upon which they are proceeding; Mr. Churchill stated that it was only toward the end of the war that an appreciation of the value of the use of aircraft en masse and for purposes other than observation, etc., came to be really recognized. Therefore, it is his feeling that an entire "strategy of the air," if you like the term, will have to be developed and taught to the men who enter the air college, just as naval strategy is taught in the naval college, and army strategy is taught in the military academy.

In short, we are dealing with a great new art, having naval, military, and commercial aspects, the possibilities of which have only been scratched.

Senator NEW. Right there, from the diagram which you have drawn and from the statement you made a little while ago, I gather that Mr. Churchill thinks that the three departments—army, navy, and air—are coequal in importance?

Mr. COFFIN. Exactly.

Senator NEW. Certainly that the air is no less important than either of the other two, and that the possibilities of its development are practically unlimited.

Mr. COFFIN. Mr. Churchill made one statement which, from a Britisher, I think we will agree is extreme; and that is that he could easily conceive that within five years the naval appropriation would be greatly decreased and the air appropriation be very greatly increased, and that it was not at all beyond the possibilities of development that air power would sooner or later dominate naval power. And that, really, is the keynote of Great Britain's activity in the air.

Senator NEW. And it has something to do, I think, with the opposition on the part of the navy.

Senator THOMAS. That shows that Mr. Churchill is a great man, because you and I had those impressions last year.

Senator NEW. Yes; he agreed with Senator Thomas and myself.

Mr. COFFIN. Let me read you one sentence from a communication over the signature of M. Clemenceau, which will show you where the French stand. Just a word in explanation of this letter of M. Clemenceau. In January I was in Paris and was quite generally

familiar with the aircraft plans under formation by the various allied powers. It was the desire of the Allies that we join with them in a very energetic campaign in relation to international air control and certain basic engineering standards work.

An international meeting was scheduled to be held some time during the end of January or about the 1st of February. Appointments were to be made by the various powers. The meeting was postponed once or twice. A meeting was finally called for, I think, the 6th of March. That was to be an international meeting, looking toward the formulation of the basic rules or international laws of the air and all of this mass of underlying detail which goes with any great navigation control, such as we have in the merchant marine, and all that sort of thing.

Knowing that we were lagging behind in this, and were losing out, if you like the term, I wrote to the President a fairly comprehensive letter (dated February 14), setting forth, as I saw them, the European developments in relation to the air service, also what was proposed and something about the amount of work that it would be necessary for the United States to do to keep abreast with the foreign powers.

This resulted in the appointment at the last moment of a committee consisting of Admiral Knapp and Gen. Patrick to represent this country at the meeting of March 6. This appointment was made about March 4, only a couple of days before the meeting. Great Britain and the other powers, of course, in the meanwhile had been formulating their policies; in fact, at that time Great Britain had already printed in document form the drafts of the international convention practically as adopted, with certain reservations and suggestions on the part of our own delegates and those from the other powers. Our representatives, of course, went into this meeting unprepared. Admiral Knapp stated to me that he had never had anything at all to do with aviation before. We had no delegates at all representing the aircraft industries of America, and I think all of you realize—and certainly it is realized in Europe—that during peace time at least, 80 or 90 per cent of aviation activities will sooner or later be commercial and civil and not military or naval, although an eye should always be kept upon the possibilities of quick conversion from civil to naval and military uses.

Senator NEW. That is a fact which I do not think is appreciated in this country; I do not think it is appreciated by the Army and Navy particularly.

Mr. COFFIN. Well, of course, that is well known.

Secondly, we should have had, as had Great Britain, the best men of our industry represented in the drafting of this international document, which probably will form the basis of international law governing our aircraft activities for centuries to come.

Senator FRELINGHUYSEN. Is that prepared yet?

Mr. COFFIN. Yes.

Senator FRELINGHUYSEN. Is a copy of it available?

Mr. COFFIN. It is.

Senator FRELINGHUYSEN. Can you produce it for the record?

Mr. COFFIN. Yes; I can turn it over to you.

Senator FRELINGHUYSEN. I suggest that it be done.

The CHAIRMAN. Is not that the same document that has been presented to this committee, along with the introduction of the bill authorizing our Government to be represented in this international commission?

Mr. COFFIN. Possibly so. I do not know.

Senator FRELINGHUYSEN. I do not think it is the same.

The CHAIRMAN. No, probably it is not. I should think we would be glad to have that.

Mr. HOUSTON. May I be permitted to interrupt?

Mr. COFFIN. Yes.

Mr. HOUSTON. To say that this convention should be presented in due time by the State Department for ratification, and I do not believe it will be proper for our mission to present it to a Senate committee.

Mr. COFFIN. I should think it would be proper and necessary if this committee is to realize our international obligations and the urgent need for a single authoritative head for American aeronautics.

The CHAIRMAN. Is it a public document?

Mr. COFFIN. It is—much of it has already been published.

Senator FRELINGHUYSEN. Is it a part of the peace treaty? Is it now in the text of the peace treaty?

Mr. COFFIN. I do not know how it is attached to it, but it is a part of the general proposal.

Senator FRELINGHUYSEN. As I understand it, it is a part of one of the regulations formed under the treaty of peace.

Mr. COFFIN. Yes.

Senator FRELINGHUYSEN. And is being prepared by some mission?

Mr. COFFIN. It was prepared under direction of the peace conference, and the State Department is now urging the recommendation of this mission. The State Department may, in turn, as I understand it, accept the document. That is the situation that exists to-day.

Senator FRELINGHUYSEN. In other words, does it commit the United States to certain regulations formulated by that mission?

Mr. COFFIN. As I understand it—absolutely.

(Informal discussion followed, which was not reported.)

Mr. HOUSTON. I think I should simply say that there is a national convention governing the use and operation of aircraft in process of formulation, which will ultimately go through in some form or other, as the Senate sees fit.

Mr. COFFIN. Touching for a moment on this general situation, in the international negotiations relating to aircraft development, the United States has consistently been a stumbling block. We have repeatedly asked for the postponement of international meetings because we did not have representatives appointed or properly accredited. We have refused to attend international technical meetings, one very important one, even during the progress of the war.

Senator THOMAS. Well, that obstacle was largely created by Congress.

Mr. COFFIN. The first one was not.

Senator NEW. I know we asked for one postponement of this international convention; that was from March until June, I think. Now, did we ask for another?

Mr. COFFIN. We asked for postponements of various technical sessions. We did not send properly accredited delegates even while the war was still in progress. As a matter of fact, we sent no delegate, and have not even yet, to attend any international technical meetings, except the first one, in January, 1918. Then we did send delegates. I sent them myself. In the fall of that same year we refused to send delegates, or at least did not send any properly accredited.

Senator NEW. I recall that in the closing days of the last session—no, it was not; it was along in June, I think, of this year, that this committee was approached with a request that we prepare and pass a resolution authorizing the United States, and I think possibly naming the representatives from the United States, anyhow, authorizing the United States to be represented at that meeting, and we did not have time to get that through Congress because of the lateness with which it was brought forward.

Mr. COFFIN. Just for the record, our attendance at these meetings has in no instance involved any serious financial obligation on the part of the United States. The technical organizations of the country have been perfectly willing, and are perfectly willing now, as in the case of the mission sent over in January, 1918, to defray the expenses of their delegates. But they can not well, with proper dignity, send these delegates without governmental recognition, because they will be forced to sit in conference with the duly accredited representatives of other nations. They, of course, have no credentials and no voice in the proceedings unless they go with the backing of the American Government.

Senator NEW. Yes; and it was a great oversight that this country was not represented. It should have been, and I have tried to bring out that this country has been remiss on that point.

Senator SUTHERLAND. Whose fault was it?

Senator NEW. I don't know. I would like to know.

Mr. COFFIN. Well, I think I can answer that in a nutshell. It has been because you gentlemen have had no definite or authoritative aircraft head in whom you had confidence to tell you exactly what should and what should not be done. You have had too many wild-cat proposals of various kinds.

Senator FRELINGHUYSEN. Yes; there has been no progressive leadership.

Mr. COFFIN. That is it, yes.

Senator FRELINGHUYSEN. Let me ask you this. Are the General Staff in favor of a progressive aircraft policy and these conventions, or have they opposed it?

Mr. COFFIN. They are not only not in favor of a progressive policy, but they have no appreciation of the value of it, or of the industrial and commercial development. I will go further and say that since the beginning of my connection with the Air Service, as a member of the Advisory Commission, of the Council of National Defense, there never has been a man on the General Staff of the United States Army who knew anything about the Air Service or cared whether he did. I will qualify this statement only in that recently returned overseas aviation officers may have been added to the General Staff.

Senator NEW. In other words, the position of the General Staff is diametrically opposed to that of Mr. Churchill with reference to the importance of the Air Service?

Mr. COFFIN. We are not at the present time even in the "also-ran" class with Great Britain.

Senator SUTHERLAND. I suppose England's position has been brought about somewhat by the fact that it has had numerous experiences with airplanes and dirigibles bombing cities, and that that has taught her a lesson.

Mr. COFFIN. I was leading up to this statement by M. Clemenceau. In urging action upon our part in connection with these international activities, the international convention, etc., high authorities of the British service said to me: "We know, of course, what is going to happen. We have invited you repeatedly to cooperate with us in the most hearty and thorough manner; and, for one reason or another, one excuse or another, you do not do it. You have not appointed delegates to this international meeting which is to determine upon the fundamental laws governing aviation throughout the world. We are going ahead; we will draft this document, and about a year later you gentlemen will wake up to the fact that some very important work has been done in which you have had no part, and we will hear a great commotion from your side of the water about the unfair advantage which Great Britain and the other Allies have taken of America in the preparation of this document, and you will want to revise it."

So it was in the midst of this situation that M. Clemenceau wrote to the President, urging action by the United States, and the President replied, if I remember the words, that he appreciated in a general way the importance of paying some national attention to the Air Service, but that he considered it not at all pertinent to the discussions then in progress in Paris, namely, the peace treaty, the league of nations, etc. M. Clemenceau replied with this letter. I will not read it all, because it is already in the record as a part of the mission's printed report, but it is to the effect that he has the honor to acknowledge receipt of the President's answer of February 7, etc., and he goes on to say:

I am pleased to note that you agree in principle to my proposition to create an aviation committee for after the war. I take the liberty of insisting on the necessity of creating this committee without delay, in order to be able to utilize it as an advisory organ for the peace conference. Indeed, the clauses for aerial protection seem to have at least an importance equal to the clauses for military and naval protection; and it is of the greatest interest to have a study made by competent personalities of the measures to take against the eventual constitution of a German military fleet.

Senator THOMAS. Is he not referring to a supplemental treaty instead of the general treaty with Germany? I think that explains that puzzle that we were considering a few minutes ago.

Senator NEW. That may be.

Mr. COFFIN. I had no such thought at least.

Senator THOMAS. I can not recall anything in the treaty itself in the nature of a clause such as Mr. Clemenceau refers to in this letter.

Senator FRELINGHUYSEN. Would not that have some relation to restrictions placed on Germany and the type of airplanes that they might be permitted to use?

Senator THOMAS. It might.

Mr. COFFIN. That expresses M. Clemenceau's idea of the importance of the air service as related to future affairs.

Under the date of June 6 M. Clemenceau, in transmitting the ministerial decree creating a separate air service in France uses this language. This is addressed to the President of the French Republic.

Aircraft has developed considerably during the war. It should at this time adapt itself to a no less important part in peace times, but because of the many initiatives which cooperate in its new use and development, the efforts and needs are dispersed in various ministerial departments.

The future of aviation in France will only be assured by the coordination of all efforts and the unification of the general services. Also, it will give the advantage of better work from the personnel and credits which are actually effected to similar objects in different ministries.

In short, they are seeking for one appropriation dealing with aeronautics, rather than making appropriations for all sorts of governmental activities dealing with the subject.

He goes on to say :

With this object in view, and according to the propositions of an inter-ministerial conference which I am able to assemble, I have the honor to submit for your signature the following decrees creating an organ of general coordination of aviation.

This should not be confused with any of the particular aviations of the various ministerial departments. At its origin it will be attached transitorially to the minister of war.

In short, they are creating in France, transitorially under the minister of war, a separate department for aeronautics. The reason for taking this intermediate step was that the political situation was such that they did not want to ask for legislative action creating an entirely independent ministry. When, by ministerial decree, they could create a separate department heading up into one of the existing ministries.

Much the same situation exists in Rome. There they are establishing by ministerial decree, under the minister of transportation, a department of aeronautics, and it is their proposal to put under this organization all engineering and production, all commercial aviation, inspection, and license of machines, the licensing of pilots, the encouragement of the transportation are by the supervision of air-dromes, by the conduct of meteorological observations, by educational means, and through other governmental agencies, all of the colonial activities—linking up the colonies with the parent country, etc.; in fact, everything of a civilian nature, plus the manufacture of machines for all purposes including Army and Navy, preliminary training of personnel for all services, it being the intention to leave the finished training and the operational activities of the War and Navy Departments to those departments. An independent ministry is proposed as the ultimate step.

Approximately that same thing is going along in France and, as I said in the beginning, I believe that England, having swung to the extreme of putting every thing first under one service and realizing some of her mistakes and complications, will now more nearly approximate the policy that is being worked out in France and Italy. In short, the ultimate organization will be a separate department, headed in those countries by a ministry, and in this country perhaps by a man responsible directly to the President or by a Cabinet officer, if the President sees fit to create one. And that department will supervise all of the thousand and one rami-

fications of air-service development; in fact, covering all air activities in the country, other than the actual operational activities of the governmental departments and the specialized training, or advanced training, if you like, necessary for the peculiar operations of those departments.

For instance, it is conceivable that the Post Office Department will have a certain special training to give its flyers, even after they may be graduated from the National Air Service and assigned to Postal Service. And similarly with the War and Navy Departments.

Also, there should remain with the War and Navy Departments a nucleus of technical organization, so that the military and naval experience actually developed in the operational end may be intelligently transmitted to the central department for incorporation in the equipment which is to be produced or which is already in service.

Just take a dyed-in-the-wool military man like Gen. Duval, whom Mr. Houston mentioned. As Mr. Houston said, he stated that, of course, all aviation with the French at the moment is military. That is so in France particularly because they have not very much naval aviation. He stated that the entire personnel of the new department of aeronautics will necessarily be military, because they are military men; but that it is proposed to get these men out of uniform as quickly as possible, because they see clearly that the ultimate development of aviation is going to be only in a small degree the function of the War and Navy Departments. The activities of these departments will soon sink into insignificance as special uses to which commercial aircraft will be put are developed. The great thing is that a new system of transportation is being developed which is only indirectly involved in military and naval affairs. It was very easily within Gen. Duval's conception that he and the military group with him will relinquish control, leaving the entire activity to soon be headed by an 80 per cent civilian personnel.

Senator SUTHERLAND. But in time of war it would take on a different aspect?

Mr. COFFIN. Yes. Of course, the thing they are all planning is that the Governments—not through subsidy, or through the appropriation of money to private industry, or anything of that sort—that the Governments shall make appropriations for the general purposes of the development of the art, such as research, meteorological information, the mapping and making of routes, the maintenance of public aerodromes, etc.; in short, carry a general overhead, if you like, which can never be borne by the private individual or corporation. They will thus indirectly encourage and lend support to industry.

To point to some of the things which ought to be going ahead, but which are not, I would like to read a few items here from the report of the mission. This is all in the record. [Reading from report of mission, p. 10:]

That among the many considerations of early moment requiring governmental direction may be mentioned the following:

(a) Federal and international laws governing the use of air routes.

(b) Federal and international control of pilots' licenses; examination and tests required.

There is no more reason, in fact much less reason, why a man should be permitted any place in this country to take 10 people up in an airplane which has not been inspected and certified by dependable authorities than there is that you should ride in an elevator out here in the Senate corridor that has not been properly inspected. Certainly, no man should be allowed to leave the ground carrying passengers—if he does not care for his own life, he has some obligation to the passengers—no man should be allowed to carry up passengers without a governmental license showing he is competent to operate an airplane. I believe I am correct in the statement that not a machine is going into the air in Great Britain to-day that does not carry the British Government's certificate as to air worthiness, and the pilot carry his license. This is one point Gen. Seely made in his office in London when we were there. He is undersecretary for air. A liberty loan drive was on in London on that particular day and a great many airplanes were flying over the city, and they were performing in what Gen. Seely considered to be an unsafe manner. They were flying too low and doing some stunts which he felt were uncalled for, and he turned to us and he said, "One of the advantages of our plan of organization is that I can issue an order in the next five minutes which will affect every one of those machines. They are all under my control."

Senator SUTHERLAND. Was that by wireless?

Mr. COFFIN. I don't know. I suppose that he meant that he would issue the order immediately and on their arrival at the airdromes they would be given it for future guidance. And he said, "Of course, you have no such centralized authority"—in fact, he drew the comparison. He said, "If you were sitting with the Secretary of War in Washington," (the Assistant Secretary of War was one of the party calling upon him) "I would suspect that the Secretary of War would accuse the Navy or some other department of permitting unsafe flying." [Reading further from the report referred to:]

(c) Federal inspection of all commercial aircraft for airworthiness or suitability for service.

(d) Customs and other regulations for crossing State and National boundaries.

(e) International standards for methods of communication and signaling.

(f) International standards covering the marking or charting of air routes, and of landing places for both day and night use.

(g) International specifications and rules governing the construction, equipment, and operation of standard airdromes, landing stations, signal towers, and other aids to aerial navigation.

It is not so much so with us, but it is peculiarly so in Europe that almost every time a man goes into the air he crosses an international boundary, and so, of course, there must be international understandings and standards of all kinds or there will be trouble. [Reading further from report:]

(h) Port regulations and fees covering seaplanes.

(i) Federal taxation of aircraft and license for its use.

(j) Safety measures and devices; legislation forcing adoption.

(k) Fire underwriting standards, regulations, and safeguards; insurance of machines, of material, and of persons in transit (property and life).

(l) The legal status of privately owned aircraft; the property rights of the air; liability for damage inflicted and incurred.

(m) International standards and specifications covering accepted practice in quality of materials, in factors of safety, and in methods of construction; an engineering literature of this new art must be created by international approval.

(n) Maps and navigation charts of the United States and its territories.

There are two points that I desire to bring out, and bring them out very forcibly. One is that because of lack of Federal jurisdiction and control in the air development of this country to-day, any man who has a machine he thinks will fly is privileged to take passengers up or do anything he likes, and as the result there have been a great many fatal accidents. I think it would be found that very few fatalities have occurred through straightaway flying. The art singularly free from accidents of that kind. It is stunt work and flights by improperly designed or uninspected machines or by careless pilots which in the majority of cases brings them to grief. As the result of lack of Federal supervision in these matters local legislation is springing up all over the country. I found in California they were proposing drastic ordinances covering the flight of machines. Chicago has passed ordinances, I understand, within a brief period, and all over the country is springing up local legislation governing aircraft, State and municipal, without guidance or uniformity.

The question of taxation is one which ought to have consideration. In the early days of the motor-car industry we had the opportunity to obtain Federal license and Federal taxation. That opportunity was lost.

Senator THOMAS. You got Federal taxation afterwards all right.

Mr. COFFIN. Yes, but we got all kinds of local license and taxation also. In short there was no policy dictated in the National Government, and hence almost impossible local conditions of all kinds sprang up. We have here again the opportunity for national action, for Federal regulation, license, and taxation. This certainly should exist in this industry, because it is so intimately linked up with our national defense. The Government, in my estimation, should exercise full control in this art, because of its very great interest in its development for the purposes of national defense. It is peculiarly an art in which the National Government has a great stake, and if permitted to be legislated upon by 48 States, and 4,800, if you like, municipalities, it will certainly place a great handicap in the way of an ultimate development, in which the Government is vitally interested.

You see each State is going to soon learn that there is a new source of revenue, and there will be legislation introduced for the local licensing of pilots and of aircraft. Inasmuch as a machine may fly across a dozen States in a day and alight in any two or three of them, you will see that there will be a great deal of difficulty if it is necessary to have a license for each State.

Senator NEW. Is it not true that the British Government and the French Government are both of them giving direct encouragement to the development of their commercial aviation?

Mr. COFFIN. Here is the underlying theory in all European countries—and undoubtedly this applies to Germany, because there is no doubt but Germany is going ahead on air development as fast as she can.

They realize, certainly, that at the present stage of aircraft development and in the present financial condition of the Governments, it would not be possible to continue extraordinarily large appropriations for air service. Therefore, the maximum good to be accomplished is going to be through the active encouragement of the commercial and transportation sides of the art, in order that this development may be available in time of need for the national defense.

Senator NEW. Exactly, and I have dealt upon that point here with nearly every witness who has been before this committee. While that is the policy over there, is it not true now that nothing what ever is being done in this country to promote the commercial enterprise here?

Mr. COFFIN. Absolutely nothing is being done. Of course, I am not interested in the industry, but I am a fairly close observer, and I know generally what is going on.

Senator NEW. Well, you were a member of that mission and you have been interested in it, and you are familiar with the facts, and I wanted your idea.

Mr. COFFIN. Furthermore, Senator, after an experience here extending over the war period, and an observation of the activities of the various agencies interested, I believe it is utterly impossible for any definite policy to be laid down and carried by the United States Government, through the encouragement of the industry or otherwise, until you have a single authoritative channel or point of contact of sufficient consequence in the councils of the Government to warrant the confidence and the support of Congress.

And another point is that the adoption of the international convention which has been drawn will necessarily force the United States Government to establish some authoritative channel for handling international affairs. We are going to be called upon to co-operate with the other governments, and to-day I do not believe there is a man in this room who would know where to go in the Government of the United States to get "Yes" or "No" on any important aeronautical question, either national or international. I think that you can easily verify this statement.

Objections to the establishment of an agency such as outlined in the Crowell report are urged, I think, usually without reading the report at all, and certainly without a clear understanding of the proposition.

Senator NEW. Mr. Coffin, where do these objections come from?

Mr. COFFIN. I can illustrate the attitude of the Navy, if you like. I have worked with the Navy for years; I think they are the most wonderful body of men we have in the national service. I was in San Diego when Secretary Daniels reviewed the fleet recently, and one of the admirals with him, apparently without remembering at the moment that I had had anything to do with the aviation mission, remarked of the Assistant Secretary of War that he had had the highest regard for his ability until he went to Europe and came back and recommended a separate department of aeronautics; he had not read the report, but, on general principles, was against the proposition.

That is the usual state of affairs. All of the departments—in fact, if you will look back over the period of the war, back to the spring of

1917, you will appreciate that the reason for the creation of "advisory" commissions and aircraft boards with only advisory powers was that no existing governmental department would consider relinquishing any of its authorities or powers. No department desires to give up any power it has to-day.

And, of course, the peculiarity of the proposition I have outlined to you this afternoon is that all of the powers which ought to remain with the War or Navy or Post Office are certainly left with these departments.

Of course, I saw all sides in this air development after the United States went into the war. I served always in an advisory capacity. There were many times when I wanted to get out and kick the lid off and fight and tell the facts. There are just two ways of working in Washington—one is to work quietly with the department to aid them to achieve results, and the other, perhaps, is to get out and criticize everybody in sight and say that everything is rotten, etc. As a member of the Advisory Commission of the Council of National Defense and the Naval Consulting Board, I have been, of course, in a position where I felt that the other services I was rendering were very much more worth while than any satisfaction I might have in pointing out any possible shortcoming to the public. It might have been a great satisfaction and better for me personally, but I think everything worked out for the best all around.

The accomplishments of the War Department in aviation were easily among its best in the war—cranks and manufactured public opinion to the contrary notwithstanding. In your investigation of the mechanical achievements of our war activities, including tanks, artillery, etc., you must have found aircraft close to first place. It is too bad that the Air Service should have been made the football of dissatisfaction, with such small regard to comparative facts. We are going to reap the result now in shattered morale and in difficulty in upbuilding the peace-time service.

You will necessarily encounter opposition from the men called before you. Let me interrupt by saying that there probably never has been a development of any kind where the curbstone opinion of the individual has been given the weight that it has in the United States air program. Any man could go out and make a statement with regard to the Air Service, because the chances were that no one within earshot knew anything about it or enough about it to deny the statement. I think you gentlemen have had experience enough in listening to hair-brained testimony of that kind, and you are going to have men from all quarters who will oppose any such move as this.

Senator THOMAS. We have had them.

Senator NEW. I think every naval officer, and certainly all the General Staff officers of the Army, have opposed it.

Senator THOMAS. And the Secretary of War.

Senator NEW. The Secretary of War and all of them. They put it on the ground that the air service has not yet developed, and they think never will develop to the point where it is anything more than just an adjunct, an accessory. That is the size of it exactly. That seems to be the burden of most songs.

Mr. COFFIN. Well, the answer to that is this: That on the first——

Senator NEW. I was asking to bring out particularly what you gave as the opinion of Mr. Churchill and what the English view of it is.

Mr. COFFIN. On approximately the 1st of June, when we sailed, we were arguing among ourselves and betting that before January 1 the ocean would be crossed. Before we got back, as I remember it, it had been crossed four times. A very little while ago we had no conception that an airplane was anything more than a light, bird-like structure, incapable of lifting any great amount of weight. We do not need to go back very far to arrive at that period. To-day the planes used by our own Navy in transocean flights and other planes built abroad, weighing 30,000 pounds, or approximately that, fly with a great deal more stability and certainty than any of the light planes with which we were familiar a few years ago.

Senator NEW. A few days ago a plane went up with 17 passengers, including the Secretary of War. It carried 14 passengers from New York here and could have brought 10 more. It carried approximately that many people from Milwaukee to New York, starting first at Cleveland, and then from Cleveland to Syracuse, I believe, and it is now, I guess, leaving here for Dayton.

Senator SUTHERLAND. You mean that is the weight of the load?

Mr. COFFIN. No; I mean the total of machine and load. I merely refer to the fact that great loads may be lifted.

If anyone comes before you gentlemen and prophesies as to the future of aerial navigation, remember that your prophesy is just as good as his. None of them know other than what has been clearly demonstrated before our eyes and the probable tendency of future events. Certainly the development has far outstripped anything the wildest dreamers had in their minds even two or three years ago.

Senator NEW. Mr. Glenn Martin was here two or three weeks ago, and testified that it was his belief that within the next year, I think it was, a machine would rise from New York to an altitude of 30,000 feet, taking with it passengers who had had their breakfasts in New York, and set them down in San Francisco in time for supper that same evening.

Mr. COFFIN. Of course, that sounds like Jules Verne stuff even to-day.

Senator NEW. It does, of course. But since that time a machine has twice attained an altitude of over 34,000 feet.

Senator THOMAS. I should think it would be uncomfortable at that altitude.

Senator NEW. What he predicts is an inclosed engine and an inclosed car.

Mr. COFFIN. Of course, that condition is utterly unnecessary. I mean an altitude of 3,000 feet would be sufficient.

Senator NEW. He said it is necessary in order to permit the speed that he predicts; that the resistance at 30,000 feet is so much less than the resistance of the air at 3,000 feet that the machine that can travel at the rate of 120 miles an hour at 3,000 feet, can travel at two or three times that speed at 30,000 feet.

Mr. COFFIN. I can only say this—and you will have other members of the mission before you who are better able to speak than I am, because they personally visited and examined these things—

that is true that the British to-day consider the R-34, which crossed the Atlantic, as entirely out of date; in fact, they considered her out of date before she started. That machine, which crossed the Atlantic, does not represent in any sense the ultimate aerial development in that line as they see it. That trans-Atlantic trip was an experiment to get some information which would be of value to them. It is the feeling in British quarters that the first trans-Atlantic service must be largely a governmental activity in its initiative. In short, if the United States Government will join with the British Government in financing the first transoceanic service, enough data will be obtained from that service to enable private corporations to present bids for carrying mails and passengers over long distance. We have no data on which to base the formation of corporations for aerial transportation purposes. And another interesting thing which is being developed for aviation purposes is this: Take a machine like the R-34, capable, say, of carrying several tons; a system is being developed of reducing transoceanic correspondence by a photographic process, running the uniform sheets through a reduction machine which reproduces the correspondence upon a tape or ribbon. At the other end of the line the letter is enlarged to its original size. This will permit the carrying of a large percentage of the first-class trans-Atlantic mail in a comparatively small tonnage space. It is a reducing process on one side and an amplifying process on the other, for reducing tonnage. This merely indicates possibilities.

Senator SUTHERLAND. The development of the dirigible type is apt to be as marked as the development of the heavier than air machine.

Mr. COFFIN. There are two schools. I do not know. One can only guess what the development will be. The field is so big that, in getting this sudden summons to come before you this afternoon, I felt it impossible to more than touch on a little corner of the subject. If there is any other question I should like to have it.

Mr. HOUSTON. Before we leave, Mr. Chairman, I would like to add one short statement in regard to commercial airplanes.

The CHAIRMAN. We would be glad to have you.

ADDITIONAL STATEMENT OF MR. GEORGE H. HOUSTON.

Mr. HOUSTON. I was asked by Sir Percy Gerouard to sit down with him and discuss the matter of commercial transportation while we were in England. He is managing director of Armstrong-Whitworth Co., one of the largest industrial enterprises of Great Britain. He went into the building of dirigibles early in the war and has built a great dirigible plant in central England. He is a man of mature judgment and business experience, ranks among the foremost of Great Britain's industrial commercial leaders. He stated to me that the British Government was ready at this time to organize with America a transatlantic airship line which would establish between London and New York a three-day mail service, provided the United States saw fit to construct in the vicinity of New York proper airdromes and provide one-half of the ships. He stated that in his opinion the time was ripe for such a venture, but

until the probability of profit was established that private enterprise would not go into it, or at least very slowly. He stated that, in his opinion, it would not require more than three or four years' operation of such a venture to prove the possibility of profit, and by bringing about such an effort the time for the transportation of mail from London to New York could be cut in half.

He stated further that a 3,000,000 cubic foot displacement machine, which is 50 per cent larger than the R-33, would be capable of carrying 5 tons of mail in addition to the crew and fuel for a transatlantic passage, and he has backed the development of the reducing process spoken of by Mr. Coffin, by which such items of mail as are not confidential could be reduced to one-twentieth of their weight and be automatically restored to their original dimensions upon receipt at the other end of the journey.

Other men in Great Britain expressed similar opinions, that the time was ripe for the organization of a British-American airship line to dominate the Atlantic Ocean, and that unless Great Britain and America awoke to these possibilities and took advantage of this opportunity, that in all probability Germany would acquire supremacy of the air crossing the Atlantic, and that it would be a long, up-hill fight to equal or surpass her in the future.

The statement has been made from time to time that commercial aeronautics were of very little value to military uses because the commercial equipment was so unlike the military equipment as to make it unusable. I wish to go on record at the present time in answer to that statement as follows: Air flight involves the following activities. First, an organization for design and development of equipment. Second, organization and equipment for production. Third, an organization and equipment for ground service and maintenance. Fourth, an organization and equipment for flying fields, signaling, and communications. Fifth, the personnel and flying equipment proper.

It will be seen at once that an organization trained to design commercial crafts can be quickly changed to military crafts when needed; that organization and facilities trained for production of commercial craft form a great reserve for the construction of military craft; that organization and equipment trained for maintaining aircraft in the field for commercial purposes could be very easily applied to the maintenance and service of military craft in active service; that organization and equipment to supply flying-field signaling service and communicating service throughout the United States would be admirably equipped for the training of military fliers in the event of need; and that the personnel trained for commercial flying could be much more easily developed into military fliers than men entirely inexperienced in air flying.

So that the only item of commercial personnel or equipment that would not be applicable to military usage in the event of need would be a portion of the commercial flying equipment proper.

There is no doubt, however, that a considerable portion of such flying equipment would be well fitted for training purposes, transportation of personnel, and communications, and for certain classes of bombing.

This analysis of the situation, in my opinion, should receive careful attention on the part of persons considering the availability of commercial aeronautics as a reserve for military needs.

The CHAIRMAN. We are very much obliged to you.

Mr. COFFIN. In short, Senator, the subject is so much bigger than the average military or naval man has any grasp of, that it is not to be wondered at that they get very specialized views of the situation.

There is one thing I would like to add there. I made a statement with regard to the personnel of the General Staff having had no one on it familiar with aeronautics. That perhaps is not true at the moment, because I imagine that returned officers of the Air Service have been added to the General Staff. But it was certainly true during 1917 and 1918.

(Thereupon, at 5.45 p. m., the committee adjourned, subject to the call of the chairman.)

REORGANIZATION OF THE ARMY.

FRIDAY, SEPTEMBER 26, 1919.

UNITED STATES SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON MILITARY AFFAIRS,
Washington, D. C.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to adjournment, at 2 o'clock p. m. in the committee room, Capitol, Senator James W. Wadsworth, jr., presiding.

Present: Senators Wadsworth (chairman), New, Sutherland, Frelinghuysen, Chamberlain, and Thomas.

STATEMENT OF MR. JOHN D. RYAN, OF BUTTE, MONT.

The CHAIRMAN. Will you give the positions you held during the war?

Mr. RYAN. I was named chairman of the Aircraft Board by the President about the 1st of May—I do not know the date—1918. I was confirmed some time after that. I was appointed Director of Aircraft Production upon the creation of the Bureau of Aircraft Production by presidential order of May 20. I was appointed Second Assistant Secretary of War and Director of Air Service in August. I resigned as Assistant Secretary of War and Director of Air Service on the 21st of November, all in 1918.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Ryan, we have this bill here, introduced by Senator New, which looks to the establishment of a separate department of aeronautics, and the committee thought, in view of your experience as head of the Air Service, and particularly in connection with the production side of the problem, that your comments would be of value either in discussing that bill, or if not in discussing what the policy of the country should be—anything related to it that occurs to you as important.

Mr. RYAN. Of course I am perfectly willing to answer any questions as they asked, but if it suits the purpose of the committee just as well I think I would rather give my ideas than to take the bill and agree with it or disagree with it, as the case might be.

Senator New. Frankly, Mr. Ryan, that was just what I had in mind for you to do. We should like to have you give to this committee the benefit of the ideas that you have as the result of your experience as the Director of Aircraft Production concerning the whole subject.

Mr. RYAN. I shall be very glad to give you my ideas, but I should like to preface anything I have to say on the subject with the statement that during the time, and the only time that I have given any

study to this matter at all, the country was at war and I was appointed to take an emergency job and my whole effort, my whole mind, and all my energies were devoted to the immediate and pressing needs of aircraft production. I might on that account not have as clear a picture of a general plan of production as I would have had if I had more time to work it out and think it out. It was emergency production and emergency plans that had to be pursued, and I feel that perhaps that the plans that were pursued and that I was in entire accord with in the emergency might not be such plans as I would carry out if I had the time to frame an organization and to get it working without any pressure such as we were under during the war.

I believe, and I always did believe while I was engaged in aircraft production, that production ought to be centered; that no more than one organization should produce aircraft. By that I do not mean to infer that the Army, the Navy, Post Office, or any other branch of the Government that might have need of aircraft should not have as much to say as they wanted about the kind and the quantity of aircraft that they needed for their purposes, but the production should actually be made under one bureau or one department, as it might be for all of them, and for the reason that I do not believe that it is possible to make the progress in the aircraft design that ought to be made if it is being carried on in more than one center, by more than one organization, by organizations that are not cooperating and coordinating and practically working together. That is, it would be a waste of brains, it would be a waste of money, and a waste of all kinds, to have independent research, independent experiment, independent engineering, and design going on.

The basic and fundamental things in aircraft are much the same whether they are for one type of plane or one plane for one purpose or for another. There is not any doubt that types will differ and planes for different uses will differ, but down at the bottom there is very much in all of them that there is in any one of them, and I think it would be a great waste to carry that work independently in more than one place. I believe that some field, centrally located, near the great manufacturing centers of the country, accessible to the great engineers of the country, should be developed and equipped to carry on that research, experimental work, and general development of aircraft, with equipment, personnel and limited manufacturing facilities, such as are required for experimental work; that a considerable number, not a large number, but a considerable number of planes of type that research work, investigation, the general opinion of those in authority found were desirable types to develop should be put into production in factories and plants not controlled by the Government, in order that they should be encouraged, that people should be encouraged in the development of the industry and have what help the Government can give them in developing manufacturing facilities.

I believe that it is more important to develop the manufacturing facilities than perhaps would appear at the surface, because the great interest that was aroused in aircraft during the war is bound to subside to a considerable extent after the realization comes that

it takes so much money to carry on either manufacture or use of aircraft. The use of aircraft is too expensive to come into common use quickly. The development work will have to be done, I think, at considerable cost, for a number of years, and with no possibility of private capital being profitably employed for some years to come, and during that time I believe that the manufacturing facilities, to a reasonable extent, ought to be employed by the Government and used by the Government.

I think the future use of aircraft will probably, after some years of development, getting it to a point where it can be availed of by people of moderate means, might develop into a considerable industry, but for the present I would say that the great interest developed by the war is about to die out unless it is fostered by the Government, and as it can not be subsidized, and it can only be sustained by Government expenditure in carrying out a reasonable program of production.

Senator NEW. A little intelligent administration and help toward the establishment of a new industry is what you have in mind?

Mr. RYAN. Exactly.

Senator NEW. With reference to that, Mr. Ryan, you have said that there is existing a feeling, a realization, I suppose you mean, that the expense attendant upon the establishment of an industry of that kind here is so great that private capital is not apt to be found ready to take that chance; there are so many other things open to it that offer it less risk that it will seek other channels and will not seek this. Now, as a matter of fact, just looking at it from the standpoint of a business man, who has had experience with it, you give it as your opinion, do you not, that if we are to have an industry in this country that will be of sufficient magnitude to meet the emergency demands of the Army and Navy, in case this country again finds itself at war, that the industry must have Government aid in order to be brought to that point of efficiency?

Mr. RYAN. Without a question.

Senator NEW. That unless something of that kind is done the Government will find itself in case of another emergency just about where it found itself when this last one confronted it.

Mr. RYAN. Not quite, perhaps.

Senator NEW. Perhaps not so bad as that, but substantially so, because the other fellow is going to be advancing too.

Mr. RYAN. I think it will find itself, at best, just where we left off at the end of this war. I do not believe that private capital will carry on the development beyond the point that it has reached now. It will likely maintain the development at the point it has reached. I mean there were things under way, a great many things under way, in the development of aircraft that will never be finished and will be lost entirely if it is dependent upon development by private capital. I do not believe that private capital can obtain any reward for a few years from the development of the aircraft business, and if it is to be developed it has got to be done with Government aid.

Senator NEW. That seems to be the impression of the men who are now, and who have been for the last two or three years, en-

gaged in the business, and is it not true, Mr. Ryan, that most of the productive capacity that this country had on the 11th of November last has already been liquidated?

Mr. RYAN. Undoubtedly. It had to be, the men, facilities, shops, and materials, and all things that were in process could not be maintained or kept in the shape that they were; they had to be cleaned up and sold and gotten out of the way, and these people had to get back to manufacturing in other lines, to resume their business and use their facilities in other lines, that had been set aside and diverted for the purpose of manufacturing aircraft.

Senator NEW. And is it not also true that the demands of the Army, in normal times, are insufficient to keep anything like what may be called an industry going?

Mr. RYAN. I think it is true that any air service the country is likely to carry on, will not use aircraft to carry out the work of development and carry on research and experiment sufficient to keep us even with the rest of the world in the development of the art, the science.

Senator NEW. If they were to undertake to do that, the expense to the Government would be simply enormous?

Mr. RYAN. I think so.

Senator NEW. It would be prohibitive?

The CHAIRMAN. Are you familiar with what the British Government is doing?

Mr. RYAN. In a general way, Senator. I have read a good deal about the plans of the British, and I think that, in a general way, I know about what they intend to do. There is not any question in my mind that England is determined to obtain and maintain as great a superiority in the air as she has on the sea. I think England naturally figures that she has got to do it. She is within reach of so many other countries by air that the possibility of any kind of disturbance would render her cities, the whole country, accessible to damage by aircraft, that I think it is the policy that has undoubtedly been determined upon in England to obtain and maintain superiority, both in quality and in quantity, and design.

The CHAIRMAN. The information which has reached this committee was that in the month of July, 1919, there were something like 2,000 complete air planes manufactured in Great Britain. In the same month in the United States there were 14. Not that we should necessarily govern our program by what they do, but it shows the condition of our industry as compared with theirs.

Senator NEW. The report, so far as the United States is concerned, is an official report.

Mr. RYAN. Well, I think it is too bad that we should ever get to the point where we only manufactured 14 airplanes in a month, because there must be provided, there must be developed, some manufacturing capacity in this country that can be spread quickly if we are ever going to meet an emergency. I do not mean to have manufacturing capacity to take care of 4,000 or 5,000 plans a month, but I mean a manufacturing capacity that could be spread quickly.

Senator NEW. Exactly.

Mr. RYAN. And would have developed experts in every line of manufacture who could be taken out and spread over the country and get into manufacture within a reasonable time after the neces-

sity arose, whenever it arose. I do not believe in making a large number of planes and piling them up. I think that aeroplanes and aircraft are a good deal like millinery in the matter of going out of style. I do not think that they will keep very long and be of much use.

Senator NEW. I think there is no question about that, but that is to be met in only one way, I think, with which I think you will agree, that is, by creating a commercial demand.

Mr. RYAN. That is the best way, of course.

Senator NEW. And the machines that have to be used in commerce, of course they quickly wear out; the life of an airplane at the best is not very long?

Mr. RYAN. It is measured by hours instead of years.

Senator NEW. And if a commercial demand is created that is sufficient to keep these planes going, that output can be very quickly diverted from commercial to military needs in case of sudden emergency. Do you share that view? Is that your opinion?

Mr. RYAN. Undoubtedly. Any plant manufacturing aircraft could be quickly adapted to manufacturing any kind of aircraft. That is true, excepting engines, perhaps. Of course, in building engines, from the time the design is undertaken, or the design is completed, it takes a long time to get into active and quantity production on account of the necessity of making tools, jigs, and dies that are necessary in making engines; all take time, even though you have all your plans ready to lay on the table to start with.

Senator NEW. You said earlier in your testimony, Mr. Ryan, that you thought there should be one central head for the direction of production of aircraft for the Government; that the Army and the Navy, the Post Office Department, and any others, should be allowed the right of suggestion, some latitude in the selection of types of planes they were to use, and so on. Just how would you limit that?

Mr. RYAN. I do not think I would limit it. I would say this, Senator, that if, for instance, the Army wanted 100 planes and they wanted certain types manufactured, that they would have to go to this production center and order them, and I think they ought to go back of that, and that this production center should do the designing for the Army, that the general type should be specified by the Army, but the designs should be made by the production engineers.

Senator NEW. That is just what I meant by my question.

Mr. RYAN. The production center should design. In other words, if the Army said, "We want 100 pursuit planes," the production center should know what was the most efficient pursuit plane at that date; what was the up-to-date and efficient machine that could be turned out at that date. If the Army said, or the Navy said, for instance, "We want planes with a great radius; we want planes for reconnaissance; we want planes for a great radius," that that production center should know the type of machine that was best adapted to that work and should be ready to put it into manufacture.

Senator NEW. Yes; that should be unlimited in their right to suggest, but that the production should all be by the one central department?

Mr. RYAN. Under the direction of one central department.

Senator NEW. Mr. Ryan, just as a business man, you have had considerable experience in that line; do you think it is possible for the highest development to be reached in any enterprise where there is divided authority?

Mr. RYAN. Well, generally, I would say that it is not possible to reach the highest development with divided authority. At the same time I recognize that, taking the military end of it, there has got to be placed the direction of affairs in the hands of the Navy and of the Army. Under our form of Government the Navy is separate from the Army entirely, and I do not think it would be fair to place under the Navy, for instance, the decision as to aircraft for the Army, and vice versa, neither would it be fair to place the decision for the Navy in the hands of the Army. I do not think that the decision as to the development of an aircraft plan and program for the Navy should be taken out of the hands of the Navy. I do not believe it can be with good results, and vice versa with the Army. The Army has got to fight planes over land in any military operation and the Navy has got to fight planes that fight over the sea.

Senator NEW. Of course, that is not contemplated in this bill; nobody contemplates taking from the Army or the Navy that decision.

Senator FRELINGHUYSEN. What valuable experience have we got out of this war, what have we learned and what equipment have we got? You were closely connected and did great work.

Senator NEW. I should like to have your views on that.

Senator FRELINGHUYSEN. The question is, what ought Congress to do to create a proper air force, in your opinion? What would you do if you had the supreme authority and power to do it?

Mr. RYAN. Senator, I said before you came in that my experience was a war experience, was an emergency experience; that there were many things that I would want to make a thorough study of; I never had time to study while the emergency was on. I cited particular things in aircraft production that, when they came to me and seemed to be disordered and in a mess, I realized I did not have time to straighten them out, and they were not so important as other things to which I could better devote my time and mind, whatever I had, so I never had opportunity, as man would in peace times, to see the whole scope of the thing and the plan and organization. I tried to carry on the work the best I could the way I found it, and get the best results out of it, in the hurry and in the emergency.

Senator FRELINGHUYSEN. You were taking care of your inheritance?

Mr. RYAN. I will not say that. As I said in the presence of all of you gentlemen before, I found many things done. Now, further, you all realize that at the time I took charge of the aircraft, there was loud and very general criticism of the Liberty engines, and from the first, as quickly as I could get a grasp on it and talk with men that I had confidence in. I placed my whole reliance on the Liberty engine. I had no doubt of it; it was sure that it was our greatest contribution and was going to be our greatest contribution. That is one of the things we did. We did not fail as to that. That was started before my time. I had nothing to do with the development of the Liberty engine, but I did stick to it and help to get it into big production because I believed in it and realized what it was worth to the allied air services.

Senator FRELINGHUYSEN. Was not the mistake we made in trying to build something around that Liberty engine that was not fitted.

Mr. RYAN. I think only one really serious mistake was made, and that was in the case of the Bristol Fighter. I do not believe we made a serious mistake in trying to build around the Liberty engine, with that exception. I think we made a mistake in not building a Liberty 8 from the beginning, as well as the Liberty 12, because we needed 250 to 300-horsepower engines as well as 400-horsepower engines. We were relying on one type of engine of 300-horsepower that we perhaps could not build as many of as we could of the Liberty if we had it started, although it was a very good engine, and while it was slow in coming into production it was a splendid engine.

Senator FRELINGHUYSEN. You mean the 12?

Mr. RYAN. The Hispano 300.

Senator FRELINGHUYSEN. Do you think the DH-4 was an appropriate type of plane for the 400-horsepower Liberty engine?

Mr. RYAN. I think so, unqualifiedly.

Senator FRELINGHUYSEN. I was anxious to have your view on that.

Mr. RYAN. About the DH-4: It was one type that was in quantity production, as you know. As I said before you came in Senator, I made up my mind when I was on the other side and had opportunity to see, that the policy of not building pursuit planes for the front in this country was a correct policy. We could not have built them and gotten them there in time and kept them up to date. We should have built pursuit planes so as to have a complete program of our own, but not in quantity to supply the front, because we could not get them there in time. The things that we could furnish, of course, were materials and engines. The plane that we built in quantity, the De Haviland, when it was started, was perhaps the best plane of its type, and for general all-around work, outside of pursuit work, the De Haviland was by all odds—well, I will not say by all odds—but was as useful as any one plane built by any nation in the war, on either side of the war.

They say we did not build fighting machines. The De Haviland had two sets of machine guns, and many a one has fought its way out and fought its way back. The De Haviland was a fast machine. It was a machine that had good climbing qualities; it could, for a machine of its size, take care of itself and get out and get away as well as any machine in the war. I think it was a better machine than the French Breguet, which was the corresponding machine in France, and De Haviland himself said that it was better than the British De Haviland, and the British De Haviland was the machine they relied on for general work, observation.

Now, mind you, day bombing did not get very far. There was not any great amount of day bombing done. Day bombing, in my opinion, did not pan out. It was too costly. But there was not any machine in the war—this was found to be true in St. Mihiel fight and also in the Argonne fight—that did as effective work in strafing, as they call it—firing with machine guns into bodies of troops—as the De Haviland did, because it had a better speed, could get up and away better than any of them, and the pursuit planes do not carry guns enough for that kind of work. I think the De Haviland was a useful machine. Of course, we would have bettered it. We had the De Haviland 9, which is a better arranged machine; but at the

time the De Haviland 4 was started, and up to the time it was put into production, there was not any better machine of its kind; and the Liberty engine, I think, without a doubt was just as good an engine in size, in performance, in weight, for the De Haviland machine as we could put in it. It was a better engine for the De Haviland plane than the British Rolls-Royce, because it had more power and made a faster machine of it.

Senator FRELINGHUYSEN. I always thought it was a little over-horsepowered.

Mr. RYAN. I did not think so.

Senator FLETCHER. In what way were they useful?

Mr. RYAN. You mean the machines?

Senator FLETCHER. Yes.

Mr. RYAN. They were a very good observation machine; they carried two sets of machine guns, and outside of a pursuit plane they were as maneuverable as any plane that any country had.

Senator FRELINGHUYSEN. Did you tell the committee, Mr. Ryan, what you thought ought to be done in order to build up this aircraft industry in the United States and what we ought to have?

Mr. RYAN. I think I did, pretty generally.

Senator FRELINGHUYSEN. I did not hear you. I am sorry.

Mr. RYAN. There is one other thing I think I should state. I do not want to change the course of this examination if you want to follow along these lines.

Senator NEW. No; we want you to give us your views, Mr. Ryan.

Senator FRELINGHUYSEN. We want your observations.

Mr. RYAN. That is the matter of education. I very firmly believe we should educate an Air Service from the beginning. I do not believe that we should take men who have been through West Point and try to make Air Service officers out of them in a six-months course, or who have been through Annapolis and try to make Naval Air Service men out of them in six months. I think we should have an academy or a college, whatever you call it, devoted to the study of aircraft, and the problems of the Air Service, and that we should take the boys at the age that they go into West Point and into the Naval Academy and educate them all the way through and turn them out in sufficient numbers, so that they will form the nucleus of an organization that could take care of manufacturing problems in an emergency, could take charge of the personnel, and of the whole Air Service without necessity for calling in a lot of people from business and other walks of life that have had no experience.

Senator NEW. Does not that necessarily imply the establishment here of a separate Air Service?

Mr. RYAN. I do not know. Mind you, Senator, I am not combating the idea of a separate Air Service at all. When you speak of a separate Air Service, what concerns me is that you might take out of the branches of the Government, the Navy and the Army, more or less of the direction of the thing that they have got to fight with if we ever have a war. The Navy has to fight with aircraft, and so has the Army, and we have to turn it over to them if we ever do fight.

Senator NEW. Exactly; I think that it is all right, that during the time of conflict the force shall be turned over to the Army and

to the Navy, but you can not have such an institution as you have described, can you, that shall be under the joint management and direction of the Army and the Navy and the Post Office Department?

Mr. RYAN. No.

Senator NEW. That can only be maintained by some department here that has its own head, its own separate entity, and its own specific purpose.

Mr. RYAN. Of course, I feel that in time of the war the control of operations of an air service ought to be entitled to perhaps as good representation as any other service, but in time of peace I do not believe that it will be an organization of such size that it would be entitled to a place in the cabinet, for instance, I doubt whether it would be a business or an organization of such size that would warrant it. As I look at it, it is largely a question of manufacture and of education, and if those two things can be carried on, if the education of the personnel of the Air Service from the beginning all the way through, can be carried on, and the manufacture of aircraft can be carried on, centered in one organization rather than scattered over two or three, we will make very much more progress, but if that can be done without a separate department I do not see any real necessity for a separate department. If it can not be done without a separate department—

Senator NEW. Do you think it can, as a matter of fact, be done without a separate department?

Mr. RYAN. You know, Senator, it is more difficult to do things for the Government than it is in business. In business I would not have any doubt that, for instance, in my own business we have departments that act for every other department in our business, and they do it perfectly and function perfectly, and there is no difficulty in doing it. We place our orders with one department for all other departments of the business, and they take care of them. Whether you can do that in the Government I do not know.

Senator NEW. You have had some experience with the Government?

Senator FRELINGHUYSEN. And some in business.

Senator NEW. Yes; and some in business and you recognize the difference?

Mr. RYAN. I do, thoroughly.

Senator FRELINGHUYSEN. To do anything we have got to have money, and we have got to make appropriations, and we have got to overcome the prejudice, the opposition to large appropriations. Now, do you not think there ought to be something done along educational lines to have the country understand how necessary it is for America to develop along that line?

Mr. RYAN. Unquestionably.

Senator FRELINGHUYSEN. So that the sentiment back home will be created for the Government to develop, not only for the sake of its defense, but commercially, the Air Service?

Mr. RYAN. Without question.

Senator FRELINGHUYSEN. Do you think that a statement through some of the large commercial bodies, probably such as the United States Chamber of Commerce, get them to take it up in individual

committees and discuss it with the Military Affairs Committee and give them a digest, or have them make a digest of the testimony on this subject before this committee, and then present that to the various commercial bodies throughout the United States, present them the facts, what England is doing, what France is doing, what Italy is doing, and finally put up a referendum, as they do, to probably 1,500 or 2,500 of these commercial bodies, so that it is discussed throughout the entire United States in all these boards of trade and chambers of commerce. Do you not think that would be a good practical plan or not?

Mr. RYAN. I think it is well to interest the public through the business bodies of the country in anything that is of as great importance to the country as this is. I think, as I said before you came in, that the aircraft business is not going to be developed in the near future by civilian needs; it is too expensive; it is too great a luxury; it is not a thing that many people are going to be able to afford. It is going to take governmental help to develop it.

I think that if the country could be brought to realize the importance of a substantial air service that it would be less difficult to get appropriations for it than it would be otherwise. For instance, I feel that a good, substantial air service, in quality and in numbers of personnel, scattered up and down the Atlantic and Pacific coasts, would render the defense of this country so much easier and require so much less expenditure in other lines that the people would see it almost on presentation and would heartily approve the expenditure of a good deal of money for it. For instance, I should say that with a proper equipment of long-range aircraft up and down these two coasts, that there would not be a possibility of a hostile fleet to approach within 500 miles of this coast without being located, and its direction and position every hour until it came within range would be known to every ship we had on the coast. They could be assembled to meet them and the defense could be prepared. I do not think that is generally thought of. I do not mean it is a possible thing to destroy an enemy's fleet through aircraft; you could hamper it. You could destroy units of it, but bombing from the air at such a height that would avoid antiaircraft guns is rather uncertain; you make a good many attempts before you could make a direct hit perhaps. But to locate them, planes with a long radius would go out and patrol the seas and undoubtedly locate such a fleet at such a distance that everything possible to meet it could be done in advance of its reaching our shores. It would cost comparatively little money. It would not be a great item of expense as the cost of defense of other things are reckoned, do you not see?

Senator FRELINGHUYSEN. But you have got to create public sentiment before you can spend the money.

Mr. RYAN. I think so.

Senator FRELINGHUYSEN. What I want to find out is the best possible method of developing public sentiment, a demand to appropriate the money, just the same way as the demand is made for good roads. It is an acknowledged fact that everyone wants good roads. Now, there are other bodies, the defense societies and those bodies that are interested. If you could just simply have the matter discussed throughout the country so you could get back to these

men who doubt the advisability of it, in Congress and elsewhere, some sentiment which would push it along.

Mr. RYAN. I think it is very desirable to arouse and keep up public sentiment, for the reason that if we get a year or two further along and there are not any disturbances in the world people will forget we ever had any disturbance and will forget it is necessary to provide against another one.

Senator FLETCHER. Do you think that public sentiment would be back of an effort to develop aircraft along commercial lines and for commercial purposes?

Mr. RYAN. I do not see how, Senator Fletcher, you could provide for the development of commercial aircraft. I do not suppose the country would approve subsidy any more than it does the subsidy of ships, and my idea was that the way to do it would be to place enough orders through the Government for aircraft with manufacturers, who, in that way, would be helped to develop a commercial enterprise alongside of it without going to the great expense of carrying on a commercial business without any Government help. I think they could be aided in that way, but I do not know in what other way. I mean a vote of money would be a very difficult thing to get, a straight vote of money to promote commercial aviation.

Senator NEW. Could they not be aided here the same way that they are being aided by the British and French? For instance, they have Government agents sent out on authority, and with the backing of the Governments themselves, to various other countries. For instance, there are many of them in South America, in Japan, they are in the British colonies, and even in this country, seeking to attract attention to the manufacturers to build a French design and to establish a demand in those countries for those machines. For instance, the British have taken some machines that were built for the British during the war for military purposes; they have given some of those machines to the Governments and to private business enterprises in South American countries simply to get them going, to get aircraft introduced in those countries and create a demand for them, and the British Government has nothing to do with it beyond that.

Mr. RYAN. You know, Senator, that just brings back to our attention that the other great commercial nations of the world have done more always to foster and support their industries and their commercial enterprises than we have ever done in foreign countries; I mean they have given more support to the extension of commercial business in other countries than we have ever done.

Senator NEW. They have made a business of getting business?

Mr. RYAN. They have assisted their nationals in every way possible to obtain the business in other countries.

Senator FLETCHER. From your knowledge of the aircraft production and all the circumstances, Mr. Ryan, do you think that a great commercial possibility is ahead?

Mr. RYAN. I think ahead, but I am afraid not immediately ahead, Senator. It requires a great outlay of money for either individual or commercial use. It requires a great outlay and development—I mean building of machines and maintaining of machines, and the establishment of fields, and all that sort of thing—that private en-

terprise is not likely to get far in the next few years without Government assistance.

Senator FRELINGHUYSEN. The waste is so much?

The CHAIRMAN. We had some very interesting testimony given by Mr. Howard Coffin, describing the conventions that have been drawn up—the international conventions that have been drawn up to fix the rules of the air, the issuance of licenses to pilots, the inspection of machines to see that they are safe—and these countries are about to adopt these conventions, if they have not already done so, and I believe it is going to be laid before our Government very soon.

Mr. RYAN. Of course, a convention of that kind would be a necessity in Europe, for instance, where the countries are small, just as an agreement in State laws would be desirable in this country, you see.

The CHAIRMAN. We have one neighbor, at least, that is very apt to develop such a condition—that is, Canada?

Mr. RYAN. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. And we are in a very close contact with them for 3,000 miles. They will be coming over here and we will be going over there?

Mr. RYAN. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. But the time is bound to come, I assume, when the rules of the air and the licensing of pilots and laws governing the rights of aviators must be regulated?

Mr. RYAN. And the rights of the people underneath.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Mr. RYAN. They will have to be defined and regulated.

The CHAIRMAN. Defined and enforced, and that of itself will draw us, whether we are willing or no, in my judgment, to the creation of a separate department in our Government. We will have to establish a system of inspection of licenses. It is going to go and go and go on.

Mr. RYAN. Undoubtedly.

The CHAIRMAN. If the dreamers are anywhere near correct, in another generation it will be very large?

Mr. RYAN. I think in another generation it will be very important. It is very important now, but I mean it is a thing that will grow into a great industry before another generation.

Senator FLETCHER. Do you think it is an effective and practical branch of the military service?

Mr. RYAN. I think in case of another war it will quite probably be relied upon to a greater extent than it was in this war, because the development began with this war. You gentlemen all realize that for the first two years of this war the only arm that was carried on any air machine was the pistol in the pocket of the pilot, and it got so they were carrying nearly a ton of bombs, or more than a ton of bombs, and some were carrying eight machine guns, but before these first two years there were not any armed airplanes.

Senator FRELINGHUYSEN. They only carried pistols?

Mr. RYAN. They did not have any arms at all.

Senator FLETCHER. What were you able to get over there that was made in this country before the armistice?

Mr. RYAN. I do not remember the number, Senator, and, as I told the Senators before you came in, when the war ended I left and went back to my business and devoted my time and attention to it, but we had in the St. Mihiel fight 29 squadrons on the front, and they were virtually all engaged. We had some, I suppose 10 squadrons more, at the time of the Argonne fight.

Senator FLETCHER. What machines were they using?

Mr. RYAN. They were using French pursuit planes; they were using French Breguets and our own De Havillands for observation and day bombing, and we had never gone far into the use of night bombing machines. The night bombing was done by the French and by the British, but those were the principal machines.

Senator FRELINGHUYSEN. What ever happened to the old Langley that we launched down here?

Mr. RYAN. I never saw it after that day, Senator.

Senator FRELINGHUYSEN. She did not have enough engine power for her size?

Mr. RYAN. Oh, yes; they were using those planes in England, the independent bombing forces of the British were using that Handley-Page plane with two Rolls-Royce engines, with 100 horsepower less than our Liberty engines.

Senator FRELINGHUYSEN. That was a Handley-Page?

Mr. RYAN. Yes. I say, they were using that same plane with two Rolls-Royce engines that had 100 horsepower less than our Liberties.

I just want you all to understand I forgot this business when the war ended, and I went back to my own business and have not refreshed my memory; I have read something about it, of course, as everybody has, but I have not thought about it as much as others have.

The CHAIRMAN. It has been very interesting. I thank you very much.

Senator FRELINGHUYSEN. We are obliged to you, Mr. Ryan.

Mr. RYAN. I thank you very much for your attention.

(Whereupon, at 3.30 o'clock p. m., the committee adjourned until Monday, September 29, 1919, at 2.15 o'clock p. m.)



REORGANIZATION OF THE ARMY.

MONDAY, SEPTEMBER 29, 1919.

UNITED STATES SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON MILITARY AFFAIRS,
Washington, D. C.

The subcommittee met at 2.15 p. m., in the committee room, Capitol, pursuant to recess, Hon. James Wadsworth (chairman) presiding.

Present: Senators Wadsworth (presiding), Warren, Sutherland, New, Frelinghuysen, Chamberlain, Fletcher, and Thomas.

STATEMENT OF GEORGE W. GOETHALS, MAJOR GENERAL, UNITED STATES ARMY, RETIRED.

The CHAIRMAN. Will you state, General, for the information of the committee, the assignments you had with the military during the war with Germany?

Gen. GOETHALS. I was recalled to the active list on December 12, 1917, and assigned to duty as Acting Quartermaster General on the 26th of December. In January, 1918, the Division of Storage and Traffic was created and the duties of that office were also assigned to me. In April of 1918 I was relieved from duty as Acting Quartermaster General and assigned to duty as Assistant Chief of Staff and Director of the Division of Purchase, Storage and Traffic. I continued in that until March 1, 1919, when I returned to inactive duty.

The CHAIRMAN. Have you had opportunity to examine this bill, prepared in the War Department?

Gen. GOETHALS. In a general way.

The CHAIRMAN. What comment have you to make on the situation as you view it?

Gen. GOETHALS. I am in favor of universal military training; as to the size of the Army, I do not know that I have any comments to make; do not consider myself competent to offer any opinion, as I do not know the needs to which an army will be placed under the present conditions of unrest over the world.

On the question of universal military training I am in favor of it. The length of military training is another question, on which I am not able to pass judgment. Economic conditions are to be considered. Three months are better than one, six months are better than three, and a year is better than six months. I am particularly interested in the question of the supply of the Army.

The CHAIRMAN. We would be very glad to have you discuss that.

Gen. GOETHALS. In order to discuss it, I should like to explain the conditions that obtained and how the Division of Purchase, Storage and Traffic eventually was formed for the purpose of overcoming difficulties that we encountered.

When I came here in December, 1917, the Quartermaster's Department had been deprived of the embarkation, which was formerly one of its functions, and also of its construction work, two divisions of the War Department having been created to take over these duties. The Quartermaster's Department looked after the purchase of clothing and subsistence, the remount service, the purchase of horses and mules, and wagon transportation. It was engaged in developing the Liberty truck, as far as the motor transport was concerned, and it had charge of a certain amount of railroad transportation, and a certain amount of steamship transportation.

The subsistence organization was good, and subsistence was being furnished in ample quantity and as required. The clothing situation was bad. I found that the clothing situation was complicated by the fact that other bureaus of the War Department were competing for wool. The Signal Corps was furnishing clothing for aviators, and the Medical Corps was furnishing blankets for the hospitals; the Ordnance Department was furnishing blankets for horses. The leather situation was also in an unsatisfactory condition. The cotton situation was in bad shape. Not only were the War Department bureaus competing with each other to get the necessary materials, but the War Department was competing with other departments of the Government, both for woolen goods and cotton goods and leather goods. The same situation developed with respect to hardware, and I advocated that some steps be taken to reduce the competition within the department itself by consolidating purchases within the various bureaus of the department, so that the bureaus would not compete with each other in order to get the same things. No action was taken. The condition at the seaports was horrible.

The CHAIRMAN. When was this, General?

Gen. GOETHALS. That was in the early part of 1918. Shortly after I took hold of the Quartermaster Department the embarkation service, which had been separated from it in 1917, was returned to the Quartermaster's Department. We were unable to load ships properly or fast enough because of the condition of the ports. I was particularly familiar with the business in New York, because I was occupying an advisory position to a joint port development commission, which had been constituted by the States of New York and New Jersey. Docks in New York were being used for storage. The various bureaus were shipping everything they could as soon as made or purchased to the seaport and it was loaded on the docks. Materials were hard to get at to load on ships. Each bureau had its own transportation service on the railroads. Each bureau had its own storage, received appropriations from Congress for the purpose. There was, as a part of the Council of National Defense, a committee on storage, and they had advocated the creation of certain storage areas in various parts of the United States. I took up with the then acting Chief of Staff, Gen. Biddle, the question of centralizing transportation: the bureaus ought not to be allowed to ship to the seaboard any article that was not needed on the other side at once, and the result of that conversation was the creation of the Division of Storage and Traffic.

The storage for all the bureaus of the War Department was placed under the direction of that division. All transportation of the United States was placed under the director of that division and he handled not only the supplies to be shipped by the various bureaus, but also handled the supplies to be shipped to and from the factories under the various bureaus.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. The direction was under you?

Gen. GOETHALS. I was the director. After this was in operation it gave the control of the shipments from various points in the United States to France through the embarkation service. In February of 1918 the number of men that had been sent overseas was too many for the supply ships that we had, and we could not get the necessary supplies over.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. What date was this, General?

Gen. GOETHALS. This was in February, 1918. I called the attention of the Chief of Staff to the condition that existed, and stated that unless more ships were forthcoming it would be necessary to stop sending men overseas. A conference was called with Mr. Hurley, of the Shipping Board, who promised to furnish us some ships the 1st of February to meet our needs. The 1st of February came and none were forthcoming, so another conference was called, and the necessity of getting the necessary shipping brought about the organization of the shipping control committee, consisting of Mr. Franklin, Mr. Raymond, and Sir Connop Guthrie, an Englishman. This committee was given charge of securing ships from commerce for the use of the War Department. They cooperated with the Shipping Board and cooperated with the Allies through Sir Connop Guthrie, who had control of the allied shipping in this country.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. Were they under you, too?

Gen. GOETHALS. The shipping control committee reported to me; yes, sir. As the result of that we got sufficient ships from the commercial trades to keep up our shipments overseas, and as the demands for shipping increased the shipping control committee would reach out and bring in more commercial ships, transferring them to the Shipping Board, who chartered them for the use of the War Department.

At about that time, in January of 1918, in order to bring about a coordination of purchases, a division of purchase and supply was established as part of the General Staff organization, and Gen. Palmer Pierce was placed in charge. Mr. Stettinnius came down about that time and was appointed surveyor of purchases under the Director of Purchase. I took up with him and with the Secretary of War the idea of concentrating the purchase of all commodities under one control. The Director of Purchase had instructions that certain materials purchased by the various bureaus should be concentrated and purchased by that bureau of the War Department, which was buying a large portion of that particular material, and the coordination, so-called, was brought about in that way.

Coordination of that character always works well when everybody is in harmony with the proposition, but when bureaus are deprived of making purchases which they think they should be allowed to make, friction then begins to creep in. We were keeping track through the embarkation service of the supplies needed overseas, and we would fall short of certain articles that were cabled for. On taking up the

matter with the various bureaus responsible we would find that the blame was being transferred from one to the other, the one that had previously purchased and fallen short would claim that had it been allowed to continue the purchasing, the supplies would have been there, but having been deprived of his rights in this matter by transfer of duties to somebody else, this somebody else had fallen down. We were running up against that sort of thing all the time. The result was that in order to get the supplies we had to take drastic measures.

In April of 1918 Gen. Pierce was ordered overseas, and the Division of Purchase was combined with the Division of Storage and Traffic. I was relieved from duty as acting quartermaster general and assigned as Director of Purchase, Storage and Traffic. In July of 1918 I submitted to the Chief of Staff a memorandum that had been prepared by the Director of Purchase, Gen. Hugh Johnson, advocating the consolidation of all purchases in the War Department under one head. That hung fire and was approved in September of 1918, and it was to go into effect beginning October 1, 1918, when we moved into the Munitions Building on B Street and Twentieth, and it was not in full operation at the time the armistice occurred. That is the general history of the purchase, storage, and traffic.

I have always thought the name was unfortunate; that it should have been the "service of supply," or the "supply department."

Senator FRELINGHUYSEN. You did a big job, did you not, General?

Gen. GOETHALS. Yes; we think it is a big job, and it is a job that ought to be perpetuated.

The CHAIRMAN. Do I gather from that that the service of supply shall be a General Staff function or shall be a service in the true sense of the term?

Gen. GOETHALS. I do not know what you call it. I believe there is some criticism of me because I was a General Staff officer and assumed operating functions. When I put my proposition up to Gen. March, Gen. March said, "I am going to hold you responsible that the supplies get overseas to the troops." I told him I was willing to take it; it did not make any difference to me whether I was a General Staff officer or an operating officer; that was my duty and that was what I did.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. Did you decline to take the job unless—

Gen. GOETHALS. No; I did not have any need to make any condition of that kind with Gen. March. He is my own type of man.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. There was a rumor that you were unwilling to take charge unless you had absolute charge.

Gen. GOETHALS. No; I have a wrong reputation attributed to me.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. I think it was the right position to take whether you did or not. You did have absolute charge?

Gen. GOETHALS. I had absolute charge of the Quartermaster Department. That was assured me by the Secretary of War when I came down in January of 1917.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. Did anybody undertake to interfere with you?

Gen. GOETHALS. No, sir.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. So you had it your own way?

Gen. GOETHALS. I had it my own way.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. I think you did it very well.

Senator WARREN. This "department of supply," that name was given to the Quartermaster Department, was it not, some years ago?

Gen. GOETHALS. I do not know, Senator.

Senator WARREN. At the time they raised the grade to major general and consolidated the Quartermaster and the Commissary?

Gen. GOETHALS. It was the Quartermaster Department. It was still a Quartermaster Corps when I came here in 1917.

The CHAIRMAN. I think it will be found, if the record is looked up, that the bill was drafted and prepared and reported by the committee, either in the House or in the Senate, and carried the new name, "supply" or "supply corps," and at the last moment some one urged, very strenuously, that the word "Quartermaster" be preserved and the word "supply" stricken out.

Senator WARREN. I know the intention at the time was to get things together, very much as Gen. Goethals has described his endeavors, although that was in time of peace.

Gen. GOETHALS. I discussed the question. I do not know whether this is the same bill that was presented last winter after the armistice. I discussed with Gen. March the substitution of the Supply Department for the Quartermaster Department, and he said that the Quartermaster Department was an old designation and he thought Congress was rather in favor of this nomenclature. If so, I would not say anything, but I think "supply department" ought to be substituted. We were forced to that condition by the war, and it is a strange coincidence that on the other side the organization there is the "Service of Supply," and the Quartermaster Department had very little of its original functions to perform during the war.

Senator FLETCHER. You had not only to do with the purchasing of the supplies, but the arrangement of supplies, etc.?

Gen. GOETHALS. I stated that I transported them to seaboard and shipped them overseas by the transports. I handled the whole situation.

Senator FRELINGHUYSEN. It has been suggested here I think by Gen. Hines—that the Quartermaster Department have a certain amount of shipping tonnage allocated to them and placed under their charge, boats that they shall run. I understand the Transport Service is under the Navy. Is it not?

Gen. GOETHALS. I understand the ships are operated by the Navy.

Senator FRELINGHUYSEN. But, as I understand, Mr. Chairman, did not Gen. Hines recommend that the Quartermaster Department have their own ships and run them and operate them?

Was not that his testimony given here?

Gen. GOETHALS. I do not think that is correct.

The CHAIRMAN. I do not recollect that.

Gen. GOETHALS. Unless Gen. Hines has changed his opinion, because I discussed it with him some months ago in New York, and he stated he was going to advocate that some of these vessels which belonged to the Government now should be definitely assigned to the War Department, so that they could be called back for transports in case of necessity, but that the ships themselves were to be turned over to commercial lines for operation until the War Department actually needed them.

Senator CAMBERLAIN. I think that is what he contended.

Gen. GOETHALS. Ah ! I think that is a good position to occupy.

Senator FLETCHER. We passed a bill to that effect, and authorized those ships to transport passengers; to that extent they do commercial business.

Senator FRELINGHUYSEN. Do you believe in time of war they should have those ships?

Gen. GOETHALS. I do.

Senator FRELINGHUYSEN. I think Gen. Hines suggested the War Department operate them.

Gen. GOETHALS. I would not be in favor of the War Department operating them; but, as we discussed it, I thought his view was we would turn them over to commercial companies for operation, and then in time of war the War Department could have ownership in them and call them right back.

Senator FLETCHER. Why should the War Department not operate them?

Gen. GOETHALS. I do not think they could operate them so economically as the commercial companies can operate them.

Senator FRELINGHUYSEN. I have always been curious to know where you got all these ships.

Gen. GOETHALS. We got them from everywhere. All the German interned ships were turned over to the War Department, then this shipping committee would call in ships from different trade routes, turn them over to the Shipping Board to make the charter rates, then the Shipping Board turned them over to the War Department.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. You had British and French and other ships?

Gen. GOETHALS. Well, the British came to our assistance for the movement of troops, and came to our assistance in the movement of freight.

There is one thing here that strikes my eye, and that is the Motor Transport Corps. I am not in accord with a separate, independent Motor Transport Corps. I think that ought to be under the Transportation Corps. Let us take a condition which exists in New York. Ships were being loaded at Hoboken; our supplies came in from the Bush terminals, in South Brooklyn, and from Newark base. We could ship things to the steamers by water and by rail and wagons, all under our own control, but if we wanted to ship things by motor trucks, we had to get the permission of somebody else to do it, which was bad.

The CHAIRMAN. General, reverting again to that suggestion I made a moment ago as to the direction of the supply department, and its connection, if any, with the General Staff as such. Do you believe that a supply department, such as you in effect established, is a proper part of the General Staff?

Gen. GOETHALS. No; but it should be under the supervision of the General Staff.

The CHAIRMAN. Certainly, that is to be assumed; yes.

Gen. GOETHALS. You see, Senator, I was on the General Staff when the General Staff was organized. The General Staff was to coordinate the various bureaus of the War Department. That is one of the functions of the law. I served here nearly four years on the General Staff and I never saw much coordination of the bureaus.

The CHAIRMAN. Where was the fault?

Gen. GOETHALS. The fault was that a bureau chief could pass right around the Chief of Staff and go to the Secretary of War.

Senator WARREN. What years does that cover?

Gen. GOETHALS. 1903 to 1907, just after the creation of the General Staff.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. Then the Secretary of War was to blame for that?

Gen. GOETHALS. Exactly.

Senator WARREN. In other words, they did not follow the intention of Congress in making that law?

Gen. GOETHALS. No; it was an unfortunate situation. The General Staff was never really put on its feet.

Senator WARREN. No; that is my observation. We had a long consideration of that in the committee, a good deal of discussion of having a staff, and it has been since then a matter of comment and regret on the part of those who helped to make that law that it has not been observed in its meaning.

Gen. GOETHALS. And conditions were such, during the war, especially on the supply question, when somebody had to do something—it did not make a particle of difference whether it was a General Staff officer or a line officer—somebody had to do it.

The CHAIRMAN. Then it was the idea that the General Staff originally should coordinate these bureaus, not the intention that they should administer the bureaus?

Gen. GOETHALS. No.

The CHAIRMAN. If the effort at coordination had been followed out by the General Staff it would have been less trouble, would it not?

Gen. GOETHALS. Probably.

Senator WARREN. I think, too, it has been at times almost impossible for a chief of bureau to get before the staff, or get to them, because of the assumption by the Chief of Staff.

Senator FLETCHER. Do you think in peace times it is necessary to have such an organization as you have?

Gen. GOETHALS. Not such a big organization, but I believe that such an organization ought to exist. It is simply absurd for two or more branches of the Army to be buying woolen clothing, for instance, on cotton goods; several buying leather goods, several buying hardware. When I looked into the situation with regard to hardware, I got Simmons, of St. Louis, to come on, and some hardware men from New York, and they showed me the purchases to be made by the various bureaus, and the total amount required by the various bureaus of the War Department exceeded the production of the United States in hardware. Now that was an absurd condition.

The CHAIRMAN. General, would you outline to us your idea of the function, of the proper constitution, of the Supply Corps, or Supply Department, what should it cover?

Gen. GOETHALS. It should cover all standard commodities; it should cover their storage and transportation.

The CHAIRMAN. Transportation by motor, rail and water?

Gen. GOETHALS. Transportation by motor, rail, water, and wagon.

The CHAIRMAN. Then would you leave the other service bureaus

to the purchase of those things which are not common to two or more of them?

Gen. GOETHALS. If they are standard commodities I would put them all under the Supply Service, and I would leave to the bureaus the technical articles, that require technical service, technical knowledge.

The CHAIRMAN. Would you say that medical supplies are standard?

Gen. GOETHALS. No, that is one class I had with the Medical Department.

Senator SUTHERLAND. And dental supplies?

Gen. GOETHALS. And dental supplies. They stated I could not buy medicines. Well, the doctors can not buy medicines, either. They get chemists in to do their purchasing, and I could get chemists in to do the purchasing, and those chemists could buy chemical goods that were required by the other bureaus.

Senator WARREN. Do you think the Ordnance Department ought to buy their saddles?

Gen. GOETHALS. No; saddles ought to go to the Supply Department.

Senator SUTHERLAND. The various bureaus would draw the specifications, I suppose.

Gen. GOETHALS. Yes; the various bureaus would draw the specifications and the Supply Department would purchase them.

The CHAIRMAN. Under such a scheme, tell us what would be left for a bureau such as the Ordnance Department to purchase.

Gen. GOETHALS. Lots of things. Ammunition, gun carriages, etc.

The CHAIRMAN. All sorts of weapons, I suppose, and their equipment?

Gen. GOETHALS. Yes.

Senator FLETCHER. Explosives?

Gen. GOETHALS. Explosives.

The CHAIRMAN. And the Medical Department?

Gen. GOETHALS. They would not have much to buy. They could then look after the sick. That is their proper function.

The CHAIRMAN. You would have the purchase of medicines made by the Supply Department?

Gen. GOETHALS. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. I thought you answered that in the negative before.

Gen. GOETHALS. No; I answered that in the affirmative. That is a standard commodity.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, as to the Engineer Department.

Gen. GOETHALS. They would have the construction work.

The CHAIRMAN. No purchasing?

Gen. GOETHALS. There is technical work of the Engineering Department. They would have searchlights, electrical equipment, all things of that kind.

The CHAIRMAN. Bridge material?

Gen. GOETHALS. Bridge material, unless it is some standard material. I did leave with them, when the consolidation was made in October, the purchase of railroad equipment, because they had Mr. Felton with them, and he preferred to remain with the Chief of Engineers; the records were all there and I left that with them.

Senator FLETCHER. How about such material as cement?

Gen. GOETHALS. That is standard material required by several bureaus.

Senator SUTHERLAND. Would you include dental materials along with medical supplies to be purchased by the Medical Department?

Gen. GOETHALS. Yes; I think the dentists and the medical officers ought to give their attention to the sick and the wounded without meddling into administrative functions at all.

Senator SUTHERLAND. I should have said by the Supply Department.

Gen. GOETHALS. By the Supply Department. You would get specialists for that under the Supply Department.

Senator FLETCHER. What would the Quartermaster have to purchase?

Gen. GOETHALS. The Quartermaster would not exist.

The CHAIRMAN. You would simply enlarge the Quartermaster Department to a department of supply?

Gen. GOETHALS. Into a department of supply; change the name to supply department.

Senator WARREN. That was the intention of the bill as stated some years ago, but it seems to have been mutilated.

The CHAIRMAN. On the question of storage, I will say first, in advance of asking you a question, Gen. Black, in testifying before the committee, made some criticism of the storage system, which seemed rather strong. He stated that the storage system, under Purchase, Storage and Traffic, was so operated at present as to scatter engineer material needed for equipment of the regiment and its Engineer train throughout several different storage depots, so that when the Chief of Engineers received an order to send the equipment to the Engineer regiment of the First Division over to New York, and the equipment of the Engineer train, the Engineer Corps had no means of knowing where that equipment was, and it turned out it took about two or three weeks to gather it together, that it had to be brought from various parts of the country on account of the system established by Purchase, Storage and Traffic in the matter of storage.

Gen. GOETHALS. He was talking about the First Division?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes; when they returned the other day to New York.

Gen. GOETHALS. I know nothing about that.

The CHAIRMAN. His criticism was under a system which I think he called "commodity storage," the equipment for different branches of the service was in effect mixed up so that the Engineers could not put their hand on the equipment for the regiment without putting their hand in several different storage depots.

Gen. GOETHALS. I rather imagine, knowing Black, if Black played the game, that nothing of that kind could have occurred.

The CHAIRMAN. He cited that as an instance which occurred a few days before he appeared before the committee.

Gen. GOETHALS. I know nothing about that.

Senator FLETCHER. He found some supplies in one part of the country and others in other parts of the country, scattered all around.

Gen. GOETHALS. There were no instructions, so far as I know, that required storage by commodity, and I do not think there is yet.

The CHAIRMAN. Gen. Burr, can you enlighten us on that?

Gen. BURR. I think what Gen. Black referred to was the attempts that were made the last few days before it was paraded to get the goods together. We had about 10 days and a certain part of the engineering equipment necessary was stored in one depot and a certain part in another. Those were stored in our Army reserve departments, and I imagine they were stored there somewhat on commodity lines. They can easily be recognized, whether stored under a general storage system or under the other system. Gen. Black's criticism is to the effect that the material intended for the regiment of the Engineers, or railway regiment, or something like that, was not stored in a single storehouse ready for instant use, and as far as the general supply depots, from which we drew those supplies, are concerned, that is true, but as soon as we get time, the stores will be assembled, even at those depots, toward the front, or any place we expect to use them, whereas they are now being dumped together in the Engineer units, the Ordnance units, the Medical Corps units.

The CHAIRMAN. I could see no insurmountable difficulty, but it did present one case which is worthy of attention. Of course, Gen. Black's criticism was, at least I assume it was, that that displayed a state of affairs which, in turn, argued in favor of the Engineers managing their own storage.

Gen. GOETHALS. Yes; Gen. Black has opposed this proposition all the way through, right from the start. He came and told me I would not be able to buy rope for his department because various kinds of rope were required. I never differ with Black. I have known him for years.

Senator FRELINGHUYSEN. I do not want to interrupt, but I should like to follow up this question in regard to the ships, because I must leave in a few minutes.

The CHAIRMAN. You may proceed.

Senator FRELINGHUYSEN. I should like to have Gen. Goethals's opinion on it. Gen. Hines testified before the committee as follows:

The conditions which will follow the ratification of the treaty of peace will be different than those which existed before the war, and will have a material bearing on the necessity for the Transportation Corps. Under the treaty of peace the German interned vessels which were in our ports at the time we declared war—some 15 passenger ships, the largest of which was the *Leviathan*, and a number of cargo vessels—became the property of the United States. I have advocated as strongly as I know how that the title to these vessels always remain in the United States; that they form a transport reserve; that when the War Department does not need these vessels that they be assigned to the Shipping Board or to an operating company to operate commercially, subject only to the inspection of officers of the War Department or Navy, to see that these vessels are kept in repair; that no radical changes are made in their interior arrangements which would prevent their use as transports, and that their upkeep is such that they would be suitable for immediate use as transports.

That would permit the War Department operating only what transports are necessary, and at the same time you would build up a fleet which can be used if you need it, and which can continue to handle commerce if you do not need it.

And the final question by Senator Chamberlain was:

I am disposed to agree entirely with you, General, except one doubt in my mind is as to whether the War Department or the Navy Department should have charge of the actual control of the shipping from the docks to any point of necessity.

Senator THOMAS. If you will pardon me, if the War Department's position with regard to controlling aviation is sound, then I should say that the Navy ought to have charge of these transports.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. To be consistent?

Senator THOMAS. To be consistent; yes.

Gen. HINES. The Navy have all they can do to take care of their own matters.

Senator THOMAS. Mind you, I am not saying that the Navy should have control of these transports.

Gen. HINES. It is not a Navy matter to command a transport. It is nothing more than a commercial ship put in the War Department service for the purpose of handling troops by the Army. Whenever you put Army personnel and Navy personnel on a ship they get along; they all belong to the same country; but I feel sure that Army personnel can handle the Army personnel much better than Navy personnel can handle Army personnel.

Do you agree with that?

Gen. GOETHALS. The first paragraph that you read I agree with that the title to the ships remain with the Government, that the operation of the ships in time of peace be by some commercial company through the Shipping Board, but the War Department always having its hands on the ships ready to call them back in case of necessity.

Senator FRELINGHUYSEN. Whom should they be operated and controlled by, the War Department or the Navy Department?

Gen. GOETHALS. You mean when they come back as transports?

Senator FRELINGHUYSEN. Yes.

Gen. GOETHALS. The Navy Department operated them as transports during the past war.

Senator FRELINGHUYSEN. Gen. Hines believed they should be in charge of the War Department and operated by the War Department.

Gen. GOETHALS. Well, I do not know.

Senator FLETCHER. The Navy furnished a good portion of the crew?

Gen. GOETHALS. They did all of the crews; their men controlled them. In time of war the Navy ought to have charge of it, I think.

Senator FLETCHER. I think Gen. Hines feels that the War Department should train men to handle these in time of war and have control of them, charge of them, command of them.

Gen. GOETHALS. During peace times?

Senator FLETCHER. Yes; during peace times.

Gen. GOETHALS. Oh, no; I would not favor that. I think his idea of the Government owning the ships is correct, operated during times of peace by the commercial company to which they are assigned by the Shipping Board. In time of war to be recalled for use as transports, and operated, as we did during the last war, turn them over to the Navy for operation, because the Navy can furnish officers.

Senator FLETCHER. The charter provides they shall be returned to the War Department.

Gen. GOETHALS. On demand.

The CHAIRMAN. Returning to the proposed supply department again, General; what function, if any, have you to propose for the Assistant Secretary of War in connection with this system? We understand that in a greater or less degree during the war the Assistant Secretary of War, in this case Mr. Crowell, had official supervision of some kind over the munitions situation and that later another Assistant Secretary of War was authorized, and he had some supervision over it. How can you head up this system?

Gen. GOETHALS. During the war I reported directly to Gen. March. Mr. Stettinius was appointed as Second Assistant Secretary of War with a view to taking over the Supply Division, but he went overseas shortly after he was appointed, in connection with an international supply committee and the munitions committee, or something of that kind. When we moved over into the Munitions Building in October last, Mr. Crowell took over ordnance matters, and supervised the purchase of ordnance. With the signing of the armistice in November he took over the question of the settlement of contracts, outstanding contracts.

The CHAIRMAN. Then at no time was your Purchase, Storage and Traffic Division reporting to him?

Gen. GOETHALS. No. I think that subsequently he took charge of Purchase, Storage and Traffic.

There is a proposition, as I understand it, of making supplies separate and distinct from the Army, a civilian organization. I had considered that and discussed it, and always came back to the military control. I think in time of war the supply organization has got to be, to a considerable extent, under military control, and that civilians have got to be brought in in order to handle the situation, and the Quartermaster's Department, after I had it reorganized, consisted almost exclusively of civilian control. That will have to be the case in the next big war.

The CHAIRMAN. They were civilians in uniforms, were they not?

Gen. GOETHALS. No; they were not civilians in uniform. I did not put them in uniform.

Senator SUTHERLAND. General, we are not going to have any more general wars, are we?

Gen. GOETHALS. That is what I have heard. I am still skeptical.

Senator WARREN. Stettinius did not hold the position of assistant very long, did he? He resigned, did he not?

Gen. GOETHALS. Yes; Mr. Ryan was put in charge of the aircraft.

The CHAIRMAN. Again, discussing the proposed supply system or supply department, General, what have you to say as to the detail system or the permanent commissioned personnel system?

Gen. GOETHALS. In the Supply Corps it ought to be permanent. I am opposed to the detail system. One of the reasons that the Quartermaster's Department broke down was that as soon as war came on, all the detailed officers who were of any account wanted to get out with the troops; that is where they properly belonged, and they did get out, and their places were filled by commissioning a number of clerks in various divisions of the Quartermaster's Department, with the expectation that they would continue to perform the functions they previously performed. Gen. Bliss, who was then Chief of Staff, objected to that and had the men ordered away.

The CHAIRMAN. And incidentally lost some very valuable men?

Gen. GOETHALS. They lost valuable men and it disrupted the department pretty badly.

Senator SUTHERLAND. Ordered them away where?

Gen. GOETHALS. Some of them were commissioned in the line; ordered them out to the line.

The CHAIRMAN. These men had been civilian clerks?

Gen. GOETHALS. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Those were the men who knew how to draw estimates and requisitions and do all that work which, from a clerical standpoint, is rather technical?

Gen. GOETHALS. Rather technical. For one thing it did away with a good deal of the red tape that previously existed.

The CHAIRMAN. Would you make the whole Supply Corps a commissioned personnel?

Gen. GOETHALS. I do not see how you can get away from it in time of peace, unless you are willing to pay proper salaries. If you pay proper salaries to civilians, I would civilianize the whole thing under military control.

Senator SUTHERLAND. It is your idea it would be better, cheaper, to have it under a military control?

Gen. GOETHALS. It would be in the general run, yes; and then expand in time of war.

The CHAIRMAN. How far would you extend the system of permanent commissioned personnel through the other bureaus? Only two have it now, Engineers and Medical Department.

Gen. GOETHALS. A permanent organization?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Gen. GOETHALS. I have never believed much in a detail system. I think it is a good thing to get these bureau officers out in the line of the Army and in touch with them, but I think it could be done in some other way than with a detail system.

Senator FLETCHER. What is the size of this department that you would have? What would you require in time of peace?

Gen. GOETHALS. I do not know. I have never figured it out. When we consolidated, and it was the only way we could get it to function properly, I consolidated first by transferring over the engineering purchasing bureau, then I just took that purchasing bureau bodily over into my organization, and then I think the next one we took was the Signal Corps, and next the Ordnance Department, and the next the Medical Department, and then after we got them together we began to concentrate and reduce the force. We never did get fully consolidated by the time the armistice came. Gen. Burr could give you more information on that than I can.

Senator FLETCHER. Of course, we have to have some regard to this question of expense.

Gen. GOETHALS. Oh, yes; that is right. It is a very important question.

Senator FLETCHER. How much of a skeleton could you get along with in peace times and still preserve the organization?

Gen. GOETHALS. You can work that out, Burr?

Gen. BURR. Oh, yes.

The CHAIRMAN. What observations have you to make on the detail system, applying it, say, to the Ordnance Department? We have some very interesting testimony from Gen. Williams, Chief of Ordnance, on that, he urging the permanent commissioned personnel.

Gen. GOETHALS. I think the Ordnance Department detail system was a better one than obtained in any of the other bureaus where the detail system was applicable. They kept men permanently, practically after they had been tried out for a while.

The CHAIRMAN. Above the rank of major, was it not?

Gen. GOETHALS. Yes, but I have never believed in the detail system and I do not yet.

The CHAIRMAN. How would you propose that officers of the permanent staff corps should be provided then?

Gen. GOETHALS. The supply corps?

The CHAIRMAN. The supply corps, yes, or services as they read in this bill. How would you keep in touch with the needs of the line?

Gen. GOETHALS. By detail to the line; have them assigned to duty with the line.

The CHAIRMAN. In what capacity?

Gen. GOETHALS. Why, they could be detailed to the staff of the colonel of the regiment or the brigadier general, for the specific purpose of informing themselves as to the needs of the service under various conditions.

Senator WARREN. You would simply change it in time of war from line into staff?

Gen. GOETHALS. I would have a permanent staff, detailing into the line.

Senator NEW. Just reverse the process?

Gen. GOETHALS. Exactly.

The CHAIRMAN. Have you noticed that this bill, in effect, abolishes the office of chief of bureau, clear through?

Gen. GOETHALS. No, I had not noticed that.

The CHAIRMAN. The bill provides, in one section, that officers now heading the different departments shall be recommissioned into the line, and from then on, as I understand it, they may be detailed to command a department, but the office of chief of the Medical Department, Surgeon General, for instance, is abolished, Chief of Engineers, Chief Signal Officer, Quartermaster General, they too are abolished, and it is to be done entirely by detailing general officers of the line to head those departments from time to time. In other words, a Cavalry man or Infantry man can be, under this proposed law, as I read it, detailed as Chief of Engineers.

Gen. GOETHALS. You might get one that would do well. I do not know. As a general principle, I would not favor it.

The CHAIRMAN. You would not?

Gen. GOETHALS. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. I do not know whether you care to comment on another feature of that, and probably it is more particularly for the Senate itself to consider, but that also results in taking away from the Senate the power to confirm the Chief of Ordnance, the Chief of Engineers, the Chief of the Medical Corps, the Quartermaster General, and the Surgeon General. Do you regard that as a good change in general policy?

Gen. GOETHALS. Why, I should say not. These various officers in the bureaus look forward some day to becoming heads of the bureau; it takes away some of their incentive, perhaps. I think the chiefs of bureaus ought to be selected from the officers of the bureau.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you think the legislative branch should have some—exercise some check upon it?

Gen. GOETHALS. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. It is very seldom that it does.

Gen. GOETHALS. It is very seldom that it does, but it might.

The CHAIRMAN. It is very seldom that an appointee is rejected, very seldom.

Gen. GOETHALS. No; I should not favor that.

The CHAIRMAN. Are you familiar with the language of the national defense act limiting the powers and duties of the General Staff Corps?

Gen. GOETHALS. Yes; I heard a great deal of discussion of it when I came down here in 1917. The question had been put up then to the Secretary of War, and I had a general idea that the Judge Advocate General and the Secretary of War took opposite stands on the proposition. That is all, just in a general way.

The CHAIRMAN. The significant thing in this bill, so far as it relates to the powers delegated to the General Staff, is the omission or repeal of the second provision now in the national defense act which forbids officers of the General Staff from invading the field of the service corps or staff corps to the extent they would deprive them of their initiative and responsibility, and around that proviso seems to center this controversy, whether they should be retained in the law, as it now stands, or shall be repealed, and thereby give the General Staff Corps what some of the bureau people would term *carte blanche*. That proviso was an attempt on the part of Congress to limit the General Staff to planning and purchasing and control and to keep them from administering and operating.

Gen. GOETHALS. Well, the General Staff operated during the war, and I do not see how we could have gotten along without their doing it. Is that not rather a question for Congress to determine?

The CHAIRMAN. We want the best military judgment on it. It is a military problem, affecting the interior organization of the Army as a whole.

Gen. GOETHALS. We were forced to do it during the war. I suppose it can be avoided during times of peace, but probably in case of another war the same conditions would come out.

The CHAIRMAN. Would a properly organized supply department such as you suggest—and I think that is a very important suggestion—with a properly organized supply department, do you think that would necessarily occur again in war?

Gen. GOETHALS. No; there would be no necessity for it, because it was only on the question of supply that the interference came in at all.

The CHAIRMAN. Exactly so; and you did it under the terms of the Overman Act, practically.

Gen. GOETHALS. We did it because there was no other way of doing it that we could find out, or that I knew. It was the Overman Act that gave us the necessary authority to do it.

The CHAIRMAN. I think it is generally admitted that something of the sort had to be done there in the crisis.

Gen. GOETHALS. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. But it is the ambition of this committee, and I assume of Congress, to erect a system that will respond to wartime emergencies without subjecting the different parts of the Army to dislocation immediately upon the outbreak of war.

Gen. GOETHALS. I do not think that the General Staff would need to have any operating functions at all, if you concentrate your supplies under a supply department. The great difficulty in the past has been that a chief of bureau comes before a committee of Congress and advocates certain money for certain things, and it is a plausible excuse and a plausible reason and Congress appropriates the money, and that broadens out the bureau chief's authority. It is on that account that these various bureaus were all purchasing supplies of the same character. Now that can be done away with entirely by creating a supply corps for all standard articles and then subsequently adhering to that. The Navy requires that same operation. They have their department of purchase of all standard supplies, and are doing it under very general legislation. I suppose it has been called to the attention of the committee?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Gen. GOETHALS. And Senator Chamberlain, in his comment, complimented the Navy for getting along without any friction, and that was due to the fact that all the purchases were concentrated under one head, and the Army would have gotten along without any friction if the bureaus had not been interfering with each other in the purchase of standard supplies, and perhaps if they had gotten somebody else besides myself to handle it.

Senator WARREN. It would necessitate an appropriation following the plan of the Navy more nearly, would it not?

Gen. GOETHALS. Yes.

Senator WARREN. They do not divide their appropriations into so many lines as the Army does?

Gen. GOETHALS. That is an outgrowth from the records of the bureau chiefs, from committees of Congress. The more general legislation the better it is, the freer you can operate. The more general the scope of appropriate acts the better it is for the War Department. When they begin to abuse it, Congress finds itself fooled, then they begin to confine the appropriations for specific purposes.

The CHAIRMAN. Of course, in the items of appropriation in the Army appropriation bill, in many instances there is more than the mere appropriation of money—dollars and cents—they very often reflect a policy of Congress.

Gen. GOETHALS. That is true.

The CHAIRMAN. And it is necessary, therefore, for this committee, for example, and the corresponding committee in the House to bring out, to a great degree, detailed appropriations so Congress may keep track of the carrying out of this policy?

Gen. GOETHALS. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. The ramifications of the Army are a good deal broader than they are of the Navy. There is a suggestion carried in this bill for what might be called a budget system inside of the War Department for the making of estimates and making of appropriations by Congress. Have you any comment to make on that?

Gen. GOETHALS. I do believe in it. You can even carry it further.

Senator FLETCHER. Do you approve of this general staff corps as proposed in section 3 of the bill?

Gen. GOETHALS. That is the number, of course.

Senator FLETCHER. Yes.

Gen. GOETHALS. I do not know anything at all about that.

Senator FLETCHER. Its organization?

Gen. GOETHALS. I have not looked into the details of organization, and I was not consulted when this bill was gotten up, so I do not know the reasons which underlie it.

Senator FLETCHER. That is section 3, page 3.

Gen. GOETHALS. I do not know the reasons which resulted in this organization.

Senator FREELINGHUYSEN. You do agree we have got to have a general staff corps?

Gen. GOETHALS. We have got to have a general staff corps.

The CHAIRMAN. On page 32 of the bill, line 4, you will find the following language:

Congress shall appropriate in one item for the support of the Army the total amount of money authorized by them therefor for the ensuing fiscal year. Thirty days prior to the first day of each quarter of the fiscal year the Secretary of War shall apportion the amount of money needed during such quarter by the various services for which appropriations have been made. The Chief of Staff shall advise the Secretary of War as to the necessary apportionments and shall cause to be kept such accounts and make such reports as may be necessary to keep the apportionments thus made from being exceeded and to enable the Secretary of War to make additional apportionments or reapportionments during the quarter in the event the regular quarterly apportionments should prove to be deficient or excessive. The same procedure shall be followed as to estimates, appropriations, and apportionments in the case of deficiency appropriations should these become necessary.

Gen. GOETHALS. If the Army could get that it would put it in pretty good shape so far as its financial needs are concerned. That is what I used to fight for on the canal, but I never got it.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, are the two efforts similar?

Gen. GOETHALS. No; I do not think they are.

The CHAIRMAN (reading:)

Congress shall appropriate in one item for the support of the Army the total amount of money authorized by them therefor for the ensuing fiscal year.

If this bill became a law Congress will only appropriate \$900,000 and say, "Do what you like with it." Do you believe in that?

Gen. GOETHALS. No; not with the present condition of taxation.

The CHAIRMAN. I am not speaking of the amount.

Senator WARREN. Perhaps Congress would like to have somewhere within its boundaries a chance to look at the items.

The CHAIRMAN. It was explained by the Chief of Staff and the Secretary, both, I think, in their testimony, that the Congress would nevertheless appropriate by items for the support of different branches of the service, but that in the event of one branch of the service being operated at less than the estimate, or less than the item appropriated, the surplus thus created could be transferred and used to help out other branches of the service. The bill does not say that.

Gen. GOETHALS. No. I know I should not have any hope of it going through.

Senator SUTHERLAND. General, I want to ask you what you thought of promotion by selection as compared with promotion by seniority. We had quite a little discussion of that. There has been considerable testimony by different officers.

Gen. GOETHALS. I believe in promotion by selection, if it can be properly safeguarded.

Senator SUTHERLAND. Can it be?

Gen. GOETHALS. I do not see how it can be. There is the trouble.

The CHAIRMAN. There is some danger of the selections being made from those immediately about one, or personal friends, and so on?

Gen. GOETHALS. Well, if the question comes up as between two men, and you know one man and do not know the other, you know how it is, yourself. You are rather inclined toward the man you know, if he has made a favorable impression upon you.

Senator SUTHERLAND. Human nature works just the same in the Army as elsewhere.

Gen. GOETHALS. Exactly; I think more so in the Army.

Senator WARREN. With the result that those that work in Washington are nearer to the powers that be?

Gen. GOETHALS. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you believe in elimination?

Gen. GOETHALS. Yes, if you do not have selection; and elimination ought to be rigidly enforced.

Senator SUTHERLAND. Have you any suggestion to make as to how proper elimination can be secured?

Gen. GOETHALS. No. You are up against human nature again.

Senator SUTHERLAND. The board of officers is rather slow to throw out an officer who has been 15 or 20 years in the Army and whose sole means of livelihood is his place in the Army?

Gen. GOETHALS. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. In that connection, Gen. Snow, Chief of Field Artillery, in testifying before the committee the other day, submitted to the committee the proposed draft of legislation installing a system of elimination. I was looking through his testimony, but I do not happen to find it now. I think I can remember how it was proposed to operate it. It worked somewhat as follows:

That upon the report or recommendation of two officers, superior in rank to the officer in question and his commanding officers, the board shall be convened and the officer summoned before that board, in a sense to answer why he shall not be retired on a system of graded-retirement pay; and they aid the board to look into his case, and if they decide that the recommendations of the two officers who are his commanding officers are justified, he is retired and paid at the rate of 2½ per cent of his salary for each year of his service in the several grades.

Senator WARREN. How is that board constituted?

The CHAIRMAN. I forget how that board is constituted; it is appointed by the President; something to that effect. I wish I could see the exact language.

Senator WARREN. The main feature in that, I think, is the way they appoint the board.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you think some such scheme as that would work in the matter of elimination?

Gen. GOETHALS. I don't know. We have had elimination in the Army right along, but nobody has taken advantage of it that I know of.

The CHAIRMAN. What is the present provision?

Gen. GOETHALS. For retirement. An officer is called up before an efficiency board.

The CHAIRMAN. It is only for physical disability, is it not?

Gen. GOETHALS. Oh, no. He can be called up for mental disqualification or general ineptitude.

The CHAIRMAN. How do you think it could be worked out or have you worked it out in your own mind?

Gen. GOETHALS. I have not worked it out. I would prefer selection if we could work it out in some way; but I have not found any solution to it.

The CHAIRMAN. You do not think this bill presents a proper solution for that?

Gen. GOETHALS. It may. I don't know. Oh, this bill?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Gen. GOETHALS. By selection?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Gen. GOETHALS. No; I do not. I do not think any bill by selection can do away with the human nature involved.

Senator WARREN. You are speaking now of times of peace as well as times of war?

Gen. GOETHALS. I am speaking of times of peace. In times of war there are other ways.

Senator WARREN. Selection is practiced more in time of war?

Gen. GOETHALS. It has got to be. You can not get away from it.

Senator WARREN. You think we are sufficiently provided under the present law, do you, with the power to select?

Gen. GOETHALS. I think so.

Senator SUTHERLAND. Do you think there is enough ground in the lower grades to base a system of selection upon? Are not the duties so thoroughly prescribed that it is really difficult to judge of the men accurately, taking below the grade of major?

Gen. GOETHALS. No. I think you can judge accurately, but the difficulty is that the board that is appointed has got to know every man that is up before it for consideration and know how he does his duties, which the board will not be able to do. The board will have to be guided largely by efficiency reports. Efficiency reports were instituted in the Army some years ago. I was on duty in the Chief of Engineers' Office as one of his assistants, and the efficiency reports used to be passed through my hands. Some of the officers are very conscientious in reporting on their subordinates. Others are rather flowery and verbose in reporting, and if I did not know the officers that were reported on personally and know the work that they had been doing, I would get entirely wrong impressions from those efficiency reports. Gen. Poe, who was at that time one of the shining lights of the Engineer Department, was very sparing in his praise of anybody, and the result of the matter was that an officer who was serving under him—his record did not show up as well as the record

of a man who subsequently I recommended as unqualified for promotion because of his examination, and yet if a board passing on the selection of officers were to take the efficiency reports of those two officers the man who was found deficient would have been the man who was selected.

So any board, if they are thoroughly familiar with the officers themselves and the manner in which they have performed their duties, can select, and the selection will be all right; but we can not get a board with that knowledge.

Senator SUTHERLAND. It would be important, too, to know the characteristics of those who were recommending?

Gen. GOETHALS. Exactly; so I do not see how selection can be safeguarded. Elimination would be the better method, yet an officer will rather hesitate about dropping an officer who, as you say, has had 15 years of service. At the same time they may lean the other way, and you do not get the results that you ought to get.

The CHAIRMAN. To-day it is practically impossible to get rid of the incompetent officer except it can be shown affirmatively that he is mentally unfit?

Gen. GOETHALS. Yes; I know it.

The CHAIRMAN. Or by court-martial. And under the system to-day, if an officer were eliminated, he is discharged; he is not retired?

Gen. GOETHALS. No; he is discharged.

The CHAIRMAN. Does not that very state of affairs cause eliminating boards and efficiency boards to hesitate in throwing a man out?

Gen. GOETHALS. Yes. When certain officers get to a point where they are useless to anybody, even to themselves, they generally have sufficient warning to brace up, and if they do not, they do not have the sympathy of anybody. When I came here there was an officer from Portland who was absolutely worthless, and he was dismissed from the service. I did not have any compunction about it.

The CHAIRMAN. That is the exception that only proves the rule, I imagine. But I can well understand how a board of officers would dislike to throw an officer out in the cold world without any provision, and they lean as far as they can in his favor in order to save him.

Gen. GOETHALS. Oh, yes. So have you objections to both.

Senator SUTHERLAND. There should be some retirement provision coupled with that, should there not?

Gen. GOETHALS. Yes; that would probably help matters some.

The CHAIRMAN. Were there any other matters that the Senators desire to ask of the general? Are there any other phases of this bill or any other bill or proposal which has come to your attention which you would like to discuss? If so, we would be glad to hear from you.

Gen. GOETHALS. The only thing I was interested in, so far as the Army legislation was concerned, was the continuance of that supply system. I think it would be a mistake to go back to the conditions that existed previously. I also felt that the Motor Transport Corps ought to be part of the Transportation Corps.

I believe in a finance department. I have never believed that the purchasing officer ought to make the payments.

Senator WALSH. I did not get that.

Gen. GOETHALS. I believe in the finance department or corps. I say I have never believed that the purchasing officer ought to be the paying officer.

Senator WARREN. That, in practice, does not pan out, does it?

Gen. GOETHALS. Just at present it does not.

Senator WARREN. That is what I meant, just at present.

The CHAIRMAN. I wish you would elaborate that a little.

Gen. GOETHALS. The finance officer would make payments for all purchases. I think it is bad practice to have a purchasing officer of a corporation do the paying, and in the case of a corporation you will always find a separate officer doing the paying, and you have a separate check, and I think the same policy ought to be followed in the Army.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you think the contract by the purchasing department ought to be reviewed?

Gen. GOETHALS. We organized under the P. S. & T. Division a section to review all contracts; that became necessary. There was another feature I took up in connection with the P. S. & T. that I think in the supply, so far as the supply corps is concerned, that all contracts for supplies ought to be drawn up in consultation with the finance officer; all matters covering payments for contracts ought to be taken up with him.

The CHAIRMAN. I want to ask you about one more thing. This bill abolishes the office and department of the Inspector General.

Gen. GOETHALS. There is only one Inspector General now, and I think that could well be done by officers detailed from the General Staff. That is, there is only one officer permanently belonging to the Inspector General's Department.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes. I meant there was an Inspector General's Department, and this bill abolishes it.

Gen. GOETHALS. There was some talk; there has been talk ever since the creation of the General Staff of combining the Inspector General's Department with the General Staff. This accomplishes the same purpose and has generally been regarded as favorable in the Army. So I think that change is all right.

The CHAIRMAN. You do not believe that there should be an independent department?

Gen. GOETHALS. No.

The CHAIRMAN. It would have to be an organized division of the staff, would it not?

Gen. GOETHALS. It might be, in order to do the ordinary routine inspection that is required.

Senator WARREN. That one permanent officer is getting pretty nearly his retirement age, is he not?

Gen. GOETHALS. Yes; he retires in a few years. Special inspections could be made by special inspection officers; and that is done now, and not necessarily by officers of the Inspector General's Office.

Senator SUTHERLAND. In inspecting accounts you detail some one from the finance department, do you?

Gen. GOETHALS. Probably so. The Inspector General's Department had only one or two accountants who would actually make the inspections, accompanied by the Inspector General.

Senator WARREN. Is not that department supposed to make tours in times of peace?

Gen. GOETHALS. Yes. It inspects cemeteries and various organizations. Officers of the General Staff could do that just as well.

Senator WARREN. As it is now, they simply appoint specialists as occasion arises?

The CHAIRMAN. It goes further than that. They inspect the National Soldiers' Home.

Gen. GOETHALS. Yes; they inspect the National Soldiers' Home once or twice a year.

The CHAIRMAN. Then to all intents and purposes we would still have an inspection department?

Gen. GOETHALS. Not as an independent department. We would have inspections made of the Army, but not as an independent department.

The CHAIRMAN. I am wondering whether it is not a pretty healthy thing to have a separate and independent inspection department. I can not see what harm it does.

Gen. GOETHALS. It does not do any harm.

The CHAIRMAN. And I think on occasions it might be a pretty healthy influence.

Another proposition that has been made here by witnesses before the committee is that the branches of the service, such as Infantry, Cavalry, and Field Artillery should have service chiefs. We now have a chief of Field Artillery, but no chief of Infantry and no chief of Cavalry.

Gen. GOETHALS. That has been a standing fight ever since I have known anything about the Army: since the organization of the Coast Artillery. I do not know that I have any views on that subject at all.

Senator WARREN. That is an old nut to crack.

Senator SUTHERLAND. You mean to express?

Gen. GOETHALS. I mean to express. You see, I have not had anything to do with the Army since 1907, and I just came back during the war period for 15 months, and found my hands pretty full with the supply and embarkation situation and did not give much attention to the Army generally. I was always regarded as a mud digger and not much of a soldier.

Senator WARREN. Yes; your duties were in that department.

Senator THOMAS. I would like to amend that by saying you were regarded as a good deal of a mud digger.

Senator SUTHERLAND. It would be better to be a good mud digger than a poor soldier.

Gen. GOETHALS. It was only once in my life I thought I was a soldier and I got rather a shock later in life.

Senator NEW. I would like to ask the General if he has had opportunity to look over the bill 2693, providing for the establishment of a department of aeronautics, and, if so, whether he has any ideas to express on that.

Gen. GOETHALS. I came before a Senate committee in 1917 and advocated a department of aeronautics.

Senator NEW. If you have any particular suggestions to make concerning that, the committee would like very much to hear them.

Gen. GOETHALS. I do not exactly see how you are going to separate Army aeronautics from the Army itself. I think the department of aeronautics which would take hold of experimentation of all kinds, laboratory work and field work and experimental work for the development of the best types of motors and planes——

Senator NEW. And production?

Gen. GOETHALS (continuing). And production would be all right. The needs of the Army would have to be considered, and naturally a department of this kind would do that. The needs of the Navy would also be considered, and then the commercial system. The Government has got to take hold of aeronautics and do something. Private capital will not do it.

Senator NEW. Is not the situation such that private capital can not do it?

Gen. GOETHALS. It can not do it; no.

Senator NEW. And, that being true, it follows as a necessary sequence that the Government has to do something or the industry is going to go out of existence, so far as this country is concerned?

Gen. GOETHALS. Yes; so that the creation of a department would assist in that way. There must be a branch of the military service, the Aviation Corps, that must always exist; but I do not see why all the experimental work should be conducted for the Army and the Navy and the Post Office Department or any other branch of the Government. They all ought to be concentrated under one head, and the needs of the Navy should be looked after by this central department; and the needs of the Army and the other branches of the Government the same way. There would be economy in it, and the results secured ought to be good.

The CHAIRMAN. Can you not well imagine that this warfare in the air is going to be such an important feature of future warfare that before long we will be establishing a military academy to train men for that service?

Gen. GOETHALS. I should not wonder, but that would not affect the general proposition as outlined here, where all the experimental work and the development is done outside, with the assistance of details from the Army aviation and the Navy aviation.

(Whereupon, at 3.55 o'clock p. m., the committee adjourned subject to call of chairman.)

REORGANIZATION OF THE ARMY.

FRIDAY, OCTOBER 3, 1919.

UNITED STATES SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON MILITARY AFFAIRS,
Washington, D. C.

The subcommittee met pursuant to the call of the chairman, at 2.15 o'clock p. m., in the committee room, Capitol, Senator James W. Wadsworth, jr., presiding.

Present: Senators Wadsworth (chairman), New, Fletcher, Frelinghuysen, and Chamberlain.

Also present: Mr. Howard H. Gross president Universal Military Training League, and Bishop Samuel Fallows.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order.

STATEMENT OF REV. SAMUEL FALLOWS, BISHOP REFORMED EPISCOPAL CHURCH, CHICAGO, ILL.

The CHAIRMAN. We shall be glad to have your views, Bishop, on the question of universal military training.

Mr. GROSS. I think he had better state the positions he has held. It is rather an interesting record.

Bishop FALLOWS. I am presiding bishop of the Reformed Episcopal Church; mustered out brigadier general of the Civil War and chaplain-in-chief of the Grand Army of the Republic, and chaplain in chief of the Blue and Gray Legion; department commander of the Grand Army for the State of Illinois; and the department commander of the Loyal Legion of the State of Illinois; president of the Society of the Army of the Tennessee; president of the Grant Memorial Commission authorized by Congress to complete and dedicate the monument to Gen. Grant in the Botanical Gardens here. I was professor-elect of the University of Wisconsin; regent of the University of Wisconsin; superintendent of public instruction of Wisconsin; president of the Illinois Wesleyan University; and for 21 years the president of the board of managers of the Illinois State Reformatory, during which time I helped parole nearly 10,000 young men. Perhaps that is a sufficient enumeration without any other.

The CHAIRMAN. We have a bill before us here, in fact two bills, and in each of them the principle of universal military training is contained. We would like to have your observations on that phase of our problems.

Bishop FALLOWS. I will say, to begin with, I am most thoroughly in favor of the substance of the bills which have been presented before the Senate and the House committees on military-vocational

training for young men. I had occasion, of course, in my life, to know the beneficial effect of academic education along with partial military training in the past, in connection with the universities with which I have been connected, and I have seen its beneficial effects in the Illinois State Reformatory. I was connected with that institution for 21 years, as I have stated, and during eight of those years we had nearly 1,500 young men, and during that time we had military instruction, two battalions of 600 young men each, who were uniformed and equipped with muskets, without, of course, ammunition, and the beneficial effect upon them and the institution was marked in every particular. The reason why the policy of military training was not carried out longer was because there were some people on the outside who said, "You are periling your discipline, the lives of your officers are in danger in giving to over 1,000 young men these arms; they could overpower you," and all that. Not a single disturbance took place in the ongoing of the institution during that time.

This was before the Spanish-American War. A second lieutenant from the Regular Army came to the board, as I was presiding, and said, "We know you have got a lot of fine young fellows here, and we have learned that they have been having military drill, and we are in need of young men who have been trained in military matters in the Regular Army. Will you parole to us, to me, as representing the Regular Army, 40 or 50 of your young fellows?"

Well, we could do it, because the reformatory was not a penal institution, as the State prisons are, and we could parole them, and the boys would not lose caste in the Army, and so no stigma would be attached to them if they went.

We let them go, and we learned in a very short time afterwards that nearly every one of those young fellows had been promoted to be corporals or sergeants in the Regular Army, and went to the front with the Spanish-American troops.

Senator FLETCHER. About what was their ages, Bishop?

Bishop FALLOWS. About 18 would be the average age of those young fellows. We were empowered by the law of the State at that time to take young fellows from 10 to 21 years of age. Afterwards the law was amended so that the younger ages were excluded, and they extended the age to 25, but their ages then were about 18 or 19, so that they were well fitted for military duties.

They came there from the slums of Chicago and from other parts of the State, committed for almost every offense known to the law, and yet being minors, they were not held to be guilty of the same crimes which an adult person would commit.

Since then we had, through the board of education in Chicago, an advisory board of five gentlemen, of which I was one, appointed by that board to take into consideration the uniforming of our 5,000 high-school boys of the city.

Mr. GROSS. It was before the war?

Bishop FALLOWS. Before we got into it; yes. There was a good deal of opposition to it on the part of the women of the city and the mothers of these boys, and on the part of the Federation of Labor. We had a very hot discussion with the leaders of the Labor Party in Chicago on the subject. They were very fierce against the movement and said, "You are simply uniforming and arming these boys

to shoot us if any labor difficulty should occur." Of course we told them that was not the intention at all.

We had these boys, a whole lot of them, march through the loop portion of the city of Chicago in their civilian clothes, and large numbers of the city turned out to see them. The mothers were there. Then the board of education went on without any regard to the clamor, which was raised, and put the uniforms on the boys, gave them their muskets, and marched them again through the loop district. Then thousands and thousands viewed their marching. The mothers were there and the labor men were there. Well, pretty much all the multitude were converted. There was scarcely any opposition manifested. Before this measure was carried out there were 800 women, the brainy women of the State, representing various clubs, and literary and benevolent societies, and so forth. Out of the 800 799 voted against this proposition. One lady, president of The Ladies' Association of one of my churches voted in favor of it. Then, as I said, came the reversion of feeling, and the almost if not entirely unanimous feeling was in the other direction.

These bills, or the substance of the bills that are before you, provide that the boys shall go for training, not for service, but for training simply in cantonments, and with that training to take their vocational studies as far as possible for their life's work. But they are not to be used as these labor men feared at the beginning of the training of our high school boys to come into the military ranks; and be used for strikes, or anything of the kind. They are not to do police duty. They are simply to be trained for service, and that is as far as we go, waiting for any emergency that may arise to call these young fellows into action, or into the service of the State in a military direction.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. That would have to be done by subsequent congressional action?

Bishop FALLOWS. Of course, it would have to be done by your supreme body, which is the supremest body, of course, except perhaps the Supreme Court, in our political organization.

Now, from every point of view, it seems to me there can be no objection to carrying out the provisions of the bill. In the first place, these young fellows get a good physical development to begin with, and then they are taught all the fundamental principles which every young man ought to be taught, self-respect, respect of others, obedience to law, instant obedience, and to come together as representatives of one great union on a purely democratic basis and be in every way fitted for the duties of citizenship.

I do not see any alloy in the pure gold.

Mr. GROSS. What about crime?

Bishop FALLOWS. There is no doubt in my mind, not a bit, as this military discipline in our institutions shows, that if these young fellows, before they came in, had been subject to a similar treatment they never would have been inside at all. I thoroughly believe that almost all of the 10,000 that I came in contact with as president of the board, that four-fifths of those young chaps would have kept out of mischief and instead of being a burden to the State would be numbered among its productive elements.

Then I have taken a good deal of pains to find out what the pulse of public opinion is on the subject, and I can speak with a good

deal of assurance, that the great majority of the clergy of the country are in favor of it, and the medical men are unanimous almost in favor of it, and the Army is in favor of it, and I have taken special pains to get the opinions of these young fellows who have come from abroad, who have been a part of the 4,000,000 who have been selected and sent to the front are generally in favor of it, and this is true while they have had enough of war, as all soldiers in a country like ours have enough when the war is over, and do not want any more of it. I presume that three out of four of these young fellows are going to compose the American Legion, just as we composed the Grand Army of the Republic and the Confederate Veterans years ago. Many of them say that it is a benefit in every respect for a young man to have had the military training that they have had, and while they have done their duty and do not want any more of it, they think it is the best thing that can be done to train these young boys that are now coming up.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. There is opposition to it. Where does that opposition come from, do you think? What is the source of the opposition?

Bishop FALLOWS. Well, I can hardly analyze the sources of opposition, except that there is a misapprehension of the effect of this training. They are apprehensive of what they term the development of the spirit of militarism or the militaristic spirit in the community, but that comes, I am sure, from the uninformed and unenlightened.

Of course, you gentlemen know, as well as I know, that it is just as remote as light is from darkness that the American Nation will ever be infected with the spirit of militarism, because militarism is the rule of a state by soldiers or military forces. That is militarism in its essential nature.

The CHAIRMAN. As a matter of fact, Bishop, a large standing army is much more dangerous from that standpoint than a large trained citizen force?

Bishop FALLOWS. Yes; and yet you know, Senator, that whatever standing army Congress may determine—I hope it will not determine too large a standing army; we do not want too many soldiers; we want just enough to keep the peace at all times and present a respectable showing to the nations outside—but the idea that any army that the Congress of the United States will create can come here to Washington and dominate the policy of the country, which is militarism, is absolutely inconceivable, in my judgment.

Senator NEW. Do you not find that there is a widespread confusion of ideas as between military training and military service?

Bishop FALLOWS. Surely.

Senator NEW. The public, some large part of it, seems to feel that training means service.

Senator FLETCHER. Compulsory service.

Senator NEW. Compulsory service. They confuse the two things?

Bishop FALLOWS. Yes.

Senator NEW. And my observation has been that most of the objection to it comes from the wrong impression that is conveyed to so many minds by the use of the term.

Senator FLETCHER. I do not know how far that extends among labor organizations, but I have been getting resolutions from various labor unions opposing universal training and universal service, and

whether that is widespread or not I do not know, or whether it comes just from local unions here and there, but that same idea, I rather think, comes from certain unions.

Mr. GROSS. Senator, permit me to say this, that two months ago I was invited to a luncheon at which there were eight gentlemen, two very prominent labor men, the publisher of the Chicago Tribune and the publisher of the Daily News, and a man high in high military circles, myself and one other, and these labor men said, "Well, now we think the country should be in a position of preparedness, able to defend itself from aggression, but we do not like this idea of making soldiers out of our boys and subjecting them to the Articles of War, and all that sort of thing."

We discussed that matter from half past 1 until 4 o'clock, and when we got through this principal labor leader, who is very close to Sam Gompers, one of his closest friends, said, "Now, gentlemen, I am entirely in accord with military training as you have described it and am willing to do anything I can to help it along," but, he said, "In labor circles we have a refractory element, guided many times by impulse, and they start off and go in a reckless way, and sometimes you can not head them," but, he said, "I will do what I can." He has been doing it, helping me in getting this before some of his associates.

What we differentiated was this, that the men put into training do not go into the Army at all; they are trained and sent home and go into the industries, and the vast difference between training and service. Then the other man, two weeks later, went down to Bloomington at the State federation of labor meeting, and an extreme Socialist brought in a resolution condemning universal military training. He at once took issue with it, had it referred back to the committee and revamped in such a way that it was rather helpful than otherwise, and he did that because he came to understand it.

This is a campaign of education, and I am working with the labor people with good prospect of help, but right now they are all torn up over other matters and you can not get a hearing. It is the same as the people and the press, they are burdened with this question of the peace treaty and the like, so you can hardly get a hearing. Excuse me, I just wanted to make that point plain.

Senator FLETCHER. In regard to the time, the reorganization bill only provides for three months, and Senator Chamberlain's bill provides for six months. What have you to say about that?

Bishop FALLOWS. I would say emphatically, Senator, that six months is better than three. Of course, you can do a good deal with lads giving them 12 weeks' training.

Senator FLETCHER. If you give them only three months, you do not get any vocational training; you only get the military training, I take it?

Bishop FALLOWS. That is all. The major part of the training would be military in that period. With six months it seems to me that would be a far better period than three months in every respect for young men. It takes some time to get accustomed to the surroundings. You must allow for that, a week or two weeks or whatever it may be, to get used to the atmosphere. Then the six months of the vocational training is, of course, more valuable than three months. We know that as a postulate in education.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. Bishop Fallows, there is another thing that you have not suggested. You have noticed, doubtless, that the young men who were selected for military service were in a very large degree afflicted with social diseases.

Bishop FALLOWS. Oh, yes.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. Do you not think that much of that could be obviated if young men had opportunity to go into cantonments and receive instructions on sanitation and hygiene from a moral standpoint?

Bishop FALLOWS. Most assuredly.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. They are young men, many of them, who never had heard of these diseases; under the old system of enlistment they would not take a man into the Army who was so afflicted, but under this selective service law they took them in, and not only did they restore them to useful life, but taught them from a moral standpoint the evils of intemperate social life.

Bishop FALLOWS. Yes. That is going on now. All the fellows who have not gone into the Army, have the sociological features presented by the military authorities.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. The most remarkable statement I heard from a commanding officer over there was that when he demobilized his men that occupied a place in the army of occupation, out of 28,000 men there were only 12 men that were afflicted with these diseases and he said that came from the competent lecturing of officers of the different smaller units.

Mr. GROSS. Right in that connection. General Leonard Wood told me in his cantonments out there with more than 40,000 men and nearly 10,000 of them afflicted with those diseases, that after three months only six new cases developed and most of those other fellows had been cleaned up. It was of wonderful effect in that very view, teaching the young men personal hygiene and cleanliness and high thinking and high living.

Bishop FALLOWS. As I said, take it from any angle and there is nothing but benefit to accrue. In the first place the individual, and then the associated individuals, and thus the whole community, the American citizenship.

The CHAIRMAN. At what age would you suggest beginning their training?

Bishop FALLOWS. I think the bills which you have under consideration make in the nineteenth year. I would begin, if it were my own subject for determination, at an earlier age, but to remove all possible objections I think the nineteenth year is about the age. A young fellow then is coming to the age of self-consciousness. It takes him pretty nearly that length of time to realize that he is himself, and then the development goes on. He is fitted then to carry a musket, if necessary to carry his accouterments on his shoulder, and stand up under whatever load may be put upon him.

Senator NEW. I was going to ask how long a time you thought it necessary for proper training.

Bishop FALLOWS. I should say six months, that is a very happy medium, I think, because a young fellow can get all the essentials of military training, all the essential rudiments in that time, and be ready when called upon to take his place in line without going through the experience of an awkward squad, because every soldier

has to be trained and disciplined that way. That is all anticipated by this treatment.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. With your experience with young men, if you were at the head of an industrial establishment, and had, we will say, to select 10 young men to start them in business, where would you look to find the best material, among those who have had military training or among those who have grown up without it?

Bishop FALLOWS. Those who had military training.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. Why?

Bishop FALLOWS. Because they are, in the military parlance, better set up young fellows to begin with, more square shouldered; they are more amenable to rules and orders, more prompt in obedience, more alert in taking in things and carrying out orders. Naturally more so.

Senator NEW. They would learn more about men, too, would they not?

Bishop FALLOWS. Far more.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. And know more about how to command than men who had not had the training?

Bishop FALLOWS. Certainly.

The CHAIRMAN. How do you think a period of six months would affect the educational institutions of the country?

Bishop FALLOWS. You mean the higher institutions?

The CHAIRMAN. Such as the colleges.

Bishop FALLOWS. If you take the young men of 19, which is the contemplated age, the nineteenth year, which is between 18 and 19, I do not think it would have any serious effect on the colleges and universities who take young men of that age and at a little older—a few take them a little younger. But this training would be in line with them, not antagonistic to them. Take my own university, of Wisconsin. It sent, I think, nearly 5,000 young men to the front. The State has now passed a law giving \$30 a month to every Wisconsin returned soldier who attends the university, and free tuition.

Senator FLETCHER. For how long?

Bishop FALLOWS. A complete course to graduation.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. Would not the universities, too, if the system became a general one, fit their curriculum into the courses prescribed in the cantonment?

Bishop FALLOWS. Oh, yes; there will come about a coordination, because the universities are just as wide-awake on the subject as anyone can be. They are in favor, so far as I could find out, taking my own university and the three others I have been connected with. I have recently been president of the alumni association in Chicago: all the young fellows that I have been brought in contact with are thoroughly in favor of the idea of this preliminary training. Then, you know, in most of the State universities they have had grants and give military instruction to their classes in the sophomore and junior year, and perhaps in the freshman year. They are thoroughly imbued, all of these leading educators, with the importance of some kind of military training for the young men connection with their university courses.

Senator FLETCHER. They would have three months' vacation between the terms. You could use that all right in training camps.

Would the university be willing to give the young man credit for the other three months of his course?

Bishop FALLOWS. As I say, I think a coordination could be secured. I remember during the Civil War the senior classes of the university were graduated on the field; they gave them the last three months of their terms. Some of the universities and colleges during this war have done the same. So that I do not have any fear whatever but that there would be a complete coordination between this preliminary system of training and the higher training which the universities would carry out.

Mr. GROSS. Bishop, Senator Chamberlain's bill, which was introduced some time ago, provided that all boys taking training in the universities that were acceptable to the Secretary of War would be accepted as a credit of three months, which would reduce it to three months.

Bishop FALLOWS. Yes; we may take it for granted that the universities are in sympathy with any well thought out effort to train the young men. They see the importance of not merely the physical training in athletic areas, but of military discipline, which carries with it all the athletic work which the university does on the baseball or the football campus.

Mr. GROSS. Only 22 men play football, and the others stay on the side lines?

Bishop FALLOWS. I have rooted, but I have never played.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. I have seen a number of young men who have come back, Bishop, who were attending college in a perfunctory sort of way when they left, but they have come back more thoroughly imbued with the necessity of securing an education.

Bishop FALLOWS. Yes.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. I know one young man, who is a lieutenant in the Regular Army, who is very anxious now to complete his education. He said he had seen the necessity to know more.

Bishop FALLOWS. As illustrating that, the University of Wisconsin is now getting an enrollment of 10,000 young men, 4,000 of whom have been in the service, and are discharged and are in the State and are eligible to appointment under that law.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. Do you not think they will learn to take a more serious view of life?

Bishop FALLOWS. Oh, they have, and the very fact of their going back shows that. Then any number of young men in the Civil War, just as soon as that war was over—of course you know how young fellows were that went in, there were 104,987 that were only 15 years of age, and 231,051 that were 16, and 844,891 that were 17 years of age and under, and 1,151,438 that were 18 years and under. Now, when the war was over, which lasted longer than this war did for us in years, numbers of them went back, became lawyers, ministers, business men. They went to college or the business colleges or the law schools and graduated. So that this idea of military training is not going in any way to interfere with the great work of the education of the American people. It is going to facilitate, help it forward.

Senator FLETCHER. What effect do you think it will have on the industries, taking the men out, say, for six months in a year?

Bishop FALLOWS. Of course, the vocational training, the curriculum of studies that will be arranged, so that as far as possible they will be following the preliminary studies for their life work. Engineering and mechanics, and everything that pertains to the industries, and agriculture of the nation will be taught.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. Let me suggest, Bishop, I see by the papers—I do not know whether it is true or not—that universities now are segregating young men from a psychological standpoint to ascertain what they are best fitted for in life, and advising them taking an education along that particular line.

Bishop FALLOWS. Yes, you know the new era in education, it is comparatively new, I would say within 4 or 5 years, certainly 10 years, has been to the vocational side, the practical side of education. Those of us who are older than the younger generation know how the training in a college or university was entirely distinct from the practical side of life. Again, my own University of Wisconsin—pardon me for referring to that—it was the pioneer of all universities of the world in making education thoroughly practical. We received the agricultural land grant. I was then one of the regents of the university. I saw the first things that were planted in the little area near the university proper. I began instruction to everything pertaining to agriculture as well as the mechanical arts. And now, in all directions, the trend of education is in the direction of the practical. The question is, "What is your culture worth to me?" That is what a young man is asking, and the universities and colleges are meeting the demand; all of them.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. I have noticed that discussed in the press somewhere and I wondered if it was true.

Bishop FALLOWS. Yes, it is. In former universities training nothing was taught but the ancient classics and belles-lettres, rhetoric, philosophy, logic, and so on. Nothing else. At that time electricity was simply taught by revolving a glass wheel in an envelope of silk and developing sparks. Chemistry was taught simply in a perfunctory way; there were some simple experiments performed. The trend of education to-day is in the right direction.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. To find out first what a man is fitted for, then teach him how to do it?

Bishop FALLOWS. Teach him how to do it, at the same time not to forget to give him an education that will make him sympathetic in the broad field of knowledge with his fellow men; that is the idea of modern education.

The very best that has been thought out can be applied to the educational training that shall be given, with military training, keeping in view in educating the young man, you are not going to take him out of the protective areas of life, instead, you are going to fit him for the very thing that will give him bread and butter to begin with and develop the industries of the country.

Senator FLETCHER. You have considered, have you, the expense of this training?

Bishop FALLOWS. Yes.

Senator FLETCHER. That is an item that impresses us very much, whether the country would look with favor on the expenditure of something like \$800,000,000 a year.

The CHAIRMAN. That was in the Regular Army.

Senator FRELINGHUYSEN. It was about \$94,000,000 estimated for the universal training.

Senator FLETCHER. I was taking in the whole.

The CHAIRMAN. The whole was \$900,000,000.

Bishop FALLOWS. Of course you know we American people have learned to think in billions and not in millions, to begin with. I remember that the president of the Bankers' Association of the United States was in Chicago during the war. He said, "Gentlemen, the wealth of the United States is \$320,000,000,000." Then he went on to say, "If it is necessary to win this war, we will spend every dollar of our wealth sooner than be crushed." We spent pretty nearly one-tenth of it.

Senator FRELINGHUYSEN. We have spent a tenth.

Bishop FALLOWS. Of course a lot of that has gone into smoke, and in different ways, but the winning of the war was worth it. The expense of this movement, why, we should not feel it!

Senator FRELINGHUYSEN. Bishop, I think the question is not to convince the committee of the necessity of military training, but to convince the country of it.

Bishop FALLOWS. Precisely.

Senator FRELINGHUYSEN. And the reaction against it is going to be the people at home who are opposed to it, particularly because they are ignorant of its benefits. I think it is like all other great movements, which, practically, radically change the policy of the country, that you have got to educate the people to the necessity of it. Now, in your country, how far have you observed, not among the educational people, not among the boys who come to your institution, but among the working classes and the business classes of the country, the taxpayers, have you noticed any sentiment for it and what has been done along educational lines?

Bishop FALLOWS. I will let Mr. Gross, who is the president of the movement, answer that question. But I can say in advance of what he is going to say, that most earnest and widespread efforts have been made to educate the people, the common people, the ones to whom you refer, and Mr. Gross can speak far more intelligently than I can speak, and yet I have been trying to ascertain what the general feeling is, and it is increasingly favorable, and the men who mold public opinion are the ones who are most earnest in their advocacy of the plan.

Mr. Gross can tell you, in brief, the propaganda which has been inaugurated and carried out and which is being carried out so that as we suggested to the committee of the House who are, of course, very close to the people, that no pains have been spared to educate their constituents in the supreme issues of this movement and to discriminate in the use of terms, such as "training" and "service," and so on.

Senator FRELINGHUYSEN. I did not mean to cut short your testimony.

Bishop FALLOWS. No; not at all. But I have finished it and wish to express my sincere appreciation of your great courtesy in listening to me.

The CHAIRMAN. We will now hear Mr. Gross.

STATEMENT OF MR. HOWARD H. GROSS, PRESIDENT UNIVERSAL MILITARY TRAINING LEAGUE, CHICAGO, ILL.

Mr. GROSS. I will endeavor to make my talk brief.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well, sir.

Mr. GROSS. A vast majority of the people are ready for universal training—I should say 80 to 90 per cent. For four years I have been doing nothing else but study this question, and as far as I was able, to get before the people the real underlying facts and principles of this training, and to show them that training was not service. What the people object to is any liability for service in peace times. They understand the boys must serve in an emergency, such as a war. When they are assured that the boys after training are sent home and not subject to mobilization except in a crisis of war they will be satisfied.

Last year at the Rotary convention in Kansas City (you know the Rotary clubs are exceedingly active and influential, and there are nearly 550 of them in all the principal cities of the Union) we discussed the matter of universal military and vocational training and the convention passed a resolution unanimously indorsing it and requesting the various local clubs to form special committees to cooperate with our organization to bring this matter before the public.

Senator FLETCHER. How about the agricultural organizations.

Mr. GROSS. A good many of them are for it. So far as we have been able to get before them exactly what we are striving to accomplish, the vast majority are for it.

Last year in Iowa I attended a convention of farmers and dairymen. There were from fifteen hundred to two thousand people there. After a full explanation and calling to their minds that in the cantonments we would have the most remarkable rebuilding of the manhood of the Nation and that every boy was stronger and better for the experience, and made it clear that the liability to serve rests upon the boy anyway and that the Government will call him in a crisis whether trained or untrained, just as was done in the selective draft, that the training does not increase his liability to serve one iota, but it does enable him to defend his country much more efficiently and with much less danger to himself—in fact that his chances of coming back unharmed are at least three times better than going in untrained, approval was shown everywhere. I asked for a show of hands, and every hand came up apparently in that whole vast audience. I called for a show of hands on the negative side and two fellows put their hands up, then pulled them down again.

Two weeks later, at Columbus, Ohio, at the national meeting of the Dairymen's Association, I addressed an audience of about 2,000. I stood among the cows down in the ring. After putting the proposition before them I asked for a show of hands. Hands came up like a forest, while against the proposition but one hand appeared. The papers next day said the vote was 2,000 to 1.

I discussed this matter before women's clubs, where, to begin with there was opposition because of misinformation. They did not "raise their boys to be soldiers." This was soon after we entered the war. After a full discussion, I said: "Girls, how many of you are in favor of this proposition?" and every hand came up.

Senator FRELINGHUYSEN. When you spoke before those various dairymen's associations, was that after the armistice or during the war?

Mr. GROSS. No; it was before the armistice. About three months ago, when Col. Foreman's regiment returned to Chicago, there was a big celebration at Medinah Temple. The place was filled, there were nearly 5,000 present—the boys in khaki and their friends. They asked me to speak upon universal training. After a 10 minutes' talk I asked for a vote by a show of hands. It was practically unanimous. The papers said next day the vote was unanimous—the boys were for it.

I have tried to ascertain as fully as I could how the boys from "over there" felt upon the proposition. I employed a very bright second lieutenant, who had spent two years abroad, to go to Camp Grant and to different places to look up the boys who had been "over there." His instructions were not to try to convince or influence them, but to ascertain what their reaction was and what they had to say. Some of the boys were sore. Some thought they had not had a square deal. After listening to their stories, he asked them: "Did the training do you any good?" They said, "Yes, I am stronger and better man for it." "Do you think the Government ought to establish training so that all the boys may take it?" More than 90 per cent said "yes." (Mr. Abbott, here, who represents us in Washington, found the same conditions in talking to the boys on the streets of this city.) I gave the lieutenant a letter to Gen. Bell, and he had all facilities at Camp Grant and met several hundred boys.

The war is now over, or it seems to be. We have an enormous debt, and what Uncle Sam needs more than anything else is man power, strong virile citizens who will do a man's full duty and will be an asset instead of a liability. Give the boys training that will broaden the shoulders, make muscles like whipcords, render the men from 50 to 100 per cent stronger and more efficient. If there is one thing we need more than another it is strong manhood with a broadened vision and a new inspiration.

The training camp to the average boy will be the greatest event in his life. Some will come from humble homes, some from homes of affluence, from all parts of the country, and various nationalities; and the only place in this country where they will stand upon an absolutely democratic basis is the training camp, every boy in the same uniform, given the same training without discrimination or distinction; through this commingling getting the other fellow's viewpoint; forming acquaintances and friendships that will grow and grow; and when they get back home, if they have had at least six months of it—and they should not have a day less than that or they will miss nine-tenths of the benefits—they will be stronger and better men, with a higher view of life and a better understanding of the problems of the other fellow; and when they meet in after years, wearing the insignia of training that shows they have been through the camp, there will be a bond of sympathy born from a common experience; and if they come together as employer and employee, they will adjust their differences more readily. Now, they come together with a chip on their shoulders and fight until they are exhausted. That condition can not continue and democracy survive. Universal training will be a great factor for industrial tranquillity.

James J. Hill said to me, and aside from the chairman here I think he was the greatest man I ever knew: "Putting the boys together in a training camp will put lubricant in the gear boxes of our industries instead of sand." Gentlemen, I believe it will do that very thing.

Something over a year ago I sent a questionnaire to judges of the supreme courts of the various States—not all the judges, but most of them—trial judges of the criminal courts of the various States, prosecuting attorneys, and prison wardens, asking what in their judgment would be the influence on crime of universal obligatory military training, and here is a little pamphlet that gives those letters. We have analyzed them carefully. We went over them with Victor F. Lawson, publisher of the Chicago Daily News, and reached the conclusion that if it was as stated, a composite of all these would justify the statement that training would reduce crime at least 50 per cent. The reasons given were that an untrained man is a dangerous animal; he acts upon impulse; and any amount of crimes are committed upon impulse. Training teaches responsibility, teaches deliberation, teaches respect for authority and self-respect. A résumé of those letters were published in the Chicago Daily News of February 22, 1919, copies of which will be sent to the chairman. If you can realize what the reduction of crime means in lowering of taxes, you will find there will be a tremendous saving which would go a long way toward paying the cost of the training.

Upon examination I find that the War Department has estimated that it will cost \$144 per boy to bring them together, including physical examination, and training them for three months. If the period were extended to say six months the expense would be something like \$220. Whether it would cost \$96,000,000 as per War Department figures or \$126,000,000 is not so important as to build up a higher and better civilization. That is what we must do. We want every man built up—with a better physique—and thus produce better fathers and workers for future generations.

Senator FLETCHER. You would not leave it voluntary, would you, with the men? You think it necessary to make it compulsory?

Mr. GROSS. I do, most emphatically, and it must be done under military discipline. To put it upon a voluntary basis, in my judgment, would make it a failure.

Senator FLETCHER. Three months' time you think would be almost a failure?

Mr. GROSS. I would say it was hardly worth the trying. It would make the training unpopular. Why? Because it would have to be an intensively hard grind of military discipline and training in order to accomplish anything. The boys would be tired out and worn out, and on hot days some would hardly be able to stand it. I think many boys would fall by the wayside. With six months' training the boys need not go so hard a pace and you can give them much more and, when they are through with it, it would be worth many times more than can be accomplished in the three months' period. I feel entirely sure about that. I have made a careful study of the whole subject for nearly four years, and this thing has got to be popular with the boys, it has got to be popular with the people, or they will not stand for it. We all know that. We must give the boy such training and

instruction as will help him make his way in the world. If we forget the need of the boy, we overlook the most important factor in the problem.

The Government has the right to call a boy, put his life in jeopardy to defend the flag. The boy has no option in the matter. A government holding that authority owes it to the boy to train him to render service if service should become necessary, and to do it with the highest efficiency and with the least risk to himself. If we had had universal training five or six years ago I question whether there would have been a world war—certainly we would not have been forced into it, and I think the *Lusitania* would be afloat to-day.

I am doing all I can to get the real facts before the people. Within a few weeks approximately 400 newspapers throughout the country will publish a series of cartoons made for us by the best cartoonists of the United States. One hangs upon the wall of the committee room on the right as you go out. We believe these cartoons will bring home to the people in a very striking manner the necessity for training.

The training camp ought to be the boy's greatest opportunity. Every day is golden. He will be learning something. The training will develop a higher type of manhood. The boy will be taught the philosophy of government. It will get people of all walks of life together, and we will find that the training camp is the only melting pot that melts and transmutes our conglomerate of various nationalities into loyal American citizens. Do this, and you will have done something worth while—you will have saved civilization, and this is absolutely essential if we are to go on to the great destiny that awaits us.

A trained citizenship is the fundamental of national defense; it is absolutely essential to any military policy you may adopt, if you are going to be safe. It is the best policy for peace and the best insurance against an attack that you can have.

If Dempsey were walking down the street and I knew him, I would not go out of my way and try to push him into the ditch; I would have respect for his prowess. In strength there is safety. As a Nation we have unlimited, unmeasured resources, and we have potentially the greatest man power of any nation in the world.

Senator FLETCHER. What will you do with these men after they leave the camp? Will you let them go or will you keep some record of them?

Mr. GROSS. Yes, sir; I would let them go.

Senator FLETCHER. What would be your method of making them available as a reserve?

Mr. GROSS. I think the best way is to let them go home—back into the industries; let them be registered as a reserve and if a crisis should arise, to call them into the service in the reverse order in which they were trained; that is, those last trained should be called first. Every one trained should be required to make a report to the Government at least once a year. How? At the post office upon a card that should be furnished him, he should give his name, where he was trained and the identification division, his post office address, what he is doing, the kind of work, etc., the state of his health, and (if you wish to know) the amount of his earnings.

Senator FLETCHER. And whether he is married or not?

Mr. GROSS. And whether he is married or not. Now, let that be the practice for five to seven years. Thus the War Department would have a record of every young man in the land. They will know what each one is fitted for. If an electrician is needed, or any other trade, the Government can put its hands upon the man it needs. It will be no hardship upon the boy to make this report. He merely goes to his post office.

Senator FLETCHER. You would not assemble them once a year for maneuvers, or keep them in touch with any particular command?

Mr. GROSS. I should like to do so, but it would cost too much money.

The CHAIRMAN. Right there, it is probably conceded that it is a proper military point of view; that it is a better military policy to have a reserve organization; that is, after you have trained these men for six months and assign them for a period to reserve units, regiments, and battalions, batteries stationed in their various localities, with the requisite equipment stored in the neighborhood, and then have them, if the country can afford it, attend the maneuvers, properly organized with officers and men.

Mr. GROSS. To have them locally come together in small bodies where they can do it quickly and without much expense?

CHAIRMAN. Yes; of course that brings in the question of compulsory service. There is where that dividing line runs between the training camp itself and the obligations to serve in a reserve force for a period thereafter. Without doubt, from a military standpoint, that is the most effective, if we were to get into a great big war, because we could summon up our reserve army already organized to train their own men.

Mr. GROSS. I am afraid you would find more opposition to that than you would to the other plan.

The CHAIRMAN. That is the point I am trying to bring out. There is where the distinction comes.

Bishop FALLOWS. In the progress of the years if the public saw that this plan was working out all right, these other things could come in—I mean those maneuvers.

Mr. GROSS. On this little leaflet, right at the bottom, you will find printed in red a note that the labor leaders seem entirely satisfied with. The note reads:

Those trained can only be called for service in case of war. They can not be mobilized for suppression of strikes or rioting. That is the function of the police, the State troops, and the Regular Army.

That is what we must do—keep the training and service separate. You will find no opposition, practically, to the training, but if you mix training and service, you will have trouble. The main purpose of this training will not be to make soldiers, because that is incidental; training for the defense of the country is their obligation anyway, under the law, and every man must defend his country in case of stress. Make the training period a period of education, and give the man taking it a lot of other things that will help him in his life work.

The CHAIRMAN. And build up the manhood?

Mr. GROSS. Yes; and build up the manhood of the country.

The CHAIRMAN. And the man power?

Mr. GROSS. The man power of this country would be doubled in a few years. We have spent hundreds of millions of dollars and two or three generations breeding up higher types of farm animals. That was done in your part of the country and mine and it has spread all over the land. Now we find that six months scientific training under military discipline will do more to develop higher types of manhood than two generations have done in developing stock. Query: Shall we develop the steer and neglect the boy? That is the question.

I believe when our cartoons have been published and the public mind is relieved as to the uncertainty of the peace treaty and the league of nations, that the Congressmen will hear from home and find that the people are ready to accept this training; but they want to know that the training does not mean that these boys are to be pushed into the Army and sent to Armenia or some other place for policing purposes.

Just one thing more: Assuming that we have a league to enforce peace, as the President desires, or as it is now framed up, I would like to read you this from David Lloyd-George, the British premier, when he returned from Paris and addressed Parliament. He said:

I look on it as a great and hopeful experiment. I beg this country may give it a fair and honest trial. It will not stop all trouble; it may stop some.

And further:

After all, the league would have no value unless it had behind it strong nations prepared at a moment's notice to stop aggression.

I think we may assume that human nature is pretty much the same as before the war. Germany's industries are intact, and she is at work night and day, and in 10 or 12 years she will be on her feet, and during this time she may dominate Russia with her "Kultur;" and we have no assurance that we will not be called upon to protect ourselves from some other quarter of the world as well. But I will say this, if we were never to have another war and could be sure of it, I would urge this training under military discipline just as strenuously, because it builds up the manhood of the country to higher and better types of citizens, and will produce a better civilization than the world has ever known.

(Whereupon, at 4.45 p. m., the subcommittee adjourned, subject to the call of the chairman.)

X

REORGANIZATION OF THE ARMY

HEARINGS

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE COMMITTEE ON MILITARY AFFAIRS. UNITED STATES SENATE

SIXTY-SIXTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

ON

S. 2691

A BILL TO PROVIDE FOR UNIVERSAL MILITARY, NAVAL, AND VOCATIONAL TRAINING AND FOR MOBILIZATION OF THE MANHOOD OF THE NATION IN A NATIONAL EMERGENCY

S. 2693

A BILL TO CREATE A DEPARTMENT OF AERONAUTICS, DEFINING THE POWERS AND DUTIES OF THE DIRECTOR THEREOF, PROVIDING FOR THE ORGANIZATION, DISPOSITION, AND ADMINISTRATION OF A UNITED STATES AIR FORCE, CREATING THE UNITED STATES AIR RESERVE FORCE, AND PROVIDING FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF CIVIL AND COMMERCIAL AVIATION

S. 2715

A BILL TO REORGANIZE AND INCREASE THE EFFICIENCY OF THE UNITED STATES ARMY, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES

PART 18

Printed for the use of the Committee on Military Affairs

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REORGANIZATION OF THE ARMY.

MONDAY, OCTOBER 6, 1919.

UNITED STATES SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON MILITARY AFFAIRS,
Washington, D. C.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to the call of the chairman, at 10.15 o'clock a. m., in the committee room, Capitol, Senator James W. Wadsworth, jr., presiding.

Present: Senators Wadsworth (chairman), Sutherland, New, Frelinghuysen, and Chamberlain.

STATEMENT OF GEN. H. M. LORD, DIRECTOR OF FINANCE, UNITED STATES ARMY.

The CHAIRMAN. Will you tell the committee, General, about your appointments during the war?

Gen. LORD. At the present I am Director of Finance, United States Army. At the beginning of the war I was in active charge, under Gen. Cruse, of quartermaster finances. On the consolidation of the War Department finances under one control, I was designated Director of Finance, and hold that position at this time.

Senator FLETCHER. What does that involve, General?

Gen. LORD. It involves the entire charge of all War Department disbursements, exclusive of the civil appropriations, like river and harbor bills, accounting for all such appropriations, and in charge of the submission of estimates.

Senator FLETCHER. Is that connected with the Purchase, Storage and Traffic?

Gen. LORD. It is not a branch of Purchase, Storage and Traffic. When the Finance Service was originally organized, it was organized as a branch of Purchase, Storage and Traffic, but afterwards separated therefrom by an order, so that the Finance Service to-day is exactly as independent as the Engineer Corps, or the Ordnance Department, with the exception that those organizations are statutory, while the Finance Service is an emergency organization.

Senator FLETCHER. I did not want to interrupt the order of your statement, but I wanted to understand that a little myself. I was not quite clear what its functions were.

The CHAIRMAN. We will be glad to have any observations you care to make on the bill prepared in the War Department, or anything connected with this problem, connected with military policy.

Gen. LORD. I should like to speak at some length relative to the financial operations of the War Department, which led up gradually to the centralization of all finances under one control, and the provision made in this so-called reorganization bill, which has been submitted to Congress by the War Department, which provides for an independent finance system for the War Department.

NO FINANCIAL SYSTEM OR POLICY.

When we entered the war, the War Department had absolutely no financial system or policy. It could not have, under its organization, under its statutory organization. There were five separate, independent bureaus, each having its own functions and making its own purchases, its own contracts, and making its own settlements, having its own independent system of contracting, its own system of expenditure, its own methods of accounting. Later the question of supply—that is, the consolidation of supply and its coordination—was effected under the provisions of the Overman Act, and later still the dissemination or distribution of financial responsibility was corrected under authority of the same act.

I wish to furnish certain figures and make certain statements and submit a report to this committee of my stewardship as Director of Finance of the United States Army. As I stated in the beginning, we entered this war without any financial policy, and yet we required, in the course of operations, appropriations exceeding \$24,000,000,000. We have expended at the present time, actually expended, approximately \$15,000,000,000 with more than an additional billion of expenditure in sight.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you mean by that in all departments?

Gen. LORD. In the War Department, in all the bureaus, the War Department appropriations were in excess of \$24,000,000,000. I will repeat that: We have already expended 15 billions and we have more than 1 billion in sight to expend.

There are certain financial problems that belong to the War Department as a whole and do not allocate themselves to any particular supply bureau or any group of supply bureaus. They are financial problems per se; they do not necessarily associate themselves with supply, but are of the greatest importance, requiring solution. It seems to have been the idea in the War Department that financial matters can be handled in the most casual way, as a side issue, and that idea, which seems to have been very general, has cost the Government a great deal of trouble and a great deal of money.

What I have to say is in no way any criticism of any of the bureau chiefs. I know them personally and they are my friends, and I do not think I have an enemy in the bunch. I trust I have not. I hope I have not. They all have done a great amount of constructive work, and they did a great amount of splendid work in spite of this handicap, this wretched system of finance, or rather lack of system of finance.

I have referred to certain problems that were really financial problems and did not belong to any special supply bureau. I wish to cite a few examples, to illustrate the point I make.

MEMORANDUM RECEIPT LEGALIZED.

I realized while in charge of the quartermaster appropriations that the question of paying an enormous number of troops coming to the cantonments, and troops who would be overseas, by disbursing officers belonging to the disbursing corps, would be impossible; that to have a bonded officer for every payment would be impossible and impracticable; that we must be able to utilize line officers, such as supply officers of regiments and company commanders to make actual payment of funds to the men.

This was necessary in order to get prompt and accurate payment. A memorandum receipt, if we issued money to such officers on a memorandum receipt, such memorandum receipt under such conditions would merely be prima facie evidence that the officer so issuing that money had transgressed the law and it would be no protection to him whatever in case of loss. We succeeded in getting incorporated in the act of May 12, 1917, a provision legalizing the memorandum receipt, so that we would be enabled, in our quartermaster activities, to utilize so-called agent officers; that legislation provided for agent officers. We could then turn the requisite amount of money over to the company commander, taking his receipt therefor, and he taking the roll, pay his men, at his own convenience, without interfering with the operation of troops and without calling into the service an extraordinarily large number of disbursing officers to meet that need.

Senator FRELINGHUYSEN. Would he pay them by cash or check?

Gen. LORD. In cash always during the war; some few payments were made to officers or enlisted men by check, and payments were made monthly, except where troops were separated from their base in the field of action and could not be reached. In those cases they did not of course receive regularly the monthly payment, but all payments over here were made monthly; in the Spanish-American War troops were paid every two months.

Senator FLETCHER. There was a great deal of complaint made on the other side of failure to receive their money.

Gen. LORD. Necessarily so. As an illustration, an organization was brigaded with the French. We had no disbursing officer with the French. Movements were made by night, and an officer going to a point where the troops were to-day might find them 50 miles away, and upon reaching that point might find they were shifted again. The most serious trouble came with the casualty men, the wounded or sick who fell out of their organizations, were evacuated to this and that hospital and did not get their pay for some months.

Now we succeeded in getting this provision legalizing the memorandum receipt in 1917. The need of it in other bureaus was just as urgent, and yet there was no one to represent the other bureaus. We represented the Quartermaster Corps. We had no thought of anything else. No one bureau had any thought or reason for thinking of others than themselves. If we had attempted to get that provision for other bureaus of the War Department it could have been claimed to be an interference on our part; that is, we would have been interfering with their prerogatives, but in a little more than a year later they came along and succeeded in getting legislation that applied also to their bureaus.

As another illustration, when Gen. Pershing went overseas with his first staff detachment, I realized the possibility that cable communication might be cut. I realized also the necessity of there being an uninterrupted flow of money overseas and so gave instructions to quartermaster disbursing officers going across to draw their Treasury checks whether they had a balance in the Treasury or not, and pay all legitimate bills, pay the troops, and pay everything that was a proper object for payment, and notify us at the earliest possible date and we would see to it over here that if checks reached the Treasury Department in excess of the disbursing officer's balance a requisition would be put through at once and the check covered. In that way we guaranteed a continuous supply of funds for troops overseas.

That was not done with other bureaus. I had, as I said, no authority to act for other bureaus. It was one of those general matters of policy belonging to no agency whose duty it was to handle it.

CONVERSION RATE.

Another and a more serious problem that faced us was the question of exchange, especially in France. Those who have been familiar with the fluctuations in exchange of the franc from 5.45 last March to 6.88 and something to-day, would realize what it would have meant to disbursing officers disbursing funds daily, purchasing at one rate to-day and paying out at another rate to-morrow. It would have landed them, every one of them, in bankruptcy or St. Elizabeths.

Senator FRELINGHUYSEN. I do not understand the differential in exchange. What was it based on-- the franc?

Gen. LORD. On the franc. The question was just here: We paid in francs, not in dollars. The law requires that Government vouchers and accounts must be stated in terms of United States currency. He must buy the francs and pay the bills. If the francs are 5.45 to-day and to-morrow the rate is 5.70, the difference in exchange must be carried into that transaction and it would have given them a fluctuating basis that would have been absolutely impossible of working out in a successful manner.

We succeeded in getting through in the act of July 9, 1917, authority for the Secretary of the Treasury to establish for any determinate period a fixed conversion rate for all foreign moneys. That is, after studying the market he, for example, for the month of October, would establish the exchange rate for francs at 5.70, and the law stated that as regards quartermaster funds disbursing officers should receive funds at that rate and that they should pay out funds at that rate for the entire month of October; that any loss for exchange would be charged against the Government and any gain by exchange would be credited to the Government. This, as stated, we succeeded in getting for the Quartermaster Corps. We had no authority at that time to ask for legislation for any other bureau of the War Department, but the need became so urgent the Treasury Department very wisely construed the law so as to make it apply to all War Department funds, and the question of exchange in France was definitely settled.

This was a problem that did not allocate itself to any one of the supply bureaus. It was a War Department problem.

HELPING CONTRACTORS.

When Congress adjourned, March 4, 1917, the Army bill failed of passage. War was declared April 6. The war appropriations did not become available until the middle of July. There was a small deficiency available that had no reference to war conditions, and the Regular Army appropriation of May 12, which had no reference to war conditions, had become available; but the War Department had then entered into contracts amounting to millions for war supplies. Under section 3477, Revised Statutes, Government officials are precluded from transferring or assigning claims against the Government. We had no money to pay our quartermaster contractors.

The demand upon them for supplies and their demands for raw materials were something so extraordinary that it was impossible for them to finance their business, and we were, under the law quoted, unable to give to them a due bill or to so provide that they could go to a bank and raise money on the strength of their contract with the Government. That was a problem that faced the whole War Department. The demand for help on the part of the contractors was very insistent. The very success of our getting supplies in any sufficient quantity depended on our financing the contractor. We took the matter up with the comptroller and with the Federal Reserve Board and succeeded in so providing, through the help of the member banks, the Federal Reserve banks, that these contractors were able to get loans on the strength of their Government contracts, and this saved the situation until we got a war appropriation in the middle of June.

This was another matter that was a general war problem and did not belong to any particular bureau, the Quartermaster Corps acting for itself, with no interest in or authority to act for other bureaus.

CONSOLIDATING REQUISITION OFFICERS OVERSEAS.

We sent over to France many disbursing officers. Under the system, or lack of system, that prevailed, when we had a dozen quartermasters overseas, each of them cabled for his funds. As the Ordnance disbursing officers increased in numbers, they were all cabling for funds, and so on through all the various bureaus, until finally we had from 60 to 80 disbursing officers, each in his turn loading the cable down with requests for funds.

Here is another example of interference on my part with the business of the supply bureaus of the War Department, for I was now going to ask for action that would affect all the bureaus. Gen. Goethals at that time had been appointed Acting Quartermaster General. I knew this condition overseas was going to get worse, because as we shipped more troops we were sending over more disbursing officers for all the various bureaus. I knew that the problem must be solved, and I prepared a letter for Gen. Goethals' signature to the Secretary of War, recommending that each of the bureaus who had disbursing officers overseas select one officer who should collect the requisitions and the money needs of the disbursing officers of his corps and send one cable for all Quartermaster funds, one for Ordnance funds, one for Engineers and so on, and this central disbursing officer should make the distribution among the various disbursing officers of his corps. Gen. Goethals signed the request, and it was sent around to the various bureaus and met with a great deal of opposition; they said it could not work, was not an economical and proper way of handling it, but after some weeks it was put into effect. Each bureau overseas named one central disbursing officer, who really acted as a transfer officer, or clearing house. During the weeks we were waiting for the approval of this plan I had progressed, and it seemed to me if it was good to have only six officers calling for funds it would be better to have only one, and I made recommendation that one central disbursing officer be appointed overseas who should collect all the requirements of all the various corps and send one cable, and he make the distribution for the various bureaus. That was adopted and that particular problem was solved, and this was

a problem that did not allocate itself to any supply bureau. If there is any supply bureau whose duty it was to attend to it under the War Department's statutory organization I do not know which one it is.

Senator FLETCHER. Who was that disbursing officer, General?

Gen. LORD. He has just been relieved. It was Maj. R. Ives, an Engineer officer; his title was the Financial Requisition officer. His successor is Maj. Orva E. Beezley, Quartermaster Corps.

The CHAIRMAN. How did it work?

Gen. LORD. It worked well.

The CHAIRMAN. Did the bureaus continue to complain?

Gen. LORD. I think not. I think they were satisfied with it after it was put into effect.

The CHAIRMAN. How long was it in operation?

Gen. LORD. It has been in operation a year or more.

[NOTE.—A Central Disbursing Officer for each bureau in the A. E. F. was authorized on January 11, 1918. The Chief Disbursing Officer of the Army in the A. E. F. was designated on April 15, 1918; and this title was changed to the Financial Requisition Officer on July 22, 1918.]

The CHAIRMAN. On the other side?

Gen. LORD. On the other side.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. Why was there so much complaint among the men of the Army that they did not get paid?

Gen. LORD. There was no complaint this side of the water. Of troops in this country and in the cantonments, and sometimes we had 48,000 to 50,000 men in the cantonments, the greater majority were paid the last day of the month, which was never done before in the history of the Army. Overseas, under war conditions, there was a great deal of complaint. I want to take that matter up later with particular reference to your experience and mine, Senator, in connection with that particular matter.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. I heard a good many complaints that came to me quite often from enlisted men over there that they did not get their pay; that they were pretty hard up. You sent money over to the disbursing agent there. The fault must have been there?

Gen. LORD. They were given ample funds at all times.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. Pardon me for interrupting you.

Gen. LORD. I would like any questions or queries in this matter, and I do not want to be tiresome, but these problems we faced, and as I told the committee at the start, I want to give here some sort of account of my stewardship as Director of Finance.

OVERSEA BANKING ARRANGEMENTS.

Another serious problem overseas was the question of our banking arrangements. It was a very trying problem at first. The disbursing officers who went overseas in the early days of the war were given Treasury credits exclusively; they had a balance in the Treasury Department and a treasury check book, and they would draw their check and sell it to the best advantage in the market for francs. The Treasury Department found it necessary, afterward, as a war measure, to discontinue the selling of Treasury drafts overseas. We had to solve the problem in some way, and with the Treasury Department we worked out an arrangement whereby our business

over there was handled by three banks. The three banks were the Guaranty Trust Co., the Farmers Loan & Trust Co., and the Equitable Trust, Paris branches of the New York organizations of the same names, and they were made national depositories, and through them we financed our people overseas. The Quartermaster account was with the Guaranty Trust Co., and the accounts of the other bureaus were divided between the other two. Questions of this sort do not seem to associate themselves naturally with any one of the supply bureaus. I, although in the Quartermaster Corps, was officiating for all the corps of War Department, without any authority whatever from the independent bureaus. There was no agency to do it and it had to be done. There are general problems requiring some general agency to handle them. In lieu of such an agency, and at the risk of a charge of interference, as a matter of necessity, under the stress of war conditions, I attempted to solve these questions with the approval of the Secretary of War.

ACCUMULATION OF FUNDS IN HANDS OF DISBURSING OFFICERS.

After we had been operating over there sometime a very serious problem presented itself in the way of accumulation of balances in the hands of disbursing officers in the field. I had been a paymaster and I knew how a disbursing officer fears above all things to be out of funds, and if he finds that his disbursements for a month are going to be approximately \$100,000, for fear some untoward happening may arise, some new condition appear, he is going to ask for \$150,000, and the parties furnishing the funds do not dare cut him down, taking it for granted that he knows the condition in the field better than the supplying agency. We found there were millions of dollars tied up overseas in the hands of disbursing officers. We had approximately 400 disbursing officers, and the dead money in France amounted to so much that it was a serious tax upon the Treasury.

Again a problem that did not belong to any particular supply bureau had to be settled, and representing the Secretary of War we worked out a solution with the Treasury Department that was wonderful in its simplicity and most effective, and as I will show, resulted in great saving to the Government. All of the money was placed, as I have stated, under the control of the finance requisition officer in France. He kept his balance in the French treasury. In that balance were funds belonging to all bureaus in the War Department. Under an arrangement with our three fiscal agents, no money was actually placed, no credit actually given to disbursing officers in the field at any time after this plan was put into effect.

A disbursing officer in the field, for example, at the end of September, would notify the central disbursing officer, the financial requisition officer, that he would need approximately \$100,000 for his expenditure the next succeeding month. The Guaranty Trust Co., he was a quartermaster disbursing officer, would be immediately notified to honor that disbursing officer's checks in an amount not exceeding \$100,000. The bank would not carry one cent of credit, except this tentative credit. At the end of a week or at any time that the Guaranty Trust Co. saw fit, it would notify the financial officer at checks had been received from the field from that disbursing officer amounting to \$25,000, and the financial requisition officer

would then take up the checks and give the Guaranty Trust Co. \$25,000, so that he, the financial requisition officer, had always under his fingers the total amount of money we had in France, and we knew to a penny just the amount.

Senator FLETCHER. You shipped him the total amount of money.

Gen. LORD. No; cabled. We had arrangements with the French representatives here so that when the French Government furnished us funds, we immediately gave the French representatives here a corresponding credit by means of Treasury warrants.

Senator FRELINGHUYSEN. There was no transfer of gold?

Gen. LORD. No.

Senator FLETCHER. No actual shipments?

SAVING MILLIONS.

Gen. LORD. No; not at all during the war. That simple effective method of preventing accumulations of funds in the hands of disbursing officers, I hope, may be followed in this country, because we have the same difficulty here. It has been an extraordinary tax on the Treasury. Try as we may, it is impossible to keep disbursing officers in the field down to actual needs. Although they may be able to get money promptly, still it seems to be an inherent trait of disbursing officers to collect more money than necessary for their business. It is a matter we have discussed with the representatives of the Treasury Department, and we hope to be able to apply the same system in this country. I stated some time ago that that system, which was not worked out by any supply bureau, succeeded in saving the Government money. For the month of March, 1919, the Secretary of the Treasury fixed the conversion rate at 5.45 francs for a dollar. March 15 the French Government pulled out the artificial props that had supported the franc and it dropped in a couple of days to 5.80. On the first report of the drop my office was notified, and I got immediately in touch with the Treasury Department, which at once cabled to Norman Davis, who was the Treasury representative in Paris. We at that time had in the possession of Maj. Ives, the financial requisition officer, in the French treasury, \$285,000,000 worth of francs, approximately 1,280,000,000 francs, which we had bought at 5.45, which were worth on the drop only 5.80.

The possible loss in the drop to 5.80, I think, was \$14,000,000 or \$15,000,000, and that would have been our actual loss if the money had been out in the hands of disbursing officers under the old procedure, because it would all have been scattered here and there, and it would only have been a question of disbursing it at 5.80 and later at 6.18, a still greater loss, which in its total would have reached a loss of approximately \$28,000,000. Upon representations from this side, Mr. Davis got in touch with the French Government, which took off our hands a large portion of the accumulation of francs, and we sent instructions overseas to make all possible payments during the month which, under our contracts, would be payable at 5.45, so that we made a total saving under those conditions, under the drop to 5.80, of \$13,000,000 because of consolidation of all funds under one central control.

Senator FRELINGHUYSEN. You had made the contract at that rate of exchange?

Gen. LORD. Yes; by paying that month under our law we could pay at 5.45; beginning with the next month we would have to take up the new rate, which the Secretary of the Treasury fixed, which would have been in accordance with the lower actual rate of exchange.

Senator FRELINGHUYSEN. But, General, suppose you had not had those francs in your possession, you could have gone out and bought francs at a better rate of exchange and have saved that amount of money, could you not?

Gen. LORD. Yes; we did save it as it was. It was unfortunate we had it, but it was necessary. We had it because we had terminated contracts and we were making big payments at that time; that is the reason there was such an accumulation there at that time.

At that time, because of the fall in the exchange, the Post Office Department was obliged to discontinue the issuance of money orders, which gave occasion to a great deal of complaint, and the cable came from overseas to the War Department that it was a great hardship to the soldiers, and we got in touch with the Post Office Department, and this was under the Director of Finance, and made arrangements by which we took over funds received from the sale of money orders, and utilized them in our disbursements and enabled the Post Office Department to renew the issuance of post office orders.

BUYING FOREIGN MONEY.

This was another illustration of certain general finance problems, and not supply problems. During the war we bought pesos in Spain, and pesetas in South America, and liras in Italy, and rubles in Russia, and guilders in Holland, a matter of financial procedure for the War Department for all bureaus. It might be interesting to know our experience with rubles in Russia. After Gen. Graves went in there we received a cable from him that there was absolutely no local currency available and it was working great hardship and inconvenience, and wanted to know what arrangement could be made to finance him in that respect. At that time a news cable was received and published in the papers that the situation was so acute they were using postage stamps and bath tickets for currency in Vladivostok and vicinity.

We tried to locate rubles somewhere that we could ship out there for the use of our forces. We located 5,000,000 rubles belonging to the First National Bank of Manila and held in the Taiwan Bank in Vladivostok. The question was whether they were pre-Kerensky rubles, Kerensky rubles, or post-Kerensky rubles. Pre-Kerensky rubles had good value, Kerensky rubles had some value, and post-Kerensky rubles had practically no value. The question was urgent and we finally bought the rubles on the best representations we could get, paying 13 cents for them. We found two days afterwards those rubles were pre-Kerensky rubles and were selling in Japan at 15 cents, so it was a good buy, and we flattered ourselves on having settled a very acute problem in a very scientific way. A week afterwards we received word that the rubles in Taiwan Bank were all of large denominations, and that our troops were just as bad off as before. Then in consultation with the Treasury Department we worked out a solution and notified the United States authorities in Siberia to print rubles of small denominations, holding the 5,000,000 rubles of large denominations as a reserve to protect the issue. We hear'

nothing more from Vladivostok. I suppose the proposed plan was adopted and the problem solved.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. Were these rubles in gold or paper currency?

Gen. LORD. They were paper rubles. We had some financial problems to solve, Mr. Chairman, during this war, and we have been doing business in large denominations, and I do not know which of the Supply Bureau chiefs would have handled that particular problem under our present statutory organization.

We provided quartermaster disbursing officers, who went overseas, with only one appropriation, although under ordinary conditions we would have given him fifteen to twenty to do bookkeeping with. I notified Col. McCarthy, who went over first with Gen. Pershing as chief quartermaster, that we would give his disbursing officers but one appropriation—"Pay of the Army"—which could be used for all purposes of expenditure. They bought subsistence with it; they paid transportation; they hired quarters, and did everything with "Pay of the Army." They vouchered their disbursements properly; they carried them to the abstract of expenditures properly; and the auditor's office made the necessary adjustment, charging the expenditures to the proper appropriation. The other bureaus did not do that, and all through the war the War Department and the Treasury Department, until the consolidation of finances came, were troubled trying to solve the calls under the various bureaus for money under one to a dozen or more different appropriations. At three separate times there was such an urgent need that I made three advances of \$50,000,000 each from Quartermaster appropriations for use as a general fund for use, while the authorities this side were getting the necessary information from overseas regarding the various appropriations involved in a call from some of the other bureau officers.

ATTEMPTED FINANCIAL COORDINATION.

There has been some talk before the committee, by some of the bureau chiefs who are not friendly to an independent finance, stating they do appreciate the need of some coordinating influence, or some coordinating agency in finance. Back in February or March of 1918 that attempt was made by Gen. Goethals to get that coordinating agency at work, and an expert accountant from the West was called in here under Gen. Hugh Johnston to do exactly that particular piece of work, to coordinate these activities, but not to interfere with the bureaus.

This expert accountant was a very able, conscientious man, but he got about as much cooperation and assistance from the various bureaus as Gen. Hines, Chief of the Embarkation Service, received from the German submarines in transporting our troops overseas. He tried diligently to coordinate these various financial activities with indifferent success. Now, I would say a word as to the bureaus. I was at the head of the finances of one separate bureau. We were then right in the midst of readjustment under the Overman Act; we were striving desperately to get our supplies overseas, to handle our finances, and everything that came from outside at that time did seem like an interference. I can understand the attitude of all the bureaus under those conditions, but it was an honest attempt at coordinating without setting up an independent finance, and it failed

not only because it was only a half step in the right direction, but because the various bureaus did not desire any coordination.

Senator FRELINGHUYSEN. Do you believe the Overman Act permitted you to coordinate the activities of your department?

Gen. LORD. Permitted us to consolidate all financial activities.

Senator FRELINGHUYSEN. And you believe it was a good thing to do?

Gen. LORD. I believe it was absolutely necessary.

Senator SUTHERLAND. That or some similar act?

ORGANIZATION OF INDEPENDENT FINANCE.

Gen. LORD. Yes. Now the independent finance service under the Director of Finance was organized by order of October 11, 1918. Later, as stated in the early part of this hearing, it was separated from Purchase, Storage, and Traffic, of which it was originally a branch, and made an independent bureau, like other statutory bureaus of the War Department, except that it is an emergency bureau and not established under permanent law.

This consolidation of finance was a consolidation at that time of approximately eighteen billions of dollars in appropriations. I realized the magnitude of the task, and with the approval of Gen. Goethals I called to my help an advisory council, a volunteer advisory council, none of the members getting even the dollar a year. This council consisted of Otto Kahn, of Kuhn, Loeb & Co., New York City, C. D. Norton, of the First National Bank, New York City, C. B. Seger, at that time president of the Union Pacific Railroad, and now president of the United States Rubber Co., conceded to be one of the most expert and best known financial organizational experts in the world; C. G. DuBois, comptroller of the American Telegraph & Telephone Co., and comptroller of the American Red Cross; Gerard Swope, of the Western Electric Co.; S. H. Wolfe, insurance actuary and well-known financial expert; George E. Frazer, of Frazer & Torbet, expert accountants of Chicago, who had a great deal to do with the present fiscal system of the State of Illinois. Now in the policies that have been planned, in the arrangements that have been instituted in our organization, I have had the cooperation of this advisory council.

I have met with them, or they have come on here to meet with me, and as I have developed certain procedures they have been submitted to them for their approval and for their consideration; they have approved or suggested changes, so that when I state that while the independent finance service, operating under the Director of Finances, may not be perfect, yet it is an organization which in its procedures and in its mode of operation and in the business principles underlying its operations has the indorsement of men of this standing.

Later Gen. Charles Gates Dawes, president of the Central Trust Co. of Illinois, Chicago, Ill., was added to the council. Gen. Dawes went overseas as a major of Engineers, was afterwards promoted to brigadier general of Engineers, and was appointed general purchasing agent by Gen. Pershing and given absolute authority to coordinate and control the purchasing of all supplies for the American Expeditionary Forces. He was also chairman of the General Purchasing

Board and Gen. Pershing's representative on the Military Board of Allied Supply. Gen. Dawes, who experienced the urgent need of a centralized finance service during actual war conditions overseas, and who is thoroughly familiar with the finance organization as it is operating to-day under the Director of Finance, is one of its warm supporters and advocates.

LETTER FROM FINANCE ADVISORY COUNCIL.

NEW YORK, October 10, 1919.

HON. JAMES W. WADSWORTH, JR.,
Chairman Committee on Military Affairs,
United States Senate, Washington, D. C.

DEAR SIR: Upon the invitation of Gen. H. M. Lord, Director of Finance, United States Army, we have been acting as a consulting committee on Army finances for the past 15 months. We have had several extended conferences with Gen. Lord, examined numerous papers, and have thus become familiar with the problems before him, as well as with his methods, proposals, and purposes.

As a result of our discussions and investigations, we are thoroughly convinced that the office of Director of Finance created by order of the Secretary of War under date of October 11, 1918, should be preserved, and the functions and authority appertaining to that office continued and indeed strengthened.

It seems to us manifest that the former system of autonomous action by each bureau of the Army in effecting purchases, disbursing funds, preparing estimates for Congress, etc., is antiquated, inefficient, confusing, and wasteful.

We believe that all vouchers should be checked and reviewed by one and the same controlling authority; that the preparation of estimates for Congress should be submitted to the scrutiny of a coordinating factor so as to enable Congress to obtain accurate, unambiguous, and concise information, thus preventing duplication of appropriations and the needless tying-up of funds; in short, that there should be one single agency in full and responsible charge of everything which appertains to disbursing, accounting, and financial control, and that this agency should be divorced entirely from the procurement bureaus so as to establish and maintain in the Army the organization axiom that the department or individual that effects purchases should not have charge of paying the bills incurred.

We believe that the Department of Finance of the Army should be clothed with adequate powers to become that agency, and thus given scope to apply that specialized knowledge, experience, and competence in such matters which no one bureau now possesses or can possess and which are indispensable for the satisfactory administration of the finances of the Army.

We are entirely certain that no private corporation or business would think of carrying on its affairs under a system of divided and disjointed financial control such as existed in the Army prior to the creation of the office of Director of Finance. We believe the recommendations which Gen. Lord is prepared to submit to the consideration of your honorable committee, and which have been discussed by the consulting committee, to be sound and wise, and in accordance with tested and approved corporate practice. We are confident that the adoption of these recommendations would facilitate the task and make more effective the supervision of Congress in dealing with the affairs of the Army, would produce economies, and promote the efficiency and welfare of that great branch of the public service.

If it should be the wish of your honorable committee that we supplement this letter by a verbal statement, we shall be happy to delegate one or more of our committee to appear before you at such time as you may be pleased to designate.

Two of our members, Messrs. Charles G. Dubois and Gerard Swope, are in Europe at this time, but knowing their views on the subject, we feel authorized to state that they would join unreservedly in this expression of our opinions, if they were present.

We have the honor to subscribe ourselves,

Most respectfully,

OTTO H. KAHN,
Kuhn, Loeb & Co.

CHARLES D. NORTON,
President, First Securities Co. of New York.

C. B. SEGER,
President, United States Rubber Co.

Since my discharge from the Army, in April, 1919, I have been acting as one of the consulting committee on Army finances, and concur in all of the foregoing statement.

S. H. WOLFE.

LETTER FROM GENERAL PURCHASING AGENT, A. E. F.

CENTRAL TRUST CO. OF ILLINOIS,
CHICAGO, October, 13, 1919.Hon. JAMES W. WADSWORTH,
Chairman Senate Committee on Military Affairs,
United States Senate, Washington, D. C.

MY DEAR SENATOR WADSWORTH: The experiences of the American Expeditionary Forces demonstrate the fact that in supply procurement the greatest accomplishment is possible only by recognizing two great principles:

First. That there must be a central control agency which, whenever it is compatible with the military aspect of supply procurement, will apply the checks and safeguards of normal business.

Second. That this central control must not interfere improperly with the independent functioning of the separate services where the pressure comes direct from the point of necessity upon the agent charged with supply procurements.

There was, in reality, no conflict of authority involved in recognizing these two principles in the business administration of the American Expeditionary Forces. While the chief purchasing officer of each service was put under the absolute control of the general purchasing agent for purposes of coordination, as well as the extension and supplementing of supply activities, yet that control was not exercised by him so as to interfere with the immediate responsibility of the purchasing agent to the chief of the service responsible to the Commander in Chief for the accomplishment of a certain task. In other words, in the system devised by Gen. Pershing for the American Expeditionary Forces, the safeguards of normal business were recognized and used wherever normal conditions surrounded the transaction, without interfering with the direct steam pressure from the point of military necessity upon the supply procurement agent directly responsible to it as well as to the central agency.

Gen. Lord has asked me as to whether there is anything in his plan for a central finance division which, in my judgment, is inconsistent with the proper operation of the Army under circumstances similar to the American Expeditionary Force in Europe. After carefully considering the matter, I am of the opinion that not only is the plan which Gen. Lord proposes not inconsistent with the interests of such an army, but it is necessary to its proper functioning.

In opposition, the contention of the bureau chief will be, of course, that the separation from his control of the most important function of payment will tend to interfere with that which is of first importance in time of military necessity--the immediate procurement of supplies at the point of greatest necessity. The objection of the bureau chiefs to Gen. Lord's plan probably centers in this and in this alone: for the immense advantage to the Army of an independent finance division from every other standpoint needs no argument.

As indicated by my report to the commanding general, Service of Supply, American Expeditionary Force, I laid great stress upon the importance of the principle of the continued independence of functioning of the separate services: and yet, for nearly a year I continually endeavored in France to have created a central independent finance department of the American Expeditionary Force. This department was finally created, but after long delay owing to the opposition of the independent services: and, while my office for a long time endeavored to serve as an imperfect substitute for such an independent finance department, it operated under every disadvantage.

As a strong advocate of the necessity of that right of independent bureau functioning, involving, as it does, the right of self-preservation on the part of the independent services, provided, of course, it operates under a central authority sufficient to bend unreasonable independence into courses consistent with common sense and the common interest of the Army, I yet see in Gen. Lord's suggestion of an independent finance division nothing which, with proper administration, should interfere with the speed with which the chief of any service can secure supplies and services.

Gen. Lord's plan recognizes that fundamental principle of proper business administration that the agency which obligates shall not be at one and the same time the agency that makes payment, thus interfering with independence of audit. At the same time, I can not see where there would result any delay because of the relations of the central finance division to the services operating in time of war in the field.

Gen. Lord tells me it is the custom and will continue to be the custom in cases of special emergency to nominate as disbursing officers the procurement officers of the service itself. In other words, where, as with the American Expeditionary Forces in France, purchasing must be done under extraordinary war conditions of time, place, delivery, etc., the central finance division will be prepared in emergency to recognize

a control of the whole operation of a special purchase by the bureau chief. Thus, the independent finance division in doing its absolutely necessary general work for the Army will be so organized as not to cause an infraction of the principle that in time of actual war military and not business results must sometimes be first in mind. This organization will not overlook the military aspect of any Army financial transaction any more than any competent supply procurement agent will overlook in the pressure of actual battle the military aspect of supply procurement. In certain cases all business considerations yield to military necessity and the securing of military results.

The administration of Gen. Lord's department has indicated that under a man of his wisdom, the independent services would not need the protection of specific regulation, but, nevertheless, such a division should be so organized that its efficiency does not depend upon its operating head.

Having been made acquainted with the character of the organization which has been installed under the direction of Gen. Lord, and after a full consideration of the central finance division plan of the Army, I am heartily in favor of it.

I have taken the liberty of sending a similar letter to Hon. Julius Kahn, chairman of the House Committee on Military Affairs.

Very truly, yours,

CHARLES G. DAWES,
General Purchasing Agent and Chairman
General Purchasing Board, American Expeditionary Forces.

PREPARING ESTIMATES.

The question of estimates I know is of interest to this committee. Bureau chiefs still make their estimates. There has been no interference with them whatever, and they still sustain them before the committees of Congress.

Now I know how estimates have been submitted. There has been absolutely heretofore no comparison; there has been no place where they have been brought together to see if they dovetail with each other; there has been no policy to study and compare and prune and modify. There has been no time, place, or agency for eliminating discrepancies and duplications. We are trying to do that now with somewhat indifferent success. As we all know, military matters are in a state of flux. There is no fixed or determined basis from which we can work, but even under these conditions we have succeeded in eliminating many discrepancies and eliminating many duplications in appropriations.

I have in mind one particular matter in connection with the last Army appropriation bill, in which two bureaus estimated for the same thing—a little item of \$250,000. This will just illustrate the procedure. The estimates are made by the bureaus and submitted to the Director of Finance, who has no authority to cut them. The Director of Finance calls upon the bureau chief, stating he wants to get in touch with him or his representatives, to consider this particular estimate, to go over it together, so that if the Director of Finance has any information concerning any of the other estimates that have come in that will throw any light on the needs of the bureau immediately under discussion, he can bring it to bear on that particular estimate. We brought the two mentioned together and found both bureaus were estimating for exactly the same activity. It might have been discovered in the House or Senate committee, or might not, but because of the study we gave it it was brought to light. As neither bureau was willing to recede and allow the other bureau to carry on the activity, the matter was referred to the Secretary of War and one of the bureaus was notified to discontinue that particular activity.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. Did you do that with the Secretary of War or the Chief of Staff?

Gen. LORD. In principle all policies instituted under the Director of Finance have been put in force through the knowledge and approval of the Secretary of War. In some cases I have gone to him direct; in some cases to the Chief of Staff; and in some cases to both the Secretary of War and the Chief of Staff in consultation. I have always had access to the Secretary of War on any of the things I desired to take up with him.

Senator SUTHERLAND. Do you have such access now under the new orders which have been issued?

Gen. LORD. I have seen no order which prohibits me.

Senator SUTHERLAND. I saw some statement to the effect that nobody has access except under the Chief of Staff.

Gen. LORD. I received no such orders. It is very natural and it is very proper for the Director of Finance to take things up with the Chief of Staff. To illustrate, there might be some certain financial policy which would affect not only supply, but effect operations, and before I reached a conclusion for the recommendation, I would submit the matter to the Chief of Staff, as I do frequently. He would tell me, as he does often, You see Gen. Jervoy, or that is a matter for Gen. Burr, who is supply representative to the Chief of Staff, and work it out with them, but as far as I am concerned in finance the Secretary of War has been kept as intimately informed as I could keep him as to what we are doing in finance.

Senator FRELINGHUYSEN. You spoke of different bureaus. You handled this only for the Quartermaster's Department, did you not?

Gen. LORD. Originally.

Senator FRELINGHUYSEN. What other bureaus do you supply it for now?

Gen. LORD. All of them. I handle all War Department appropriations, except civil appropriations like the river and harbor money, and all expenditures are made by the finance officers under my control and all the accounting and bookkeeping is done in my office.

Senator FRELINGHUYSEN. Do you handle any of the Engineer's appropriations?

Gen. LORD. Not his civil appropriations; but all of his military appropriations.

Senator FRELINGHUYSEN. And the Signal Corps?

Gen. LORD. The Signal Corps, all of it, Air Service, Medical—

Senator FRELINGHUYSEN. How many accounting units have you, separate accounting units? Have they separate systems of bookkeeping?

ALL WAR DEPARTMENT ACCOUNTS IN ONE BOOK.

Gen. LORD. For the first time in the history of the War Department the accounts are all in one book. There are used throughout the Army to-day for the first time in history standard forms. We have reduced the number of finance forms by more than 50 per cent, and all disbursing officers are using one kind of form; and we instituted a uniform system of terminology. No two bureaus have ever come

before the Congress and talked in the same financial language, Mr. Chairman. You have never been able to tell whether there was a Treasury balance or a book balance; whether an obligated balance or an unobligated balance, and you may have one thing in one bureau and another thing in another.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. Do you not find some objections to it, however?

Gen. LORD. Not to that particular phase of it, Mr. Senator.

Senator FRELINGHUYSEN. Would you not say there was prejudice against it?

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. Put it that way. I have heard some officers complain that they liked the old system of accounting better. I suppose that would apply to his particular department.

Gen. LORD. Yes. Now here is what we have done. We have called the representatives of these various bureaus into consultation with us. For instance, the Ordnance had many most admirable things, which we have adopted into our system of accounting. Now it is difficult for their old employees who have been working on their books for years, to take up a new system of accounting, and I can understand a reasonable dislike of an attempt to do anything new. But we have attempted in our system of accounting to couple into it, consolidate into it, the best things in the various bureaus.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. Let us take, say, an illustration. Is the whole sum of money appropriated for the use of the Ordnance Department handled by your department?

Gen. LORD. Yes.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. You have in your books the amount of the appropriation?

Gen. LORD. All of it; yes, sir.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. And the specific object for which the appropriation was made?

Gen. LORD. Yes.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. And you disburse those appropriations on the requisition of whom?

Gen. LORD. On the allotment of the Chief of Ordnance. The Director of Finance has no authority to obligate, and he expends not one penny of Ordnance money without the authority of the Chief of Ordnance.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. Say there is \$220,000, just for illustration, to be used in buying rifles. What becomes of that when the rifles are bought? Who buys them?

Gen. LORD. The Chief of Ordnance makes his contract, and notifies the Director of Finance that he plans to buy so many rifles, and they will cost \$1,000,000 approximately, and that the contract will be carried out by the ordnance officer at Bridgeport, Conn. Immediately the Director of Finance takes \$1,000,000 from the proper ordnance appropriation, puts it to one side, reducing the total amount of the appropriation by \$1,000,000, notifies his disbursing officer at Bridgeport that \$1,000,000 under such an appropriation has been set aside subject to the disbursing officer's draft with which to pay the purchasers under that particular contract. We make the allotment at the request of the Chief of Ordnance. We merely serve as his paymaster and his bookkeeper.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. That makes the transaction go through two bureaus instead of one, does it not?

Gen. LORD. Yes; but he did the same thing before. He made the allotment formerly through his own allotment branch which is now with the Director of Finance. He had to set up his allotment anyhow. Instead of setting it up on his books, we set it up on ours.

Senator FLETCHER. Does he not have to keep a complete and distinct set of books?

Gen. LORD. Gen. Williams, the Chief of Ordnance, is opposed to an independent finance service, but I wish to say, as far as actual operation is concerned, Gen. Williams has played the game. The office of the Chief of Ordnance has one officer and 13 clerks engaged on finance work.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. How many did they used to have?

Gen. LORD. Oh, hundreds.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. I just gave that by way of illustration, but the same rule would apply to other departments?

Gen. LORD. Yes. We have available the information the bureaus need, even in the items and subitems, and never have we failed to give them the information called for.

Senator FLETCHER. How much force do you have, General?

Gen. LORD. I have in my office to-day—I will give the personnel later. To illustrate, twice a month we furnish bureau chiefs a report of transactions under all appropriations. Each bureau chief is furnished a complete statement of his disbursements, the standing of his appropriations, the amount that has been allotted, and if he wants it oftener we will give it to him oftener.

The CHAIRMAN. Has the establishment of this system you have just described resulted in decreasing the accounting force or book-keeping force of any of these bureaus?

Gen. LORD. It certainly has, and should eliminate the finance force in all the supply bureaus. Ordnance has one officer and 13 clerks in its finance division. Now, the Ordnance has more money at the present time to disburse, and more allotments, and greater demand for keeping track of its allotments, than any of the bureaus, because Ordnance has outstanding to-day something more than \$1,000,000,000 in contracts to be settled. Presumably that force will be reduced as they complete settlements of these contracts, because the Ordnance is handling a very large amount of money on disbursements coming over from the preceding fiscal year. But there is no reason why any of the supply bureaus at this time should maintain a finance section.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you happen to know about the Quartermaster's Department?

Gen. LORD. I do not know about the Quartermaster's Department; I have not had an opportunity to know. I know this one thing, that we are in the same building, our records are available, we can give them the most accurate information at any time.

Senator FRELINGHUYSEN. Right there, under this accounting system, could you make an estimate for all military appropriations to Congress?

Gen. LORD. No, sir.

Senator FRELINGHUYSEN. You could not?

Gen. LORD. Not to-day, no, sir. That is a matter I wish to touch upon later. Estimates for appropriations are made by the various bureau chiefs, and not by finance.

The CHAIRMAN. Going if you please on to another topic. You were demonstrating the process by which the estimates were made by the bureau chiefs and contracts were made for them, and you had one for the bookkeeper or paymaster. Have you any power to review the contracts or reject the contracts?

FINANCIAL REVIEW OF CONTRACTS.

Gen. LORD. We have established in our office a board of contract review. To that board of contract review it is required that all contracts made by Purchase and Storage, which is under Gen. Rogers, must pass the inspection of our contract review before it is finally enacted and put into force. We are taking steps to have contracts from other bureaus come before that same contract review branch. We give these contracts a financial review. I mean by that, that we see whether or not they are so drawn that payments thereunder will pass the accounting officials of the Treasury, but we have no authority to study them with a view to ascertaining if the contract is a reasonable contract, if the price paid is proper, or if the quantities called for are really necessary.

The CHAIRMAN. What has been the experience of that bureau of contract review? Have they had much work to do?

Gen. LORD. They have a great deal of work to do. At first they found many mistakes that would have proved fatal, that would have put the disbursing officer in the hands of the auditor for suspension, but now we have so educated them that we find comparatively few errors.

The CHAIRMAN. Has there been much complaint against that?

Gen. LORD. No, sir; not that I have heard. There was a fight against it at first, but I do not hear any complaints now. We have it well organized. There is a lady, Miss Jessie Dell, who is very efficient, at the head of our contract branch, and there has been little delay caused by such review. If that board of contract review had been in operation as now organized, and the various bureaus had been compelled to submit their contracts for review, there would have been at least no proxy-signed contracts that would have required an act of legislation to enable us to do business under them, or to settle them.

The CHAIRMAN. You think the board could have acted with sufficient celerity in the first few months of the war?

Gen. LORD. Not in all matters. It would have presented such an obvious and unnecessary failure to comply with the law as is found in the case of proxy-signed contracts. That is a question where the contracting officer merely worked out the detail, then did not sign it, but it went to a second lieutenant, or some one else, to sign for him. If that had been placed before the present contract review branch the first proxy-signed contract would have been the last, for the error would have been detected and the practice discontinued.

The CHAIRMAN. As I understand it, then, that Board of Contract Review performs the functions, as it were, of unofficial auditor?

Gen. LORD. Performs the function of an unofficial auditor before payment. As I stated, it is just to see that the contract is legally drawn, but not to see whether the price or amount are reasonable. We have no authority for such action.

Senator FLETCHER. Properly executed?

Gen. LORD. Properly executed.

Senator FLETCHER. And does not call for more funds than are to the credit of the officer making the contract?

Gen. LORD. In the contract review branch that action is not taken, but before the contract is let the director of finance is notified by the supply bureau chief to make a reservation, i. e., to set aside the amount of money to meet the contract. If there is not enough money to comply with the bureau chief's request he is notified immediately. That is to prevent overdrawing.

The question of whether or not the director of finance, or any activity of that sort, should be authorized or given the power to go into a contract, as to the wisdom of the expenditure, as to whether the price is the proper price to pay, is something I would not dare recommend.

Senator FLETCHER. Do you have any duplication of work with the Engineer Corps, where some or a part of their funds you do not handle at all and some you do?

Gen. LORD. I am going to discuss that later, as we get along, if you will bear with me.

I think it wise, perhaps, to follow along the procedure. I described the way the estimates are made. They are made by the bureau chiefs. I do not interfere with them and I try to inform myself as much as possible as to the relation of the estimates with each other. I try to ascertain the sustaining facts so as to assist them. In many cases I have advised them the Congress will probably want information along certain lines, and I advise them to get up their estimates in a certain way so that Congress will not be obliged to resort to cross-examination or detective work to find out just the reason they are asking that amount of money. Estimates are submitted and the bureau chiefs notified and they either appear before your committee or they send their representatives. The bill becomes a law. The bill goes to the President and the President approves it; then it goes to the State Department and the State Department makes a record of it, and then sends a certified copy to the Secretary of the Treasury, and he sends it to the bookkeeping and warrants division, where the appropriations are put on the books under proper titles.

APPORTIONMENT OF APPROPRIATIONS.

Then the Secretary of War is notified that so much money is there subject to his requisition, and it is always the Secretary of War's money. It does not belong to the bureau chiefs. No one can draw that money out of the Treasury except the Secretary of War. At the present time the Director of Finance acts as requisition officer for the Secretary of War; we handle the requisitions for all appropriations except civil appropriations. After the money is appropriated there is a provision of law in the act of March 3, 1905, which requires that all these moneys shall be apportioned over certain periods.

Senator FLETCHER. Periods within the year?

Gen. LORD. Periods within the year. I thank you for that correction. It is important. Some years ago the Department chiefs were accustomed to expend all their appropriations the first two or

three months, then come to Congress to pull them out of the hole. An attempt to correct that kind of procedure resulted in this act, which compels bureau chiefs, under penalty of fine and imprisonment, to apportion their funds during the year over certain periods so they will not spend it all the first quarter and go the remaining quarters without funds. Some of the departments have perfunctorily complied with this provision of law, and have apportioned the most of their appropriations to the first two or three months, leaving a little to spread over the remainder of the year, because what they do not expend in the first quarter reverts to the next quarter. In the War Department these apportionments are made by the Secretary of War. There have been severe criticism by certain bureau chiefs before this committee of certain things in connection with the apportionment of funds for the fiscal year 1920, the current year.

The Director of Finance, as representing the Secretary of War, notified the various bureau chiefs of the amount of money available for expenditure during the current fiscal year, and were requested to apportion it into quarters, as they saw fit. The apportionment made was submitted to the Secretary of War and approved by him. But there were several new features in this apportionment which caused the criticism to which reference has been made.

The policy which I am trying to follow as the Director of Finance is to keep the congressional committees informed as to what is happening to the appropriations, because I think we still owe these committees something after we have secured our money. In pursuance of this policy, when this apportionment was made with these innovations, I submitted the matter to the chairman of this committee and the chairman of the House Committee on Military Affairs, so that they might know what we were doing with the moneys they had given us.

Under contingencies of the Army we put aside a general reserve of \$300,000. There was \$1,000,000 appropriated. A portion of the contingency was intended for the usual contingencies of the Army, but the greater portion of it was intended for the activities of the men in charge of sales of surplus war supplies, so that \$600,000 of the million was allotted for that purpose, and \$100,000 was allotted to the office of the Secretary of War for contingencies, and \$300,000 set aside as a general reserve, so that if some unforeseen exigency should make a demand for funds it would be possible to meet the need without incurring a deficiency.

I want to say that this, so far as I know, is the first serious attempt made to give the Secretary of War real control of his appropriations. There has been no objection on the part of anyone regarding Contingencies of the Army, as far as I know, but there was objection on the part of the Quartermaster General as to the apportionment made to him and as to the general reserve.

Conditions affecting the so-called Quartermaster appropriations differ materially from conditions affecting all other appropriations. Under Regular Supplies there are two independent activities, supplied from the same funds. Congress did not give all of the money estimated for by these two activities; that is, the Quartermaster General and Gen. Marshall, head of the Construction Division. The apportionment was made according to the best information obtainable, but there was a general reserve of \$6,000,000 set aside, which

was not apportioned either to Gen. Marshall or to Gen. Rogers. As emergencies might make it necessary to allot something more to Gen. Rogers, who had an interest in the appropriations, or emergencies might arise that would make it very essential that Gen. Rogers be given some additional appropriation, this general reserve was established to meet emergencies of that character.

Now, what has been done here will not, I am afraid, eliminate the possibility of asking for deficiencies during this current year. It is rather a difficult year to attempt to apply a principle of that sort because of unknown liabilities coming over from war conditions. We do not know just exactly what we will need, but it will make it somewhat more difficult to incur a deficiency than it has been heretofore. It certainly is a restriction put upon the free use of appropriations in the face of what might be a deficiency condition.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you happen to know, General, upon what ground those two officers complain? How did it handicap them in that case?

Gen. LORD. I understand Gen. Rogers's complaint was with particular reference to subsistence. The subsistence appropriation was \$62,526,466.50. In this apportionment letter, approved by the Secretary of War, it was stated that receipts by sales that come back to the appropriation would not go to the amount apportioned but would come back to the reserve. That is, he could only expend the amount that had been apportioned to him; that any receipts would serve to augment the reserve and not increase the apportionment.

Now, the reason for that is this: Under Clothing and Camp and Garrison Equipage the Quartermaster General was given \$20,000,000. There will be receipts from sales under Clothing and Camp and Garrison Equipage of approximately \$50,000,000. It has always been the policy and belief of Congress, and a most justifiable policy, that any moneys expended by Government bureaus should be moneys appropriated; that there should be no augmentation of appropriations from any sources: that bureaus should be obliged to come to the Congress for the moneys to expend. The policy laid down by the Quartermaster General, if you comply with what he demands, would be that the \$50,000,000 possible receipts under Clothing and Camp and Garrison Equipage would be added to the \$20,000,000 that you gave him. I do not think Congress intended that or desired it.

The CHAIRMAN. I think you are correct.

Senator FLETCHER. If he needs to call on that reserve, and shows you it is necessary to use more than he is allotted, you have the privilege to let him have more, have you not?

Gen. LORD. The Secretary of War can let him have it all if the need justifies it. There is something more in connection with this question. I called the attention of the Secretary of War to the possibility of our receiving under clothing and camp and garrison equipage a total of \$50,000,000, or more, from the sale of wool, and said I did not think it was the wish of Congress that we use it, and recommended that it be set aside as a special account to be turned back into the Treasury rather than be utilized for current expenditures. He approved that policy, and instructions have been issued that these wool receipts be kept entirely separate and not used for expenditures of any description.

Senator SUTHERLAND. Neither by allocation by you or otherwise?

Gen. LORD. In no way. It might be some great emergency would arise when we would need a portion of it, but the policy of the Secretary of War, if that need came, would presumably be to take it up with the committees and get their approval to use a certain amount of it. His instructions are that this money must go back into the Treasury.

SALES OF SUBSISTENCE SUPPLIES.

The CHAIRMAN. While you are on that question of receipts from sales. What is coming in from the sale of Army subsistence supplies?

Gen. LORD. A certain amount of money is received from sale of subsistence supplies. This develops another interesting feature of estimates. For years the Quartermaster Department submitted an estimate to Congress for so much money for sales of subsistence supplies to officers, and so much money for sales of subsistence to enlisted men. That merely was a method of augmenting the appropriation. If we were first starting in business, it would be proper to secure an appropriation to begin the business of selling to officers and enlisted men; but once established in business and having supplies on hand, what we sell to the officers and to the men is repaid, because the men and the officers have to pay the quartermaster for all supplies they get. Now, the statement was made to this committee that the provision in the apportionment made by the Secretary of War that receipts from sales should go to the reserve rather than to the apportionment was a diversion or misapplication of funds; that this money received from sales of subsistence supplies should not go back to the general reserve because, they said, it might be used for some other purpose. It can only be used for what it was originally appropriated for under the law, and there can be no diversion of appropriations. It is credited back to the subsistence appropriation. It has never, prior to this time, gone back specifically to replacement of sales articles.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you think Gen. Rogers and Col. Hannay were wrong in connection with their criticism of that item?

Gen. LORD. Absolutely wrong. They were misinformed.

The CHAIRMAN. I remember very well Col. Hannay—

Gen. LORD. Col. Daly.

The CHAIRMAN. And also Gen. Rogers said the operation was contrary to law.

Gen. LORD. The operation was in strict accordance with law, as the books will show. They were not as familiar with the law as they should be. I will insert in the record the provisions of law governing sales of such supplies.

NOTE.—Section 3692, Revised Statutes:

"All moneys received from * * * the sale of commissary stores to the officers and enlisted men of the Army (or from the sale of materials, stores, or supplies sold officers and soldiers of the Army) * * * shall respectively revert to that appropriation out of which they were originally expended and shall be applied to the purpose for which they are appropriated by law."

The act making appropriations for the support of the Army for the fiscal year 1911, approved March 23, 1910, provides:

"Hereafter all moneys arising from the disposition of serviceable quartermaster's supplies or stores, authorized by law and regulations, shall remain available throughout the fiscal year following that in which the disposition was effected for the purposes of that appropriation from which such supplies were authorized to be supplied at the time of the disposition."

The CHAIRMAN. I asked you about receipts from sales. I had not so much in mind receipts from sales of subsistence to officers and men, but these receipts from sales to the general public.

Gen. LORD. They go to Miscellaneous Receipts of the Treasury.

The CHAIRMAN. Then, why should not that wool sale go to miscellaneous receipts of the Treasury?

Gen. LORD. Because it was not surplus stock. There was never any appropriation made for the purchase of wool. We were buying for the Navy Department and for industrial concerns for the purpose of protecting the wool supply. We were never given money to buy wool. If we had to continue to buy wool, as we were doing under a contract, it would take all our appropriation if receipts from our sales went into Miscellaneous Receipts, because we bought nearly a half billion dollars' worth of wool. It was not in the same class as other surplus materials. We acted as agents.

Under the provision of the act of November 4, 1918, receipts from sales of surplus war supplies revert to Miscellaneous Receipts of the Treasury Department. Receipts from wool during the fiscal year 1919, however, reverted to the appropriation, inasmuch as purchases of wool were made from Quartermaster Corps appropriations as the most available fund with which to control wool supply. Wool was bought from these appropriations for the Navy Department, and for industrial concerns, and for this reason wool was not included in the list of surplus war supplies, proceeds from which revert to Miscellaneous Receipts of the Treasury Department. Under this procedure receipts from wool sales since June 30, 1919, would revert to General Appropriations, Quartermaster Corps. Whether or not they properly belong there, the Secretary of War has decided that they shall go back into the Treasury, and will not be used for current expenditure.

Senator FLETCHER. Are you still buying wool?

Gen. LORD. Just a little amount of our second contract with the British Government from Australia.

Senator FLETCHER. How did you come out on that you bought and sold?

PURCHASE AND SALE OF WOOL.

Gen. LORD. We bought Australian wool from the British Government; our first contract amounted to about \$60,000,000, and we bought South American wool, South African wool, and Iceland wool. We were obliged to take the Iceland wool whether we wanted it or not, because Iceland wool was finding its way down into Germany, and we took the whole Iceland output for the sake of getting it under our control. We bought the entire American wool clip. We bought in all 673,931,552 pounds; we paid for that wool \$480,230,074. We have sold 522,000,000 pounds in round numbers. For that wool we have received \$362,000,000; that is, we have realized approximately 75 per cent on the amount that we have sold. We have on hand 141,000,000 pounds approximately. There is a little discrepancy, apparently, in these figures, but it is due to the fact that a certain portion of the wool we had scoured and the loss by scouring accounts for the discrepancy in weight. The value of the wool on hand is about \$94,000,000.

Senator SUTHERLAND. How would that make your total come out? What is the difference between the total of sale and purchase?

Gen. LORD. If we get the \$94,000,000 we will lose [about \$24,000,000, and there is something more than that; we have lost, in addition to that, about \$10,000,000 that we had netted at the time we began the auction sales to the general public. When we started selling we had a net profit of approximately \$10,000,000. That \$10,000,000 has been wiped out with \$24,000,000 more, so we stand to lose about \$34,000,000. We have little prospect, however, of getting \$94,000,000 for wool on hand.

Senator FLETCHER. I can see the reason for buying the American clip, but why go into these other countries?

Gen. LORD. They needed the supply and needed the kinds of wool, I am told. I am not an expert wool man.

Senator FLETCHER. The Government did not utilize that wool; it just simply sold it?

Gen. LORD. We were buying for an army of 5,000,000 men when the armistice came.

Senator FLETCHER. Was any sold to manufacturers?

Gen. LORD. We were selling to manufacturers all the time. It is the only way we could guarantee our troops getting the necessary clothing and blankets. We also sold to our own contractors.

Senator SUTHERLAND. It hardly seems to me there should be that much loss on that transaction. Nothing else has gone down.

Gen. LORD. Wool has. The British Government is selling wool in this country now at a less price than we paid for it.

The CHAIRMAN. Do those accounts come to your department?

Gen. LORD. Yes; we get them.

SALE OF SURPLUS WAR SUPPLIES.

The CHAIRMAN. Could you, without looking up too many matters, tell us offhand what those receipts have been for the sale of surplus materials?

Gen. LORD. I will insert it in the record.

[NOTE.—Receipts from sale of surplus war supplies to October 4, 1919, not including wool, amount to \$262,862,430.30. This does not include sales overseas.]

Senator SUTHERLAND. The same method is pursued with reference to materials, all sorts of materials abroad?

Gen. LORD. Yes.

Senator SUTHERLAND. All sorts of material abroad and everything else?

Gen. LORD. Yes: the receipts go into the Treasury. Col. Daly, of the Quartermaster General's office, was one of the officers who made the statement that the plan of crediting receipts from sales to the reserve was contrary to law. Col. Daly is a well-informed officer on such matters but evidently was not fully advised as to what was really being done, because if he had known the disposition we are making of these funds he would not have made that statement.

I want to say a word here to this committee about Col. Daly. As you may know, his regular rank is that of captain and military storkeeper in the Quartermaster Corps. It was an old position revived to make a place for him. Now, Capt. Daly—Col. Daly, as he is to-day—is one of the most valuable officers in the War Department. He has been with the Quartermaster Corps for many years.

At the beginning of this war he was with the Quartermaster General, and when Gen. Goethals came here he made Col. Daly his executive officer, and during all of those trying times, when we were making strenuous endeavors to get supplies overseas in sufficient quantity and in the right order, one of the prime factors in the office of Gen. Goethals was Col. Daly.

Later he went to New Orleans and took charge of that big supply activity there. He is now back with Gen. Rogers as his executive officer and I have no doubt doing high-grade work. It seems to me it would be a pity if in all this legislation some provision is not made to give him proper recognition. I think he deserves consideration. I hold no brief for him, and he does not know that I am speaking for him, but I feel that I should say this much. I do not know whether he has anybody to speak for him, but it would seem most just to give him some consideration in the way of increased rank in this legislation that is contemplated.

Senator FLETCHER. You spoke about the War Department having spent some \$15,000,000,000. You did not make allowance for any of these credits that are coming back from proceeds from these sales?

Gen. LORD. No; that is an offset.

Senator FLETCHER. And that would reduce the net amount expended by whatever those proceeds are. Have you any idea what they are likely to be?

Gen. LORD. No; I have not. They have been having some big transactions overseas lately, and they have not come to me yet from Mr. Hare, but we should have something definite soon.

The Quartermaster General, Gen. Rogers, during his appearance before this committee, made another complaint of interference on the part of finance, stating he was thinking of making certain purchases of leather and that I interfered with his procedure. I am very friendly to Gen. Rogers, and no one appreciates his ability better than I do and nothing was further from my thought than to attempt to interfere with him.

When Congress adjourned on March 4, we had a deficiency of some \$826,000,000 in general appropriations of the Quartermaster Corps, and we had suspended payments for a time in March until we could formulate a policy. One of the finance officers learned that one of the divisions in Gen. Rogers's office was contemplating buying half a million dollars' worth of leather. Thinking Gen. Rogers might not be informed of the actual situation, I went into his office and called his attention to the fact that we had no money and that there was a deficiency, thinking he might desire the information. He quotes it now as a matter of interference on my part, and I understand that he stated before the committee that he proceeded to make the purchase. Whether it was a wise purchase or not, it was not a proper purchase in the face of a deficiency.

As I have stated, the bureaus have control of their appropriations. Under this present system the Director of Finance has no authority and no desire for authority in any way to obligate appropriations, and he only pays under direct allotment from the bureau chiefs.

There was, as I stated, no financial control, no financial policy, in the department, and until the setting up of a Director of Finance, there was no bringing together of appropriations under one review.

FAILURE OF DEFICIENCY BILL.

When Congress adjourned on March 4, there was in the deficiency bill that failed of passage a deficiency estimate submitted by the Appropriations Committees of the House and Senate for \$829,375,295.16 under General Appropriations of the Quartermaster Corps. This appropriation is the great maintenance appropriation of the Army. From it we buy our subsistence, clothe our troops, buy our tentage; we transport troops and supplies and hire all of our employees from it; and when Congress adjourned we not only had no money in the Treasury under that appropriation, but by the act of February 25, which was a deficiency act reducing War Department appropriations—

Senator SUTHERLAND. What year?

Gen. LORD. In 1919; last February. We still owed the Treasury Department, after turning in all of our Treasury balance under General Appropriations—we still owed the Treasury Department more than \$800,000,000. The act of February 25 reduced War Department appropriations \$6,856,835,124.70. The deficiency in General Appropriations of the Quartermaster Corps was \$826,000,000. We owed the Treasury \$869,000,000 after we had turned in what balance there was in the Treasury. We were facing the Victory loan, and we were trying to make settlements with hundreds of contractors whose contracts we had terminated. It was a most serious and critical time, because it was absolutely necessary, to prevent unrest and disturbance, that these various industrial plants should get back into commercial production as soon as possible, and we realized that necessity.

When Congress failed to give us our deficiency appropriation we realized that some very drastic measures should be adopted. I studied the obligations; I studied the appropriations. I found that while there were deficiencies under the appropriations of some of the bureaus, there were surpluses under other appropriations sufficient to meet all deficiencies.

The governors of the Federal reserve banks of the country were summoned to Washington by the Federal Reserve Board to devise relief measures for the business interests of the country, jeopardized by the failure of the deficiency bill. In that bill, in addition to the War Department deficiency, were estimates for funds for other Government bureaus and a deficiency estimate of \$750,000,000 for the Railway Administration. The governor of the Federal Reserve Board applied to the Director of Finance asking what steps should be taken by the Federal reserve officials to help War Department contractors. The Director of Finance decided, however, that as there were plenty of War Department funds, the War Department should resume payment, and in accordance with this policy the following letter was sent to the governor of the Federal Reserve Board:

MARCH 20, 1919.

From: Director of Finance.

To: Governor of Federal Reserve Board, Treasury Department, Washington, D. C.
Subject: Obligations to commercial firms under War Department appropriations.

1. In compliance with request from a representative of the statistical division of your office I beg to submit the statement which follows relative to obligations against War Department appropriations.

2. In the third deficiency appropriation bill, which failed of passage, there was a provision for a deficiency under General Appropriations of the Quartermaster Corps of

\$329,375,295.10. This appropriation covers the ordinary maintenance of the Army, including purchase of subsistence, supplies, general supplies of many descriptions, clothing, equipage, trucks, automobiles, and all classes of transportation accounts. Pending the necessary steps to finance the situation disbursing officers in Chicago, New York, Washington, and the Wool Purchasing Office in Boston were instructed to suspend payment of all accounts of whatever character that were payable from this appropriation, but this suspension was removed yesterday and no War Department accounts are now being refused payment because of lack of funds.

3. The War Department, pending the enactment of a deficiency bill, has made arrangements that will enable it to finance its undertakings and pay all obligations under War Department appropriations that may be presented for settlement before Congress can extend the necessary relief so that the assistance of the Federal Reserve Board and its member banks, and the aid of the banking interests of the country will not be needed to finance War Department contractors because of the failure of the third deficiency appropriation bill.

H. M. LORD,

Brigadier General, Director of Finance.

The CHAIRMAN. You used the unexpended balances of certain appropriations?

Gen. LORD. We used the unexpended balances of certain appropriations to meet the needs. We had a working balance in the hands of our disbursing officers with which we continued to pay. This letter to the governor of the Federal Reserve Board, dated March 20, is interesting in this connection.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you have the legal authority to do that, General?

Gen. LORD. This working balance did not go back into the Treasury. We left the indebtedness that this appropriation had toward the deficiency bill stand, and used our working balance to make payments until we could get relief from Congress. We had under Supply, Services, and Transportation for 1918 a surplus. Supply, Services, and Transportation covered exactly the same class of obligations that General Appropriations did. We utilized a portion of that to meet the needs, feeling that while we did not have authority for it, to have failed, to have defaulted in our payments at that time, would have been so serious that such action could not even be considered.

The first payment we made after we resumed was an advance of \$100,000,000 to the Railroad Administration, which was in a very desperate situation at that time.

I would like to put that in as a personal exhibit [producing photographic reproduction of a check for \$100,000,000].

Senator FLETCHER. On account of transportation?

Gen. LORD. On account of transportation. We had in our office the duplicates of bills of lading and transportation requests sufficient to warrant that advance. That is, they had not submitted bills, they had not been able to state their accounts, they were scattered all over the country. Under our system, whenever a bill of lading is issued a copy of it goes into the finance office.

We then proceeded to pay all bills. There never was any further hold-up in the payment of bills. Now, I am stating that as one of the problems that presented itself, to show the need of some centralized agency to handle the financial operations of a big institution like the War Department. Under the old procedure, there would have been no one to study the general situation and solve that problem, but under a central finance system the money was found to pay all obligations, wherever they occurred, and no contractor was forced into bankruptcy because of failure of the War Department to pay its bills, and a great financial disaster averted.

REORGANIZATION OF THE ARMY.

TRANSFER OF APPROPRIATIONS.

When this present Congress came into being we had deficiencies approximating \$1,270,000,000. Two questions presented themselves. There were two solutions, either to go to Congress and ask for a deficiency of \$1,270,000,000, or ask for authority to use the surpluses under appropriations already made and which would stand as a liability against the Treasury Department for three years.

We went before the House Committee on Appropriations and stated the case, and they gave, in the act of July 11, 1919, the third deficiency, authority to take from surplus in ordnance \$770,000,000, Quartermaster Corps \$450,000,000, Air Service (military), \$20,000,000, and Air Service (production), \$30,000,000, a total of \$1,270,000,000, with which to meet deficiencies wherever they occurred, reappropriations which did not add to the total of new appropriations made by this Congress.

The first act was to keep faith with Congress by making up the amount we owed the Treasury Department under the reduction of the deficiency bill of February 25, 1919, and we turned back into the Treasury, out of that \$1,270,000,000, \$822,789,983.48 and squared our account with Congress.

CONSOLIDATION OF FINANCE OFFICES.

We made a physical consolidation of the various bureau finance activities very gradually. We took over the quartermaster appropriations and the quartermaster financial personnel first. In each case I went to the bureau head and discussed the consolidation with him, following the line of least resistance in order to make the physical consolidation in the manner and at the time that would best meet his wishes, so as not to interfere with operations. This was done, one after another, two or three months apart, until we finally got the various forces together and all the appropriations together and all the accounting together under one control.

Senator SUTHERLAND. Did you take over a large part of the personnel?

Gen. LORD. We took the finance personnel that had been engaged on finance work.

Now, under the old procedure in New York City, which I shall refer to because it has been one of our most important centers of expenditure activity, they had originally five independent offices, located in different parts of the town, and a man with a bill would have to find the proper office. If he had a bill against the Quartermaster Corps, he could not get it paid at the Ordnance office or at the Signal office; he had to find the Quartermaster office, and so on. And after the consolidation, and now, wherever you may go with a bill you will only find one disbursing officer who will pay that bill if it is a legitimate War Department obligation, no matter to what appropriation it pertains. The disbursing officer pays it, and he is paying it out of the one appropriation that he carries, under the same system we adopted overseas.

Let me tell you about New York City. Bureau chiefs have complained of duplication of work. Before the consolidation the War Department had in New York City 5 independent offices, 5 inde-

pendent leases, 66 officers, 150 enlisted men, 568 clerks. To-day there is 1 office, 1 lease, 10 officers, no enlisted men, and 375 clerks. At the end of the current month there will be 9 officers, no enlisted men, and 130 clerks.

We are disbursing there an average of \$200,000,000 daily. We have in one office on one book, handled by one disbursing officer, seven different bureau appropriations. We have one disbursing office, one disbursing officer, and one disbursing account in place of that scattered, expensive set-up which existed before the consolidation.

I am talking from the record, and these are exact figures. If Congress decides to return to the former method of operation, it means in New York City you must renew your leases or take new ones and spread out your activities as they were before the consolidation of finance.

FINANCE PERSONNEL.

The question was asked, I think by Senator Fletcher, as to the field personnel. Outside of Washington, our field personnel to-day is approximately 2,000. Under orders issued it will be reduced to 600 between now and the 1st of January, the greater portion of the reduction taking place this current month. That is, between now and January it will be reduced by approximately 72 per cent.

The question came up as to the personnel of the corps. Now, this is also interesting in connection with the statement that we have increased work and expense. The number of disbursing officers prior to the war, from the books of the Treasury Department, was 390. The number of disbursing officers at the time of the consolidation was 1,035. The number of disbursing officers at the present time, including 30 military attaches, is 258. We have less disbursing officers now than prior to the war, although our disbursing activities have not been very materially reduced, because we are making extraordinary payments under terminated contracts, to-day, demobilization is not yet completed, and we have a great many disbursing officers overseas. The figures include 30 military attaches. Every military attache is a disbursing officer to the extent that he is able to pay his own pay and his interpreter's pay and pay his rental and pay for his office supplies. That is very immaterial, but they figure 30 in that total of 258.

The CHAIRMAN. Will that be further reduced?

Gen. LORD. Yes; we are still reducing. For instance, this month there will be, in and around Camp Mills, a reduction of from five officers to one by the use of the memorandum receipt that allows us to use agent officers at the flying fields and outside points, so, in place of six disbursing accounts there to-day there will be one.

Senator SUTHERLAND. How about the rest of the personnel, outside of the actual disbursing officer?

Gen. LORD. I will come to that. It is the entire corps you are asking about, both the disbursing officers—

Senator SUTHERLAND. Yes.

Gen. LORD. There is a provision in the reorganization bill for 318. Now, when that recommendation was made, we thought that was the lowest amount we could operate under, but, as the result of improved methods, the standardization of forms, etc., I will submit and put in the record a revision of that estimate, which calls for only 258 entire personnel for finance. That is for an army of 500,000 and more men.

If you reduce under the national defense act to approximately 225,000 men we would require 178 finance officers.

The CHAIRMAN. Will you submit memorandum covering both increases?

Gen. LORD. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Revised memorandum covering both sizes of the Army.

Gen. LORD. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. The Army as composed in the bill and the Army approximating 225,000 as established in the national defense act?

Gen. LORD. Yes, sir.

Finance personnel for 500,000 men.

	Director of Finance.	Washington, D. C., zone finance officers.	Department, zone finance, and deputy finance officers (including property auditors).	21 tactical divisions.	Camp or station personnel for 21 divisions.	Posts and stations other than divisions.	Total.
Brigadier general.....	1						1
Colonels.....	2	1	14				17
Lieutenant colonels.....	2	1	3	21			27
Majors.....	5	2	31		21	7	66
Captains.....	5	4	67	21	42	8	147
Total commissioned.....	15	8	115	42	63	15	258
Enlisted.....				336	483	240	1,059

Finance personnel 225,000 men.

	Director of finance.	Washington, D. C., zone finance officers.	Department, zone finance and deputy zone finance officers (including property auditors).	10 tactical divisions.	Camp or station personnel for 10 divisions.	Posts and stations other than divisions.	Total.
Brigadier general.....	1						1
Colonels.....	2		9				12
Lieutenant colonels.....	2	1	2	10			15
Majors.....	3	2	25		10	7	47
Captains.....	4	3	58	10	20	8	108
Total commissioned.....	12	7	94	20	30	15	178
Enlisted.....				160	230	240	630

Senator FLETCHER. That number you gave includes the officers and privates as well?

Gen. LORD. No. This is the commissioned personnel. I will give the entire reduction of enlisted personnel. You can figure, starting with your twenty-odd divisions, that you can reduce the personnel by five officers with the reduction of a division.

Senator FLETCHER. In the reorganization bill you call for 175 privates, first class, and 100 privates in addition.

Gen. LORD. Yes. I have that worked out and I will put that in.

Senator FLETCHER. Do you reduce those in your present estimate?

Gen. LORD. Yes. We make the same proportionate reduction in all the personnel.

Senator FLETCHER. Your intention is, in creating this department, that it would make for economy?

Gen. LORD. There is no question about it. It has done so and is doing so now. Along that same line, a reference has been made to the number of officers in the reorganization bill for the Finance service and the Transportation Service and the Quartermaster's Corps, and attention was called to the fact that in the national defense act there were only 362 quartermasters allowed, and that any excess over and above that should be explained, which is true. Now, in the National Defense Act, those 362 quartermasters constitute 3.16 per cent of the entire commissioned force of the Army. In the reorganization bill the Quartermaster Corps is allowed 863 officers, which constitutes 2.92 per cent of the strength in the reorganization bill; the Finance, 258 officers, revised estimate, which would constitute 0.87 of 1 per cent; and Transportation, 120 officers, which constitutes 0.44 of 1 per cent. This would make 4.23 of 1 per cent, as against 3.16 per cent, the difference being accounted for by the fact that there has been transferred under the present organization a large portion of the purchasing activities of all these other bureaus to the Quartermaster Corps; that there has been transferred to Transportation all of the transportation of the Army, some of which formerly was handled by Ordnance; and that there has been collected under the Finance not only all of the financial activities of the other bureaus, but Finance has the duty of auditing the accounts of all of the six and one-half billions of property that has been accumulated, in possession of the Army, and has, by this new system of property accounting, decentralized it from Washington, reducing, as it must, to a very appreciable amount, the clerical force necessary in Washington, which heretofore has been keeping the property accounts of the Army.

I have not included Motor Transport Corps in this total of percentages. The Motor Transport Corps is a new activity and it has heretofore been provided for by details from the line. It is not proper that it should be included as part of the personnel in this summation of what would be required in the reorganization bill. And the Construction Division is not carried in the bill.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, you do not see it there as personnel, but it is there?

Gen. LORD. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. It is under the Engineer Corps.

Gen. LORD. Yes. I think it should be an independent activity.

NO DUPLICATION OF WORK OR PERSONNEL NECESSARY.

If I have the time, I wish to take up some of the criticisms of the Chief of Engineers. On page 680 of the hearings, he refers to duplication of work and force. The one thing that he may state with some appearance of reason is that he must keep track of the allotments he makes to the Director of Finance for disbursing purposes. His activity is not nearly so large or so important as that of the Ordnance and the whole financial activity of the Ordnance which is keeping

that allotment, as I have been informed, consists of one officer and 13 clerks, and neither of them really need any finance personnel.

He has available for his information at any time, from the office of the Director of Finance, immediately upon application, any information that he wants as to his allotments and as to his disbursements.

I have called attention to the semimonthly report that lies here, which is more complete in its detail than anything ever issued by any of the bureaus. He states, on page 680, that he is unable to do business without having actual control of his disbursements. All up-to-date business concerns have separated paying from obligating.

He states on that page that the removal of finance and disbursing officers to a distant point has crippled him in his activities. At the time of the consolidation the office of the Chief of Engineers was located down at Seventh and B, in Henry Park. His depot, where most of his disbursing was done, was on U Street, just off Fourteenth, about two miles away. At the present time the Chief of Engineers is housed in the same building with the Director of Finance, who has in his office the complete record of his allotments and expenditures made thereunder.

On page 681 he refers to the case where he restricts the purchase of office furniture, and states he is unable under the present organization to tell whether or not his restrictions as to the purchase of office furniture are carried out. The same answer applies, that he can have information at any time as to disbursements out of Engineer appropriations; and he really has no authority at the present time to buy any office furniture anyhow; the duty of purchasing furniture belongs to the Quartermaster General.

He states, at page 682, that there are no irregularities in the Engineer Corps that have been found by the auditor, but, like the other bureaus, he has many proxy-signed contracts, amounting to something like one and a half millions, which are absolutely illegal; and he has, like all other bureaus, contracts for many millions, which it was necessary to settle under the Dent Act.

On page 683 he speaks of duplication of accounts because of separation of the civil from the military appropriations. He has, for example, an Engineer officer disbursing out of River and Harbors, and the same officer disbursing out of Fortifications appropriations. He states that he is obliged to separate them and furnish two accounts. Even if that were necessary, it must be evident to the committee that anything that will compel a separation of these two accounts should be encouraged, because while there must have been in the office of the auditor an accurate accounting as between appropriations, the separation in actual accounts current, it seems, should be necessary to enable us to get the proper cost accounting. But it is not necessary for this Engineer officer to submit two separate accounts.

The Chief of Engineers has chosen to conduct his disbursements in that way. The Finance Service stands ready at his wish at any time to take over all of his military appropriation disbursements without the increase of personnel, resulting in a reduction of accounts submitted to the accounting officials of the Treasury Department. He has 32 disbursing officers in this country to-day. In some places, like Charleston, he has two disbursing officers, handling not very

large accounts; and in all except six of these places Finance officers are located disbursing funds, who, without increase in their clerical force or their overhead, can take over all the military disbursements now made by Engineer officers and handle them promptly and properly.

The CHAIRMAN. But you have not taken that over?

Gen. LORD. We have not taken it over. We have had enough to do, and my relations with the bureau chiefs are very friendly and I do not desire to run counter to their wishes if I can possibly avoid it. I think, however, that every penny of money appropriated by Congress for the War Department should be disbursed by one bureau, and that the Finance Service.

The CHAIRMAN. Then you have discretionary power to take that over or not?

Gen. LORD. It is with the Secretary of War. We had enough to do. We did not want the River and Harbor appropriation.

The CHAIRMAN. I am not speaking of the river and harbor. I am speaking of these disbursing officers.

Gen. LORD. Oh, the same man is disbursing the two classes of appropriations, civil and military. To the extent these Engineer officers are disbursing military funds, they are financial officers under my control and account to me. That was the objection the Chief of Engineers made to the plan. They account to me for military funds and account to him for civil funds.

The CHAIRMAN. Are there any other of the bureaus that still have their own disbursing officers?

Gen. LORD. No. If they do, then they are disbursing as my representatives.

Senator SUTHERLAND. Would it be feasible for you to disburse the civil appropriations, too?

Gen. LORD. Yes; without an increase of personnel.

Senator SUTHERLAND. Also the military?

Gen. LORD. Also the military.

The CHAIRMAN. You mean the same 32 men do it? Would you need 32 men?

Gen. LORD. No, sir; we have the men there; with the exception of six places we have disbursing officers in the places where the Engineer officers are disbursing.

Senator SUTHERLAND. You think, then, that the objections he has raised to that plan are not sound?

Gen. LORD. They are not. He chooses to do it that way. He calls attention to the fact that he has been obliged to separate civil appropriations from military appropriations, which I maintain is highly desirable.

Senator SUTHERLAND. They could be separated in your office just as well as there?

Gen. LORD. Yes; they could be separated in my office just as well as there.

Senator FLETCHER. There is no interference with the power of making contracts in handling the River and Harbor funds?

Gen. LORD. Oh, no; I have nothing to do with making contracts. I have nothing to do with purchasing. We do not initiate anything, Senator Fletcher. Bureau chiefs are entirely unhampered. The money is under their control. They obligate it as they see fit, and

then tell us to pay such a contractor so much money. We complete activities they originate.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you ever hold up payments for any reason?

Gen. LORD. We do. The Chief of Engineers charges, on page 683, that the finance service increases paper work and accounts. The very illustration of New York, where they are rendering one account instead of seven, seems to be a conclusive answer to that. The same thing obtains in all the large cities of the country and at every camp and cantonment.

He says, on the same page, that property forms do not properly safeguard the Government. I will treat of that later, and merely call attention to the fact that the Chief of Engineers discontinued the old method of accounting December 31, and refused to put in the new system; so that since January 1 he has had no accounting of his property.

The CHAIRMAN. What do you mean by his having no accounting of his property?

Gen. LORD. He has rendered no abstracts; made no returns on his property.

The CHAIRMAN. No inventory?

Gen. LORD. I do not know whether he has an inventory. He made no returns on his property. We wanted to put in the new system and are trying to put it in now, and are informed by letter that he discontinued the old system, on December 31, but has not applied the new.

Senator SUTHERLAND. The power of direction in that case, of course, would be in the Secretary of War?

Gen. LORD. Yes; and he accounts for his own property—the Chief of Engineers. That is, he is the one that passes upon it. The final authority rests, under the law, in the Secretary of War. The accounting officials of the Treasury have nothing to do with Army property. They have to do with money. The statement made is that he has adopted no method; he has just let his property hang, without doing one thing or the other, and we are now applying to the Engineers this new method of property accounting, which I will take up later.

The CHAIRMAN. Would it not be desirable to have one system throughout the entire department?

Gen. LORD. That is what we have. He is the last one to come in under.

The CHAIRMAN. Does the Secretary of War know that he is still without?

Gen. LORD. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. He will come in?

Gen. LORD. He is coming in all right.

The CHAIRMAN. It takes some time?

Gen. LORD. Yes.

On page 684 he says it is possible that services or supplies might be paid for twice. Only with the connivance of Engineer officers. And that obtains under the old system as well as under the new.

On page 684 he speaks of the increased expense of operation and delay. The reduction of the force, both commissioned and clerical, reduction in disbursing officers, reduction in accounts, and reduction in officers do not increase the expense of operation, and I have stated the exact cases where we have done that all over this country.

There is no duplication of work and no duplication of force that is necessary in any of these bureaus because of the installation and operation of an independent finance department.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you know how many bookkeepers and accountants the Chief of Engineers has now?

Gen. LORD. No; I do not. He is making his administrative examination of river and harbor bills. As long as he controls that appropriation he would have to have a force to handle it. The only thing I can see, the only reason, that he can offer is that they might require a finance organization to handle allotments. In the office of the Director of Finance to-day we are handling all the allotments for the entire War Department with the exception of the River and Harbor, and we have only 20 clerks engaged on that task. If they require a large overhead for that purpose, I suggest that they come to the office of the Director of Finance for lessons in efficiency.

NO DELAY IN PAYMENTS.

The Chief of Engineers charges delay in settlement of bills. When we took over the Engineer Office in Washington, there were 420 bills, unpaid vouchers, some of them of long standing that we cleared up, and we did it immediately. Every Engineer voucher in my disbursing office at noon to-day unpaid was held there waiting for information from the office of the Chief of Engineers, i. e., his receiving report that the goods had been delivered, and my representatives were trying in person and by telephone to secure that necessary information.

The CHAIRMAN. What is the average length of time taken to get those returns and receipts?

Gen. LORD. The Engineer or other bureau chief or his representatives lets a contract and the goods are delivered. The contractor sends his bill to the Finance office. If it is New York, he sends it to the Finance office there, in the Printer Craft Building on Eighth Avenue, and we immediately proceed to make up the voucher, so as to facilitate payments. We proceed to make up the voucher, and we need, before we can do it, a statement from the supply officer that he has received the goods. We are not going to pay until we have evidence that the goods have been received. That is what we call a receiving report.

Now, this delay in getting the receiving report from the supply officer may be due to something over which he has no control, as may be the case in the office of the Chief of Engineers, but we immediately get busy, as soon as we get the bill, make up the Government form, War Department Form 330 which is a common form for the first time all through the War Department to cover regular purchases, and we get in touch sometimes to the extent of sending messengers to see if we can get that receiving report, and as soon as we get it we settle the voucher. We do not intend to close the day in any one of the Finance offices without getting out every voucher that is in any way payable.

The CHAIRMAN. Why do you not provide that the contractor himself shall bring the paper with him when he asks payment?

Gen. LORD. The receiving paper is a statement from the Supply Officer that he has received the goods.

The CHAIRMAN. Why can not the supply officer give that receipt to the contractor?

Gen. LORD. The contractor may be in St. Louis and the receiving officer may be in New York, and he sends his bill by mail.

Senator FLETCHER. Why do you not require the contractor to send his bill to the Chief of Engineers, for instance, and have him transmit it to you?

Gen. LORD. Well, they do in most cases. The quicker procedure is to send it to us, because when we get it we get busy in the effort to get the supporting papers. But in some cases they do send it to the contracting officer and the contracting officer sends it to us. I get reports showing how many vouchers are held in the disbursing offices unpaid, and the length of time the oldest has been there and the reason they are not paid; and I have two men traveling all the time to facilitate these payments, because the contractors need this money. There is no delay because of failure of Finance to function.

INDEPENDENT AUDIT BY FINANCE SAVES MONEY.

There is a statement made on one page of the hearing, by the Chief of Engineers, with reference to delays on the part of Finance, and he says that in the golden times before the institution of Finance, an Engineer contractor would come to Washington with his bill and in 24 hours he would go away with a check. The first definite complaint that came to my office of delay on the part of Finance to settle a bill was in the case of a settlement made with the Cummings Machinery Co., of Munster, Ohio. This claim was against the Engineers on an Engineer contract. It was passed by an Engineer Board, certified to by an Engineer officer. The contractor was here, and went to the Finance office in this city and presented his voucher. Now, this was a settlement under the Dent Act. Under that act the Secretary of War has been given full and complete authority to make settlement. After award has been made the bill is paid in accordance with the award. Whether it is an award made by the Secretary or by delegated authority, the disbursing officer can pay the bill without question, because under the provisions of the Dent Act the accounting officials of the Treasury have no power of suspension or modification, if payment is made in accordance with the award. In ordinary payments, the auditor goes into the merits of the case, examines the papers, and if it is not a proper payment he makes a suspension against the disbursing officer, so that on any of these awards, as far as he is selfishly concerned, the disbursing officer can pay without fear of suspension. Disbursing officers of the Finance Service, however, are instructed that their first duty is not to see if they can get by the accounting officers, but that they must look out for the interests of the Government. So, when this case came to the accounting officer, it did not look right and he refused to pay it until he had had opportunity to look into it. The case was brought up to me immediately, and it was stated that the contractor needed the \$72,000 awarded on the claim, and that the voucher should be immediately paid. I declined to order payment, and submitted the voucher to the experts in my office. They studied it, and the next day sent it back to the Engineer office for redrafting. The Engineer Board reduced it by \$14,000, the contractor was paid \$58,000 instead of \$72,000, and the Government saved \$14,000. There was delay in this case, but a profitable delay for the Government. We are making delays all along the line where we are not satisfied that the payment is absolutely correct.

There was another payment in which \$92,000 was saved. I do not think that was an engineer payment. But, no matter what award the boards of review make, the review of a finance officer who is not under the control of any of these bureaus is absolutely necessary for the protection of the Government, and that is fundamental and up-to-date business.

Senator FLETCHER. Did that Ohio concern accept the settlement?

Gen. LORD. Took it with the reduction of \$14,000 and went away and I have not heard from them since, but they did not get away within the 24 hours.

Now, we do get complaints of delay of that sort, and Senators and Members of Congress get complaints, but we are paying promptly; but, at the same time, it is more important to pay properly.

Senator SUTHERLAND. They sometimes complain about the delay of the Senate here.

Gen. LORD. That is like these general charges of delay in payment of bills. I might make a general charge that this Senate Committee on Military Affairs is inefficient and, absurd as it may be to us all, you might find difficulty in specifically refuting the charge. A general charge is pretty safe; but I am trying to disprove these charges from the records.

On page 693 of the record the Chief of Engineers says the chiefs of bureaus should have control of purchasing and paying.

This doctrine is financial heresy and is abhorrent to good accounting and good business, and it will be so denominated by every good accountant and every good business man. The man who obligates should be entirely and absolutely divorced from the man who pays. In that way you will get an independent audit and in no other way, and in that way you will get the only audit that you will get before payment. As it is now, the only audit we get is by the Auditor for the War Department, and he audits after the payment has been made, when it is too late.

Senator SUTHERLAND. Well, he does not go into the merits of the case as you did in the case of that \$14,000.

Gen. LORD. He does not know anything about it. The bureau chiefs know nothing about these problems we have been solving. They do not know anything about the general financial problems overseas. When they read this record it will be the first time they have heard of most of them. They have profited by what has been done, but they have not had their attention called to it. They do not know that these problems have existed.

Relative to personnel, the Chief of Engineers said he was called upon to supply more finance officers to the Director of Finance than he had in his office. He had in his disbursing office at the time of the consolidation seven officers. Three came to me. Two, Col. Butler and Lieut. Weber, were property men. They did not belong in Finance. Engineers had a special system of overseas property accounting, and these two officers were connected with that property accounting, and when they broke up the Engineer depot, consolidated it with the other depots, these two men were sort of left to me. They proved to be very valuable men. There came also with them a Lieut. Boehler, who was a disbursing officer. So that I got three officers from his depot, and only one of them a finance officer. Later Maj. F. W. Browne was assigned to me from the office of the Chief of Engineers, so that he must have had eight finance officers. So he

sent me four out of eight, and two were property men, but I used both of them afterwards for finance. I only have one in my office to-day. If I had realized at the time what really valuable officers they were, I think I should have tried to have gotten more of the same kind from him.

The CHAIRMAN. Were these officers' places in the Engineer organization filled by other men?

Gen. LORD. I do not know. Of course, his property accounting came away; he did not fill those two places.

The CHAIRMAN. As I remember Gen. Black's testimony he contended that after he furnished you with the requisite number of officers, he had to duplicate them again.

Gen. LORD. Yes. Well, there was no need of doing that. I am handling his finance, with the exception of the civil appropriations. There was no necessity for doing it, whether he did do it or not. I have only one of the Engineer officers with me at the present time that he assigned me.

Page 693, he states that Finance is a branch of Purchase, Storage and Traffic.

Senator SUTHERLAND. What became of the other men?

Gen. LORD. They have gone back into civil life. We let out from Finance this month more than 200 officers. An interesting thing in connection with letting out of these Finance officers is that in every case but two these officers have gone back to better positions than the ones they occupied when they came into the Army. One of the two did not want a position, as he desired to recuperate, and the second officer discharged recently has just been provided for. And the same way with clerks. We are reducing our clerks in the field 45 per cent this month, and have instructed Finance officers in the field to get in touch with the contractors and business people, to see if they can provide places for the outgoing clerical force.

Col. Bunker, of the New York finance office, told me two days ago that he had been able to find places for all his outgoing clerks.

FAILURE TO SECURE ALLOTMENTS.

Gen. Williams, in his statement made before this or the other committee, speaks about interference and delay. Now, there was delay in connection with Ordnance payments. Ordnance has a system of allotments very similar to that I have described, and had it all through the war, and reports came to us from the contractors that the disbursing officers at such and such points, and particularly at Toronto, where we have very large Ordnance contracts, were not paying. Now, if there is a failure to get a settlement in the first instance it is the Finance that is charged with the delay. They look to the disbursing officer for their money, and if they don't get it they blame him. They don't know the reason the disbursing officer does not pay. If it is a complaint that comes to one of you it is generally a complaint that Finance does not settle.

Now, we had these complaints of failure to pay on Ordnance settlements and I put Col. Sears, of my office, on the job to see what the trouble was. We found this condition prevailed: A contract would be let for Ordnance, say, for 1,000 units of some particular thing. The contractor would deliver the 1,000 units, and having a good contract might deliver 50 or 60 or more units than the contract called for, which, of course, would be more than the allotment of funds con-

templated. Immediately the disbursing officer would pay the amount that had been called for under the contract and notify the Chief of Ordnance or the Office of the Chief of Ordnance that there had been these overdeliveries and notify him, asking for an additional allotment to pay it, provided the Supply Officer at that point decided that it was wise to accept such overdelivery. Here is the condition we found: Unpaid vouchers awaiting allotment of funds, \$3,927,-661.12. This is all Ordnance.

Unpaid vouchers awaiting procurement orders, \$270,418.30.

Unpaid vouchers awaiting purchase orders, \$25,000.

Unpaid vouchers awaiting emergency letters, \$848,331.16.

Unpaid vouchers awaiting miscellaneous reasons, \$667,438.86.

This makes a total of \$5,748,849.38.

And, awaiting payment because of failure to get the allotments from the Office of the Chief of Ordnance, or to get the procurement orders or the receiving reports or other supporting papers from Ordnance officers.

When our attention was called to this we immediately took the matter up with the Chief of Ordnance. In the meantime, his attention was called to the fact of the failure to pay these bills; and I am satisfied that if he had known of the conditions that obtained he never would have accused the Director of Finance or his office of interference or delay, because I am satisfied he had these complaints in mind.

I could have given, under the conditions, a new allotment to these men, and had them paid promptly rather than wait until the Ordnance Office in Washington had functioned; but there I would have transgressed the authority that is given the chief of the bureau to control exclusively his own appropriations, and I did not do it, and we were called upon to answer continued charges of delay because we waited, trying to get the Ordnance people to function so we could pay. Of course there are occasional delays, but, in most cases, these delays can be obviated by conferences with the other bureaus, and this is being done. None of these delays are due to the organization of an independent Finance.

Gen. Rogers, the Quartermaster General, Director of Purchase, also accuses the Finance Service of delay.

The same trouble occurs with quartermaster vouchers, failure to get receiving reports, but that does not necessarily prove to be a fault of the bureau concerned. It may be that there may have been some delay in shipment; but the delay can not properly be charged up against the Finance agents, because the vouchers are paid daily, as soon as they are complete and in order for payment.

PROMPT PAYMENTS THE RULE.

I have had a most intimate acquaintance with disbursements in the Army; and I state without any reservation that there never was a time in the history of the War Department when its bills were paid so promptly and so accurately as they are being paid now. We have a system of discounts in the Army, where we state in the contract, in general terms, something as follows: That for payment within 10 days after receipt of bill the Government will be entitled to 2 per cent discount. That is, we take 2 per cent for prompt payment. We found that was not being taken advantage of, that the Government was losing money, and we had the matter investigated and found

that the trouble was that we could not get our receiving reports; that in every case on the reports submitted from the field, that in every case where the voucher was ready for payment, the Finance Department had taken advantage of it, and through prompt payment had secured the discount.

Senator SUTHERLAND. That is a very considerable item in every business, General.

Gen. LORD. It is a very considerable item in the Army.

Senator SUTHERLAND. And you ought to take advantage of it, always.

Gen. LORD. Yes. I have a statement here—a combined statement from the field—giving the record of each disbursing office. We found in the Atlanta office that the amount of disbursements on which discount was taken was \$2,602.06—that is, the Government netted a discount of \$370.60 under that contract. In Baltimore, the amount of disbursements on which discount was lost was \$12,121.74—that is, discount was only taken amounting to \$69.44, and we lost a discount of \$221.43.

Now, I have an activity that is looking after that. We are trying to clean those things up; and I find the explanation is, the receiving report was received too late; we could not get it. The Finance officer in each case gets busy and tries in every way possible to secure the necessary papers. We are having these cases looked after, and we hope to clean it up.

These reports from the field show that there has been no loss of discount by failure of the Finance Service to pay a bill when it is properly drawn and ready for payment, and that there has been no delay in the settlement of accounts. Reports from the field show prompt payment and the statements of contractors show the same thing, many of them having expressed their appreciation of the prompt settlement of their accounts.

The New York Merchants' Association has something over 3,000 firms or members, and among them we had many hundreds of contractors. The executive secretary of that body expressed to me his appreciation of the prompt manner in which the accounts of the association's members had been settled since the consolidation, and this gentleman, the secretary of that association, was particularly grateful, for when the consolidation was made in New York we took over from the consolidated bureaus more than 20,000 delayed vouchers awaiting payment and cleaned them up. Some of these vouchers had been hanging fire for more than a year.

The CHAIRMAN. It is now 5 o'clock, and I imagine that some of the members of the committee would like to attend to some other business before the dinner hour. I was going to ask you before we closed this afternoon if you would make an effort to draw a provision in legislative form, or suitable for insertion in the bill, tentative, of course, prescribing the various functions of the finance department.

Gen. LORD. I have it drawn. I will present it the next time I am before the committee. [Note.—See end of hearing.]

The CHAIRMAN. It occurred to me while you were talking that this bill does not attempt to set forth the duties of the finance department.

Senator FLETCHER. I think that is very important, especially with reference to the new departments.

(Whereupon, at 5 o'clock, the committee adjourned until tomorrow, Tuesday, October 7, 1919, at 2.15 p. m.)

REORGANIZATION OF THE ARMY.

OCTOBER 7, 1919.

UNITED STATES SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON MILITARY AFFAIRS,
Washington, D. C.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to the call of the chairman, at 2.15 p. m. in the committee room, Capitol, Senator Wadsworth presiding.

Present: Senators Wadsworth (chairman), Sutherland, New, and Fletcher.

STATEMENT OF BRIG. GEN. H. M. LORD—(Resumed).

The CHAIRMAN. We can proceed, General. You might proceed from just where you left off yesterday, in your own way.

Gen. LORD. I was talking yesterday about the many problems of the Director of Finance that had a very general bearing upon the War Department and that did not associate themselves with any particular bureau or any two or three bureaus of supply.

This morning I had another illustration of the fact. I found that it is necessary to have printed immediately certain maps that we may need for service in a certain country. The Military Intelligence Division has the data ready for the printing of the maps. The question had to be decided as to what appropriation was applicable for that particular purchase, for that particular service. It was submitted to the Director of Finance. Under the old procedure in the War Department there was no one to submit it to. It would have gone to the Engineers or the Signal Corps or here and there to find some place into which it could fit. In this case it came in regular order to the Director of Finance for solution.

We had just reached the point yesterday in our discussion in which I had referred to the matter of standardized forms for the War Department.

STANDARDIZED FORMS.

Under the old statutory organization, and until the organization of a Bureau of Finance, each bureau had its own forms, its own kinds of contracts, and its own system of reports. The variation was very wide in finance matters. To-day we have a standardized system of financial forms that applies to all the finances of the War Department. By so doing, we have been able to reduce by a very large amount the number of forms in use. For example, in place of 29 financial forms we are to-day using 9. To-day all payments are made from one appropriation of the War Department, so that throughout the Army for expenditures and for accounting and for making reports everything is handled on the same system of forms and under

the same system of accounting. We have one system of expenditure and one system of accounting and, as I stated yesterday, one consolidated approved system of terminology, so that when we make a report the report will really mean something.

The question has come up before the committee as to the consolidation of procurement or consolidation of supplies or consolidation of purchasing. Whatever may be the merits of that policy, it is not necessarily connected with a consolidation of finance. If you do not have a consolidated procurement, the consolidation of finance is all the more necessary, because in that way you will get some centralization of your expenditure activities. There will be one puckering string to bring them together for review.

PROPERTY ACCOUNTING.

In the discussion yesterday the question of property accounting arose. With January 1 a new system of property accounting was installed in the War Department. The attitude of the Finance Service toward War Department property is that a monkey wrench that costs a dollar is just a dollar in another form, and that we should have just as accurate accounting for the monkey wrench as we would have for the dollar. Our money accounts go to the Treasury Department. The Treasury officials have the last word in their analysis and in their auditing, but the accounting officials of the Treasury have no concern and no authority over property. The last word in property accounting is the Secretary of War.

Under the present organization the Secretary of War has delegated to the Director of Finance the question of property auditing. Under the new system Finance is not accountable for property. Property officers belong to the supply bureaus, and these officers who are responsible for property and are obliged to account for it are supply officers as distinguished from Finance officers. The Finance Service, an outside, impersonal concern, audits their accounts and finds whether or not they have in possession the articles for which they are accountable.

The system that was in effect at the breaking out of the war was a centralized system, centralized in Washington. The accountability was all worked out here. Each bureau had its own property returns organization. A contracting officer buying property or coming into possession of any Army property would take it up on the property form and send the form on to Washington, and there the books were kept. If he turned the property over to another officer, he sent a copy of that officer's receipt to Washington to clear his account, and it was charged against the other, the incoming officer. This resulted in all bookkeeping of property being done in Washington in each bureau. There must have been in all the bureaus a considerably large force engaged in the work of property accounting. In most of the bureaus, if not all of them, the matter of property adjusting was very much in arrears, and officers in many cases were called upon two years after the event to account for property which they had forgotten they ever had.

The new system decentralized the system of property accounting. The Director of Finance has established a system of field auditing. In each particular district, for example, in New York City, and in Atlanta, and in Boston, and in Chicago, and in San Francisco, we

have an auditing officer. The auditing officer visits the posts without prior knowledge as to his arrival. He immediately inspects the property at the post and sees whether or not the property officer has in possession or can properly account for all the property which is charged against him. If a discrepancy is discovered the matter is settled right then and there. If it is a matter that should be settled by a board of survey, a board of survey is appointed by the commanding officer and the account looked over, the circumstances considered, and a finding is rendered by the board of survey, as to whether the officer should make good the discrepancy and the lost property, or whether he should be released from that accountability because of the exigencies of the service. The new method has been of almost incalculable value at this time, when there have been demands to release from the service officers who have been accountable for property and are leaving the service. Under the old system the returns would have been sent in and it would have been months before we could get reports in from all the various points and relieve the officer of his property accountability, so that he could get his final pay. It has been necessary for the officer to get his clearances before he could be paid. Now auditors at these posts and camps immediately audit the man's accounts and give him his clearance there, or take the necessary steps so that the matter can be settled. I hold no brief for this property-accounting system. It was not devised by Finance. It was the work of a board of officers of the General Staff, who made their report about July or August.

Senator SUTHERLAND. What year, General?

Gen. LORD. Of 1918.

Senator FLETCHER. Would that come within the jurisdiction of this Department of Finance, if it is created?

Gen. LORD. Just the auditing. I do not think that the Finance Service should at any time be accountable for property, for the very reason that it should be an outside, impersonal agency that inspects the property accounts, just as it should an outside disinterested and independent agency that pays the bills.

Senator FLETCHER. But the department would have the right to locate the property and to give releases and acquittances to officers?

Gen. LORD. Each bureau would control its own property.

Senator FLETCHER. No; but I am speaking now about this Department of Finance, would you propose to put all that under their control?

Gen. LORD. Only the auditing. The supply bureaus would still control the property and should control it.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you in any way in that respect conflict with the functions of Inspector General?

Gen. LORD. Yes and no. The Inspector General made no regular inspection of property with the exception of clothing and possibly one or two other classes of property. He inspected the money accounts. To put this new system into effect we have had prepared a field manual for auditors; directions as to how they should audit property. I submitted this manual to the Inspector General and requested that it be given an exhaustive study by his force, to modify it and make such recommendations as they saw fit. It was returned, stating that so far as the inspectors could determine, it was in every way satisfactory and met the need.

The CHAIRMAN. Did that result in taking away from the Inspector General the duty of inspecting accounts?

Gen. LORD. No. He still inspects money accounts.

The CHAIRMAN. Inspecting property?

Gen. LORD. Inspecting property accounts?

The CHAIRMAN. That was one of the important duties, was it not?

Gen. LORD. No. I do not think the Inspector General's force inspected property at all, in fact, unless they were called upon to inspect it, because the accounting was all done in Washington. All the receipts, all the invoices, all the transfers were in the hands of the bureau chiefs in Washington. I do not think, unless there was a complaint or suspicion of embezzlement or misuse of property, that it was ever called to the Inspector General's attention. If I am wrong about that, I will get in touch with the Inspector General and correct the record when it comes to me.

The CHAIRMAN. I had an idea that he made regular inspections of property at posts and camps and fields. I am not sure.

Gen. LORD. I do not think so. He may have done so. I have asked the Inspector General to instruct his inspectors to study the new system to satisfy themselves as to whether or not the Government is protected fully under the new system.

[NOTE.—Inspector General does not and did not inspect property accounts, except as they related to financial transactions, such as clothing accounts in days of the clothing money allowances. Inspections of property were for purpose of determining whether or not it was cared for properly and proper records maintained. They made no property check.]

CONTRACT AUDITS.

We have instituted in connection with this property auditing a contract audit section in the office of the Director of Finance. This contract audit section has to do with the auditing of the accounts of contractors, to whom we have issued material for the purpose of making certain articles for Army use, where, for example, we issue cloth and textiles to manufacturing contractors to make uniforms. There has been heretofore no systematized endeavor to properly check up the material used by contractors under those circumstances.

Before final payment is made to a contractor now his account is audited by a representative of the office of the Director of Finance, to see whether or not he has manufactured out of the cloth furnished, or out of whatever material is furnished, the amount of completed articles that could reasonably be expected, and we have required a careful and accurate accounting on the part of the contractor as to his disposition of any material not used in Army production.

From April 19 to September 5 the auditors of the Director of Finance have found due the United States, under material contracts, \$635,823—due from one firm \$68,402 and due from another firm \$48,027. We found in many cases that the books of the supply depots were in extremely bad condition, having in some cases almost no records whatever of the status of these contracts as regards the amount of material furnished contractors. So it has been necessary in some cases to practically build up the record, going to the invoices and the records of supplies furnished and checking up. It has been necessary in some cases to go back to the mills that manufactured the cloth to find the width of the cloth which was furnished, whether it was 42 inches or whether it was 38 inches, and so on.

In New York, from July 5 until September 20, under this system of audits, there was found \$240,044.55 due the Government on account of material furnished under contract.

Senator FLETCHER. Do you mean the Government had overpaid, or the material did not come up to specifications, or what?

Gen. LORD. If the contractor had been furnished material sufficient to make 100 units, we found, possibly, that the contractor had delivered 98 units and had not accounted for the balance of the material.

The CHAIRMAN. In that respect you duplicated the Quartermaster Corps?

Gen. LORD. No. Finance is the only agency making property record inspections.

The CHAIRMAN. Of material issued to the manufacturer to make up into finished goods?

Gen. LORD. Yes; we audit the contract for them. They do no auditing. In most of these big supply bureaus—you are speaking of the Quartermaster Corps—the supply officers representing the Quartermaster Corps cooperate with Finance in this work. They refuse to approve final payment in cases where it is not required in the contract that final pay should be withheld until a property check is made. It requires an expert force to do this properly. We have some accountants and men who have a natural inclination for this work, and we have brought them in here and schooled them and trained them, so that our auditing officers are men who have been trained and schooled here and have studied this system, and they go out and make a real expert, scientific audit of these contracts.

CONTRACT REVIEW.

I took up yesterday the question of contract review. There is to-day in the office of the Director of Finance a contract review section, to which are referred all of the contracts of the Purchase and Storage, which comprise the greater number of contracts of the Army. They come to the office of the Director of Finance for review before they are finally put into effect, to see if they meet the requirements of law and regulations, and that all payments thereunder by a finance officer will pass the accounting officials of the Treasury. Steps are being taken to have all of the contracts of the War Department pass through that board of contract review, so that they may have the same expert examination and review that is given to the Purchase and Storage contracts.

SETTLEMENT OF TERMINATED CONTRACTS.

[You are all interested in the settlement of terminated contracts. We terminated two classes of contracts and procurement orders—those that were regular and legal and were suspended because we had no use for the supplies, and those which were irregular and required legislation to permit settlement.

Senator FLETCHER. When you say "we" you do not mean the director of finance?

Gen. LORD. The War Department. The bureaus terminated their own contracts.

The legislation necessary to settle the irregular contracts was provided by Congress in the Dent Act, so called. At the signing of the armistice, contracts and procurement orders of all classes that were terminated involved a total of \$5,060,000,000. There had been deliveries made under these contracts so that the part which was really terminated amounted to \$3,757,177,710.45, of which we have already settled about half, or \$1,873,000,000.

To make that settlement we have paid \$281,982,817.17; that is, the part thus settled has been satisfied with the payment of about 15 per cent of the amount involved. The balance yet to be paid, if settled on this same basis, will cost approximately \$281,000,000.

The Finance Service, of course, has had a great deal to do with these settlements. We have made all the payments and have had a great deal to do with the auditing of these accounts before their settlement, not to the extent that we should have had or could have had under the circumstances. But, as stated yesterday, the fact that we now, under the independent finance system, have an independent audit of these settlements before they are paid has saved the Government millions of dollars.

In the regular contracts terminated, such an audit prior to payment was not quite so essential because in the case of regular contracts terminated the accounting officials of the Treasury have the last word, and if the payment is not properly made in accordance with the terms of the contract and all supporting papers, the discrepancy and the fault will be found there; but in that case it is after the event, and in many cases too late. In the case of the other contracts, the irregular contracts and irregular procurement orders which were settled under the terms of the Dent Act, the finding of the War Department claims board, which has been delegated authority by the Secretary of War, is final. And if the payment is once made in accordance with the award, the accounting officials of the Treasury Department are helpless and can not set it aside or modify it. So, in these cases we are giving the most searching examination possible, and many times we have been able to reduce the amount of the award and save the Government, as I have stated, millions of dollars.

The CHAIRMAN. Does that examination ever result in increasing the awards?

Gen. LORD. Not in an award. It could not result so.

The CHAIRMAN. When they reach you, they are agreed upon by the contractor, aren't they?

Gen. LORD. Agreed to by the contractor.

The CHAIRMAN. So, of course, there would be no increase to them anyway?

Gen. LORD. No. I called attention yesterday to one case of the reduction of \$14,000. In another case, the case of the Fox Furnace Co., we made a saving of \$91,000. Many other similar cases passed over my desk, but there were certain peculiar conditions about these two cases that fixed them in my mind.

The holding up of some of these cases has resulted in charges of delay against the Finance. Some of them may have reached the Members of Congress, that these men do not get their money; but there are no cases of delay which are not warranted by some such explanation, some such cause as this.

Senator NEW. General, can you tell us how many of those claims were to be adjusted?

Gen. LORD. Twenty some thousand.

Senator NEW. How many of them have been adjusted now?

Gen. LORD. I should think there have been about three-fourths of them adjusted.

Senator NEW. About 75 per cent of the number?

Gen. LORD. Of the number, about.

Senator NEW. Now, as to the amount, you said the total was how many billions?

Gen. LORD. The total to be settled—the part terminated—was a little more than three billions and a half.

Senator NEW. Of which about—

Gen. LORD. Of which we have already settled a billion and eight hundred and seventy-three million, and we settled that on a basis of about 15 per cent.

Senator NEW. That is about 50 per cent of it?

Gen. LORD. That is more in number. Some of our larger contracts, like the contracts with the Du Pont Powder Co. and the Bethlehem Steel Co., are the most trying and the most puzzling ones and the most important ones, and involve the largest amounts of money and we have not settled them.

Senator NEW. What I am trying to do is to figure out just about what percentage of the total number of claims had been settled and the percentage of the total amount that had been settled, how they ran together.

Gen. LORD. The great mass of the claims have been settled. The great number of them have been settled, but not the greatest amount, because the biggest claims still stand.

Senator NEW. I see.

Gen. LORD. In discussing this, it has seemed to me that if the bureau chiefs who have expressed their disapproval of an independent finance could have made a study of it, could have come in and looked it over and seen what we were doing, seen some of the problems that we have faced and that have been settled, they would approve it as a matter of course; but if the Finance Service is what according to their testimony some of them think it is, they could not very well approve it; but they are entirely misinformed. Finance does not interfere with them. It is as serving as a paymaster and a bookkeeper for the other bureaus, and it is prepared to do that to the fullest extent.

PAYMENT OF TROOPS.

Senator Chamberlain yesterday asked some questions about the payment of the Army, which is one of the duties that falls upon the finance. We have accomplished that with a smaller number of personnel than it would seem possible, by the use of the memorandum receipt which I described yesterday, making use of agent officers. In that way and only in that way did we succeed as we did succeed in this country all through the war in paying on the last day of the month great cantonments where enlisted men numbering anywhere from 30,000 to 50,000 were stationed, and it was possible because we were able to utilize as agent officers, troop officers, company officers, and supply officers to make payments to the men.

With August and September of last year many complaints were heard relative to the arrival in this country of the sick and the wounded from overseas without having been paid for some prior months. These men arrived here with no records whatever. We only learned from their serial number and their own statements what their names were. We did not know the organizations to which they belonged, except as it was developed by the serial number if they had that with them. We were absolutely without the slightest vestige of supporting evidence as to their status or as to their pay, and the reason for that is a question that lies in war conditions overseas. My attention was first called to it by a report that out here at Walter Reed Hospital, out here in the very shade of the Capitol, were 500 or 600 men from overseas, some of which had not been paid for 8 or 10 months. I sent an officer out to investigate the conditions, and he reported that the men were there, sick and wounded, some of them hadn't been paid for months, and none of them had papers on which we could base a payment. I then sent the officer back to the hospital with instructions to get an affidavit from each of the men, stating his name, his organization, and the date of last payment, his rank, how long he had been in the service, as to whether or not he had made an allotment to the War Department or allotment to the War Risk Insurance, whether any court-martial charges stood against him, or whether he owed anything else; and to bring the affidavits back with him. On the strength of those affidavits we prepared rolls, I certified to their correctness, and the men were paid.

I came before the Senate Committee on Military Affairs, then under the chairmanship of Senator Chamberlain, and told what I had done, and Senator Chamberlain voiced the sentiment of the committee that I would have the backing of the committee in all efforts of that sort, to see that the men were paid.

From that, fortified by the expression of opinion from Senator Chamberlain and the attitude of this committee, I issued instructions, under the approval of the Chief of Staff, to all disbursing officers everywhere, that they should pay the men in their own affidavits every penny that they said they were entitled to; and in the bill of July 11, 1919, Congress, through the instrumentality of the two Military Affairs Committees, gave us legislation that sanctioned what we had done.

Senator NEW. Have you any means of knowing, General, whether you were ever victimized, and to what extent?

Gen. LORD. Not definitely, but the strange thing is that we have found in many cases that soldiers made affidavit that resulted in payment of amounts less than was really due them; that they were so afraid of getting too much that they purposely asked for less than they thought might be due them.

Senator NEW. The general disposition was to claim no more than was honestly due?

Gen. LORD. It seems to me that the general disposition was to claim less. They had to take oath, and to take that oath with the Government. People are afraid of the Government. And then, too, this is one difficulty we experienced. Men would state that they did not want to make the affidavit, they did not know how much was due them, and they were afraid they would state too much, and we found from reports in the files that that was quite prevalent, and

while we did check up, I am satisfied that it was nearly an offset, that there were a few cases where men intentionally swore to more than was due them, but we did find some cases where men who went out of the service—were paid final pay and went out before we found their papers—were paid less than they were entitled to, and we are settling some of those cases now.

SECOND LIEUTENANTS, QUARTERMASTER CORPS.

When we went into the war we had few disbursing officers skilled in the paying of troops. We have in the Quartermaster Corps a most anomalous condition. We have to-day 62 former pay clerks who are second lieutenants, Quartermaster Corps, and second lieutenants permanently, without prospect or hope of promotion under the law. These men, while second lieutenants, were experienced in the payment of troops. That had been their business, and I located in every one of these cantonments before the arrival of the troops under the draft one of these second lieutenants of the Quartermaster Corps, with plenty of Treasury credit, and with his check book, and such force as I could give him, and around these second lieutenants centered the financial activities of these posts and cantonments. You would find there a second lieutenant who was really the brains of the financial establishment ranking below the majors and captains of temporary rank, and he was the man who was doing the work and furnishing the entire information for the successful prosecution of our financial activities in that cantonment.

Finally, we succeeded in getting them the rank of captain, making a portion of them majors, three of them succeeding in getting the temporary rank of lieutenant colonel, and one of them a colonel; and two of them are the heads of divisions in my office. These men have done an extraordinary amount of constructive and important work during this war—they have served in the field and under the most trying conditions overseas and in this country—I wish to make a plea for them to-day, that in whatever military legislation is enacted by Congress these men be not overlooked, because they have a well-earned increased rank, and I am deeply concerned for them. I think it would be a great injustice if there does not come out of this proposed legislation some provision for these faithful and efficient Army officers, and that after their splendid service during the war they be not obliged to revert to the rank of second lieutenants.

Senator FLETCHER. Are any of them over 40 years of age?

Gen. LORD. Yes, sir.

Senator FLETCHER. That is one provision in this bill.

Gen. LORD. Yes, but they have been serving in the Army; have been commissioned officers for some little time.

The CHAIRMAN. Are they in the regular service?

Gen. LORD. They are in the regular service; they are second lieutenants of the Quartermaster Corps in the Regular Army.

SIXTY-DOLLAR BONUS.

Congress decided to give to each enlisted man a bonus of \$60. When that went into effect something more than a million and a half men who were entitled to it had gone out of the service.

I am giving a little accounting of some of the activities with which this committee is concerned, and it seems to me you are entitled to

have a report on what has been done with legislation affecting the Army, and if I get tiresome the chairman, I know, will give me the necessary instructions to stop.

Senator FLETCHER. It is very interesting, General.

Gen. LORD. The bonus law went into effect February 24. There were, we estimated, outside of the service, who had gone out at the time the law went into effect and whom we had to pay from Washington, something more than a million and a half of these men. On April 30 we were absolutely current; that is, we had paid all accumulated claims, and on April 30 we were paying the claims received on the previous day. We have paid up to and including day before yesterday 1,595,412 of those claims.

Senator FLETCHER. You mean that is the number of claims?

Gen. LORD. The number of claims of \$60, which means \$60 for each one.

Senator FLETCHER. Yes.

TRAVEL ALLOWANCES.

Gen. LORD. The 5-cents-a-mile travel allowance was another interesting matter that gave us a good deal of trouble and called for a good deal of work of a character.

Before the act of February 28, 1919, enlisted men on discharge received $3\frac{1}{2}$ cents a mile. That act provided that they should have 5 cents a mile, including those men who were in the service on the date of the signing of the armistice. We figured that there were approximately 800,000 men who had gone out prior to the passage of the act, with whom we would have to do business.

In the wording of the law, provision was made that a man should be entitled to this 5 cents a mile, not necessarily to the place where he was upon entering into the service, but from where he was discharged to his bona fide home. These words "bona fide" home were difficult of construction. We put the matter up to the Comptroller of the Treasury for a decision, as to what should constitute a soldier's bona fide home, and while we were getting the decision the Director of Finance was served with a subpoena to show good and sufficient cause why he was not paying these allowances, but all suit proceedings were set aside on our reply to the writ.

We called attention to the fact that on questions of this sort we were compelled by law to go to the Comptroller of the Treasury for a decision before we could make payment. The comptroller's decision on the question presented to him was that a man could establish his bona fide home, if when he came into the service he had stated that such and such a place was his home, and his service record showed it. One of the first cases that reached us was that of a soldier who was taken into the service in Chicago, but on his service record he had stated at the time of his enlistment that his bona fide home was Fort William H. Seward, Alaska. He was discharged at Camp Dix. He had been paid his $3\frac{1}{2}$ cents a mile from Camp Dix to Chicago. So, under the finding, under the law, he was entitled to the difference between $3\frac{1}{2}$ cents and 5 cents per mile from Camp Dix to Chicago and to 5 cents a mile from Chicago to Fort William H. Seward, Alaska.

Many interesting questions have come up in connection with that law.

Senator NEW. Five cents a mile from Chicago to Fort William H. Seward, Alaska, would amount to a great deal?

Gen. LORD. He was given actual transportation to Fort William H. Seward, which would reduce the cost, but that illustrates some of the possibilities under the law as construed by the Comptroller of the Treasury.

NOTE.—Soldier is entitled to 5 cents per mile from Chicago to Fort William H. Seward, Alaska, a distance of 3,294 miles, \$164.70. Of this distance 1,096 miles is by water, but under the act of June 12, 1906, water travel between the United States and Alaska is considered land travel for purposes of travel pay.

ALLOTMENTS OF PAY.

The War Department has had an allotment system for many years, which was broadened in the early part of this war to allow officers as well as enlisted men, to make allotments to their families. During the course of the war our allotments in the War Department, which were entirely separate and distinct from the Bureau of War Risk allotments, reached a total of more than a million. These allotments were paid regularly each month without any interruption. In fact, under the original law we were obliged to skip a month before making payment. That is, the allotment of money which was due in July we could not pay until September. We succeeded in getting legislation to eliminate that, picked up the slack of the intervening month and paid regularly each month without delay.

CLAIMS OF OFFICERS AND ENLISTED MEN.

Prior to the war the Treasury Department had always held that claims of officers and men, who had gone out from the service, must be settled by the Treasury Department; that is, by the auditor, for the reason that they were separated from the military service and had become citizens, civilians, and therefore their claims should be settled by the Treasury Department. We received many complaints from the discharged men and from Congress that these men had pay due them, or that there was a question about their allotments or their deposits. The statement that it was not our duty to settle these accounts did not seem to solve the problem, which became acute.

We found that the auditor's office, which we knew was absolutely overwhelmed with an extraordinary mass of work, was unable to reach these claims, and probably would not reach them for months. We took the matter up with the comptroller, and the comptroller agreed to let us handle the matter, so that we could get payments made, and the auditor's office turned over to us something more than 12,000 of those claims.

We have received 133,724 claims of enlisted men up to date, and we have disposed of 44,432 and they are coming in now at the rate of 500 or 600 a day.

These are not supply questions. They are Finance matters.

STATEMENTS OF DIFFERENCES.

We have instituted another new agency in the office of the Director of Finance. When a disbursing officer sends in an account it is submitted to an administrative analysis under the law, and it then goes

to the auditor, and the auditor examines it, and if he finds that there is any question about it he makes a suspension of that account against that disbursing officer and notifies that officer by sending him a statement of differences. Originally these statements of differences went to the place where the disbursing officer was last stationed, and we found that the result was that disbursing officers who had been ordered overseas were followed to France by suspensions amounting to many thousands of dollars against their accounts, while their records were all in this country. We immediately secured authority from the comptroller to allow the auditor to send these statements of differences direct to the office of the Director of Finance. We took the statements of differences, analyzed them, procured the papers necessary to clear the account, and in many cases the officers never knew of the suspensions. We are enabled through this in another way to help. The auditor frequently makes a decision on some one of these statements of differences, a decision on a question that has never come up before, and while it is made in that particular officer's accounts, it affects every other disbursing officer of the Government. In such cases we immediately notify all the Finance officers so that they will not make the same mistake.

DRAFT BOARD CLAIMS.

The office of the Director of Finance is handling the claims taken over from the Provost Marshal General's office. These are claims for compensation for board members and for additional clerks and examining physicians, registrars, interpreters, janitors, and messengers, and there are charges for rent and supplies and crating of records, travel, drayage, advertising, auto hire, telephone, and telephone bills.

Under the Provost Marshal General there were 44,648 local boards and 150 district boards, and we have received from him 300 filing cases containing the records of disbursing officers of 48 States, Hawaii, Porto Rico, Alaska, and the District of Columbia. We have settled hundreds of them, most of them for small amounts, but this illustrates the class of work that necessarily falls into the hands of the Director of Finance. It could not go to any supply bureau. The Provost Marshal General's office was discontinued, his force was discharged, and the office of the Director of Finance afforded a very proper place where this activity could be continued to completion.

SOLDIERS' DEPOSITS.

We are running a savings bank down in the office of the Director of Finance, with a capital at present of \$7,500,000. For 38 or 40 years enlisted men have been authorized to deposit with paymasters, and the Government pays 4 per cent interest on such deposits, and I thought you would be interested to know that in spite of the fact that soldiers have been called upon to make compulsory allotments to families, to pay their insurance, and to buy Liberty bonds, we have at the present 162,487 depositors after all of this demobilization and men going out. We have repaid 59,425. We have paid \$128,158.34 in interest, and we have remaining to the credit of depositors \$7,634,140.37.

The CHAIRMAN. As soldiers were discharged from the Army, were they repaid their balances?

Gen. LORD. They are paid in the field as they go out.

Senator NEW. The account is closed?

Gen. LORD. The account is closed and they are paid the interest and the principal as they are discharged.

Senator FLETCHER. What does that figure per capita, about?

Gen. LORD. \$46.98 per man.

Senator NEW. That is a very interesting thing to know.

SIMPLIFICATION OF PROCEDURE.

Gen. LORD. We started off overseas using one appropriation for all purposes, paying for everything from that one appropriation, the auditor making the necessary adjustment between appropriations. After an independent Finance was installed, we gave everywhere one fund as a working balance to every disbursing officer, wherever he might be. Under the old procedure a disbursing officer in the field in the Quartermaster Corps would carry on his books anywhere from 10 to 15 to 20 different appropriations, requiring an extraordinary amount of bookkeeping; likewise, the Ordnance Department, the Engineers, and other bureaus, with their different appropriations, followed a similar plan. To-day the Finance officer pays all accounts, no matter to what supply bureau they pertain. There is only one disbursing officer at a place, and he pays every bill that is presented which is properly payable out of a War Department appropriation.

To obviate the extraordinary amount of bookkeeping entailed by carrying all these appropriations the Finance officer is given a working balance from one appropriation. At the beginning of the month the disbursing officer, in New York City, for example, is given a working balance of \$1,000,000 from one appropriation. Out of that he pays everything, Subsistence, Pay of the Army, or Transportation, or Ordnance bills, Signal Corps obligations, and so on. He pays them all out of that one appropriation, and at the end of the month, instead of making an estimate of the amount of money he will need for the next succeeding month, he reports how much he has expended out of that fund, so much for Subsistence, so much for Transportation, so much for Ordnance, so much for Signal Corps, etc. He is immediately given from the proper appropriations the amounts that he has paid on accounts belonging to those appropriations, thus balancing his appropriation account and restoring his working balance.

ARMY ACCOUNT OF ADVANCES.

I was here before this committee at one time during the war asking that we be authorized to handle our appropriations under what we called an Army account of advances; that is, that all of the appropriations of the War Department should be covered under that one head. It has no relation to a budget, allowing us the use of funds of one appropriation for the purposes of another, but it is to enable us to use all the Army appropriations, under this one title, to accomplish just exactly what we are doing under the working balance to-day. I will not take the time of the committee to explain this Army account

of advances, but will submit in the record a statement relative thereto, with a copy of the proposed draft. If given that authority, we could issue to the field, to all disbursing officers, just one fund, Army account of advances. We could pay everything out of this one fund. We could only pay just such obligations as we are authorized to pay by the bureau chiefs, and the amounts expended would be charged against the proper appropriations by the Treasury Department, so that there could be no intermingling of appropriations.

This committee favored this proposal during the war; that is, approved the use of it for a year as a tentative measure, to see how it would work out. It passed the Senate and went to the House committee and rested there. It never got further than that.

THE CHAIRMAN. What was the objection raised to it in the House committee, do you remember?

Gen. LORD. No; just then we got into the armistice and we were so busy with other legislation and other things that it was just lost sight of. I do not think that I had the opportunity to push it at that time or the heart to push it. I was preoccupied with more important measures, and I do not know that they had any opposition to it at all. I never heard any expressed.

NOTE.—Submitted herewith is the provision for an Army account of advances, as recommended to Congress by the Secretary of War:

WAR DEPARTMENT,
Washington, July 25, 1918.

To the CHAIRMAN COMMITTEE ON MILITARY AFFAIRS,
United States Senate.

SIR: Owing to the great increase in Army disbursements and the absolute necessity of having each Army disbursing officer or agent supplied with funds out of which he can pay any claim, irrespective of the department, corps, or bureau to which the claim pertains, or the appropriations involved therein, the War Department is desirous of having a provision of law which will enable the Army to meet its financial obligations in the same manner as is now authorized for the Navy, and has for that purpose drafted the following bill:

"A BILL Authorizing an Army account of advances for Army appropriations, and for other purposes.

"Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That the Secretary of War be, and he hereby is, authorized to issue his requisitions for advances to disbursing officers and agents of the Army, under an 'Army account of advances,' not to exceed the total appropriation for the Army, the amount so advanced to be exclusively used to pay, upon proper vouchers, obligations lawfully payable under the respective appropriations.

"SEC. 2. That the amount so advanced be charged to the proper appropriations and returned to 'Army account of advances' by pay and countervarrant. The said charge, however, to particular appropriations shall be limited to the amount appropriated to each.

"SEC. 3. That the Auditor for the War Department shall declare the sums due from the several special appropriations upon complete vouchers, as heretofore, according to law; and he shall adjust the said liabilities with the 'Army account of advances.'

"SEC. 4. That any balances of existing Army appropriations now available for withdrawal from the Treasury, together with any unexpended balances now charged to disbursing officers or agents of the Army which, under existing law, are available for disbursement, shall at such time as may be designated by the Secretary of War, be transferred on the books of the Treasury Department to 'Army account of advances' and shall be disbursed and accounted for as such."

Should the foregoing provision of law be enacted, it will enable any disbursing officer or agent of the Army, irrespective of the corps, department, or bureau to which he belongs, to pay any claim or obligation which pertains to any bureau, corps, or department of the Army, and thus expedite the settlement of all Army obligations. It will also operate to reduce the balances to be carried by disbursing officers and

agents of the Army for the reason that all of their funds will be under one account, thereby making it unnecessary for them to anticipate obligations accruing under several appropriations and keep funds on hand pertaining to these several appropriations.

May I request that this bill be favorably considered at the earliest opportunity?

Respectfully,

NEWTON D. BAKER,
Secretary of War.

The history of this measure as presented to the Sixty-fifth Congress will be found in bill entitled S. 4857, introduced in the Senate August 5, 1918, by Mr. Chamberlain; Calendar No. 543, Sixty-fifth Congress, second session, Senate Report No. 592.

BRITISH ARMY SYSTEM.

I want to repeat what I said yesterday, that good business principles dictate that the obligating officers should not have control of the paying officers. As it is now, every voucher gets an independent audit before its payment and not after it is paid, and that system as established now has saved the Government many millions of dollars. That system is rigidly adhered to in the British Army, and I want to read right here just two paragraphs from the regulations of the British Army:

657. Quartermasters are not to perform any cash duties whatever except in circumstances in which they are by the regulations recognized as subaccountants.

658. The practice of allowing a quartermaster to perform the duties of a paymaster during the illness or absence of the officer charged with these duties is objectionable. The duties of these two officers should not be confined in one person whenever it can possibly be avoided.

In discussing the subject of an independent finance, the question was asked that although an independent finance might have proved itself valuable and necessary in time of war, would it be necessary in time of peace?

I do not think the members of this committee contemplate any course of legislation that is perhaps effective or passably effective in time of peace, but inadequate in time of war. That doctrine has cost us too much already.

But along that line, I wish to call attention to the fact that estimated withdrawals from the Treasury, actual payments that will be made under the Director of Finance for the fiscal year that will terminate June 30 next, will be \$1,893,250,000. From January 1, 1919, to July 31, 1919, there has been disbursed under the Director of Finance an average of \$944,460,255.38 monthly.

The CHAIRMAN. Nearly a billion a month.

Gen. LORD. Nearly a billion a month.

Senator NEW. Since when was that, General?

Gen. LORD. Since January 1, 1919.

Senator NEW. About \$7,000,000,000?

Gen. LORD. And considering the overhang from the war, outstanding obligations that will be delayed in payment until settlements can be made, which will continue into several subsequent years, the Government will be indeed fortunate if yearly expenditures from the War Department for some succeeding years do not approximate nearer one billion than they do half a billion.

Senator FLETCHER. How about the later months? Those payments were larger, I take it, in January than in March?

Gen. LORD. Oh, yes; they have fallen off greatly. The average for the year won't be anything like that. Of course, it was a good deal more than a billion in some months.

It would seem that even in time of peace with disbursements of that amount there should be the most careful and wise expenditure of this extraordinary amount of money, and that if it was necessary to have an up-to-date organization like independent finance to disburse it in time of war, it is just as necessary in time of peace.

Senator FLETCHER. In time of peace you ought not to have your disbursements amount in a year to what they have amounted to in a month?

Gen. LORD. No, they will not. I hope not.

Finance should be independent. It should be an independent bureau of the War Department, just as independent as the Engineers and the Ordnance and the Signal Corps and the Quartermaster Corps. It should not be a part of the General Staff. It is not a part of the General Staff to-day, and is not a branch of any division of the General Staff. It should deal directly with the Secretary of War or the Chief of Staff, and not through any intervening agency. The Secretary of War should be kept in such close touch with his appropriations that he will be given real control of the appropriations, and that can only be done through centralized finance. The proper procedure is, of course, to present all such matters to the Chief of Staff, who has reference made to the various bureaus or activities concerned, and in that way acts as a coordinating agency. Direct reference to the Secretary of War would merely require reference by him to the Chief of Staff for coordinating or other action.

PERFECTING THE FINANCE ORGANIZATION.

We have been operating and trying to perfect our organization. It is not perfect by any means, but we are trying to perfect it while we are doing the bookkeeping and the accounting for an expenditure of more than \$15,000,000,000, looking out for the demobilization of troops who have gone out in thousands—and there has not been one delay on account of failure of Finance to function—trying to operate a large savings bank, look out for the Provost Marshal General's claims and the thousands of enlisted men and officers' claims, answering the numerous letters from Senators and Representatives in Congress, and doing this under a constant demand to reduce our commissioned and our clerical personnel.

I can see how possibly there might be criticism on the part of other bureau chiefs of the personnel selected to put this new finance plan into effect, I can see how they might question the efficiency of the organization, but I can not see how they can legitimately question the principle involved in an independent finance for the War Department.

Now, I would like to take up this matter of a budget, Mr. Chairman.

QUESTION OF A BUDGET.

The CHAIRMAN. I should be very glad if you would, General.

Gen. LORD. The budget and the budgetary system have a much wider application than the giving to bureaus of a lump-sum appropriation to be used as they see fit. To me that is one of the minor features of a budget system, and that lump-sum authority may figure

in a budget system or it may not. A proper budgetary system means something more, as I have stated, than a lump-sum appropriation for a bureau or for a bureau chief to disburse. Congress has not done its full duty when it has given a lump-sum appropriation to a bureau. Its duty is to ascertain how that money has been appropriated, or in the first place how the money is to be appropriated. A budgetary system should constrain bureaus and governmental departments to so adjust their accounts that Congress can be fully and completely informed as to expenditures—what they were, why they were made, and how they were made.

I have been interested in a budgetary system and in this system of accounting and reporting to Congress for some time, and I have had an intensive study made by William F. Willoughby, Director, Institute for Government Research, of our War Department procedures, appropriations, estimates, accounting, reservations, and allotments, and that study has shown that there are three things absolutely essential to the proper administration of War Department finance. If we are going to have a proper system of accounting and reporting to Congress that will dovetail into any budgetary system that is established by Congress, these three things are essential:

(a) That the entire financial needs of the War Department shall be estimated, considered, and appropriated as a unit;

(b) That the financial needs of the War Department shall be stated according to a system of classification based on some principle that shall be rigidly adhered to at all times; and

(c) That in all financial operations of the Government this system of classification that is adopted shall be followed, so that in all estimates and appropriations and reports and accounts there will be no variation.

Now, the first, that the estimates should be submitted as a unit, is necessary from the fact that to-day in Congress there is a divided committee authority for the Army bills. The Army bill proper and the Military Academy bill go to the Military Affairs Committee of the House and the Military Affairs Committee of the Senate, while the military appropriations in the sundry civil bill and the fortifications bill go to the House Committee on Appropriations and the Senate Committee on Appropriations.

Now, I know that under Mr. Shirley, under Senator Martin, under Mr. Good, and under Senator Warren, the appropriations committees have tried in every way possible not to interfere with any policy of the Military Affairs Committees through their appropriating authority. Yet it has sometimes resulted that a policy by one committee has been seriously interfered with by the appropriation of another committee, not intentionally, but innocently. I repeat, as I stated, the first essential, then, is that the War Department estimates shall be submitted in one single bill to the one single committee.

The second requisite is that the financial needs of the War Department should be stated according to some certain fixed principle of classification. I have found in handling War Department appropriations that Congress will require information from certain fixed standpoints as follows:

- (1) Function or purpose.
- (2) Organization units.
- (3) Activities.

(4) Character of expenditure, whether it is for capital outlay, like the building of barracks, or for fixed charges, or for current operation.

(5) Object of expenditure, whether for supplies, like equipment, or for services, like salaries and payment of troops.

Under the present forms of Army bills such a classification is impossible. One appropriation may be made based on the object of expenditure, and another the character of expenditure, while in the same appropriation both may appear, or again the organizational units may function.

We should be able to give to Congress not only information from one of these, but from all of these standards, perhaps selecting one as the primary standpoint. For example, if it is in connection with a certain series of maneuvers the purpose would be a military purpose as distinguished from a civil purpose; if Cavalry were employed the organization unit figures as a factor, so that in connection with that maneuver we ought to be able to state not only that a brigade of Cavalry or a regiment of Cavalry was employed, but we ought to be able to tell in connection therewith the cost of the Cavalry unit, not only the cost of saddles, but of forage, and all along the line the factors making up the entire cost of the maneuvers, so that from any one of the standpoints we could give to Congress any particular line of information that it might need.

We are helpless to-day, and can only furnish information by the greatest expenditure of work and time. We have attempted to remedy it by getting out a system of itemization. It is just a make-shift, in lieu of a rewriting of the Army bill. But in this itemization, as we call it, is included apparently everything in the way of information that any congressional committee could ask.

With a budgetary system—and I am satisfied, as the result of this war, the Government will be compelled to put in some sort of a budgetary system—the Army bills must be rewritten, and the finances and accounting of the War Department must be centralized in order to dovetail into any sort of budgetary legislation that may be enacted.

The CHAIRMAN. May I call attention to the language of the bill prepared by the War Department, section 38, commencing at the bottom of page 31? Have you a copy of the bill before you?

Gen. LORD. I have a copy here; yes.

The CHAIRMAN (reading from bill):

SEC. 38. On or before October 15 of each year the Secretary of War shall transmit to the Secretary of the Treasury, for transmission to Congress, an estimate of the financial needs of the Army for the ensuing fiscal year, prepared under the supervision of the Chief of Staff and so arranged, with the necessary supporting data, as to show the amount required for the support of each service of the Army. Congress shall appropriate in one item for the support of the Army the total amount of money authorized by them therefor for the ensuing fiscal year. Thirty days prior to the first day of each quarter of the fiscal year the Secretary of War shall apportion the amount of money needed during such quarter for the various services for which appropriations have been made. The Chief of Staff shall advise the Secretary of War as to the necessary apportionments, and shall cause to be kept such accounts and make such reports as may be necessary to keep the apportionments thus made from being exceeded and to enable the Secretary of War to make additional apportionments or reapportionments during the quarter in the event the regular quarterly apportionments should prove to be deficient or excessive. The same procedure shall be followed as to estimates, appropriations, and apportionments in the case of deficiency appropriations should these become necessary.

Now, I want to ask you your explanation of that section, particularly this phase of it, on page 32, line 4, where we find this sentence occurs:

Congress shall appropriate in one item for the support of the Army the total amount of money authorized by them therefor for the ensuing fiscal year.

That would seem to mean one appropriation. The singular is used. That is the only language in that section which attempts to regulate or prescribe what Congress shall do. Further down in the section the term "appropriations" is used in the plural.

Gen. LORD. "Congress shall appropriate in one item for the support of the Army the total amount of money."

The CHAIRMAN. Yes. Now, if that means what it says, it means, in the case of this bill, if the estimates which accompany it are correct, that we shall appropriate \$900,000,000; and that the War Department can take that sum and apportion it through the office of the Chief of Staff, via the Secretary of War, into any subdivisions it pleases.

Gen. LORD. That provision in the bill was, I think, drawn up in the War College with the help of some outside assistance.

The CHAIRMAN. May I ask right there, were you consulted at all in the drafting of that provision?

Gen. LORD. I was not.

The CHAIRMAN. Were you consulted at all in the drafting of any portion of the bill?

Gen. LORD. Yes; as to the finance set up.

The CHAIRMAN. Merely as to the personnel?

Gen. LORD. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. But not as to any of the working parts of the bill?

Gen. LORD. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Is my interpretation of that reasonably correct; my interpretation of that section?

Gen. LORD. I interpret that to mean that there should be one appropriation. If the total amount is \$900,000,000; that that should be placed under the control of the Secretary of War, and that he should apportion so much to Ordnance, so much to the Engineer Corps, so much to the Quartermaster Corps, so much for payment of the Army, and so on.

Now, I do think that the War Department could with advantage be given more latitude in the use of its appropriations. You have already given the War Department latitude with respect to certain appropriations. If you will examine Pay of the Army you will find that there are a number of independent items. At the end of it you say all of these items, the amounts of these items, shall be used interchangeably, with the exception of one, and that is mileage. That is, we can only expend the amount of mileage stated in that item; but if we have a surplus under pay of officers and a deficiency under the pay of enlisted men we can take the surplus from officers without any question under the authority you have given us in that combining clause at the end, and pay the enlisted men.

Several years preceding the war Congress gave us additional budget authority when they allowed us to combine the Quartermaster appropriations of Subsistence and Regular Supplies, Incidental Expenses, Clothing and Camp and Garrison Equipage, Transportation and Water and Sewers, under the title of "Supplies, Services, and Trans-

portation." Up to that time each one of those was a separate and distinct appropriation, and if we were short on Subsistence we could not take Regular Supplies money to fill the deficiency.

As we got into the war, in the act of July 9, 1918, you gave us additional budget authority. You expanded that authority to take in enough additional Quartermaster appropriations, so that there were covered under the title of General Appropriations, Quartermaster Corps, 21 appropriations which had before that time been independent with the exceptions noted above.

In the last bill you again restricted your budget authority, continuing the same title of General Appropriations of the Quartermaster Corps, but restricting it to the original appropriations carried under Supplies, Services, and Transportation.

Senator FLETCHER. I would like to call your attention to another provision. In that proposed bill, beginning at line 11, I find this language:

The Chief of Staff shall advise the Secretary of War as to the necessary apportionments and shall cause to be kept such accounts, and make such reports, as may be necessary, to keep the apportionments thus made from being exceeded and to enable the Secretary of War to make additional apportionments—

And so forth.

Now, does that mean that there will be a bookkeeping establishment under the direction of the Chief of Staff?

Gen. LORD. Oh, no; that does not mean that.

Senator FLETCHER. He might direct the Finance Department to do that.

Gen. LORD. I think the meaning of that is this. It is very evident that the Secretary of War can not keep himself informed and work out the detail of all military problems that are presented. The only agency that has been given him by the Government to solve those problems is the General Staff, and the question of apportionments and the question of finance is always coming up as a problem between the various interests in the military service.

Frequently a question of finance presents itself that affects Operations as well as Supplies. In that case I might take it up with the Chief of Staff and the Chief of Staff may say "You had better go to see the Director of Operations about that," or "take it up with the Director of Supplies, Service, and Transportation," and they would decide the problem, so I would know what recommendations to make. And that means there that these questions should be coordinated by the Chief of Staff, that he should take it up with the various services and then make his recommendations to the Secretary of War.

Senator FLETCHER. You think it is proper to have the Chief of Staff make this apportionment?

Gen. LORD. It must be left with some central authority. The Chief of Staff is the only one who is in touch with all the activities of the Government. If it was a bureau chief or the Director of Finance, he does not know what is going on in the field, and this question of finance, of course, and apportionments is essentially a field problem, because we only exist here for the men in the field. The Secretary of War must make the apportionment, but it must be prepared somewhere for his approval.

Senator FLETCHER. Well, it seems to me like that probably contemplated a bookkeeping establishment in the General Staff.

Gen. LORD. Oh, no; that was not contemplated, I know, and it would not be possible to do it. The Secretary of War makes apportionments now through the Director of Finance. The bureau chiefs make their recommendations and the Secretary of War is the one to make the apportionments. He is obliged to under the law, and the Chief of Staff gets in touch with the field and keeps the Secretary of War posted.

Senator FLETCHER. He is to cause to be kept such accounts and make such reports as may be necessary. Where will he keep those accounts?

Gen. LORD. Under the present organization they are kept in my office.

Senator FLETCHER. All right. You may proceed.

Gen. LORD. I was calling attention to the fact there that it is nothing new for the Congress to give budget authority to the War Department, and in many ways I can see how greater latitude is desirable. As in the case of the Mileage, Congress can put any restriction over any particular activity it wants to. It can apportion so much money for construction, not to exceed so much, or not less than so much money for the purchase of real estate, or only so much shall be expended for the construction of big guns.

I believe that a budget appropriation, or, at least, greater latitude in the handling of the appropriations on the part of the Secretary of War, would tend to economy. For example, a year or so ago we had, after June 30, 1918, a balance of \$32,000,000 under the appropriation "Horses for Cavalry, Artillery, and Engineers," etc. We could not spend a penny of it after June 30, 1918, except to pay such obligations as were outstanding. We had that balance because the necessity of sending troops overseas prevented the War Department from carrying out its intention of buying more animals and shipping them. So we had that balance left. And yet in November we had to go before Congress for a deficiency appropriation for similar purposes, when, if prior to June, 1918, the Secretary of War had had authority to use a portion of that money he could have paid his obligations and obviated to that extent the necessity of going before Congress and requesting a deficiency.

ECONOMY IN BUDGETARY AUTHORITY.

There is no incentive at the present time for a bureau chief to be economical of an appropriation if he has sufficient money in it, outside of the general interest and the general duty of protecting the Government and conserving Government funds. But if authority were vested in the Secretary of War to use a surplus in one appropriation to meet a deficiency in another I believe it would result in great saving to the Government. We are now preparing our 1921 estimates which we must get into the hands of the Secretary of the Treasury the 15th of this month. We are estimating now for needs of the Army on and after July 1 of next year, so that it almost always occurs that there are needs that arise after the year arrives that we did not originally contemplate, and knew nothing about.

Now, then, it is possible for the Secretary of War with a budget appropriation to say: "Ordnance has an appropriation of so much for a certain particular purpose. It is desirable enough but it is

not so necessary as this new need. We will discontinue that work, take the money for the emergency, and thus avoid a deficiency."

Now, here is an illustration at hand. The Air Service finds to-day that its appropriation of \$25,000,000 is entirely insufficient for its needs; that a year from now, unless it gets additional money to make contracts for fighting planes, we will be without any adequate Air Service defense at all. Now, if to-day the Secretary of War had budget authority, instead of coming before Congress it would be his privilege and his power and his duty to study these appropriations and see if he can get some money for the Air Service without troubling Congress.

Senator FLETCHER. It is very much the same principle as we adopt in the river and harbor bill, where we put in for a dozen projects and appropriate a lump sum, and if the Chief of Engineers finds during the year some of those projects can wait and needs a little more than he expected he needed on some particularly important project, he can use any portion of that lump sum for either or all of those projects.

Gen: LORD. That is right.

Now it is not necessary to give us help along budgetary lines, to appropriate this all in a lump sum; I do not anticipate that Congress is ever going to do that, and I do not know as far as I am personally concerned, that is desirable; but we should have more latitude, and Congress can restrict the things that should be restricted.

The system we have now, it seems to me, is well illustrated in the case of a man building a house who had one tank on the roof to supply his kitchen, and another entirely independent tank to supply his bathroom and another independent tank to supply another room, and so on, none of them connected in any way. It might result that he would have plenty of water in his kitchen tank while his bathroom tank would be empty, and he has to go outside and make efforts to fill from the outside the tank that supplies his bathroom, while he has surplus water in his kitchen tank. It seems to me that if we could be given additional latitude in connection with our appropriations, so that we could take a little money from here and restrict that particular activity there, and use it here where it is urgently needed, it would be an economical thing for the Government to do.

In all these matters it is a question of the War Department being honest with Congress.

In the hearing of Gen. March before the committee—I think that was the first hearing you had in connection with this reorganization bill—the committee and the Chief of Staff seemed to be in some ways talking at cross purposes. The impression given by the hearing was that under the Overman Act, moneys, for example, from the Signal Corps could be used for Quartermaster purposes and so on. I think and understand what Gen. March had in mind was this authority that had been given by the act of July 9 to use these 21 appropriations interchangeably, and in their place he was talking about this budget provision—what it would do, not what had been done.

The Overman Act gave no authority to use funds for any other purpose than for what they were originally appropriated. It did authorize the separation of work, taking work away from this bureau and assigning it to another bureau, or creating a new bureau and

assigning it to that bureau. The money in all cases must follow the work; you could not divert the money from the particular work or purposes for which it was appropriated. And I thought it might be well to bring that out in order to make the record clear, as I know that Gen. March was talking from one standpoint and the committee considering his remarks from another.

I wish to continue along the line of the general finance discussion. It seems to me that the setting up and the maintenance and perpetuation of an independent Finance Bureau is a question that should be divested of all personalities. What I mean by that is, my wish and the wish of any other bureau chief should have no weight in the consideration of this question. If independent Finance is justified by what it has done and what it is doing and what it will do, then it ought to be perpetuated. If not, then it ought not to be perpetuated.

So far as I am concerned, there is no question of preferment involved. The legislation in this bill provides for a Finance Department with a brigadier general at its head. I have the rank of a brigadier general in the Regular Army, and so, as to rank, it means nothing to me. And I really have no personal interest in the matter. But the dignity of the job should merit a higher grade of rank at the head of Finance than is carried in this bill. When you consider the responsibilities and the capital involved and the immense amount of money which will be controlled by the Director of Finance it is very evident that that sort of a job in civil life would carry with it a great deal more remuneration than is carried with the rank of a brigadier general.

I am convinced that a return to the old method of scattered, separated Finance would be unfortunate and that it would mean a loss in efficiency that would prove of great inconvenience to contractors, that would continue to prove an inconvenience to Congress, and that it would invite, if it did not bring, disaster.

THE REGULAR ARMY A CONSTRUCTIVE FORCE.

So far we have had no discussion about the size of the Army in this bill. I do not consider that that is a matter that I am well qualified to discuss. It is a military question which should be handled by those who are performing strictly military duties. But it has seemed to me through all this discussion that some very important things have been overlooked. The Army is being considered purely as a military engine, and the fact seems to be entirely ignored that the United States Army—the Regular Army—has done in years past a great deal of constructive work. We all know that the development of the West was made possible by the Regular Army. The Regular Army went into Cuba and instituted a stable government; we reopened and taught the schools, and came out leaving a happy and prosperous people. We did the same thing in Manila, where the Army did a great deal of constructive work. We cleaned up the city and brought the children into the schools and wiped out the pestilence, and made of Manila one of the finest municipalities of the world.

Senator FLETCHER. And built roads?

Gen. LORD. And built roads, yes. We laid cables and put in the telegraph.

In San Francisco at the time of the earthquake and the fire, and in the forest fires and in the mid-West floods the hand of relief was the military, and the amount of constructive work of the Army in these times of trouble should not be overlooked. We were able to do it because we had the force and we had the equipment and we had the training.

We have done the same thing on the Mexican border, and we have done the same thing in Alaska. The Army built the Canal.

So it seems to me that in discussing this thing we must bear in mind that the Army is always being called upon to do certain important constructive work that the Government could perform through no other agency, because no other agency is available.

Senator FLETCHER. The work of sanitation, and that sort of thing, under the Surgeon General of the Army has been of enormous benefit, has it not?

Gen. LORD. To the entire world, yes.

Senator FLETCHER. To the world, I mean.

Gen. LORD. I saw a statement from Gen. Gorgas to the effect that yellow fever has been practically wiped off the face of the earth. He and his assistants were largely instrumental, if not entirely so, in bringing that result about, or at least they took the initiative and brought it to a successful conclusion.

Senator FLETCHER. Yes, when it comes to yellow fever it is simply a matter of spending \$2.50 for mosquito netting now in order to prevent it.

Have you any views on the question of promotion by selection?

PROMOTION BY SELECTION.

Gen. LORD. I believe in promotion by selection. I admit that there may be cases where injustice is done; but there are cases where injustice is done by the system of promotion by seniority. I know, and every other Army officer knows, of cases where junior officers are absolutely estopped from promotion to places they are qualified to fill, because such places are filled by senior officers while the juniors continue to do the work and furnish the brains, and the senior officers continue to hold the rank and reap the credit, and that condition exists all through the Army.

Senator FLETCHER. Do you want to express any definite opinion as to the size of the Army beyond what you have said?

Gen. LORD. I prefer not to do that. I can only take the expression of opinion as given by the Chief of Staff and the various other officers who have appeared here. I do feel that growing out of this extraordinary condition of unrest that exists everywhere, we do not know what the emergency may develop that we may be called upon to meet.

UNIVERSAL MILITARY TRAINING.

Senator FLETCHER. What are your views about this plan of universal military training, either in the reorganization bill or Senator Chamberlain's bill?

Gen. LORD. I am heartily in favor of universal military training. I think that three months is better than nothing, but that six months would be better than three months.

Senator FLETCHER. Do you favor a vocational feature added to the military training?

Gen. LORD. I do, indeed.

Senator FLETCHER. If we have vocational training it seems to me we will be almost obliged to have more than three months. You can not train men, even in a military way, very satisfactory in three months.

The CHAIRMAN. Referring again, General, to section 38 and the policy laid down in that section of the lump-sum appropriation for the entire needs of the Army, and the apportionment of that lump-sum appropriation by the Secretary of War in any manner that he and the Chief of Staff see fit, I want to ask you this question: Is it not a fact that there is reflected in certain items of a big appropriation bill the desires and policies of Congress, as affecting some particular activity or branch of the War Department, and that if the Congress surrenders the right to itemize the bill, in some respects at least, it loses control to that extent of the policies of the War Department through its several branches?

Gen. LORD. It certainly does. That is the reason that I qualified my approval of the budget provision in this bill, and stated that Congress should by restrictive phraseology control such things as it had a specific interest in. For example, the Congress would state that not to exceed so much should be expended for construction; or, again, that there should be expended for a certain purpose so much; but that certain of these general appropriations should be available for apportionment interchangeably by the Secretary of War, subject to such restrictions as the Congress might insert to carry out their definite wishes.

The CHAIRMAN. By general appropriations inside the total appropriations, you mean appropriations such as for pay and subsistence, and barracks, and quarters, and incidental expenses, and transportation—those big, standard items?

Gen. LORD. Might I illustrate? In this bill, for example, the Secretary of War might be given authority, budgetary authority, to use Air Service, Engineer, Ordnance, Quartermaster appropriations, Signal Corps, using them interchangeably with certain exceptions that so much should be used for such and such a purpose or that so much should be expended for such and such a purpose.

The CHAIRMAN. Have you read the testimony of Gen. March and Secretary Baker on this so-called budget system?

Gen. LORD. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. We gathered the impression from them that it was their intention in presenting the draft of the bill, or in their estimates, to include all the details, itemized appropriations, and that all this bill authorized them to do would be to transfer a surplus of one item to meet a deficit in another. Now, this bill, on careful reading, places no such limitation upon them as that.

Gen. LORD. I think what is intended—and that is what I interpret to be meant here—is that we would present our bill, as we have always done it, specifying the various items for the various purposes, such as in "Pay," we want so much for the pay of line officers, and so much for the pay of enlisted men, and so much for the pay of the Staff, and so on; we specify the particular need and the amount we think we will want; but yet there you have given us the same

authority that I understand we are asking for with reference to the great mass of Army appropriations. If we found we could spare some money from Ordnance and there should be a need arise that had not developed before, and Ordnance had some particular project that it was not necessary to complete now, although perhaps important, the Secretary of War could take some of that fund to meet an emergency that occurred in Signal Corps rather than incur a deficiency, and then come to Congress for help.

The CHAIRMAN. I can see, of course, that there are some desirable elements in such a plan. There is one thought that always comes in my mind a little bit, and that is that under such a system that it would be possible for the General Staff or Chief of Staff, who in most technical matters influences the Secretary of War very largely and must—

Gen. LORD. Naturally.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes. It would be possible for such a piece of machinery to starve one branch of the service which the Congress was particularly interested in, and create a surplus in its appropriation, create a surplus by starving the branch and then use that surplus to build up a service that was for the time being the favorite of the administration.

Gen. LORD. Mr. Chairman, there is one thing that is necessary. The only way we can come and present proposed legislation to you is on the assumption that the War Department is going to be absolutely honest toward the Congress.

The CHAIRMAN. Of course, we have to trust people, and I do not mind doing it, but sometimes Congress is very jealous about doing things of that sort; and suppose that a certain branch of the service is not getting a square deal from the Army as a whole, and friends of the service come to us and say, "We are being starved out up there, and we ought to be bigger; and you wanted us to be bigger when you appropriated, but we are getting nowhere, because there is a prejudice against us at the top somewhere." You know about that?

Gen. LORD. Yes. But I think in the long run that the people at the top, the officers who are in and about the Secretary of War, whatever their rank, or whatever the branch of their service, do have, the great mass of them, the general welfare of the Army at heart. If they did not, we could not do business.

The CHAIRMAN. Is there any other phase of the bill you care to discuss?

Gen. LORD. I think that is all.

(Thereupon, at 4.30 p. m., the committee adjourned until tomorrow, Wednesday, October 8, 1919, at 2.15 p. m.)

PROPOSED FINANCE LEGISLATION.

The following draft of legislation, requested by the chairman of the Senate Committee on Military Affairs, is predicated on the national defense act of June 3, 1916, and on the strength of the Army therein prescribed:

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That section 2 of the act approved June 3, 1916, entitled "An act for making further and more effectual provision for the national defense and for other purposes," be, and is hereby, amended by adding to the composition of the Regular Army a Finance Department, which shall consist of the following commissioned and enlisted personnel: One major general, who shall be known as the

Director of Finance and who, under the authority of the Secretary of War, shall be charged with the duty of making all disbursements of funds appropriated for the War Department or any of the activities of said department, the accounting therefor, and such other fiscal and accounting duties as may be required by law or delegated to him by the Secretary of War; 12 colonels; 15 lieutenant colonels; 47 majors; 103 captains; 20 finance sergeants, senior grade; 140 finance sergeants, first class; 180 finance sergeants; 100 finance corporals; 120 privates, first class; and 70 privates: *Provided*, That the enlisted men herein provided for shall receive the same pay and allowances as provided by law for corresponding grades in the Quartermaster Corps of the Army: *Provided further*, That the officers of said department, except as hereinafter specifically provided to the contrary, shall be detailed under the provisions of sections 26 and 27 of the act of Congress approved February 2, 1901, entitled "An act to increase the efficiency of the permanent Military Establishment of the United States:" *Provided*, That officers so detailed in grades above that of captain may be redetailed without a compulsory period of service out of that department: *Provided further*, That the Director of Finance of said department shall be appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, from among the officers of the said department, and in accordance with the requirements of section 26 of the act of Congress approved February 2, 1901, hereinbefore cited.

2. That for the purpose of carrying into effect the provisions of this act the President is hereby authorized to appoint, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, the Director of Finance herein provided for immediately upon the passage of this act: *Provided further*, That original vacancies caused by this act in commissioned grades shall be filled by appointment by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, from among officers now holding commissions in the Regular Army, including second lieutenants of the Quartermaster Corps, and persons not over 45 years of age who have at any time served honorably as finance officers in the temporary forces of the United States organized since April 6, 1917: *And provided further*, That so long as there remain any officers holding permanent appointments in the Finance Department they shall be promoted according to seniority in the several grades as now provided by law.

3. That nothing contained in this act is to be held or construed to prevent any officer of the Army from being assigned to duty as an acting finance officer, where the conditions of the service make it necessary for an officer of other than the Finance Department to disburse funds: *Provided*, That hereafter, under such regulations as may be prescribed by the Secretary of War, officers of the Finance Department and acting finance officers, accountable for public moneys may intrust moneys to other officers for the purpose of having them make disbursements as their agents, and the officers to whom the moneys are intrusted, as well as the officers who intrust the moneys to them, shall be held pecuniarily responsible therefor to the United States.

4. That the provision in section 37 of the act approved June 3, 1916, entitled "An act for making further and more effectual provisions for the national defense, and for other purposes," waiving the age limitation on the appointment or reappointment of officers to certain staff corps or department sections of the Officers' Reserve Corps, is hereby extended to the Finance Department section of said Reserve Corps.

5. That all laws and parts of laws in so far as they are inconsistent with this act are hereby repealed.

NOTE.—For an Army of 300,000 men substitute the following personnel: One major general; 12 colonels; 17 lieutenant colonels; 49 majors; 109 captains; 24 finance sergeants, senior grade; 152 finance sergeants, first class; 200 finance sergeants; 120 finance corporals; 128 privates, first class; 84 privates.

NOTE.—For an Army of 350,000 men substitute the following personnel: One major general; 12 colonels; 20 lieutenant colonels; 52 majors; 118 captains; 30 finance sergeants, senior grade; 170 finance sergeants, first class; 230 sergeants; 150 finance corporals; 140 privates, first class; 105 privates.



REORGANIZATION OF THE ARMY.

WEDNESDAY, OCTOBER 8, 1919.

UNITED STATES SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON MILITARY AFFAIRS,
Washington, D. C.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to the call of the chairman, at 10.15 o'clock a. m., in the committee room, Capitol, Senator James W. Wadsworth, jr., presiding.

Present: Senators Wadsworth (chairman), New, Sutherland, Fletcher, and Chamberlain.

STATEMENT OF GEORGE O. SQUIER, MAJOR GENERAL, CHIEF SIGNAL OFFICER OF THE ARMY.

The CHAIRMAN. Gen. Squier, will you please give your name to the reporter?

Gen. SQUIER. George O. Squier, major general, Chief Signal Officer of the Army.

The CHAIRMAN. You have held the assignment of Chief Signal Officer during the recent war?

Gen. SQUIER. Yes; since the 14th of February, before the outbreak of the war in 1917.

The CHAIRMAN. In a general way, that covers your war assignments?

Gen. SQUIER. Yes; I was Chief Signal Officer of the Army during the whole time of the war.

The CHAIRMAN. And you made one or two important trips abroad?

Gen. SQUIER. Yes, sir. I was abroad. I left in May, 1919, and I came home at the end of July, 1919.

The CHAIRMAN. And you were abroad just before our entry into the war?

Gen. SQUIER. Yes, sir. I was for four years United States military attaché in London, including two years before the outbreak of the present war and two years of the present war, and as such I represented the American Army at the western front, off and on, returning to my station in London and going back and forth.

The CHAIRMAN. We have three bills before us, and before we ask you specific questions about them, most of which will probably be in connection with Senate bill 2715, we will be glad to hear any general observations you may have to make that you think are of importance on this question, as affecting the Signal Corps or the Army at large.

Gen. SQUIER. Perhaps I should speak first of my own corps, which would be pertinent. In this bill, 2715, the provisions for the Signal Corps are found in section 13, as I recall, in which is given certain totals of different ranks on the basis of the strength of the Army here, which is something like 500,000 men.

That paragraph is not satisfactory to my department.

The CHAIRMAN. Were you called upon by the authorities of the General Staff to submit a memorandum setting forth the personnel that your branch would need?

Gen. SQUIER. During the preparation of this there were certain hearings had which the junior officers attended, where they discussed the needs for this and that part of the Signal Corps. I believe I went myself to a committee meeting, I have forgotten now just what it was about, but as to the completed bill I never presented what we consider a study of the needs of the Signal Corps.

The CHAIRMAN. That would seem to be an exception to the general rule. We have been told by other services that they were called on to submit a memorandum as to the personnel necessary in their several branches, and in general those memoranda were followed in the writing of the bill. In what way is this unsatisfactory to your corps?

Gen. SQUIER. I should say, to make it clear, that I have submitted memorandums from time to time and the views that we have had have not coincided with the views of the General Staff on this section. I have so stated officially. We have made a study of the needs of the Army from the Signal Corps standpoint, both abroad and here, and I have in my hand, in order to save the time of the committee, a memorandum of what we consider is necessary.

The CHAIRMAN. In the way of personnel?

Gen. SQUIER. Yes; in lieu of section 13.

The CHAIRMAN. We will be glad to incorporate that in the hearing, but would be glad to have you, in your own way, point out the difference between your suggestions and the ones in the bill, and the reasons for your suggestions.

Gen. SQUIER. The way we have arrived at our study is to take the experience of this present war on the spot in France, before the officers had a chance to come back, and to get it and study it carefully there before they came home—that is, what they thought the present war had taught them—and I have done the same thing with my officers on this side. Then I brought the two groups together and have held various conferences in my office to adjust whatever differences were found between our estimation and their estimation, and what I have here represents the combined judgment of every one, I think. I think this is agreed to pretty thoroughly by all the Signal Corps senior officers, such as Gen. Russell, Col. Gibbs, Col. Voris, and others. Gen. Saltzman and Col. Curtis are also familiar with this study, and that seemed to me to be the best way to get at the needs of the corps. Our solutions were very close to each other, so close that we could adjust them very easily.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. Have you submitted a section for the statute that would meet the requirements that you have suggested?

Gen. SQUIER. I did not catch that question, Senator.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. Did you prepare a bill or section to go in the reorganization bill to meet your views?

Gen. SQUIER. Yes; I have it here. I have prepared it for this statement, knowing that time was limited. It is written on a wholly different basis from the other, it being largely on a percentage basis, because we were not sure of the size of the Army, and it is more scientific, anyway, to use percentages, that have to be worked out in your study, then you can apply it to any sized army.

I have written this section, and, instead of totals, because we are uncertain of the number, I have done it the more scientific way—so many per division, for instance—which makes it very easy, with the additional overhead for the other special agencies that the Signal Corps is required to form. This study is ready to go in the record, if you wish.

The CHAIRMAN. We will put that in the record.

The Signal Corps of the Regular Army shall consist of: One major general, who shall be the Chief Signal Officer of the Army; 1 brigadier general; 5 colonels; 6 lieutenant colonels; 15 majors; 52 captains; 72 first lieutenants; 7 second lieutenants; 2,357 enlisted men and the following officers and enlisted men assigned to tactical organizations:

To each Infantry division: One lieutenant colonel; 2 majors; 2 captains; 1 division signal company.

To each Infantry brigade: One brigade signal company.

To each Infantry regiment: One regimental signal company.

To each Artillery brigade: One Artillery brigade signal company.

To each 75 mm. Artillery regiment: One 75 mm. regimental signal company.

To each 155 mm. Artillery regiment: One 155 mm. regimental signal company.

To each Cavalry regiment: One Cavalry regimental signal troop.

To each Cavalry division: One lieutenant colonel; 2 majors; 2 captains; 1 Cavalry division signal troop.

To each Cavalry brigade: One Cavalry brigade signal troop.

To each Cavalry regiment attached to a Cavalry division: One Artillery regimental signal troop.

To each corps: One colonel; 1 captain; 1 corps signal battalion.

To each Army: One brigadier general; 1 colonel; 1 major; 2 captains; 1 Army radio company.

In addition to the above commissioned strength the President is hereby authorized to add such officers in their proper grades as he deems necessary to provide technical signaling personnel for the Air Service, including Balloon organizations, Corps and Army Artillery and Tank Corps.

In addition to the above enlisted strength the President is hereby authorized to add such enlisted men in such grades in percentages authorized as he deems necessary to provide technical signaling personnel for the Air Service, including Balloon organizations, corps and Army Artillery, and Tank Corps.

The enlisted personnel of the Signal Corps shall consist of master signal electricians; sergeants first class; sergeants; corporals; chauffeurs first class; chauffeurs; cooks; horseshoers; privates first class and privates. The numbers in the various grades shall not exceed the following percentages of the total authorized enlisted strength of the Signal Corps:

Master signal electricians, 2 per cent; sergeants first class, 7 per cent; sergeants, 10 per cent; corporals, 20 per cent; chauffeurs first class, 1 per cent; chauffeurs, 2 per cent; cooks, 2 per cent; horseshoers, 1 per cent; privates first class, 44 per cent; privates, 11 per cent.

The normal peace strength of each division signal company shall be: One captain; 3 first lieutenants; 3 master signal electricians; 11 sergeants first class; 18 sergeants; 31 corporals; 4 chauffeurs first class; 13 chauffeurs; 4 cooks; 1 horseshoer; 92 privates first class; and privates.

The normal peace strength of each Infantry brigade signal company shall be: One captain; 2 first lieutenants; 1 master signal electrician; 5 sergeants first class; 8 sergeants; 12 corporals; 1 chauffeur first class; 2 chauffeurs; 2 cooks; 44 privates first class; and privates.

The normal peace strength of each Infantry regimental signal company shall be: One captain; 1 first lieutenant; 3 second lieutenants; 1 master signal electrician; 7 sergeants first class; 11 sergeants; 18 corporals; 1 chauffeur first class; 2 chauffeurs; 2 cooks; 70 privates first class; and privates.

The normal peace strength of each artillery brigade signal company shall be: One captain; 2 first lieutenants; 1 master signal electrician; 4 sergeants first class; 6 sergeants; 7 corporals; 1 chauffeur first class; 2 chauffeurs; 2 cooks; 32 privates first class; and privates.

The normal peace strength of each Artillery regimental signal company to be assigned to a 75 mm. Artillery regiment shall be: One captain; 1 first lieutenant; 2 second lieutenants; 1 master signal electrician; 6 sergeants first class; 9 sergeants; 11 corporals; 1 chauffeur first class; 2 chauffeurs; 2 cooks; 50 privates first class; and privates.

The normal peace strength of each Artillery regimental signal company to be assigned to a 155 mm. Artillery regiment shall be: One captain; 1 first lieutenant; 3 second lieutenants; 1 master signal electrician; 7 sergeants first class; 11 sergeants; 14 corporals; 1 chauffeur first class; 2 chauffeurs; 2 cooks; 66 privates first class; and privates.

The normal peace strength of each Cavalry regimental signal troop shall be: One captain; 1 first lieutenant; 1 second lieutenant; 1 master signal electrician; 6 sergeant; first class; 8 sergeants; 10 corporals; 1 chauffeur first class; two cooks; 1 horseshoer; 42 privates first class; and privates.

The normal peace strength of each Cavalry division signal troop shall be: One captain; 2 first lieutenants; 2 second lieutenants; 3 master signal electricians; 12 sergeants first class; 18 sergeants; 27 corporals; 2 chauffeurs first class; 9 chauffeurs; 3 cooks; 2 horseshoers; 79 privates first class; and privates.

The normal peace strength of each Cavalry brigade signal troop shall be: One captain; 1 first lieutenant; 1 master signal electrician; 4 sergeants first class; 8 sergeants; 11 corporals; 1 chauffeur first class; 2 chauffeurs; 2 cooks; 1 horseshoer; 30 privates first class; and privates.

The normal peace strength of each Artillery regimental signal troop on duty with a Cavalry division shall be: One captain; 1 first lieutenant; 3 second lieutenants; 1 master signal electrician; 7 sergeants first class; 11 sergeants; 15 corporals; 1 chauffeur first class; 2 chauffeurs; 2 cooks; 3 horseshoers; 62 privates first class; and privates.

The normal peace strength of each corps signal battalion shall be: One major; 4 captains; 8 first lieutenants; 4 second lieutenants; 9 master signal electricians; 35 sergeants first class; 50 sergeants; 82 corporals; 11 chauffeurs first class; 33 chauffeurs; 9 cooks; 276 privates first class; and privates. This corps signal battalion shall be organized into a battalion headquarters, a construction company, and an operating company.

The normal peace strength of the Army radio company shall be: One captain; 2 first lieutenants; 2 second lieutenants; 2 master signal electricians; 4 sergeants first class; 8 sergeants; 16 corporals; 4 cooks; 116 privates first class; and privates.

The enlisted personnel comprising the organized field units provided above and the officers serving therewith shall constitute a part of the line of the Army.

The chief signal officer of the Army shall be, ex officio, an additional member of the General Staff.

Officers of the Signal Corps, including and above the grade of captain, shall be permanently commissioned in such corps. Below the grade of captain vacancies shall be filled by detail in the manner prescribed by law.

Gen. SQUIER. I may say it represents very close to 4 per cent of the Army as being our best judgment of the strength of the service, which provides what is known as the communication service; the signal service in all of its activities. It is incomplete to this extent, that it does not provide the number that the Air Service may want for the manning and training of air radio operators, for instance, for airplanes, because that is a mooted question. It is not complete in that respect, but it can be made so the moment you decide upon that subject.

Senator NEW. That 4 per cent of the whole, then, does not include any provision for the Air Service?

Gen. SQUIER. Only on the ground. As to what would be required in the planes themselves is a question. At the present moment we provide for training operators on the ground so as to have somebody on the ground anyway. In the American Expeditionary Forces we trained all the operators that they had for the planes, just as we trained them for every other branch. That seemed to be the more scientific way. There is also a question of the number for tanks. The meteorological subject is another subject which is not sufficiently definite yet. Otherwise it is complete.

The CHAIRMAN. Those last two phases are not included in the estimate?

Gen. SQUIER. No; that is, not an adequate amount. Meteorology is a very large subject. If we are to be charged with the entire

military meteorological development in this country that is one thing, and if the Weather Bureau should take over a considerable amount of this, it would be quite another thing; otherwise the bill is in form to be inserted.

The CHAIRMAN. Is your suggestion for a larger personnel or a smaller personnel than the one in the bill?

Gen. SQUIER. A larger personnel. The personnel provided in the bill is something over 2½ per cent, or something like that, and this is slightly less than 4 per cent. I should say that is more apparent than real, as you will see by reading it, because certain strengths of personnel which are now in the infantry regiments, for instance, which do signal duty, we take over and add them to the Signal Corps, but subtract them from their present units, so that the total number in the Army is not so much changed. The principle of taking over people in the regiments that are now doing signal duty is embodied in this suggestion, which we think is sound. This is the recommendation of all the senior officers apparently of the Signal Corps proper, and a considerable number of the line commanders, although some line commanders do not agree with it.

In regard to the 4 per cent personnel, or nearly that, I might say that the Signal Corps has a special, clear-cut job to do; I think more so than most of the departments. Anything and everything pertaining to communication is our job, and our solution of the matter is to have no officer or man in excess of what is needed to do that job. We would rather have the smallest corps possible than to annex any duties that do not pertain to it, for the reason that it is so vital, so peculiarly a service universal to all agencies and departments of the Army. We believe in no encumbrance or addition of any sort that is not an exact attribute of it. We do not want to have anything to do with additional encumbrances. We are not anxious to annex anything that does not pertain to our regular work.

Speaking of the object of our service and its peculiarity over all other services, it might be likened, I think, to the great body of the Army on the one hand, including all of its branches, and the Signal Corps to a small nervous system of that body, which is small in bulk but very important in function. We served literally, as you will see, from factory door and training camp throughout this country to the barbed wire of the front line trenches in France, and this 4 per cent is on duty everywhere, from the place where equipment is produced through to the front line operating messengers. To make that clear, I think I could safely say that the subtraction, if such a thing were possible, the subtraction of this 4 per cent from the Army for one hour—taking it right out of the Army for one hour at any time prior to November 11, 1918—utter confusion and chaos would have occurred in the whole Army, from the adjutant general's messages to some camp clear through to the operations on the front line. I doubt if any other small percentage subtracted would have had anything like that effect. I mean, if you would take that same number of people away from the Infantry, for instance, you would still have Infantry. Perhaps I should say the Artillery. You would still have Artillery, but it would not be so good. The function of this small percentage is so essential to every department, no matter whether it is administrative or operative, that nothing should be left undone to make it as efficient as it possibly can be made.

The CHAIRMAN. You have the radio, the telegraph, and signaling?

Gen. SQUIER. The messenger service, the pigeon service, meteorological service, and photography, etc.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you have that branch of the service which locates the enemy artillery?

Gen. SQUIER. You mean sound ranging?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Gen. SQUIER. We developed that primarily. It was turned over to the Engineers afterwards. We started the service, organized it, and later turned it over to the Engineers. But we design the radio apparatus for the Army in its various forms, including that for aeroplanes.

The CHAIRMAN. You not only design it, but you operate it?

Gen. SQUIER. We design it and make it.

Senator SUTHERLAND. You operate the radio with the aeroplanes by your corps?

Gen. SQUIER. That is one of the mooted questions that I spoke of a moment ago. There has been a discussion going on which has gone back and forth several times. That is the reason the total I have mentioned is not complete in that respect. I think it would be better myself if we should operate it everywhere. At the present time we design every piece of radio apparatus that goes on an aeroplane. We make it, test it, and superintend its manufacture and delivery. There is a tendency in the Air Service to want to do that themselves, but at this time we are responsible.

I merely mention that, gentlemen, to try to impress upon your minds what an essentially vital service this small 4 per cent happens to be. I doubt if there is anything quite so universal in its application.

Senator SUTHERLAND. What was your maximum force during the war?

Gen. SQUIER. Including those infantrymen, for instance, and artillerymen that we propose to transfer to our corps, that is practically the percentage—

Senator SUTHERLAND. I do not mean expressed in percentages, but expressed in actual numbers.

Gen. SQUIER. We had about 35,000 men on the other side in the Signal Corps proper, not counting the Air Service, and on this side we had about 18,000.

Senator SUTHERLAND. About 53,000 altogether?

Gen. SQUIER. About 53,000 total. That number did not include certain men on signal duty that are now called infantrymen that we think should be transferred to us.

The CHAIRMAN. Under this bill that matter of transfer would be brought about by the War Department regulations?

Gen. SQUIER. Yes; as I understand this bill, the President could do that.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Gen. SQUIER. I might state that I think that should be a little more specific.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you prefer that this be more specific in the law?

Gen. SQUIER. Not too specific, but we want something outside of just a general blanket authority. I think it should be about the same

as that which Congress usually prescribes in a general way within limits. I do not think it ought to be too definite, but yet I would not be in favor of allowing anything to be done. I think some supervision is useful and desirable by Congress; not to the extent of making us come down every time we change a small organization, or company, or anything of that kind, but a common-sense line in there is a wise thing, I think.

Now, in regard to the other features of it, I think, as you will see at the end of the statement there, I have stressed one or two features, perhaps the main one being this: That the Signal Corps of the Army should be a permanent corps and not a detailed corps, except, of course, in the low grades of first and second lieutenants; but, including captains and above, it should be a permanent corps. There is no sort of doubt about that now, Mr. Chairman. That used to be the way in the Signal Corps, but it was changed over to a detail corps. I was one of the men in favor of it, and I founded the school for teaching the detailed men myself. However, this war has shown us absolutely that it is a war of specialists, as everybody knows, and our job, as I outlined it to you a moment ago, is such that a man must devote his entire life to it. There is no illusion about that, and there should be no illusion about that.

It is a job that has got to be done in a certain way, the way that we succeeded well in doing in this war. When this war came on we went straight to the people of experience and took them bodily and sent them to France to take charge of the installation of that splendid system that you saw there, Mr. Chairman. That system was not devised, installed, nor operated by detailed officers, men from the Infantry and Cavalry; nor could it have been done by them. There would have been no hope of it at all. Therefore we must revert, so far as the Signal Corps is concerned, to a permanent system. The officers must be commissioned in the Signal Corps. At present the number of officers of the permanent Signal Corps is limited—there are only 13 of us left—and it will not do to detail officers from the Infantry and Cavalry and Artillery to continue this job; it can not be done.

The CHAIRMAN. What does the law permit in that respect now?

Gen. SQUIER. It is a detailed corps composed of officers from the Cavalry, Infantry, and Artillery.

The CHAIRMAN. You said something about 13 permanent officers?

Gen. SQUIER. I meant that all of us in the permanent corps will soon have retired. I think there are 13 left, and within a few years there will not be any permanent corps at all. We are being eliminated. I am very strong on that point. There is no use talking about it, the detail system can not be continued in the Signal Corps. This has been proved thoroughly, and I think everybody realizes it now.

The CHAIRMAN. Your suggestion is that everybody, including the grade of captain and above, should be permanent?

Gen. SQUIER. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. And that the first and second lieutenants should be detailed?

Gen. SQUIER. Yes. That would give us a chance to look them over the first couple of years. We will do the detailing to the line the other way about. Our trained battalions are a part of the divisions that live and move with the Army, as you know. If they fail in one single instance the whole division knows it, because ours is a universal service. Therefore the idea of the men getting out of touch with the line is absurd. If they are out of touch for an hour the commanding general wants to know what is the matter with the system. The fear of the staff officers getting away from the line is not true at all with the Signal Corps. We are right with the line all the time and function with the line both in peace and in war.

The CHAIRMAN. Every division has a Field Signal Battalion?

Gen. SQUIER. Yes. They are in touch with the line, and staff officers that are not with the organized divisions the Chief Signal Officer will detail with them. It will be the other way about, that is all. They will be put into those divisions for service. Therefore the detailed system would still be maintained except in a different way. You still have all the advantage of the detail system.

The CHAIRMAN. Have you reduced to writing, and in legislative form, a proposal on that point?

Gen. SQUIER. Yes, I have it here at the end of this paper:

Officers of the Signal Corps, including and above the grade of captain, shall be permanently commissioned in such corps. Below the grade of captain, vacancies shall be filled by detail in the manner prescribed by law.

The CHAIRMAN. How about the detail from the corps to the line of officers of higher grade, that you mentioned a moment ago?

Gen. SQUIER. That is not necessary to go into the law at all. I think any Chief Signal Officer would do that. That is a matter of regulation by the War Department, and I doubt if it is necessary to put it into the law.

The CHAIRMAN. That matter has been discussed in connection with some of the other special services and some of the other chiefs, as I remember it, thought that that might be incorporated in the law, so that the policy would be laid down in the law.

Gen. SQUIER. I should not object to it at all.

The CHAIRMAN. That is the detail from the service to the line and from the line to the service?

Gen. SQUIER. I would certainly do that if I was the Chief Signal Officer—

The CHAIRMAN. Would you say two years out of six for the line?

Gen. SQUIER. Not quite that much. These organized units give us a reservoir in the services anyway. It would only be those that were not in such units that would need it at all. The danger would be that some Signal Corps engineering specialist that designed radio apparatus, for instance, would be kept away and would be away from the line for years and not get a chance to keep in touch. The Chief Signal Officer should attend to that.

The CHAIRMAN. In order that the committee may have the benefit of it in its deliberations, I wish you would submit something of that sort.

Gen. SQUIER. I think two years out of six would be too drastic, as I think of it at the moment. I will be glad to give consideration to that and submit something for the committee.

The CHAIRMAN. How about one out of five?

Gen. SQUIER. One out of five, I should think..

The CHAIRMAN. One year out of five years?

Gen. SQUIER. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. I imagine its application would be largely confined to what might be termed administrative officers of the Signal Corps who are not with these signal battalions?

Gen. SQUIER. Yes; those and the signal communication engineers and research personnel are the only people we would have to have it for.

I have covered one or two other general subjects here.

The CHAIRMAN. We will be very glad to have you discuss them, General.

Gen. SQUIER. One is "Enlisted personnel comprising the organized field units provided above and the officers serving therewith shall constitute a part of the line of the Army."

I feel very strongly about that. Those special fighting units that are sent with the fighting divisions and are an integral part thereof, while on such duty should have the status of the rest of the division.

The CHAIRMAN. The Field Signal battalions are commanded by a major?

Gen. SQUIER. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. And you would have that major a line officer?

Gen. SQUIER. I would have him a part of the line, just like it is with an Engineer battalion.

The CHAIRMAN. As a line officer he might be promoted to a lieutenant colonel of Infantry?

Gen. SQUIER. No; he belongs to the Signal Corps. He should be a Signal officer, commissioned as such, and when promoted from a major, Signal Corps, should be commissioned a lieutenant colonel, Signal Corps.

The CHAIRMAN. Oh, I see. My question was based upon a confusion of thought. What change in their status would be brought about by your suggestion which, to your mind, would be advantageous?

Gen. SQUIER. Merely this—at this time they are technically staff troops and this change merely gives them an added morale, a feeling that they are fighting soldiers, serving with the fighting troops and not discriminated against in any way.

My main argument in favor of that is the casualty list, which I would like to file. I find in looking at the statistical account of the dead and wounded that the Signal Corps comes second to the Infantry enlisted personnel, that is, wounded and killed from shrapnel, for instance. If they come second in the whole Army, surely I think it is the right of those soldiers to have the status of fighting soldiers.

Senator NEW. Does that include the Air Service?

Gen. SQUIER. Yes. I think perhaps the insertion of these figures in the record would be better than any statement I could make about them.

Casualty rates, by arm of service, per 1,000 of troops who reached France.

Arm.	Officers.	Men.	Arm.	Officers.	Men.
DEAD AND WOUNDED.			BATTLE DEATHS.		
Infantry (and machine gun)	330.2	2,262.8	Infantry and machine gun	55	46
Tank Corps	82.0	38.4	Air Service	31	1
Air Service	57.5	2.5	Tank Corps	16	7
Engineers and gas	52.3	43.2	Engineer Corps	10	6
Artillery and ammunition train	47.3	33.5	Artillery	8	6
Antiaircraft	29.4	43.5	Cavalry	6	8
Signal Corps	25.8	50.4	Signal Corps	5	8
Police and headquarters troops	19.9	24.0	Medical Department	4	5
Headquarters	15.6	31.6	Ordnance	2	3
Cavalry	15.2	6.4	Quartermaster	1	1
Medical	10.4	12.6			
Motor Transport	8.1	7.3			
Quartermaster	1.8	7.7			
Pioneer Infantry	1.7	3.6			
Ordnance		1.4			

Senator NEW. Looking at your figures, I think you must have misunderstood my question of a moment ago. I asked you if that included the Air Service figures and you said that it did—

Gen. SQUIER. I did not mean that. I did not catch the drift of your question. There was a time when the Air Service was a part of the Signal Corps. However, this was made up separately. It is a very illuminating thing.

The CHAIRMAN. You make this suggestion for the effect on morale?

Gen. SQUIER. Yes, sir.

Senator SUTHERLAND. How was that handled in the British and French Armies?

Gen. SQUIER. I do not know whether their Signal Corps is considered line troops when in divisions. I think so, but am not certain. Even if they were not before this war they will be now. These men go out and expose themselves to repair these lines in a perfectly marvelous way, and they get shot up all the time. The evidence that we have from all sources is that the men have been perfectly splendid soldiers. This is a small matter. They already have it in the Engineer Corps and I would just like to see the men placed in the same status as those in the Engineer Corps and for the same reason.

An officer on duty designing radio apparatus would not be in the line of the Army, but would be a staff officer; but an officer detailed by the War Department in command of one of the Signal Corps units when he reported to the division commander would have the same status as the Engineer Corps officers on duty with troops.

Another suggestion I have made which I think should be embodied in this—it may be solved in some other way than this, but I merely offer this as one solution—that is, that the Chief Signal Officer of the Army shall be ex officio an additional member of the General Staff. There may be other ways of accomplishing that, but this is one of the ways I suggest. I very greatly feel the need of some representative on the General Staff. I have never had any, although I have asked every succeeding Chief of Staff that he detail some one, and I have nominated several officers, but I have never been able to get any one on the General Staff.

The CHAIRMAN. Not even some one of subordinate rank?

Gen. SQUIER. Not any rank. Once or twice there has been some officer who had previously been detailed in the Signal Corps on the Staff, but of course he has rarely been assigned to any duty governing the Signal Corps when he has been on the Staff. Of course, he has been primarily an officer of the Cavalry or Infantry, from which his promotions came, where he took his examination for promotion, etc., and I did not feel that he represented the Signal Corps, and I have objected to it. Naturally his predilections are going to be where his future is and where promotion comes from and where his lifework is, and in the last analysis he will always think that way, of course.

Now, if the chief himself is ex officio a member of the General Staff, there is liaison at least between the General Staff and the operating department—my department—and that would enable the technical views of my department to at least get a hearing before decisions are made, which, in my judgement, will add very materially to efficiency.

The CHAIRMAN. Your argument would apply with equal strength to some of the other services?

Gen. SQUIER. Exactly, Mr. Chairman, I think they ought to have it; that the chief of the service ought to be a member ex officio of the General Staff. Then he would be sure that his corps was represented. A junior officer might present something that did not fully represent the views of the chief. I wouldn't for a moment have a junior speaking for the chief signal officer, because he might advocate something of which the chief signal officer might not approve. The best way to do that is to make the chief himself a member of the General Staff ex officio.

The CHAIRMAN. Of course, that involves an element of planning and operating which the General Staff is not supposed to indulge in.

Gen. SQUIER. Well, I am very much in favor of a strong General Staff. I think it is absolutely necessary. I think there is a tendency always to overstep and reach out into administrative work. The staff has always done that. It is doing it now.

The CHAIRMAN. We have had that question discussed a good deal and the committee would be glad to have your views on it, as to how it has affected your corps. I was wondering if your suggestion was not in violation of the principle which provides that the General Staff should not do any operating or administrative work.

Gen. SQUIER. You mean paragraph 5 of the national defense act?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Gen. SQUIER. That was a peace arrangement. Of course, that is all off now.

The CHAIRMAN. I knew that it was all off under the Overman Act. What I mean is, your suggestion brings up the same question again.

Gen. SQUIER. Oh, I see.

The CHAIRMAN. If you were to make the heads of the services ex-officio members of the General Staff, you would put into the General Staff elements of administration.

Gen. SQUIER. Yes, but you would have liaison there. I am not wedded to this solution. I am just trying to get some solution that will enable the operating people, who are responsible at law for the success or failure, to have some say. The responsibility is always

left with the bureau chief, you know. If there is anything the matter with the Signal Corps they never think of anybody but the chief. You can not get away from that under the present system. The chief of the bureau must have authority in some way as well as responsibility. He needs advice and supervision and plenty of it, and coordination principally. There is no question about that. While I am not wedded to this solution, I think it is one. I think paragraph 5 in the national defense act is a good thing and ought to be preserved in some way in the future.

The CHAIRMAN. You have reference to the proviso which forbids the General Staff to have jurisdiction of the administrative department?

Gen. SQUIER. Yes, sir. The great tendency of people is always, when they get power, to take a little more, and it is quite easy to drift into administrative duties. That is quite a normal tendency, I think, of human beings.

The CHAIRMAN. Were there any other things in this memorandum to which you wanted to call attention?

Gen. SQUIER. Those are the main things.

The CHAIRMAN. I mean of a legislative character.

Gen. SQUIER. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. I want to ask your opinion of the provision on page 3 of this bill, which, if enacted into law, would result in all officers being recommissioned in the line and then detailed to the services, with the exception of the Medical Department.

Gen. SQUIER. I am not in favor of that.

The CHAIRMAN. For the same reasons that you have submitted for the necessity of a permanent personnel?

Gen. SQUIER. Yes. I think the Engineers, the Medical Corps, the Air Service, the Signal Corps, and other special services should be permanent services and have permanent officers. I hold a commission in the Signal Corps of the Army. I see no necessity for commissioning them all in those three any more than in some other three. You would have a hard time defending the policy that would stop at the Artillery and Cavalry. I think they should be recognized as special services and the officers commissioned as permanent officers in those services.

Senator FLETCHER. Do you approve section 13 in the bill?

Gen. SQUIER. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. The general has submitted a substitute for that.

Gen. SQUIER. Yes; I have made a study of that, and to save time I have put in a memorandum.

Senator FLETCHER. In speaking about the Signal Corps, you said one major general. Did you change that so as to have a chief of the Signal Corps?

Gen. SQUIER. Yes.

Senator FLETCHER. You specify that?

Gen. SQUIER. One major general, who shall be Chief Signal Officer of the Army. Otherwise you could have a colonel of Cavalry made the Chief Signal Officer at any time, and that would not do at all.

Nobody is qualified to be Chief Signal Officer who has not had many, many years of specializing in signal work. It is absolutely impossible in these modern days. It might have been possible years ago when the Signal Corps was a small affair, but when you are dealing with

apparatus like you are dealing with at present it is impossible. I can show you a catalogue here including appliances. There is not one man in a thousand, unless he is a specialist, can tell what the things are. It is hopeless, and it would not do at all to detail men from some other branch who would not know anything about it. The Chief Signal Officer himself ought to at least know enough about things that he does not have to depend on juniors all the time. It is impossible for him now to keep track of all the special things that are a part of the work, and the best he can do is to keep pretty close to it, so that his judgment will be good as to what the things are worth and what is best for the service. It is getting more and more difficult every day.

Senator FLETCHER. Have you expressed yourself as to the size of corps desirable?

Gen. SQUIER. Yes; practically 4 per cent, which of course means transferring troops that are now with regiments to our control. I have mentioned the fact that certain signal duties now are done by regimental personnel, which I think should be under one control and which would centralize the work of the department.

Let us take this situation. Suppose the Infantry had a telephone system in an area surrounding the Capitol; the Signal Corps a telephone system in an area between that of the Infantry and the War College; the Cavalry having a system which included the War College. Now, suppose you, while here at the Capitol, wanted to get somebody at the War College, you would have to pass through two or three agencies. Such a multiplicity of systems would cause endless confusion.

The reason why we have a good telephone service here in Washington is because it is a universal service, the same training of personnel all the way through from beginning to end. That, of course, is accentuated a great many times in war. It is a uniform, standard trained personnel clear down to the last man. So it is particularly true with the training of troops and officers—that the Signal Service should be a chain of responsibility right down to the end. Of course, where you are dealing with runners and things of that sort, or when a man becomes a messenger, it could be stopped there.

The CHAIRMAN. The duties of men like that do not involve the handling of any apparatus of any kind?

Gen. SQUIER. No; but in the main the work, the backbone of it, should be under one control right straight down through, with standards of construction for everything, because otherwise you get utter confusion. That is true of systems of communication in everyday life.

Senator FLETCHER. Is it necessary for you to have a system of training in effect all the while?

Gen. SQUIER. Yes; and it should be standardized right straight down the line.

Senator FLETCHER. Where is that training done now?

Gen. SQUIER. Our training is done at our special training station, and our special engineering training is being done now at Little Silver, a new station that we have. Of course the units with the division are trained with the division.

Senator FLETCHER. You have to keep up your training in order to have the proper efficiency?

Gen. SQUIER. Yes. We are responsible for it. We have to keep training all the time. In a nut shell the Signal Service has become so technical that if I should lay at that end of the table the apparatus we started the war with and then at this end of the table the apparatus we ended the war with, it would make an interesting exhibition, in that few articles of our present equipment are similar to those used when war was declared and these articles have multiplied many times in number. We have evolved enormously and it has gotten more and more technical. Very little if anything is left of what we did have.

Senator SUTHERLAND. And you keep that process right up now, in peace times?

Gen. SQUIER. Yes; we have to. We do not dare stop it. The things we are doing now are unbelievable almost in radio work. If you gentlemen have time, you should go over to the House Office Building and there you can hear Germany or France over a little coil right there in a room, or you can hear practically any place in this country.

Senator FLETCHER. Is that the Rogers system?

Gen. SQUIER. No; it is not. The Rogers system is for underwater operation.

Senator FLETCHER. It is through the earth, too, both land and water.

Gen. SQUIER. What we have in the House Office Building is nothing but a little coil of wire which you can examine and look at. There is also a very fine exhibition of photograph enlargements. I think you received an invitation to come and see that. It is well worth seeing. They are real photographs taken abroad, which have since been enlarged.

The intense interlocking of all different communication systems has reached such a stage now that there is no hope of doing anything with it unless you make a prolonged study of it.

The CHAIRMAN. Does your corps still have the duty of taking and preserving the photographs?

Gen. SQUIER. Yes, we have charge of that.

The CHAIRMAN. And the historical records, etc.?

Gen. SQUIER. Yes, under the General Staff. We are merely the servants of the General Staff. They tell us what to do and we do it. We sell now to the public, manufacture and sell, under the rules prescribed by the General Staff.

The CHAIRMAN. Are you selling photographs now?

Gen. SQUIER. A very large number of them every day. We have catalogs from which you could order, just like Woodward & Lothrop have catalogs. People come in there and order what they want and buy them at 15 cents apiece. I think it is one of the best things we could do; it is a great psychological proposition.

Senator FLETCHER. Where do you keep your stock?

Gen. SQUIER. Down at the office of the Chief Signal Officer, at Eighteenth Street and Virginia Avenue.

I think it is a splendid thing to get these photographs out to the people at cost price. I think it is a very good thing in view of unsettled conditions, and I believe thoroughly in getting them out before the people. I think it is being handled satisfactorily to the General Staff and to all concerned.

The CHAIRMAN. You are not selling films, are you?

Gen. SQUIER. No. We make two films of everything; we file one with the General Staff and keep the other in my office. Most of the things now are filmed by private people, and wherever they will do that we do not enter into competition with them at all.

The CHAIRMAN. There are two bills pending before this committee authorizing the sale of selected photographs—

Gen. SQUIER. I hope that bill will pass, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. And the other bill authorizing the sale of films.

Gen. SQUIER. Yes. The reason for that is at the present time we have not capital enough, as you can see, to finance anything to any extent. All the money we take in goes back into the Treasury, and we would soon run out of money, would we not? The bill merely allows us to take the money that we get for the pictures and put it back into the same thing, allows us to spend it for more pictures. That is all the bill means. Under the present law, without such a bill, whenever you sell anything, any Government property, the money goes into the Treasury. When we put in our estimate for this the General Staff cut it very seriously and crippled us. As I remember it, we asked for seven or eight hundred thousand dollars and they cut it to three or four hundred thousand, presumably on some theory of the strength of the Army, the number of men or something of that kind. You can see, gentlemen, that it has nothing whatever to do with the strength of the Army at all.

The war is over, we have the photographs, and now is the time to get them out into the hands of the people in the next year or two. It has nothing to do with the size of the Army at all. Presumably it was reduced on some system of the War Department, some sliding scale system. We haven't got the funds which in my judgment we ought to have. It is a special case of getting these photographs of the great war out to the people. As a psychological thing, I think it is fine thing and ought to be done.

The CHAIRMAN. In mentioning the General Staff a moment ago you said that they had interfered almost every day in the administration or operation of the office of the Chief Signal Officer.

Gen. SQUIER. I do not know that I said "interfered." Perhaps that implies the wrong thing. I think there is inefficiency caused.

The CHAIRMAN. In what way, General?

Gen. SQUIER. Well, in reaching over and doing administrative things in connection with my corps, making decisions without full knowledge of the circumstances, which knowledge we alone have on file in our office.

The CHAIRMAN. Such as?

Gen. SQUIER. Well, I could give examples, plenty of them. For instance, take one example close at hand. I am just giving this from memory. There were three small radio stations in Alaska that were built by commercial people in the placer mining district, the Iditarod district and two others. Local commercial people put in little radio stations along with the building up of the communities. They tried to run those radio stations as commercial enterprises to be linked up with the Government stations, no telegraph lines being available. Of course, they failed, because they had to pay an operator, a civilian, up in that country something like \$200 a month. It is a well known fact that no commercial people can operate these isolated stations, and that the Army is the only body that

can operate them at this moment. When that fact was discovered by them these people proposed to sell these three stations to the Army. We had already been furloughing men for a year to run the stations for them, to keep them from being shut down.

When the matter was submitted to the Chief Signal Officer he recommended to the General Staff that the purchase be made, and it was disapproved on the ground, as I recall it, that there was no military necessity for it. Of course that stopped the thing. Those people could not get anybody to go there, and it meant that the stations would be shut down and those communities would be entirely isolated during the winter; they would have no communication with the outside world. If they should happen to have an attack of influenza there the whole community might be wiped out and nobody would know it. Then there might be a case for justice, a murder might be committed, or something of that sort, and they could not do anything about it. In other words, those communities would be completely isolated.

Now, in my opinion, that decision was made in error. That argument might be applied to the whole Alaska telegraph, radio, and cable system, because there is no real military necessity for such a system in Alaska. It is nearly all commercial. We handle nearly all the commercial business in Alaska and have done so for years in addition to all official business. Congress understands it thoroughly and knows all about it. The decision was wrong, in my judgment. I think we should have bought those stations promptly.

Senator FLETCHER. Would they have cost much?

Gen. SQUIER. \$15,000 they could have gotten them for, and they cost \$37,000. We had the money to buy them. The system is run at a profit, anyway, to the Government. It is a very creditable performance.

Senator FLETCHER. Did you have the money available?

Gen. SQUIER. Yes; and full authority of law and everything else. I just mention that as a case where, if a study had been made by a man who understood the circumstances, that would not have happened.

Senator FLETCHER. In a case like that, could you not take the matter up again with the General Staff, furnish them with full information, and get them to change their position?

Gen. SQUIER. That is just what did happen. As soon as we began to shut them down, by the withdrawal of our operators who were furloughed to them, of course the Governor of Alaska began to telegraph, the banks began to telegraph to Mr. Baker. He was flooded with telegrams, and pretty soon he sent for me, the thing was gone over again, and it was found that the thing to do was the thing which it was originally recommended to do. I was directed to return it to the staff again with recommendation that they should reconsider and that the original thing suggested be done. What happened was that what was originally recommended to be done was done, but there was a great delay. I do not know that that illustrates my point, Mr. Chairman, but it seems to me it does. The Signal Corps is running the Alaska telegraph system and has been for years. We know the reasons for the rates, and any decisions about it had presumably best be made in our office, and an officer's decision made without knowledge of the full facts is very apt to be wrong. I am not making any real criticism, except of the system.

Senator FLETCHER. Your decision in that matter would be reviewed by the Secretary of War, would it not?

Gen. SQUIER. Yes.

Senator FLETCHER. It would go to him to be reviewed and then through the General Staff?

Gen. SQUIER. Yes. I just happen to recall that as indicating the tendency which has grown up in the past—you will remember that you had to pass a law about it once; that is the reason that I think something ought to be in the law in the future in regard to it.

The CHAIRMAN. Is your jurisdiction in regard to purchasing supplies of special character invaded from time to time by any branch of the General Staff?

Gen. SQUIER. Yes, sir. The question of purchase of supplies, finance, and storage was all taken over, taken out of the Chief Signal Officer's office practically by Purchase, Storage and Traffic before the armistice was signed, and it resulted in a very grave state of affairs so far as my corps is concerned, so much so that I made a special report about it, and it is improving now very rapidly. The system is working a good deal better than it did.

The CHAIRMAN. It still rests with Purchase, Storage and Traffic?

Gen. SQUIER. Yes; and we are all trying to get back into the region where we were before.

The CHAIRMAN. What supplies that you use are purchased by agencies other than the Signal Corps?

Gen. SQUIER. We purchase nearly everything.

The CHAIRMAN. Does Purchase, Storage and Traffic take over very much of your purchasing?

Gen. SQUIER. They did at the beginning, but we are gradually taking it back. They don't even know the names of lots of things, or anything else about them. If you will look at our catalogue once, you will see how perfectly hopeless it would be for anybody to try to buy those articles who is not a trained man. We are not only practically the only users of these specialties but they have to be made especially for us, and the inspection and storage and the following of it right straight through, the manufacturing, and so forth, is a highly technical matter that we have to watch every moment and it must be in the hands of trained men. This apparatus we buy is not standardized; it changes very rapidly and is so technical that you can not do anything with it without a technical knowledge of it. You can not buy it cheaply. With respect to our purchases, the men who know what the things are made of and how long it takes to make them, and so forth, buy them. If they do not know that, manufacturers can camouflage any sort of price on you. I have had it happen to me lots of times. For instance, we might need some crystals, let us say, that are offered to us at \$50 apiece. We might want a large number of them which would run up into a large amount of money. The experienced man knows perfectly well that that crystal is nothing but a piece of carborundum or something, and he knows how long it takes to make it, and the trained engineer, knowing what is in it, would simply say "Well, we will just make those," while, on the other hand, a man who is just buying them in the abstract, you see, could be sold anything at any price that manufacturers wanted to charge. You have got to know those things to be able to buy them cheaply in the first place

If you do not know that you are getting into all kinds of expense. You are in the hands of the man who sells it to you; that is all. Anything that has been standardized at all, that has reached the stage where it can be bought by anyone we do not want anything to do with at all. We want the Purchase, Storage and Traffic to take it off our hands. Anything that can be delivered to us cheaply and as we want it we would like to have bought by other people.

The CHAIRMAN. Would you like the Purchase, Storage and Traffic to do it?

Gen. SQUIER. I do not mean that necessarily; I mean any other agency.

The CHAIRMAN. You mean some general supply agency?

Gen. SQUIER. Yes, sir. For instance, motor cars. We would not want to buy our motor cars, our passenger cars. There are certain special bodies that we have to buy, because we have to mount on those bodies certain things.

Senator SUTHERLAND. You could furnish specifications for those?

Gen. SQUIER. Yes.

Senator SUTHERLAND. If you furnished specifications for those special bodies then some other agency could purchase them?

Gen. SQUIER. Yes. Anything that could be purchased in that way we would be glad to have purchased by some one else and save us the trouble. We want just the smallest possible corps which is efficient to do the work.

Senator FLETCHER. I understood Gen. Goethals to state that he was in favor of that, and that it had been the policy of the Purchase, Storage and Traffic to only buy standard things and that they did not mean to buy everything for the different corps.

Gen. SQUIER. That was not what happened in practice. They took over the purchase of submarine cable, for instance, and there are not a dozen people in the country that can test and inspect accurately a submarine cable; and all sorts of things that they could not handle at all. If you go over into this other room in the House Office Building to see that radio set you would see a little tube, a perfectly innocent-looking little tube, which might look like a lamp to you. That tube is worth a large amount of money. The care of it is a very difficult thing. There are only a few dozen people in the whole world that know the theory of that tube. Now, we want to take that tube and take care of it. Just now, under Purchase, Storage and Traffic, it might be stored away with lamps somewhere. Storage batteries have to be especially treated. You can ruin one, as you know, in an automobile, in a few minutes by short-circuiting it. Nearly all of our equipment is that sort of equipment.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, as to storage, what observations have you to make on that point?

Gen. SQUIER. Well, storage, so far as we are concerned, at the moment, although it has improved, has reached the point where we do not know how much we have nor where it is. You can see the fix the Chief Signal Officer is in. He can not get an inventory, or find out where the property is. It has improved, as I say, very much now. We are all working hard to improve it.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you control your storage now in any degree?

Gen. SQUIER. No, sir.

Senator SUTHERLAND. Have you a great deal of surplus material?

Gen. SQUIER. Quite a lot of it has come back from France, but I do not know where it is. Things like wireless stations, for instance, I do not know where they are located. We want just the reverse of commodity storage. We want unit storage. When we want a radio station suddenly to sent it out, we want to have it all in readiness, every item that goes into it, the engine, the tube, and everything else. Under the commodity system the engine is here in one town, the tube is over in some other place, and the rope is somewhere else, and so on. So you see the commodity storage won't do at all, with special articles of the sort that we have to handle. It will do all right for shovels and wheelbarrows and definite standard things like that, axes and things, all right.

Senator SUTHERLAND. I was wondering what you would do with the surplus material. You can not sell it very well. Do you expect to keep a large reserve of this material that has come back from France?

Gen. SQUIER. Of course, in the months immediately following the armistice, we stored everything over there with great care; we have sold what we could profitably sell, and we have repaired what we could profitably repair over there during these months of inactivity. We had an immense plant there. We took out what we would use here in training and use in issuing to the troops. That was done with the greatest care, and only that stuff is being brought home, considering the cost of transportation. We have done, I think, a very creditable job on the whole performance, and I feel rather proud of the way that has been handled. Most everything that we had in France was just the sort of thing that France and England needed. We sold our telephone system at 85 cents on the dollar standing, and that is about a record. Of course, it was a better telephone system than they ever had in peace times. I don't mind saying that no such telephone system, even in the United States, was ever put up before in such an efficient manner. The result was they took it right off our hands at 85 cents on the dollar. It was something they needed, and needed badly, and in addition to that we loaned them people to teach them how to use it.

The same is true with the cable across the English channel. We laid our own cable, and when the war was over we sold it to Great Britain and France for all we paid for it, plus transportation, and we got the use of it all during the war besides. We happened to have things that were ahead of Europe even in peace times, so we got out of it pretty well, from a commercial standpoint.

The CHAIRMAN. That is particularly so of our telephone and telegraph installations, is it not?

Gen. SQUIER. Yes, sir. We gave them the best engineering that there was, that the state of the art could produce; we cut away from from their lines largely and put up our own poles, lines, and everything else.

The CHAIRMAN. What would be the result of the establishment of a special department, charged with the purchase and storage of all articles used which were common to two or more branches of the Army?

Gen. SQUIER. That would suit me—you say two or more branches?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes; common to two or more branches.

Gen. SQUIER. I think that would be satisfactory.

Senator FLETCHER. Provided they were standard articles?

The CHAIRMAN. If they are common to two or more?

Gen. SQUIER. On that definition of standard——

The CHAIRMAN. No. For instance, medical supplies are standard, but they are not common to two or more branches of the service.

Gen. SQUIER. Col. Moore mentions the fact that we issue some apparatus that is used interchangeably between the Infantry, Cavalry, and Artillery, so that definition would have to be qualified to be acceptable.

Senator FLETCHER. And the Navy might be interested in some of that.

Gen. SQUIER. There are certain things that the Navy uses——

The CHAIRMAN. Yes; but I am speaking only of the Army. I do not refer to the Army and Navy combined. Gen. Goethals gave us a very interesting talk the other day. He goes further than the suggestion you have just made, because he used the word "standard," and he includes in that definition of standard supplies, such as medical supplies. We asked him what would be left for the Medical Corps to do, and he said to take care of the sick; that is, if the central supply depot bought all medical supplies.

Gen. SQUIER. Of course, I think that is absolutely wrong. Taking care of the sick is also getting the exact things necessary to take care of them with. He did not define correctly taking care of the sick.

The CHAIRMAN. In using the phrase "common to two or more," the central supply department could buy hospital blankets, because blankets are used through the service, although the blankets might be of different quality, also mattresses, and perhaps hospital beds.

Gen. SQUIER. I see no objection to going as far in that direction as you can. Horse blankets might be a little different, but still if there is a blanket expert that man can buy blankets for all of them. That is a splendid theory, but our situation is so different——

The CHAIRMAN. Your supplies are not common to two or more?

Gen. SQUIER. No.

The CHAIRMAN. Very little of it?

Gen. SQUIER. I might say that the percentage is so small that it is almost negligible. The stuff is issued to two or more, but we have to get it and are responsible for supplying it to the Army. If you will look through that catalogue I gave you, you will see only a very few things that could be regarded as standard articles.

The CHAIRMAN. What supplies do you issue to other branches of the service?

Gen. SQUIER. Why, the whole list of anything needed for communication, no matter in what form. The whole table of supplies—we have special kinds of radios that go with the tanks, for instance, another kind that go with the infantry, another with the cavalry, another kind with the aeroplanes, and another kind for the range finders.

The CHAIRMAN. Are they operated at the present time by your service or by their own personnel?

Gen. SQUIER. By the Signal Corps, largely.

The CHAIRMAN. Then they are really issued to you?

Gen. SQUIER. With the exceptions I have stated before, and especially with the exception of the Air Service—they always like to keep a certain personnel, but I think that is wrong in principle.

I think we ought to go right there and do it; not only furnish it, but operate it.

The CHAIRMAN. Nearly everything issued is operated by your men?

Gen. SQUIER. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. So that the phrase "common to two or more" would not invade your legitimate jurisdiction very deeply?

Gen. SQUIER. There are certain universal equipments, like disks, and flags, etc., that the soldiers have, but they are not the difficult things. The difficult part of our equipment we do operate and have to operate because the men have to be highly trained to it. We are largely like the Medical Corps. We buy supplies; we not only have to order them, but we have to follow them every day and have to send a man right down into the factories to inspect them during their manufacture.

The CHAIRMAN. How do you look upon the suggestion that there shall be a finance department which shall act as the disbursing officer, paymaster for the whole War Department, but shall have nothing to do with making contracts or drawing specifications; that it shall merely be the paymaster, paying the bills?

Gen. SQUIER. Well, of course, I would have to say just what I did in regard to the storage. The present arrangement of finance is entirely unsatisfactory to us; that is certain.

The CHAIRMAN. In what respect?

Gen. SQUIER. We have to keep the records of our finances any way. I can not act intelligently as Chief Signal Officer without knowing my state of finances. When a requisition is in, I must know what the allotment is, the balance, etc., in order to come to any decision at all.

Senator SUTHERLAND. Could not you get that from the finance officer?

Gen. SQUIER. I can send over for a copy of it and get a few sheets of it. I do that almost every day. No matter what the financial condition is, I have to have it right before me in order to act intelligently.

Senator SUTHERLAND. Gen. Lord, in his testimony, testified that he supplied the information twice a month in the form of a statement.

Gen. SQUIER. Yes.

Senator SUTHERLAND. And he said he would be perfectly willing to do it oftener than that if it was required.

Gen. SQUIER. But that means extra clerks and overlapping in the two offices. I must have statements of the finance condition on my desk all the time, if I am going to be responsible for it. Probably a certain amount of it could be done, and I am willing that you should go just as far as you can with it. As I said before, I think we ought to consolidate, as far as we can consistently, but we ought to stop very drastically where the end ought to be and not do anything that requires the services of a double set of people. I have kept a finance department just as I did before.

Senator SUTHERLAND. Do you have as many in your finance department?

Gen. SQUIER. Almost, but not quite; and it is very unsatisfactory.

The CHAIRMAN. Judging from Gen. Lord's testimony, which was exceedingly interesting, I gather the impression that it would be quite unnecessary for the bureaus to maintain a finance department.

Gen. SQUIER. For instance, you may get a requisition; somebody wants \$10 000 somewhere. Well, now, you may have to save it from certain savings made in allotments, or some other item. For instance, you might have a saving in one office and transfer it to some other place, and unless you know something about the state of the finances, you can not act at all. It is just like running any other business. You can not recommend the thing to do unless you have your financial sheet.

Senator SUTHERLAND. Does not the finance department furnish you with a weekly report?

Gen. SQUIER. No, I think it is every two weeks; but I can not wait two weeks to act, can I? I ought to have it every hour of the day so that the work can move right on.

There is no doubt but what Gen. Lord handles that as well as anybody could; but I only wanted to call attention to the fact that we keep our financial affairs also.

We are responsible at the present time. I have to get up the estimates, and I have to know exactly the shortages in every section of the country. I do not know how I could act intelligently without having it right on the desk before me.

The CHAIRMAN. I do not understand that the finance department gets up estimates, or that it makes any attempt to keep track of the property.

Gen. SQUIER. No, I did not say that they did that. I have to do that.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes. You have to do that, I understood; merely the finance department made all payments to contractors to the Army, paid the soldiers, paid the officers, paid the contractors, paid the railroads.

Gen. SQUIER. Actual payment is such a small affair; the signing of the checks is small compared to getting the contract made and seeing it through.

Senator SUTHERLAND. You keep a pretty elaborate system of book-keeping.

The CHAIRMAN. But it is fair to say that in making the financial arrangements on behalf of the War Department to meet expenditures aggregating \$15,000,000,000 there is a good deal of argument in their having a central finance bureau?

Gen. SQUIER. Certainly.

The CHAIRMAN. They have to make arrangements with banks and the Treasury Department to handle these large sums?

Gen. SQUIER. I do not for a moment want control over all these things, only to devise some way not to take too much of it away; and the tendency always is to take more and more away. Everybody tries to do the best he can, as far as I can see. I go so far in my department as to tell my officers, "Now, do your own duty and everybody else's duty that is necessary to get this to go." We just go over there personally and help out in any way to get it done, because that is the loyal way to do, of course, and we have been complimented once or twice officially in our corps on account of the way we have tried to work with P. S. & T. We have sent the best people we could find, and we have received letters of commendation on that. So we are very clear about not having any preconceived notions about one system over another at all.

We will make any system work some way, only I am pointing out now in the abstract weaknesses that I think have been developed.

The CHAIRMAN. Have you any other observations you want to make?

Gen. SQUIER. I do not know that I have, particularly.

The CHAIRMAN. We wanted to ask you first, of course, about the personnel.

Gen. SQUIER. I think I have stated that.

The CHAIRMAN. And its status in the service.

Gen. SQUIER. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Whether it should be by detail or otherwise, or whether they should be line troops or otherwise, and then we wanted to ask you about the supply problem, which we have just done.

Senator NEW. I would like to ask you in a general way if you have read this bill on aeronautics?

Gen. SQUIER. Yes, sir.

Senator NEW. What disposition should be made of the Air Service?

Gen. SQUIER. I am strongly of the belief that a "combined air service," under a single agency, is highly desirable. I have read the New bill. There are some features of it that I would change, but, in general, I believe in it.

Senator NEW. Please state frankly what they are. What we want is to get your views and the views of other officers on this thing, and I have advanced this, not as the last word, by any means, but as an idea of what ought to be done for the benefit of the service.

Gen. SQUIER. You noticed I did not use the word "separate" air service, because I have found that every time I have said "separate" air service someone finds some objections about the Army people or the Navy people, so I used the words "combined air service" rather than "separate" air service. I think we are apt to look at this thing possibly from the bottom up, instead of from the top down, from the fact that the principal part of aviation development has been brought about by war. If we had not had any war this whole matter might be over under the Committee on Commerce instead of the Committee on Military Affairs, and I think that leads us perhaps to a sort of local thinking about it, rather than in a broader way.

In my own view I can not but believe, in fact I do believe, that the potentialities of the air in its many aspects is easily the leading constructive possibility of the industrial and mechanical world to-day, bar none. I know of no agency that offers anything like the chances that this does, and I have no doubt that in the organization of the committees of this body, the Senate, five years from to-day the aeronautical committee will be very likely considering that subject, and that committee may be as large as this military committee is at present.

The treatment of the matter now has a natural tendency always in the direction of war, because we have just been in a war, but I believe it to be the start of the greatest system of transportation that has ever been known, and I believe it will be linked up with all the older methods, just as each new agency becomes linked.

Senator NEW. You speak of it as the greatest method of transportation. Does that necessarily imply the greatest method of carrying on a good many other things besides a mere system of transportation?

Gen. SQUIER. Yes, sir.

Senator NEW. Transportation means.

Gen. SQUIER. It is only one of the things. I mention it because it stands out. It comes to one's mind first, and many, many other things will affect us profoundly. In fact, when you get into that view you are led necessarily into speculation, and I prefer to look at the air as a "new ocean." Of course, it is much larger than any other ocean we have ever known, as it extends over the entire earth, without regard to land or sea, and the commercial side of it—and when I say commercial I mean all that it implies in distinction from war—will very largely increase and soon obtain a magnitude far greater than mere use in war, either on land or sea.

Senator NEW. General, do you not believe that the military possibilities depend to a very great degree upon the condition, commercially, of the aircraft industry in this country?

Gen. SQUIER. Yes. I will say now that what we have got to do is for the Government itself to encourage industrial development of aircraft. There will be a time, no doubt, when it will take care of itself, its development commercially will come in time, anyway, on account of its intrinsic value, but we can hasten it and must hasten it, and should hasten it during this very critical period immediately ahead, by the Government getting behind it as a national policy. I think there should be a distinct national policy of aeronautics in all directions, as it is in any of our other universal policies, such as irrigation or forestry or conservation, and it should not be treated continually as a military or naval subject.

Senator NEW. You had some experience with aeronautics at the beginning of the last war. Is it not true that your chief difficulty was found in the fact that you did not have an aircraft industry in this country upon which to rely for the production and development of the things you had to have?

Gen. SQUIER. Yes, sir. There was absolutely nothing in this country, as you know, neither men nor factories. That was the principal trouble—unpreparedness.

Senator NEW. Now, is it not true that since the armistice was signed the aircraft industry has been allowed to lapse into comparatively the condition it was at the breaking out of this last war?

Gen. SQUIER. I do not know the details, of course, because it is not in my charge, but I understand that there has been—that the manufacturers have largely given up the making of aircraft, because it is not a profitable business to stay in.

Senator NEW. It has been developed here——

Gen. SQUIER. I do not know to what extent, because I am not in charge of it——

Senator NEW. It has been developed here in the course of hearing that during the month of July, for instance, there were 2,000 airplanes produced in England and 14 produced in the United States. That means airplanes of all types.

Gen. SQUIER. What we have got to do, in my judgment, in the next few years, is to get behind aviation and really subsidize the industry—although I know we hate to use the word "subsidy," but it amounts to that—to keep these manufacturers alive, giving them orders enough and paying them such prices as will keep them going until and the time when the other uses of it can be evolved sufficiently for it to stand alone.

Senator NEW. To assist them over the hiatus here between military demand and commercial demand?

Gen. SQUIER. Yes; there is no doubt of it at all.

Senator NEW. So as to justify them in keeping up their existence?

Gen. SQUIER. Yes, sir. The time will come, in my judgment, when they will not need any assistance; they will be so big that they will take care of themselves; but now is the time we have to do it, and if we do not do it we will be behind the other nations; the other nations will get ahead of us, and we must look the thing squarely in the face and get behind it as a national policy rather than as an Army or Navy policy. I consider the Army and the Navy as only one small part of it, and much the largest thing is the commercial end of it.

So that is why some central agency would have time to look after many things that the Army and Navy would not have time to look out for. For instance, in this "new ocean," as I call it, Indianapolis becomes an airport town, and you have to have a board of dock commissioners there, and the morning papers will announce the tonnage arrivals and that sort of thing. We have now a complete shift; in fact, an inland town now has advantages over a town on the seaboard, because there is land all around it. You prefer to have it a little ways inland, because you can lay out your docks all around. So the truth is we have been leading our lives really on the bottom of an ocean about 50 miles deep, crawling around on the bottom of it, and we have learned, like fish, to get up and move little distances in it, from point to point, and we will soon learn to go further and move freely in three dimensions. We are submerged in it, and that profoundly affects everything that we do, even our aspect toward many problems is going to be profoundly affected by this new enterprise. It is a very important thing that has happened, this moving about in three dimensions—easily the leading feature of present-day developments.

The period will be summarized in thousands of years from now as the time when mechanical flight came in. The feat of building the Panama Canal, for instance, as big as it is, will hardly be noted in comparison to the "Age in which man began to fly." For that reason the Nation itself has got to begin to think of it as a great, big national affair of vital interest to the future of this country and the world.

Now, the Army activities can not be curtailed at all. It should be encouraged, and we ought to help the Army instead of hurting it, and the reason I mention a combined air service instead of a separate air service is that we are apt to get involved in the discussion as to whether these particular officers that fly these machines shall be commissioned or not commissioned and under the command of the commanding general. It seems to me that is entirely beside the big question. The big question is so much above that that I feel sure we can find out some way to not retard the development of aviation in the Army, but to help it, and this proposed agency can easily do that.

For instance, take the Bureau of Standards. It has proven to be a perfectly splendid thing to try out all sorts of fundamental things in aviation. During the war the Signal Corps filled up the Bureau of Standards with scientific problems of aeronautics. It took an agency that already existed, the finest in the world. That Bureau of

Standards ought to be utilized to the limit with all these problems. Their work on this problem that we are confronted with applies immediately to the Army and Navy. You do not want an overhead doing the same sort of thing in an inferior way.

So the whole thing wants addition and multiplication rather than subtraction. We must have an agency with a commercial man, in my opinion, a man of the type of Cecil Rhodes or James J. Hill, at the head of it. Such men would be splendid heads of it if they were alive. As a matter of fact, such men would be big enough to see great regions of country that do not exist, so to speak, to us at this time.

Senator NEW. There is no man big enough for the job?

Gen. SQUIER. No, sir. Such a man is not going to hamper the Army at all; he is going to be a great help to it and to the Navy too. For instance, you take this other ocean, which is the nearest thing we have to the atmosphere. The kind of ships that Admiral Taylor designs are quite different from the big cargo ships that run across the ocean. The design of this class of ships helps the design of the other, and we do not find any trouble about it. The Navy will require special kinds of planes that maneuver about and have guns on them, and all sorts of things, but there are a large number of other kinds of planes that will not have guns and that will be built for different purposes, and the number of the second class compared to the number of the first class will be very, very large, very soon, in my judgment. But that time when it will be large depends on how we get behind and push. The time will soon come when this class of aircraft will take care of itself, I think.

Senator NEW. And if we are to undertake to keep plants going for the manufacture only of the types of planes that have guns, then that will be the only kind of plane that will be perpetuated, will it not?

Gen. SQUIER. Yes, sir. So I am for a combined air service, unequivocally.

Senator FLETCHER. I did not quite catch that last remark.

Gen. SQUIER. To summarize, I am for a combined air service.

Senator FLETCHER. A separate department?

Gen. SQUIER. Whether we should have immediately a secretary in the Cabinet for that branch or not is a moot question. I think ultimately he will undoubtedly be a Cabinet officer. In 10 years from now he will undoubtedly be, and there will be committees in the Congress on aeronautics which will be as big and able as this committee.

Senator FLETCHER. Do you think there will be an extended use of these planes in a commercial way in a few years?

Gen. SQUIER. There is no doubt whatever about it.

Senator FLETCHER. I think you are rather more optimistic than most of those who have testified before this committee.

Gen. SQUIER. I know I am optimistic, very optimistic.

Senator SUTHERLAND. You have had more to do with it than most of them.

Gen. SQUIER. I may be wrong, of course, but I have given you what I think about it.

Senator FLETCHER. It is not exactly a new proposition, this flying in the air. It dates back a good many hundred years, and it has been feasible all this time as a practical thing. The question is why has it not been developed more?

Gen. SQUIER. It has been developed faster than any new thing that has occurred in the history of the world. It is now far the fastest agency of transportation known to man. After hundreds of years of working on other lines, it has outstripped them all in a few years. We can take a man, for instance, from Washington to New York now quicker than he could be taken there any time before in all the ages that have preceded us.

Senator NEW. One reason it was not developed sooner was that there were a lot of yaps in Congress that would not encourage it.

Senator FLETCHER. They appropriated a few million dollars to it.

Senator NEW. A Congressman from my State a few years ago got up on the floor of the House and abused Prof. Langley, called him an old charlatan and a visionary, and denounced him, objected to the proposition for an appropriation for the development of aeronautics, and did so successfully, prevented any appropriation for carrying on his experiments, and that Congressman is still alive and Langley is dead, but that ex-Congressman is no longer in the House of Representatives.

Senator FLETCHER. And we hear of Langley and those who come after us will hear of Langley, but they will not hear of this Congressman?

Senator NEW. No; you will never hear of him again.

STATEMENT OF COL. C. A. SALTZMAN, SIGNAL CORPS.

The CHAIRMAN. Will you tell the committee about your assignments during the war?

Col. SALTZMAN. At the commencement of the war I was assistant to the Chief Signal Officer in the War Department and continued on that duty until about the 1s of June, 1918, when I was transferred to the Air Service. I served in the Air Service until the 12th of August and was transferred back to the Signal Corps.

Senator SUTHERLAND. What year was that?

Col. SALTZMAN. 1918—the 1st of June and the 12th of August, 1918. Since that time I have been on duty in the office of the Chief Signal Officer as his assistant.

The CHAIRMAN. General, have you any observations to make about this pending legislation?

Col. SALTZMAN. I have read with considerable care that portion pertaining to the Signal Corps. I notice in the proposed act a provision to detail, or rather a provision which would enable an officer of the line to be detailed as the Chief Signal Officer of the Army. I think that such a provision is inadvisable, unwise. I think the Signal Corps is a very technical branch of the service. I think the officer who holds the position of Chief Signal Officer must know that technical business, and that it would be unfortunate for the Army and unfortunate for a line officer who was so detailed as Chief Signal Officer of the Army, if he had not had the opportunity of spending years in studying up that profession.

I notice in this proposed legislation, also, a provision which would continue what we now term the "detail system" in the Signal Corps. Since 1901, a large proportion of the officers serving in the Signal Corps have been detailed from the Infantry, Cavalry, and Artillery.

As I stated before in my testimony, the work of the Signal Corps is highly technical work; it requires study and thought and research in technical matters. An officer from these line branches has been for years studying other things pertaining to his branch of the service, and he comes to us unprepared for our work. It is unfortunate for us and it is unfortunate for him.

Many of those officers do not like that duty; they do not want to be detailed to the Signal Corps. Their home and their interests and their life work is elsewhere, and to break off their own work and plunge into a lot of electrical study and research work necessary to enable them to perform their duties in the Signal Corps is not fair to them.

I wish to say that we have had some few officers detailed several times, and they proved to be very efficient, we place dependence on some of those officers; but in general the system has absolutely failed.

As an officer of the Signal Corps, I do not believe that the provisions of section 13, relative to the personnel of the Signal Corps, are adequate or proper. We have made a study of the needs of the Signal Corps in our office, by boards of officers who served on this side during the war, and officers who served in the A. E. F., and as the result of that study we are prepared to present different figures, different organizations from those in section 13 of the bill. I believe a copy of our study has been introduced into the record by the Chief Signal Officer when he testified. That is the organization and system recommended by him as the result of the observations of competent signal officers during the war, and I can recommend it.

Senator FLETCHER. Was the Signal Corps consulted when this bill was prepared?

Col. SALTZMAN. The Signal Corps was called on months ago to submit its recommendations for a proposed reorganization of the Signal Corps of the Army. Those recommendations were submitted, but were disapproved. I assume that this bill is the bill the General Staff had in view at that time, but I really do not know.

The CHAIRMAN. I believe it is. It was really prepared last January.

Senator SUTHERLAND. Are the suggestions now made by the Chief Signal Officer about the same as those recommended at that time to the General Staff?

Col. SALTZMAN. With very slight modification. We made a slight modification after consultation with the senior officers of the Signal Corps, that came back from France, but those modifications are very slight and only pertain to a man or two in different organizations.

The CHAIRMAN. The suggestion laid before us by the Chief Signal Officer, Gen. Squier, as to the personnel, was based, of course, upon an entirely different method of computation. It is all done by percentages. I thought at the time, and meant to have spoken to him about it, if we prescribed the size of the Signal Corps personnel on the basis of percentage we would have to do it for all the other branches of the service, and I am wondering whether you or Gen. Squier—you might see him when you return—would send us a computation of the necessary personnel in actual numbers, based on this bill.

Col. SALTZMAN. This data which he turned in to you is a recommendation for a certain number of officers for an overhead force

for duty, say, at department headquarters, at depots, at schools, for training, etc. Then, in addition to that, his recommendation is that for every division in the Army, there be a field signal battalion, and he prescribes the proposed strength of that battalion.

The CHAIRMAN. But you see we may never know how many divisions there will be, even when we finally legislate on the reorganization of the Army. I do not believe the bill will specifically provide that there shall be so many divisions.

Col. SALTZMAN. I will ask to have that done.

Senator FLETCHER. My understanding is that the bill contemplates 20 divisions.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes; but it is not in the bill. That is really for the War Department.

Senator FLETCHER. And one of cavalry.

Senator SUTHERLAND. It might also be well to ask for specifications on the personnel based on different sizes of the Army.

Senator FLETCHER. Based on an army of 250,000 men, and based on one of 300,000?

Col. SALTZMAN. Yes, sir.

Senator FLETCHER. How would it do to have it also based on your own judgment as to what should be required for peace? Just suppose, now, you were to figure out what kind of a Signal Corps you would want during peace times, under present conditions?

The CHAIRMAN. Well, he would have to make his calculations somewhat on the size of the whole army?

Senator FLETCHER. Yes; he could do that too, but that would give us——

Senator SUTHERLAND. That would give us what his idea is of what the size of the Army ought to be.

Senator FLETCHER. Yes, give us both.

The CHAIRMAN. As much as I admire the Signal Corps, the Army is not going to be built on the size of the Signal Corps.

Had you any other general observations about the Signal Corps or any portion of this bill?

Col. SALTZMAN. The Signal Corps before the war purchased and stored and issued its own equipment. This practically was continued up until a short time before the armistice was signed. Gen. Pershing has officially reported on the efficiency of the Signal Corps in France and I would like to state that the efficient work which the Signal Corps did in France was done on supplies and equipment which was purchased and stored by the Signal Corps, and not by the division of Purchase, Storage and Traffic. The Signal Corps, in the early part of the war consisted of two sections, the aviation section and one which we always referred to as the Signal Corps proper.

Now, so far as supplies and equipment of all kinds for the Signal Corps proper, for its work in France, were concerned, its supply system did not fall down. We turned over about 60 per cent of our functions as a purchasing agency and all our storage functions, to Purchase, Storage and Traffic about the last of October, 1918, and we received a letter from the Director of Purchase and Storage as to the efficiency of the Signal Corps in performing those functions. Since that time the efficiency of the Signal Corps has been lowered by the fact that these purchasing and storage functions have not

been carried on as efficiently as they were before. Our equipment and supplies are very largely of a technical nature. We have found in 20 years' experience that there must be a line of contact between the troops in the field that use this equipment up from the purchasing department to the inspectors who are in the factories while that material is being made. We have found in purchasing radio equipment, switchboards, and other technical apparatus, that there are always changes to be made, and we have always welcomed those changes. As soon as you stop permitting those to be made, you stifle development and improvement. Under the present system, I think Purchase, Storage and Traffic is trying to make purchase a mechanical operation, and, so far as applies to the technical equipment used in the Signal Corps, it is not a successful system.

As far as storage is concerned, we know practically nothing to-day as to where our equipment is located. We know that considerable quantities of Signal Corps equipment have been returned from France, but as to where it is and as to its condition we know very little.

The CHAIRMAN. Can you not find out?

Col. SALTZMAN. The records of our office will indicate that we have made many attempts to locate the material and have gotten information from Purchase, Storage and Traffic as to inventories in various storehouses, but we do not believe that those inventories are accurate. In fact, we have at times tried to do more than our duty and have been able to locate Signal Corps supplies for Purchase, Storage and Traffic.

Senator SUTHERLAND. Apparently, then, they do not know where these things are, where these supplies are?

Col. SALTZMAN. I doubt very much if their information is very accurate.

Senator NEW. Of what does that equipment consist? What has the Signal Corps in the way of equipment that would be lost in such quantities as that?

Col. SALTZMAN. Our equipment is of two classes, which might be called technical and nontechnical equipment. The technical equipment includes everything that is used by the Army in transmitting information. That includes various types of radio equipment, telephone apparatus, telegraph apparatus, cable apparatus, all the communication apparatus that is used by the Coast Artillery in its fire-control systems. We also handle all the pigeon equipment of the Army and do all of the photographic work for the General Staff.

Senator FLETCHER. Most of that telegraph and telephone and cable equipment apparatus you sold over there—you did not bring that back, did you?

Col. SALTZMAN. We sold a very large amount of the apparatus we had installed, on the lines which we had built in France, to the French Government, for 85 per cent of its cost. But in our storehouses in France we had considerable quantities of all kinds of apparatus used in the transmission of information, and we know that large quantities of that were sent back, because we made arrangements with our own people over there as to what types of equipment we wanted back for training purposes, for issue to the Army, and we made arrangements about the repair of certain types of apparatus and their return, but as to what has become of it we know very little.

Senator SUTHERLAND. Have you much equipment on this side now, including that which was brought back, that could be termed surplus?

Col. SALTZMAN. We do not know, because all that is in the hands of Purchase, Storage and Traffic.

The CHAIRMAN. Are you not asked by Purchase, Storage and Traffic, or the proper authority, to make an estimate or an inventory or a list of the stuff you want to keep as a reserve supply and that shall not be declared surplus?

Col. SALTZMAN. We have at times been called upon to furnish such data, yes; and we also have found them at different times starting to sell things that we did not want sold. An officer in my department to-day told me that while in New York he found that they were about to sell some multiplex telegraph equipment which we earnestly wanted to keep for instruction purposes. It could not be duplicated, because it would be difficult for us to get money to purchase that again.

The CHAIRMAN. Are you going to save it?

Col. SALTZMAN. I think we stopped the sale; yes.

Senator FLETCHER. Does Purchase, Storage and Traffic undertake to sell stuff on its own responsibility?

Col. SALTZMAN. I think some board or commission organized under their jurisdiction does that.

Senator SUTHERLAND. The Director of Sales?

The CHAIRMAN. He is directly under the Secretary of War. It is supposed to be the different bureaus that declare things surplus.

Col. SALTZMAN. Well, we have been called on at times to give certain data about that, but I am quite certain we have found an attempt to sell things that we did not recommend sold.

Senator SUTHERLAND. The system must be very incomplete if they would undertake to sell equipment for the branch of the service that you represent, for instance, without specific information as to whether you needed it or whether you did not need it.

Col. SALTZMAN. Yes, sir; that is correct.

Senator FLETCHER. It seems to me quite clear, too, that the Signal Corps itself ought to know exactly or approximately, anyhow, what it has on hand, what it needs, and what is in the nature of surplus that can be sold, and where it is. It seems to me that for you to be able to run your own establishment you ought to know what you have on hand and what is available.

Col. SALTZMAN. It is very difficult. Take, for instance, the Southern Department, along the Texas border. The Signal Corps to-day is operating a great many telephone, telegraph, and radio stations. The Commanding General of the Southern Department looks to the Signal Corps to operate those installations efficiently. He holds the Signal Corps responsible for that work. Now, when we want to get our supplies, we have to ask some zone officer down in that part of the country to issue us material and supplies. That zone officer has very little knowledge of this equipment, and we have had a very serious condition of affairs existing in getting necessary supplies promptly. I am sure that the records of our office show many instances of great delay and inability to get Signal Corps supplies and material that we are ourselves needing at our stations along the border, whereas we feel that there are large quantities of that

equipment and material in the United States, and it ought to be delivered promptly. Under our old system we found that we could efficiently supply the Army from four small depots, one in the East, one in the West, one in the North, and one in the South. We do not have a large amount of equipment, like the Quartermaster Corps, but, in general, our equipment is rather expensive. It requires technical care. When you have in your depots such equipment as radio sets and storage batteries and switchboards, you have got to have caring for them men that understand them, not only in order to take care of them, but also to assemble them properly when you get these requests for such equipment.

Now, when you turn that sort of equipment over to the depot officers who know nothing about that sort of thing—who do not know what a retardation coil is when they get a requisition for one—it makes it very difficult and slow to supply troops.

The CHAIRMAN. It seems a pity, Colonel, that a situation of this sort should exist, and it seems unreasonable to ask Congress to regulate the management of such a business like proposition as storage by law; it would seem that the Army within itself could operate its own storage system without having a situation such as you have just described exist at all. It must be a lack of team work or refusal of certain elements in the Army to consult other elements in the Army. I thought for several weeks that it was entirely possible for the problem of storage generally to be placed under the general supervision of some one department or branch of the service, because it was so intimately related to traffic. As you store goods, thus do you ship them, or as you unload goods thus do you store them, and the things kind of go together; and traffic and storage have always seemed to be closely related subjects. It seems to me that in the building and handling of these great storage depots the officer responsible could have evolved a system by which the Signal Corps stuff should be taken care of in the way required, and that a Signal Corps officer or an intelligent noncommissioned Signal Corps man could be placed in immediate charge of that material and assist and direct in its loading and unloading from time to time.

Senator SUTHERLAND. And keep account of it.

The CHAIRMAN. And keep account of it, so you would know what you had in storage and where it was and that it was in good shape, and when one of your officers sent to the storage department, or whatever it was, for the stuff he needed there it would be, and the storage department, of course, intimately association with traffic, would ship it on to you. Now, why must Congress proceed to cut all these knots for the Army?

Col. SALTZMAN. I would like to say, Mr. Chairman, that late in October, when this transfer was effected, we turned over the actual personnel that was operating our depots; we turned over the actual personnel that was purchasing our Signal Corps equipment to them.

Senator SUTHERLAND. October what year?

Col. SALTZMAN. October, 1918. 'This personnel worked efficiently for us.

The CHAIRMAN. That was your procurement crowd?

Col. SALTZMAN. Procurement and also storage. We turned over our depots complete, with the personnel that was operating those depots at the time they were turned over.

The CHAIRMAN. What has become of that personnel?

Col. SALTZMAN. I can not say definitely, but I have gained an idea from several individuals that were in that personnel we transferred that after this transfer was made they rather spread this personnel out throughout their big organization down there. That is, instead of keeping that personnel together as a Signal Corps unit, they took a man who had been buying wire for us, for instance, outpost wire, a special type of wire that we bought in enormous quantities during the war, and put him over in a wire section of P. S. and T. and he might be buying barb wire. I think that in the depots we turned over there were changes made, and other officers put in charge of the depots, but I can not say that authoritatively, because they got out of our charge, they were out of our control and we lost touch with them.

Senator FLETCHER. Does P. S. and T. use your depots?

Col. SALTZMAN. Oh, yes; we turned over everything we had—personnel, records, stock, and everything.

Senator FLETCHER. I know you turned it over, but the question is do they actually use them for storing your material?

Col. SALTZMAN. I think they do. They turned one depot back to us at Fort Wood, N. Y., in New York Harbor, because the situation as to certain types of radio equipment got so acute that they handed it back to us.

The CHAIRMAN. You mean things being burned?

Col. SALTZMAN. Well, they handed it back to us, to store radio equipment, to repair it and keep it in order.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you object to a centralized control of storage for the Army if it is properly conducted?

Col. SALTZMAN. No, sir; but in a large depot, such as a depot in the vicinity of New York, for example, if there is an officer of Purchase, Storage and Traffic there in charge of that big depot and he will allot a section of that depot for the storage of Signal Corps equipment and supplies and allow us to put our supplies and equipment in that space under our own personnel, we will be thoroughly pleased with that, provided he will allow the Chief Signal Officer of the Army to have control of that property. But if that property, so stored, has to be under the control of some outside agency, we do not recommend that system.

The CHAIRMAN. You mean the issue of that property in particular?

Col. SALTZMAN. The care of that property and the issue of it; yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. I can see your point there, and I do not see why that can not be worked out. The Army ought to be able to settle a problem of that sort.

Senator NEW. The point is a very, very good one, an excellent one.

Col. SALTZMAN. I can illustrate that by an example. Here is an officer serving at a post on the Texas border. He puts in a requisition to-day for a job lot of Signal Corps supplies, telephone equipment, etc. That goes under the system of to-day to a zone officer somewhere in Texas. He issues what he can of that requisition, under the present system, and as to the rest of it, makes what we call an "extract requisition," which goes by devious ways I

know not of until it finally gets to our office. It is simply an extract, enumerating certain things that the zone officer could not supply down there. Now, we do not know what the rest of the articles were on that requisition; we do not know what they are to be used for. We do not know what the necessity is for them. Therefore we are blindly forced to take steps to get those articles for that man. They may be unnecessary. It may be that they will not fit into the installation. If not in stock, it may be that something we do have on hand will do just as well; but we do not know any of these things because we have no information with this little extract requisition.

Now, if you will let the Chief Signal Officer control those supplies in those storehouses, we will have that whole requisition come to us. We will then know the work going on at that place, we will know what will fit into that work, and we will know what we have on hand. If he asks for an article not in stock and we have something else that will work just as well, we will send a satisfactory substitute to him and get it all to him promptly, which is not being done under the present system.

The CHAIRMAN. You heard the discussion that was held while Gen. Squier was on the stand as to the feasibility of having a central supply department purchasing things that were common to two or more services?

Col. SALTZMAN. Yes, sir. We have no objection to some central agency purchasing standard supplies that are common to two or more agencies, provided it will efficiently do that and get those things to the right place at the right time. The Signal Corps uses a certain amount of nontechnical equipment, but all that nontechnical equipment is installed with and in connection with technical equipment. I have in mind what happened at Marfa, Tex., where we did get a lot of technical supplies that were needed, but we could not get our nontechnical supplies, because it had to come under the present system from a number of different storehouses and depots. Our case is a little bit different from that of a big corps like that Quartermaster's Corps, which serves all the Army, because almost all the Signal Corps supplies are used simply by the Signal Corps.

I am not prepared to say that it is economical for one outside agency to even buy the few nails, shovels, boards, and other standard nontechnical supplies that the Signal Corps uses, because the Signal Corps use them in connection with other technical stuff, and we want all our supplies for an installation to get to the place at the right time and at the same time. If this is not done and a part comes now and another part comes later, from another part of the country, what you have gained in a little economy on first cost, you are losing on transportation charges and delay. In general I would say that we are perfectly agreeable to some central agency buying those things which are common to two or more services.

The CHAIRMAN. Have you any observations to make on promotion by selection?

Col. SALTZMAN. Mr. Chairman, I just spent yesterday and this morning with a board of officers, trying to decide and trying to pick out a certain number of temporary officers to be retained in the Signal Corps. The efforts of this board were to keep the best officers and let the poorest ones go. After that experience, I wish to say that I am not

in favor of promotion by selection. In that work yesterday and today we continually came to the names of officers that we did not know. We sent for the records, and we found the records meager. We found the records in many cases colorless, and we had great difficulty in selecting those officers. Certain officers we knew; certain officers had come under our observation, and it was easy to decide as to them; but in the case of that unknown officer, who is way down at El Paso, Tex., all we had about him was a sheet of paper. We found it a great, trying responsibility, and I believe that is the situation that will confront any board that sits to pick out officers for promotion.

The CHAIRMAN. Would you call this a board for selection, or a board for elimination?

Col. SALTZMAN. I would call it a board for selection. We really selected the men to keep.

Senator FLETCHER. You could have those men come before you if you had time to do that and wanted to?

Col. SALTZMAN. Yes, Senator; but we had to have these names reported before October 10. Now, if we had unlimited time and unlimited money, we could order these officers up here and look them over; but we can not do that in practice.

Senator SUTHERLAND. It would be expensive?

Col. SALTZMAN. It would be expensive; yes. When a board meets to promote officers by selection that same thing is coming up time and time again. Here is an officer that nobody on the board knows, and they have nothing but a brief record on a sheet of paper, and a good deal depends on who wrote that piece of paper. It is a serious proposition, on account of the effect it would have on morale.

Senator SUTHERLAND. It might affect a man in the Philippines, or Panama, or anywhere else?

Col. SALTZMAN. Yes. I believe this trying subject can be met by an elimination system which will operate and a graded retirement law.

Senator SUTHERLAND. Would you not have the same trouble about elimination?

Col. SALTZMAN. If a board is confronted with recommendations giving the names of 13 or 14 or 15 men recommended to be eliminated, it is a good deal easier to find the men that should be eliminated than it is to go over the service in general and find men to be promoted.

Senator FLETCHER. You do not stand for an absolute seniority rule?

Col. SALTZMAN. I do; yes.

Senator SUTHERLAND. With the process of elimination added to it?

Col. SALTZMAN. Yes; weeding out the unfit.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you happen to see Gen. Snow's suggestion for elimination?

Col. SALTZMAN. I do not believe I did.

The CHAIRMAN. Gen. Snow submitted a little draft covering that point in a legislative way. As I remember it, he suggests that when two officers senior to the officer in question, and those two officers being at the same time his commanding officers in the unit, recommend that the officer in question be eliminated, then those recommendations are forwarded to an elimination board, and only in that way can a board gain jurisdiction over the question; but the elimination must be recommended by two of a man's commanding officers.

Col. SALTZMAN. Yes, sir; and a system based on that plan will work, because, as I said before, when you set a board down to consider names which have been recommended for elimination, that

board can pick out the men to be eliminated easier than it can look at the whole United States Army and try to pick out men to be promoted.

Senator SUTHERLAND. And they would be the exception?

Col. SALTZMAN. Yes, sir.

Senator FLETCHER. What are your views about universal military training?

Col. SALTZMAN. I am very much impressed with the features of the bills that have been introduced for universal training. I believe that more money should be spent on universal training and perhaps less money on a large Regular Army.

Senator FLETCHER. Would you include vocational training?

Col. SALTZMAN. I would not.

The CHAIRMAN. For lack of time, I suppose.

Col. SALTZMAN. For lack of time.

Senator FLETCHER. What time would you suggest—three months or six months?

Col. SALTZMAN. I do not think that three months is long enough. Of course, I am a Signal officer. The soldier that I have most to do with are men who have to operate technical apparatus. We could do nothing with those men in three months. No, it is not correct to say we could do nothing, because we could do a great deal; but we could not do enough. I think that this universal training idea is a matter of great importance, not only to the Army, but to the young men of the country themselves, provided that system is put in force by men who act tactfully and do not antagonize the men to be trained, and I believe that six months of a young man's life spent in this training, say, beginning the 1st of April of the year, would be a great thing for that young man.

Senator FLETCHER. As the young men are called into training, would you give them the right to say what branch of the service they would enter?

Col. SALTZMAN. I would; yes, sir.

Senator SUTHERLAND. What do you think about vocational training in the Regular Army as a means of attracting enlistment?

Col. SALTZMAN. There is probably no corps in the Army that has greater opportunity to do that than the Signal Corps, because we are a vocational training institution. For the last 20 years we have been taking young men into the Signal Corps and keeping them one enlistment and turning them out as telegraph operators, radio operators, cable men, photographers; we have given them a trade. But when I said I was not in favor of that vocational training, I am rather opposed to holding that out as an inducement for a man to come and get this military training.

The CHAIRMAN. You do not think we ought to promise too much in that respect?

Col. SALTZMAN. I do not think we should promise too much, and I am against holding out too great inducements for a man to come and be patriotic.

The CHAIRMAN. You are referring now to the universal training side of it?

Col. SALTZMAN. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Not to the Regular Army side?

Col. SALTZMAN. No.

The CHAIRMAN. The Senator was asking you what you thought about the vocational training scheme for the regular Army, which is now a part of the law.

Senator SUTHERLAND. And which is being advertised over the country extensively as a means of getting enlistments?

Col. SALTZMAN. As I said, we are a vocational training institution in the Signal Corps. We take young men from home and we turn them out as telegraph operators and radio operators; we give them a trade.

The CHAIRMAN. How are enlistments in the Signal Corps proceeding?

Col. SALTZMAN. Not very well. We are authorized in the Signal Corps to have 3,214 men, and to-day we have enlisted a little over a thousand, I think.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you recruit separately from the other branches?

Col. SALTZMAN. No, sir; although we have been making a special effort, with the permission and authority of the general recruiting service.

The CHAIRMAN. How is it that you are having difficulty in getting recruits when the Signal Corps offers these special advantages?

Col. SALTZMAN. I do not know, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Your noncommissioned officers get the highest pay of any noncommissioned officers in the Army, do they not?

Col. SALTZMAN. Yes, sir. Our master electrician is the highest paid noncommissioned grade in the Army.

Senator NEW. Col. Saltzman, what have you to say with reference to the matter of finance, as applied to the Signal Corps?

Col. SALTZMAN. The present system of having a Director of Finance managing the general financial affairs of the various departments is very unsatisfactory and involves a duplication of personnel. All rules concerning disbursements are matters of law or regulation by the Treasury Department, and all bureaus of the War Department must obey those laws and regulations. If there is any special uniformity desired in the matter of disbursings or contracts in the War Department, a few leaflets by the Purchase, Storage and Traffic, or the General Staff, would produce that uniformity. But to have another central agency to manage these finances for the various bureaus is to do something seemingly unnecessary and is requiring a duplication of personnel.

In our office we have found that this financial statement which comes every two weeks from the Director of Finance is but a very meager bit of information about our money. The Chief Signal Officer must know daily about allotments and about the state of those allotments. Otherwise he can not authorize additional expenditures.

If the Director of Finance had his office near our office, we could run over every few hours and look at his books, but he is in a different building, and therefore we have to keep records in our office to give us this information. I suppose other personnel are keeping those same records in Gen. Lord's office. Suppose we purchase something in our office. We have to make out the vouchers and follow those vouchers up to the point where the disbursement is made. In other words, we make a check of those vouchers. We send them over to the Director of Finance and he makes a similar check of those same

vouchers. I can not see under the present regulations—regulations of the Treasury Department—where much is to be gained by a separate disbursing office.

The CHAIRMAN. Gen. Lord gave us some interesting testimony on that. For example, he states that under the old system in New York City, there would be five disbursing officers, representing five purchasing bureaus, and a man who had money coming to him from the Government would have to hunt up one of the five, but to-day he can go to one zone finance disbursing officer and get his pay right away.

Col. SALTZMAN. But I feel certain that in each one of those five bureaus in New York, that since they have transferred their finances to Gen. Lord, they have built up a new section in their own offices to keep track of their own finances. We turned over to the Director of Finance all our books, all our personnel, and all our records, and we have had to go and get another officer and some clerks and start new accounts to keep track of our finance. I have no doubt the same thing occurred in New York.

The CHAIRMAN. You have done that because you are required by law, practically, are you not?

Col. SALTZMAN. If we are to make estimates to you for the funds necessary for the Signal Corps for the next fiscal year, we have got to have an intimate knowledge of what we did with those funds the year before.

Senator SUTHERLAND. Can you not get that from the Director of Finance?

Col. SALTZMAN. I suppose we could from time to time, but we would have to have somebody to take that duty, go to the directors' records, make copies, and study them.

Senator SUTHERLAND. Gen. Lord stated yesterday that he furnished twice a month to the different bureaus a complete statement of the state of their finances.

Col. SALTZMAN. He does, but that statement contains a very meager amount of information, and it is not that kind of information I speak of. Suppose a certain post, Fort Sill, for example, should ask us to-morrow for \$1,800. Suppose it is getting along toward the end of the fiscal year, and we do not know whether we have \$1,800 to give or not, we must have records of our finances, and we must find out if we have the money available. It may be that this \$1,800 was needed for a very laudable purpose, and we want to find \$1,800 for the purpose. We find that by going over some other allotments we can reduce them and in this manner give Fort Sill the \$1,800. We must have records of expenditures on these allotments to do that. If our money was unlimited, we would approve every request that comes to us, but in the Signal Corps, in peace times, for a great many years, we have been pinched for money, and we have to make our appropriation go as far as possible, and you can not do that unless you have the ample records of how our money is being expended.

Senator FLETCHER. But Gen. Lord's statement was that you could get that statement from his office about as promptly as you could get it from your own office.

Col. SALTZMAN. Yes; but it will be necessary for us to send over there and get into his office, and find the right clerk and to make a copy of the record, and then to come back to the office. It is not a

question of doing such a thing once a week or once a month, but of doing it three or four times a day, and it would be rather a delaying process, I think. I have the greatest possible admiration for Gen. Lord, he is a very able man, and I know of nobody who could manage that any abler than he, but I object to the system.

Senator NEW. Is that all that you wanted to say on that subject, Colonel?

Col. SALTZMAN. Yes, sir.

Senator NEW. If nobody has any questions they care to ask about the bill under consideration, I would like to ask you for your opinion of what is known as the New bill, No. 2693, on aeronautics.

Col. SALTZMAN. Well, Senator, I have read that bill very carefully. I think it is a very good bill. I think it shows a great deal of study. I believe in a separate Air Service. I believe that the Air Service is simply in its infancy, that there is to be a wonderful future development, and that that development is to involve the people, various branches of the Government, other than the War Department and the Navy Department. I believe that development is coming, and I believe that by the formation of a separate Air Service to manage aviation, that the development can be hastened. I am very much in favor of the separate Air Service.

The CHAIRMAN. You believe, then, that it would be practical, don't you, for such an aeronautical department, to assign to the Army and Navy the requisite personnel and equipment as they might want for the Army and Navy use?

Col. SALTZMAN. Yes; we in the Signal Corps organize and train different organizations. One is called the Field Signal Battalion, and we are called upon to furnish one of these battalions to each division of the Army. When we have trained a new battalion we turn it over to the division commander, we say good-bye to it, and it is then up to the commanding general of the division to use it as he sees fit. I see no reason why a separate Air Service should not organize the aeronautical units and turn them over to any other agency to use.

The CHAIRMAN. Certainly to give them the elemental training. Teaching them how to fly.

Col. SALTZMAN. I would like to say that I do not approve of all the little features in that bill. There are points in that bill that I do not believe in, but I do approve of the bill in general.

Senator NEW. We would be very glad now to have you point out the things you do not believe in.

Col. SALTZMAN. I believe there is too much rank in various parts of this bill. If I am not mistaken, there is a provision in this bill by which, for instance, the officers of the Army would be taken over into the new service with their present rank.

Senator NEW. That is correct.

Col. SALTZMAN. There is a great deal of inflated rank in the Army to-day, and in creating this new separate Air Service you would be creating a new and very important and powerful organization. We would then have an Army and a Navy and an Air Service. I think, in the interest of the Army and the Navy, and this institution in general, that there ought to be more or less of an equality about rank between officers; that is, an officer in the Air Service should, in general have about the same rank and pay as an officer in the Navy that has, had an equal length of service.

There are several similar points; they are all minor, but I heartily approve of the bill in general. All the points I object to are minor points, such as those I have mentioned.

I notice in your bill that the Director of the Air Service could not command a unit unless he is a flying officer.

Senator NEW. He must be a flying officer; yes.

Col. SALTZMAN. And, therefore, if some great man, like James J. Hill, should be wanted at the head of this great institution, you could not have him because he would not be a flying officer; likewise, your assistant director, you could not pick out the second biggest man in the United States because he is not a flyer. I think that is a weakness in the bill.

Senator NEW. I think that both of those are very fair criticisms.

The CHAIRMAN. Are there any more questions?

Senator NEW. No.

The CHAIRMAN. Colonel, we are very much obliged to you.

(Thereupon, at 5 o'clock p. m., the hearing was adjourned, subject to the call of the chairman.)

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Col. Gilmore 360
REORGANIZATION OF THE ARMY

HEARINGS

BEFORE THE

**SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE
COMMITTEE ON MILITARY AFFAIRS
UNITED STATES SENATE**

SIXTY-SIXTH CONGRESS.

FIRST SESSION

ON

S. 2691

**A BILL TO PROVIDE FOR UNIVERSAL MILITARY, NAVAL, AND
VOCATIONAL TRAINING AND FOR MOBILIZATION OF THE MAN-
HOOD OF THE NATION IN A NATIONAL EMERGENCY**

S. 2693

**A BILL TO CREATE A DEPARTMENT OF AERONAUTICS, DEFIN-
ING THE POWERS AND DUTIES OF THE DIRECTOR THEREOF,
PROVIDING FOR THE ORGANIZATION, DISPOSITION, AND AD-
MINISTRATION OF A UNITED STATES AIR FORCE, CREATING
THE UNITED STATES AIR RESERVE FORCE, AND PROVIDING
FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF CIVIL AND COMMERCIAL AVIATION**

S. 2715

**A BILL TO REORGANIZE AND INCREASE THE EFFICIENCY OF
THE UNITED STATES ARMY, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES**

PART 19

Printed for the use of the Committee on Military Affairs

WASHINGTON
GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
1919

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REORGANIZATION OF THE ARMY.

THURSDAY, OCTOBER 9, 1919.

UNITED STATES SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON MILITARY AFFAIRS,

Washington, D. C.

The subcommittee met at 2.15 o'clock p. m., pursuant to the call, in the committee room, Capitol, Senator James W. Wadsworth, jr., presiding.

Present: Senators Wadsworth (chairman), Sutherland, New, Fletcher, Thomas, and Chamberlain.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will be in order. We will now hear Col. Palmer.

STATEMENT OF COL. JOHN McA. PALMER, GENERAL STAFF.

The CHAIRMAN. Will you state to the committee your assignments during the war?

Col. PALMER. At the outbreak of the war I was a member of the War Plans Committee of the General Staff. Immediately before the war a special committee, consisting of three other officers and myself, prepared a plan of a national military policy, based on universal military training. This plan was not acted on, because the war came on just at that time, but it was transmitted to Congress by the Secretary of War without comment and was published in the Congressional Record some time in March, 1917. This plan, however, was very detailed, and furnished the basis for the actual plans for organizing the war Army—that is, the formation of the National Army, and the broad principles of policy underlying the selective draft.

After the publication of that plan, as a member of that same committee we prepared the initial plans for the war. When Marshal Joffre and Mr. Balfour came over I was detailed as the chairman of a committee to ascertain from the officers accompanying these gentlemen what changes would be necessary in our organization to enable us to operate in the European theater of war. These conferences were continued for some time, and we found from them that very material modifications would have to be made in our organization.

About the 1st of May, I was detailed as a member of a committee, consisting of two other General Staff officers and myself, to draw the plan of organization for the first expeditionary division to be dispatched to France. This organization, of course, was based on what we had ascertained from the foreign officers, particularly those accompanying Marshal Joffre. We prepared this plan and included

in the plan not only the details of the first expeditionary division to be sent, but also, in a broad way, the general plan from which the A. E. F. developed. Shortly after that I was selected by Gen. Pershing to go on his staff and was detailed as the first Chief of Operations of the A. E. F. I went to France with Gen. Pershing, and during the time that I was in the Operations Division, we completed the final tactical organization of the A. E. F. We also prepared the initial organization of the General Staff of the A. E. F., and under instructions from Gen. Pershing we made the reconnaissances that were necessary to determine what the general strategic field of operations of the A. E. F. should be. That was before the Training Division of the General Staff of the A. E. F. was formed as a separate division. The Operations Division prepared the general training plans for the A. E. F., including the general plan for the training of additional General Staff officers.

I went on sick leave for two months, beginning the 1st of September, and after my return to duty I was on duty with the school system for a time; at first under Gen. Bullard at Lyons, in connection with the training of Infantry officers, and later with Gen McAndrew at Langres, particularly in connection with the organization of the General Staff College of the A. E. F.

In February, 1918, I was sent down to Italy for a time as a member of a military mission there. I went on sick leave again in May, 1918, but returned to duty in France in October and was assigned to command the 58th Infantry Brigade in the 29th Division. This brigade was in the fighting north of Verdun, the Meuse-Argonne offensive, taking part in three attacks there.

After the armistice I remained with this brigade until December, when I was ordered for temporary duty at the General Headquarters. I returned to Washington in February and was assigned to the War Plans Branch of the General Staff. I am now chief of that branch.

Senator NEW. You are a graduate of the Military Academy?

Col. PALMER. Yes, sir.

Senator NEW. And have been in the Army all your adult life?

Col. PALMER. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Have you any general observations to make about the legislation that is pending before us?

Col. PALMER. I have studied the three principal plans of military policy now before Congress—the one contained in the War Department bill; the one contained, not in a bill but as outlined at the hearing of Gen. O’Ryan; and the one outlined in the Kahn-Chamberlain bill. These all aim at establishing what we have never had before, a military policy of the United States—and before commenting on any one of those three plans, Senator, I would like to mention one or two general considerations which, in my opinion, determine what the strength and form of any military establishment should be.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well.

Col. PALMER. The first question is what is the measure of the war strength. The next question is what should be the size of the peace establishment, and the next is what should be the form of institution in order to have a peace establishment that will develop the necessary war strength. I think this war has demonstrated, that so long as war is a possible contingency, there is no measure of ultimate war strength other than the total man power of a nation; and that the

military policy should be so constructed as to develop all or any necessary part of that man power in time to meet any given emergency.

There have been attempts in the past to compute a nation's war establishment from a consideration of other powers that might possibly be enemies; but this is fallacious in principle. The very first requirement of strategy is superior numbers, and the only way to be assured of approaching that as soon as possible is to be prepared to develop the total man power if necessary.

For example, the British worked up a very elaborate plan of placing six divisions on the left flank of the French army in the event of a war with Germany. Of course, it developed immediately after the war began, as Lord Roberts had pointed out, that the only real measure to meet that situation was the total man power of Great Britain. And her ability to carry out the proper measures when she finally saw them was seriously jeopardized by the fact that in sending the six divisions to France she lost a great part of the trained personnel necessary to develop the total man power.

I think that the same principle really develops from the history of all of our great wars. In the Civil War we ultimately had to go to the total man power through the draft. In the War of 1812 the avowed object of the war at that time was to capture Canada. It was a failure. I have no doubt that if the conception of developing the total man power had been appreciated at the time of the Revolution it would have terminated that war very much sooner. Of course, in the recent war we were actually developing our total man power at the time the hostilities ended.

Now, when we come to the measure of peace strength, the time factor comes in. Economy demands the minimum peace establishment through which the war establishment will develop in sufficient time. It depends a good deal upon the frontiers of a country—how close it is to its prospective enemies. Two nations having the same total man power might have very different peace establishments, depending upon the difference in time allowed for deployment in the two cases. I believe that complete preparedness implies capacity to develop all or any necessary part of the man power of the nation in time to meet any given emergency, and that this can be assured only through universal military training.

When we come to the question as to the form of military institutions, I think, sir, that that is very largely a political question and depends upon a consideration of the general system of national institutions. There are two types of armies through which the total man power may be developed. One is the professional or standing-army type. In this the man power is drawn into the army very largely in the lower grades. The function of the citizen is ordinarily to be a private in war. Reserve officers are to be used, but generally in the lower grades and in subordinate capacities. Under this system leadership in war and conduct of preparation in peace are concentrated very largely and necessarily in a professional class.

This is the system of continental Europe, the system that Germany had and Austria had and France to a very large extent. It produces a highly efficient military system, but it is open to certain serious political objections. In such a country intelligent opinion as to military policy is largely concentrated in a professional class. Under

such a system the people themselves are competent to exert only a limited intelligent influence on the issues of war and peace. As military leadership and control in war are largely concentrated in the personnel of the professional military establishment, that establishment must be relatively expensive and of relatively large dimensions in time of peace. Under such a system only the brawn of the people is prepared for war, there being no adequate provision for developing the latent military leadership and genius of the people as a whole. The evils under this system may be summarized under the term militarism. For militarism is a characteristic of a particular type of military institution, and is not necessarily inherent in all forms of preparedness.

The second type of a military institution is a citizen army, formed and organized in peace, with full opportunity for competent citizen soldiers to rise by successive steps to any rank for which they can definitely qualify, and with specific facilities for such qualification and advancement as an essential and predominating characteristic of the peace establishment.

An army of this type has, among others, the following advantages:

First. Military leadership is not exclusively concentrated in the professional soldier class. All citizen soldiers after their initial training, are encouraged to develop their capacity for leadership to such an extent as may be consistent with their abilities, their tastes and their civil obligations.

Second. As the war army in this system is identical with the organized citizen army in time of peace, and as the bulk of the officers and noncommissioned officers required for war are assigned in peace to their proper places in the citizen army, the peace establishment of professional personnel is logically reduced to a determinable minimum required by certain specific purposes.

Third. As the bulk of the leaders of the citizen army are included in the civil population as a whole, an intelligent and widespread public opinion is provided as the basis for the determination of all public questions relating to military affairs.

Again, as the war army is identical with the organized citizen army, all plans for national preparedness are simplified into dispositions for the employment of a specific force always organized, always at war strength, and always prepared to function under tested mobilization plans.

Again, as the war army is identical with the organized citizen army, all plans for equipment and armament, all fiscal arrangements, and all plans for the development and control of war industries and the predetermined provision of the necessary personnel therefor, are definitely associated with the obvious requirements of a specific force of definite size and organization.

Again, as with an organized citizen army the minimum number of soldiers is maintained on active service in time of peace, the cost of an effective war establishment under such a system is necessarily reduced to a minimum.

And finally, as all our great wars have been fought in the main by citizen armies, the proposal for an organized citizen army in time of peace is merely a proposal for perfecting a traditional national institution to meet modern requirements which no longer permit extemporization after the outbreak of war.

In studying the three plans of military policy before the committee, I consider that the War Department bill proposes a military institution of the first or standing army type. It relies essentially on a large regular army and proposes universal military training primarily as a means of providing men to fill its lower ranks on the outbreak of war. It does not provide for an organized citizen army and does not provide sufficient training to prepare the young men of the country for membership in such a force, nor does it provide the adequate facilities nor the organization essential to the full development of efficient citizen officers. In my opinion, the War Department bill proposes incomplete preparedness at excessive cost and under forms that are not in harmony with the genius of American institutions.

Senator NEW. May I interrupt you right there?

Col. PALMER. Certainly.

Senator NEW. I wish you would tell us just as briefly as you can something about the War Plans Section of the General Staff, how it is composed.

Col. PALMER. There is a War Plans Division of the General Staff, which includes several branches. One of them is the War Plans Branch which is charged with the preparation of plans for the national defense, with the preparation of coast defense plans, and the plans for the organization of the Army.

Senator NEW. That is it; there is a War Plans Branch that is charged with that particular duty?

Col. PALMER. Yes, sir.

Senator NEW. Did the War Plans Branch of the General Staff prepare the so-called War Department or General Staff bill which this committee has under its consideration?

Col. PALMER. The War Plans Branch was not consulted in regard to the policy underlying that bill. It performed the purely ministerial duty of working out the details of the policy that had been laid down.

Senator NEW. What is the opinion of the War Plans Branch of the General Staff as to the merits of this bill?

Col. PALMER. The War Plans Branch at various times has made recommendations with reference to military policy, and I think I can say that these recommendations invariably embodied these ideas: Universal military training, an organized citizen army, and the minimum regular establishment necessary to carry that policy into effect. These recommendations, in my opinion, are diametrically opposed to the policy outlined in the War Department bill.

Senator NEW. In your opinion as a member of the War Plans Section, how should a plan of national defense be prepared in order to conform to the General Staff act of 1903?

Col. PALMER. The act of 1903 created, in my opinion, Senator, two entirely distinct agencies. One was a General Staff charged with the duty of preparing plans for the national defense and for the mobilization of the land forces of the United States. That was provided in the second section of the act. In the fourth section of the act it created a new supervising agency in the person of the Chief of Staff. In my opinion a plan of military policy is the preliminary plan of national defense, and I believe that the General Staff was

the agency created by Congress to prepare such a plan. I do not believe that the Secretary of War or the President or the Congress should necessarily adopt that plan, but as it can be carried into effect only through the action of Congress, it is, in my opinion, the necessary intent of that law that that plan should be submitted to Congress unmodified, but with such concurrence or nonconcurrence and reasons therefor as superior officers might choose to attach to it.

Senator NEW. Well, was that the procedure in the preparation of the bill under consideration was that followed at all.

Col. PALMER. No, sir.

Senator NEW. Tell us what the procedure was, in the preparation of this bill, if you can.

Col. PALMER. I had not returned from Europe when this bill was first prepared; but instructions were issued to the War Plans Division to assume a military policy with a permanent establishment of about 500,000 men, organized into 20 Infantry divisions and 1 Cavalry division, forming 5 army corps of 4 divisions each, and the War Plans Division was instructed to prepare the Tables of Organization and the details of organization under that policy.

Senator NEW. In other words, the policy was defined and you simply were told to prepare a coat to fit it?

Col. PALMER. To work out the details; yes, sir.

Senator NEW. Yes; to work out the details. Colonel, I want to ask you another question. During the last session of Congress, probably along in February last, I introduced a bill in the Senate providing for a system of military training. At the time I introduced that bill I said in introducing it that I presented it at that time in order that it might be referred to the General Staff for study and for a report to this committee at the early convenience of the War Plans Branch of the General Staff. Subsequently the bill was referred by this committee to the General Staff. No report has ever been made to the committee so far, but I would like to ask of you if the bill was submitted to the War Plans Branch and if any study was ever made based on it?

Col. PALMER. A letter from the Military Affairs Committee transmitting a copy of the Senate bill known as the New bill—I do not remember the number of the bill—

Senator NEW. You are referring to the same bill that I am.

Col. PALMER (continuing). Was sent to the Secretary of War, as I remember it, requesting that the General Staff make a report on that bill, and on the subject of universal military training in general. I was a member of the committee to which that letter was referred.

Senator NEW. Will you please tell us if you can, if it is not inconsistent, who composed that committee?

Col. PALMER. I was the chairman of it. Col. Allen J. Greer of the General Staff was another member, and Col. Tenney Ross of the General Staff was a third member. They are both of them on duty now at the General Staff College.

Senator NEW. Now you may proceed if you will.

Col. PALMER. This committee realized that the adoption of universal military training would completely modify and determine the character of our military policy, and it prepared a general statement of military policy under the assumption of universal military train-

ing and submitted it with the recommendation that it be approved in principle, so that a detailed plan could be worked out. This preliminary paper, outlining the policy as a whole, but not going into minute details of organization, was forwarded by the chief of the War Plans Division.

Senator NEW. Forwarded to whom?

Col. PALMER. The Chief of Staff. And some time in April the committee was informed that its proposal was disapproved and was instructed to base all plans on the 500,000 Army plan.

Senator NEW. Could you produce for the committee the recommendations that were made by the war plans section at that time?

Col. PALMER. No, sir; I do not think I could do that.

Senator NEW. The committee would have to get that from the Chief of Staff if at all?

Col. PALMER. I think so; yes, sir; or the Secretary of War. I do not think I could submit a document of that kind, sir.

Senator NEW. Well, I presumed not. Mr. Chairman, I would like to suggest that this committee make a request of the Secretary of War that those recommendations be submitted to the committee for our inspection.

The CHAIRMAN. Is there any objection?

Senator FLETCHER. What was the idea of the war plans section of the General Staff, Colonel, with reference to the minimum size of the standing or Regular Army?

Col. PALMER. In that paper, sir?

Senator FLETCHER. No; you spoke about three things you kept in mind.

Col. PALMER. Yes.

Senator FLETCHER. And one of them was the minimum size of the Regular Army. I was curious to know what you had in mind, what number you had in mind.

Col. PALMER. That, Senator, was only indicated approximately, because if this paper had been approved in principle we would have worked it out minutely; but I think that a total of about 280,000 would certainly accomplish all the necessary objects, and that in the actual operation of the system that number might be materially reduced in time.

Senator FLETCHER. That many officers and men?

Col. PALMER. Enlisted strength, sir; about 21,000 officers would be required.

Senator NEW. That would mean, then, approximately 300,000 officers and men?

Col. PALMER. Well, ultimately less than that; but just how much less would depend on quite a number of undetermined conditions.

Senator FLETCHER. The 280,000 included the 21,000 officers?

Col. PALMER. No, sir. It might under the operation of the plan be reduced materially below that, depending very largely on the actual success of the citizen army.

Senator NEW. Just one other question. Have there been any other occasions, and if so how many, when the War Plans Board of the General Staff has made any recommendations relative to a military policy based on universal training?

Col. PALMER. The Chief of Staff, Gen. Scott, recommended a policy of universal military training in the fall of 1916, and it was

after that that we made the plan that I have already referred to. That is the prewar plan which was published in the Congressional Record some time in March, 1917. Then, later, the General Staff, at Gen. Pershing's headquarters, without instruction from him, as I understand it, prepared a plan based on the same general idea but calling for a smaller regular personnel than the original plan, and for certain other simplifications due to our increased experience in the war. I saw that plan just before I left France, in December and January. It was prepared, I presume, for the action of Gen. Pershing, but Gen. Pershing did not act on it, I think primarily because he had not been called on for a recommendation of that character, and also because at that time he had not been able to go into it in detail. I do know that it had not been approved by him.

The CHAIRMAN. That was prepared by Gen. Fiske in G-5, was it not?

Col. PALMER. It was originally prepared there, but but circulated through the General Staff of the A. E. F. and was not unanimously concurred in; but it was similar in form to the General Staff plan of 1917. Then, again, the basic outline of a plan was drawn when the General Staff considered the New bill.

Senator NEW. No action on any of these recommendations was ever taken?

Col. PALMER. No; none so far as I know.

The CHAIRMAN. You might proceed with your statement. You had covered a discussion of the large standing professional army, and you were about to proceed, I think, to the discussion of the others?

Col. PALMER. Yes, sir.

The other two plans before this committee—that is, the one outlined in Gen. O'Ryan's hearing and the one outlined in the Kahn-Chamberlain bill, both propose a military system of the citizen army type. In my opinion they are both highly constructive propositions and essentially sound. There are certain details which I believe should be corrected. But there are certain things about this discussion of a citizen army that in my opinion have not come into the hearing at all. That is, just how it should be formed, how it ought to be organized, and what it ought to aim at. Before discussing those plans in detail I would like to present some views on that subject, because I have given a good many years of my life to the study of that question, both on the General Staff and as an individual.

The CHAIRMAN. We would be glad to have you.

Col. PALMER. The main feature of the military establishment of the United States in my opinion should be a trained citizen army organized territorially in divisions, army corps and field armies, in such a manner as to permit immediate mobilization in the event of emergency.

In the initial organization of this force the charter members should be those veterans of the great war who volunteer to enter a unit of the citizen army whose territorial allocation includes their place of residence. This force should be perpetuated by universal military training.

Every young man should undergo military training for not less than six months and after such training he should enter an organization of the citizen army and should be a member thereof for five

years, after which he should pass to the unorganized reserve unless after due qualification he elects further service in the citizen army as an officer or noncommissioned officer. The organized citizen army should be mobilized for inspection and team training for a short period of about two weeks each year.

During this mobilization period, maneuvers and terrain exercises should be provided on a sufficient scale to test the effectiveness of mobilization plans and the capacity of commanding officers and staff officers. Battalions and regiments generally, and in populous regions brigades, can be concentrated by marching. Corps and divisional maneuvers should be provided from time to time when appropriations permit the necessary transportation. When and where circumstances do not permit the concentration of large units the capacity of higher commanders and staffs can be effectively tested by appropriate terrain exercises.

All private soldiers who are graduates of the training system should be required to attend at least two annual mobilizations during their period of prescribed membership in the organized citizen army. Officers and noncommissioned officers should be required to attend all such annual mobilizations except when excused by competent military authority. All original vacancies in commissioned and noncommissioned officer grades in the organized citizen army should be filled by the appointment of veterans of the war in civil life and by detail from the Regular Army. In making such initial appointments former veterans of the war, whether in the National Guard, the National Army, or the Reserve Corps, should be eligible to appointment in any grade not above the highest grade held by them with credit during the war and in a unit of their proper arm of the service whose territorial allocation includes their place of residence. Their subsequent promotion should be after such examination, including practical tests at the annual maneuvers or elsewhere, as may be prescribed by the President.

The annual six months' training course should be conducted by a thoroughly trained corps of officers and noncommissioned officers detailed or selected from the Regular Army and supplemented to such extent as may be practicable from citizen officers and noncommissioned officers who voluntarily accept active service for such temporary but sufficient periods as may be necessary.

In order to provide for the necessary continuous administration of the organized citizen army in the intervals between annual mobilizations, each unit of the organized citizen army should be provided with a small skeleton staff of officers and enlisted men detailed from the Regular Army.

Officers and noncommissioned officers of the citizen army should be eligible for promotion to any grade for which they are able to qualify under regulations to be prescribed by the President and for assignment to any duty in the Military Establishment appropriate to their rank except such duties in time of peace as obviously can not be performed by persons not continuously on active service. All offices in the Military Establishment requiring the services of persons continuously on active duty should be filled by detail from the Regular Army or from qualified citizen officers and men who voluntarily accept active service for such sufficient continuous periods as may be prescribed by regulations. Officers and men of the citizen army while

on active duty should receive the pay and allowances of their proper grades in the Regular Army.

No regular or citizen officer should be assigned to the command of any tactical unit until he has affirmatively demonstrated his capacity to maneuver, command and administer such unit under such practical test as may be prescribed by the President.

Regular officers assigned to duty in the citizen army should be assigned in their actual grades or in temporary advanced grades appropriate to and during the continuance of such assignment.

In time of war all officers of the military establishment should be pooled and assigned either in command of troops or on staff duty according to their tested qualifications and in grades for which they have been or may be tested under regulations to be prescribed by the President.

The organized citizen army should include an organized harbor defense corps at full war strength, with ample replacements as well as a territorial field army organized in divisions, corps and field armies. With 16 training centers located with proper reference to the distribution of military population, each such training center should generate and maintain the personnel for an army corps of two or three divisions. The commander of this army corps, provided with a proper staff, should command the army corps and should be responsible for all military activities within his corps area. In the initial organization of each army corps its component units should be given the designation of previously existing local military units, having historic records in former wars, in so far as this can be done without defeating the primary objects of correct military organization and the localization of homogeneous tactical units.

Upon mobilization of the army corps in war the corps training center will continue its training function with the view of maintaining the supply of trained replacement. If the period of membership in the organized citizen army be fixed at five years, each corps area will be able immediately to mobilize a complete army corps at full strength and to fill its replacement depots with trained replacement and will have sufficient surplus strength in trained officers and men to form such new and unforeseen organizations as any particular military situation may require even after necessary exemptions for war industries have been determined. The corps area with its territorial units and its training center thus becomes a continuously functioning machine through which, if necessary, the entire man power of the nation can be mobilized promptly, effectively and economically.

Now, whether such a force as that is practicable depends on whether citizen soldiers can be trained to perform the functions demanded of them under that system. I do not think there is any question about the feasibility of doing that if the citizen army is actually organized. If it is not, of course, there will be no effective machinery for making the necessary tests.

Senator FLETCHER. That plan means not only universal training but universal compulsory service?

Col. PALMER. No, sir, it is a universal obligation to serve in the event of war, but no service except for training purposes in time of peace, no attendance except for training purposes.

Senator FLETCHER. You oblige them to remain in the service four or five years, subject to assembling each year so many weeks?

Col. PALMER. Well, it would not be necessary for any of them to attend more than twice. The unit a man belongs to would assemble annually but the individual private soldier would only have to attend twice. Of course the men who voluntarily accept the opportunity to be officers would voluntarily attend in order to qualify themselves for promotion.

Senator FLETCHER. That is not compulsory?

Col. PALMER. No, sir, that would not be compulsory.

The CHAIRMAN. And you would make the maneuvers that are held during the four or five years of their training a continuation of their training?

Col. PALMER. Absolutely. There would be no service for them.

The CHAIRMAN. You would not have those reserve units subject to call for any military purpose?

Col. PALMER. Except when a sufficient emergency is designated by Congress.

The CHAIRMAN. How about riot duty?

Col. PALMER. I should think, sir, that it would be very much better to have a separate force for that purpose.

The CHAIRMAN. Of course that would not be for training purposes, that would be a military purpose?

Col. PALMER. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. And would involve the element of compulsory military service?

Col. PALMER. That would be a question, it seems to me, for each State to determine for itself, that is, what particular forces it required—

The CHAIRMAN. Do you remember Gen. O'Ryan's suggestion on that?

Col. PALMER. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Of course his suggestion involves the use of this trained citizen army for military purposes in time of peace, by compulsion!

Col. PALMER. Yes. I would be glad to go into that now, but I intended to go into it later.

The CHAIRMAN. You may go on in your own way.

Col. PALMER. But I think this particular point about the qualification of citizen officers is really the crux of this whole question. It all depends on that. The primary thing is that they must be efficient, and I believe that the determination of efficiency is purely a question of fact. If a man alleges he is a major of infantry you can determine it in precisely the same way that you can determine whether an alleged chauffeur is really a chauffeur. Let him try it in the presence of competent judges. That has been the practice abroad, and it is thoroughly feasible. And the same test ought to be applied to regular officers and citizen officers. If a man is a candidate to command a battalion of infantry, say, if you take him with the battalion of infantry under a competent umpire, and give that umpire control for five or six days, with the necessary complete transportation—

Senator SUTHERLAND. Do you mean the umpire or the candidate?

Col. PALMER. The umpire. And then let the umpire give that man a continuing situation for six days, simulating war conditions, requiring him actually to administer, maneuver and march that battalion, you will have a test that will determine that question of fact as closely as it ever can be determined in time of peace.

Whether a man is a regular officer or a citizen officer he should not be assigned to command any unit until his capacity to command it has been demonstrated, and if his capacity to command it has been demonstrated then he should not be arbitrarily restricted to any particular rank merely because he is a reserve officer or a citizen officer. There has been a great deal of nonsense and interested camouflage on that subject. It is purely a question of fact. There is nothing in our history that justifies the presumption that all regular officers are competent to command, and there is nothing in our history that justifies the presumption that no citizen officers are capable of rising to high command. There have been many men with natural military leadership—Cromwell, Forrest, Logan, and many other instances I might mention. With the organized citizen army you would discover such men in time of peace, and put them in their proper places, and multiply their number as much as you can.

So it seems to me, in a complete scheme of National preparedness, that feature, above all others, should be developed. We should develop the natural leaders in the citizen soldiery. We would find a great many of them among the millions that would pass through that system in the course of time if we have universal training, and I do not think there is any question about the practicability of it.

Senator FLETCHER. Where is the place for your National Guard there?

Col. PALMER. In my opinion, sir, the National Guard should go into that organized citizen army. I commanded a National Guard brigade in the fighting north of Verdun, and it had severe fighting. I talked to a great many of my officers on this question, and that was the opinion of most of them I talked to. If we had an organized citizen army under Federal control, that is what they would want to enter. I think the main concern with them would be whether they are to have a square deal in entering it. I think that is the general sentiment of most of them. I have talked to some of them since they came back, and I have heard a number of them say that if there is to be an organized citizen army they want to go in it. They say "If we are to go back to a vague reserve status like our present reserve corps or to National Guard duty, we are through." A number of them have said that to me. I think the point is just this, Senator. We want a citizen army. Those gentlemen of the National Guard, in my opinion, have done an immense public service in this country by keeping alive the tradition of the citizen army, but they have done it under an immense handicap. You can not organize an efficient army—it is impossible to organize an efficient army—for war purposes under the militia clauses of our Constitution. If you should speak to Marshal Joffre or to Marshal Foch or to any great military expert, and say "I will allow you to organize an army. You can do whatever you please with it except you can not train it, you can not discipline it, and you can have no voice in the training of its officers, the selection of its officers," and he would say to you,

"But those very things you except and exempt are the absolutely essential things in providing an efficient military force."

I believe that the solution is to form a citizen army under the constitutional clause that authorizes Congress to create and support armies. The service in many respects would be like your National Guard service. The present National Guard personnel should be received into the new force and should be an important element in starting it. They should have the fairest chance. In my brigade there were two regiments. In one of them, a regiment that came from Maryland, the colonel was a National Guard officer, and he was one of the finest colonels I have ever seen. I did not have the opportunity to serve with that division during the period of organization, but its division commander, Gen. Morton, regarded this colonel as one of the best colonels, one of the best administrative colonels, he had ever seen in his long experience in the Army. When I joined the brigade it was in action, it had been checked the day before I joined, and two or three days later we carried a position with heavy loss, and I observed that colonel particularly, and I know from my observation that he is a splendid colonel.

I believe if an organized citizen army should be formed, that colonel and most of his men would want to enter that force, and that they would prefer that to any other status for them. I believe firmly that that is what they wanted the National Guard service for. There has been a great conflict of opinion; but those men entered the National Guard because they wanted to be citizen soldiers, and I believe they would welcome that status, at least all I have talked to—and I have talked to a great many, Senator Wadsworth, who have told me that they specifically objected to that phase of Gen. O'Ryan's plan which would leave them the double function—

The CHAIRMAN. That suggestion of his, that that Federal citizen army should, within the boundaries of the several States and with the permission of the President, be subject to the call of the governors to suppress disorders?

Col. PALMER. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Of course his idea there was to substitute some force inside the State boundaries which could be used in place of the militia for the maintenance of order in case of disturbance.

Col. PALMER. It would be feasible from the organization standpoint, there is no question about that.

The CHAIRMAN. But it does bring in entirely new elements.

Col. PALMER. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. In the first place, it brings compulsory service.

Col. PALMER. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. And it probably clashes with the Constitution.

Col. PALMER. And, Senator, there is a principle of very general application in military affairs, and that is that as a rule an organization that is designed to perform a double function does not perform either one of them very well.

The CHAIRMAN. I know myself that the guard has always detested riot duty. They say it is a policeman's duty and not a soldier's duty. Soldiers are the most expensive and most inefficient policemen. That is one reason why New York has established a State constabulary, and Pennsylvania has done the same thing. They can do with a

thousand men what it took ten thousand men of the National Guard to do.

Col. PALMER. There is another thing about a citizen army that I think has an immensely important bearing on preparedness. If we had a force of that kind and if that was our main dependence in time of war, I think there could not be devised a force that would be less provocative of war, and on the other hand there could not be devised a force that would be more powerful in war, because if that system were in operation for, we will say 25 years, every member of Congress and probably the Secretary of War and the President and all people who influence public opinion throughout the country would have been members of that force. A considerable number of them would probably have had sufficient interest in it to have served for some time as officers. The result would be then that instead of military problems being very largely a matter of mystery and camouflage, the people concerned would understand them just as they do any other public question, and I think that would have an enormous effect not only in avoiding unnecessary wars but in assuring the highest efficiency if war did come.

Senator FLETCHER. Have you figured out the expense of that plan.

Col. PALMER. I should say, assuming that the National Guard is absorbed in it, that it would probably not cost much more than half of the cost of the War Department plan. It would probably provide twice as many men on the outbreak of war as the War Department plan, and its subsequent expansion would be at a very much higher rate than would be practicable in the plan proposed in the War Department bill.

Now, there is one question about these fundamentals of military organization—that is, the relation between military systems and international peace arrangements. I do not think they change the essential character of a nation's military institutions. Take France, for example, and with the situation of course in France entirely changed, in that Germany is prostrate, there may also be an international arrangement through which the menace will be very much further reduced. But that is not changing her military institutions. She is simply changing the size and characteristics of her peace establishment. The national policy is still there. The chance of war is more remote, that is all. Her policy is still to develop her total man power if the emergency comes, but under the new situation, instead of strategical deployment being a matter of two or three days, it will be a matter of considerable time. Therefore she is able to reduce the period of training required, she is able to reduce the numbers under arms in time of peace, and she is also able to reduce the elaborateness of her armament program. That is, the essential organization of the machine remains the same, but now that it does not have to function so fast they do not have to elaborate so much of it in time of peace. When we come to a time when there can be no war at all, then necessarily there will be no military establishment at all. But so long as war is possible the only answer to the preparedness problem is capacity to develop all or any necessary part of the total man power in time.

If the plan of an organized citizen army is accepted, the regular personnel should be limited to the minimum number of officers and enlisted men required to perform such continuous functions as obvi-

ously can not be performed by citizen soldiers. We will require regular personnel for foreign garrisons. We have certain garrisons we have to maintain because they act as naval bases, or for other reasons. We can not send citizen soldiers to such places. We will have to have a small mobile force for minor emergencies not justifying the mobilization of the citizen army. We will have to keep up the peace establishment of harbor defence artillery.

Then, of course, will come the professional component of the training establishment required for universal military training. For instance, if a regiment should be formed in Maryland and this colonel that I spoke of should be the colonel of the regiment, as he ought to be, it would still be a desirable thing, if that regiment is to mobilize promptly for the annual maneuvers or for war, to provide him with perhaps a regimental adjutant and a sergeant major and a supply sergeant, and perhaps a couple of clerks, so that the necessary continuous administration would be provided. But when you consider that that is a unit of something like 3,700 men, of course that cadre is a very small charge in the way of overhead to keep it going.

The CHAIRMAN. Three or four professionals on duty at headquarters all the time?

Col. PALMER. Yes, that is for purely administrative purposes.

Senator FLETCHER. As I remember what we have heard officers say during these hearings, the large demand will be in the number of men required for training, conducting these training camps. Some have estimated one man to every six. That in itself would call for a tremendous force.

Col. PALMER. When you consider the requirement of getting very efficient training in the time allowed, and when you consider the personnel that you have to have for administration duties, I do not think that would be excessive. You could make the allotment you have mentioned and still come within the total of 280,000. Then, of course, the other elements of the regular peace establishment would be the peace establishment of the War Department and the several staff corps and services. But that would be very much reduced and would be continually further reduced as time goes on. In the recent war we took a great many civilians in to expand these services. Under the citizen army plan they would be in all the time, and the only difference would be they would know their places and what they were going to do, so that the overhead would be very greatly reduced.

The establishment of such a system now of course would be simple. Five or six years from now it would not be so easy, because the trained people to start it would then be too long back in civil life. If it is started now, what it would amount to, in my opinion, would be—it would be perpetuating the Army we have created in this war. It would be converting an immense unproductive outlay into a permanent investment, so that the outlay for this war to a very large extent would be available for a war a hundred years from now. For example, if at the end of the Civil War—we then had a trained citizen army on both sides—and it was largely a citizen army—if that army at the close of the Civil War, when they went back into civil life, instead of being disbanded, had assumed a reserve obligation for two or three years and then had gradually been replaced by each year's crop of young men, we would have had a very economical

military system, and we would have had a military system that would have found us prepared for the last war. We would have had a functioning machine through which we could actually have developed our man power.

Senator, you were speaking about the total numbers required, and I told you that I could tell you what would probably be the maximum allowance, but there would be a great many factors to be considered in determining the minimum. I would like to give a little more detail on that point, because it is interesting. Of course the conception is—and I believe it is a sound conception—that the number of professional soldiers in a country like ours ought to be reduced to a minimum, to the lowest minimum consistent with war preparedness.

The total number of trained officers and men required for the purposes that I have indicated will be approximately 21,000 officers and 280,000 enlisted men. All of these need not be regulars, because a considerable number of citizen officers and noncommissioned officers may be effectively employed for relatively short periods in the training service. This should be encouraged, as such service by citizen soldiers will tend to increase their qualification for promotion in the citizen army and will greatly increase the efficiency of that force. But while the numbers of citizen soldiers so employed will tend to reduce the number of professional soldiers required, the actual number can not be predicted in advance and can only be determined by experience. It may be said, however, that the enlisted strength of the Regular Army, after the citizen army is fully organized, will not be greater than 280,000, and will probably prove to be considerably less.

The total number of officers provided by the national defense act will be insufficient, as between 9,000 and 10,000 more trained officers will be required, but the proportion of these that must be regular officers can not be definitely determined until experience shows the number of capable citizen officers that can be expected to serve for sufficient temporary periods in the training service.

But while the total required strength of the regular establishment is uncertain the personnel required for the several branches of the service is even more uncertain. There will be some branches of the new army that are not recognized in the national defense act at all, and, on the other hand, certain branches of the service, such as the Cavalry and Coast Artillery, are provided in the national defense act in greater numbers than will be required in a regular military establishment based on providing a regular nucleus for an organized citizen army.

Again, the ratios of strength between a given arm in the citizen army and the corresponding nucleus in the Regular Establishment will be different for different arms of the service. For example, as mechanical transport is highly developed in civil life, the mechanical transport of the citizen army will require a relatively small overhead in the Regular Establishment, while others, like the Air Service, will probably require a higher percentage of regular personnel.

It is obvious, then, that there must be a readjustment of the allotment of personnel to the different branches and that the ultimate percentages in the several branches, as well as the ultimate totals of the Regular Establishment as a whole, can be precisely determined only by experience.

The solution of this problem contains enough inherent difficulties, even if the army could be trusted to work it out in a strictly scientific manner. But this is out of the question on account of the irrational legal organization of the commissioned personnel of the Regular Army. The problem is to provide a minimum personnel sufficient to perform the functions of the Regular Army. It will result, if it is done honestly and scientifically, in reducing the numbers of regular officers in some branches of the service; it will involve increasing some branches a little, some of the branches a great deal, and it will involve forming some entirely new branches of the service.

If this situation should arise in the Navy, it would be met as a simple administrative problem. If the development of battle cruisers should reduce the requirement for some other type, there would be simply an increase in the roster for one and a decrease in the roster for the other. If the development of aircraft and submarines should be increased at the expense of the dreadnaught, the number of officers serving on the ascendant types would be increased and the number serving on the declining type would be reduced. This would be possible because Congress provides a total strength in the several grades of the Navy and does not prescribe a definite number of officers and a separate line of promotion for each separate naval function. Nor does it prescribe the total numbers, nor much less the numbers of the several grades that must rigidly and definitely constitute the crews of the different types of war vessels. If Congress should provide a separate, rigid allotment of personnel and a separate line of promotion for every naval function, it would be impossible to solve the problem of proper equilibrium for the service as a whole, as the personnel pertaining to each function would then find a natural human interest in magnifying the relative importance of that function. The relative importance of various naval types would be determined not by proper tactical and strategic requirements, but by an unscientific compromise of conflicting partisan views. And yet that is precisely the condition with reference to organization in the Army. Congress fixes the total strength and detailed organization of the personnel assigned to each major military function and provides a separate line of promotion for each. So long as this system prevails it will be impossible to provide a flexible and economical military organization properly adjustable to changes in the military art. Under this system each branch of the service is and always will be tempted to overstate its proper personnel requirements. Under this system it is impossible to make a scientific readjustment of the authorized commissioned personnel to meet the requirements of a new policy in which the regular personnel is to be adapted to its proper function of providing the necessary minimum professional cadre for a great citizen army.

I have frequently heard members of Congress say that it is impossible to find any unanimity among Army officers as to the needs of the military establishment. This is undoubtedly true, and I have stated the reason. When promotion is uniform throughout the service, as in the Navy, and not dependent upon changes of tactical organization, the personnel is content to leave questions of policy to the limited number of officers trained to make a proper scientific determination. In the Army every second lieutenant is forced to form

his views as to what the organization of the Army should be long before he knows that there is such a thing as a science of military organization.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. Do you think that system would be possible to be transferred to the Army and Navy?

Col. PALMER. Yes; I do. I do not think there is any question about it.

The CHAIRMAN. This War Department bill takes quite a long step in that direction, although it does not go as far as establishing a single list. As you undoubtedly remember, on page 3, line 7, you will find that language which would authorize the recommissioning of all officers of the line, all general officers of the line.

Col. PALMER. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. And from that point on they are to be detailed to the different branches, staff corps, and even to the technical services.

Col. PALMER. Yes, sir. I think that principle of flexibility ought to be carried just as far as it can be carried.

The CHAIRMAN. There is no doubt about the correctness of that theory, in my judgment; but I wonder whether it is wise to permit the indiscriminate detail of officers in that way, in view of the very intricate and scientific specialties that have grown up in the waging of war.

Col. PALMER. Well sir, under that system you could make exceptions of any service you cared to; for instance, you might apply the single list to the combatant arms. Take an instance like the Medical Corps—

The CHAIRMAN. They are the exception here.

Col. PALMER. They would be carried along, as I understand they are in the Navy, by having running mates in the line of the same length of service, and they would be promoted in accordance with the promotion of their running mates. You could extend that to any service you pleased. There was a strong argument, presented by Gen. Squier yesterday. But if you do not limit it at all and do as they do it in the Navy, where you assign men to proper special functions and are not restricted as to how you do it, it seems to me you meet all the requirements of specialization and the very important requirement of readjustment. That is where we are tied up in the Army.

The CHAIRMAN. Everything around you is in a state of flux and you can not move. You may proceed, Colonel, in your own way.

Col. PALMER. In order to correct the conditions I have just described, and in order to make it possible to compute the minimum requirements of the Regular Army scientifically, I believe that the following principles should be embodied in legislation:

(a) The aggregate commissioned and enlisted strength of the Regular Establishment and the total number of officers and enlisted men in each of the several grades of the military establishment as a whole should be fixed by the Congress. The number of officers and enlisted men assigned to the several branches of the service and the detailed organization of each of such branches and services should be fixed by regulation.

(b) Whenever a vacancy occurs in any grade below that of brigadier general, the officer in the next lower grade having the longest

commissioned service, if duly qualified for promotion, should be promoted.

The CHAIRMAN. You do not believe in promotion by selection then?

Col. PALMER. Yes, but I do not believe in the form of selection that is in the War Department bill. The form of selection that I believe in would be provided in the citizen army, that is, you would actually try out these men in time of peace; you would actually fit the round peg into the round hole in time of peace; you would have the data for selection. I believe I have a statement here of a solution of the promotion question.

The CHAIRMAN. We do not want to interrupt you if you had not finished the line you were on.

Col. PALMER. I will come to that a little later, then. I have already indicated the total regular enlisted personnel ultimately required under a citizen army policy will not differ greatly from the total personnel authorized under the national defense act. But if the citizen army policy should be authorized today, it is obvious that for a considerable time there will be additional requirements. Until the process of demobilization is complete and during the transition to the permanent organization, each of the supply and procuring departments will require a greater personnel than will be necessary after the transition is complete. We still have considerable numbers of troops in Europe and Siberia, and the exact time of their return and demobilization cannot be predicted.

Under the citizen army plan it is contemplated that a small regular mobile force should be provided for duty as border patrol and minor emergencies. Until the citizen army is actually organized, the troops required for these purposes should be provided on a more liberal basis. In my opinion, if Congress should authorize the President to maintain not to exceed 380,000 enlisted men for two years and to retain not to exceed 16,000 temporary or reserve officers for the same period, there would be ample personnel to meet all temporary requirements, to establish the foreign garrisons, to maintain a reasonable emergency force, to organize a citizen army and to inaugurate universal military training. Before the end of that time the extra personnel employed in demobilization would complete their work and be discharged, definite experience would be obtained as to the number of citizen officers and men available for duty in the training service, and the precise determination could be made as to the proper personnel of the regular establishment.

I think I can illustrate this whole conception by a rough diagram I have here. Our conception has always been that in time of war we are going to fight with a citizen army and that we are maintaining the regular peace establishment in some undefined way as the nucleus of the larger war force.

In this diagram the small rectangular area on the left represents the permanent establishment; the large, vague, uncertain figure "B" on the right, represents the citizen war army, absolutely indefinite, no determination as to how it is to be organized, or anything about it. That is the way it has been in the past, and for that reason our war plans have been more or less mere ropes of sand, because we did not know what we were going to have to carry them out with.

Now in that uncertain war army, we will say, is to be an engineer contingent, which I have represented by the vague segment

marked E¹. We do not know anything about that either. We do not know what the total is going to be, and therefore we do not know what this engineer component is going to be. Down here in the regular rectangle we have the smaller rectangle E, which represents the necessary peace-time component to develop E¹. But the Chief of Engineers does not know anything about it. All he can do is to estimate as high as possible, and as all Engineer officers have a separate line of promotion based on getting as much as you will give them, there is every incentive to make that and every other component just as big as possible.

(The diagram referred to was passed around and examined by the members of the committee.)

Now, if you replace that vague, formless conception by an organized citizen army, then the size of that force becomes absolutely precise. Instead of measuring from the regular establishment to the citizen army, it ought to be figured back the other way. Determine what the citizen army is going to be and then figure back to the necessary regular component to generate it.

For instance, you have then a certain definite percentage of this total force that are going to be engineers. The proper engineer contingent then in the Regular Army is the minimum number of officers and men required to generate that. Thus, under the old system you can not compute what the size of the Regular Army should be in time of peace—there is no basis for such computation. But assume the organized citizen army and you can compute it as precisely as you can compute the members of a bridge or any other structure that really exists, you can figure out just what it ought to be in whole and in part.

The CHAIRMAN. That is a very apt illustration.

Col. PALMER. I would like to make one or two references now to Gen. O'Ryan's plan. In the main it is constructive and sound. It provides for an annual training under a trained cadre. It proposes an organized citizen army raised under the constitutional power to support armies and not under the militia clauses of the Constitution. It proposes a territorial organization, a system of annual maneuvers and full Federal control, and those are the essential features, in my opinion, of a correct and economic military policy.

There are certain statements in Gen. O'Ryan's hearing before the committee, however, which I believe are erroneous, and I am very much inclined to believe that if Gen. O'Ryan had access to some of the information I have he might agree with me.

In the first place, in his computation as to the size of the Regular Army required, he says that we practically do not need any troops for the foreign garrison because their tenure depends upon the Navy, and if the Navy keeps the sea that will determine the whole thing. Well, now, as a matter of fact, there is nothing that is more essential to the Navy in its plan to keep the sea than to have certain secure bases to fall back on, and of course that would imply sufficient garrisons for Oahu and Panama and possibly some other places. It is quite obvious that the duty of garrisoning those places must be performed by soldiers and that it can not be performed by citizen soldiers.

Gen. O'Ryan, instead of proposing six months' training, proposes three months' training, followed by armory training, eighty hours

per year for two years and nine months. I believe that six months would be better for the individual recruit, so that he can take it and get through with it. The night work is all right throughout the year, but in my opinion it is better to get through with the close order work for the recruit and devote the night work to the further training of the officers and noncommissioned officers of the citizen reserve army. His three months' training, in my opinion, is too short to secure the educational and vocational advantages of universal training. It takes more time than that to correct certain bad mental and physical habits that can and ought to be corrected by universal training, and it takes more time than that to develop certain good habits that ought to be developed. I think his plan would be measurably practicable in cities and in thickly settled parts of the country, where in the past the National Guard has been developed to the best advantage. I think it would be absolutely impracticable if it becomes universal and you try to extend it throughout the country.

I think the plan would also be more onerous for the individual man and that it would be a greater drain on business and that it would be better for the average soldier to take his individual training once for all. Then you say to him, practically, "Now you have had your six months' training; you go back into your home infantry battalion [or whatever his arm is], and you are going to be subject to a war call there, if one comes within the next three or four years. If you are content to go to war as a private, you are through; but if you want to rise, if you have ambition to be a leader, you will have to take such additional time in training as may be necessary to qualify you to go up step by step." If there is six months once for all for the private, then all of the time devoted to training during the year can be devoted to the more important object of developing officers and noncommissioned officers.

I think that the economies proposed in Gen. O'Ryan's plan,—that is, his idea of having two or three crops of three months each through each year—would not work out very well. There would be certain classes in mid-winter, for instance, that would not get very much out of it, that would not have the proper training.

THE CHAIRMAN. I think he had in view differences in climate geographically in the United States in that suggestion,

Col. PALMER. Well, it might be you would have to shift your training cadre.

Senator NEW. Yes, I am sure he had that in mind.

THE CHAIRMAN. You could save in the personnel on the training cadre by having them work in the summer and work in the south in the winter.

Senator NEW. Is it essential that the four months period should be at any particular time of the year? Is it not possible to arrange that on the zone theory, so, for instance, that a farmer's boy in Indiana or Illinois, our section of the country, need not have to go to the camp during the harvest season, but could go at a time of the year when he could be best spared from the farm?

Col. PALMER. Well, sir, I have been thinking, of course, about a minimum period of six months. Now if we have one training period of six months, the training cadre will really be occupied throughout the year. For six months it will be busy training recruits. For at

least another month it will be engaged in work connected with the annual maneuvers. That will leave five months. From this must be deducted some time for leaves and furloughs and necessary rest. The remaining three or four months it will be busily engaged in conducting schools for the officers and noncommissioned officers of the citizen army, and in reorganizing the training service for the next year's class under universal training. The season should culminate in the annual maneuvers. These would be, say, in October. That would fix the end of the six months' training season about the end of September, and would carry you back until about the 1st of April for the beginning of the six months training.

If you tried to bring in the six months of winter, too, you would break down your training cadre and the men who got the training then would not be so well qualified to enter the citizen army.

Senator NEW. I agree with you as to what would be ideal entirely, but it occurred to me that that season would interfere more seriously with the farmers in the country from which you and I come, than to take them during the winter months, say, and train them, for instance, in the South. I am just considering some of the very rigorous objections that are going to be interposed on the part of the people to any plan for universal military training that may be suggested, and considering what we may have to accept in lieu of what we might regard as ideal.

Col. PALMER. Well, sir, those of course may be necessary compromises and you would have to be the judge of the relative values. There is no question about that.

Senator NEW. But I wanted to get your views on it.

Col. PALMER. In my opinion you would sacrifice a great many advantages that the people themselves would recognize if they understood them. Now, for example, if you reduce the period of training, we will say, you will also reduce the amount of training received by those classes that take it at an unseasonable time of the year. You save a certain amount of money on that in the cost of training. But you will sacrifice a corresponding degree of efficiency in the organized citizen army. Now, as to your regular establishment, which is the most expensive element of the system—to reduce its cost to a minimum you have to have a citizen army that will mobilize very promptly, but if you reduce the time for that, assuming that you retain the same amount of security, you have to increase the regular establishment accordingly. And I believe—I don't know of course how people would feel about it—but I believe if I had a son, the thing that you would have to convince me of would be that he needed training and that the country was entitled to it, and if I was convinced of that, then I believe I would want him to get it so it would be effective. I believe ultimately our people are sensible enough to look at it that way, sir. But there would be a material loss, in my opinion, to the individual in reducing the period below six months—there would be a very great loss—there is an economic by-product from universal training, and you would reduce that materially.

General O'Ryan also proposed, for a force of a million and a half men, two years and nine months service or membership in the organized reserve. In order to do that, he ignores replacements and the possibility of forming new units, and the uncertain requirements

of war industries when war comes. The result is that when he deploys that force it may be theoretically at the strength of a million and a half, but he will have to go into the unorganized reserve and take men who have passed out and bring them back into the service in order to raise his war establishment to full strength.

Now, in my opinion, it would be better to keep the men a couple of years longer and carry them frankly as over-strength in their units. You could still have it that each private would attend only two annual maneuvers, just the same, but the advantage would be that a regiment of infantry in the organized citizen army, which is mobilized say at the strength of 3,700, would actually carry on its rolls a thousand or perhaps fifteen hundred more. Then when it mobilized you would know that it would mobilize at war strength and that the over-strength would go into the depots and replacement depots. It may happen that in a particular locality there will be a big drain for certain war industries, and those men would have to be dropped. One of the advantages of the organized citizen army is that all those requirements can and should be anticipated. It would not increase the burden of the individual in the slightest. If you figure that three years is the theoretical time required to make your organized reserve contain enough men to mobilize at the strength you propose, it would be better to keep them in it—just keep them on the rolls—a year or two longer in order to provide for replacements and other contingencies.

The Chairman has already referred to the point in Gen. O'Ryan's plan about "duties similar to those required of the National Guard," as Gen. O'Ryan stated it. That is, that these citizen army units in each state would be at the disposal of the governor for State purposes. I think it is always a good principle that there ought to be different organizations to perform different functions. There would be some upsetting of mobilization plans, which, however, could be met by proper arrangements. That is, we would suppose you had a division in Nebraska and on the eve of war a regiment or two were being employed by the governor for State purposes. Your mobilization would be thrown out. That can be met by organizing surplus units. But suppose you have a division assigned to Nebraska and you mobilize it and send it out and then some State emergency occurs and there are no State troops there at all. I believe it would be better to have separate forces for the two separate functions. My strongest reason for believing it is objectionable is that that is objectionable to National Guard men themselves, in so far as I have talked to them.

Gen. O'Ryan also refers to the preservation of names and traditions of old organizations. That is an immensely important thing. I think it is one of the strongest features of the citizen army that it is localized; that so far as practicable the men from the same community and under their natural local leaders go into war together. I think it is very important for morale and efficiency and economy; but when you come to the initial organization of the force, if that is emphasized too much it may get us into serious difficulties. For example, suppose there is a large city that, before the war, had four National Guard regiments in it, and then during the war those National Guard units were merged into war-organization units and got certain new numbers; then during the war two National Army regiments were also raised in that city. Now, suppose under your

quota in organizing the new citizen army your new organization is going to call for four regiments in that city. You are going to have an embarrassing question. It is a local question. It ought to be carried out to meet the views of that city and State. I do not think we could work it out in the War Department without making mistakes on it. Consider a State that would furnish only four regiments to the new citizen army. We ought not to superimpose four regiments one on the other—that is, take them at large all over the State; each regiment ought to be taken from a part of the State containing approximately a fourth of the population of the State. If you do, then you can mobilize it quicker in time of war, and you can perhaps mobilize for your maneuvers by marching and save a great deal of expense, but if the first regiment is drawn from all over the State and the second regiment is drawn from all over the State and the third regiment the same way, then of course no one of them can be concentrated either for war or for maneuvers without the maximum amount of cost. So it seems to me that the primary things are to make a sound territorial organization—

Senator THOMAS. Would you carry that further by localizing the companies?

Col. PALMER. I think it could be carried for the Infantry as far as the battalion. There is a limit beyond which you can not carry it. I think it is a principle we should carry out as far as we can. But I believe if you adopted that principle there would be a delicate, special local problem in almost every State, and it would probably be very desirable in working out the necessary regulations for the War Department to have the advice of National Guard officers and National Army officers on it, because there are a great many difficulties in it and if you commit yourself too far on it it may be embarrassing.

The CHAIRMAN. Have you finished your discussions of Gen. O'Ryan's suggestions?

Col. PALMER. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you care to comment on his suggestion that the National Guard or the National Reserve Army, whatever name is given it—he did not seem to care what name was given to it—should have representation upon the General Staff?

Col. PALMER. Mr. Chairman, I think that if you pass any law on this subject you will have to leave a great deal to regulation. Now, my branch in the General Staff is the branch that would probably have to prepare a great many of those regulations in so far as they affect organization. It would be of the very greatest advantage to us, to the officers in that branch, to have citizen army officers actually working with them on that question, for two reasons. We have a lot to learn from them in regard to the local difficulties of the problem; and, in the second place, they would come into our branch and see some of the war plans and learn of other difficulties that we have to deal with in connection with this problem. I do not think it would be a good idea to have a separate bureau or agency for that purpose, but for us to work with them on the problem of the citizen army would be the most desirable thing.

The CHAIRMAN. No; I did not mean to suggest a separate bureau or agency inside the General Staff or attached to it composed solely of citizen officers; but a provision of law making them eligible for membership or detail to the General Staff at the pay and emoluments

of their grade for a period of years, say four years or three years, or whatever seems wisest, and the percentage fixed in numbers.

Col. PALMER. Oh, if we are going to have that kind of an army we have got to rely on the citizen soldiers to help us work it out properly; there is no question about it.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. Do you not find that as a rule the Regular Army officer has not the same civilian touch as the man who is called from a State organization?

Col. PALMER. I think that is most undoubtedly true, Senator; it is unfortunate we can not get together better. I have always believed that if I could have a couple of officers like Gen. O'Ryan, and a couple of officers of my own branch, and a couple of National Army officers to work together on the question of the proper military policy for the United States, we would get together within a week and come to a unanimous agreement as to what it ought to be.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. I believe so, too.

The CHAIRMAN. I haven't the slightest doubt about it. The thing that has stood in the way of it is that the citizen officer, whether he was a National Guard or a National Army officer, has had no legal status. He has no privilege of conferring. It takes even a special order, I believe—and it is exceedingly difficult to get it for him—to admit him to Leavenworth or to any of your post-graduate schools. Lots of men have wanted to go there and have found the greatest difficulty in going. I think it is fair to say that there have been a good many Regular Army officers that I do not think wanted them to go there. I remember when the National Defense Act, Senator Chamberlain's bill, passed Congress in 1916, there was a provision in it giving National Guard officers representation in the General Staff, and the Army officers fought it bitterly, and it was knocked out in conference. If they had had one year of contact it would have done both of them a lot of good.

Col. PALMER. I have always thought so. My first tour of duty on the General Staff was in 1911 and 1912, when Secretary Stimson appointed me a member of a committee to make recommendations in regard to military policy, and I specifically recommended at that time that arrangements be made for some National Guard officers to work with us. We could have gone further with our recommendations, I have not the slightest doubt.

The CHAIRMAN. Some of the older officers of the Army would not stand for it if they could help it. I think their attitude has changed in that respect.

Col. PALMER. Oh, yes; it has. I find all along the line that the point of view of Army officers has very much cleared since this war.

The CHAIRMAN. Now you were going to discuss the Kahn-Chamberlain bill.

Col. PALMER. The Kahn-Chamberlain bill, it seems to me, proposes the same general policy that is embodied in Gen. O'Ryan's plan, and I believe that it would tend to avoid the objections that I have mentioned.

I feel quite satisfied that if a citizen army could be formed under the general provisions of the Kahn-Chamberlain bill, with a provision added giving it sufficient regular personnel to tide over the

emergency, that we could work out under it a military policy of probably the maximum efficiency and economy.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. And that leaves a good deal to regulation?

Col. PALMER. Yes; it does.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. Would you still further modify that?

Col. PALMER. I think you will have to leave it to regulation, Senator, because it is a matter, many features of which ought to be determined experimentally.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. I did not mean to modify that particular provision, but would you make modifications in the general outline of the bill itself?

Col. PALMER. The Kahn-Chamberlain bill?

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. Yes.

Col. PALMER. I do not think it would be necessary, I think the bill would operate. The question as to the details of the method of inducting into the service I have not given very much study to.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. And I would like, and I am sure the committee would like, to have you, or some one under your direction, take that bill, which in its general outlines seems to meet your approval, and make such modifications as you might deem advisable and give the committee the benefit of your views.

Col. PALMER. I think that that bill might be amended in the last few sections so as to make a complete solution of the problem.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. I think the committee would like to have you have those changes in it submitted to them in the form of a letter, or embody it in your testimony if you see fit.

Col. PALMER. All right, sir. I will get at it as soon as I can, sir.

I had already made some reference to this question of promotion. I believe that the formation of an organized citizen army in which it would be practicable to try officers out in time of peace would prevent in the future practically all of the difficulties with reference to personnel that have occurred during this war. Because every man, every officer, with every unit and every staff would get a trial, and he would be replaced in the event of inefficiency, and in many cases in justice to him he would be assigned to some other function that he could perform well.

I believe that something like the following would make a complete solution of our personnel problem.

1. Promotion up to and including the grade of colonel should be by seniority on a single list based on principle on total commissioned service. A board of general officers should be convened annually and should divide all officers in their several grades into three classes according to their records:

A Those worthy of immediate promotion;

B Those who should remain for the present without promotion, and

C Those who should be eliminated.

The classification by this board should not be subject to revision by any other authority. Promotion during the ensuing year to all grades below that of brigadier general should be made by seniority on the single list from among class A officers in the next lower grade. Officers of the Medical Department and chaplains should be extra numbers in all grades and when in class A should be promoted with their running mates on the general list.

The names of all officers in class A should be published to the service annually.

In essentials this is closely allied to the promotion system upon which the efficiency of the German army was based. That is, in any group of officers fit to be promoted the senior should be promoted, but nobody should be promoted by seniority who has not proved his fitness for promotion. If the classification were made annually and a man should be in class B this year, he would have a stimulus, he would have a chance to get into class A next year. It would give all the advantages connected with the other features of the citizen army, all the advantages of selection, and it would give an opportunity to equalize promotion. It seems to me that the curse of our promotion system is this great inequality of promotion. Down there at the General Staff College now there is an officer with 21 years' service, a colonel simply because he happened to be in the Field Artillery, which got a large legislative increase. There is another officer down there of 28 years' service who is a lieutenant colonel because he happened to be in the Infantry; and yet this Infantry officer, a man of much greater experience, was a very brilliant division commander during this war. If you take selection and put it on top of that, the defect of inequality is not corrected by selection at all, it is made worse.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. You know there has always been a great protest against promotion from a single list. The different branches of the service usually object to that, and that grows out of the reason you now suggest, they each want to have promotions in their own branch of the service.

Col. PALMER. Yes, sir.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. For instance, a Cavalry officer might be slower of promotion than an Infantry officer, or an Infantry officer might be slower of promotion than a Cavalry officer, with the result that we have unequal promotions in the Army now.

Col. PALMER. Yes, sir; that is true.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. And yet whenever they have talked about a single list there has always been a kick.

Col. PALMER. I think the idea has grown in popularity to such an extent that a great majority of thoughtful officers believe in it.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. It looks to me as if it were a fair way to do it.

Col. PALMER. It could be put into effect now much better than in the past. This war has demonstrated that a class A officer in any combatant arm, if you give him an opportunity for a little more training, will go ahead of a class B officer in any other arm in a mighty short time. There have been many instances of it. In the National Defense Act there was a provision providing for a great increase of the Field Artillery, and there was a provision for officers from other arms to go into the Field Artillery. I think that those transfers were discouraged as much as possible. I think that Field Artillery officers wanted to get as much of that promotion as they could and the transfers were discouraged as much as possible. They did not want to share it with anybody else. The idea was that an officer could not go into some other arm and learn its mysteries in such a short time, and those who did go in suffered in relative rank. They were placed so they would lose in relative rank by going, al-

though it was the intent of Congress, in my opinion, to take an over-expanded arm and help it out by giving it experienced officers from other arms.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. That was the purpose.

Col. PALMER. Yes, it was discouraged as much as possible, and yet, so far as I know, the Field Artillery officer, who most conspicuously distinguished himself during the war as a Field Artillery officer, first as a regimental commander and then as a brigade commander, was an officer who was in the Cavalry until after the National Defense Act passed. There is an awful lot of camouflage about it, Senator; it is not so terribly mysterious. I think the mystery is exploited largely, perhaps unconsciously, to preserve the advantages of the promotion.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. A man who is a successful commander to a large degree is a man who understands human nature and knows how to handle men; is not that true?

Col. PALMER. Yes. When you consider that the general officers are men who are going to command combined arms, that it is a very decided advantage for an able officer to go into another arm. In the Army the differences in functions are no greater than the differences in functions in the Navy, in which there is a constant transfer of personnel. Of course, if it were necessarily followed that the man promoted under the single list should go into the other arm—that particular individual—that would be a bad thing, but that can be avoided. It can be avoided by anticipating requirements and letting the officers who go over be officers who select the new arm and have some additional training before they go over.

The CHAIRMAN. Will you explain again how you would take care of that system of promotion from a single list, with the exception of the Medical Corps and perhaps the Signal Corps and Ordnance Corps?

Col. PALMER. We will say we admit the practicability of this system, so far as the combat arms are concerned.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Col. PALMER. Now, then, I graduate from West Point and go into the Infantry. I will be promoted by a single list. But in the case of some medical officer who goes in at the same time, you do not want to transfer him to the Infantry and Cavalry. You just make me his running mate, and if he is a competent man, he will be promoted when I am promoted. He will be promoted when the line officer who is his running mate is promoted.

The CHAIRMAN. Provided there is a vacancy in the Medical Corps of the next higher grade? You cannot promote him until there is a vacancy?

Col. PALMER. Yes, you can, Senator—in this way. You keep your total of the Medical Corps constant. It would involve some fluctuation in the numbers in particular grades; that is, it might be that it would increase the number of colonels and, correspondingly, the number of lieutenant colonels would be decreased. For an arm like that it would keep their total number constant, but the allotment to the different grades would fluctuate.

The CHAIRMAN. What would be the controlling factor then in that fluctuation? You have a single list, the combatant arm, including

Air Service—which I think the committee is disposed to call a combatant arm.

Col. PALMER. It should be; yes.

The CHAIRMAN. You have a single list for all the combatant arms and you promote from that single list. Would that promotion be apt to be faster than it would ordinarily be in the Medical Corps?

Col. PALMER. I think it would be slower than it is now. In any branch of the service where the initial grade is first lieutenant, they ought to be given a constructive increased length of service to start with. As I have stated here—well, I have not come to that point. Shall I go on?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes; go ahead.

Col. PALMER. The names of all officers in class A should be published to the service annually.

2. An officer placed in class C should be examined by a board to determine whether his service has been honest and faithful. If the board finds that it has, he should be placed on the unlimited retired list, with pay at the rate of $2\frac{1}{2}$ per cent for each year of active service, not exceeding 75 per cent, unless his commissioned service is less than 10 years, in which case he should be discharged with one year's pay.

If the board finds that his service has not been honest and faithful he should be discharged without pay.

3. The relative rank of officers in all grades below that of brigadier general should be determined by their relative seniority as fixed by the single list.

The effect of that, in the instance I gave of those two officers in the staff college, would be that this distinguished Infantry officer, when he does come into the grade of colonel, would become the senior, as he should, of the man of seven years' less service, who happened to arrive there a little sooner.

Finally, the original single list should be formed by merging the lineal lists of the several branches into one list arranged so far as practicable in the order of total length of commissioned service. Officers of the Medical Corps and chaplains should be credited with two more years than their actual service. After the list is once formed, a newly appointed lieutenant should be placed at the foot of the list and officers of the Medical Corps and chaplains should be placed immediately below officers of two years' service.

Now you could take any other arm you wanted to make strictly a specialized arm and treat it in the same way.

The CHAIRMAN. Your suggestion would destroy the permanent commissioned personnel of the Engineer Corps?

Col. PALMER. Yes, as it stands. But they might be excepted also. At first glance, an Engineer officer might think that it would be a disadvantage to him; but I think after more careful reflection he would feel that he would rather in addition to his service in the Engineer Corps be in the line as a whole, so he could have better access to command if he develops in that direction.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. It would practically interfere with all of the permanent corps, would it not?

The CHAIRMAN. There are only two—Medical Corps and Engineers.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. The others are all detailed except the new men that are left over.

Col. PALMER. There would be some good reasons for placing the Engineers in the same category as the Medical Corps.

The CHAIRMAN. It is a puzzling thing to know what to do with the technical corps.

Col. PALMER. Senator, if that question of equalizing promotion were a mere question of equity, a mere question of individual justice, I would not give it a moment's thought; but the reason in my mind why it is imperative, is that you can not get an honest computation of what the requirements of the Army are until you do it; because there is always an incentive for this line of officers, along this line of promotion on this particular function, to magnify that function as much as they can; they are bound to do it. I can give an instance of it. About 1907 we separated the Coast Artillery and the Field Artillery. In forming the new regimental organization the Artillery Board—I believe there was a board—proposed the four-gun battery as opposed to the six-gun battery, and they urged some very important advantages for it, and those advantages undoubtedly existed. There is a certain technical advantage in reducing the number of guns from six to four. It increased the number of captains by 50 per cent, but there was an advantage in it. They took that from the French, and I have no doubt that was communicated to Congress, but they did not communicate to Congress the fact that the same thing was considered in the German Army and that the Kaiser placed one of the greatest field artillery experts, Gen. Von Rohne, in charge of an investigation, to look into that for the German Army, and that Gen. Von Rohne reported that there were decided technical advantages in the change, but not sufficient to offset the increased cost.

Now, there is no question about it being a somewhat better organization; but our artillery officers went the French one better. They succeeded in adding on to that, a provision under which we have more brigadier generals, colonels, and lieutenant colonels to a given number of guns than any other army in the world. For example, under our organization, the divisional artillery must have a brigadier general, three colonels, and three lieutenant colonels. That is, each two groups of three batteries form a regiment. But during this war the divisional artillery of many French divisions was commanded by lieutenant colonels, or colonels. I remember one particularly, a lieutenant colonel, who was commanding a divisional artillery, and I asked him why he was not promoted, and he said, "Well, I am too young." He said, "I can not be promoted until I have served a little longer as lieutenant colonel." He said, "The effect would be, that it would be promoting me too much ahead of senior officers of other arms." In other words, they wanted specifically to avoid that.

Now, there is no question about the merits of the four-gun battery; there is no question about it, even though secured at increased cost. But all that overhead was not necessary; and, so far as the inefficiency of the six-gun battery was concerned, I do not think that any of us who ever happened to be in a Boche barrage, felt that the German artillery was hopelessly inefficient on account of having six guns to the battery.

That is an example of the effect of a separate promotion list, and it could be carried further, too—the effect of a promotion list where the

promotion is along the line of one particular function. The more technical that function is the more easy it is to impress members of Congress as to its importance.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, to speak frankly, let me give another illustration, not of what has occurred in the past, but what may occur in the future. You have fixed an Infantry regiment at 3,700 men. The experience of a few years may persuade some portion of the Army that happens to be in control that 3,700 is too big for an Infantry regiment, and that they would try to reduce it to 2,000. That would make more colonels and lieutenant colonels necessary, granting that the total number remains the same.

Senator FLETCHER. More in proportion.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes. Now, if a thing of that sort is done and you have a Signal Corps and Medical Corps and an Engineer Corps off to one side, but which, to keep pace, go hand in hand with the men on the combatant single list, it would be a God-send to the men in the Medical Corps, the Signal Corps and the Engineer Corps.

Col. PALMER. Well, that is true, but I think that efficient officers, unless they are given advanced promotions for some special cause, should be advanced at about the same rate in all the arms. I think it produces a better moral effect, and distracts attention from this organization question. Too many people are thinking about organization.

The CHAIRMAN. The tables of organization are very potent in the effect upon promotion. I think the War Department ought to have the right to change organizations inside the branch as it sees fit, but the change in the table of organization in the War Department which could be brought about by a stroke of the pen might mean the creation of 10 more colonelcies, 10 more lieutenant colonelcies, and 10 more majors.

Col. PALMER. You mean in that bill?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Col. PALMER. I have not examined that feature of it.

The CHAIRMAN. You see, the National Defense Act contains tables of organization, which I do not agree with. This bill does not. It provides that the Infantry shall consist of so many officers and so many men, to be organized as the President sees fit, and I think that is the proper system.

Col. PALMER. It seems to me so, yes. I think one reason it has been difficult to get this single list adopted is that it is rather complicated when you come to the details of making out the list. But that can be worked out. It would obscure the general principle, to go into detail about it; but it can be and has been worked out.

Mr. Chairman, I have quite a little more to say, if it is of interest to you, in regard to the general staff and certain defects in its organization and functions.

The CHAIRMAN. That is a very important feature of this problem.

Col. PALMER. But it would take me some little time more. It would take me, I should say, an hour. Shall I start on it?

The CHAIRMAN. I think if you can return tomorrow afternoon we will hear you then, as it is now the usual adjourning hour.

(Thereupon, at 5 o'clock p. m., the committee adjourned, to meet on Friday, October 10, 1919, at 2.15 p. m.)

REORGANIZATION OF THE ARMY.

FRIDAY, OCTOBER 10, 1919.

UNITED STATES SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON MILITARY AFFAIRS,
Washington, D. C.

The subcommittee met at 2.15 o'clock p. m., pursuant to adjournment, in the committee room, Capitol, Senator James W. Wadsworth, Jr., presiding.

Present Senators Wadsworth (chairman), Sutherland, New, Fletcher, Chamberlain, and Thomas.

The CHAIRMAN. Col. Palmer, on yesterday I believe we had reached the point in your testimony where you were about to take up the General Staff, its functions and powers.

STATEMENT OF COL. JOHN McA. PALMER—Resumed.

Col. PALMER. Yes, but there were one or two answers left rather incomplete yesterday, and I would like to complete them first, if I may.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well.

Col. PALMER. I think I left my answer to one of Senator New's questions incomplete. I stated that a committee of the General Staff, of which I was a member, prepared a preliminary report on Senator New's bill. I wish to add that that report was concurred in by all the members of the War Plans Branch of the General Staff and also by all the members of the War Plans Division of the General Staff, the War Plans Branch being a branch of the War Plans Division. Also in compliance with general instructions in regard to the preparation of the General Staff papers, copies of the plan were shown to all of the Chiefs of Division of the General Staff and to all of the bureau chiefs concerned. So far as I remember, all of these officers concurred in principle, some of them fully and some of them with certain reservations as to detail, except two of them, whose comments were not received, that is, the Chief of Coast Artillery and the executive assistant to the Chief of Staff.

Then, in regard to the question by Senator New as to whether any further recommendations as to a military policy had been made, I should have added that about June the War Plans Branch of the War Plans Division—

The CHAIRMAN. Of what year?

Col. PALMER. Of this year—prepared a statement of a military policy to guide it in the study of other plans that might be referred to it, and that was called “Statement of an ideal military policy, all things considered”—is that the correct title, Col. Gulick?

Col. GULICK. I think so.

Col. PALMER. That paper was submitted to the Chief of the War Plans Division and I have no knowledge of any further action on it. A little bit later the branch was called upon to prepare a review of the Kahn-Chamberlain bill, which it did.

The CHAIRMAN. Was it sent to the Chief of Staff?

Col. PALMER. My impression is that it was. It went to the Chief of the War Plans Division and, I presume, from him to the Chief of Staff.

In referring to the single list on yesterday—

The CHAIRMAN. Before you leave that, do you recall any instance of the recommendations of the War Plans Branch of the War Plans Division having to do with the military policy, being approved?

Col. PALMER. No, sir; I haven't any knowledge of anything of that kind.

The CHAIRMAN. In so far as affirmative action by the controlling powers is concerned, the work of the division has not been of advantage to the War Department?

Col. PALMER. It is not incorporated in any War Department plans, so far as I know them.

The CHAIRMAN. You said a moment ago that the study made of Senator New's bill received the approval of the War Plans Branch and also of the officers of the War Plans Division?

Col. PALMER. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. About how many officers would that mean?

Col. PALMER. I should say at that time there were about 30 officers. Could you tell that, Col. Gulick?

Col. GULICK. I should say there was more than that, probably 50.

The CHAIRMAN. I understand from that that something like 50 officers gave their approval of that study?

Col. PALMER. There was a considerable number. I should say from 30 to 40. Col. Gulick says there were more than that, probably 50. The division has been very much reduced since that time.

Senator FLETCHER. You are not referring to the New bill as now before us?

Col. PALMER. No, sir.

Senator FLETCHER. That is the bill with reference to aeronautics, but it was a bill for universal training?

Col. PALMER. Yes.

Senator FLETCHER. Wherein did it differ from the Chamberlain bill which is before us?

Col. PALMER. The principal difference in Senator New's bill, which proposed universal training, was that it was not connected up with the military policy as a whole. It did not indicate anything as to the relation between the Regular Army and the universal training, and it did not provide for organized reserves.

I would like to say that the paper was an initial study, giving our views as to what the bases of policy should be, leaving practically all the details for further minute study, if the plan were approved in principle.

The CHAIRMAN. And that study advocated the establishment of an organized citizens army?

Col. PALMER. It advocated universal military training, an organized citizen army, and a minimum regular establishment sufficient to accomplish that object.

With reference to the discussion yesterday in regard to the single list, the chairman suggested that if the officers of the Medical Corps were carried as "running mates" of officers on the line, that the effect of increase in any part of the line would be an increased promotion for the Medical Corps. That is true, but I think under a reasonable theory of a citizen army that, once established, there would not be any more increases in the Regular Army or there would be very small increases.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. On the other hand, would it not be gradually reduced?

Col. PALMER. I was about to say, sir, that on the contrary, having a single list would facilitate that process materially, because whatever the reduction might be it would be an equalized reduction and would affect all officers alike.

I have a table here which may be of interest, showing the dates of original commissions of the senior colonel, the junior colonel, the senior lieutenant colonel, the junior lieutenant colonel, the senior major and the junior major of certain branches of the service:

Year of original commission—Data obtained from Army Register for 1918.

	Senior colonel.	Junior colonel.	Senior lieutenant colonel.	Junior lieutenant colonel.	Senior major.	Junior major.
Medical Corps.....	1881	1900	1900	1904	1904	1917
Cavalry.....	1877	1890	1890	1895	1895	1900
Field Artillery.....	1880	1898	1898	1901	1901	1904
Coast Artillery.....	1881	1892	1892	1898	1898	1901
Infantry.....	1879	1890	1890	1894	1894	1901

I do not like to leave this question of a citizen army, the feasibility of a citizen army, without referring just a little bit more to the practicability of tests of efficiency that will make it possible to determine the proper places of officers, whether they happen to be in the Regular Army or in the citizen army. It is not purely a question of educational knowledge; it is a practical question.

For instance, in the case of the law, a man may come out number one in the class of a law school, but it will be impossible to determine in advance whether or not he is going to be a good lawyer; it may be that he will become a successful practitioner or judge, or it may be that he will be a mere pedant. His actual place is fixed during the practice of his profession. Now, in the military profession, a man may not have a chance actually to practice it in war until he has been in the service for 20 years, and it is a little bit more difficult to determine.

But in France and Germany that is precisely what they determine in their peace establishment. That is the object of their annual maneuvers.

Wherever a country has an army that is substantially the same in peace and in war, such questions of fact can be determined.

It may be a little bit academic, but I would like to point out the principle of it in this way.

The military efficiency of an officer might be indicated by an equation: $E=AK$, in which E is his efficiency and K is his knowledge and A is a coefficient, an applicative coefficient determined by his character, his energy, and other practical factors.

Now, if you take a soldier like Napoleon, K is very high and A is also near its maximum value. In the case of a theoretical soldier, like our Gen. Halleck, of Civil War fame, K was probably as high as it was in the case of Napoleon, or nearly so, but his practical or applicative coefficient was very low, therefore his efficiency as a whole was low. Take a man like Forrest, a man so illiterate that he could not write an order; yet one of the greatest cavalry soldiers the world ever produced. In that instance K was perhaps very small, but A was exceptionally larger and what little he did not know he could apply. In his case the product, or total efficiency, had a large value. This fact has been very largely ignored in our military educational system. We develop K , or theoretical knowledge, as much as we can, but we do not put enough stress on A . We do not know whether we are going to produce a practical man or a pedant. In France and Germany they do not do that; they measure the product itself. When a man comes up to be promoted to a grade that would entitle him to command a battalion of infantry that is the one thing they measure—can he do that? It doesn't make any difference whether he is a philosopher or not or that perhaps some time later he may become a field marshal. What they measure is his capacity to command a battalion. It is perfectly feasible to measure that.

I can take a military map and write out a military situation indicating that there is a division of troops here and reports of an enemy off there, with certain other data pertaining to the situation, and I can give a candidate, we will say, for the General Staff, precisely the same intellectual problem—absolutely the same intellectual problem—that he would have to solve in time of war. He must answer it, not by writing an essay, but writing the precise orders that he would give in that situation.

That method was invented first by Frederick the Great, and was developed by von Moltke. In France it has been carried on by men like Foch. Through that method they have been able not only to train officers, but to actually measure them: they calibrate them and determine in time of peace whether a particular man can actually do the particular thing that is going to be required of him. And that is a very important thing to consider in regard to this citizen army.

THE CHAIRMAN. In other words, these officers, before being promoted to a higher command, would be taken out and given an opportunity to show whether they could actually command a body of troops?

COL. PALMER. Absolutely; and purely as a matter of fact.

That leads me to one of the strongest points in this citizen army. I think when the conception first came to me, when I first began to work on it, the idea I had in mind was this: That it was the kind of an army that the United States must have. Whether the most efficient or not, it was the type fixed by our political institutions. But, as I have worked into it, I am inclined to believe that it is a powerful

army in a military sense, the most efficient army in a military sense, because if you have universal training, those citizens who take the training, and are interested in military things, keep on and qualify for advancement from year to year so that what you really do in the end is to select military ability and leadership out of the whole twenty million people who would pass through that institution in thirty years. I believe that produces an army that is least militaristic in peace and also an army that is the most powerful in war. I think it would produce the most powerful army that the world has ever seen. As a member of the War Plans Branch of the General Staff, I believe that, under that system, we can create an army that would defend the United States against any combination of enemies, even assuming that our navy should lose command of the sea, and that the command of the sea should pass into the hands of a hostile combination. A citizen army of that kind would make our shores absolutely inviolate. Behind it we could deliberately develop our resources to meet any situation.

Senator FLETCHER. Would it take long to mobilize such an army?

Col. PALMER. You could mobilize it quicker than you could any other kind of an army. For example, take the plans for the defense of New York City. With an organized citizen army there would be one or more divisions actually living on Long Island. There would be two or more divisions in the city itself and others in New Jersey and elsewhere near the city. These troops would be living all their lives near their initial war positions. They would mobilize and be in their war positions within forty-eight hours, commanding every practicable landing place within striking distance of New York. During their peace maneuvers they would be practiced in the art of taking these positions. In my opinion, such an army would mobilize to meet the situation quicker than any other army that could possibly be devised, assuming, of course, that its men had had sufficient training that the officers and noncommissioned officers should get as a preliminary to promotion.

The organized citizen army would modify the conception of the Reserve Officers Training Corps as it exists under the present law. The Reserve Officers Training Corps is extremely important, as a part of the existing system. But if you have universal military training and an organized reserve army, most of the officers of that army would be raised from among the trained young men of each community, whether they go to college or not. It would not be necessary, inasmuch as all young men would receive military training, to have arrangements for close order drill and matters of that kind in the colleges. It would modify the system materially. The college would still have a place in offering certain elective studies to men who are qualifying for promotion in the military service, but it would take away any necessity on the part of the colleges to give a part of their time to rudimentary military drill.

I have heard it suggested, I think it was in Gen. Woods's testimony, that under universal training, young men in the colleges should be exempted from a part of the compulsory training. I think that would be a mistake, because I think it is just those young men who, for their own good and the good of their fellows, ought to go right into this democratic army.

I have noticed a number of references to West Point in the hearings. I think if an organized citizen army is our policy that the place for West Point would be a very definite one.

Under the system I have in mind, no young man would go to West Point until he had served his time in the ranks under this system of universal training. The cadets under that system would be the cream of the young men from the training camps, men who had already developed military aptitude. It would be no longer more or less of a pure accident as to whether a man was to go there or not; they would be men of predetermined aptitude.

Then, as now, the Regular Army being relatively small, its main function in peace times would become an educational one, and the place of West Point in the system would be that of a place to train trainers, a sort of normal school for the whole system, which would justify the highest kind of basic education.

So it seems to me that under that plan West Point while fulfilling its original aims would be brought into the closest contact with the people.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. Before you leave that question of West Point, why would it not be possible, under some system of army reorganization and of a citizen army, for the colleges and universities to be training schools, with West Point as a postgraduate institution?

Col. PALMER. Well, I think a system of that kind could be worked out, but it seems to me that the citizen army itself would be the school for the training of the officers of the country; that it would be the school for the training of officers for the great war army. You will have to have a professional cadre, a professional training cadre, composed of men who are going to devote their lives to the military profession, and who would require this special training, and I believe that West Point itself would fill that bill.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. In over 100 years they have not sent as many as 10,000 officers into the Army from West Point. They can not graduate enough men to do the work.

Col. PALMER. I do not know exactly what the present capacity is, but I think it might graduate three or four hundred a year. It would not be sufficient to furnish all the professional officers for the Army.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. Some of the best officers we had in the war were young college men who have never been to a military institution?

Col. PALMER. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. It is fair to say, however, that they learned the game from the West Point officers?

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. Yes.

Col. PALMER. Section 3 of the War Department bill contains proposed legislation affecting the General Staff. The hearings have been full of comment on and criticisms of the General Staff.

After the national defence act was passed in 1916, as a member of the General Staff, I was detailed to prepare some new regulations for the General Staff, in the light of the new law, and I had to dig in and find out just what a General Staff was before I could start on them. My ideas on that subject I suspected were vague, and I found that they were very vague when I began to go into it. I had to dig out and study the evolution of the institution in Germany,

where it had gradually developed ever since about 1760, since the Seven Years War, and then I had to study the other question as to how an institution of that kind, designed for an autocratic government like Germany, could best be adapted to the kind of Government that we have.

I am perfectly satisfied that one of the principal causes for the confusion of thought in regard to a General Staff is that very few people know what a General Staff is. That is true in civil life; it is true in the Army; and it is also true in the General Staff itself.

One reason for the confusion is the fact that the German word "generalstab" when translated into English as "general staff" is an incorrect translation; it does not convey the same idea at all. It is generally supposed, because of that incorrect translation, that a General Staff officer is an officer who has a sort of general relation to every military activity, whereas, as a matter of fact, in the German Army and in the French Army he is a specialist of the most restricted type.

We started our general staff in 1903 and the British started theirs in 1904. The British recognized the foregoing fact, and in the literature, the documents, in connection with the establishment of the General Staff in Great Britain they pointed out that this confusion of meaning must be avoided. It was therefore suggested that it should not be called a General Staff at all, that it should be called an operations staff, a military operations staff.

Now, as an example of how restricted the meaning is in German—I am not a German scholar, but I have looked this up—the army General Staff in its modern form was started away back in the time of Frederick the Great and has been developing all these years. The German Navy, however, did not develop until comparatively recently. When it got important enough for them to devise an agency for the navy corresponding to the General Staff in the army they did not call it the naval general staff, they called it the "admiralstab" or "admiral's staff."

That word "generalstab" should not be translated into English as "general staff." It should be translated into English as the "general's staff," or the "generalship staff," or the "tactical staff." The point is that just as a general needs a quartermaster's staff to assist him in certain matters of supply, a medical staff to assist him in certain matters in regard to the health of his command, so he needs a "generalship staff" or "general's staff" to assist him in the performance of his own peculiar function of leading troops in battle.

So in France and Germany General Staff officers are products of a special system of education and the subject matter of that education is precisely the same as the subject matter of the generals' education. The idea in Germany is to begin training these young men while they are young. They seek out those who have the tactical aptitude and train them as generals' assistants. They give them the precise training in higher troop leading and things of that kind that a general should have. The idea is that during their youth they are generals' assistants and that when they attain sufficient rank to command they will be generals in fact. For example, Marshal Hindenburg received that training in the German War Academy, and the fact that he had the tactical gift was determined in his youth as the preliminary qualification for the General Staff. He

was trained all of his life to perform that function. As a captain or lieutenant he was on some corps commander's general staff. As he became older, he was on the great General Staff from time to time, and at another time he was a teacher in the General Staff college; but all of his life he was practicing the profession of troop leading, of generalship.

So we have their conception of a general staff in connection with troops. They had a general staff with troops in the German Army for 60 years before they ever had a "Great General Staff" or central general staff in Berlin; just as we had Army quartermasters, and a conception of what a quartermaster should be long before we had a quartermaster general in Washington.

It is important to realize the fact that a general staff officer is primarily an officer of special training, of a special professional type; and I think it is interesting to go back to the way the thing started.

At the close of the Seven Years War, Frederick the Great started a school for training young officers to perform this duty. He had developed himself in a method for accomplishing that end. It is described somewhat in Carlyle's History of Frederick the Great. I do not remember the exact quotation, but Carlyle points out Frederick's habit when going through the country, and seeing a piece of ground of a certain kind, of saying to himself, "I am in command of troops here, and if I were attacked by other troops from this direction, what should I do; what orders should I issue?" He began that practice before the battle of Mollwitz. Before his first battle he recognized that the question on the battlefield was a question of action, a question of what to do, and not a question of theoretical knowledge; that it was a question of practice. He kept that method up throughout his life. As he went on with it he developed his practical sense of tactical judgment; and out of that grew a great educational system.

The next step in the evolution of the idea was the thought that if this method of self-training in tactics was successful, it would also be an excellent means for training others. It is something like the case system in the law school, where a man is given a specific case to work out. We call this method the applicatory method. In France they call it the method of concrete cases. The student is required to solve a specific tactical problem and not to write an essay on it. He is required to make a tactical decision and to write the orders which should be written to meet that situation.

So Frederick the Great developed that idea in his educational system for young officers. It also has a further advantage, which is really the most remarkable thing about it. That is, it becomes a tactical measuring rod; it becomes a method of calibrating, by means of which a man who himself knows tactics can determine whether some candidate has tactical judgment or not. This is the method that Frederick the Great developed and for over 50 years before the great general staff was to meet in Berlin that system of education went on in Germany. It was training men to be general staff officers in the purely restricted sense that they were to be the assistants of generals in the performance of the generals' proper and strategical and tactical duties.

A General Staff officer in that sense is primarily a trained troop leader; he is a man who is trained in tactical values; and when he comes to coordinate other agencies or other services, it is purely in

that direction that he ought to influence them. He should not do their business for them.

In that strict, original sense, the duties of these General Staff officers were to prepare fighting orders, to get intelligence of the enemy and make proper inferences from that intelligence, to conduct the training of troops and the development of tactical doctrine. A general can not do all those things alone, and these officers were to assist the general in doing the thing which was the general's peculiar problem. No officer could have this duty unless he was equipped for it, and all able officers were encouraged to aspire to it and to qualify for it.

Now, after the collapse of Prussia in the Napoleonic Wars, the old system broke down. Scharnhorst established "the Great General Staff" in Berlin, which would correspond to our War Department General Staff. The natural idea was that if it was desirable to have General Staff officers in Army corps and divisions to look out for purely military functions there, it would be equally desirable to have men qualified to work on substantially the same problems for the Army as a whole. So in that way the great general staff at Berlin was formed.

I have frequently heard an analogy between a general staff and a board of directors; I think I have read it in these hearings. But the analogy is not carried far enough. It is a good analogy; but in a board of directors, as I understand it, a director does not interfere with any of the great industrial or technical activities of the corporation of which he is a director. He is an expert on just one thing, and that is the problem of profit. He coordinates that corporation, because he is acting on the whole proposition from the standpoint of its most important function; that is to say, the director is opposed to an item of expenditure even though very trifling, if it is a waste and affects the problem of profit unfavorably. But, on the other hand, if it is a question of the expenditure of a million dollars that will add to profit, he is favorably disposed to it. I think that is the real analogy with reference to the General Staff. The General Staff officer, if he is a real General Staff officer by training and belongs to that professional type, endeavors to coordinate the whole system in the direction of its primary function, that is effective fighting power. That is the only thing upon which he is supposed to be an expert.

If he is a trained General Staff officer, under the French and German systems, the tactical faculty has been determined and developed in him and that is the primary reason he is there. He may be much else, many other things may be required of him. If he is in the operations, or "G-3" branch, he is dealing almost purely with tactics. When he comes to "G-4" branch, the supply branch, he is dealing with something more than tactics, but he is always dealing with it from the tactical point of view. You put a trained General Staff officer in "G-4" and he will inform the supply services as to what they ought to supply in order to conform to the tactical plan; but if you put a former quartermaster in there, who is not a trained General Staff officer, he will think, no doubt, that he is put there for some reason or other, and the only way he can solve the problem is to do the quartermaster's business for him.

That is the thing, in my mind, that we have overlooked entirely in the development of our General Staff.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. Well, did not the national defense act undertake to check measurably the disposition of the General Staff to go outside of what you conceive the General Staff duties are?

Col. PALMER. Yes; it did, but if you had prescribed that only trained General Staff officers could have been on the General Staff, the occasion for that legislation would never have arisen.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. In other words, they would have known that it was not their duty to administer?

Col. PALMER. Yes, sir. If you should form a surgical hospital, and provide trained surgeons for it, it would not be necessary for you to make regulations that they should not interfere with the nurses or the apothecaries; because they would not want to do it.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. But there was nothing in the act of 1916, and there was nothing in the General Staff act of 1903 that placed any check upon the appointing power, with regard to men who were suitable for General Staff officers—

Col. PALMER. That is true.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. So that if there was any mistake made it was not in the law?

Col. PALMER. It was not in the law. I think the act of 1903 is one of the most perfect laws that we ever had on our statute books.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. I think so, too. I read it only a day or two ago.

Col. PALMER. Yes, sir.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. That was a perfect law, but the General Staff created under it began to go outside of the provisions and province of the General Staff proper, and the act of 1916, the national defense act, attempted to check that and to bring them back within the purposes of the 1903 act.

Col. PALMER. Yes; that is true.

I want to explain why that situation existed.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. Yes, and if you can, suggest how it can be checked. I think it ought to be checked.

Col. PALMER. I have a specific recommendation for that when I come to it.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. I would be very glad to have it. I did not mean to interrupt you, Colonel.

Col. PALMER. Before leaving this German institution, to which I referred, because that is where it evolved—

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. We are very much interested in it.

Col. PALMER. Von Moltke, when he came to the General Staff—I mean the original great von Moltke—regarded it as the principal duty to the General Staff to train General Staff officers. Even after he became chief of the General Staff he continued to be the principal tactical and strategical instructor of the German War Academy. He did that for two reasons: One was to see that the proper doctrine was imparted to these important officers that were being trained; but primarily I think so that he himself could determine which of them were General Staff officers in this strict professional sense.

For example, we have down in the library at the War College a set of von Moltke's problems—problems given to captains and lieutenants who were in the War Academy as candidates for the Gen-

eral Staff. In addition, we have comments on those problems taken from his shorthand notes. In one of these problems, he gave the candidates a map of Eastern Prussia, and told them that each one of them was in command of an Army corps and a Cavalry division stationed at a certain point on the flank of a possible advance of forces from Russia. He gave them that problem and all the information that might reasonably have been known to the commanding officer of that force, and he said, "What are your arrangements for to-morrow?" This situation was given as at 7 o'clock in the evening. In other words, they were not to write an essay on tactics or anything of that kind, but they were to put themselves in the place of a corps commander, make a decision and write at once the specific orders that should be issued to meet that situation.

Now, the remarkable thing about that was that those officers were young captains or first lieutenants. We have had a great deal of criticism in our own service sometimes because we have given problems that are a little bit too advanced for junior officers. It is significant that Von Moltke was doing it there, and for a reason.

In his comments he mentions a number of defects in the solutions that were offered, and offered his suggestions as to how they were to be corrected, but he says "The majority of the young gentlemen have demonstrated that they are able to lead troops of all arms." And it was their capacity to do that, determined by him, that gave them their first provisional tour on the German General Staff. These young men were not given that test because he had the slightest idea of employing captains or first lieutenants to lead army corps, but because he expected to use them as assistants of the generals who were going to lead and train the army corps.

Education for the General Staff or *État Major* in France proceeds along practically the same lines. All candidates for the general staff attend the *Ecole de Guerre* for three years. The ascendancy of men like Foch, Petain and Fayolle in the French army is due to the fact that they were the recognized teachers of tactics and the art of war in that school. The tactics of the whole French army have been formed by them. The corps commanders, division commanders, and most of the higher general staff officers have received their doctrine at their hands. They attained their positions because they had that doctrine.

In France the officer who successfully passes that course receives what is called a general staff brevet; he is borne on the rolls of the French army as a general staff brevet or eligible, and selections for the general staff are taken only from that list. The number of brevets, of course, is very much greater than there are places on the general staff, but members of the general staff can only be selected from that brevet list. Then when war comes that very large list is immediately available for the expanded general staff.

In my opinion, one of the most valuable features of that system is the fact that just as soon as an ambitious young officer enters the French army that eligibility list shows him the real goal for advancement. We have no criterion for advancement to our General Staff; there is no well-known way through which an ambitious officer can reach it.

When you consider the duties of the general staff in the field—and it should be understood, of course, that nobody should be on the War

Department General Staff unless he is competent for General Staff duties with troops—you have to consider that a general, in order to make a command fight as a unit, has to give orders to thousands of men in the infantry, the cavalry, the artillery, the air service, the tanks, and the chemical warfare service. Those are the tactical elements. He also has to give instructions to the following administrative services: The adjutant, the inspector, the judge advocate, the chaplain, the provost marshal; also the following technical people: The engineers, the signal corps, the medical corps, the motor transport; also to the following supply people, the quartermaster, the ordnance, the transportation people, and so forth. He can not possibly do that himself, and the measure of his general staff is simply that body of officers necessary to assist him in giving the general's orders, and those orders only. Organization is facilitated in the first place by dividing up the different fighting services into organized units like divisions. Let us take the case of the commanding general of a corps with three divisions. He has those three divisions out in front of him to give orders to. He has all of these administrative and supply services in the rear that must function. He perhaps has only one or two roads up to his position, over which proper priorities must be determined; that is, the time when munitions must go up, another time when rations must go up; and another time when the wounded men must be evacuated. Obviously that road would become congested beyond belief in a very short time if somebody did not co-ordinate the activities of the operating services, at least to the extent of telling them what particular road they should use and when they should use it.

Now, I think I can illustrate right here as to how far the General Staff should actually operate. The operations section or the "G-3" section, gives the tactical or fighting orders. If it is a well trained army, with a well trained staff and well trained commanders, those orders will be extremely brief. They will simply give to each division commander his mission telling him what to do but not how to do it. They will be very brief. It is one of the first principles of proper General Staff practice, that the orders of the General Staff should not go any further than necessary to accomplish that object. But if the divisions are only partially trained; if the divisional staffs are improperly developed; if it is a new Army; then, as a matter of fact, you can not assume that all subordinate units will know just exactly what to do. In that case success demands that the operation orders should be amplified as much as necessary.

For instance, if I am a competent commander of a trained brigade and an order is given to me as to just how I would use my machine guns, that would not be a proper order; but if I am a partially trained brigadier general, and my troops are only partly trained, it would be quite proper to give me such detailed instructions as might be necessary.

Coming back, then, to the services in the rear you have the same thing. There you have "G-4," the supply section of the General Staff, and its function is to give orders to the services in the rear. The same principle should apply here; no more interference in the operating functions than necessary. But there again you have the same proposition, that it may be necessary at times to go into a great deal more detail.

Now, when we formed our General Staff we were in a different position from the French or the Germans.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. You mean over there?

Col. PALMER. No I mean the formation of the General Staff in 1903. The British formed theirs in 1904, and we formed ours in 1903. We had the problem of forming a General Staff in a country where there were no trained General Staff officers. That is a good deal like forming a college of physicians and surgeons in a country where there are no doctors. The British recognized that fact. Their literature shows that, and they pointed out that one of the first functions of this new General Staff must be the education of general staff officers and the establishment of eligibility for General Staff. Men like Haig, Robertson, and Wilson are products of that system.

The problem was a little bit simpler for the British, because their General Staff had that one function of general staff duty. Our problem was a little more difficult because the act of 1903 created two new agencies and not just one. The act of 1903 created a General Staff, and it also created a new supervising agency in the War Department, an office of Chief of Staff which was not included in the British system at all.

If that act of congress had merely created a General Staff, we might like the British, have taken time to solve the first problem of the General Staff. Namely the development of a personnel, trained for General Staff duty with troops. Having that personnel and the general educational system necessary to produce it, the coordinating problem would largely have solved itself. But it is safe to say that probably nobody on our first General Staff panel really knew what a General Staff was. They probably all felt, however, that they were ready to assist the Chief of Staff in supervising the Adjutant General and the Quartermaster General and the other Bureau Chiefs. They were ready to coordinate without ever realizing that they did not possess the fundamental and specific tactical training which is the sole legitimate basis for General Staff coordination. In short through the popular mistranslation of a foreign term they began to busy themselves as a "General" Staff and not as "generalship" staff.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. Perhaps they thought that they had nothing to do unless they did that.

Col. PALMER. Quite likely.— That was very natural under the circumstances.

If they had really known what the professional type was and how important it was to create it, they must have accepted that as the first problem before them.

In other words, our General Staff was formed not to perform functions that were already being performed, but to perform functions that were not being performed at all under the old system. They did not get started at that right away, and the consequence of the situation was that we had no General Staff with troops; we did not have any organized bodies of troops and did not have any conception of what the General Staff's duties with troops were. We had no specific eligibility for the General Staff, and the conception was that what we wanted on the General Staff was merely able men. Well, we got them, probably the ablest group of officers in the service, but that did not fill the bill. What was required was a particular

kind of ability. No amount of legal or architectural skill or ability will qualify a man to practice surgery. And no amount of ability as an artilleryman or infantryman or cavalryman will qualify a man for the General Staff. That was the situation when our General Staff was founded.

However, not very long after that, it happened that a revolution took place in our school system. We had what was called an Infantry and Cavalry School at Fort Leavenworth. Before the Spanish-American war it was an excellent school. That school was resumed in 1903, and started very much along the old lines of giving a great deal of academic knowledge and a great deal of information on military matters, up to 1906. About 1906 Maj. Morrison, now Maj. Gen. Morrison, introduced out there in our school a system precisely the same, with respect to the method of tactical instruction, that von Moltke had developed; that is, specific instruction for the tactical duties of the General Staff, by the method of concrete cases. It was absolutely revolutionary in our service, and very few of our officers realized it.

We had that school out there and, in theory, officers would go there for two years, and if they passed the qualification stage they would come to the War College here and take a course, which was really a probationary tour on the General Staff. Under that plan we had an educational system very much, so far as practical efficiency goes, the same as the one von Moltke started.

Now, these new tactical methods, these methods of practical education and calibration were put into effect by Gen. Morrison, a man whom I regard as one of the greatest geniuses I have ever known, a man who is not well known outside the Army, but who to a large extent has put a new soul into our military service.

From that time on, officers graduated from there, after two years of practical test as to their capacity to solve tactical problems, and upon graduation recommendation was made as to whether or not they were qualified for General Staff duty with troops; they were recommended as competent to be division commanders, or perhaps chief of staff of a division in the event of war. But that was never recognized at all as essential in our practical determination of General Staff eligibility.

In 1916, when I was detailed to draw new regulations for the General Staff, I tried to get a regulation to that effect put in. I fought it out, but without success.

There were 51 officers on the General Staff at that time. Of these one officer, and one only had had the course of the Staff College, with the final course at the War College. There were six or seven of us who had had the preliminary two years tactical grounding at the Staff College, but had not had the final course at the War College. I think there were 10 or 11 who had the finishing school without the proper preliminary training. The remainder, a great majority of all, had had no General Staff training at all.

Now, that was the situation before the war. We had not done what the British regarded as essential and necessary to be done, and that was to establish a system of General Staff eligibility, and I think that accounts for a great many of our difficulties. Fortunately, however, there was a considerable number of officers in the service who were trained and available for such duty.

Senator FLETCHER. How was the General Staff selected at that time?

Col. PALMER. Selected as it is now, by boards of general officers who, in the absence of any specific criterion, selected generally able officers. They always have selected able officers; but, because they did not understand the real requirement, they did not pick out the specific type.

But when we went over to France, Gen. Pershing recognized and carried out the correct policy just as far as he could.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. That is the French policy?

Col. PALMER. Yes; that is, wherever he could, he employed trained General Staff officers for General Staff duty. There were not enough to go around. There were a great many very able officers, who were sent over there for Staff duty that had not had that training, but wherever he could he utilized trained officers and trained just as many as he could.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. Where could he get them?

Col. PALMER. There were probably a couple of hundred of them trained before the war.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. That had had General Staff duty or training?

Col. PALMER. Yes, officers who had had General Staff training along tactical lines.

Gen. Pershing utilized these officers as far as he could. In my own section of the General Staff, the Operations Section, so far as I could I got officers with that training, officers that I knew had been calibrated and tested for that duty. Then just as soon as we could we supplemented that supply by establishing a General Staff School at Langres, where we had the advantage of the assistance of British and French General Staff officers. Of course, we could only give these students a three or four months course and could not give them full General Staff training. We had to specialize instead of training them for General Staff duty as a whole. We had to take a man whose record showed that he might have aptitude for operations and train him for "G-3."

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. That was what ought to have been done here before the war, according to your theory?

Col. PALMER. Certainly. In my opinion, it was that policy more than anything else that made the tactical and strategical success of the American Expeditionary Force possible. To my mind it was due very largely to that, that within a little over a year after our first division arrived in France, there was a great American front; that there were two major American offensives and that American commanders with American staffs actually led those large bodies of troops in battle.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. You think they could not have done it in the condition they were when they first went over?

Col. PALMER. I do not think it could have been done if Gen. Pershing had selected his general staff in the promiscuous and unscientific manner prevalent in the United States before the War.

In the latter part of August, 1917; I think it was the 19th of August, I went up to the French front north of Verdun. I went up with Gen. Pershing and we were the guests of Gen. Petain. I was

there when the French made that attack through which they recovered the position of Morthomme on the hills just northwest of Verdun, on the morning of the 20th of August. On the evening of the 19th I was present when the chief of staff of the French Second Army was receiving reports from the chiefs of staff of the different army corps as to the progress of demolition and the progress of artillery work up to that point, and giving final instructions and modifications necessary for the attack, which was to begin at daybreak. When I looked at the elaborateness of the system, at the business methods required, and the large number of highly trained and specialized men that were necessary to make it work, it was almost appalling to me to conceive how we could ever do the same thing promptly with the limited trained personnel that we had.

On that trip I was present at a number of conversations that Gen. Petain had with Gen. Pershing; and, in considering and weighing the contribution that America might make to the war and the difficulties that confronted us, the French commander expressed more concern over our lack of trained General Staff officers than any other thing.

Gen. Pershing had already completed his plans for starting this General Staff training and Gen. Petain was more than ready to assist him in every way. Now, while we had a very limited number of trained General Staff officers, we had a good many more than the French realized, so that it was not necessary to simply let them lead us by the hand. We were able in a few months to take the additional doctrine that they had, and in a very short time we were running our own schools.

Now, that was in August of 1917 and in October of 1918, just a little over a year later, I went up to that same front, just before I reported to command my brigade and I heard an American chief of staff of a field army, in pretty nearly that same terrain, giving tactical directions to three American chiefs of army corps, to take such and such a place the next day. They were all men that I knew and they were all men who were graduates of our staff college at Fort Leavenworth—all men who had been tried out for their present duty and recommended for it and calibrated for it—men that there was every reason to believe could deliver the goods, and they did.

Now, sir, in my opinion, that represents the absolute fundamental requirement for an efficient General Staff. I believe a General Staff is an absolutely indispensable agency, and I believe if it is composed of properly trained General Staff officers that it will necessarily function. I do not believe that any amount of prohibition or injunction will make it function unless that preliminary condition is fulfilled. I know of many cases where General Staff officers have gone beyond their proper sphere in dealing with troop commanders and services; but I do not know of any instance where it ever occurred that it could not be traced back to the fact that the man who did it was not a trained General Staff officer. That has been my experience. Trained General Staff officers do not want to do it. The 1903 act is a brilliant and beautifully worded law, ideally adapted to accomplish its intent. In that law the phrase "informing and coordinating" is used. It has been my experience that if the informing part is properly done, the coordinating part generally takes care of itself. And that is the great function of the General Staff.

Finally, I believe that the following rules must be adopted if you are to have an efficient General Staff:

(a) No officer should be detailed to the General Staff until after specific training for General Staff duty and official determination of capacity to perform the duties of a General Staff officer with troops. The test of eligibility should specifically include a determination of the officer's tactical judgment and his ability to prepare sound tactical orders for the maneuver and combat of a division or greater force of all arms. A list of all officers eligible for detail to the General Staff under these conditions should be published in orders annually and the fact of eligibility should be published in the annual army register under the name of each eligible officer.

(b) The list should include the following officers:

(1) Those graduates of the Army Staff College prior to July 1, 1917, who upon graduation were specifically recommended as qualified for duty as commander or chief of staff of a division or greater force of all arms.

(2) Those graduates of the Army War College prior to July 1, 1917, who upon graduation were specifically recommended as qualified for duty as commander or chief of staff of a division or greater force of all arms.

(3) Those officers who have demonstrated by their actual service during the recent war, that they are qualified for duty as commander or chief of staff of a division or greater force of all arms.

(4) Those officers who hereafter upon graduation from the General Staff School are specifically recommended as qualified for General Staff duty with troops on active service.

(c) Boards of general officers detailed to select officers for the General Staff should be composed only of general officers who themselves are eligible for detail to the General Staff.

The provision of such a list would not only assure competent personnel for the General Staff, but would establish a clearly defined avenue to the General Staff open to all ambitious officers who desired to qualify for that duty.

Nothing could be done that would have a more stimulating effect upon the ambitious young officers of the Army. It would establish a clear goal for professional aspiration open to all from the moment of entry into the service. It would produce a greater number of general staff eligibles than would be required for the peace establishment of the General Staff and would furnish a means for the immediate expansion of an enlarged General Staff in time of war. I think that the number of officers that would come under that classification now would be approximately 250, and that our existing system of military education would probably add 30 or 40 to the list each year. It is fortunate now that it can be done without putting it purely on an academic basis. A credit should therefore be given to those officers who during the war have performed that duty and have performed it well.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. Can you tell the committee how the selections for the General Staff have been made since 1903; what the consideration has been that has led to the appointment of officers on the General Staff?

Col. PALMER. Well, I have no doubt that the boards have been very conscientious in their efforts to find able officers. There have been

careful examinations of the records of prospective general staff officers and the boards have generally selected officers that they know to be efficient. But there has been no established criterion such as exists in all other modern armies.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. In other words, they have not had in mind the fundamentals of which you speak?

Col. PALMER. They have not.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. Do they have them in mind now?

Col. PALMER. I think so, because in the last list the great majority of them would have been eligible for General Staff duty under the rules I have just indicated. But I think it ought to be mandatory. I believe it ought to be known to the service and known to the country.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. You have doubtless seen the opinion of the Judge Advocate General, as well as the opinion of the Secretary of War, overruling the opinion of the Judge Advocate General, in 1916?

Col. PALMER. I have read them, Senator, but it was some time ago.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. I rather incline to the opinion, from my recollection of those two opinions, that the Secretary of War in his opinion did not have the idea of a General Staff which you have so plainly explained to us to-day.

Col. PALMER. I think it is quite likely that he has not. I think it is not generally known in our country, Senator; it is not generally known.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. Is there any way to define in a statute what the qualifications of appointees for the General Staff should be, and is there any way to ascertain those qualifications when once they have been prescribed?

Col. PALMER. Both are perfectly feasible. There is no doubt about it.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. There isn't any bill before us now that does that.

Col. PALMER. No, sir.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. Do you think it would be a wise policy now to practically reenact the General Staff act of 1903, eliminating a Chief of Staff for the future?

Col. PALMER. No, sir. I am afraid I ran the risk of being misunderstood on that, Senator. What I meant to say was that two new agencies were formed in 1903, but that the primary and more important agency was overlooked for a long time. I think we ought to have them both and that the law as it stands is ideal. There ought to be a policy forming or planning agency in the War Department, as contemplated by the second section of the act, and there ought to be an executive agency to supervise the execution of that policy as provided in the fourth section of the act. Now, if all the officers on the General Staff were trained General Staff officers, all the causes for any shortcomings that there might have been in the past would be removed.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. Is there any officer, either in the British or French or German general staff that corresponds to our Chief of Staff?

Col. PALMER. Yes, in the French system but not in the original German system.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. Does he have any functions of command?

Col. PALMER. You mean the French chief of the general staff?

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. Yes.

Col. PALMER. I think he does. Gen. Foch occupied some such position before he was placed in supreme command of the allied armies.

The CHAIRMAN. Early in the war he became an army commander.

Col. PALMER. But I think just before he was made supreme commander he was on duty at the French Ministry of War in a position that corresponds very closely to the position of Chief of Staff. That point, Senator Chamberlain, depends on the political organization. In Germany the problem was a very simple one. There was a Kaiser, who was a soldier himself, the War Lord. Now he had under him three practically independent agencies; he had three problems; first to determine what to do, second, to provide the matériel and the means of executing that policy; and third, to provide proper leaders to carry it out; a General Staff to determine what to do, a Minister of War to provide the army, the money and the men, and a Military Cabinet to select the higher commanders. The military cabinet had the function of selecting army and corps commanders and the higher agents to carry the determined policy into effect. So in Germany the War Department and the General Staff were entirely separate. The Chief of the General Staff was coordinate with the minister of war. When they prepared for the Austrian war in 1866 von Moltke was the Chief of Staff and von Roon was the War Minister.

The idea was that Von Roon prepared the sword and Von Moltke wielded it. That is possible in a system where the head of the government is the military commander, because he is the coordinating agent himself. But when you come to a form of government in which you have a civilian minister of war who is responsible to the civil authorities for the efficiency of the military establishment, it seems to me you have got to connect up everything under him; that makes it necessary to have some military agent through which he acts. If he has a properly formed general staff with four sections, very much as the French have it, I think it is an ideal system for us, and at any rate that is the thing—

The CHAIRMAN. What do you think the proper function of the Chief of Staff is under an ideal system in this country?

Col. PALMER. I think when it comes to a question of military policy, when it comes to a question of planning the national defense, and the plan is of such a nature that it has to be transmitted to higher authority and ultimately to Congress in order to be carried into effect, that that part of the General Staff that is charged with planning is really a deliberative body, and that the Chief of Staff is then a presiding officer and not a commander. When it comes to the execution of an approved policy I think the executive function of the Chief of Staff should be absolutely like any other function of military command. When it is a question of bringing a policy to you prepared by an agency which you have created in order to form that policy it looks to me like the Chief of Staff is essentially in the position of a presiding officer.

For example, if I am in command of a regiment of infantry, so long as I act according to regulations and orders of higher authority, the policy of that regiment is my policy, and that is proper and

right; but if I am the senior officer of a deliberative scientific body, instructed to prepare a recommendation for a higher authority, I am not the commanding officer in that sense. In other words, you can not apply the principle of command to both processes. In that event—and I will take my own branch of the General Staff, dealing with national defense plans, if a project is brought to me that I do not agree with, I call the members of the branch together and talk it over with them. Frequently that will result in a correction or amendment. Perhaps they will continue to be a difference of opinion between me and the officers who prepared the plan. In that event I do not believe that I have any right to order them to accept my view. I do not believe I have any right to forward my own opinion and suppress theirs, but I do have the right and duty to forward their view with such adverse comments as I choose to make. I do not think you can arrive at a scientific determination of policy in any other way.

The CHAIRMAN. On page 6 of the War Department bill will be found a paragraph prescribing the duties of the Chief of Staff. Among other things it says he shall be charged by the Secretary of War with the planning, development, and execution of the Army program. As I understand it, you believe the General Staff should be charged by the Secretary of War with planing the Army program?

Col. PALMER. Yes, sir; in so far as it is a question of military policy that would have to go to higher civil authority for approval before it can be put into effect. I think the paragraph you have just cited would destroy the institution created in the act of 1903 and replace it by another institution entirely different in kind.

The CHAIRMAN. It occurred to me that it is exceedingly important language, and it refers merely to the Chief of Staff. That practically makes him what you think the General Staff ought to be.

Col. PALMER. The act of 1903 made the General Staff the planning agency. This new language would make the Chief of Staff the planning agency. Now a little bit further down the language of the act of 1903 with regard to the duties of a General Staff is retained, except that new words are inserted.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. That changes the whole basis of it.

Col. PALMER. It says: "The duties of the General Staff Corps," and then come the new words inserted "Under the direction of the Chief of Staff," and then it continues "shall be to prepare plans for the national defense," and so forth. In other words, the passage of that law would transfer the planning function to the Chief of Staff, and would leave to the General Staff only the ministerial function of working out the details.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. I do not think that is right.

Col. PALMER. I do not think that power should be given to any individual. I do not think it was intended in the law. I do not think it is essential to the proper operation of the General Staff.

The CHAIRMAN. Now that we are on that language, Colonel, why not discuss it rather thoroughly. On the bottom of page 5 will be found a portion of section 3 which prescribes the duties of the Chief of Staff and later of the General Staff Corps. It reads as follows:

The Chief of Staff, under the direction of the President or Secretary of War, shall have supervision of all agencies and functions of the Military Establish-

ment and shall perform such other military duties, not otherwise assigned by law, as may be assigned to him by the President.

Have you any criticism to make of that language?

Col. PALMER. I think the wisest thing would be to adhere to the 1903 act. I think that is ideal legislation for a perfectly efficient General Staff, except in so far as it prescribes the number of General Staff officers and makes the Chief of Coast Artillery an ex officio member of the General Staff.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. Would not that language, which the chairman just read to you, practically turn over the Army to the Chief of Staff?

Col. PALMER. Yes. It would turn over that function which was not heretofore turned over to him, the planning function.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. Which practically gives him control over the whole Army—

Col. PALMER. The act of 1903 has quite different language. The act of 1903 gives the Chief of Staff supervision of the different branches of the Army and of certain specific departments. This is rather noticeable to me, the order of statement is different. I do not know whether that carries any significance in the law or not, but in the act of 1903 the first section creates a General Staff Corps, and the second section defines the duties of the General Staff—

The CHAIRMAN. You mean the Chief of Staff.

Col. PALMER. No; the General Staff comes first in the act of 1903 and the Chief of Staff does not come in until the fourth section, Mr. Chairman. In the act of 1903 the General Staff is defined; then its duties are prescribed with reference to the plans for national defense, then in section three the number of officers on the General Staff is brought in, and it goes on down in section four, where the Chief of Staff is given the supervisory function. I have always supposed it meant that when it came to the execution of policy that he was the executive agent to issue orders in the name of the Secretary of War. There is a big problem that comes in here and that is where our General Staff differs from the German General Staff. The German General Staff was designed to inform and advise just one man who was himself a military man. Our General Staff is very much like the British General Staff, and was formed primarily to advise a civilian Minister of War, and through him, the national legislature. It is quite a different problem.

Now, when it comes to the question of determining a policy, the whole situation is different from a question of command. Whether a national policy is sound or not, is a question of its intrinsic merit and not a question of authority. It is a good deal like a theorem in geometry, in that it does not make much difference whether the best solution is made by a lance corporal or a field marshal. When it comes to the test it has to be determined on its merits. No question of national policy is ever settled until it is settled right.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, we want to get your recommendations and opinions on the rank of officers on the Staff.

Senator FLETCHER. How large a General Staff do you recommend for peace times?

Col. PALMER. I should say that the general method of determining the strength of the General Staff is correct in this bill. This bill provides, if I remember correctly, for 217 General Staff officers, 120

of them with troops; that is, 50 of them are on duty with corps staffs and the remainder of the 120 on duty with divisional staffs, leaving about 97 for the War Department General Staff.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. What would they do here in peace times?

Col. PALMER. In the War Department?

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. Yes, those who are on duty here?

Col. PALMER. They have a great many important duties. They have the problem of keeping the Army prepared for war, supervising its training, coordinating its supply system, and so forth.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. In an army prepared for defense, do you think the Chief of Staff or the General Staff, should direct the chiefs of bureaus in the purchase of supplies, etc.?

Col. PALMER. I do not think any General Staff officer, except the Chief of Staff, should direct the chiefs of bureaus.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. Would it be within the functions of the General Staff to direct the bureau chief as to what he was to do or simply advise him as to what the staff had adopted as a policy?

Col. PALMER. I think it is perfectly proper for the Chief of Staff to give whatever directions are necessary in order to carry out an approved policy, Senator, but I think that if the bureau chief is correctly and intelligently informed as to the plan to be followed in order to carry out a policy, that that will generally be sufficient.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. You do not think the Chief of Staff should be an administrative officer?

Col. PALMER. I think he must be to a very large extent; I think so when it comes to carrying out a policy that has been approved. For example, if you should create a citizen army and that should become the military policy of the United States, I think the Chief of Staff—after the regulations covering it are prepared and approved by the President—would have to be the executive officer for carrying that policy into effect.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. You mean for the President?

Col. PALMER. Yes.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. But not directly in connection with the bureau itself. What I am trying to get at is this: You will remember the restriction which was undertaken to be placed upon the General Staff by the act of 1916?

Col. PALMER. Yes.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. The intent and purpose of that restriction was to prevent the General Staff or any of its agencies from undertaking to control the administrative bureaus or service bureaus, and don't you think that restriction was proper?

Col. PALMER. I do not think you can apply any hard and fast rule there. I think the evil, then, you speak of has occurred, and I think it has generally occurred, because the General Staff was not composed of trained general staff officers.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. Men who did not understand the General Staff duty thoroughly?

Col. PALMER. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Of course, under our present system, the Secretary of War, with, of course, the President to oversee it, decides upon the Army program and the General Staff is to advise him, to investigate and study, and keep him informed.

Col. PALMER. I should say—

The CHAIRMAN. Of course he can disapprove in whole or in part any of their recommendations.

Col. PALMER. I believe you said, Senator, that it is the duty of the Secretary of War, for the President, to decide upon the Army program?

The CHAIRMAN. Within the limits laid down by Congress, of course.

Col. PALMER. That is what I mean, because the determination of an Army program depends very largely in the beginning on congressional action. And now I think that is what is referred to here as the planning function of the General Staff as a whole, the determining of what that program should be for transmission to Congress.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, with such comment as the Secretary of War might see fit to attach to it.

Col. PALMER. Yes, of course.

The CHAIRMAN. Those are the broadest problems that are to be considered by the General Staff, but there are lots of other problems in the Army itself which would not in the ordinary run of events come before Congress. For instance, this bill, I think, quite properly does not attempt to prescribe the strength of an Infantry regiment; it simply prescribes what shall be the total number of Infantry officers and soldiers. Is it not in the duty of the General Staff to study the question and organize Infantry units?

Your system there is such that I suppose when recommendations go through the Chief of Staff to the Secretary of War, the Chief of Staff, as those recommendations or studies pass over his desk, I assume, has a perfect right to make comments on them, either favorably or unfavorably.

Col. PALMER. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. The Secretary of War must decide whether to accept the study or recommendation as it stands, with such amendments as he sees fit to add to it.

Col. PALMER. Yes, unless it is a question that has already been settled by a predetermined policy. I do not think it would be necessary with a question of that kind, if the Secretary of War has already approved the general policy with reference to one of those matters, that all matters arising under that policy should be referred to him. They would be decided by the Chief of Staff, because he already has the decision of the Secretary of War on those points or on the policy governing them.

Senator FLETCHER. In other words, he follows a precedent that has been established?

Col. PALMER. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Have you any further criticisms to make of the language used in this bill describing the powers and functions of the Chief of Staff and the General Staff Corps?

Col. PALMER. The point I made with respect to eligibility is, I think, a very important thing. I would like to refer to the number of officers specified in the War Department bill. I think the total should be specified, but I do not think a General Staff law should specify the numbers in each grade so definitely. For example, this bill specifies 10 general officers, 41 colonels, 73 lieutenant colonels, 89 majors, 17 captains. I think there should be a provision that if

there are not 10 general officers available who are really eligible for duty on the General Staff, that eligible men should be taken from the lower grades; that if there are not 41 colonels who are really fit for duty on the General Staff, that proper and eligible officers should be taken from some other grade. In my opinion we do not want anybody but trained General Staff officers on the General Staff. If you have untrained officers on the General Staff, the higher rank they hold the more harm they will do.

The CHAIRMAN. Of course, to make your suggestion effective we would have to insert in this bill the eligibility clause which you have been discussing.

Col. PALMER. Yes, sir.

Senator SUTHERLAND. Then you would have to put in a proviso where these specific numbers are provided for?

Col. PALMER. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. As I understand you, you think the language of the act of 1903 plus the language prescribing eligibility is sufficient?

Col. PALMER. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Then whatever number is requisite could be decided upon?

Col. PALMER. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. As I gather your idea, you think the language commencing near the bottom of page 5 and on page 6 would be unnecessary?

Col. PALMER. I think that language would completely modify the original General Staff law. I do not believe in it.

The CHAIRMAN. Particularly that phrase, "under the direction of the Chief of Staff."

Col. PALMER. Yes, particularly that question of planning for the national defense.

The CHAIRMAN. The language that the Chief of Staff shall be charged by the Secretary of War with the planning, developing, and so forth of an Army program?

Col. PALMER. Yes. Of course, the language is a little vague as to what an Army program means. I do not know just what it means. I think the language of the act of 1903 is a great deal better language.

Senator FLETCHER. Did you say you had prepared something to substitute for this clause.

Col. PALMER. No, sir.

Senator FLETCHER. I thought you said at the outset that you had something prepared?

Col. PALMER. I said I had a specific recommendation to make with reference to the General Staff, and that is that it should be restricted to officers who represent that professional type, as a matter of fact.

Senator FLETCHER. You have not anything prepared on that subject, have you?

Col. PALMER. I have not here, no, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. We should be very glad to have you prepare a section embodying your views on that.

Now, Colonel, a new question has arisen which I imagine is puzzling the people and which springs from the fact that Congress has created the grade of General of the Army. Have you given any study as to what function he shall perform in our military system?

Col. PALMER. No, I have not.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you feel able to discuss it? It must of necessity bear such close relation to the status of the Chief of Staff, as prescribed under the existing law, a connecting link between the Chief of Staff and the General Staff Corps, that I presume there must be legislation on it before we get very much farther.

Col. PALMER. I never have thought about this particular problem, but I have always supposed that a general officer of the grade of general, where there happened to be only one, would be assigned to an important command, unless he was selected by the President to be the Chief of Staff; that he would be assigned to the most important command available.

The CHAIRMAN. Under our peace time system or establishment, if he were not selected to be Chief of Staff and merely selected to command in some portion of the country, he would continue to outrank the Chief or Staff.

Col. PALMER. I do not think that makes the slightest difference.

The CHAIRMAN. You do not?

Col. PALMER. No, I do not. I noticed the other day in one of Gen. Von Ludendorff's publications in the newspaper, in referring to the Fourth Germany Army, he mentioned its Chief of Staff as Maj. So-and-So. I think from Ludendorff's point of view and the general point of view of men like Marshal Fock that they would rather have a major, if he had the General Staff point of view, than to have a lieutenant general or a major general with simply the General Staff label. I do not think it makes very much difference. The Chief of Staff issues his orders in the name of the Secretary of War, and I do not think the mere fact that you have officers in the Army who are senior to him is a serious matter.

The CHAIRMAN. We never have had that condition since we have had a Chief of Staff.

Col. PALMER. I do not think it is a serious matter.

The CHAIRMAN. The law when it was drawn was apparently careful to provide that while an officer occupied the position of Chief of Staff he should outrank everybody else.

Col. PALMER. That is not in the old law, is it?

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. That was put in as a rider to an appropriation bill and offered on the floor of the Senate.

Col. PALMER. If I remember correctly, Gen. Bell was Chief of Staff when he was in the grade of brigadier general.

The CHAIRMAN. In any event, that is the case to-day and has been for some time.

Col. PALMER. I think it is the wrong principle. Whatever authority he has he exercises in the name of the Secretary of War.

The CHAIRMAN. And not by reason of his rank?

Col. PALMER. Not by reason of his rank.

The CHAIRMAN. It has grown to be, however, a case of rank,

Col. PALMER. There is one solution of the question that you mentioned, a possible solution, that might lead to a great deal of difficulty. The making of an officer ex officio commanding general of the Army by virtue of his rank was one of the very evils that Congress was trying to get away from in creating the original General Staff law. We had distinguished men like Gen. Grant and Gen. Sherman, who had the rank and title of General of the Army, but the real commander in chief is the President and the actual command is going

to flow through the agents that he selects. The trouble was with men like Gen. Sherman that they might not be in sympathy with the views of the President.

Therefore a new agency was created for the channel of command to flow through, and that agent held office at the pleasure of the President. That was one of the fundamental conceptions of the original General Staff law. It doesn't make very much difference how much rank or prestige a general has, he can not command actually unless he commands with the confidence of the President. Perhaps a general might be selected under one administration that would be very unsatisfactory to the President under another administration and the President would command around him; he would be short-circuited, and that was one of the things they tried to overcome in the War Department and was the reason for the forming of the General Staff. That is, a man had the rank, he had the office, but he had no authority. I think at one time Gen. Sherman actually moved his headquarters out to St. Louis.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes; I remember he did that, because he had nothing to do.

Col. PALMER. The command of the Army, it seems to me, will really pass through the agency that the President wants to command it.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes; I think that would be true.

Senator FLETCHER. He might be made chief of staff if the President saw fit to make him such.

Col. PALMER. Yes, sir.

Senator SUTHERLAND. Would there be any objection to putting him between the General Staff and the Secretary of War, having the chief of staff report to him and the general then taking matters up with the Secretary of War.

Col. PALMER. I think if that were a satisfactory arrangement to the President, the President could appoint him chief of staff.

Senator SUTHERLAND. Now, the general who was in the field as a chief of staff of operations, and why shouldn't he have it here in peace times. In time of war he had it abroad, and why shouldn't he have it in time of peace?

Col. PALMER. That is a new question to me, Senator. I realize that the old-fashioned way of having a commanding general of the Army in time of peace was a disadvantage. We had great difficulty in getting away from that, and I do not know whether this would be the same thing or not. I am talking about the institution. I do not think this is a personal question.

Senator SUTHERLAND. No, it is a matter of organization.

The CHAIRMAN. That would be the spirit in which we would all discuss it here, Colonel.

What other observations have you to make on the subject of the General Staff or other matters?

Senator SUTHERLAND. That condition would only be temporary probably, because on the retirement of the present general of the Army the position would lapse; but if he performed in time of peace as he did in time of war, of course, under the President—

Col. PALMER. That would be on the idea of having the commanding general of the Army between the Chief of Staff and the Secretary of War?

Senator SUTHERLAND. Yes, and the Secretary of War.

Col. PALMER. I think he would simply be a Chief of Staff, and I think he would be a Chief of Staff created by Congress instead of one created by the President. That is what I think it would amount to.

The CHAIRMAN. If that were done it might not be illogical—I do not know, because I haven't studied the proposition much, but it might not be illogical to have the General of the Army appointed Chief of Staff.

Col. PALMER. I think that would be——

The CHAIRMAN. And the Assistant Chief of Staff to be of course the General Staff Corps of the Army, as suggested by yourself and as is provided in the act of 1903.

Col. PALMER. If he were between the Secretary of War and the Chief of Staff, he would still be practically Chief of Staff and the other would become practically an Assistant Chief of Staff, it seems to me.

Senator SUTHERLAND. He would have to be provided with work commensurate with his rank and pay.

Col. PALMER. I must confess this is a pretty big question to be considered offhand, but it seems to me that you would be selecting the particular individual through whom the President would exercise his command of the Army, and it strikes me that the selection of that individual is a function of the Commander in Chief.

The CHAIRMAN. But he does select him. It was not Congress who selected the General of the Army.

Senator SUTHERLAND. He had already been so designated.

The CHAIRMAN. We were exceedingly careful in drawing the bill, and in fact when the bill first reached us from the War Department they named General Pershing specifically, and Congress, anxious to preserve the prerogatives of the President as Commander in Chief, saw to it that that was changed and merely created the grade, authorizing the President to appoint to that grade an officer who had distinguished himself in the higher commands in an expeditionary force or on foreign soil. Then he selected General Pershing, and that should always be the case, in my judgment. Congress should never name an officer to fill a newly created grade. It should merely create the grade. It has the right, I believe, to lay down certain broad general qualifications, but the President must be left free to name the man to meet the qualifications and to fill the grade, and that was done in this case.

Senator FLETCHER. By and with the advice of the Senate.

The CHAIRMAN. That follows, of course, with the advice of the Senate, because that makes it constitutional.

Col. PALMER. You will remember the situation with respect to Admiral Dewey——

The CHAIRMAN. If I have been informed correctly, great confusion was created when that situation existed.

Col. PALMER. It was a matter of serious embarrassment so far as the question of settling a policy was concerned.

The CHAIRMAN. Col. Palmer, have you anything further?

Col. PALMER. I have just one thing more, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. We will be glad to hear you, Colonel.

Col. PALMER. This is on the question of military expenditure. There is an economic side to it. If you take a Regular Army of the old type, the cost is generally computed as unproductive; there is no return on it, but if you take the cost of the citizen army, where all the people have adequate training, you get an economic output. For example, in such an army as proposed in the Kahn-Chamberlain bill, the foreigners, the non-English speaking foreigners, would receive an advantage which they would carry back into civil life. All men would have certain pathological tendencies discovered early and corrected; they would be improved in health, and they would have better instruction as to personal hygiene. There would be the substitution of many good habits for many bad habits. The idea of the development of leadership in a military sense would reflect back into civil life to a certain extent. The system would have a nationalizing influence. There would probably be a reduction in the cost of prevention of crime and for dependency. Of course, a good many of these things are imponderable, but I think they undoubtedly add to the economic value of men.

Now, if the average man in that system has his productive power increased only 30 cents a day, by the time the system is in operation for 40 years this would mean an increase in the annual productive power of over two billion dollars a year. If the average individual received a benefit of only 30 cents a day the annual economic gain would be more than three times the cost of the whole Military Establishment. If you take an army of the professional type, with any given amount of military power, the cost is greater and the economic output on the other side is very much reduced.

The CHAIRMAN. In fact, when they have stayed in the service beyond a certain useful period, there economic value would begin to decrease?

Col. PALMER. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. The enlisted men, if they go on reenlisting, would pass the age beyond which, when discharged, they would produce effectively in civil life.

Col. PALMER. I mean the amount expended on universal military training would be very much less than the economic advantage that would result from it as expressed in dollars and cents.

I think that is all.

But there is one other feature upon which the efficiency of the General Staff depends. General Staff officers should view military questions from the standpoint of all arms combined. No officer should be on the General Staff merely as a representative of the interests of a particular arm. This implies that the General Staff should exercise a judicial function. For this reason each combatant arm should have a chief or director in the War Department, but not on the General Staff, charged with presenting the ex parte view of his own arm. At present we have no chief of Infantry or chief of Cavalry. These officers should be provided by law.

The CHAIRMAN. We are very much obliged to you, Col. Palmer.

(Whereupon, at 4.30 o'clock p. m., the subcommittee adjourned subject to the call of the chairman.)



REORGANIZATION OF THE ARMY

HEARINGS

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE COMMITTEE ON MILITARY AFFAIRS UNITED STATES SENATE

SIXTY-SIXTH CONGRESS.

FIRST SESSION

ON

S. 2691

A BILL TO PROVIDE FOR UNIVERSAL MILITARY, NAVAL, AND VOCATIONAL TRAINING AND FOR MOBILIZATION OF THE MANHOOD OF THE NATION IN A NATIONAL EMERGENCY

S. 2693

A BILL TO CREATE A DEPARTMENT OF AERONAUTICS, DEFINING THE POWERS AND DUTIES OF THE DIRECTOR THEREOF, PROVIDING FOR THE ORGANIZATION, DISPOSITION, AND ADMINISTRATION OF A UNITED STATES AIR FORCE, CREATING THE UNITED STATES AIR RESERVE FORCE, AND PROVIDING FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF CIVIL AND COMMERCIAL AVIATION

S. 2715

A BILL TO REORGANIZE AND INCREASE THE EFFICIENCY OF THE UNITED STATES ARMY, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES.

PART 20

Printed for the use of the Committee on Military Affairs

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REORGANIZATION OF THE ARMY.

THURSDAY, OCTOBER 16, 1919.

UNITED STATES SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON MILITARY AFFAIRS,
Washington, D. C.

The subcommittee met at 2 p. m., pursuant to the call of the chairman.

Present: Senators Wadsworth (chairman), Sutherland, New, Chamberlain, and Fletcher.

STATEMENT OF HON. HENRY L. STIMSON, FORMER SECRETARY OF WAR.

The CHAIRMAN. Please state your full name and residence, for the benefit of the record.

Mr. STIMSON. Henry L. Stimson; residence, New York City. My office is at 32 Liberty Street.

The CHAIRMAN. Will you state, for the purpose of the record, the period of your service as Secretary of War?

Mr. STIMSON. I served as Secretary of War from May, 1911, to March, 1913.

The CHAIRMAN. Then, will you also state to the committee the assignments that you had during the recent war with Germany?

Mr. STIMSON. I was commissioned as major in May, 1917, and was assigned first to the War College intelligence section, where I spent the summer until August, when I was promoted and made a lieutenant colonel of artillery and sent to the Three hundred and fifth Field Artillery Regiment at Camp Upton. I spent a little over three months helping organize and train that regiment, and in December, 1919, I was sent by the divisional commander, Seventy-seventh Division, to precede the division to France. I was selected as one of two officers to take general staff instruction in France.

I was then assigned to the British Army, Fifty-first Division; served with them in the line for about a month in January and February, 1918. I was then sent to the General Staff College at Angres and took their course there—a three months' course—and as recommended for general-staff duty as chief of staff of a division, at on my application I was sent into the line again with my regiment, which by that time had come over, and I took the artillery course and went into the line with it in July near Baccarat in the Meuse sector, and on the 1st of August I was promoted and made

colonel of Artillery and was sent to the Thirty-first Field Artillery, which regiment was being organized in America at Camp Meade. I returned to America the 10th of August and was engaged in training that regiment—the Thirty-first Field Artillery—until we were under sailing orders to return to France when the armistice came and we were then mustered out of the service in December.

The CHAIRMAN. I think of all the witnesses who have come or will come before the committee you have had the most remarkable experience—as Secretary of War and then serving as an officer of the line in active operation.

Mr. STIMSON. It might be of interest to say that I was nine years in the National Guard also in New York State.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Stimson, we have some bills before us, copies of which I think you have had a chance to look over. The committee wanted very much to have your views on Senate bill 2715 especially. We hope you will go ahead and express whatever comments you have to make in any way you want; anything you think deserves emphasis, based on your experience as Secretary of War and your experience in the Army.

Mr. STIMSON. Well, Senator, of course you will appreciate that my memory has been getting a little bit dim on certain features since I was here six years ago, but since your telegram came I have been trying to refresh my recollection of the work that we did and the views that I formed at that time in regard to the questions of Army organization that are before you. I think possibly the best way for me to do would be to state generally first the conclusions which I have formed as to the general outlines of a policy and then take the details of this bill.

The CHAIRMAN. We will be very glad to have you do that.

Mr. STIMSON. I have not been able to give it a careful analysis. I have been over it, I have read it as carefully as I could in the time I have had, but I feel a great deal of hesitation about entering into details on many features. Some others I do know about.

In general, I am one of those who believe that the Regular Army of the United States should be confined to a force which was just large enough, and no more, to constitute our foreign garrisons, to serve as a training cadre or nucleus for our citizen army, upon which we have got to rely in any serious struggle, and to serve as a minor expeditionary force when such is required.

I am one of those who have always believed that the main defense of the country must rest upon a citizens' army, and I have long held the view that the only effective way to raise such an army, and the only one that was democratic and in consonance with our institutions, was by a system of universal service and training.

The third feature that is necessary is the establishment of an officers' reserve corps for the purpose of training the citizen officers that must supplement the Regular Army officers in the work of officering the citizen army.

That, in general, is the barest outline of the kind of a military policy that I believe in.

There are certain additional features which must be considered. I think one of your important duties will be to stimulate the development of the ordnance side of our Army. The present war has shown, to a degree that has astonished even those of our officers who had

studied it beforehand, how mechanical war has become, and the situation which we were in in this war was wholly abnormal in having the protection of Allies who supplied us with ordnance which we could not possibly extemporize. That can not be counted on to happen again.

Up to the time when I left France we practically had received no American artillery. There had been a few pieces of railroad artillery, but all the divisional artillery came from our Allies, and practically all the corps artillery. Of course I suppose that has all been told before you.

Senator SUTHERLAND. When did you leave France?

Mr. STIMSON. In August, 1918. I do not think at the end of the war there was any divisional artillery received.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. I think Gen. Pershing's report in November, 1918, was essentially to that effect.

Mr. STIMSON. I know we did not use to think strongly enough on that side of it. We did not realize six years ago what a change had taken place and how important it was to have a special establishment that would coordinate the resources of the country for that kind of manufacture, which the average civilian manufacturer has nothing to do with, knows nothing of. But it is a side of it on which I am not particularly qualified to speak except to emphasize that it must be done.

Another feature in regard to the personnel; I very strongly feel from my observation in this war there must be introduced a system which will differ from the present system of promotion in that it will eliminate unfit officers and will provide, so far as possible, so far as can be safeguarded, for a system of selection. I will take that up in turn. I am just enumerating the different things now. But we must have elimination, and, also so far as possible, so far as can be safely safeguarded, selection.

I was trained in this war as a General Staff officer and that qualified ideas which I had formed here about the General Staff.

I think that is another thing that is a most important part of our policy, that I will take up if you desire.

Then, finally, on the negative side, I have formed very definite views on the limitations of the militia for the services of sustaining a national war.

Those are the different topics upon which my mind has been running, and any one of them or any group of them that you would be glad to have me submit to you I will, to the extent of my ability.

The CHAIRMAN. I think the first one you mentioned was that of universal military training. Of course, we have had that discussed a great deal—

Mr. STIMSON. The first I spoke of was about the Regular Army.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, then, we will be glad to have you enlarge upon that observation.

Mr. STIMSON. This bill, 2715, is mainly directed toward the organization of the Regular Army. In the first place, the bill proposes an Army of a larger size than I had thought necessary and I am quite clear that under any method of recruiting, which has been in force since I have been acquainted with the War Department, it would be impossible to raise such an army upon anything like the pay which the Army is now receiving.

In the structure of the bill it seems to me that that was faulty in this respect; that it was not elastic enough in the organization of the Army. I am bound to say it follows the precedent of former legislation in this respect—but the development of this last war has shown, if it has shown anything, the futility of expecting that in any future war you will find the same methods of organization and the same methods of combat that you did in the last war. It therefore seems to me a faulty method of legislation to engraft into the statute law of the country the exact limitations, not only of the different kinds of units that are going to be in your Army, but even the exact size down to the last private in number. Of course, maximum limits must be placed by Congress on the power of the Executive to recruit, but, for instance, when you organize, as this bill seeks to do, a tank corps—I take that as an example—with a certain number of officers and a certain number of noncommissioned officers and 1,538 privates first class, and 902 privates, my mind at once jumps to the fact that when this war started nobody dreamed of such an organization as a tank corps, and very possibly when the next war comes the tank corps will be obsolete.

I do not think Army legislation should be constructed that way. I think that more should be left to flexibility and development, subject to the proper restrictions and limitations which the legislative branch of the Government should place upon the Executive in its development.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, there are several of these new branches or departments, the Tank Corps for one, and the Air Service—just above it, on page 14. Would you apply the same criticism to all those sections of the bill which prescribe, for example, the Corps of Engineers, the Signal Corps, the Ordnance Department, the Medical Department, the Infantry, the Cavalry, and Field Artillery?

Mr. STIMSON. Well, as I say, the brevity of the time I have had to criticize makes me reluctant to criticize too much in detail, but it struck me very forcibly that this bill did not allow sufficient flexibility, and that same criticism applies to most of the departments in here. For instance, just to show you in regard to the mobile army, this provides the exact number of privates and officers and noncommissioned officers, and it provides them at peace strength. So far as I can recollect, there is no provision in here for the raising of them to war strength. They wipe out the method which my administration thought was the proper one, namely, by establishing a Regular Army Reserve.

Of course, the way in which the old Reserve Corps was established was a very faulty application of what I think is a correct principle. It was the result of very divergent views in Congress and in the Executive, and provided for a length of enlistment which, in my opinion, was very much too long, with the colors, and which discouraged enlistments and discouraged reserves. But, nevertheless, I have always thought that a short term with the colors followed by a furlough to the reserve was the proper system, or a very proper system—I am very modest about saying that any system is the only one now—by which the necessary steps could be taken of raising your Regular Army up to its full strength when the emergency arose which made it necessary.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. That is, keep them with the colors long enough to give them a good training and have them go into the reserve.

Mr. STIMSON. The old law made it too long. I have always believed that the troops who were in the foreign garrisons should be kept at war strength, if for no other reason for the reason of economy. I remember that the step of raising those garrisons to full strength was taken during the time I was here, and it produced a calculated saving in the Philippine garrison alone of a million and a half a year just in the pay of officers and enlisted men. In other words, to garrison your different posts with regiments at peace strength is a most expensive way of getting the necessary number of rifles in those garrisons. The officer and noncommissioned officer is paid such a high rate compared to the private, when you put a disproportionate number of officers and noncommissioned officers in the force compared to the number of privates, you have the most expensive force you can have, as well as an ineffective force. The foreign garrisons are supposed to be ready for any immediate emergency. They can not be reinforced from home in an emergency; they have got to be ready. This bill makes no provision by which that could be done. In other words, our system of having regiments at peace strength historically arose out of the situation in this country, not from the situation out in the garrisons, and there should be a differentiation made there.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. Would you make it so flexible as to say that the Army should consist of a maximum number of men, for illustration, 250,000, to be organized in such units as the Secretary of War may determine or the Commander in Chief may determine upon, and leave the fixing of the units, the different kinds, and the number of men in each unit to the Commander in Chief?

Mr. STIMSON. That is precisely what we did in this war, with very great success.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. Yes; we did that. Would you advocate such a system in peace times?

Mr. STIMSON. Well, looking at it from the side of the efficiency of the Army, I should say yes; but I assume that there are other considerations from the side of Congress that might come in that might compel a different answer when you consider both together.

The CHAIRMAN. Speaking of the elasticity, it might be well to call attention to the fact that this bill, for the first time, in setting forth the different branches of the service does not attempt to subdivide those branches into fixed units—that is, does not say so much Infantry, for instance, so much Cavalry, and so forth, as the old bill did.

Mr. STIMSON. In that respect this bill is an improvement on the old law.

The CHAIRMAN. It is quite a long step toward elasticity.

Mr. STIMSON. Yes; there is no doubt about that. But I call your attention to the fact that there is an unfortunate amount of rigidity that still remains.

The CHAIRMAN. What would your idea be as to the size of the regular Army?

Mr. STIMSON. Well, that is a matter on which a man could most easily get out of touch with the present facts. The situation has changed very much in six years. I made an estimate this morning, with the aid of certain officers, who were telling me where our troops

were now and what was required, and frankly it is larger than I had thought was the fact; it is larger I think than will be necessary after affairs have become more normal; but it amounted to something over 300,000 men. We had to estimate our figures for a training cadre and officers and men for the universal training; but it amounted to something over 300,000 men. I think you would have difficulty in getting less than that number to work at its best. You might have to do it, though.

Senator NEW. What did you put down as the force on the Continent of Europe?

Mr. STIMSON. Well, it took what are actually there now, 30,000 men.

Senator NEW. You continue that number?

Mr. STIMSON. That is temporary. That is taking the men now there, in Germany, France, and Siberia, and I put that in as force that could be reduced under normal conditions. That would carry it to something like 330,000 men.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you mind saying what your estimate would be for the Philippines?

Mr. STIMSON. Well, taking our permanent garrisons as they are now, all of them, counting the present garrison size, I believe—I do not mean necessarily there this minute, but as figured in our past appropriation bills, and construction, counting in Oahu, Panama, the Philippines, Alaska, Porto Rico, and the present force in China, it amounted to about 60,000 men.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. Do you remember what the size of the Army was when you became Secretary of War and what it was when you went out?

Mr. STIMSON. There was no change substantially, as I remember it, Senator, made then in the law. The Army was approximately between 90,000 and 100,000 men, as I remember it. That is, counting all overhead and the noncombatants.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. Do you think that would be large enough now?

Mr. STIMSON. No; not at all large enough now.

Senator FLETCHER. What has made the difference, Mr. Secretary?

Mr. STIMSON. Well, one great thing that would make the difference right in the beginning would be the training corps for your universal service. Another thing, the Army at that time was too small for the foreign garrisons we had.

Senator NEW. It should have been larger then?

Mr. STIMSON. It should have been very much larger at that time. As I recall it, we had a very small garrison at Panama. The Panama Canal was not finished. It was at once raised by legislation and by Executive order while I was here to a very much larger force than what it was during construction time. The force in Hawaii, owing to studies that were made by the General Staff and which were accepted by the Executive and by Congress, was raised. In other words, we recognized what had not been recognized before, that the strategic defense of our Pacific coast and of the Panama Canal was at Hawaii. I think those were the main things. But at that time we did not have a large enough Army, even with those foreign garrisons at reduced strength; at that time we had in this country an Army which was wholly insufficient for the work it has been doing since.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. See if my memory is right. I remember some discussion at the time about the size of the Army. Were you not disposed to favor a larger Army than the President himself, and did not the President suggest these reductions in the Military Establishment?

Mr. STIMSON. I do not recall any serious difference of opinion.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. I don't know that it was a serious difference, but I recall some discussion.

Mr. STIMSON. You see about that time the Mexican situation became acute, in February, before we went out of office. That involved the mobilization of a large force of troops at Galveston at first, and afterward on the border, which have never been removed, and to mobilize those troops we drained every soldier out of the center of the country, virtually.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. What year was that?

Mr. STIMSON. 1913. That force has been on the Mexican border practically ever since, and the additions have been in the way of refilling the depleted posts in the rest of the country. That answers Senator New's question. I think that is the main thing that has made the difference.

Senator THOMAS. That was prior to 1913, was it not?

Mr. STIMSON. No. The Army was first mobilized in the insurrection against Madero in 1911. A division was mobilized then. And then to a very large extent that division was demobilized and sent back. Then, I think on the 7th of February, 1913, the insurrection against Madero himself broke out, which resulted in his death, and then I remobilized the Army again down there in a larger force than we had before.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. It was in a state of flux when the old administration went out and the new came in?

Mr. STIMSON. No; it was not.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. Not in a state of flux?

Mr. STIMSON. This is what happened, if you are interested in knowing it. In the War Department we had just completed the first tactical organization of the United States Army in time of peace that I think has ever taken place; that is, for the first time we had created an Army instead of a number of disconnected regiments and companies. The orders for that organization had been the result of studies which were going on the preceding summer and autumn and the final order creating that organization of, as I recall, four divisions—one in the East, one in the center, one in the West, and the Cavalry division in the Southwest—had just been put in effect when the revolution against Madero broke out. President Taft directed, in order that his successor might have everything in hand for his decision which ever way he should decide it—he ordered me to mobilize one of those divisions at Galveston, which was the nearest port to Vera Cruz, in case President Wilson after his inauguration should decide that intervention was necessary in order to save life in the City of Mexico—which was the thing we were most concerned about. There was a great deal of fighting going on there and our embassy had been fired on. When we went out of office, instead of things being in a state of flux, there was a well-organized division at Texas City ready for such action as the new administration might desire.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. I did not mean that the Army was in a state of flux, because, as you say, it was well organized; but the thing that was to be done at that particular time was uncertain?

Mr. STIMSON. Yes, in that sense you are absolutely right.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. In your opinion, the larger Army that you fixed would be necessary for training purposes, but if universal training of some kind were put into effect and a year of training had by the young men of the country, then do you not think that training might be reduced to the training of the young men as they come in?

Mr. STIMSON. I should hope so, sir. I should think it would be possible to get enough men from a preceding year to stay over and act as instructors, to very materially reduce that. That would be my personal view. I may not be correct.

The CHAIRMAN. It is fair to say that you would start in, under such a system, with a very large number of officers of wide experience in this war who are not officers in the regular service?

Mr. STIMSON. You would, if you could avail yourselves of them in the Reserve Corps.

The CHAIRMAN. Undoubtedly there are some 40,000 in the Reserve Corps now. As a matter of fact, Mr. Stimson, do you not think they would really carry the heavier share of the burden of the training, under the direction of a professional?

Mr. STIMSON. I think they certainly would, in the regimental training and the company training, and probably up as far as the brigade training. There would, of course, be a large part of the work of organization into higher units, which I think ought to be done each time for the sake of the practice of the officers, and a maneuver at the end of each six months' period, which would require the work of a permanent cadre of officers and some noncommissioned officers. But the squad, platoon, company, and regimental training should be done practically all by citizen officers. They are amply capable of doing it.

The CHAIRMAN. Of course, that is the kind of training in which the larger number of officers is required.

Mr. STIMSON. That is certainly so.

The CHAIRMAN. One criticism I would have to make on this bill is that while it provides for a system of universal military training, it makes no provision for the use of citizen officers whom we have available in such large numbers.

Mr. STIMSON. I think so.

The CHAIRMAN. And by reason of failing to make that provision, of course, it vastly increases the expense.

Mr. STIMSON. Well, take as a whole, on my rather cursory examination of the bills, it seems to me that the provisions for the universal training, which are contained in the bill introduced by Senator Chamberlain, are much more complete and workable than the ones in the bill 2715.

The CHAIRMAN. Have you any other comments to make on the size of the Army?

Mr. STIMSON. No; I think not.

The CHAIRMAN. What is your next topic—universal training?

Mr. STIMSON. Universal training. That has been so fully discussed I do not think I had better take up much of you time. I

thought I would allude to one thing which I have noticed in the last few months which possibly you have not noticed, bearing on the general question of the popularity of such a system with the men who have just been at war. I hear a good many people saying, "Well, we find the soldiers that have come out are so disgusted that we don't think that such a thing could be passed." Well, I have been keeping in touch with my own men in my own regiment, and I have found this very marked transition of feeling. When they came back there was a great deal of grouching, there was a great deal of reaction, which took the form of complaint against military life, against officers, against the Regular Army in particular, and anyone who drifted around among them without much careful analysis of the situation might reach the conclusion that the whole American Expeditionary Force was sore on the subject of war. I noticed a marked change later. The other evening, for instance, we formed an American Legion post in the regiment I was abroad with, and you would have been delighted to notice the change in the attitude which had already taken place in those boys after they had readjusted themselves. We had a great big meeting. They all came back, they all wanted to join, and they all talked it over and they were all beginning to talk about their life in the past with a very different feeling from what they had in the first reaction against the toil and the difficulties that they had been through.

I think it was very significant that the other day at the State convention in Rochester, at which I think Senator Wadsworth was present, the American Legion voted unanimously for a system of universal military training as a part of the policy of this country, and I look to see the men who have been over there, after they have really got their feet again and got their bearings, want to have that made a part of the policy of this country. That is my judgment.

I have always felt that a system of universal military training was particularly important in this country, more so than for any other countries, as an educational force in the direction of molding together the divergent elements that have come into our civilization.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. Was it tried by recommendation or otherwise during your administration?

Mr. STIMSON. No; we had not reached that point at all. We thought of it as a hope of the future. But the sentiment of the country had not yet reached that point. It was not until the mind of the country had been called to the general subject by the great war raging over in Europe for a year or two that they began really to come to it.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. I think the present Secretary of War has opposed it until this last bill came in, in his reports generally.

The CHAIRMAN. How long a period of training would you advocate in time of peace?

Mr. STIMSON. I think, all things considered, the period should be six months. I was looking over our old records, and I found that in 1912 at the conference of the General Staff which we held on the whole subject it was agreed then that that would probably be the minimum period in which you could develop a fairly well-trained force.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. It used to be the theory of many Army officers that you could not make a soldier in less than a year.

Mr. STIMSON. I think one of the first things I was confronted with when I came into office here was there was a fight raging as to whether the regular enlistments should be three years, which they then were, or be raised to five years; and you find many Army officers of long experience who would swear themselves black in the face that you could not train a soldier in less than five years. I remember, Mr. Hay, chairman of the Military Affairs Committee of the House of Representatives, got up a list of those things, which he filed with Congress. He was in favor of the longer term. But since then many things have happened to change that view. The main thing that has happened is we have tried it out. The first thing that showed was the effect of the training, the unofficial training camps at Plattsburg and other places, and the type of men that were turned out. In 1914 Gen. Wood took an Infantry company of the Regular Army composed of raw recruits and tried it for, I think—well, it was not more than two months, as I recall it—under a very well-known, good captain of the Infantry. I saw that company later in the fall, and it was the best company in that regiment—after a very brief time. The whole question is the method of instruction, whether it is intensive, whether the instructors are keen and zealous, and whether you are trying to accomplish a definite, intelligent goal; and I know now you would have hard work to find anybody in the Army whose opinion counted for anything who would dream of saying that it would require the length of time that they used to insist on.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. There might be some difference. You take a cross section of the American people, that is, the young men who come from all walks of life, and put them in the Army for three months, and they would know as much as your Army, composed largely of foreigners, would know in twice that time.

Mr. STIMSON. Well, one dislikes to speak of his personal experience in the war, but in this last war I trained two artillery regiments, which was difficult training. One has to train such men to ride, and train them to be telephonists, and to be geometricians to an extent, besides training them to shoot. You have to teach them a great many things that the average infantryman does not have to know. I saw one of those regiments afterwards in action, and you can not talk to me any more about it taking five years to train a soldier. That is nonsense.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. I am in accord with your views on that proposition.

Senator FLETCHER. But you do not think three months would do it?

Mr. STIMSON. I do not think three months would do it. It did not do it in this war. The divisions were rounding out into shape when they had been at it for four, or five, or six months.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, having trained these men in large bodies in cantonments, as is proposed, having trained them in large bodies, what have you to say to the proposal that they shall be then assigned to organized units of the citizens reserve for further training or instruction over a period, we will say, of two years?

Mr. STIMSON. Well, it has been suggested that they should have further training of something like two or three weeks each year?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes; in organized units.

Mr. STIMSON. Well, that will come down largely to the matter of comparing the additional expense on the one side with the additional efficiency of the mobilization, more than anything else, on the other. I think your system would not be complete unless you had every year after the period of training, or at the close of the period of training, your force mobilized into units, as you said. I think that is an essential part of the training of both men and officers.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. Could not that be handled largely as a matter of regulation, or do you think that it would require a statute?

Mr. STIMSON. I do not think it is necessary to put in the statute, but the Senator is asking me my opinion about the system. I think that it is a necessary part of the system.

Senator FLETCHER. You would have that part of it voluntary?

Mr. STIMSON. I do not think so. I think it ought to be an integral part of the training. Whether it would be necessary to recall the reservists back each year I think that would be a thing to be considered in the light of the expense involved. The main thing is that you must get the men who are in training assembled into large units for maneuvers before they are disbanded; it would be a good thing if you could also mobilize them again while they are in the reserve, but it would not be so important, in my opinion, as to be sure that the men and officers get the first period of mobilization anyhow. Do I make myself clear?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes; you do.

Mr. STIMSON. That is just my opinion.

The CHAIRMAN. The thing that I would regret about it would be this: That at the end of the six months' period you would discharge the whole number into civil life unattached to any military unit.

Mr. STIMSON. I think they ought to be organized into paper divisions and steps taken to connect them with arsenals and places where their records would be kept, so that they would know what they belonged to and keep track of their changes of addresses. I think that is essential. I thought you meant bringing the force out into the field again. That would be a question of expense whether you could afford it. It would do good, but it would be very expensive. But I do not think you ought to turn them loose, and I do not think that would be necessary without any reserve organization. I think, on the contrary, there should be a reserve organization, and I think such a reserve organization could be organized with comparative economy.

The CHAIRMAN. But turning them loose is practically what this bill does. That is, it turns them loose as individuals.

Mr. STIMSON. That would be a grave error, I think.

The CHAIRMAN. The individual is required to report his change of residence from time to time, but at the outbreak of war he would be called up as an individual and not as a member of a unit. And your experience, in this recent war—if you had no other—would tell how long it takes to organize a regiment, even if the men as individuals have had some training.

Mr. STIMSON. Yes; that is one of the hardest parts of it.

The CHAIRMAN. It takes two months at least?

Mr. STIMSON. Yes. I would like to say one thing about the subject of the necessity of elimination.

The CHAIRMAN. We would be very glad to hear you on that.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. That is, on promotion?

Mr. STIMSON. Promotion in the Regular Army.

The CHAIRMAN. I wish you would give us the benefit of your observations somewhat in detail on that.

Mr. STIMSON. When I was here in the War Department I found the Regular Army was almost unanimously opposed to any system except the seniority system, solely for fear of the introduction into promotion of undue influence of various kinds—favoritism and personal politics and pull, as they call it, and at the same time I found that the far-sighted officers were all in favor of a system of elimination and, if possible, selection. I found this great obstacle, which I do not think people who lightly condemn the continuance of the old system always appreciate. To introduce selection you have the hardest possible problem arising out of the lack of any basis of field experience. In other words, in time of peace, it was my duty, as the adviser of the President, to recommend officers for promotion to the grades of brigadier general and above, where selection does apply now. I regarded it as perhaps the most serious function I had to perform, and I went at it with the utmost care and conscience I could, but I found it was an almost impossible task to find out how these officers compared with each other when there was nothing to judge them by, nothing in the way of field service. If you are selecting men for promotion in a civil profession or a civil business, you are selecting them to do work of a kind that they are doing now in civil life.

It is merely a step onward; the man has been showing his qualities in his daily life; but at that time, which was before the time when we had had any extensive maneuvers, you could not guess how an officer who had done nothing except be at an Army post, at garrison drill all his life, would function at the head of an Army corps, or a division, or a brigade. It was purely guesswork, and if you went around and tried to find an impartial opinion of his fellows you found the most surprising variations. Nobody thought alike about any given officer. I think that is the main difficulty, or was then, the main difficulty to selection, and I think that was largely the basis of the fear on the part of the Army itself.

Well, that has been very much changed by development since, and selection would necessarily go hand in hand with the development of the mobilization and universal training which we have been about. If you have a system of universal training which calls out the Army in great big forces every year, men can be tried as commanders of brigades and commanders of divisions long before they are appointed to the rank of brigadier or major general, and you will have some line on what they are doing. This in the old Army we had not at all.

The CHAIRMAN. You seldom found a colonel to be promoted to brigadier general who had ever actually commanded a regiment, did you?

Mr. STIMSON. Practically never. You know we went into the Spanish War with practically nobody who had ever commanded a brigade, as I recall it; so I just wanted you to understand that that was a legitimate difficulty which existed, and which was partly, I think, responsible for the Army's viewpoint, but which would now be changed by the introduction of such a system of universal training.

So far as elimination is concerned, I have no manner of doubt, particularly after my experience in this last war. We had something like 5,000 officers of the Regular Army, when we raised a

force of 4,000,000 men, and that meant that force of 5,000, that had to be called on for everything, was one very thin on its lower edges, when you came down to the men in it who performed the lower functions of regimental commanders; and the war is full of instances of men being called upon because there was nobody else to call on to command men, when everybody knew that knew them at all that they ought not to be trusted to command a platoon, did not have the faculty, could not do it. Individuals ought not to be condemned or criticised. It was the result of the situation and the system. And a system in which a man has no incentive except to wait for the man ahead of him to die off necessarily gathers unto itself a number of mediocre men who ought to be eliminated. The wonder to me is not that such men turned up and were noticed, but that the higher grades of the Regular Army in this war did as well as they did. I think they did very well, magnificently. I am therefore very clear in the view that there should be a system of elimination. I do not think that Congress ought to be afraid to insist on it and put it through.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. For all grades, from lieutenant up?

Mr. STIMSON. I think you ought to begin and eliminate from the time the man starts, yes.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. Well, now, taking captains, even in a peace establishment, there would be a great number of them to select from for promotion to major. What basis of selection would you have?

Mr. STIMSON. Are you talking about selection or elimination?

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. I am talking about selection now, which includes elimination practically, does it not?

Mr. STIMSON. No; not necessarily. A great many more officers are in favor of elimination than are in favor of selection. Elimination is the surest and easiest step to take; that is, eliminating men who are unfit. I think you will have to eliminate them with some graded retired pay; otherwise the system will not function, owing to the reluctance and tender-heartedness of any boards you may constitute to turn out men on the cold world after they have lost the power of self-support.

Senator FLETCHER. Could it be based on age or time of service?

Mr. STIMSON. I do not want to make it as an exclusive suggestion at all, but I have heard this system suggested, and to a certain extent I participated in it in one part of my work abroad. At the General Staff College, where I was studying to be a General Staff officer, the class was divided into a number of sections, sections of perhaps 10 or a dozen in each section, with an officer as chief of section, who marked their papers and was responsible for their instruction, although he was a member of the class and a fellow of theirs to a certain extent. I happened to be one of those chiefs of sections and remember we had this method. The work consisted in this: Twice a week there was a map problem that the whole class worked on and handed in their solutions, and the chief of sections marked the solution. As the end of the course approached we were directed by the director of the schools to divide our sections into three classes of men: Class A, the men who on the basis of their work in these map problems we were sure would be immediately fitted for recommendation as General Staff officers; class B, the men who, while we did not

think they were immediately fitted, we thought there was hope for, with a little further instruction or a little further training; and, C, the men who we felt were unfitted for General Staff duty, and who should be sent back to their regiments.

Now, I have heard it suggested, and I see no reason why that system, or a modification of it applied to the Army—it worked very well in the Staff school—this is the suggestion I have heard made by a number of officers, responsible officers: That every year the men could be graded in that way by boards of officers, men who were immediately fit for promotion, men who while not yet immediately fit for promotion are not subject to elimination but there is hope for yet with further training; and men who by their record have already made it clear that they should be eliminated, and then eliminate class C.

Senator NEW. Now that, Mr. Secretary, contemplates promotion as well as elimination?

Mr. STIMSON. Yes; that combines the two. Strict elimination has been in effect already you know, sir, in the Navy, where every year or every so many years a board was chosen and had to eliminate so many men. In my opinion it produced a good effect on the Navy, which I used to observe.

Senator THOMAS. Do you refer to the old plucking board?

Mr. STIMSON. I mean the old plucking board.

Senator THOMAS. That has been repealed.

Mr. STIMSON. I know it has, and I think that was a great mistake. One reason why perhaps it was repealed was that it had been allowed to go on until in the Navy they had gotten down to the bone and they plucked a few good officers.

Senator THOMAS. Well, every man that was plucked came yelling to his Congressman and Senators, and so we repealed the law.

Mr. STIMSON. Well, perhaps if the system was spread a little more widely—

Senator THOMAS. Oh, I quite agree that we made a mistake.

Mr. STIMSON. I used to notice the difference. It toned up the Navy tremendously.

Senator THOMAS. It toned up the Navy and toned down Congress.

Senator NEW. Well, I think it is manifest that there ought to be some regularly established method of getting rid of the inefficient officer both in the Army and in the Navy. Now, Mr. Secretary, you said in your preliminary remarks, I believe, that you were in favor of promotion by selection, as far as it could be safely and justly applied.

Mr. STIMSON. Yes; and I do not like to be dogmatic in saying how far. My whole purpose is to give you the basis from which you can make inferences as well as I, rather than to state dogmatically what I think ought to be done, and in my opinion it is the most important subject for the toning up of the Regular Army. I am clear that something ought to be done, and I am telling you simply what I have seen and the results I have noticed.

Senator NEW. Referring to the method you have just outlined, is that the one you would recommend—a combined method?

Mr. STIMSON. I should look very favorably on its trial, sir. You can realize that a man who has been, as I have, practicing law for the last year does not like to talk dogmatically on a subject that is

so delicate as that. It needs trial, it needs care; but this system worked in the General Staff College at Langres where I saw it working, and I see no reason why it should not work in the Army as a whole.

The CHAIRMAN. You do not abandon seniority?

Mr. STIMSON. No, no.

The CHAIRMAN. You merely establish an eligible list for promotion?

Mr. STIMSON. You merely establish an eligible list for promotion and you sort them out and eliminate the bottom class.

Senator NEW. Frankly, the chairman knows that this method of promotion by selection has stuck a little in my crop, as the saying is, through certain abuses of it that I have seen, that have been brought so prominently to my notice, that I somewhat hesitate to adopt it as a general plan.

Mr. STIMSON. Well, I have tried to point out the basis where I thought those objections had come in the past and the way in which they would be removed, at least in great part, after seeing men on maneuvers and trying them out.

Senator NEW. Well, I think your plan does go a long ways at least toward the eliminations of those abuses or the chance for them.

Mr. STIMSON. You might well reserve the method of seniority for the class A men if they have been selected as a class of men who were immediately fit and let them be chosen from that list by seniority; such a method would serve as a selection between them and class B men and class C men. I think the worst evil comes in where you pick out one man and put him over his fellows. You see, there is then a great temptation to bring in personal favoritism and pull. But where you simply segregate all the captains into three classes there would not be, in my opinion, nearly so much danger of that pulling and hauling for individual favoritism.

Senator FLETCHER. Does an officer's appearance, his address and manner and size, cut any figure in this grading?

Mr. STIMSON. Well, in the Staff College grading, which was for a particular purpose, it did not. His whole character counted. We had to exercise our best judgment to say whether Maj. Smith, in our opinion, would competently perform all of the various duties which by that time we knew pretty well would be required of a staff officer in this war in France, and character, ability to express his views, counted; but I should say dress counted very little—

Senator FLETCHER. I said address.

Mr. STIMSON. Oh, pardon me, I thought you asked about dress. Yes; I think those personal elements all came in and counted.

Senator FLETCHER. A little outside of the technical examination, then, in grading them?

Mr. STIMSON. Oh, yes; you always have the problem that some men will do well on paper who will not do well in human conduct.

There is one thing in this bill that I think is a very serious defect on that method of promotion. They still adhere to the method of promotion by the different arms of the service—that is, Cavalry men are promoted in their arm, Infantry men are promoted in their arm, and Artillery men in their arm.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. You would advocate a single list?

Mr. STIMSON. I should advocate a single list. That was recommended in that report of the organization of the land forces of the United States, which we promulgated in 1912, and it was then the view of the most progressive officers of the Army, and I think it is now a much more general view than then.

The CHAIRMAN. What became of that portion of it; what was its fate?

Mr. STIMSON. It was printed as an annex to my report as Secretary of War in 1912.

The CHAIRMAN. Was it ever presented to Congress in legislative form?

Mr. STIMSON. No. It formed the basis of the tactical organization of the Army, which I put in effect by Executive order that same year, so far as we could do it in the absence of legislation. But the Senator may remember that it was very difficult to get any legislation at that time. The country was not interested in Army legislation. The Congress was in the hands of a divided party control, and it was a presidential year, all of which operated against constructive legislation. The purpose of the report was to try to outline what we deemed then to be the true principles of Army organization, and put those into effect so far as we could do it without legislation.

The CHAIRMAN. I wish you would enlarge a little on this single-list suggestion.

Mr. STIMSON. The main feature is the bad effect that comes from the present system. You can hardly find a piece of legislation proposed by the Army for the past 20 years, at least you could not when I was here, where you did not find creeping into it, consciously or unconsciously, a desire on the part of one of the branches of the Army to get promotion at the expense of the other branches.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. Equalizing promotion, as they called it?

Mr. STIMSON. Equalizing promotion; yes.

The CHAIRMAN. It had the opposite effect.

Mr. STIMSON. Why, you take it now, you have only to look at the different arms of the service and you will see the effect of that system. Promotions have been slow in the Infantry and Cavalry for some years.

The CHAIRMAN. Because those arms have not been enlarged—

Mr. STIMSON. Because those arms have not been enlarged by legislation or have not received the benefits of legislation. You will find, therefore, they are clogged up with a lot of old men; you will find a lot of captains who, from age, ought to be colonels. Turn to the Field Artillery, where there has been a big expansion lately, and you will find that they are comparatively young. Well, now, that pressure to pull one up and pull the other down has been the cause of more vice in Army legislation and more pulling and hauling over here in the Halls of Congress than almost any other feature. A man will feel free to play politics—an Army officer—for the benefit of his branch of the service when he would scorn to do it for himself individually.

The CHAIRMAN. It might be observed right here that this War Department bill. I think quite properly, further expands the Field Artillery in proportion to the Infantry and other branches, as the result of the experience of the war.

Mr. STIMSON. That is true.

The CHAIRMAN. The result will be that we will have captains of Field Artillery perhaps under 30 years of age and captains of Infantry will be around 45 years of age still.

Mr. STIMSON. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Col. Palmer was here the other day and gave us some interesting testimony, and he suggested the single list, as you have, with a feature attached providing for what he called, what might be termed, side by side promotion in the Army applicable to those branches of the Army that should not be put in this single list, which is the Medical Corps; so that if promotion in the bulk of the Army under the single list was faster than it was normally in the Medical Corps—

Mr. STIMSON. Or in the auxiliary branches—

The CHAIRMAN. The Medical Corps commissioned personnel would automatically receive that same percentage of promotion.

Mr. STIMSON. I have not seen that plan, but I would look with predisposition to favor any plan which Col. Palmer had worked out. I have also great confidence in his judgment and his fairness, above all things; but I have not seen that particular plan. Something would have to be worked out to adjust the promotion between the combatant branches which could be united and some of the other branches where perhaps they could not.

The CHAIRMAN. Speaking of the single list and promotion, and the noncombatant branches, or specialty service, what observation have you to make, if any, on the suggestions which come to us from several of those services for a return to the permanent personnel, commissioned personnel, in whole or in part in Ordnance, for example, Signal Corps, Air Service, which is a new branch?

Mr. STIMSON. Well, I would rather not be dogmatic on that. I was brought up as a believer in the detailed system. It was an attempt to reform certain very great abuses which had grown out of the permanent fixed personnel service. I should hesitate to believe that any development had taken place in this war which should seriously limit it. I know the pressure which is bound to come from people who think they become indispensable specialists. The same pressure I found in people who thought they had become permanent specialists in Washington, when we began sending them out to troops every little while. I am ready to believe that there are some places where it might be necessary and might be essential. I have in mind, perhaps, particularly the Ordnance. But I do not want to be dogmatic on it, and I do want to caution you against yielding to what will be a very great and very natural and very human desire to stay in the same spot where one has been for a little while.

The CHAIRMAN. Of course, the observation you made early in your remarks here this afternoon, that war has grown to be largely a mechanical thing, emphasizes in a way these specialists.

Mr. STIMSON. That is true.

The CHAIRMAN. For instance, they must have men in the Ordnance that understand explosives and are practically chemists.

Mr. STIMSON. Yes; that is true. But I think in the French Army—you may correct me if I am wrong—they have a tendency to make such men civilians.

The CHAIRMAN. In time of peace?

Mr. STIMSON. In time of war. At any rate, they are not mentioned in the same way as the combatant arms. I know we have run to greater extremes in putting uniforms on everybody who touched the Army than our allies did.

The CHAIRMAN. I think that is true.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. And unfortunate, too.

Mr. STIMSON. I think the committee ought to look into the possibility of doing a lot of this specialist work without giving men commissions for it.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. The etiquette of the Army applies to a man as soon as he puts the uniform on, and sometimes it is not to the best interests of the Army.

Mr. STIMSON. No.

Senator SUTHERLAND. Can you get the men qualified in civil life that are willing to go in for the low pay that the Government offers?

Mr. STIMSON. Perhaps not. That is something on which a good Ordnance officer's opinion would be much better than mine; but I know the general extremes of danger and of pressure.

Senator SUTHERLAND. A good many of them will go into the Army because they like the service and it gives them a position which they do not get in civil life, and that is part of the pay.

Mr. STIMSON. Well, also you will find a great many men go into the Federal civil service who accept less money, where, so far as I can see, it is merely the satisfaction of feeling that they are serving their country. That has been a very reassuring thing that I have noticed in life among people who will accept humble and obscure positions in the Federal Government for much less pay than they can get elsewhere for what you would call now psychological reasons.

The CHAIRMAN. Now another topic closely allied to the one you have been discussing is brought out on page 3 of the bill. In brief it provides for the recommission of all general officers of the staff, and that means the service as now constituted, as general officers of the line, and thereafter they are detailed to the services. That operates to abolish the Chief of Ordnance, Quartermaster General, Chief Signal Officer.

Mr. STIMSON. I would rather not go into detail on the different ones to which that could apply. The details system was in the process of working through gradually the department when I was here. I believe it could go through entirely. You have had a great war since, which has been, as I say, a mechanical war, and in which some things have developed changes, but my presumption is in favor of the detail system, and my hesitation to be dogmatic comes from the six years that have passed since I was in the department. You have original men here, and you can hear them.

The CHAIRMAN. We can understand that. There is one thing, however, which is involved in this suggestion and which is a matter of careful public policy should that legislation be enacted, that would take away from the Senate the power of confirmation over the appointment of an officer like the Chief of Ordnance or Quartermaster General or Surgeon General, or Chief Signal Officer, or Chief of Engineers. It then becomes a matter of public policy.

Mr. STIMSON. You are better judges on that than I am. Anyhow, those men have not often been rejected, have they?

The CHAIRMAN. Oh, very seldom. There have been times when business even made a man influential.

Mr. STIMSON. On the other hand, Senator, I believe that normally the Executive will act with responsibility on such important appointments as that. I should not count much one way or the other with that. I think both the Senate and Executive act with great responsibility in Army appointments. I should like to say something about the General Staff, if you have reached that point.

The CHAIRMAN. Go ahead.

Mr. STIMSON. Because that is the soul of the whole system, and that is the part of the system which this country has been most slow in developing, and in which this war has brought us along faster than anything else. It is a thing which has been the source of such burning issues here that I think it is highly important that you should get an impersonal view of it as far as possible.

The General Staff officers—I think perhaps the best way to explain it is to explain it as it has gone in my mind from the bottom up. The General Staff officer, as you see him with troops, is merely the replica of what you have here in Washington, with one addition, that is, the General Staff Corps, which corresponds to what in other nations is called the Great General Staff.

Those are two wholly separate functions. The General Staff officer is an officer whose duty is to coordinate and supervise the units and men who are under his command. The General Staff Corps is a debating society, which is performing a function which exists nowhere else in the Army and which is foreign to all of the training of our Regular Army for a hundred years. We did not have anything like it. We did not have anybody to make plans. You know, of course, the history of the introduction of the General Staff system into this Army. It was in 1901, I think—

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. 1903.

Mr. STIMSON. 1903; the legislation which Senator Root, Secretary Root at that time, fathered as Secretary.

(After certain statements made, off the record, the following occurred:)

Senator FLETCHER. Do you believe you ought to do away with the Quartermaster Department?

Mr. STIMSON. Oh, my, no. He is a "service." The function of General Staff duty, as I understand it, is to coordinate the services of supply on the one hand, and to assist and to help the commander of troops in the handling of his troops on the other. These are the General Staff duties. This war has developed them and shown that General Staff duty is more essential and occupies a wider field than we ever thought it would before. War has grown more complicated, units have been made larger, and that has caused a development of General Staff functions.

The same duties of coordination which are performed by General Staff officers for the commander of troops in the field are performed here by the Chief of Staff, acting through his assistants here, in coordinating the work of the various supply bureaus and "services," as they are called in other armies, here in Washington. That is, in my opinion, a vitally important function, and should not be impaired or diminished in any respect by legislation.

In the performance of that function the Chief of Staff in the past and within my experience has met with great opposition from the prejudices and conservative tendencies which have grown up in the course of years in the supply departments here in Washington, but such coordination and supervision on his part is vital to keep the Army adequately and properly supplied with the kind of material which experience with troops alone can test.

In that respect, the situation here between the Chief of Staff and the supply department is merely a replica of what has been found necessary in the field.

There is, however, a different and new element which enters here into the situation in the shape of the existence of the General Staff Corps as a machine for making war plans and studies and preparations for future wars. That does not exist with the army in the field. It was the intention of the framers of the legislation of 1903 to create a body which should be free from the ordinary distractions of administration, and have the time to devote to thinking out ahead against a period of war. Compared with military duty in the field, the General Staff Corps is somewhat like a debating society. Its output or product is supposed to be not the result of the order or direction or command of a single man, but of the interplay of the different minds that constitute the General Staff Corps.

The relation of the Chief of Staff to that body is a wholly different relation and should be kept a wholly different relation from his relation to his assistants and to the services or supply bureaus. In this latter work his assistant staff officers are merely the General Staff officers who help him in his duties of supervision and coordination of the Army and of the services. But members of the General Staff Corps are not his assistants in that respect or in that sense. His relation to them is more like, or should be, in my opinion, more like the presiding officer of a deliberative body. He has and should have great authority, and his opinion should be very weighty, but the final decision on such matters legally is not in him but in the President, and his relation to the President in making that decision is just as advisory, in my opinion, as that of the members of the General Staff Corps itself.

Now, do I make that clear?

The CHAIRMAN. Very. And would it not be proper to add that the function of the General Staff Corps in planning for the national defense in advance of every conceivable emergency can be of great service to the Congress?

Mr. STIMSON. Why, certainly. It ought to be.

The CHAIRMAN. The situation to-day is, as I understand it, that Congress never hears from the General Staff Corps.

Mr. STIMSON. More than that, the deliberations of the Army General Staff ought to be coordinated with that of the Navy, and probably in the course of time it would be assisted by civilian coordination and help, either from Congress or from other representative citizens of the country, whose views on general policies of defense might be helpful or efficient. I mean, it is the cauldron in which a policy of defense should be used, and it certainly should not be subject to the military direction of a single mind.

The CHAIRMAN. I think that is very well expressed.

Senator FLETCHER. What would you think, Mr. Stimson, of this proposal to have one agency purchasing all of the supplies for the Army, medical supplies included, and everything of a standard character? That has been advocated and one question I asked a very prominent witness on that subject was, What would become of your Quartermaster General? And he said, "He would be eliminated; we would not heed him."

Mr. STIMSON. Well, Senator, there has been discussed and partly carried out at different times in the past a consolidation of these supply departments; that is, the departments which purchase. I remember that in my time there was a consolidation made of the Quartermaster General's Department, the Paymaster's Department, and the formerly existing Commissary Department. Congress made such a consolidation at that time, with the object of having a single—they called it first in the original bill, I think, a supply department, but in the final legislation I think it was called the Quartermaster Department. The question of any such consolidation as that does not enter into what I am talking about just now, that is all among the services.

Senator FLETCHER. I understood that. I thought you had finished with the other subject, and I was taking this up as another proposition.

Mr. STIMSON. Well, I do not know enough about the situation of purchases to say whether there should be any further consolidation or not. You see, my service was not on that side at all during this war. I only heard about that by hearsay. There are men whose views would be far more cogent than mine would, on account of their experience in buying during the war. I was away, but that is purely an economic question of how you will best and most efficiently organize the various purchasing and supply departments necessary to outfit the Army in time of war.

Senator FLETCHER. It is a very practical question.

Mr. STIMSON. I dare say, but I do not feel that I am qualified, in my opinion, to help much on it.

Senator NEW. Mr. Secretary, if that is all with reference to that bill, I would like to ask you if you have given any thought—

Mr. STIMSON (interposing). To your bill?

Senator NEW. Yes.

Mr. STIMSON. I have read it, with the others, coming down on the train. I feel this way about that general question. I think the Air Service has got—I mean the Army Air Service—to be connected with the Army in time of war, certainly. It is an auxiliary service, like the Tank Service, and like the Artillery itself, all devoted to helping forward the Infantry and protecting it, and it has got to be, in my opinion, under the same command in action, tactical command certainly, as all of the forces, and I think the actual command and administration of the Army Air Service should be put in the Army. But I do not see anything inconsistent in that with having, if it proved to be from other reasons desirable—which I do not know about—in time of peace a civil officer or department created for the purpose of developing the Air Service in general. Do I make my distinction clear?

Senator NEW. Yes.

Mr. STIMSON. You can not separate the force, as a force, from the force that it is intended to help.

Senator NEW. Have you given any thought to the subject of aviation generally?

Mr. STIMSON. No.

Senator NEW. To the necessity for the creation of a department here which will promote the industry itself?

Mr. STIMSON. I have not, Senator, at all. My only connection with it was watching it in combat.

Senator NEW. According to this bill, the air forces will be commanded by the commander in chief of the military forces—that is, the commander in the field, in time of conflict; but the bill is aimed primarily at the creation of a department for the promotion of the industry as a whole.

Mr. STIMSON. Provided you did not divide the men, and provided you did not take the administration of the Army Air Service out of the people for whose protection it has got to eventually function, I do not see anything that would prevent the creation of an entirely separate industry for the purpose of developing aeronautics for all purposes—civilian as well as military. But I do not know that my opinion would be worth anything on that. I have not studied it carefully. I only know of it in a military sense.

The CHAIRMAN. We are very thankful to you, Mr. Stimson.

The CHAIRMAN. I am in receipt of a letter from Gen. W. M. Black, Chief of Engineers, addressed to the chairman of the committee, correcting certain statements which appeared in the newspapers describing his testimony before the House committee and before this committee. The corrections are contained in the letter, and I would like to have that go in as part of the record.

(The letter referred to is as follows:)

WAR DEPARTMENT,
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF ENGINEERS,
Washington, October 8, 1919.

Hon. J. W. WADSWORTH,
United States Senate.

MY DEAR SENATOR: In my testimony before the House Committee on Military Affairs last week, I made the following statement:

"Before the present Chief of Staff came into office, after I became Chief of Engineers, I was directed that while I had direct appeal to the Secretary of War properly in matters of river and harbor work, I was not to go to the Secretary of War concerning anything relative to the Military Establishment whatever, except through the Chief of Staff. That has been the rule followed."

In the issue of the Army and Navy Register of last week and in the Sunday edition of the Post of Washington, and I am informed also in the New York Times, there appeared items in which it was stated that I had stated that such orders had been issued by Gen. March. As you will see from the above transcript from the record of the hearing, I took pains to say that these orders were given to me before Gen. March became Chief of Staff. Since he has been Chief of Staff I have had no orders from him on this subject, nor have I ever had any conversation with him on this subject.

When my attention was called to the misstatement in the two Washington papers, mentioned above, I wrote to the editors of those papers and requested that they would make a correction of the misstatement. A small item appeared in the Post this morning giving the correct statement, but without giving any of the context, and therefore not really making a correction of the misstatement

in the Sunday edition. As yet I have heard nothing from the Army and Navy Register.

This matter has become of importance because this misstatement seems to have been received by the members of the Senate Military Committee as fact—the full testimony before the House committee not yet having been published—and I am informed that yesterday one of the members of the committee quoted the misstatement to Gen. Lord. In justice to Gen. March as well as myself, will you kindly have the members of the Senate Military Committee informed as to the truth?

Very sincerely, yours,

W. M. BLACK,
Major General, Chief of Engineers.

STATEMENT OF MAJ. B. D. FOULOIS.

The CHAIRMAN. Major, please give your name to the reporter.

Maj. FOULOIS. Maj. B. D. Foulois.

The CHAIRMAN. And will you be kind enough to tell the committee about your assignments during the war?

Maj. FOULOIS. At the outbreak of the war I was on duty in the office of the Chief Signal Officer of the Army as assistant chief of the Airplane Division of the Aviation Section of the Signal Corps. I was made chief of the Aviation Section of the Airplane Division of the Signal Corps in July, 1917. During the months of May, June, and July, 1917, I had general charge of the preparation of the organization of the Air Service personnel to meet the emergency, and especially had charge of the preparation of the \$640,000,000 bill. I remained on duty in the office of the Chief Signal Officer until the latter part of October, 1917, when I was ordered to proceed to France, as a brigadier general, to report to the commander in chief of the American Expeditionary Forces.

Was assigned to duty as chief of the Air Service of the American Expeditionary Forces on November 27, 1917; remained on duty as chief of Air Service until the 1st of June, 1918, when I was assigned to duty as chief of Air Service, First Army. I remained on duty as chief of Air Service, First Army, during the months of June and July, when I was reassigned as assistant chief of Air Service to Gen. Patrick, and placed in charge of all Air Service activities in the zone of advance.

I remained on that duty until the latter part of October, 1918, when I was taken sick with influenza and sent to the rear, and as soon as fit for duty was assigned as deputy chief of Air Service at headquarters, Service of Supply. I remained on that duty until March, 1919, when I was ordered to duty in Paris as an American member of the convention charged with drawing up the rules and regulations for international air navigation, and which also was charged with drawing up the air terms for the treaty of peace.

In May, 1919, I was designated as the chief of the American section of the Aeronautical Interallied Commission of Control, charged with the carrying into effect of the air terms of the proposed treaty of peace.

In addition to these duties, I was chairman of the joint Army and Navy aircraft committee from January, 1918, until the 1st of June, 1918, a committee which had charge of all the distribution of raw, semifinished, and finished aircraft materials received from the United States and destined for use by the Allies. I served as the American

member of the interallied expert committee on aviation of the supreme war council from February, 1918, until my return to the United States in June, 1919.

Senator NEW. Major, I would like for you to give the committee a general expression of your opinion with reference to the bill now before the committee creating a separate department of aircraft, of your opinion as to what is necessary to be done for the salvation of aeronautics in this country. I ask that you do that in these general terms, for the reason that the hour has grown so late that you will not be able to read to the committee the prepared statement which you have before you, and which will require two and a half to three hours' time. I would, therefore, like for you to cover that ground in a general way as well as you can in a few minutes, and then file this statement with the committee to appear as a part of the record.

Maj. FOULOIS. In order to cover it as a complete statement, I specifically request that I be permitted to submit the statement which I have prepared during the last three months covering my experience in aviation since its birth in 1908, in all the different features of practical, technical, industrial, mechanical, and military aviation.

Senator NEW. That will be granted.

Maj. FOULOIS. As a preliminary to the discussion of the bill for the creation of a department of aeronautics, the necessity for such creation, in my opinion, is very urgent, not only for the reason that aviation to-day as it stands in the United States is at a practical standstill, but also because in my opinion there is no effort being made by the people who should make it toward promoting the development of aviation or the aircraft industry.

The statement which is herewith submitted to this committee goes into great detail as to the history of aviation, as I have seen it in its development in the Army during the past 11 years, as it has been handled by the War Department especially, and in my opinion clearly sets forth why some other agency must be created, if aviation is to be developed as we all known it should be developed.

The bill before the committee for creating a department of aeronautics in its general principles and general lines will undoubtedly meet the conditions as they exist to-day and enable the United States to develop an industry in this country equal, or even superior to, any aviation organization in the world. The creation of a department of aeronautics in this country in my opinion is absolutely necessary in order to develop and build up aviation upon a paying, economical basis. Aviation will never be built up in time of peace if we depend primarily on the military use of aviation. I hardly think that Congress or the public will stand for a big standing air service solely for military use. This being the case, the only alternative is to create some new agency whereby we can develop the commercial and civil use of aviation to its maximum capacity, keeping in mind, however, the application of all classes of aviation to military use in time of war.

Senator NEW. Now, as to the command in time of combat, in time of war?

Maj. FOULOIS. In time of war there is no question but that, in order to get the maximum efficiency of all the elements of a military command, air service units as well as any other units, must come under the command of the supreme military commander in the field. In

time of peace I do not think it is necessary, especially in view of the peculiar situation and conditions under which aviation has been developed in the United States Army for the past 11 years, I believe there has been a great deal of discussion before the Senate Military and also the House Military Committee, to the effect that you can not separate aviation in time of peace, especially military aviation, from the people who may command it in time of war. You will notice in the written statement which is herewith submitted to the committee as part of its record that in my knowledge and experience no General Staff officer or any other officer of the United States Army not actively engaged in aviation work, during the past 11 years, has had a hand in the development of aviation since its birth. The development of aviation in the United States Army has been exclusively done by men actually in the air service or actually engaged on aviation duty. These men have, as a rule, also had a pretty clear conception of military training and the military needs and uses of aviation. In fact, in my opinion, they have had a much clearer conception of what the Army needs in aviation than the Army, and especially the General Staff, does itself.

Senator FLETCHER. Are you making any studies at all now—the air service—looking to improvements?

Maj. FOULLOIS. The officers in the air service, especially the technical officers and the officers who are primarily concerned with its use, are making studies all the time of the future use of aviation. These studies have been carried on by a great many of us for the past 10 years, and in fact the only studies that have ever been made of aviation to my knowledge have been made by the aviators themselves.

My experience in the United States and my experience in France during the war was to the effect that as a rule the line officers or the General Staff officers, who, although capable and excellent men in handling and coordinating the use of ground troops, were unable, due to lack of practical air-service experience, to efficiently plan for the use of air service troops. This lack of practical knowledge on the part of the Army is one of the principal objections that the practical aviator has to-day in connection with the further development of aviation by the United States Army.

Senator NEW. What is your conception of the future of military aviation?

Maj. FOULLOIS. My conception of the future of military aviation dates back to 1907, before the first public flights were made in the United States, and was set forth in a thesis which I prepared as a graduating thesis at the Fort Leavenworth Army Service School, to the effect that future wars would see large fleets in the air operating well in advance of the troops, and in all large strategical operations the first troops to come in contact. These opposing fleets, through their preliminary engagements, will in my opinion have a decisive effect on all future operations.

The foregoing statement, which was made in 1907, still holds true, and my future conception of military aviation has not changed in the slightest in the last 12 years.

I recently saw a statement made by Marshal Foch practically identical in terms, made in 1919, that in all the future wars the preliminary engagements between armies in the field would be first

carried out by fleets in the air, and the result of these preliminary air operations would have a very decisive effect on the war.

Senator FLETCHER. What was your experience and observation in France in that connection?

Maj. FOULOIS. Entirely identical with that. We could see without question where such operations could have been carried out if we had had the material and personnel to do it. The great difficulty that confronted aviation throughout the war was the practical lack of an industry at the outbreak of the war, and even up to the termination of the war none of the Allies ever had enough aviation material and aviation troops to fully take care of the needs of ground troops in air observation.

One of the particular difficulties I see with our own troops—that is, our General Staff and line officers—is the fact that their vision is confined almost entirely to the “defensive use” of aircraft. That is, its use for observation, its use with the troops in observing artillery fire, doing courier work for the high command, and generally what we term the defensive use only of aircraft. The fighting side of aircraft has never been developed to any extent—that is, its use as an actual offensive weapon, both in fighting and bombing, due entirely to lack of production facilities. I have placed in this statement a very illuminating article recently published by Admiral Fullam, of the Navy, which goes into considerable detail as to the seriousness of air operations in connection with naval operations.

Senator NEW. I am glad you have it in there. I had that and was going to put it in in another form.

Maj. FOULOIS. He states in his article, and I think it is absolutely right, that the Navy must take seriously the question of offensive operations in the air, and that they will probably have to modify the naval architecture of all ships in order to protect their decks particularly against direct hits from the air. If we to-day had enough airplanes of the present type, with the present type of bombs and the men that we used in France machine gunning Hun troops, I would be perfectly frank in stating that Admiral Fullam's prophecy could be carried out to-day, and that the Navy would immediately have to start to redesign their ships in order to protect from bombing in the air. It is just a question of numbers to-day.

Senator NEW. Now, Maj. Foulois, you have said that the great difficulty with aviation during the war was the absence of industry at the breaking out of the war. Did not that apply to England and France as well as to the United States?

Maj. FOULOIS. It applied to all countries; yes, sir.

Senator NEW. Following that up, is it not true that in England and France steps have been taken and all necessary things done to maintain the industry which war itself made necessary, and yet in this country, under our military control of aircraft, the industry has been allowed to lapse until we have practically none?

Maj. FOULOIS. As early as 1917, to my own knowledge, Great Britain was making complete plans to utilize her air service personnel and material which was accumulating as a result of war necessity, for the utilization of that personnel and material for peace-time purposes. Every country in Europe, as soon as they realized what England was doing and her object in view, immediately started to take

steps to follow her lead. They fully realized that in time of peace it would be a physical impossibility to maintain big fleets of aircraft solely for military purposes. They realized that the only way to do it was to create and develop commercial and civil uses for aircraft. They also realized as a result of their experience in war that every activity and every facility that they had should be put together somewhere under one control and one responsible head, in order to get maximum efficiency and minimum economy out of a very expensive piece of machinery.

They have done this by creating or intending to create a central agency in each of their countries, whereby all activities can be grouped together and efficiently administered. The United States to-day, of all the first-class powers, is, I believe, the only country which is not following the lead of all of the principal allies who have learned their lessons from the war.

Senator New. Major, if there is anything you care to say in a general way on this subject and which is not comprehended in the statement which you have there, we would be very glad indeed to hear it.

Maj. FOULLOIS. I doubt whether there is anything I could say, Senator, outside of the statement which will be submitted. I think it goes into very great detail, and I think it covers a great many of the questions which have already been asked and a great deal of the testimony which has already been submitted here, and which I have endeavored to cover with my own practical views.

Senator New. Well, the statement, then, will be made a part of the record.

Maj. FOULLOIS. I think you will find in that statement very nearly everything that I could possibly cover as a result of 21 years' service in the Army and 11 years' practical service in aviation.

Senator New. Your statement will be printed as a part of your testimony. I have read it and know in a general way what it contains. It is very complete and thorough, and we are very glad to have it.

(The statement referred to is as follows:)

STATEMENT ON THE NECESSITY FOR THE CREATION OF A DEPARTMENT OF
AERONAUTICS.

[Submitted by Maj. B. D. Foullois, military aviator, United States Army. Formerly brigadier general, and Chief of Air Service, American Expeditionary Forces.]

1. Future military and industrial preparedness in my opinion is one of the big issues which confronts the United States to-day. The use of aircraft during the recent war has fully demonstrated the fact that in future wars, aircraft will play a part second only to the infantry. In order that the United States may be properly prepared for future wars special attention must be accorded the use of aircraft, and its development in time of peace should be expedited in every possible way even at the expense of other departments if necessary. As a weapon of offense and defense it ranks second only to infantry, and in the consideration of future measures for national defense or in the formulation of a military policy, the relative importance of aircraft as compared to other military weapons should be given most serious and thoughtful study. In any study involving aircraft, it should be thoroughly realized that it is still a very expensive arm and the most technical and difficult service of all military services to organize, equip, train, maintain, and operate.

2. The war history of the United States since the Revolutionary War is a continuous story of war-time extravagance and extreme peace-time economy.

The present conditions of the world, as a result of the recent war, point straight to the fact that the United States must look to its military and industrial preparedness for many years to come.

Confronted with an inevitable reaction toward extreme peace-time economy, how will it be possible to build up such a highly important military weapon as aircraft? It is absolutely absurd, in my opinion, to imagine that the public will stand for a large standing Army or a large standing Air Service on account of the enormous expense involved.

How can the aircraft industry be best developed in the interests of future preparedness with a minimum of cost to the Government?

In my opinion, it can be most effectively accomplished in the following manner:

(a) By consolidation of every aircraft activity now in existence in the United States under one central department of the Government, and under one responsible head.

(b) By fostering and encouraging to the limit the use of aircraft for non-military and commercial service, keeping in mind the fact that practically every type of aircraft developed for nonmilitary and commercial service can be swiftly adapted to military service.

(c) By continuing the military and naval development and use of special types of aircraft not especially suited for nonmilitary and commercial service.

How can this policy be put into effect with the least possible delay? In my opinion, by the prompt enactment into law of the proposed legislation now before Congress, which provides for the creation of a Department of Aeronautics.

3. In advocating this action, I am fully acquainted with the problems involved, and also fully aware of the opposition which has developed against this proposed bill, especially in the War Department.

Is this opposition justified? Or can the War Department point to a satisfactory and efficient stewardship of military aviation during the past 11 years, which warrants a just cause for opposition to the enactment of a bill, which in my opinion, will have a most beneficial influence on the future development of aviation and the aircraft industry of the United States?

Based on a practical experience in Army aviation, ever since its birth in 1908, I can frankly state that in my opinion, the War Department has earned no right or title to claim further control over aviation or the aircraft industry of the United States.

Shortly after our entrance into the war, on April 6, 1917, I was charged with the duty of preparing the so-called, \$640,000,000 aviation bill. The fundamental policy behind that bill, covered two most essential features:

1. To provide for the Air Service needs of the War.

2. To provide for the future of aviation and the aircraft industry after the war.

What have we to show to-day for the future of aviation, and the aircraft industry of the United States? On November 11, 1918, we had a wonderful industry, developed under most adverse conditions. To-day it is so thoroughly wiped out that if we were called upon to-morrow to fit out an expedition for service in Mexico, it would take at least six months or a year, to efficiently equip such an expedition with up-to-date aircraft.

On November 11, 1918, we had thousands of well-trained flying men, whom the English, French, and Italians admit had no superiors in the air. To-day, those men are scattered to the four corners of the earth, disgusted, disheartened, and thoroughly disillusioned as to the glories of patriotic service in the United States Army.

4. Looking at the aviation situation in the United States to-day, from a broad national and international viewpoint, it is my opinion that we have mighty little to show for the time and expense which has been devoted to the development and use of aviation, during the past 11 years.

Why have we so little to show for the time and money spent? And who is responsible for this poor showing? Perhaps the following statements may throw a little light on these questions.

5. The greater part of the development and use of aviation in the United States for the past 11 years has been under the control and supervision of the War Department. In view of this fact, I frankly state that in my opinion, the War Department through its policy-making body, the General Staff of the Army, is primarily responsible for the present unsatisfactory, disorganized, and most critical situation which now exists in all aviation matters throughout the United States.

6. In my opinion the situation is so critical especially in connection with the present physical condition of the aircraft industry, that I am inclined to be-

lieve that no matter what restoratives are used, the patient will probably die on your hands, or at the most, will only be saved through the application of prompt and most drastic treatment.

7. In order to illustrate the necessity for drastic and immediate steps in connection with salvaging the existing wreckage of Air Service personnel and material, I would like to set forth a brief account of the aviation stewardship of the War Department, as I have seen it during the past 11 years and from these statements let you draw your own conclusions as to whether the War Department is competent or even willing to assist in the future development of aviation on a scale commensurate with its future military importance; or whether in the interests of aviation, commercial, civil, and military, it would be better to take aviation away from the War Department and put it under some department where it can be developed to its maximum capacity.

8. The Chief of Staff of the Army, in his testimony before the House Military Affairs Committee, May 29, 1919, in the hearings on the Army appropriation bill, 1920, said:

"The Air Service is a great big arm, a fourth arm of equal importance with the other branches of the service, and we propose to build that up if we can."

The above statement of the Chief of Staff of the Army clearly implies that the Air Service, on account of its military importance, should be placed on an equal basis with the other branches of the service, and that the General Staff proposes to build it up, if possible, to its proper place in the Military Establishment. The above quoted statement of the Chief of Staff, when thoroughly studied, holds forth a wonderful promise to those of us who have been struggling during the past 10 years to bring aviation up to somewhere near its rightful place in our military family.

9. Let us see, however, how the General Staff of the Army plans to go about this building up of the Air Service, as promised by the Chief of Staff. The United States Senate has now under consideration a proposed bill (S. 2715), submitted by the War Department to reorganize and increase the efficiency of the United States Army, a bill which was introduced in the Senate August 4, 1919. The House of Representatives also has under consideration an identical bill, H. R. 8287.

The sections of that bill (S. 2715) which directly affect the Air Service are herewith extracted and quoted as follows:

(a) Section 14, page 14, lines 4 to 7, inclusive:

"Sec. 14. Air Service.—The Air Service shall consist of 1 major general, 1 brigadier general, 22 colonels, 45 lieutenant colonels, 126 majors," etc.

(b) Section 31, page 27, lines 14 to 25, inclusive; page 28, lines 1 to 8, inclusive:

"Sec. 31. Appointment of Officers.—Hereafter all appointments of officers in grades below that of brigadier general shall be by commission in the Infantry, Cavalry, Field Artillery, Coast Artillery Corps, Corps of Engineers, or one of the corps of the Medical Department, or as chaplain, band leader, or professor at the United States Military Academy. Those now commissioned in said branches will continue under existing commissions; all now otherwise commissioned will be recommissioned with their present grades and dates of rank in the Infantry, Cavalry, Field Artillery, Coast Artillery Corps, Corps of Engineers, as may, in each case, be directed by the President."

Officers for duty in the branches herein authorized and in which officers are not commissioned, shall be obtained by temporary details from among officers of corresponding grades in other branches; but no officer below the grade of lieutenant colonel shall be detailed to duty detaching him from the branch in which permanently commissioned for more than four years in any period of six years, except in time of actual or threatened hostilities."

(c) Section 53, page 42, lines 10, 11, and 12:

"All laws providing that details of officers as aides to general officers or on aviation duty shall carry advanced rank are hereby repealed."

10. The above-quoted extracts from the proposed bill (S. 2715) taken in their entirety are, in my opinion, directly opposed to the statements of the Chief of Staff and the policy announced by him when he said, on May 29, 1919, that—

"The Air Service is a great big arm, a fourth arm of equal importance with the other branches of the service, and we propose to build that up, if we can."

Instead of building up the Air Service in accordance with the policy announced by the Chief of Staff there has been placed before Congress by the War Department proposed legislation which, if enacted into law will, in my opinion, have an exactly opposite effect and will place the Air Service in a decidedly subordi-

nate position with less dignity and a lower status than that accorded in the same bill to the Dental Corps, the Veterinary Corps, or the Army Nurse Corps. In other words, this bill places the Air Service under the "detail" system, which will result in creating a service without permanency and with a constantly shifting personnel, who would hardly be in the Air Service long enough to learn the names of all the different tools and instruments (to say nothing of their efficient use) before they, by law, would have to give up their work and try something else. The "detail" system if applied to the Air Service will, in my opinion, soon result in a high state of inefficiency, with maximum expenditure of public funds and maximum waste of equipment.

11. Let me go further in connection with section 31 of this proposed bill heretofore quoted and further illustrate the efforts of the authors of this bill not only to put the Air Service in a subordinate position, but also to effectively prevent the flying officers from having a voice in the control of Air Service affairs. In other words, to effectively keep the practical flying officers in the subordinate grades with no chance whatsoever to have a voice in the formation and establishment of future Air Service policies.

12. This carefully prepared attempt to push the practical flying officers into the background is clearly exposed in lines 1, 2, 3, and 4, on page 28, and lines 10, 11, and 12, page 42, of this bill (S. 2715), and which are again quoted, as follows:

"Officers for duty in the branches herein authorized and in which officers are not commissioned shall be obtained by temporary details from among officers of corresponding grades in other branches." (P. 28.)

"All laws providing that details of officers as aides to general officers or on aviation duty shall carry advanced rank are hereby repealed." (P. 42.)

13. If the above quoted extracts of the proposed bill (S. 2715) are enacted into law, this is what will happen:

(a) Not one practical flying officer in the United States Army will be eligible to fill any one of the 22 vacancies for colonel as contemplated under section 14 of this proposed bill.

(b) Only two practical flying officers in the United States Army will be eligible to fill the 45 vacancies for lieutenant colonel as contemplated under section 14 of this proposed bill.

(c) Not one practical flying officer in the United States Army will be eligible to fill one of the 126 vacancies for major as contemplated under section 14 of this proposed bill.

In other words, 191 of the 193 vacancies in the grade of colonel, lieutenant colonel, and major in the Air Service would under the law have to be filled by inexperienced colonels, lieutenant colonels, and majors from the Army at large.

14. If the foregoing extracts of the proposed bill (S. 2715) have the slightest prospect of being ever enacted into law, I recommend that the following clause be added to section 31 of that bill:

"*Provided, however,* That all officers above the grade of captain, detailed for duty in the Air Service, shall be required to qualify as pilots in the Air Service and be required to participate in regular and frequent aerial flights."

If this clause is inserted, I am willing to wager that the grades of colonel, lieutenant colonel, and major in the Air Service will not be very popular with the aspirants from other branches of the service.

15. I will go further still, and state that in my opinion, if Congress ever enacts into law the above quoted extracts of the bill S. 2715, the United States Army will lose approximately 99 per cent of its Regular Army flying officers now on duty in the Air Service, either by request to be reassigned to their original branches of the service, or by outright resignation from the United States Army.

16. To further illustrate the policy of the General Staff, in connection with its plans for the subordination of the Air Service, I wish to quote an extract from a statement submitted on August 9, 1919, by the Chief of Staff of the Army to the Senate Military subcommittee in its hearings on S. 2715, August 8, 1919. (Last line, page 92, and first four lines, page 95, part 2, hearings before subcommittee Military Affairs, Sixty-sixth Congress, first session.)

"While recognizing the great field of work which is ahead of the Air Service and admitting its urgent needs for proper development, the War Plans Division does not believe that special consideration should be accorded to the service in making a reapportionment at the expense of the other arms."

If the foregoing statements of the Chief of Staff are carefully examined, it will be seen that the War Plans Division of the General Staff has come out with a policy which in spirit is diametrically opposed to the spirit of the policy announced by the Chief of Staff in his testimony before the House Military Affairs Committee on May 29, 1919, in the hearings of the Army appropriations bill, 1920, when he said:

"The Air Service is a great big arm, a fourth arm of equal importance with the other branches of the service, and we propose to build that up if we can."

Why does the War Plans Division of the General Staff believe that special consideration should not be accorded the Air Service at the expense of the other arms?

I can think only of the following reasons which could influence this policy-making body of the Army to make such a statement:

(a) That the proportion of Air Service troops to the entire Army as outlined in the proposed bill (S. 2715) is sufficient to meet the military needs of the United States.

(b) That if a larger proportion of Air Service troops is authorized the country and Congress will not approve of the additional cost, and the only alternative would be to make a proportionate reduction in the Infantry, Cavalry, Field Artillery, and other branches of the Military Establishment in order to neutralize the cost to the country.

In answer to the first reason, that the proportion of Air Service troops to the rest of the Army is sufficient to meet the military needs of the United States, I wish to invite attention to the fact that at no time during the entire war did the combat ground troops of the American Expeditionary Forces have sufficient air troops to meet even 50 per cent of the requirements of the combat ground troops.

This fact not only applied to the American Expeditionary Forces, but also applied equally as well to the individual air forces of our allies.

Every military power in the world to-day except our own fully appreciates the fact that the military use of aircraft has heretofore been confined almost entirely to defensive use. The offensive use or destructive use of aircraft up to the end of the war was only just beginning its development, due to limitations on production of aeroplanes and engines.

Every military power in the world to-day except our own is meeting this new phase of military development by concentrating all of its aircraft activities under one control and by concentrating on the development of large types of aircraft for commercial use in time of peace, knowing full well that each and every one of these large types of aircraft can be converted into a military weapon within 48 hours in time of war.

It is therefore contended that the proportion of Air Service troops to the rest of the Army as authorized and proposed by the War Plans Division of the General Staff in the proposed bill (S. 2715) is entirely inadequate to meet the future military needs of the United States. It is further contended that if the United States is to depend for future military preparedness upon the air forces of the Regular Army such forces should be at least equal in numerical strength to the Field Artillery branch of the Army—that is, between three to four times its present proposed strength, or approximately 65,000 to 70,000 officers and men.

There is not a doubt that the majority of military experience in the United States Army will agree with the foregoing statements, but there are just two obstacles in the way to the building up of a large Air Service in the Army: First, the Congress of the United States; second, the United States Army.

This brings up the second probable reason why the War Plans Division of the General Staff does not recommend special consideration be given the Air Service at the expense of the other arms.

The Congress of the United States, in view of the existing economical and financial conditions which now confront the country, can hardly be asked at this time to create an Air Service for the Army of a size adequate to meet the future military needs of the country, unless retrenchment is made in another branch or branches of the military service. This is the second obstacle, the Army itself, which opposes the development of an Air Service "at the expense of the other arms." Such action, of course, would mean a proportionate reduction in the numerical strength of all other branches and departments which vitally affects promotion, which, as Congress well knows, is a very delicate question at all times in the Army.

Why shouldn't each and every branch and department of the United States Army be proportionately reduced in order that the Air Service be promptly brought up to its place in the military family, where the Secretary of War, the Chief of Staff of the Army, and every other military authority admits it properly belongs?

We seem to forget that we have at this very date approximately 5,000,000 well-trained fighting men in the United States, whose military usefulness can be counted upon for at least 5 years. We also seem to forget that there is an enormous store of war materials available and on hand to properly equip these 5,000,000 men.

But where are the aeroplanes and balloons which would be needed? Where are the pilots and observers? The aeroplane and balloon industry of the United States, through lack of vision on the part of the General Staff of the Army, and their unwillingness to "accord special consideration to the Air Service at the expense of the other arms," has been wiped out and can only be rebuilt in two logical and economical ways: First, by creating a separate department of aeronautics and, failing this, by compelling the other branches of the military service to accept a proportionate reduction in their numerical strength and allot an increased personnel and an increased appropriation of funds to the Air Service.

17. If this was the first attempt on the part of the General Staff of the Army to show its reactionary attitude toward the development of aviation in the United States, it might be excused. This is not the first attempt, however. Identical reactionary clauses as appear in the proposed bill (S. 2715) were also written into the proposed bill (H. R. 14500), introduced in the House of Representatives by Mr. Dent (by request) on January 16, 1919.

18. You can go back to the struggle in June and July, 1917, when the so-called \$640,000,000 aviation bill was presented to the Army War College, and after approximately six weeks of discussion the War College, in secret session, disapproved that part of the bill which provided for the machinery to carry into effect the enormous program as contemplated, and that bill would never have been enacted into law except for the fact that Congress itself called for the proposed draft of the bill and passed it over the disapproval of the General Staff.

19. You can go back over the entire history of aviation in the United States Army and you will not find, to my knowledge, one single case on record where a General Staff officer of the United States Army has contributed to the technical or mechanical development of aviation in the United States Army. In other words, the Air Service of the United States Army, from its birth in 1908 to the present date, has been developed in its entirety by the officers and men actively engaged in this work, and through no assistance on the part of the General Staff of the Army.

20. There have been no military air policy in existence from the official birth of aviation in the United States in 1908 up to May 29, 1919, when the Chief of Staff of the Army officially announced before the House Military Affairs Committee that:

"The Air Service is a great big arm, a fourth arm of equal importance with the other branches of the service, and we propose to build that up if we can."

And the above quoted policy is already a dead issue as the result of the more recent statement of the Chief of Staff when he informed the Senate Military Subcommittee on August 8, 1919, that the:

"* * * War Plans Division does not believe that special consideration should be accorded to the service in making a reapportionment at the expense of the other arms."

21. The General Staff of the Army is the policy-making body of the Army, and, either through lack of vision, lack of practical knowledge, or deliberate intention to subordinate the Air Service needs to the needs of the other combat arms, it has utterly failed to appreciate the full military value of this new military weapon, and, in my opinion, has utterly failed to accord it its just place in our military family.

The General Staff of the Army should have appreciated 10 years ago the fact that the aeroplane was a thousand years behind the development of all other military weapons, and that in order to bring it up to the same state of development with existing military weapons the Air Service would have to be given every encouragement and every possible precedence over other branches of the service in order that it might take its proper place in line with the other combat services.

22. If during the period between 1908 and 1916 the Air Service of the Army had had the fullest sympathy and assistance from the General Staff of the Army, and had occasionally been given special preference, strictly from the viewpoint of its military value, there is not the slightest doubt that the United States Army, would have had an Air Service at the outbreak of war, April 6, 1917, at least as efficient as the Air Service of either England or France at the time they entered the war.

23. The operation of the Air Service of the Army ever since its birth has involved duties approximately 90 per cent of which are technical, mechanical, and industrial, and only 10 per cent of which can be classed as strictly military. This classification of duties will always remain the same in the years to come. Is it thought conceivable that by the subordination of the practical flying officers, as now contemplated in the proposed bill (S. 2715), that this 90 per cent of Air Service duty can be effectively or intelligently governed by a General Staff inexperienced and totally ignorant of the practical, technical, mechanical, and industrial problems which have heretofore been borne almost entirely by the practical flying officer?

Is it conceivable that the inexperienced colonels, lieutenant colonels, and majors (191 in all) who, under the terms of the proposed bill (S. 2715), must be detailed to the Air Service and upon whom will fall the brunt of organization and development, can effectively and intelligently solve the innumerable technical, mechanical, and industrial problems involved?

Such a prospect for the future of military aviation is inconceivable, and I can not believe that any sane business man with an ounce of intelligence would listen to such a proposition for a minute.

24. There is just one way to acquire a thorough working knowledge of aviation and its problems, and that is to live, eat, and sleep with it, day in and day out. You can not learn the aviation trade by a correspondence school course or by stuffing your brain full of theoretical knowledge.

To illustrate this fact, let me relate my first lesson received from the late Wilbur Wright, when the Wright brothers were demonstrating their machine at Fort Myer, Va., over 10 years ago. I was one of the three officers originally selected to receive instruction on the first machine purchased by the Government, and had been cramming my head full of theory from a lot of books. I continually pestered the Wright brothers with theoretical questions, until one day Wilbur Wright asked me what I had been reading. I told him everything I could lay my hands on in connection with aviation. He turned and pointed to the aeroplane and said, "Throw your books away and go and get your hands dirty on that machine."

A General Staff officer or any other officer can not intelligently organize, maintain, or operate an efficient Air Service unless he thoroughly knows the practical side of the technical, mechanical, and industrial problems involved, and in making this statement I want to say that it is based on 11 years of practical experience in every phase of aviation organization and development, military, technical, mechanical, and industrial.

25. During my years of service on aviation work I have heard many high ranking officers of the Army frequently refer to aviators as being "temperamental as prima donnas," "too young for their rank," "lacking in discipline," etc. I have always resented these remarks, and always will. In connection with these remarks I want to bring forcibly to the attention of every officer concerned in the making of Air Service policies the following most vital fact, which is, in my opinion, not given its due consideration, and that is this: The military aviator in time of peace is constantly performing his duty under the threat of death, if he makes a mistake in the operation of his machine. No other branch of the military service in time of peace is required to operate under such conditions.

The natural law of "self-preservation" is still in existence, and when laws, rules, or regulations are proposed which, on their face, clearly show that their effect will be to reduce the working efficiency of the Air Service personnel, with a resultant increase of danger to the life and limb of the aviator, the aviator is going to protest, and protest most vigorously.

26. There have been several upheavals in the Air Service in the past solely on account of this same disregard for the life of the aviator, and you may rest assured that there will be future upheavals and protests whenever the aviator feels that due and serious consideration has not been given to laws, rules, or regulations designed to govern his daily life and his service.

Flying is not a theory to those of us who in the early days of aviation trusted to God and hoped that we would always land right side up.

Flying is not a theory to those of us who, with the Mexican punitive expedition in 1916, flew in rain, hail, and snow; and on account of inferior types of aeroplanes actually had to fly with inadequate clothing in order to carry gasoline sufficient to reach our objectives and return safely.

Flying is or was no theory to the pilot in France, shot down by the Hun just because his machine was inferior to that of the enemy or because his machine gun was defective. Nor was flying a theory to the pilot in France shot down in flames because of the lack of a "protected" gasoline tank.

These little items of the day's work of a pilot are not theories, but cold, merciless, and deadly facts, and they are a few of the reasons why the aviator is inclined to question the policies formulated for the government of his daily life in time of peace, especially if those policies are liable to directly increase the dangers to his life and limb.

27. After a careful review of the foregoing facts, is it any wonder that practical flying officers who have been risking their lives for the past 11 years in the development and use of this new military weapon are so keenly anxious to see aviation and aircraft development taken away from the Army and placed under a separate control, where each and every individual identified with this new art will be able to develop his entire time and energy to its fullest development without further restrictions? Is it any wonder that a few of us dare to risk the charge of insubordination to our superior authority and the possible charge of conduct prejudicial to good order and military discipline in order that our cause may be heard?

I have been in the Army 21 years, and no human being can accuse me of a single act of insubordination or disloyalty to my superiors during that period of time. If any of my foregoing statements can be construed as insubordinate or prejudicial to good order and military discipline, then I am ready to stand before any military court in the land without fear or favor to take my chances of punishment in a cause which, in my opinion, will develop and go ahead in spite of every effort to impede its progress.

28. I have previously stated that as a result of lack of policy, lack of vision, and lack of practical knowledge the General Staff, as the governing and policy-making body of the Army, has failed in the past to properly appreciate the military value of Air Service, and that in view of existing policies there seems to be no adequate future for the development of aviation in the United States Army. In making this statement I have taken into full consideration the probability that the future control of military policies will pass largely into the hands of men who have acquired their experience in the field during the recent war. In my opinion, the General Staff of the American Expeditionary Forces at the time of the signing of the armistice consisted of many of the most efficient and most experienced officers the United States Army has ever produced, in so far as their knowledge and ability in handling ground troops was concerned. Even these men, as efficient and as capable as they are, are not, in my opinion, equipped with the necessary practical knowledge of aviation to form, from their own knowledge of aviation, an efficient and workable policy for the future development of aviation and the aircraft industry. If these officers, through their lack of experience in the practical, technical, mechanical, and industrial features of aviation, are unable of their own knowledge to draw up and operate a practical policy for the future guidance of the Air Service, then what hope does there exist for the future expansion of aviation along practical lines? As late as March, 1919, after war had ceased on the western front, the General Staff, American Expeditionary Forces, drew up a tentative policy for the reorganization of the Army. In this policy it was stated that the Air Service was so new and undeveloped that it would have to be made the subject of future study, or words to that effect.

When the most experienced General Staff officers the American Army has ever produced admit that after nearly five years of war they are unable to announce a future policy for the Air Service, the situation, in my opinion, can be considered mighty serious, and, from the practical aviator's viewpoint, mighty hopeless.

29. Based upon past experience, past performance, and upon the present policy of the General Staff, that the interests of the other combat arms will not be sacrificed in the interests of aviation, I see no definite assurance for adequate future development of military aviation in the United States Army, if such a policy is adhered to.

Under peace conditions and under the natural reaction from necessary war extravagance to inevitable peace-time economy it is absolutely absurd, in my opinion, to think that the United States Army can build up an adequate and efficient Air Service unless some sacrifices are made on the part of the other combat arms of the Military Establishment.

30. The present General Staff by its announcement of a policy which protects the other branches of the Military Establishment, to the prejudice of the Air Service, and by their efforts through proposed legislation to effectively subordinate the Air Service to the other branches of the Army leave just one logical alternative, in my opinion, whereby the future development of civil, commercial, and military aviation and aircraft may still survive and still gain its proper place in spite of the reactionary attitude of the policy-making body of the Military Establishment of the United States.

That alternative is, in my opinion, the creation of a department of aeronautics as an additional executive department of the Government, wherein all aviation activities and all aviation interests may be brought together under one responsible head and coordinated, developed, and operated for the benefit of the entire country as a whole, and not simply for the benefit of the military forces of the Government.

31. During my 11 years of service on aviation, I have continuously pleaded for a fair and just hearing in the case of the military aviator versus the War Department, and have always insisted to the best of my ability on having the aviation problems presented to the Army in their true light. To show how aviation is not presented in its true light to the Army, let me quote a telegram recently sent broadcast throughout the Army for the purpose of securing an expression of military opinion on the advisability of creating a Department of Aeronautics. This telegram is in the form of a memorandum dated August 21, 1919, from the Chief of the War Plans Division of the General Staff to The Adjutant General of the Army, and is quoted as follows:

Memorandum for The Adjutant General of the Army.

Subject: Cabinet position of department of aeronautics.

1. The Secretary of War directs that a telegram in substance as follows be sent to officers as indicated in the last paragraph of this memorandum:

"Bills have been introduced in Congress to establish a department of aeronautics as a Cabinet position, which shall have charge of all matters pertaining to aeronautics including the purchase, manufacture, maintenance, and production of all aircraft for the United States and to perform all duties heretofore assigned to the War, Post Office, and Navy Departments in so far as they relate to aviation. It contemplates transfer to the aeronautical Department all officers, bureaus, etc., heretofore conducted under War, Navy, and Post Office Departments, and provides in fact for an independent fighting force coordinate with the Army and Navy, having complete charge of training, discipline, and everything in connection with an air force. In time of war, and at such other times as the President may direct, units of aviation will be assigned to Army and Navy for training in time of peace and for battle in time of war, in such numbers as the President may direct, during which period such personnel will be under complete control of the branch to which assigned. From your experience in past war telegraph your opinion as to advisability of such new department to Director Air Service.

"HARRIS."

"2. The foregoing message is to be sent to the following officers now in the United States.

- "(a) Those who command divisions, corps, or armies in battle.
- "(b) Chief of staff or corps and armies.
- "(c) Chief of Staff and Assistant Chief of Staff, A. E. F.
- "(d) Chiefs of sections of the General Staff, A. E. F.
- "(e) Chiefs of Air Service of first and second armies, A. E. F.
- "(f) Chief of Air Service, A. E. F.
- "(g) Chief of Staff of Air Service, A. E. F.

"W. G. HAAN,

"Major General, General Staff,

"Director, W. P. D., A. C. of S."

32. In quoting the foregoing, I feel that I am not violating military discipline or military ethics in submitting this memorandum to your committee as it has been broadcast throughout the Army for the express purpose of getting the

military viewpoint, and the results of the circulation of the above telegram will no doubt be reported to your committee as representing the best military opinion available in the United States.

A careful analysis of the foregoing memorandum shows the following:

Paragraph 1: "Bills have been introduced in Congress to establish a department of aeronautics as a Cabinet position."

This statement as worded is misleading and not entirely established by fact. The "bills" referred to are no doubt the bills S. 2693 and H. R. 7925, introduced in the Senate and House of Representatives by Senator New and Congressman Curry, respectively. The bill H. R. 7925 probably fulfills the conditions set forth in the above-quoted words as regards the creation of a Cabinet position. The bill S. 2693, in its present form, does not create a "Cabinet position."

33. The foregoing memorandum, in my opinion, does not present a fair and complete analysis of the aviation problem, in that it is confined almost entirely to the military side of aviation, which is only 10 per cent of the entire aviation problem.

The foregoing telegram sent broadcast throughout the country makes no mention of the industrial, technical, mechanical, economical, national, and international problems which are involved and which must be taken into fullest consideration before an intelligent answer can be submitted. No instruction is given to the officers to whom this telegram is sent to take into consideration the probability or improbability of universal military training or the probable effect of the proposed league of nations on the future development of aircraft. In other words, about 90 per cent of the aviation problem has been omitted from the foregoing quoted telegram, and therefore would probably not be taken into consideration by the officers to whom the foregoing quoted telegram was sent. A clear and full statement on the case would have been presented to these judges if the following had been added to the above-quoted telegram:

"In submitting your reply, take into full consideration the needs for maintaining an adequate aircraft industry in the United States, the technical, mechanical, and industrial problems involved in the development, maintenance, and repair of aircraft; the advantages or disadvantages which will result in connection with overhead expenses, by consolidation of all air activities now being carried on by the Government; whether or not, in your opinion, aviation will function with greater or less efficiency in connection with international commerce. If consolidated under a central control, whether or not, in your opinion, it would function under a central control, with greater or less efficiency in connection with such international problems as may arise out of the proposed league of nations; and above all, take into consideration the necessity for a readjustment of the Military Establishment on account of peace-time economy."

If the foregoing problems had been presented to the Army at large along with the strictly military problem, I am sure that the officers to whom the foregoing telegram was sent would do some mighty serious thinking before they dictated their replies. As these problems were not presented to the Army at large I feel that I can safely predict that 75 per cent of the answers received by the War Department will be in opposition to the creation of a department of aeronautics.

34. It will be noted in the foregoing telegram that of all the officers to whom telegrams were sent, only four are Air Service officers. Of these four, only two are flying officers, viz, the chiefs of Air Service of the first and second armies. The chief of the Air Service, American Expeditionary Forces, and the chief of staff of Air Service, American Expeditionary Forces, are not flying officers, and to my own knowledge have previously announced their views as being opposed to a department of aeronautics. In other words, of approximately 50 officers, to whom this telegram has been sent, only 2 of them are practical flying officers.

No opportunity, to my knowledge, has been offered to the practical flying officers scattered throughout the United States on duty at schools, on duty at the headquarters of the various departments and on active service on the border, to present the practical flying officers' viewpoint. Only a limited opportunity has been offered to the practical flying officers on duty in Washington to present their viewpoint. One opportunity, of which I have personal knowledge, was offered on August 22, when approximately 20 flying officers, including myself, were called before a board of officers, acting under official orders from the War Department. This board was composed of Maj. Gen. Haan; Maj. Gen. Menoher, Director of Air Service; Maj. Gen. Coe; Maj. Gen. Snow (all Artillery officers); and Col. Gorrell, military aviator, Air Service, as recorder.

In presenting the viewpoint of the practical flying officer, I was limited to approximately 20 minutes, the officer who followed me was limited to ap-

proximately 15 minutes. The remaining officers were limited to approximately 10 minutes. All officers were examined in approximately three and one-half hours. My examination consisted chiefly of the military application of aircraft to the needs of the Army, and how it would be influenced by the creation of a department of aeronautics. About five minutes' discussion was had on the industrial, mechanical, technical, economical, national, and international problems involved.

No doubt this board of officers had some perfectly good reason for limiting the time for the hearing of the practical flying officers' viewpoint as regards the advisability of creating a separate department of aeronautics, but due to this extremely limited opportunity for frank discussion, it is my opinion that the practical flying officer's viewpoint was not clearly and fully presented, and I therefore feel justified in taking this opportunity to cover it in detail.

35. In connection with the economical advantages or disadvantages which will result if a combined department of aeronautics is created, it has been said that there will be increased overhead expenses if such a department is created. I am of the opinion that such a statement can not be substantiated by fact. Here are a few of the items upon which overhead expenses can be reduced by the consolidation of all aircraft activities under one responsible head or control.

(a) Consolidation of Army and Navy lighter-than-air (balloon) coast defense stations. Present Army and Navy planes contemplate 12 stations for the Army and 14 stations for the Navy.

(b) Consolidation of aviation (heavier-than-air) stations. In this respect you have a typical example of unnecessary overhead right here at your door. The Army has a station at Bolling field, the Navy has their own station in another part of the same field. Both of these stations could be efficiently consolidated and operated with one commanding officer and staff, instead of two as is done at present. Duplication of this character also exists at San Diego and at Langley field, Virginia.

(c) Consolidation of preliminary training and training stations, thus doing away with existing duplication and unnecessary overhead in instruction, executive, and administrative staffs, and salvage and repair facilities.

(d) Adoption of a standard uniform and personal equipment for officers and men, instead of the different types of uniforms and equipment now provided.

(e) Consolidation of research and technical development of all types of aircraft under one control, thus obtaining maximum coordination of effort and knowledge as well as reducing overhead expense in the operation and maintenance of separate experimental laboratories and experimental stations.

(f) Consolidation of supply and disbursing, thus reducing overhead in personnel charged with the purchase of supplies and equipment.

(g) Consolidation of all appropriations within one department for presentation to Congress. An advantage which in my opinion needs no defense in view of the prevailing sentiment and need for the establishment of a "budget system."

The foregoing items represent a most substantial saving in expense to the Government, and, in view of the absolute necessity for economy as a result of the recent war, they should be given great weight in arriving at a decision in the aviation problem.

36. With reference to the supply of aircraft, it is not known whether it is contemplated that the purchase of aeroplanes, airships, etc., shall be a function of the proposed central supply bureau now advocated by the War Department. If this is contemplated, the following remarks apply:

A central supply bureau for the Army is perfectly feasible for all branches of the service whose equipment has become so nearly standardized that the average man has a well-formed idea as to the quality and quantity needed.

This does not hold true with reference to aeroplanes and aircraft equipment. The development and production of aircraft materials is constantly undergoing swift changes, and it is absolutely imperative that the branches devoted to "Research—Supply and use" be under one control if efficient results can be obtained. If you concentrate the supply of aircraft material under any other bureau than the Air Service itself, you will instantly revert to the condition which existed during the war, where the engineers of the Production Division constantly disagreed with the engineers of the Aeronautic Division, who represented the practical flying man. This disagreement you will remember resulted in our not receiving one single American fighting aeroplane in Europe during the entire war.

The ultimate acid test of aeronautical equipment is given in the field by the practical flying officers, and if you place supply and production of aeronautical equipment in a department which has power to override the practical suggestions and recommendations initiated by experienced flying officers, you are going to start trouble. Remember that the flying officer is staking his life on the equipment furnished him, and unless that equipment is right he is going to protest most forcibly. If you place the supply of aeronautical equipment under the control and direction of a bureau, which will handle every conceivable article under the sun, from beans to automobiles, what special attention do you expect will be given to the fostering of aeronautical development? The aeronautical department of this huge United States Army department store would very quickly land down in the basement and would be ranked of the same level with the mechanical-toy department instead of being given its rightful place alongside of the fighting branches of the Military Establishment. Where would this enormous supply bureau get its trained men to solve the intricate, technical, mechanical, and industrial problems which arise daily in connection with the research, supply, and use of aircraft? Will they take them from the trained men in the Army and Navy, or will they go out into civil life and bring them in to carry on this work? Wherever they get them, the Army and Navy would still be required to maintain and operate complete supply departments of their own on account of the intimate relations necessary between the man who operates an aeroplane or airship and the man who buys them. And in between these two stands the man who is devoting his entire time to the study of research and development. You can not get efficiency if you separate any one of these three men. Therefore, so long as aircraft material continues to make such rapid changes in its development, it would be the height of folly to place the supply of aircraft material under the control of a department which at the best could not devote a small fraction of its time to this most important service.

37. It has been suggested that the foregoing might be a compromise solution to the present aviation problem whereby all matters relating to production, supply, and research are placed under one central agency, leaving the Army and Navy services to remain as at present. This compromise will not make for efficiency. Such an organization existed in the Army Air Service at home during the war and it failed. That failure was due to the fact that the practical flying engineer officers who represented the men who were required to fly the machine could not agree with the engineer officers in the supply and production departments. You can not separate supply, research, and use of aircraft and get efficient results.

The department which buys aeroplanes must depend upon the practical engineers in the research department for technical advice and assistance in the preparation of plans, specifications, tests, and inspections. Both the supply and research departments must depend upon the practical flying officers in the field who use the aeroplane in service for advice and assistance in the serviceability and improvement of the aeroplane. The man who uses the aeroplane in service is the final judge as to the fitness of aircraft for field service. He also is the man who stakes his life against the equipment furnished him by the supply and research departments. This fact is frequently lost sight of by the supply department especially, and when the supply department acts on its own initiative, as it has frequently done in the past, without having fully consulted the research department or the men who use the aeroplane in actual service, trouble starts immediately, and, as a rule, the trouble is started by the man in the field who objects to anyone playing with his life, and will not tolerate mistakes on the part of the men who incur no risk to life and limb.

There is only one way in which complete coordination of supply, research, and use can be efficiently obtained, and that is by their consolidation under one central control where if a disagreement arises between either of the three departments concerned a decision can be immediately rendered which will be binding on all departments.

38. It has been stated before the Senate Military Subcommittee by the Secretary of War, the Chief of Staff of the Army, and by other high ranking officers of the Army, that full military efficiency can not be secured between ground troops and air troops unless the air troops train and operate at all times and under all conditions strictly under the military control of the Army commander, or words to that effect. Statements such as the above in so far as they apply to the United States Army are based purely upon theory and can not be substantiated by any facts within my knowledge and practical experience since the birth of aviation in the United States Army. As previously stated in paragraph

19 of this paper the entire development of aviation and its practical application to training and operations with our Army during the past 10 years of peace and war has been developed and applied by practical flying officers and not by General Staff officers or by Army, corps, or division commanders in the field. This being a fact, it should be perfectly evident that the great number of trained and experienced personnel now available in the United States both in and out of the service are fully competent to continue the future efficient military and nonmilitary development and operation of aircraft along practical and efficient military lines.

39. Full military efficiency depends upon one most vital factor which has been conspicuous by its absence in regards to Air Service work with the Army during the past 10 years, and that factor is called "teamwork." Let me state most frankly that up to the present date there has been an almost complete lack of teamwork between the air man and the Army, due entirely to the fact that Army officers as a class are utterly ignorant of 90 per cent of the air man's problems. This utter ignorance, especially on the part of the higher ranking Army officers frequently found expression during our service in France, in the issuing of orders which in a number of cases absolutely failed to take into consideration the limitations in the use of the aeroplane. In other words, the air man was often not consulted as to whether he was capable of carrying out his orders, but was often ordered to carry out his mission regardless of the possible mechanical or other technical obstacles in the way. The air man knows what he can do and what he can not do, and in many instances, especially during the recent hostilities in France, the air man endeavored to inform his superiors (not in the Air Service) as to the limitations of his equipment, with a result that the inexperienced superior usually damned the aeroplane and the Air Service man, and in so doing not only failed to make full military use of the Air Service but also utterly defeated any attempt on the part of the Air Service to secure intelligent and helpful teamwork.

40. In further connection with teamwork between the air man and the Army one very important fact seems to have escaped the notice of the Army, and that is the fact that the Air Service to-day contains a great many trained military men with from 10 to 20 years' military service, and I contend that these men with their combined military and air knowledge and experience are more competent to visualize and solve the air needs of the Army than the Army itself. These experienced military air men have spent years in hopeless effort trying to get the Army to cooperate with the Air Service, and as a result of these past failures I can only see one way to get efficient teamwork, and that is through the establishment of an agency independent of Army control with sufficient power and authority to compel teamwork if necessary. The commander in chief of the American Expeditionary Forces on frequent occasions in discussing the American Air Service development in France said that what he wanted from the Air Service was "results," and results are what the United States Army of the future has a right to demand and to expect.

The United States Army will get results from the Air Service if the Air Service is given an opportunity to develop under the guidance of practical experience instead of theory. A fair, just, willing, and sympathetic opportunity for the Air Service to produce results has never been evidenced from my experience of the past 11 years, and I doubt whether results can be obtained in the next 10 years if the Air Service is required to continue its struggle for existence under Army control.

41. Intelligent and sympathetic "teamwork" of all elements in a military machine is absolutely essential to the success of military operations. Let me illustrate a condition of affairs which arose in Europe during the recent war which fully illustrates the inefficiency and difficulty of efficient teamwork between the Army and Navy under the present aviation system in the United States. This condition of affairs referred to is fully set forth in the following official cablegram sent and received by the Chief of Air Service, American Expeditionary Forces, during April and May, 1918. These cablegrams have special reference to the acute military situation as it existed in Europe immediately after the start of the big enemy offensive in March, 1918. They especially illustrate the lack of teamwork between the Army and Navy Air services in securing Liberty engines. And they also show how disastrous this lack of teamwork would have been if prompt steps had not been taken to meet the situation.

Cable No. 1039 received by commander in chief, A. E. F.
April 5, 1918.

No. 1039-R. April 4, 1918. Confidential.

Paragraph 1. It is at present estimated that production of Liberty engines up to June 30 will amount to 3,256, including those already delivered. Of this amount, 734 have been allotted to Navy, leaving 2,522 to be divided between the Army Aviation Service, British, French, Italian, and Ordnance Department for Tanks. It is estimated that probable production of combat planes requiring Liberty engines up to June 30 will amount to 1,439, including 525 Bristol fighters, 904 De Havilland 4's, 10 Handley Pages. To equip these planes will require 2,174 Liberty engines.

No. 1039-R. Paragraph 1, subparagraph A.

Great Britain has requested 980 engines; France, 6 engines; Italy, 5 engines; Ordnance Department for Tanks, 600 engines, to be delivered at the factory prior to June 30. Total requirements, 3,605; total shortage, 1,143. French and Italian representatives here state they will make additional request for Liberty engines as soon as tests now being made in France are completed. British representatives state that if a total allotment of 980 engines be given them they can probably furnish certain fully equipped machines for our squadrons in France. Request that you advise us what allocation we should make of available engines between our Allies, Ordnance Department for Tanks, and United States Air Service. Cable your decision without delay. In the event that our output of planes is limited by shortage of engines, we will take action looking to redistribution of raw materials between ourselves and Allies.

42. With reference to the cablegram quoted in the foregoing paragraph, it will be noted that the United States Navy had at this time—April, 1918—been allotted 734 Liberty engines, whereas no allocation had been made to the Army or to the Allies.

In answer to the foregoing quoted cablegram the following cablegram was drafted by the Chief of Air Service, A. E. F., and forwarded by the commander in chief, A. E. F.

No. 904-S. April 12, 1918. Confidential.

For the Chief of Staff and Chief Signal Officer.

With reference to paragraph 1A your cablegram 1039. In order to hold the supremacy of the air on the western front, it is absolutely necessary that the United States keep France, England, and Italy fully provided with raw, semi-finished, and finished aircraft materials, even at the expense of temporarily delaying the United States Army and Navy air programs. The allotment of 734 Liberty engines to our Navy is not understood, in view of the present critical needs of the English and French land services. England, owing to her trust in the American allotment of Liberty motors, has allotted her Eagle Rolls-Royce output to big American flying boats for antisubmarine work, and so it is dependent on America for a large proportion of her Army's long reconnaissance and bombing aeroplanes. England's request for 980 engines should therefore be given full priority, and that 850 be dispatched to England before June 30. The allotment of Liberty engines for tanks is not approved at the present time for the same reasons. The allotment of 2,174 Liberty engines for an estimated production of 1,439 aeroplanes is considered excessive in view of the present critical needs of the French and English air services. Recommend that the requests of England, France, and Italy, as outlined in subparagraph A of your cablegram 1039 be given priority over all other needs. Request reasons for priority of deliveries of Liberty engines to Navy and Ordnance Department over Army Air Service allocation of Liberty engines. Request information regarding the suitability of the Bristol fighter equipped with Liberty engine. Recent information here regarding the suitability of Bristol fighter equipped with Liberty is not satisfactory. Reference redistribution of raw materials between ourselves and Allies, this should be done regardless of our own needs for the next three months in order that England, France, and Italy may be kept fully supplied until our aircraft production capacity in the United States is sufficient to take care of our own needs without imperiling the air activities of our Allies. Above conclusions based on necessity of meeting present activities of our Allies. Above conclusions based upon necessity of meeting present emergency on western front.

PERSHING.

43. The cablegram quoted in the foregoing paragraph fully sets forth the critical air situation as it existed on the western front during the big offensive of the Germans in the spring of 1918.

The foregoing cablegram was answered by the following cablegrams from the War Department:

No. 1101-R. April 13, 1918.

Paragraph 1.

With reference to your 904. British representative here has been notified that they have been allotted, and we will deliver to them 980 Liberty engines at United States factories prior to June 30. Have notified Ordnance Department that we will not deliver them the 500 engines required prior to June 30. Our total estimated output to that date is still 3,256; 734 have been allotted to Navy, making total allotted 1,714, and leaving 1,542 available for French, Italian, and United States Air Service. French and Italian representatives here have notified us informally that they will make a request for engines after certain tests now going forward have been completed. Their desire will be to have the earliest possible deliveries. If they should be allotted a portion of the 1,542 available, we should like to have advice of it at once. We will arrange distribution of spruce and dopes accordingly, we will then continue the manufacturing output of planes as far as available spruce will permit and store them awaiting supply of Liberty motors and dopes. Request that you confer with French and Italian and if possible, cable us your recommendation as to the numbers to be allocated to them. We will meet your wishes, but wish to inconvenience our factories as little as may be in order that ultimate output may not be seriously jeopardized. Answering requests for information in regard to suitability of Bristol fighter equipped with Liberty engines, preliminary tests have just been started and will continue regularly. Tests made so far cast some doubt upon its quick maneuvering abilities. Judgment should be withheld until tests have gone considerably further. Will report progress and advise you as to ultimate results shown.

McCain.

It will be noted in the foregoing cablegram that the allocation of 734 Liberty engines to the United States Navy had not been changed, and that our request for information as to reasons for this allocation to the United States Navy and priority of United States Navy over the Army, as set forth in our cablegram No. 904-S, dated April 12, 1918 had not been answered.

44. In view of our own critical needs and the critical needs of France and Italy another cablegram was sent on this same subject as follows:

No. 1043-S. May 3, 1918.

Paragraph 1.

For Chief of Staff, attention is invited to your cable 1039, paragraph 1, and subparagraph A, which indicated that United States Navy Air Service is receiving a separate and distinct priority in airplane engines over our own Air Service and that of Allies. My Cable 904 requested the reasons for this, but no reply has been received. Information indicates that United States Naval Air Service in France is planning a separate bombing offensive against the enemy submarine bases in which they expect to use land types of airplanes and operate from land bases on the Western front, also that the types of airplanes and engines to be used here by U. S. Navy will be supplied from the United States and are the same types which the Air Service A. E. F. seriously needs as soon as they can be supplied. Present military emergencies demand that the Air Services of the Allied Armies be given all priority in advance of the Air Service of the Allied Navies. The air supremacy of the Allies on the Western front is only held by a narrow margin at the present due to great wastage of material during the present offensive. This wastage must be met as long as the present offensive continues and during this year's crisis. Recommend that least possible number of airplanes and engines be diverted to any service other than to maintain and build up the Allied Army Services, including our own. Urgently request you impress this view on the War and Navy Departments and that I be informed of their final decision. Airplanes and engines now being built in the United States must be distributed to the Allied Army Air Service, including our own, as they may determine the outcome of the summer's campaign.

Pershing.

45. The cablegram quoted in the foregoing paragraph was answered on May 9, 1918, as follows:

No. 1275-R. May 9, 1918.

Paragraph 1.

Your 1043, paragraph 1 and 1A, and our 1224, in accordance with dispatches from Admiral Sims to Navy Department, priority to United States Navy Air Service for aviation materials necessary to equip and arm seaplane bases was

approved by War Department November 14, 1917. On March 17, 1918, War Department approved request of Navy Department that 80 two-seater pursuit planes be delivered to Navy on or about May 15 to be used in bombing operations. On May 2 War Department acceded to request of Navy that this number be raised to 155, but deliveries distributed over longer period. On April 10 War Department concurred with Navy Department that operations against submarines in their bases was purely naval work. Seven hundred and thirty-four Liberty engines have been allocated to Navy for delivery prior to July 1. No allocations have been made after that date. Navy Department for the last year has left matter of engine production entirely in the hands of the War Department and is in this respect wholly dependent for the operations of their Aviation Service. War Department, May 7, carefully reviewed entire matter in view of your cables and has decided that no change can be made at present in priority decision. With reference to 1B, your 1043, matter will be given consideration and results cabled.

This last cablegram effectively stopped all further discussion on our part as to the reasons why the United States Navy was given priority over the United States Army and our Allies in the allocation of Liberty engines.

46. The policies as outlined in the cablegram quoted in the foregoing paragraph were made entirely without consultation with the commander in chief of the American Expeditionary Forces and without full consideration of the needs or our Allies on the western front. Giving the United States Navy priority on Liberty engines was an arrangement that would have had most disastrous results on the British air program if we had not insisted on the British priority being taken care of. This same priority for the United States Navy directly effected the efficiency of the Air Service, American Expeditionary Forces, in that we had already made tentative arrangements with the French Government to receive an increased number of aeroplanes in exchange for Liberty engines and had also arranged to install Liberty engines in French aeroplanes which were available and which the French could not use, due to shortage of engines.

47. By reference to the last-quoted cablegram (in paragraph 45) (No. 1275-R, dated May 9, 1918), it will be noted that the War Department not only allocated a large number of Liberty engines to the Navy, but an allocation of 80 two-seater planes for bombing operations had also been made, with delivery about May 15, 1918. This action showed also an utter lack of appreciation of the priority needs of the military air forces as compared to the naval air forces. Although the number of planes originally allocated was not great, they assume huge proportions when you take into consideration the fact that the American Air Service in France during the entire war was never supplied with sufficient planes to meet the needs of the ground troops.

48. With further reference to the quoted cablegram in paragraph 45, it will be noted that—

“On April 10 the War Department concurred with the Navy Department that operations against submarines in their bases was purely naval work.”

About the 1st of May, 1918, it was learned by accident that the Navy Air Service was planning a separate bombing offensive against the enemy submarine bases, that they planned to use land types of planes, and operate from land bases on the western front; also that a number of their squadrons would be equipped with American planes. Upon learning of this, steps were immediately taken to inform the commander in chief, American Expeditionary Forces, of the Navy plans. As a result of this information, the foregoing cablegram of May 3, 1918 (No. 1043-S), which received Gen. Pershing's approval, was duly sent to the War Department and we received the final answer to the whole situation when the War Department cablegram of May 9, 1918 (heretofore quoted), was received.

The plans for the independent operation of Navy aero squadrons of land-type aeroplanes, and from land bases on the western front in France, were entirely contradictory to the policies of the commander in chief of the American Expeditionary Forces in Europe. These Naval units ought normally to have been ordered to report to the commander in chief of the American Expeditionary Forces for duty and for assignment to such air duties as the existing military conditions may have dictated instead of undertaking independent operations in territory over which the commander in chief of the American Expeditionary Forces exercised control of all American forces.

If the Army and Navy air forces operating in France had been under one head and under one control there would have been complete cooperation as to the operations and to the allocation of Liberty engines, and such operations

and allocations would have been based upon the military situation at the front, in complete teamwork with the Allied land forces, instead of having been based on a theory that air operations against enemy submarine bases were more important than licking the Hun on the western front.

49. Let me quote another instance of the inefficiency of the past and present system of independent air action, as compared to efficiency of combined action of the Army and Navy under one head and under one control.

In August, 1917, the Air Service, American Expeditionary Forces, had placed orders with the Italian Government for a large number of Caproni bombing planes. From August, 1917, until May, 1918, continuous and increasing efforts were made to effect delivery of these planes from the Italian Government, but without result. The constant argument employed by the Italian Government regarding nondelivery of these planes was to the effect that delivery of our planes could not be made until receipt in Italy of raw materials from the United States, although under our contracts with Italy no agreement had been made which bound the United States to furnish materials.

Simultaneously with our learning of the Navy's plans for independent bombing operations on the western front, I also learned through Maj. LaGuardia, in charge of Air Service matters in Italy, that the Navy was arranging with Italy for the purchase of a considerable number of Caproni bombing planes for use in their bombing operations. Upon investigation, it was learned that the Navy had planned to bring certain amounts of materials from the United States to Europe on Navy supply ships in order to help Italy insure her aeroplane production. The Army Air Service not having a fleet of supply ships at its disposal was therefore badly handicapped in its efforts to secure Italian aeroplanes, even though our orders had been placed with the Italian Government eight months before the Navy entered the market.

Upon learning of this arrangement by the Navy to secure priority on Caproni planes, the Chief of Air Service, American Expeditionary Forces, protested against this unusual competition, and for a period the amicable relations between the Air Services of the Army and Navy in Europe were in danger of being broken. The matter was finally adjusted by the Navy agreeing to a division of the aeroplanes which might be obtained from the Italians, but up to the date of the armistice the Army Air Service had not received a single Caproni plane for front-line service, whereas the Navy had received a small number.

The foregoing case again illustrates the inefficiency of the existing aviation system, especially between the Army and Navy, and it is a most convincing argument, in my opinion, for a centralized control under one responsible head, who could coordinate problems of this kind and insure teamwork without question.

50. In connection with our more recent relations with the Navy Air Service, I note that Assistant Secretary of the Navy is quoted in the Washington Star, on August 23, 1919, to the effect that the establishment of a separate Air Service which would embrace all forms of Government aviation would "materially interfere with the efficiency of naval aviation."

Unfortunately, since my return from France, I have had but little opportunity to study the plans of the Navy Department for the future development of naval aviation. I do happen to know, however, of one very important feature of aeronautics which vitally affects both the Army and Navy Air Services, and that is the question of the development and use of the "dirigible" balloon or airship. The Army and Navy both have specific need for this type of aircraft, and there seems to be some difference of opinion between the War and Navy Departments as to which department shall have control of the development and use of the dirigible airship, or whether its development and use will be carried on jointly by both services. Each service has plenty of argument to substantiate its rights to carry on this feature of aircraft development, and no doubt each service will do this work independently, subject probably to supervision by a joint Army and Navy board, whose functions naturally can only be advisory and not binding on either department in the event of disagreement.

51. Separate development and operation of "dirigible" airships means duplication of training stations, duplication of service stations, duplication of training, and duplication of supply. All of which involves a greatly increased overhead expense in the purchase of land, buildings, and materials, and an increased overhead expense in administrative and executive personnel. Therefore from the viewpoint of economy or from the viewpoint of training and operations, I fail to see how the consolidation of all "lighter-than-air" activities of the Army and Navy under one control can "materially interfere with the efficiency of naval aviation."

52. It is barely possible that the Navy viewpoint is confined to the naval application of "dirigible" airships only and does not cover the entire national and international field of activity. It is also possible that the Navy had in mind the history of the development of the British Army and Navy air forces during the past five years. If so I hope they skip the first three years of that development and take it up where the two services were placed under one control. If this could be done the question as to control of the development and operation of "dirigible" airships will be quickly and satisfactorily solved.

53. The Navy may also have in mind the struggle which has been going on between the British Royal Air Force and the British Admiralty ever since the air forces of Great Britain were consolidated under one control. This struggle referred to was in regard to operation and control of "dirigible" airships. The question was settled a few weeks ago, when the British Government took all "dirigible" airships away from the Admiralty and placed them under the control and operation of the British Royal Air Force, where, in my opinion, they belonged ever since the consolidation of the British air force. I earnestly hope the Navy can see the advantages of a more efficient operation by the consolidation of all Army and Navy air activities under one control. Such consolidation would eliminate future possibilities for disagreement and discord and make for national economy. If consolidation is not effected I am fully of the opinion that future discord and disagreement will inevitably arise, as the Army fully believes that it has an equal military use for the "dirigible" airship and is fully prepared to assert its claims and rights in this most important feature of air development.

54. The difficulties which have confronted the Air Service in its past endeavors to secure teamwork with other branches of the Army and Navy are inexcusable and unworthy of the traditions of the Army and Navy. This element of rivalry between the Army and Navy, and the rivalries and class feeling between the different branches of the Army, are well discussed in the following extracts of the Secretary of War's testimony on August 18, 1919, before the Senate military subcommittee. This testimony appears on pages 190 and 191, part 4, of the hearings on reorganization of the Army, which is quoted as follows:

"The CHAIRMAN. The mention of that appropriation brings up this very point, which is important, in my judgment, in the consideration of Senator New's proposal. The Army Aviation Service, with the approval, of course, of the War Department and yourself, sent in an estimate of \$83,000,000 or \$85,000,000 for Air Service. The Navy Department sent in estimates for something like \$45,000,000. The Naval Affairs Committees of the Senate and House knew nothing about the Army needs or estimates, and the Military Appropriations Committees of the Congress knew nothing about the Navy estimates. There was a good deal of duplication between the two. We understand that the naval aviators get their elementary instruction in flying the same kind of machine that the Army aviators use; that the Navy, on occasion, in teaching flying seeks the use of Army facilities, such as the aviation field. The two sets of committees in the Congress have no method of knowing what the best opinion is of the experts in the two departments as to what the national need is in flying machines. It results this way. The Congress appropriated \$25,000,000 for naval aviation, and finally \$25,000,000 for Army aviation; the latter is conceded to be a much larger project than the naval aviation. The thing is twisted all out of balance. There is none of that coordination—although I detest that word and wish some of you would strike it out of the dictionary—there is no central authority, there is no place where either the Congress or the public can go to understand what the net result in the aviation plan is.

"Secretary BAKER. I think that is a fair criticism, Senator; at least it was. It is not now. The joint Army and Navy Board on Aeronautics is now preventing practically all duplication. This board has recently been appointed by the Secretary of the Navy and myself, and it has at its head Gen. Menoher; they have divided the field. There are certain kinds of machines the Navy is going to develop; there are certain kinds of machines the Army is going to develop; we are seeking every place where we can make joint use of facilities owned by the Army or by the Navy. We are endeavoring to eliminate all possible duplication and waste.

"The CHAIRMAN. Of course, the weakness of that kind of teamwork was displayed several times during the war itself, in that its success rests upon the

consent of the people who are conferring. There is no authority to make them indulge in genuine teamwork. Conferences agree to do certain things, and the agreement is carried out if all the members of the conference from the different departments of the Government agree to do so. You will find conflicts and jealousies, and one branch of the service does not quite live up to the agreement, and there is nobody in authority to enforce the agreement.

"Secretary BAKER. Of course, that is perfectly so, but that is human; that is the way it always is in life. In the War Department, which is a coordinative War Department under one supreme head, you have a Chief of Staff acting under the Secretary of War, who controls all of the branches, and yet the rivalries and class feeling between the Cavalry and the Infantry and the Artillery are as old as military affairs, and you find them disposed to smuggle their secrets away from each other and to improve their arms and to press the advantages of their particular mode of fighting. It is perfectly true, and in the Air Service, between the Army and Navy, it is human.

"The CHAIRMAN. I think it is important to obviate as much of that human weakness as possible by a central authority somewhere.

"Secretary BAKER. But, Senator, you do not obviate."

The weakness of joining Army and Navy teamwork is well illustrated in the preceding paragraphs (38 to 54) of this paper. Military teamwork, if possible, should always be obtained through the mutual and sympathetic action of all concerned. Military teamwork, like any other class of teamwork, must, however, have one responsible head. That head, if he knows his job, can get results the greater part of the time without undue exercise of authority, but in order to get results all the time he must have behind him the power and authority to impose his will in emergencies upon the other members of the team. Due to the lack of a central responsible head to compel teamwork whenever necessary between the Army and Navy Air Service, you can be certain that maximum economy of appropriation and maximum efficiency in aeronautical development will never be obtained.

You may also be certain that unless a separate department of aeronautics is established, in which all air activities are under one responsible head, that the present rivalries and class feeling between the other branches of the Army and the Air Service will continue to exist, to the ultimate detriment of aviation and the aircraft industry of the United States.

55. Is it possible that the opposition on the part of many of the high military and naval authorities to the establishment of a separate department of aeronautics is based upon the fear that the Army, the Navy, or any other department of the Government will not get equally efficient service? If any of the existing opposition is based upon a fear of future discrimination as between the needs of various departments, it might be well to bear in mind the fact that if a separate department is created, it is logical to assume that the same standard of intelligence and the same agencies will be exercised in the selection of the civilian heads of such a department as are exercised in equivalent selections in the War, Navy, and other Government departments. It is also logical to assume that these selections will be governed by such considerations as loyalty, business intelligence, a fair technical knowledge of aviation, a working knowledge of its use and limitations, and a working knowledge of the needs of the other departments. It is further logical to assume that such Army and Navy officers as may be transferred to this new department will be actuated by ideals of loyalty and devotion to their country, equally as high as the ideals of the officers who are now in opposition to the establishment of this proposed separate department and that officers thus transferred would without doubt use every effort within their power and ability to insure maximum efficiency for all services concerned.

It is also logical to assume that in view of the fact that the practical flying officer, and not the General Staff officer, has, up to date, been entirely responsible for the tactical development and operation of Air Service troops, that he can still efficiently meet the military needs of the country if given a fair opportunity to demonstrate his knowledge and practical experience.

It might be well to remember that many of us have been staking our lives for a considerable number of years in order to develop aviation solely as a weapon of war, and it is logical to assume that many of us have taken this work rather seriously in the past and still consider it rather seriously in its future aspect.

In other words, many of us feel that years of practical experience gained at the constant risk of one's life, and coupled with years of practical military experience, has given many of us a clearer and more comprehensive knowledge

as to the future practical military value and use of aviation than at present appears to exist in the minds of many of our high military authorities, who, although possessed of years of practical military experience, have no knowledge of the practical side of aviation and, due to this lack of practical knowledge, can not clearly visualize the entire problem of aviation in all of its aspects.

53. Is the opposition of the War Department to the establishment of a separate department of aeronautics based upon the theory that the practical flying officers of the Army, Navy, and in civil life have not sufficient judgment, knowledge, experience, and age to administer and operate such a separate department to the ultimate benefit of the entire country?

The present roster of the practical flying officers of the Regular Army alone shows the following:

Thirteen officers between the ages of 40 and 45; 28 officers between the ages of 35 and 40; 56 officers between the ages of 30 and 35; 74 officers between the ages of 25 and 30; 10 officers between the ages of 21 and 25.

Of the above list of flying officers 13 have had over 20 years of service; 34 have had over 15 years' service; 40 have had over 10 years' service; 55 have had over 5 years' service; 1 has had over 10 years' flying service; 3 have had over 8 years' flying service; 3 have had over 6 years' flying service; 4 have had over 4 years' flying service; 64 have had over 2 years' flying service.

Of the foregoing list of practical flying officers approximately 50 per cent of these officers were charged during the war with duties and responsibilities of a size and nature which far exceeded the duties and responsibilities of many of our high-ranking general officers prior to the outbreak of war. And it is certain that if you make a careful study of each of these officer's records during the war you will find that he performed his duties and carried out his responsibilities in such a manner as to leave no doubt as to the fact that there is contained within the ranks of the practical flying officers sufficient judgment, knowledge, experience, and age to administer and operate a separate department of aeronautics to the ultimate benefit of the entire country.

57. With reference to the ages of officers employed on Air Service work, attention is invited to the testimony of the Secretary of War which appears on page 209, part 4, of the hearings before the Subcommittee of the Committee on Military Affairs, United States Senate, dated August 18, 1919, and is quoted as follows:

"There is another observation I want to make on that that is wholly out of place in the present connection, but it is one of the things I had intended to enumerate and it got out of my memory. It seems to me that the training of Army and Navy aviators by the Independent Air Service, in addition to the disadvantages to which I have already referred, has this disadvantage:

"Aviation at present, and it may be permanently, is the task of the young man—apparently the younger the better. He very quickly reaches a period when he will be useless as an aviator, a pilot, in a very few years. Now, a man who has been a capable pilot and has come to be 30 or 35 years of age has outlived his air feeling and his air ambitions will still make a very valuable officer in many other branches of the service, and having had air service will be able to coordinate his branch of the service with air in flying very much better than if he had not had the experience. That is to say, a brigadier general who was once a pilot will cooperate with the Air Service as an Infantry brigadier better for having had that experience, but if he is a member of the Air Service, so-called, and goes out of the Air Service by having outgrown his usefulness in it there is no branch of the military service to which he can go unless, as suggested half jocularly, the Air Service sets up an Infantry and Artillery division and has another army."

Aviation is the task of the young man without question, but I question the statement that "he very quickly reaches a period when he will be useless as an aviator, a pilot, in a very few years." I also question the statement that "a pilot who has been a capable pilot and has come to be 30 or 35 years of age has outlived his air feeling and his air ambitions."

By reference to the ages of the practical flying officers heretofore mentioned you will find that there are 97 practical flying officers over 30 years of age. Amongst this list I include myself, and I do not for one single instant admit that I have reached the period in my life where it can be said that I have become useless as an aviator or have outlived my air feeling or air ambitions—in other words, useless for service in the Air Service.

Furthermore, I venture to state that it can not be demonstrated by fact or theory that any individual flying officer included within the above number is useless for further duty in the Air Service.

The most important need of aviation in the United States Army at the outbreak of the war was the need for practical flying officers of sufficient age and experience to take charge of executive and administrative duties which involved millions of dollars in property and equipment. The responsibilities involved in handling problems of such serious executive and administrative importance require and always will require older men of experience. The responsibilities incident to the maintaining, supplying, and operating of air units in the field required judgment, knowledge, and practical experience that can only be acquired after years of hard, practical experience.

One all-important fact that seems to be generally overlooked in relation to aviation and its needs is the relative importance of the work performed on the ground as compared to the work actually performed in the air.

Approximately 90 per cent of all Air Service work is performed on the ground and the remaining 10 per cent is carried on in the air.

This 90 per cent of work on the ground involves the supply, maintenance, repair, experimentation, administration, and operation of plants, shops, depots, schools, and innumerable other institutions and installations necessary to keep up the 10 per cent of the work operating in the air.

This 90 per cent of work on the ground involves duties and responsibilities (mechanical, technical, and financial) which can only be efficiently performed by personnel of long practical experience.

It is our experience and the experience of every air service in the world that if a practical flying officer survives his first few years of actual flying service he acquires, as a result of his increased years and increased experience, additional responsibilities of an executive and administrative nature. The longer he efficiently serves the greater becomes his executive and administrative responsibilities on the ground and incidentally the less becomes his actual flying responsibilities, which actually require flying.

It is also a fact in our experience and the experience of every other air service in the world that a practical flying officer who is thoroughly experienced in the practical side of the work and also experienced in the executive and administrative duties and responsibilities involved is an infinitely more efficient and useful officer to the Air Service than an officer who is simply an executive without flying experience. In this discussion of the suitability and usefulness of officers for duty in the Air Service it should be thoroughly borne in mind that the Air Service also has amongst its present personnel many nonflying officers who are most efficient administrative and executive officials, and who, during the recent war, have acquired great experience in the supply, maintenance and operation of plants, shops, depots, and other similar installations necessary to keep a pilot and an aeroplane in the air.

These efficient and experienced nonflying officers, for a number of years to come, will be vitally needed in the administration and operation of plants, shops, depots, etc., until through the natural process of time, there is a sufficient number of older and more experienced flying officers who may be made available for duties of this nature. And in the performance of which their practical flying experience will be a most decided asset.

The Air Service of the United States Army, up to the present, has found sufficient work for all of its efficient practical flying officers and efficient nonflying officers, and there is not the slightest doubt that the future development of aviation and the aircraft industry in the United States for the next 20 years will provide sufficient work within the Air Service to efficiently utilize all practical flying officers and many of the nonflying officers now engaged in Air Service work, so long as they continue to keep up their efficiency and desire to keep up with the work.

58. The statement of the Secretary of War that a brigadier general who was once a pilot, or who has had service in the Air Service will make a better brigadier general in some other branch of the military service by reason of his having had Air Service experience, is without doubt true. The reverse of this is also true, that a brigadier general of the Army who has not had actual Air Service experience can not be as efficient in his general service as the brigadier general who has had Air Service experience.

With reference to the statement that there is no branch of the service to which an Air Service officer who has outgrown his usefulness may be assigned, it might be well to state that if the Air Service finds that anyone of its members has outgrown his usefulness there is just one thing to do with that man, and that is to eliminate him entirely from the Government service and not inflict him upon some other branch of the Government service. It is not con-

ceivable that the Infantry, the Artillery, or any other branch of the Government service would care to have useless Air Service personnel assigned to duty with them, and you may rest assured that neither has the Air Service any place for personnel which may be considered as useless in the Infantry and Artillery.

59. On pages 185 and 186, part 4, of the same hearings, before the Senate military subcommittee the Secretary of War makes the following statements:

"As I understand it, and I think the same state of mind has actuated my associate, Mr. Crowell, and his associates on this committee, the problem which impresses and I may say oppresses all of us, is the way to maintain an industry. That is the difficulty. We recognize that as yet the commercial use of aircraft has not created a demand which will maintain factories in this country, which will be constantly producing airplanes. We realize the Army's need is not enough to keep these factories open, and what we are all seeking is two things, first, the greatest perfection of the machine themselves, and, second, such a stabilized industry that if an emergency comes we will be able to ask it to go right into the manufacture of airplanes without loss of time. Now, the place I do not follow Mr. Crowell and his associates, and, frankly, do not follow you is your willingness to sacrifice the very obvious advantages of a specialized aeroplane establishment to solve that problem. I think it must be clear that you will have less efficient military aviators if they are trained by the Air Service than if they are trained by the Army; that you will have less efficient coordination of the Air Service with the Army if it is a separate service and must create its coordinations than if they are parts of the same service and have been trained constantly together."

"You tell me that I am looking at it purely from the point of view of the Army. I am. I want the Air Service of the Army to be the most efficient Air Service the Army can possibly have. That is frankly my point of view. Now, I do not think it necessary to sacrifice any of that to accomplish the object you want for this reason:

"You asked me whether I thought the appropriations for the Army airplanes will keep the factories open. Of course not. You will not have any more airplanes to buy by simply transferring the Air Service out of the Army into an independent Air Service than you would by leaving it there. The only way you can buy more airplanes is to appropriate more money to buy airplanes, so that if the Congress wants to provide that more airplanes shall be bought than it wants the Army to have, then it must provide that some be bought for some other purposes. If Congress does provide that some be bought for commercial purposes, some for the Post Office Department, some for the War Department, and some for the Navy Department, it can by a very simple device provide that we shall all pool our purchases so as to provide adequate encouragement for a limited number of air factories and buy from the same people, so all the machines to be bought will be bought from the same industry after this. But that does not seem to me to embody the necessity of foregoing Army training and Navy training, and coupling up the training of highly specialized military aviation, like the Army and Navy, with the commercial aviator and the post-office aviator, who is an entirely different person in the first instance, and has an entirely different function to perform in the second."

60. The foregoing statements of the Secretary of War cover a very broad field, and embrace practically all of the vital problems which to-day confront aviation and the aircraft industry of the United States. A brief summary of these statements is as follows:

- (a) How can the aircraft industry be maintained?
- (b) Commercial use of aircraft is not yet sufficient to maintain factories in constant production.
- (c) Needs of Army are not sufficient to keep factories open.
- (d) The problem to be solved consists in securing:
 - (1) The greatest perfection of the machines themselves, and
 - (2) A stabilized industry that in emergencies can manufacture airplanes without loss of time.
- (e) The Secretary does not follow Mr. Crowell and others in their willingness to sacrifice the advantages of a specialized aeroplane establishment.
- (f) Also states you will have less efficient military aviators if they are trained by the Air Service than if they are trained by the Army.
- (g) Also less efficient coordination of the Air Service with the Army if it is a separate service.

(h) Wants the Air Service of the Army to be the most efficient Air Service the Army can have.

(i) Does not think it necessary to sacrifice the Army Air Service to accomplish the object you want.

(j) Transferring the Army Air Service into an independent Air Service will not build more aeroplanes.

(k) The only way to buy more aeroplanes is to appropriate more money.

(l) If Congress provides that some aeroplanes be bought for commercial purposes, some for the Post Office Department, War Department, and Navy Department, it could provide that we shall all pool our purchases so as to provide adequate encouragement for a limited number of air factories and buy from the same people.

(m) But the Secretary states that does not seem to embody the necessity of foregoing Army training and Navy training and coupling up the training of highly specialized military aviation like the Army and Navy with the post-office aviator and the commercial aviator, who is an entirely different person in the first instance and has an entirely different function to perform in the second.

61 (a). With reference to the statement in paragraph 60 subhead (a) "How can the aircraft industry be maintained?" In my opinion, if the following steps were taken an aircraft industry in the United States can be built up and maintained:

(a) Build an organization within the Government whose one and only function is aviation in order that an efficient and businesslike foundation for the aircraft industry of the United States may be established.

(b) Consolidate under this organization every air activity and air operation now in existence in all Government departments in order to eliminate expense now being incurred in duplication of training stations, duplication of service stations, duplication of technical development and research, duplication in administrative and executive personnel, duplication in repair depots, duplication in supply, standardize clothing and personal equipment of all commissioned and enlisted personnel, standardize all small tools, instruments, and machinery used in the repair and maintenance of aircraft, standardize plans and specifications for same types of airplanes and airships in order to reduce additional expense to both Government and manufacturers; standardize types of aeroplanes which may be used for both military and nonmilitary use.

(c) Utilize the funds thus saved to buy additional aeroplanes, airships, or aeronautical accessories.

(d) Expand the existing fields of aircraft activity, especially the nonmilitary (Government) and commercial fields.

(e) Create new fields of activity.

61 (b). To efficiently handle the numerous problems involved in the foregoing subheads, it stands to reason that results can not be obtained unless the agencies charged with the job are first grouped together subject to one responsible head who can exact thorough teamwork at all times. Any thorough investigation of the air activities of the Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and Post Office Department will show a great amount of unnecessary duplication; every item of which involves extra expense and a great amount of lost motion.

The relief of an unnecessary man, the elimination of unnecessary tools and equipment, the elimination of costly experimental work and technical research, being carried on by one department which has already been successfully or unsuccessfully carried out by another department, all of which would release funds which could be utilized in the purchase of additional aeroplanes, engines, etc., thus assisting in the maintenance of the aircraft industry.

61 (c). The chief existing fields of aircraft activity at the present time are the Army, Navy, and Post Office Departments. The needs of the Army and Navy Departments under peace conditions will require a certain number of aeroplanes, airships, captive balloons, engines, etc. The quantity required for the needs of these two departments in time of peace will not maintain an aircraft industry adequate to meet the military needs of the country in an emergency involving the calling out of citizen troops, but being a fixed necessity they can be considered as a basis upon which the aircraft industry can be expanded.

The needs of the Post Office Department are fast becoming more clearly defined, and if encouraged and assisted by Congress as regards appropriations, and encouraged and assisted by the Army and Navy experienced air personnel, great stimulation and assistance can be given by the Post Office Department to the maintenance and development of the aircraft industry.

61 (d). In addition to the well-defined use of aircraft by the three above-mentioned departments of the Government, practically all other national executive departments can also be served by aircraft as follows:

(a) Department of State: In transmission of diplomatic and miscellaneous correspondence, foreign and domestic, where time is an essential item.

(b) Department of the Treasury, Coast Guard: Rendering assistance to vessels in distress, locating and destroying floating derelicts, and other dangers to navigation.

(c) Department of the Interior, Geological Survey: Air photography and air topography in connection with mapping the United States, Alaska, and Hawaii. Patrol duty in connection with fire protection for forests in national parks under jurisdiction of the Interior Department.

(d) Department of Agriculture: Weather Bureau—meteorological observations and air research, air visual and photographic study of volcanology. Forest Service—patrolling national forests, reporting fires, and putting out fires by means of chemical bombs.

(e) Department of Commerce: Bureau of Fisheries—patrol of sea fisheries, spotting schools of fish and reporting their location. Coast and Geodetic Survey—air photography and air topography of coasts of the United States and coasts under the jurisdiction of the United States. Customs—frontier patrols to prevent smuggling.

61 (e). In addition to the National Government use of aircraft, there is a good field of usefulness in connection with State police and State fire patrol. One of the greatest fields of usefulness is in connection with reporting and putting out forest fires. Enormous areas of forest are burned annually throughout the United States. Millions of feet of standing timber is lost which could have been saved by the use of an adequate air fire patrol. A forest fire discovered in its incipency can be readily checked. There is no agency available to-day which can locate a fire with greater certainty and with less loss of time than the aeroplane, and by utilizing the large weight-carrying types, loaded with fire extinguishing bombs, a few squadrons of aeroplanes could pay for themselves many times over in the value of property saved during a year.

61 (f). The foregoing practical uses to which the aeroplane can be put are based upon practical knowledge of the known limitations of the present-day aeroplane. Utilizing an aeroplane for the various duties as outlined in paragraph 61 (d), means in every instance the saving of time or the saving of money. If each and everyone of the uses of the airplane as enumerated in paragraph 61 (d) and 61 (e) supplemented with the established needs of the War, Navy and Post Office Departments were put into operation without delay, you would immediately establish a market for aeroplanes, which would go a long way toward maintaining a respectable aircraft industry. Further supplementing the National Government and State Government use, with the present limited but existing commercial and private use of the aeroplane the United States would, in my opinion, establish in a remarkably short space of time, an aircraft industry which within the next two years should equal the aircraft production of any other first-class world power.

Having fully established a home policy in the use of aircraft, the international markets must be fully studied and utilized in order not only to further build up the home industry, but to establish an export market, which in the event of a national emergency can be cut off and the aircraft exports diverted to home use.

61 (g). All of the foregoing uses of aircraft can be put into practical effect if sufficient interest can be enlisted, sufficient funds appropriated, and an efficient organization is provided to work out the details of the operations concerned. Under the existing disconnected state of aviation affairs public interest in aviation is entirely at sea, as to what can be practically accomplished at the present time. In order to develop commercial aviation, the public must be convinced of its practicability as a paying proposition. Commercial aviation can not reach that stage for years to come, unless every air activity and air resource in personnel and material is combined to help it along.

The numerous uses to which the aeroplane can be applied in strictly Government service, will probably never be developed under the existing state of affairs. Congress can not be expected to appropriate funds to be distributed through six or eight different departments when every Member of Congress is absolutely convinced in his own mind that more efficient and more economical use could be made of such funds, if appropriated to and disbursed by one department.

This fact is just as evident to every thoughtful Army, Navy, and Post Office official as it is to Members of Congress, yet why in the interests of national efficiency do the War and Navy Departments especially indorse a policy which is fundamentally unsound in principle and unsound from a practical business, financial, and economical standpoint?

62. With reference to the statement of the Secretary of War in paragraph 60, subhead (b) that "Commercial use of aircraft is not yet sufficient to maintain factories in constant production."

The foregoing statement is quite true and will remain true just so long as we approach the subject of aviation with a skeptical, pessimistic, and narrow frame of mind. There is no such word as "can't" in the aeronautical dictionary of to-day. Commercial aviation will become a substantial paying proposition within the next two years through the development and production of large weight-carrying aeroplanes and airships of sufficient speed and power to allow of operation under abnormal weather conditions. There exists to-day, especially in Europe, types of aeroplanes and airships which can be used for limited commercial purposes. What commercial aviation needs more than anything else to-day is the continued whole-hearted support of the Congress of the United States and the support and combined practical experience of each and every official of all the executive departments of the Government. With this combined official support, practically applied, we need have no fear for the speedy development of commercial aviation.

63. With reference to the statement of the Secretary of War in paragraph 60, subhead (c) that "Needs of Army are not sufficient to keep factories open."

This statement is also true and will remain true if the Air Service of the Army is sacrificed to the interests of the other branches of the Army, as is contemplated under the pending legislation contained in the proposed bills S. 2715 and H. R. 8287.

This statement will still remain true to a great extent even if the Air Service personnel of the Army is doubled in these proposed bills for the reason that much of this additional personnel would be required in the supply, repair, and maintenance of aircraft instead of being organized into new squadrons. The very important Service of Supply for the Air Service is most inadequately provided for in the proposed bills. If the Air Service personnel is doubled, approximately one-half to two-thirds of such additional personnel would have to be assigned to the Service of Supply, leaving a very small number of men to whom additional aeroplanes and airships could be assigned for use. The number of additional aeroplanes and airships thus needed would make only a slight increase in the production and development of the aircraft industry, and such additional increase would not be sufficient to enable the industry to rapidly expand in the event of a national emergency which would involve the calling out of a citizen army.

64. With reference to the statement of the Secretary of War in paragraph 60, subhead (d), that "The problem to be solved consists in securing (1) the greatest perfection of the machines themselves and (2) a stabilized industry in emergencies which can manufacture aeroplanes without loss of time."

There is just one logical policy to pursue if we wish to secure the greatest perfection of the aeroplanes themselves, and that policy is complete teamwork between all executive aviation departments and the manufacturers. To-day the Navy aviation is carrying on experiments with the land types of aeroplanes, and should have in these experiments the assistance and experience of the Army technical experts in order to avoid probable loss of time and waste of money in conducting experiments which may have been previously solved by the Army. The Post Office Department is pluckily struggling along in its endeavors to build up its air postal service. Unless it has the benefit of the Army and Navy experience of the past 10 years in both successful and unsuccessful technical experiments and engineering the Post Office Department is und to lose time and waste a certain amount of money in going over the same ground which the Army especially has already covered.

This lack of mutual assistance is a detriment to the development of the aeroplane and the aircraft industry.

Each department to-day does not know the complete air policies and plans the other departments. Such a situation is absurd between departments of a government whose sole legitimate excuse for existence is service for the ultimate benefit of the country as a whole.

The technical experts and all the practical air experience in the Army and Navy should be placed at the disposal of the Post Office Department in order

to assist the latter department in its development. As a straight question of national efficiency and national economy this assistance should be compulsory, if necessary, instead of leaving the question up to these three departments to determine for themselves whether such assistance shall be given or received. Lack of sympathetic teamwork between the several aviation departments of the Government directly affects the manufacturer. A leading manufacturer of aeroplanes recently informed me that he had spent several weeks in Washington going over details in construction of land types of aeroplanes with the Navy and Post Office Departments, and that much of this detail work involved technical difficulties which he had worked out with the Army years ago. Lack of teamwork between the several aviation engineering departments of the Government also means lack of progress in standardization of raw material, partly finished and finished parts. There is a great amount of equipment in aviation use to-day which could be made standard for all aviation services without restricting future development. Such a move toward efficiency would materially assist the manufacturer in his production by standardizing jigs, tools, fixtures, etc., thus ultimately reducing the cost of production to all concerned.

Under the existing condition of aviation affairs efficient teamwork can not be secured between the Government and the manufacturers as long as each department has the power and authority to disregard the practical knowledge and experience of other departments.

65. With reference to the statement of the Secretary of War in paragraph 60, subhead (e), that he "does not follow Mr. Crowell and others in their willingness to sacrifice the advantages of a specialized establishment."

Mr. Crowell and the others referred to undoubtedly see greater national benefits accruing to the United States, both from a military and industrial standpoint, if this so-called sacrifice is made. Those of us who are directly interested and who have had years of hard practical experience in the "specialized establishment" referred to do not consider that a sacrifice is being made. We contend that, on the contrary, the Army and the Navy will be greatly benefited by this alleged sacrifice. In so far as the question of sacrifice is concerned it might be well to bear in mind that there is a new spirit abroad in the land to-day. A spirit of national service, which includes within its scope the problems of universal military training, national vocational training, and a general national upbuilding of the untrained manhood of the country for the future military and industrial benefit of the United States. I have frequently heard it said during my 21 years of service that the Army is about the only nonproductive national agency in the country which the public is required to support. The developments of the near future are going to give the Army ample opportunity to refute the foregoing statement and to demonstrate its ability as a great producing factor in turning back into civil life men who will be better fitted to take up their duties and work in civil life. In order to accomplish results under this new order of things the Army as a whole will have to make greater sacrifices and devote longer hours to study and work than it has ever known in its peace-time history.

The Air Service feels that it also has an important part to play in this new order of things and feels that it can play its part and make its sacrifices to the ultimate benefit of national interests far more efficiently as an independent and compact operative branch of the Government service than if held back under the control of the War Department, whose time will be more than occupied in demonstrating to the country that it is an active producing asset instead of a nonproductive liability.

66. With reference to the statement of the Secretary of War in paragraph 60, subhead (f), that "you will have less efficient military aviators if they are trained by the Air Service than if they are trained by the Army."

This statement is covered by paragraph 19 of this paper and no further comment is made on this question.

67. With reference to the statement of the Secretary of War in paragraph 60, subhead (g), that you will have "less efficient coordination of the Air Service with the Army if it is a separate service."

This statement is also covered in paragraph 39 of this paper, which clearly illustrates that radical action such as the establishment of a separate department is necessary in order to obtain more efficient coordination than exists under the present condition of affairs.

68. With reference to the statement of the Secretary of War, in paragraph 60, subhead (h), that "he wants the Air Service of the Army to be the most efficient Air Service the Army can have."

The interest which the Secretary of War has always shown personally toward the development of the science of aviation fully justifies the foregoing statement and has been most gratefully accepted by the practical flying officers of the Army. The foregoing statement can not, however, be reconciled with the action planned by the responsible military advisers of the War Department, which is so clearly set forth in the Air Service clauses of the proposed bill (S. 2715) and referred to in paragraphs 9 to 14, inclusive, of this paper.

69. With reference to the statement of the Secretary of War in paragraph 60, subhead (i), that he "Does not think it necessary to sacrifice the Army Air Service to accomplish the object you want."

This statement is covered in paragraph 65 and also borne out by an overwhelming majority of the highest authorities in the civilized world, who base their conclusions on lessons learned after five years of war.

70. With reference to the statement of the Secretary of War in paragraph 60 (j) that "Transferring the Army Air Service into an independent air service will not build more aeroplanes."

This statement is covered in paragraph 61 (a), subheads (b) and (c), which enumerate how, by the elimination of existing duplication, at least some additional funds can be made available for an increased number of aeroplanes.

71. With reference to the statement of the Secretary of War in paragraph 60, subhead (k), that "The only way to buy more aeroplanes is to appropriate more money."

This statement is also covered by paragraph 61 (a), subheads (b) and (c). It is also covered by paragraph 61 (c), (d), and (e). Under these latter paragraphs, it is logical to expect that as the aeroplane establishes its usefulness throughout the various departments concerned, it will gradually displace other agencies for which appropriations are now being made and that such appropriations would become available for the purchase of aeroplanes.

72. With reference to the statement of the Secretary of War in paragraph 60, subhead (l), that, "If Congress provides that some aeroplanes be bought for commercial purposes, some for the Post Office Department and Navy Department, it could provide that we shall all pool our purchases so as to provide adequate encouragement for a limited number of aircraft factories and buy from the same people."

Pooling our purchases will not provide additional aeroplanes or additional aircraft equipment.

Pooling our purchases involves the establishment of a central aviation supply and purchasing department of the Government, which immediately puts us back to the war-time organization which is referred to in paragraphs 36 and 37, an organization which failed through lack of efficient teamwork.

73. With reference to the statement of the Secretary of War in paragraph 60, subhead (m) that "This does not seem to embody the necessity of foregoing Army training and Navy training and coupling up the training of highly specialized military aviation, like the Army and Navy, with the Post Office aviator and the commercial aviator, who is an entirely different person in the first instance and has an entirely different function to perform in the second."

In answer to this statement, the following is submitted: Flying training, whether Army, Navy, Post Office, or commercial, differs in only two special features: First, combat service in the small, high-speed, "pursuit type" aeroplane; second, gunnery in all types of aeroplanes.

These two features are especially military and would normally not be required of the Post Office aviator or the commercial aviator in his normal daily work. In every other feature of importance, the training and daily flying routine is practically identical for all classes of aviators. In an emergency, an experienced Post Office aviator or commercial aviator could master the two special military features in less than two months of intensive training.

In the event of the institution of some form of universal military training in the United States, all aviators not in the Army and Navy divisions of the Air Service could be given a prescribed period of intensive training each year, in the special features which do not form a part of their ordinary flying routine.

In view of the foregoing there need be no fear that the coupling up of Army and Navy training with the training of the post office aviator and the commercial aviator will operate to the detriment of the Army and Navy.

74. The future development of aviation throughout the world in time of peace, as heretofore stated, depends, primarily, upon its effective application to civil and commercial use, with its military use as a secondary consideration. Every first-class power in the world and many of the second-class powers as

well, fully realize this fact and are bending every effort toward development along civil and commercial lines.

Great Britain to-day, as a result of her far-sighted vision, leads the world in the race for the future commercial supremacy of the air. During the last three years of the war she never lost sight of the future commercial use of her huge aircraft industry and her great mass of trained personnel which she knew would accumulate through her war needs, and she planned accordingly.

Immediately upon the signing of the armistice on November 11, 1918, Great Britain produced a well-prepared plan for the establishment of international rules and regulations for aerial navigation, chiefly for use in connection with civil and commercial aviation. These international rules and regulations, with a few amendments, incorporated by the allied representatives, have been adopted almost in their entirety, and are now embodied in the convention relative to international air navigation, a convention which is specially referred to in the terms of the treaty of peace with Germany, and which, upon ratifications, will establish basic national and international rules and regulations for aerial navigation.

For the past two years it has been perfectly apparent to the student of military, naval and aeronautical affairs that Great Britain's after-the-war policy involved the maintenance of a large navy and a large commercial air service, with an army only of a size sufficient to police her colonies and outside possessions.

How has Great Britain organized her aircraft resources to meet future commercial and civil competition in the air? By splitting it up into a dozen different departments all in competition against each other? Not by any manner of means. England learned very early in the war that department competition caused dissatisfaction, waste, and inefficiency to such an extent that the very life and success of her troops on the western front was seriously threatened. As a result of this condition, amongst others, she immediately consolidated her entire aircraft resources under one responsible head, with the result that not only her military air efficiency in the field immediately showed a marvelous change for the better, but it placed Great Britain at the end of the war in the first place amongst the world powers in so far as air supremacy was concerned.

75. France, Italy, Germany, and all other principal European and Asiatic countries, fully realizing the future importance of air navigation for civil, commercial, and military use, and being keenly alive to Great Britain's present advantage in the air, have already followed or have plans under way to follow her lead in the consolidation of all their aircraft resources under one department with one responsible head.

England, France, and Italy to-day have missions all over the world, especially in South America, Asia, and Africa solely occupied in establishing commercial relations, involving the use of aircraft in international trade with the countries located within the above areas. Even with the unstable economical, industrial, and financial conditions which now exist in Europe, and which will continue to exist for some time to come, England, France, Italy, and Germany can still find time to devote a certain part of their energy and resources to this most important development.

76. What is the United States doing or what does it plan to do in connection with competing with the European countries for the commercial supremacy of the air? Does it intend to sit down calmly and let one or two departments of our Government hold back the development of civil and commercial aviation, just because these departments think primarily of the war use of the aeroplane and are still skeptical of its early development as a paying civil and commercial proposition? Does the country intend to sit down quietly and depend only upon military and naval ability to develop the aircraft industry of the United States for civil and commercial service, its primary use under peace conditions?

The answer to the first question, as to what the United States is doing in connection with competing with the European countries for the commercial supremacy of the air, is very simple.

The United States at present is doing nothing from a material standpoint but it has done quite a lot of serious thinking about aviation in the past, and is still thinking. It is thinking right at this minute that after appropriating approximately \$1,000,000,000 for the development of aviation and an aircraft industry for the prime purpose of helping to lick the Hun that there should be something left over after the war to devote to the peace-time use of aircraft. I have considerable faith in the thinking capacity of the American public, and am of

the opinion that the public does not place the blame for the present deplorable state of aviation and the aircraft industry upon the aviators. I am further of the opinion that once the facts are placed before them that they will demand a new deal in our aviation game. I am also of the opinion that if the American public is made acquainted with the fact that the military departments of the Government are opposed to subordinating their military views and control of aviation and the aircraft industry to the more important peace-time civil and commercial needs and use of aircraft that the answer will be very short and to the point.

77. The Congress of the United States as the representative of the American public must answer the second part of the question, viz, "What is the United States going to do in connection with competing with European countries for the commercial supremacy of the air?"

Do you intend to take immediate steps to revive the industry which has gone entirely to pieces as a result of lack of vision on the part of our military authorities and by taking such steps put the United States on a basis from which it can successfully compete in the world air trade? Or do you intend to let it stagger along from year to year as a puny adjunct to the Army and Navy?

78. The United States has just passed through a very critical period of its history, and is now facing a more critical future in its efforts to adjust its national and international relations and obligations resulting from the recent war. During the coming period of national and international readjustment the United States Army is immediately due for a general reorganization and a possible house cleaning, which in the minds of many Regular Army officers is most necessary. In my opinion, there is no time like the present to settle now and for always the question as to the future of aviation and aircraft development in the United States.

79. What further evidence do you need to come to a final decision in this big issue? On the one side you have the majority of the greatest foreign, civil, military, naval, and air leaders in the war, who, with nearly five years of war experience, believe in the consolidation of aviation and the aircraft industry under one department and under one responsible head for peace-time development.

To this weight of authority you can add the testimony of the Assistant Secretary of War and his associates, who recently returned from Europe, after a most exhaustive study of past, present, and proposed future air activities of England, France, and Italy. You can also add to this overwhelming opinion the unanimous opinion of the practical flying men of the United States, with a few isolated exceptions, who served throughout the war, both in the Regular Army and in the temporary forces.

On the other side you have probably two departments of the Government which are opposed to following the lead of countries who have learned their lesson in the bitter experiences of war, the acid test of all efficient organization. Not only are these two departments opposed to profiting by the lessons learned of greater experience but what is of equal importance is the discouraging fact that the War Department, especially, will not take advantage of the practical knowledge of the practical flying men of its own service, who, after all, are the men who have been most responsible for the work accomplished in the past, and who will also have to carry the burden of military development in the future.

The practical flying officers of the United States Army are ready to carry their share of the burden, with ultimate benefit to the national interests of the United States, provided the future policy for the development of aviation and the aircraft industry is forthcoming with the least possible delay.

The responsibility for the establishment of a policy and the means to put that policy into effect rests squarely upon the Congress of the United States, and I earnestly hope that the evidence now before Congress will amply justify the speedy enactment into law of pending legislation for the creation of a separate department of aeronautics.

WASHINGTON, D. C., October 6, 1919.

SUPPLEMENTARY STATEMENT.

80. Since submitting the foregoing statements to the House Committee on Military Affairs regarding the necessity for the creation of a Department of Aeronautics, I have had an opportunity to read the testimony of the Assistant Secretary of the Navy, in the hearings on the proposed bill S. 2693, before the Senate military subcommittee on September 12, 1919. This testimony, together

with the testimony of Admiral Jones and Capt. Craven, is most enlightening, although not very convincing from a practical flying point of view.

81. The Secretary starts off with his testimony (p. 727, pt. 15, hearings on reorganization of the Army) that "not only the Navy Department officially, but the entire naval service is absolutely opposed to the creation of another and separate branch of national defense." The above statement, in my opinion, is most remarkable. The Naval Service in its entirety is a big institution, and like the Army, I hope, contains a few men with sufficient courage to express an opinion at variance with the opinion expressed in the foregoing statement. In fact, I am quite positive that throughout the entire naval service there are a few naval officers who probably disagree with the statement so positively enunciated by the Secretary. This sweeping statement includes the entire Naval Air Service, and I am of the opinion that if some of the practical flying officers of the Navy were called before Congress to give their personal opinions, as to the best and most efficient way to develop aviation from a national, international, technical, mechanical, industrial, and economical standpoint, instead of from a strictly Army and Navy standpoint, I think you would find that the entire naval service is not such a solid unit in opposition to the creation of another branch of defense, as stated by the Secretary.

82. In order to analyze the testimony of the Assistant Secretary of the Navy, I will quote other extracts as they appear on page 727 (par. 15):

The Secretary states that "in regard to a united air service unity of command in war is essential."

From a military point of view, based on the war history of the past 100 years, the foregoing enunciated principle has been most thoroughly demonstrated, yet by reference to paragraphs 41 to 54, inclusive, of this paper one can instantly see how thoroughly this fundamental military principle was violated by the United States Navy during the recent war.

The Secretary states that "In military preparation for war those charged with responsibilities for efficiency in the Army and Navy must have full cognizance of training." The above statement is very true. "Full cognizance of training," however, means something more than a theoretical supervision of the elements of a military machine. It means an intelligent knowledge of all parts of the machine based upon hard, practical experience. How many of the chiefs of the numerous divisions or bureaus of the Navy Department, who, under the existing Naval Air Service organization, are charged with aviation matters, have any practical knowledge of aeronautics? How many of these chiefs have ever been up in an airplane or a balloon? The one thing that has impressed me most forcibly in my association with naval officers during the past 20 years is the great stress they lay on hard, practical experience in the maintenance and operation of their ships. It is therefore not conceivable that the naval officials, charged with the responsibility for naval aeronautical efficiency, can expect to get full efficiency under an organization which places theoretical authority over practical knowledge and experience.

The Secretary further states that "as far as naval aviation is concerned, naval aviation is primarily and distinctly a part of the fleet and must exist as an integral part of the fleet with the seagoing vessels." The term "naval aviation" as used by the Secretary is not very clear. Does it apply to the aeronautical units which actually accompany a fleet at sea and stay with it or does it apply to aeronautical units which operate from land bases, fly out to sea for several hundred or several thousand miles, and return? Does the term "naval aviation" apply to Navy aeronautical units operating ashore against semicivilized peoples such as it is understood has been done against the natives of Haiti or Santo Domingo? Does the term "naval aviation" apply to the patrol of our coasts? Of all of the foregoing possible meanings for the term "naval aviation" only one seems to be logically applicable to the term—that is, when aeronautical units go to sea with a fleet and remain with the fleet wherever it may go. All of the other uses to which the term "naval aviation" is applied can be performed equally as well by an Army aviator or by a post-office aviator or by any other experienced and properly trained type of aviator. There is no mystery or complicated technicality regarding the training of a Navy aviator any more than there is in connection with the training of an Army aviator or a post-office aviator. In fact, I am of the opinion that the training of post-office and commercial aviators must be far more carefully developed than the training of the Army or Navy flyer, especially from the flying standpoint, due to the fact that post-office and commercial aviators must operate on schedule, daily, regardless of weather conditions, whereas Army and Navy aviators, in time of

peace, will normally not be subjected to such a rigorous routine in their daily duties.

83. On page 728 of the hearings (part 15) the Secretary states that "There is no reason, in our judgment, why unnecessary duplication should exist in the Air Service any more than it should exist in the purchase of supplies, in the development of ordnance, artillery, in the various kinds of small arms, and so on." It exists for the very obvious reason that both the Army and Navy have a limited, direct use for aeronautical service which is practically identical for both services; that is, "observation work." This identical need of the two departments is causing duplication in training, duplication of training stations, and other duplication problems referred to in paragraph 61 (b) of this paper, all of which vitally affect the economical situation with which the country is now confronted.

84. The Secretary also states, on page 728 (pt. 15) of the hearings, that "Healthful competition between the Army and Navy is desirable. Competition in the air would be eliminated if a united air service were established." Healthful competition is desirable, provided it does not cost the Government undue and excessive expense while the Army and Navy are carrying on this healthful competition. By reference to paragraphs 41 to 54, inclusive, of this paper you will see that there is also such a thing as unhealthful and dangerous competition. Competition between the Air Service of the United States Army and Navy during the recent war nearly eliminated a large portion of the British air program and vitally affected the air program of the Air Service, American Expeditionary Forces. Competition between Government departments, in my opinion, is an unnecessary and expensive luxury. Teamwork is needed instead of competition. The so-called healthful competition which has existed between the Army and Navy Air Services during the past two years has resulted in each service hiding its plans from the other instead of automatically keeping each other informed of progress in their respective branches. Such competition is wrong, as it involves additional expenditure of public funds and loss of time in going over the same ground which either service may have already covered.

85. The Secretary further states, on page 728 (pt. 15) of the hearings, that "In regard to the officers and men of a separate service, it is obvious that they can not be fed into the ranks of the Army and the Navy when they cease flying, and not only our estimates but the experience gained in the war on the other side shows the extreme difficulty of knowing what to do with aviation officers after they reach a certain age." The war air experience which the Navy had in Europe must have been remarkably different from the war air experience of the Army. The Army has never yet been able to get enough practical trained flying officers to handle the strictly flying jobs available, to say nothing of the many nonflying jobs where the flying officers' experience would be of greater benefit to the ultimate efficiency of the Air Service than having the job handled by a nonflying officer, with no flying experience. If the Secretary is in doubt as to what would become of the so-called superannuated flying officers, referred to in his testimony, attention is invited to paragraphs 56, 57, and 58 of this paper, which cover in some detail the age question of flying officers and where they can be used as they grow older in the service.

86. The following testimony, which appears on page 729 (pt. 15) of the hearings, seems worthy of comment:

"Question by Senator New. In other words, a good part of the British Navy is jealous of what it has, and does not want to give it up?

"Mr. ROOSEVELT. No; I would not put it in that way, but rather that the British Navy feels that way because it has an independent air force, which has absolutely failed to develop naval aviation from a strategical, tactical, or operating viewpoint.

"Senator New. What proof of that assertion can you offer, Mr. Secretary?

"Secretary ROOSEVELT. I can give my personal experience. In the summer of 1918, I went to the Grand Fleet and talked with Admiral Beatty in regard to this very subject. He told me that up to the time that the naval aviation had been under the Admiralty, during the first part of the war, the development had followed the development of naval operations of the war; that when the independent air service was established things went all right for two or three months; in other words, before the change came wholly into effect. Thereupon the Grand Fleet found it necessary to carry out some very radical experimental work in the development of new types of planes to be used from the deck of cruisers and battleships; they sent their requirements to the independent air force, and they got no results. People came up from the air force

who had no familiarity with battleship design, let us say, or with naval needs, and after six months of delay, unnecessary delay, they went ahead in the fleet itself and developed the type of plane which they wished to use for this particular purpose."

In quoting the foregoing statements I wonder whether the Secretary also heard the army side of the question, or whether he simply heard the navy side and based his conclusions on the navy side only. The army side of the question, as I received it direct from a number of the highest ranking army flying officers in the Royal Air Force, was simply this: At the outbreak of war, the navy practically controlled the output of aeronautical engines, and the army couldn't get them. Instead of getting together in the common cause of licking the Hun in the air, the Royal Flying Corps and the Royal Naval Air Service spent much valuable time fighting each other over production, research, and engineering problems, with the inevitable result that British flying officers were being sacrificed in France, due to inferior equipment. The foregoing is an example of what competition will do between Government departments. The British war ministry, soon realizing the importance of the situation and its effects on the operations of the British armies in the field, promptly took a firm hand in matters, and, as a result, the British air ministry was created, under which all air forces and air activities were consolidated under one responsible head and one control. From that time on the air operations of the British armies progressed rapidly, and the aircraft industry of Great Britain went ahead by leaps and bounds.

As a result of this consolidation of all its air resources, Great Britain leads the world to-day in the race for the military and commercial supremacy of the air. The foregoing is an excellent example of what the Assistant Secretary of the Navy terms "competition," and I wish to state frankly that this same tendency toward uncontrolled competition between the United States Army and Navy Air Services during the recent war would have led us straight to the same condition of affairs as existed between the air forces of England, prior to their consolidation, if prompt steps had not been taken to protest vigorously against Navy Air Service priority over the Allies and the United States Army Air Service of engines and aircraft being built in the United States. I will go further on this same question of competition between the Army Air Service and the Navy Air Service, and predict that unless these two services are not soon placed under one responsible head and under one control that the United States will see a repetition in our Air Service of the conditions which existed between the Royal Flying Corps and the Royal Naval Air Service. All the elements for the development of such a condition of affairs exist at this very minute, especially in connection with the development and use of the "dirigible" airship, in which the Army and the Navy both feel they have equal rights and equally important uses for this type of aircraft, and, in my opinion, neither side will give way in spite of all the Joint Army and Navy boards which may be organized to adjust differences. The statements contained in paragraphs 41 to 54, inclusive, of this paper, fully set forth the past difficulties in securing efficient teamwork between two equally powerful departments of the Government. Such methods of competition are detrimental to the best interests of the national service. They are, without question, detrimental to the efficient development of aviation and the aircraft industry. They are inexcusable and unworthy of the traditions of the Army and Navy, and unless promptly corrected, governed, and controlled by one responsible head who can supervise efficiently and regulate the needs and uses of aircraft for the two services, you may be certain that we will soon duplicate the conditions which existed in the British Air Service during the first three years of the war.

87. It will be noted that the Secretary states in the foregoing quoted testimony that "the British Navy feels that way because it has an independent air force which has absolutely failed to develop naval aviation from a strategical, tactical, or operating viewpoint." Why did the British independent air force fail to develop naval aviation during the war? For the identical reason that France failed to develop naval aviation. A reason which all allied leaders abroad, military and naval, fully understood and accepted as proper, logical and most vitally necessary, and is stated as follows: Naval aviation was not developed coincident with Army aviation because every airplane and every airplane engine which could be built in France and England was needed to meet the Hun in land operations. Every military strategist in the allied forces fully realized that the value of aviation to the land forces was of far greater importance and would have far greater weight in the final issue than if de-

veloped and used for naval operations. The productive capacity of England and France was never sufficient during the entire war to even meet the needs of their land forces. Such being the fact, I hardly think the British independent air force should be criticized for not developing naval aviation. Our naval air forces went off on a tangent when they advanced the theory that air operations against enemy submarine bases would be of greater strategical value than air operations against the Hun on the western front. Theoretically the idea was sound, but its practical and effective operation was out of the question until the aircraft industries of England, France, and the United States had developed to the point where the needs of the armies in the field were first fully taken care of. Once the needs of the armies had been provided for, then and not until then should the question of air operations against enemy submarine bases have received serious consideration.

The submarine menace during the fall and winter of 1917 was fully appreciated even by many of us landsmen of the Army, and it was fully appreciated that unless some means were found to check this menace that the Huns would win the war without question before the weight of the United States could be brought to bear on the field of battle. As practical flying men, those of us in the Army know perfectly well that the aircraft industry of England, France, and the United States as it existed in the fall of 1917 could never turn out enough airplanes and engines to meet the immediate needs of the troops and at the same time provide a sufficient number of airplanes to operate effectively against enemy submarine bases. At the very time that the Navy Air Service in the United States was pressing for priority of Liberty engines for use in air operations against enemy submarine bases, the Navy Department had already embarked on the only successful plan possible (even from a landsman's point of view) of combating the submarine menace. That plan, so well set forth in Admiral Sims's story of the war, involved the maximum construction, use, and operation of destroyers, and everyone knows to-day how successfully and effectively the problem was solved. The foregoing strategical analysis of the situation in so far as the development and use of naval aviation as a primary factor in the recent war should, in my opinion, clearly free the independent air force of Great Britain from the criticism set forth in the foregoing testimony of the Assistant Secretary of the Navy. Failure on the part of our naval authorities at home to present to the War Department a complete analysis of the relative value, use, and needs of naval aviation as compared to the more important value, use, and needs of aviation with the allied armies in the field was, in my opinion, a grave strategical mistake, a mistake which not only came very close to bringing disastrous results upon the British air program but directly interfered with the development of the Air Service, American Expeditionary Forces.

88. The statements of the Assistant Secretary of the Navy in pages 737 and 738, part 15, of the hearings before the Senate subcommittee, refer to the use of United States naval aero squadrons in bombing operations against enemy submarine bases at Zeebrugge, Ostend, and Bruges, and in those statements he characterized such operations as a "fiction" and "based on a theory." If you will again refer to paragraphs 41 to 54, inclusive, and to paragraph 87 of this paper, you will obtain a very complete picture as to how this "fiction" based on a "theory" not only nearly upset the entire British air program, but also materially interfered with and delayed the practical development and use of the Air Service, American Expeditionary Forces. You will also find in the foregoing mentioned paragraphs the answer to Senator Frelinghuysen's question as to whether there was "a protest from the commander of the land forces against these raids, or against the interference of the naval aviators with their land planes." There were several very decided protests made by cable in cablegrams prepared by myself, as Chief of Air Service, American Expeditionary Forces, and approved by Gen. Pershing in each instance. How these protests were answered and how the "theory" "based on a fiction" was jointly approved and jointly ordered by the War and Navy Departments is fully set forth in the last-quoted cablegram referred to in paragraph 45 of this paper.

89. The statement of the Assistant Secretary of the Navy, on page 730 (pt. 15) of the hearings, when questioned in reference to the reservations submitted by Capt. Mustin, in the report of the Assistant Secretary of War, are also of considerable interest, especially the following-quoted extract that, "In time of peace naval aviation work is practically 100 per cent experimental." If the naval air program in time of peace is to be 100 per cent experimental, why the necessity for the 16 coast stations which are contemplated, as I under-

stand, at the present time by the Navy? Why all this fuss about who should develop, operate, and control the "dirigible" airships of the Government? If the Navy simply intends to do 100 per cent experimental work in time of peace, the entire aviation program of the United States better be turned over to the Army, because the Army intends to put a large share of its energies and appropriations into the practical service use of aircraft, in order to insure development along lines which will make aircraft a useful military asset in war. Confining aircraft development to the experimental stage will never advance the development to its efficient application in war. In order to find out what an airplane can actually do under service conditions, you must put it into the hands of the officers and men who expect to use it in active service; that is, as soon as experimentation has reached a certain stage the machine must be taken out of the hands of the technical experts and away from the well-equipped laboratories and experimental stations. It must then be turned over to the field engineers and the average enlisted mechanics who fly with it and care, repair, and maintain it under field conditions without the aid and assistance of well-equipped laboratories and well-equipped stations. In other words, the field efficiency of an airplane or airship is not found through experimentation alone, but ultimately through the test of field service.

90. What is the essential differences between training for the Navy and for the Army or any other purpose? This question was asked of the Assistant Secretary of the Navy by Senator New and was answered as follows: "A knowledge of naval tactics, strategy, and navigation, watermanship, seamanship, and practically everything which a naval officer learns at the Naval Academy." With reference to the foregoing, the following is submitted: The Army aviator, the Post Office aviator, and the commercial aviator must be as thoroughly trained in navigation, watermanship, and seamanship as the naval aviator. The Army aviator must be trained in military tactics and strategy with land troops which are infinitely more complicated than naval tactics or strategy with fleets at sea. Compare the difficulties of spotting artillery fire on land, where every possible means of concealment are used and the shots strike on ground which may or may not throw up a visible cloud of dust or dirt, with spotting the big gun fire at sea where every flash from the muzzle of the gun can be seen and the splash of every projectile registered. Compare the movement of divisions, corps, and armies, on the march or in an advance, spread out over miles of territory, using every tree or other natural cover for shelter and concealment from the eyes of the man in the airplane, with the absolutely open movement of ships at sea, with no possible concealment from the man in the air. In my opinion, it will not take any special training for the Army aviator, the Post Office aviator, or the commercial aviator to successfully solve the naval aviator's problems, nor will it require any material difference, or any extra time, in their training, other than a few weeks of theoretical study. The practical flying training of all type of aviators is almost identical, and therefore the Navy need have no fear that the creation of a department of aeronautics will reduce the efficiency of naval aviation training.

91. The testimony of the Assistant Secretary of the Navy, as found on pages 734, 735, 736, and 737 of part 15 of the hearings before the Senate Subcommittee on Military Affairs, indicates that the Secretary looks upon the future development of aviation as a far-distant dream, and not a possible near reality. This frame of mind, however, is evidently not absolutely universal in the Navy, as will be seen from the following-quoted article which appeared in the Army and Navy Journal of October 4, 1919:

[Army and Navy Journal, Oct. 4, 1919.]

ADMIRAL FULLAM PREDICTS NAVY CHANGES.

Rear Admiral W. F. Fullam, United States Navy, contributed to the New York Herald of September 29 an article discussing the probability "that a complete revolution in naval architecture" may be forced upon us owing to the necessity of more powerful protection for naval vessels against torpedo attacks from the air and from under water. Admiral Fullam points out "there are five different methods of attack that involve the possible destruction of the immense and costly ships that are now regarded as a measure of sea power," and he foresees that as the result of these effective forms of attack "the present types of dreadnaughts and cruisers will be driven from the seas." Admiral Fullam summarizes the methods of attack as the plunging fire of mod-

ern guns at extreme ranges of 16,000 yards and above, attack by bombing from aircraft, submarine mines, torpedoes fired from destroyers, and torpedoes fired from torpedo planes. He illustrates how at extreme ranges projectiles rise high in the air, and says that the impact of such projectiles on "the unarmored deck will inevitably penetrate to the vitals and cripple or completely destroy the ship." Aircraft will be more and more, he states, a determining factor in successful range determination, and he declares that "sea power, or fighting power, in the future will be largely dependent upon control of the air, and that fleet that secures this control in future battles must win, other things being approximately equal. In other words, aircraft will not only constitute dangerous offensive weapons in themselves, but they will contribute greatly to the accurate and effective use of a ship's guns in battle. They will be of double value, and from present indications airplanes will soon become one of the most invincible elements in sea power."

Admiral Fullam then illustrates the weakness of the present system of hull and deck protective armor and presents the advantages of turtle-back armor for protection against long-range fire and bombing attacks, admitting its one weakness, but pointing out that there should be careful study made of the problem, since "there must be a compromise between horizontal armor and a low-angle turtle back in order to secure the surest average protection with a given weight of armor." He further maintains that the danger to the fleet from bombing attacks of airplanes has been more or less discounted by naval officers until quite recently. It is folly, he says, to ignore longer the fact that recent improvements in air machines "will soon render them the most dangerous enemy of the enormous \$20,000,000 vessels that now constitute the fighting line of the Navy." He pictures how a country such as ours, with a sufficient number of airplanes properly armed with bombs could hold off an attacking fleet. Against the argument that improvements in guns will keep pace with bombing-plane improvements, he writes: "It is believed that this theory will soon prove illusive, and that it will at no distant time be admitted that a fleet with unarmored decks can not live at sea unless it absolutely controls the air above. Sea power will be subordinate to or dependent upon air power."

Admiral Fullam closes his article with a tribute to Rear Admiral Bradley A. Fiske, United States Navy, of whom he says: "In this connection I am in duty bound to pay just tribute to the far-seeing genius of Rear Admiral Fiske. In 1913, Admiral Fiske suggested the use and immediate development of airplanes as the simplest, cheapest, and most readily available means of defending certain of our island possessions against invasion or capture by a foreign power. Time has fully justified his theory and opinion." And he adds this judgment as to the ships of the future: "It is perhaps too early and quite unnecessary to attempt to predict exactly what manner of ship will replace the modern costly and too vulnerable dreadnaught in the battle line of future navies. That armored decks or turtlebacks must be provided, and that the ship must be completely covered by such protection, may be asserted with confidence. It is possible, therefore, that smaller and less expensive armored ships, with fewer guns, large or small, and with minute underwater subdivision, may be forced upon us."

Judging from the foregoing article, which I assume is authentic, this aviation dream must be taking on the shape of a nightmare if it is causing the naval constructors to lose sleep in their efforts to redesign the decks of their ships in order to prevent their destruction through an air attack. That dream is a living reality to-day. And all that is needed at this very minute is a few thousand of the existing types of bombing airplanes, equipped with existing types of bombs, manned by the same types of American flying men who machine-gunned the Hun in his trenches during the recent war.

92. The statements of the chairman of the Senate Military Affairs Committee, on pages 738-739 and 740 of part 15 of the previously mentioned hearings, reference the great and unlimited offensive use of aircraft in future warfare, brings to my recollection a prophecy which I made in 1907, before the first public flights had even been made by the Wright Brothers. That prophecy was contained in my graduating thesis written at the Army Signal School, Fort Leavenworth, Kans., and is quoted as follows:

"In all future warfare we can expect to see engagements in the air between hostile aerial fleets. The struggle for supremacy in the air will undoubtedly take place while the opposing forces are maneuvering for position and possibly days before the opposing Cavalry forces have even gained contact.

"The results of these preliminary engagements between the hostile aerial fleets will have an important effect on the strategical movements of the hostile forces before they have actually gained contact.

"The successful aerial fleet or what remains of it will have no difficulty in watching every movement and disposition of the opposing troops, and unless the opposing troops are vastly superior in numbers, equipment, and morale the aerial victory should be an important factor in bringing campaigns to a short and decisive end."

In June, 1919, I saw a written statement signed by Marshal Foch in which he makes practically an identical statement. This statement by Marshal Foch, I believe, forms part of the record compiled by the Assistant Secretary of War during his recent investigation of past, present, and proposed future aircraft development in Europe. My statement, as heretofore quoted, may be classed as visionary and the dream of an aviator, if so desired, but I hardly think you can dispose of the statement of Marshal Foch quite so easily, nor can you dispose of the opinions of the highest ranking foreign civil, military, and naval officials in the world by classifying them as visionary and purely theoretical. The great majority of our Army and Navy officers to-day simply see the defensive use of aviation only in its practical application to reconnaissance and observation service with ground troops. They do not see, or will not see, its great field for offensive use in attacking troops and material military objects on the ground or on the sea. They point to the comparatively small amount of damage caused in bombing operations during the recent war, never taking into consideration the fact that due to the very small number of aeroplanes available such bombing operations naturally would not show large results. Ask the officer or enlisted man who has been bombed by the Hun how he likes it, and you will find that bombing is a mighty influential factor in modern war, and if developed on a large scale will constitute a most vital measure of offense in future military operations.

98. In concluding my remarks on naval aviation and naval opinion as regards the creation of a department of aeronautics, I wish to state that the hearings on this question before Congress have had one most beneficial result, and that is that these hearings have caused to be furnished to the Army more information as to naval air policies than the Army has been able to obtain by any other means during my experience in military aviation. The Navy may answer this by saying that the Army could get all of this information by simply asking for it, all of which is perfectly true. But the Army shouldn't be required to ask for it. Neither should the Navy be required to ask the Army for its aviation policies or for data in any aviation subject which is of vital interest to both services. There should be in operation an automatic intelligence system which should disseminate all aviation information of vital interest to all Government departments concerned, instead of the present competitive system prevalent in all departments, a system which simply breeds suspicion and distrust. It certainly is an unusual procedure to be required to secure this information through Congress, and certainly, in my opinion, Congress doesn't contemplate that it shall be so used in the future. Congress has enough work on its hands without adding to its functions the duty of acting as an intelligence bureau between the Army and Navy air services, and it is earnestly hoped that it will promptly relieve itself of future duties of this character by creating a department of aeronautics wherein such duties can be properly and effectively solved, to the ultimate efficiency of national aviation.

94. In addition to the opinions and facts heretofore submitted, and which bear entirely on aviation and the aircraft industry of the United States, the following remarks are submitted on the subjects of General Staff control, the "detail" system, and the question of promotion as applied to the Army as a whole.

The hearings on the proposed bills S. 2715 and H. R. 8287 have brought out a storm of protest from the bureau chiefs in the War Department against the provisions of these proposed bills which enlarge and fix the power and authority of the General Staff of the Army.

What has caused this storm of protest? The reason, I believe, is as well known to Congress as it is to the bureau chiefs. In plain language the reason is that the General Staff of the Army plans to exercise absolute control and authority over all elements of the Army without assuming the responsibilities involved.

In other words, a complete violation of a fundamental civil and military principle, to the effect that "Authority and responsibility go together and can not be separated if maximum efficiency is desired."

Each bureau chief, within his own department, is responsible for the fullest possible efficiency of each and every part of his department, and in order to obtain maximum efficiency he must have adequate authority to fully govern and control his department in the best interests of national service.

Under the proposed legislation the General Staff will exercise all the authority and shirk all of the responsibility. Such a condition of affairs would, in my opinion, be absolutely fatal to the future military efficiency of the United States Army and positively detrimental to future military preparedness. The present bureau chiefs of the War Department, as a whole, through their practical experience gained in the recent war, are in my opinion, infinitely more capable of efficiently administering their respective departments for the national benefit than any group of General Staff officers who by the very nature of their existing organization are incapable of keeping up with progress and development of the bureaus of the War Department, especially the strictly technical bureaus such as the Ordnance, Signal Corps, Air Service, Engineers, Motor Transport, and Tank Corps.

95. One practical solution of the General Staff problem, in so far as the bureau chiefs are concerned, is to make all bureau chiefs and their principal assistants members of the General Staff. They would then be in a position to exercise full authority over their departments and be justly held responsible for the fullest efficiency of their departments. In my opinion it would be much more practical to confine the designation of "General Staff" officer to general officers only. This for the reason that no general officer of the line likes to receive orders from some junior officer of the General Staff Corps. Nor in the ordinary routine of military life does any senior officer like to take orders from a junior who may be temporarily clothed with authority and through such authority be empowered to issue orders to his seniors in rank. The question of military rank and military precedence, with its accompanying power and authority, is one of the underlying problems which must also be solved in connection with the existing dispute between the General Staff and the bureaus of the War Department, and, in my opinion, it should be taken into the fullest consideration by Congress, even to the point of fixing, by law, the relative precedence and succession to the highest military offices, similar to the existing law governing the rank and precedence of cabinet officers as regards their succession to the office of the President of the United States.

96. The following specific organization of the higher grades in the Army and their relative rank and precedence is, in my opinion, thoroughly practical and highly desirable.

WAR DEPARTMENT GENERAL STAFF.

1. General, C. in C.
2. Lieutenant general, C. of S.
3. Lieutenant general, deputy C. of S. (Operations.)
4. Lieutenant general, deputy C. of S. (Supply.)
5. Major general, deputy C. of S. (Administration.)
6. Major general, Chief of Infantry, 1 C. of S. and 3 deputies, under control of Operations.
7. Major general, Chief of Field Artillery, 1 C. of S. and 3 deputies, under control of Operations.
8. Major general, Chief of Cavalry, 1 C. of S. and 3 deputies, under control of Operations.
9. Major general, Chief of Coast Artillery, 1 C. of S. and 3 deputies, under control of operations.
10. Major general, Chief of Engineers, 1 C. of S. and 3 deputies, under control of Operations.
11. Major general, Q. M. General, 1 C. of S. and 3 deputies, under control of Supply.
12. Major general, Chief of Ordnance, 1 C. of S. and 3 deputies, under control of Supply.
13. Major general, Chief Signal Officer, 1 C. of S. and 3 deputies, under control of Operations.
14. Major general, Chief of Transportation, 1 C. of S. and 3 deputies, under control of Supply.
15. Major general, Surgeon General, 1 C. of S. and 3 deputies, under control of Operations.

16. Major general, Adjutant General, 1 C. of S. and 3 deputies, under control of Administration.

17. Major general, Chief of Tank Corps, 1 C. of S. and 3 deputies, under control of Operations.

18. Major general, Chief of Chemical Warfare, 1 C. of S. and 3 deputies, under control of Operations.

19. Major general, Judge Advocate General, 1 C. of S. and 3 deputies, under control of Administration.

20. Major general, Inspector General, 1 C. of S. and 3 deputies, under control of Administration.

21. Major general, Chief of Information, 1 C. of S. and 3 deputies, under control of Administration.

22. Major general, territorial department commander, 1 C. of S. and 3 deputies, General Staff.

NOTE.—Air Service not included in the above.

BUREAU ORGANIZATION.

1. Major general, Chief of Infantry.

2. Brigadier general, C. of S.

3. Brigadier general, deputy C. of S., Operations, General Staff.

4. Brigadier general, deputy C. of S., Supply.

5. Colonel, deputy C. of S., Administration.

And such other assistants as may be necessary.

NOTE.—Territorial department "high command" to be organized same as bureau organization.

Make the grade of general and lieutenant general permanent. Prescribe by law that the second ranking officer of the Army shall be the Chief of Staff and by virtue of his rank and position of responsibility shall succeed to the grade of general when such grade is vacated by death, disability, or through any other cause. Prescribe by law the relative rank and precedence of the Deputy Chiefs of Staff as outlined above. Prescribe by law that only Deputy Chiefs of Staff shall be eligible for assignment as Chief of Staff. Prescribe by law that major generals only, in time of peace, shall be eligible for promotion and assignment as Deputy Chiefs of Staff. Prescribe by law that brigadier generals only, in time of peace, shall be eligible to promotion to the grade of major general.

Each bureau, corps, department, and service to be authorized one major general, three brigadier generals, and one colonel, who will constitute the General Staff of such bureau, corps, department, and service.

Each bureau, corps, department, and service will then have a uniform organization throughout its "high command." The additional number of colonels, lieutenant colonels, etc., needed by the bureaus, corps, departments, and services in the War Department will vary, depending upon the size and relative importance of the particular bureau, corps, department, or service concerned. The number needed in these grades might well be left to the determination of the War Department.

The number of General Staff officers for duty in the War Department should, however, in my opinion, be fixed by law, and in accordance with the general outline submitted herein.

Not only should the number of General Staff officers for duty in the War Department proper be fixed, but the law should provide that in the event of war such officers will remain on duty in the War Department not take the field in person, except in an absolute emergency.

97. The foregoing statements regarding the fixed permanency of War Department General Staff officers, brings upon the question of the "detail" system as applied to the Army to-day.

Upon the outbreak of war large numbers of detailed officers on duty in the various bureaus, corps, departments, and services and the General Staff immediately applied for duty with troops, and many of them were successful in obtaining such duty. This stripping of the bureaus, corps, departments, and services of many of their best men vitally effected the efficiency of the entire Army. This very action has been frequently predicted during the past 20 years by the advocates of the "permanent" system, and in my opinion we should not fail to profit by our past experience.

The detail system, in so far as the technical branches of the service is concerned, simply means inefficiency. No officer with a spark of energy and ambition will go into a service and endeavor to perfect himself in such service, know-

ing that no matter how earnestly he may apply himself, he must, by law, at the end of four years go back to his original branch of the service.

Why inflict upon the technical branches of the Army a system that from a practical business standpoint could not exist six months in any business organization in the country? No business man in the world would think for an instant of selecting a man for some specific class of work and at the same time tell him that at the end of four years he must go back to his old job.

Why not incorporate a few fundamental practical business principles into our Military Establishment now that the opportunity presents itself and give the Army an opportunity to develop along practical and economical lines? The contention of those who favor the "detail" system, that the permanent staff officers who will lose touch with the troops of the line, can easily be met by requiring a certain proportion of the permanent staff officers of each bureau, corps, department, and service to serve with the several branches of the line for a period of at least one year in every five.

98. With reference to the question of promotion by selection, by elimination, or by seniority, it might be well to note that the War Department is now endeavoring to readjust the rank of all Regular Army officers to meet the conditions imposed as a result of the demobilization of the war army. How this readjustment of rank is being accomplished is not generally known to officers outside of the General Staff of the War Department.

It is generally understood, however, that all officers are being classified as (a) eligible for promotion and (b) not eligible for promotion. It is further generally understood that the official efficiency records of each officer on file in the War Department will form the basis for determining the eligibility of an officer for promotion.

How the Infantry, Cavalry, and Field and Coast Artillery officers detailed in the Air Service or any other "detail" service can be efficiently classified is beyond my comprehension.

To illustrate this I will cite my own case.

As an Infantry officer my record is being passed upon by a board of Infantry officers. During the past 11 years I have only served approximately nine months in the Infantry. The most important years of my service have been devoted to aviation and not to infantry work. To the best of my recollection, my entire official record on file in the War Department could probably be compiled on one sheet of legal-cap paper, where as a detailed record of important work performed by me or under my direction during the past 21 years (a record which I submitted recently to the president of the Infantry efficiency board) covers 165 pages of single-space typewritten legal-cap paper.

From the foregoing it would appear that the existing system of determining an officer's efficiency and eligibility for promotion by selection, based solely upon his existing official record in the War Department, is entirely inadequate to meet the needs of the service, and consequently leaves just one logical way in which an officer may be selected; that is, through promotion by "acquaintance," which I understand is the general term now being officially used instead of promotion by "selection."

Promotion by elimination has this disadvantage in that ultimately you will be required to eliminate officers who might be classified as efficient, especially if a fixed number of individuals are required to be eliminated each year. Aside from this disadvantage, promotion by elimination seems to be the most logical method from an efficiency standpoint.

Promotion by seniority, in my opinion, is only generally favored by the officer who fears elimination.

The most logical solution to the problem seems to be a combination of promotion by selection and seniority, with a strict elimination condition attached to all promotions by seniority. If such a plan should be adopted, not over 50 per cent of the promotions, in my opinion, should be by selection.

If promotion by selection is adopted, either exclusively or in combination with the other methods under discussion, a most thorough modification of the efficiency records of all officers should be made. These records should go into much greater detail as to actual work performed than is done at the present time. If this is not done, then we should admit at once that selections must be made as a result of personal acquaintance. Such a method of selection, no matter how carefully or impartially made, will lower the morale of every officer in the Army who may be passed over.

99. In conclusion, I wish to revert again to the first two paragraphs of this paper, which refer to the necessity for future military and industrial prepared-

ness, and to the part aviation should play in any plans or policies which may be adopted in the interests of national preparedness. If the testimony now in the possession of Congress for the creation of a department of aeronautics, wherein all air activities of the United States may be efficiently combined and economically controlled and administered, is not sufficient to convince Congress of the necessity for enacting into law the proposed aviation bills now pending, I earnestly hope that Congress will give serious consideration to the alternative solution suggested in the last part of paragraph 16 of this paper, wherein it is recommended that the Army as a whole be required to sacrifice a proportionate share of its personnel in the national interests of aviation and the development of the aircraft industry of the United States.

As previously stated, the aviation issue is squarely up to Congress, and the responsibility of its future efficient development rests solely in your hands.

WASHINGTON, D. C., *October 14, 1919.*

(Whereupon, at 5 o'clock p. m., the committee adjourned to meet on Thursday, October 16, 1919, at 2.15 p. m.)

REORGANIZATION OF THE ARMY

HEARINGS

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE COMMITTEE ON MILITARY AFFAIRS UNITED STATES SENATE

SIXTY-SIXTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

ON

S. 2691

A BILL TO PROVIDE FOR UNIVERSAL MILITARY, NAVAL, AND VOCATIONAL TRAINING AND FOR MOBILIZATION OF THE MANHOOD OF THE NATION IN A NATIONAL EMERGENCY

S. 2693

A BILL TO CREATE A DEPARTMENT OF AERONAUTICS, DEFINING THE POWERS AND DUTIES OF THE DIRECTOR THEREOF, PROVIDING FOR THE ORGANIZATION, DISPOSITION, AND ADMINISTRATION OF A UNITED STATES AIR FORCE, CREATING THE UNITED STATES AIR RESERVE FORCE, AND PROVIDING FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF CIVIL AND COMMERCIAL AVIATION

S. 2715

A BILL TO REORGANIZE AND INCREASE THE EFFICIENCY OF THE UNITED STATES ARMY, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES

PART 21

Printed for the use of the Committee on Military Affairs

WASHINGTON
GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
1919

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HOWARD SUTHERLAND, West Virginia.

HARRY S. NEW, Indiana.

JOSEPH S. FRELINGHUYSEN, New Jersey.

HIRAM W. JOHNSON, California.

PHILANDER C. KNOX, Pennsylvania.

IRVINE L. LENROOT, Wisconsin.

SELDEN P. SPENCER, Missouri.

ARTHUR CAPPER, Kansas.

GEORGE E. CHAMBERLAIN, Oregon.

GILBERT M. HITCHCOCK, Nebraska.

DUNCAN U. FLETCHER, Florida.

HENRY L. MYERS, Montana.

CHARLES S. THOMAS, Colorado.

MORRIS SHEPPARD, Texas.

J. C. W. BECKHAM, Kentucky.

WILLIAM F. KIRBY, Arkansas.

KENNETH D. McKELLAR, Tennessee.

R. E. DEVENDORF, *Clerk.*

REORGANIZATION OF THE ARMY.

FRIDAY, OCTOBER 17, 1919.

UNITED STATES SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON MILITARY AFFAIRS,
Washington, D. C.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 2.15 p. m., in the committee room, Capitol, Senator James W. Wadsworth, jr., presiding.
Present: Senators Wadsworth (chairman), Sutherland, New, Chamberlain, Fletcher, and Thomas.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Secretary, I understand that to-day you prefer to confine your discussion to the bill introduced by Senator New, S. 2693, which relates to the establishment of a department of aeronautics, and to kindred subjects.

STATEMENT OF HON. BENEDICT CROWELL, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF WAR.

Mr. CROWELL. Yes, Mr. Chairman, I should much prefer, if you will allow it, to do that. The reason is that Gen. Pershing is now making a careful study of the reorganization of the Army, and while in many things my own views are fairly crystallized, I am very anxious to have a talk with him after he has completed that, and Secretary Baker and I have both arranged to have that talk with him.

Mr. Chairman and gentlemen of the committee, I appreciate the opportunity your invitation to appear before you gives me to relate to you my experience, observation, and conclusions upon the subject of the future of the Air Service in the United States. We can well afford, as I see it, to formulate a policy on this subject out of our experience in the recent war. Within the War Department much consideration has been given to the problem, and it was deemed advisable that, preliminary to making recommendation to the Congress, a study be made of the activities and views of our Allies. Therefore, on May 1, 1919, the Secretary of War requested that I organize a mission to visit France, England, and Italy and make a thorough investigation of the aviation problems as they had been developed in those countries during the war and as to their future policies.

Under date of May 17, 1919, the Secretary of War gave to the press the following interview in connection with the aims and objects of the American Aviation Mission:

I am asking Mr. Crowell and his associates to get all the information they can on the development of aircraft and the plans there are abroad among civilized peoples for the development of the airship as an instrument of civilization,

whether for war or for peace service; and, as far as they can, I hope they will collect all this information and bring it back and make a report, and perhaps make exhibits which we can lay before any committee of Congress which is interested in the subject, whether it is the Military Affairs Committee dealing with the airplane as an implement of war, or whether it is any other committee dealing with it as an implement of commerce and industry.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. You might state the personnel of that commission.

Mr. CROWELL. I was the chairman. The other members were:

Howard Coffin, member of Council of National Defense.

Henry C. Mustin, captain, United States Navy.

Halsey Dunwoody, colonel, Air Service, United States Army.

James G. Blair, jr., lieutenant colonel, General Staff, United States Army.

George H. Houston, president. Wright-Martin Airplane Corporation.

C. M. Keys, vice president, Curtiss Aeroplane and Motor Corporation.

S. S. Bradley, general manager, Manufacturers' Aircraft Association.

The mission was made up as far as possible to comprise all phases of aviation—representative of the Army, Navy, and commercial interests. The mission made an exhaustive study in the three countries under the three general headings: Organization, technical development, and commercial development. As a result of their study the report of the aviation mission, as of July 19, 1919, was submitted by me to the Secretary of War.

Up to the time of my leaving for Europe, as chairman of the mission, I held no definite views on the future treatment of aviation. I, of course, knew through my position in the War Department the enormous problems we had to face during the war, and that experience forced upon me the feeling that it was of vital importance that something should be done to provide against a repetition of the situation that existed during the emergency.

After more than seven weeks spent abroad, where I was given every possible facility and opportunity to study what those countries were doing and talk with the men who had control during the war and were shaping the policies for the future, I have become convinced that the only solution of our future air policies is an air department; that only through such a department will it be possible for this country to keep abreast with the other great powers.

As a result of the studies of the American aviation mission abroad, upon its return to this country the mission recommended in its report the "concentration of the air activities of the United States—military, naval, and civilian—within the direction of a single Government agency created for the purpose, coequal in importance with the Departments of War, Navy, and of Commerce."

Among the representative men with whom the mission discussed this subject was Winston Churchill, secretary of state for war and secretary of state for air, who said that the British Air Ministry organization, although not perfect, is the best plan yet developed; it is founded on actual war experience. There is no possibility of England reverting to the prewar organization.

Maj. Gen. Trenchard, Royal Air Force (chief of staff, Royal Air Force), said:

Defense in two dimensions is comparatively simple; but for defense in the third dimension there is no real effective instrument but an air force capable of immediate contact with the enemy in the air, and able to defeat it. Consequently, an air force additional to the detachments used for the Navy and Army should be organized under a ministry independent of the other two services; for if this force is an appendage of either of the older services it will not develop its strategy and tactics along broad enough lines. However, such a force is always available for coordination with naval or military operations.

Sir Samuel Waring (well-known manufacturer of munitions) believes:

A reasonable amount of money spent by the Government for encouraging commercial air activities would eventually give a far better return than the same amount spent on purely military or naval equipment.

In France I had the honor of talking with Marshal Foch, who said that the fact was clearly demonstrated in the present war that if a nation is to conquer she must have supremacy in the air.

Gen. Duval, director of military aeronautics, said:

If commercial aviation is not encouraged and stimulated, military aviation will die.

Senator FLETCHER. Will you read that last quotation again?

Mr. CROWELL. Gen. Duval, director of military aeronautics, said:

If commercial aviation is not encouraged and stimulated, military aviation will die.

Senator FLETCHER. Suppose it should die?

Senator NEW. The trouble is it is being stimulated in some countries, but allowed to die in others; and unhappily our country is the one in which it is being allowed to die. Is not that the case Mr. Secretary?

Mr. CROWELL. That is my feeling about it; yes.

Since my return from Europe and during the two months that have elapsed I have studied most carefully the opinions as expressed by a number of gentlemen who appeared before your committee and who have opposed the centralizing of our air activities.

I have discussed this matter many times with Mr. Baker. I am sorry to say that he does not agree with me. But he has told me that, regardless of our difference in opinion, he is willing to have me present my views.

The one point which has been impressed upon me by much of the testimony is the lack of a viewpoint from the bigger aspects of the matter. They seem to view it merely from its effect on their own particular service and not from the broad viewpoint of the defense of this country and the vital necessity of creating this new weapon of defense to meet the other great powers on an equal footing.

I will leave to you gentlemen your constitutional duty of determining whether the future of this vital force in the defense of the country can be measured in the viewpoints of departmental interest.

The most important feature I am afraid has been missed. A separate department of aeronautics is a tactical necessity. The leaders of thought on the other side agree that aviation in future wars will have a function quite distinct from the present limitations

of its activities as a service auxiliary to the Army and Navy, which are observation, photography, and direction of fire; the great mission of aviation is quite independent of those activities.

Marshal Foch, Field Marshal Haig, and Ludendorff agree that before the mobilization of armies can be effected in the next war a great conflict will occur in the air. The aggressive nation will be prepared to launch an attack upon the shipping, munition, manufacturing, and storage centers, and even the cities, of its opponent. Unless the opponent is ready to meet or anticipate such an attack, vital victories will be early accomplished. It is only the nation that can clear the air of enemy forces that will be able to launch a campaign with its land and naval forces. With Europe only 16 hours removed from this country by air routes, we can not rest in fancied safety of isolation. It is only through the agency of a single responsible organization that we can confidently look to preparedness for such an eventuality.

After all is considered, the Government can not be asked to sustain by direct contribution the entire burden of keeping alive the aircraft industry. Commercial aviation must be encouraged to carry the greater part of the financial burden; not alone in meeting the requirements of aircraft production, but also because of its equally important relation to the maintenance of an adequate reserve of aviators and mechanics. In speaking of Government assistance to commercial aviation I do not mean that the Government should in any manner subsidize the industry. The best and probably most sought after assistance that can be given commercial aviation is the enactment of legislation necessary for the prevention of avoidable risks. Risks to life and property—the greatest detriment to commercial aviation development—are due to the following five causes:

- (1) Faulty design or inspection of materials.
- (2) Operation by incompetent pilots.
- (3) Insufficient number of safe landing and starting places.
- (4) Lack of information as to weather conditions.
- (5) Collision.

It is realized abroad that all of the above five causes can be almost completely eliminated through the agency of a suitable governmental organization, and that there is no other satisfactory means of avoiding unnecessary risk to life and property in commercial aviation. With the risk reduced to a minimum, the other two detriments to commercial aviation will eventually disappear (uncertainties in performance will be cured and durability of material improved in aircraft in the same way they were cured in motor cars—namely, through the efforts of many different engineering groups in competition), but progress in aircraft design will be more rapid than progress in motor-car design if the Government assists the industry by carrying on the standardization work, the research work, and the experimental work on fundamental elements of design. Unless there are governmental research and test facilities and data accessible to the private individual, only the few large corporations who are able to maintain private laboratories can make any real progress in new aviation design. In Great Britain, France, and Italy centralized organizations for technical development and the control of commercial aviation along lines to avoid these causes of risk to life and property listed above are already in effect or planned.

An air department would also look after the following:

(1) Liaison with other Governments on all international affairs in aviation, such as laws governing international air routes and air traffic; rules of the road; international codes for signals or other communication between one aircraft and another and between aircraft and surface stations; weather reports; international standards for charts of air routes, showing landing places with their designating marks and other necessary information for landing; international standards for day and night marks and signals for aids to navigation. It will be seen that most of the above are means of avoiding risks to life and property in aviation; they are those that help the air navigator in locating safe landing places, help him to avoid collision in the air and to avoid running into areas of unsafe flying weather.

(2) Planning commercial air routes throughout the country, also routes to and throughout the colonial possessions. This includes the selection of safe landing places, the preparation of charts and information (similar to sailing directions) suitable for use in aircraft, and the equipping of routes with standard marks, signals, and other communication systems required to facilitate their use.

(3) Promotion of the improvement of air routes; this to be effected by arranging for legislation or other procedure that will create new landing places and thus shorten the flying distance in a route; the first route established between two points will sometimes be considerably longer than the straight-line distance owing to the necessity for making detours around large areas where a safe landing is impossible.

(4) Preparation of regulations governing the use of all routes and landing places with a view to the avoidance of collision in the air and on the ground (in the future there will be a congestion of traffic on certain routes that will necessitate special lanes of flight and uniform procedure in getting into the air and landing). Preparation of regulations governing flight over localities where accidents to aircraft involve risk to individuals and property on the ground.

(5) Supervision of all civil schools for training pilots, as regards methods and extent of instruction in preparation for qualification for flying licenses. Preparation of physical, mental, and practical test requirements for all civil pilots and the issue and revocation of their licenses. This is the only sound method of avoiding incompetent piloting—one of the causes of risk to life and property.

(6) Inspection of design and construction of all but Government types of aircraft as to their fitness for aerodynamical, structural, and mechanical safety in flight; issue of licenses for their operation. Periodic inspections of civil aircraft and issue of regulations for the purpose of insuring the proper care and preservation of aviation material and preventing its use when no longer in safe condition for flight. This is the only sound method of avoiding failures in material that may result in loss of control, collapse in the air or fire.

(7) Research work and experimental and test work in all branches of aviation development that are along lines common to the military and naval aviation as well as to commercial aviation. Publication of technical facts and data that will be helpful to the aviation industry and to inventors.

(8) Cooperation with the aviation industry and scientific societies in the development of standards in quality of materials, in practices, and nomenclature; also, in so far as it will not stifle invention, the standardization of certain parts, fittings, and arrangements.

This character of work is being performed by Air Service abroad. In England it is already started; in France and Italy parts of it are started, and plans are being made for the rest of it. Besides that the Governments abroad are helping the industry in other ways; for example, all three Governments have provided military aviators and mechanics for missions sent to other countries to demonstrate and advertise the product of the private manufacturers; such missions are now in South America, and the Far East; in these projects the manufacturer is further assisted by arrangements with the Government for purchase at low prices of aviation material from the excess war stocks. One company in France is already delivering orders for aeroplanes in South America at a price considerably below their war-time production cost. Each Government at the close of the war had a stock of aviation material on hand considerably beyond the needs for peace-time military and naval exercises. Retention of this stock in Government storage would simply mean a large expenditure for its upkeep with no prospect of its being used before it would become obsolete or so old that further effort toward preservation would be futile. The diversion of this excess stock to commercial use benefits the Government not only by effecting a partial return of the original investment and a saving of further upkeep expense but also because it affords another means of encouraging activity in commercial aviation.

Much is being done abroad on aerial mail routes. Although the distances in Great Britain, France, and Italy inside the boundaries are not great enough to make aerial postal routes much superior in time saving to the railroads, a number of routes have already been established. In France, one route, Paris-Strassbourg, is being operated entirely with military aviation personnel and material, for the purpose of gathering data in operating methods and costs. Also, at the time of one visit, there was a commercial route in operation, Paris-Lille-Brussels. One member of the aviation mission flew over this route. He called our attention to the great value of all such routes as a means of training reserve pilots to complete familiarity with the appearance not only of their own country but also with the country of a possibly enemy. One must actually fly across country in a strange place to appreciate the full value of this relation between commercial and military aviation.

It is a significant fact that the aeroplanes used in the French postal routes are capable of being changed quickly into day bombing machines; the receptacles for mail and parcels are so designed and disposed that they can be replaced by bomb racks without altering the flying balance of the aeroplane. This is not merely because it is an easy way to divert a war type already in production to commercial purposes, for similar provisions are incorporated in new designs built primarily for commercial use.

In addition to the internal routes in operation abroad, there is a daily aeroplane service between London and Paris; also the following aeroplane routes are being prepared: From England to Cairo and

the Cape and from Cairo to Bombay; from France to Algeria and Morocco; these routes will carry mail, express, and passengers. Great Britain is investigating the possibilities of overseas routes not only to Canada and the United States but also to South America and Australia. The flight of the *R-34* from Scotland to America and return has given them much valuable data on the subject of long overseas flights with lighter-than-air craft. Well-planned experiments are being conducted for improvements in fabric and structure of rigid dirigibles that will eventually make that type independent of the large and costly sheds that are now essential for their maintenance.

Senator FLETCHER. What is the character of that service between London and Paris?

Mr. CROWELL. There are now two commercial companies operating airplanes between London and Paris. They carry mail, passengers, and packages.

Senator FLETCHER. What kind of planes?

Mr. CROWELL. One of them is the Handley-Page, a very large plane. The other company has smaller planes.

Senator NEW. They are both of the heavier-than-air type?

Mr. CROWELL. Yes, sir.

Senator FLETCHER. How many passengers each do they carry, if you know?

Mr. CROWELL. My recollection is that the Handley-Pages will carry about 10 passengers, and the smaller planes will carry 4 or 5 passengers.

Senator FLETCHER. It is regular service?

Mr. CROWELL. Yes; regular service, commercial service.

Senator FLETCHER. You do not know whether it is a success as a commercial proposition or whether it is just beginning?

Mr. CROWELL. It is too new to find out. I am very sure it is not directly subsidized by the Government.

If commercial aviation is given a fair start by suitable governmental guidance and assistance, it will require only a few years to develop into a utility of real economic value; it is believed that eventually aviation will become one of the world's greatest transportation systems. Great Britain, with splendid foresight, is evidently planning to take a lead with this utility that may be expected ultimately to place her in the same position in the air that she already holds in the remainder of the world's communication systems—with her merchant marine, cables, and radio. It is well understood abroad that commercial supremacy in the air will mean much more than supremacy with a merchant marine, for the merchant ship can not be converted in a few hours into a ship of war.

A separate air department has the following advantages:

It will save money through elimination of the duplication which exists under the present policy of having aviation developed under the Army and Navy.

As it is, we are providing two sets of technical men, two supply organizations and two schools to teach even the beginnings of flying. As a further important reason the demand for specially qualified men for research and technical development are rare, and their services should be made available for all the aviation work of the

Government and not localized in the Department to which they may belong.

It will also save delay—a factor vital in time of war—no machinery of joint boards or of liaison between services can possibly render the efficient service that would be derived in a single air department and departmental competition, which proved so harmful in the early days of the war, would be prevented.

Congressional investigation of appropriations can be centralized, and the embarrassments that come from the present control by several committees on this subject will be eliminated.

The Army and Navy must have adequate control of those aviation activities which are technically indispensable adjuncts to their efficiency in warfare. Advanced training of pilots and observers must be under the services to which they belong. Officers and men to be used by the Army or the Navy in their specialized operations should be parts of the service using them, commissioned or enlisted in it. Aviation personnel used by other departments of the Government should similarly be parts of those departments. Departments using aircraft should also be free to develop by experiment the characteristics of such type of craft and accessories as are peculiarly adapted to its work.

Because it is a necessity, in our means of offense and defense in time of war, there remains the vital necessity of organizing and operating in the air department a separate air force. The functions of this force are raiding operations and air fighting; it must always be remembered that a strong and well organized air fighting force is the only known means of defense against invasion by air. On account of the fact that raiding and air fighting are specialties, only in the infancy of their development, I am satisfied that our efficiency in those lines will not develop properly unless a separate force for this purpose is created as a part of the air department. A separate tactical organization with its controlling personnel permanently assigned to this duty seems indispensable for prompt perfection of these new methods in warfare and for the creation of an esprit which is so essential to any offensive or defensive force.

This air force can either be operated under its own leaders independently or, if strategic necessity demands, it can be assigned to operate under either the high command of the Army or the Navy, and, while so assigned, will become an integral part of those forces.

I would therefore propose to unite in a single air department the following aviation activities:

1. Aeronautic research and experimental work of the classes that have a general application in all organizations utilizing aviation, commercial as well as governmental.

2. Supply of aircraft material for all governmental branches that use aircraft; this includes liaison with the aircraft industry that will permit the maintenance of plans for mobilization of the industry in time of war.

3. General training, namely, that kind of practical and theoretical aeronautic instruction which is common to all branches of the Government employing aviation personnel.

4. Supervision of all matters relating to commercial aviation which require Federal guidance and encouragement.

Under the head of the air department, there should be the following four divisions charged, respectively, with the above four activities:

1. Technical; 2. Supply; 3. General training; 4. Civil aviation.

In addition to the above-mentioned divisions there should be organized in the air department an air force with two functions: Raiding and fighting; these functions, as previously stated, are specialized branches in air warfare that are distinctly different from the military and naval aviation specialties, like reconnaissance, control of gunfire, etc. The pilots for this force need have very little Army or Navy knowledge and training and, therefore, it would be necessary to obtain only a portion of the officers for this force from Army and Navy personnel.

During the war both our Army and Navy had forces of this kind, although the Navy's force (northern bombing group) was organized on a comparatively small scale. But that duplication of effort certainly should not be repeated; the raiding and fighting force, for economy and efficiency, must be under one head. The reasons for placing this force under the air department instead of under either the War or Navy Departments are as follows:

(a) By assigning the air force to a department whose sole reason for existence is aviation, certainly better attention to its needs will be assured than if it were assigned to either the War or Navy Department where aviation can not escape being looked upon as an auxiliary.

The creation of a separately organized air force will offer an opportunity to such officers of the Army and Navy who desire to do so, and who are suitable, to make this service their life's work. If this kind of an air force is not organized separately from the Army and Navy, it can always be controlled by officers who are taking up aviation work as a temporary assignment (often with no real aviation knowledge, practical or theoretical), while the chief hope in their professional lives is the eventual command of armies or fleets. Certainly far better progress in the tactics of air fighting and raiding and a far better esprit will be attained if the controlling positions in this force are held by officers who have no thoughts for the future other than aviation.

(b) In time of war the personnel of this force must be rapidly expanded to comparatively enormous proportions. We must look to commercial aviation for the personnel for this increase. The air force through the air department, which licenses civilian fliers, will have a better liaison with the source of reserve pilots that could be effected by any existing machinery in the War or Navy Department organizations.

(c) A very large proportion of the aeroplanes that will be used for commercial purposes will be suitable for conversion into raiding types. As the air department will certify all commercial aeroplane designs prior to their use, the air force, through the department of which it is a part, can properly guide this design along lines that will make these types immediately convertible into war material.

It is unfortunate that an air force of this kind is frequently called an independent force; the word "independent" is often construed as meaning that this force, in time of war, would be a sort of free lance. As a matter of fact it should be independent only in its or-

ganization, administration, discipline, and in its tactical development, precisely as the Marine Corps is independent of the other fighting service. It may, and doubtless will, engage in independent war operations especially prior to mobilization of the Army or Navy, but it would cooperate with either the Navy or Army in the same manner that the Marine Corps supports the strategy of that arm which requires it.

In order to keep the technical division in constant touch with the needs of the Army and Navy. I suggest that flying officers from these two services should be detailed for service with this division. Similar details should be made from the air force to the technical division. This division should also be prepared to carry out special research and experiment at the request of any other department using aircraft.


It will be the duty of the supply division to act as the organization for supply of aircraft material for any department authorized by Congress to acquire aircraft. Provision should be made for the detail to this division of representatives of each department to aid in understanding and filling the needs of their services. Actual production of planes and motors should be carried on almost entirely in private establishments, in order to encourage competition and to give a broad basis for a greatly enlarged supply in case of war.


It is recognized that most of the ground training of a flier and a part of his training in the air are of the same character, whatever the ultimate nature of his duty. So far as this training is common to the various departments, it will be obviously a saving of money and effort to have it under one control and thus prevent duplication, both of organization and of physical facilities. In order to secure the fitness of this training to the ends to be reached, it is suggested that in this division officers of the air force be detailed for service as instructors.

Under the division of civil aviation should come not only the control of civilian flight within the national boundaries but the whole field of international flight, including such administrative action as may be needed to put into force the provisions of the international convention, should that be ratified. It will be to this division that foreign aeronautical authorities and foreign nationals wishing to fly across our boundaries will be directed for information. The making of maps, the control of aerodromes, the establishment of rules of the air, inspection and other provisions for safety, and the publication of information will be among its duties.

The foregoing plan is suggested as meeting the existing difficulties of loss of motion between the air activities and lack of central authority to control and administer the whole subject of air transport in the United States. It should be emphasized that activities of such enormous importance for the future, and of such necessity for the present plans for national defense, should not be hampered or crippled by division of authority among several departments or (which would be still more harmful) obscured and neglected by being entrusted to a mere bureau of an existing department.

As the proposed air department will have as one of its most important functions the supply of material to several great departments, such an arrangement is perfectly logical; and the plan of





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creating for the purpose an independent office is supported by the precedents of the Shipping Board and the Interstate Commerce Commission.

I have here a chart showing this organization which I have proposed.

(The chart referred to is here printed in full.)

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Secretary, you might describe this chart verbally as it depicts the proposed organization, so that your testimony will illuminate the chart as printed.

Mr. CROWELL. This shows the President as Commander in Chief. Under him are the different departments, the executive departments of the Government. For instance, the Post Office Department, the War Department, Navy Department, and the proposed Air Department. We have the Air Department; the subdivisions are supervision commercial aviation, general training; research, general development, and supply; and then we have here air-force raiding and fighting [indicating on chart]. The connection between the Navy Department and the Naval Air Service leads directly, of course, to general training and to research and supply, as the supply department of the Air Department will supply all departments of the Government. Carrying this out further, we should connect it with any future departments of the Government which will require any aircraft. The War Department in the same way connects the Air Service of the Army with the Air Department through general training, through research and supply. They also get their entire supply of aviation material from the supply department of the Air Service.

The CHAIRMAN. Then the Army Air Service can take over for itself under this the advanced training of the personnel and development of strictly Army tactics, and also special training and special development?

Mr. CROWELL. That is all that the Army retains; yes; of the Air Service.

Senator NEW. And the Naval Service exactly the same way?

Mr. CROWELL. Yes; exactly the same.

Senator NEW. Now, Mr. Secretary, is not that in accordance with the reservations to the so-called Crowell report that were made by Capt. Mustin?

Mr. CROWELL. It is.

Senator NEW. And this arrangement satisfies such objections as Capt. Mustin made to what we know as the Crowell report?

Mr. CROWELL. It fully satisfied all objections that Capt. Mustin raised. I think it would satisfy most other objections also, Senator.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you know whether or not any division of the General Staff or the General Staff Corps has made an independent study of the future of aeronautics? In other words, is this mission the first and only body of men acting for the Government which has made a study of the future of aeronautics?

Mr. CROWELL. It is my impression that a study of aeronautics has been made since the return and report of this mission. If they have completed it I have not happened to have seen the report.

The CHAIRMAN. By whom was the study being made?

Mr. CROWELL. By some members of the General Staff; I don't know who.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. In consultation with any members of the Navy?

Mr. CROWELL. I don't know.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. There you run against the same trouble that you have been discussing here.

Mr. CROWELL. Yes, sir.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. You have an investigation being made by the War Department only and without regard to the Navy.

Senator FLETCHER. Well, would you have in this plan, Mr. Secretary, connected with the Department of Aeronautics, a part of that department, officers from the Army and officers from the Navy, who may have been selected particularly because of their knowledge and interest in this general subject, and who might be in position to suggest improvements and to also recommend the needs of these two departments, and would they be regular officers of the Army and Navy and still assigned to the Department of Aeronautics?

Mr. CROWELL. Every year I would expect a large detail from the Army and Navy to the Department of Aeronautics for a certain length of time. During that time these men would be completely educated in aeronautics and would then be returned to the Army and Navy except such of them as decided to make aeronautics their life work. They would then be commissioned under this plan in the department of aviation and would there continue. The result would be that you would have in the Department of Aviation men who had had an Army and Navy training and education. That is, who had been through the Military or Naval Academy and had served a considerable length of time in the Army or Navy. More important than that, however, you would have in the Army and Navy men who had taken this course in aviation and who understood it. Eventually these men would grow to be department commanders and division commanders, and their knowledge of aviation would then become a very important thing, I think.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you not anticipate that before many years roll by we will be seriously discussing the establishment of a United States Aviation Academy, performing somewhat the same function in its sphere as is now performed by West Point and Annapolis?

Mr. CROWELL. I think it should be established as soon as possible, myself. I certainly believe that we should discuss it right away.

The CHAIRMAN. It would be quite impossible for the curriculum at West Point or Annapolis to be so changed or enlarged as to permit of the education of the cadet or midshipman in aviation?

Mr. CROWELL. Oh, I think so.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. Could you, without impropriety, say which of the governments you visited seemed to be making the best headway in the department of aeronautics?

Mr. CROWELL. Great Britain has made much progress.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. Using planes of her own manufacture, or is she availing herself of developments in other countries?

Mr. CROWELL. Through her system of air attachés in other countries I believe she knows everything that is going on in every other country and it taking advantage of it.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. Are we doing anything of that kind that you know of?

Mr. CROWELL. Of course the Army has no such thing as air attachés.

The CHAIRMAN. Are any of our military attachés abroad members of our Army or Navy air service?

Mr. CROWELL. I think not. I do not recall any that are. Of course, they will pick up what information they can; but I can not believe that it is given the attention that it should by our own Government.

Senator FLETCHER. Have not these fatalities in recent experiments rather exceeded your expectation?

Mr. CROWELL. Yes; they have.

Senator FLETCHER. How do you account for them—defective planes or lack of good landing places, or what?

Mr. CROWELL. In the first place, there were no fatalities among those who had been long accustomed to driving D. H. 4 planes. No men, for instance, who flew them in Europe were injured in this contest. So my own view, and it is only my own, is that lack of familiarity with that plane was one cause of accident. Another was, of course, the lack of proper knowledge of weather conditions in advance. A third was the size and scarcity of some of the landing places. I am told they were rather small for men who were inexperienced, or comparatively inexperienced, in driving D. H. 4 planes.

Mr. FLETCHER. The D. H. 4 itself is not looked upon as a safe plane, is it?

Mr. CROWELL. It is rather hard to answer that question. The D. H. plane, of course, as long as it is in the air is as safe as any; but when the D. H. 4 crashes the whole difficulty we have talked of so long is immediately apparent, and that is that the pilot is sitting between the gasoline tank and the engine, and it can not do anything except crush him.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. The men who have come from overseas have spoken of it as a dangerous plane. They had the name of "flaming coffin" given to the De Haviland 4.

Mr. CROWELL. That was one of the reasons.

Senator NEW. They were very easily set fire in the air by an enemy shot?

Mr. CROWELL. Yes, sir.

Senator SUTHERLAND. Do you think the results of this experiment are worth while, considering the number of fatalities?

Mr. CROWELL. I think we are going to get a great deal of information out of it. It is hard, of course, to measure that against the lives of men.

Senator NEW. You are speaking of the transcontinental flight?

Senator SUTHERLAND. Yes.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. What were the planes used generally for that flight?

Senator NEW. Everything.

Mr. CROWELL. Almost everything. There was one bomber.

Senator NEW. And a La Pere or two, I think.

Mr. CROWELL. And one British plane with Rolls Royce engine, used by Gen. Charlton.

Senator NEW. That was a Bristol?

Mr. CROWELL. A Bristol fighter. Several German Fokkers.

Senator NEW. Yes; several German Fokkers.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. What did Maynard use?

Senator NEW. A D. H. 4.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you have some more material that you wanted to present to the committee as part of the hearing on aviation? There are some Senators who may want to ask you some questions, but we do not want to interrupt the continuity of your statement.

Mr. CROWELL. I had a little more to say in support of the retention by the Army and Navy of these squadrons for the purpose of observation. It is a matter in which there is going to be a great deal of dispute. I have gotten this information, I will say, altogether from naval officers. The case of the Navy is a little simpler than that of the Army.

In explanation of the statement that the officers and men to be used by the Army and Navy in their specialized aviation operations should be parts of the service using them—commissioned or enlisted in it, I will discuss first the question of spotting naval gunfire:

In a naval battle there are two officers in the ship's company who are of supreme importance, these are the captain and the spotter; the work of the other officers is important, of course, because they are all essential parts of a complicated human mechanism—the fire-control organization; but in target practice or battle all but the captain and spotter have fire-control duties that have become almost automatic from constant daily drills. On the other hand, in target practice or in battle the spotter and captain have duties that are in no sense automatic; failure of either one of them to display cool and accurate judgment in their work will make their ship ineffective. Broadly speaking, in target practice or battle, their duties are as follows: The captain puts and keeps the ship in position where the spotter can operate that human mechanism—the fire-control organization; if the spotter has been thoroughly trained and his judgment is good and he keeps his head, he will bring the salvos on the target or on the ship quickly and keep them there; but if he is not thoroughly trained or if his judgment is bad or if he loses his head, his ship will never make a hit.

Briefly the procedure in naval-gun firing is as follows: The salvo is fired and when it splashes the spotter instantly estimates the error of the mean point of impact of ten or a dozen splashes; the error may be over or short, right or left; having decided what the errors are, he immediately gives an order to the ship's plotting room. These corrections are then promptly combined in the ship's plotting room with the rate of change of range; new readings for range and deflection are signaled to the guns, and when these are applied another salvo is fired. Again the spotter estimates the errors in fall of shots, and then gives another order to the plotting room; this process continues until he gets a "straddle" (some of the shots beyond the target and some of them short).

For each successive salvo that continues to straddle he must judge if there is any tendency to creep off the target in any one or two of four ways (over or short, right or left) and must give the proper orders to plotting room to correct it. While all this is going on he

must be constantly watching out for a change of course or speed of the target, or enemy, and when either occurs, estimate what it amounts to and notify the plotting room so that they can correct their rate of change of range accordingly.

There are several instances in the past where, even at target practice, insufficient training or bad judgment of the spotter has caused the ship to make nearly a zero score, although every other item in the fire control organization functioned perfectly. Assignments to duty as spotters in the Navy are not made according to rank. It is so important a duty that the best officers available are selected and trained for this work, regardless of their rank; for example, on one ship you may find the chief spotter is a junior lieutenant, while on the sister ship he may be a lieutenant commander; it is needless to say that the greatest care is given in the training of spotters.

The change that aviation has made in spotting ship's gun fire is essentially nothing more than this: Instead of sitting in the ship's top, the spotter sits in an aeroplane (which he must pilot himself, as will be explained later), and gives his orders to the plotting room by means of the radio telephone instead of through the old type of telephone. The result of this change of location of the spotter has made it possible to fire at greatly increased ranges; the distances of the target are now so great when spotting by aeroplane, that no one on the ship can see whether the salvos are straddling or not; the situation is more than ever before in the hands of the spotter. The reason that the spotter himself must pilot the aeroplane is as follows: on account of the short run available aboard ship for getting into the air, it is not possible to use a heavier aeroplane for this purpose than a two-seater; consequently, the spotter must be the pilot because the other person in the aeroplane must keep a constant watch upward and to the rear, ready with his machine gun for attack by enemy aeroplanes. Now, that the great advantage of spotting by aeroplane is recognized, it follows that one of the first things that will be done in fleet engagements will be an effort by each side to put the other's spotting aeroplane out of action.

The problem of spotting by aeroplane is now very well solved for the condition of individual ships firing at their own targets, or, as it would be in action, each ship firing at their opposite ship in the enemy's column. But there is much to be done in the way of experiments and training before the Navy arrives at a satisfactory solution of the problem of spotting for concentrated fire, two or more ship firing at the same target or a single ship of the enemy; the great difficulty here is the confusion of salvo splashes. How is the spotter going to distinguish the splashes of salvo from his ship from the salvo splashes of another ship firing at the same target? This very difficult problem must be solved or otherwise the commander in chief of the fleet will not be able to make use of any advantage obtained by outmaneuvering the enemy; for example, what will be the use of capping the enemy's column ("crossing the T"), if we are not able to use concentrated fire? Naturally when a solution is arrived at in any Navy it will be kept secret as long as possible.

Consider next the question of naval aeroplane reconnaissance prior to battle.

Now that fleets have become so large, the maneuvers required for changing from cruising formation to battle formation have become exceedingly complicated. In a large mixed fleet engagement (which will involve battleships, battle cruisers, light cruisers, destroyers, submarines, and torpedo-aeroplane carriers), the stress on the commander in chief of each fleet is far greater than it ever was before; the introduction of submarines and torpedo-aeroplanes have added two serious complications to naval battle tactics. Now more than ever before, it will be necessary for the commander in chief to get rapid and accurate information on the disposition and maneuvers of the various enemy forces, immediately before engaging and throughout all phases of the battle. On account of the fact that everything in a naval battle is in motion, there are no fixed points of reference, as is the case in a battle on land; therefore, even if there should be time to develop and study them, photographs from aeroplanes will be useless for the analysis of naval battle maneuvers. The observer in the aeroplane (who, for the same reason as given in the case of the spotter, must be the pilot) will be of the utmost value to the commander in chief, provided he is able to analyze modern battle maneuvers correctly. It is inconceivable that any one who has not had a long period of training and experience in naval tactics would be of any use at all in work of this kind; furthermore unless one is brought up in the Navy and in the fleet, he will not only have difficulty in distinguishing differences in types of ships but also will have great difficulty in distinguishing his own ships from enemy ships.

Capt. Mustin in his published report directs attention to the operation of torpedo carrying aeroplanes. He says:

Attack on enemy ships by aeroplane carrying torpedoes or bombs is a recent development in naval aviation that promises to have as much, if not greater effect on naval strategy and tactics than has the introduction of the submarine. The suddenness with which such an attack must be made against ships well equipped with antiaircraft defenses (and these must steadily improve) demands pilots for this work who have had ample naval training; there must be no doubt at all in the pilot's mind as to whether the target is an enemy ship or one of his own; to this end he must be so familiar with his own ships that he can recognize them at a glance even when low visibility from one cause or another makes their identification marks illegible. For this work it will always be wasteful to carry someone additional to the pilot for the sole purpose of recognizing ships; any additional man or men that can be carried in the future must be gunners and they should never be distracted for an instant from observation in the air.

It is for these reasons, which I have stated, that I favor the control by the Army and Navy of those branches of specialized aviation which are essential to the operation of armies and fleets.

That, Mr. Chairman, is all I have to say.

The CHAIRMAN. Were there any other questions that the members of the committee desired to ask the Secretary on this matter of the Department of Aeronautics?

Senator NEW. I think the Secretary has covered that case very well, but I would like to ask this: Mr. Secretary, did you read the testimony given by Assistant Secretary Roosevelt before this committee?

Mr. CROWELL. Yes.

Senator NEW. I would like to call attention to one thing. In the course of his testimony Mr. Roosevelt said this:

On page 299 of the principal hearing in answer to a question of the chairman, Gen. MITCHELL said:

"Our naval aviation does not exist as an arm, under their new organization; they are even worse off than they were.

"The CHAIRMAN. In what respect?

"Gen. MITCHELL. In that they stopped having a separate bureau for aviation and have distributed those duties among six or seven different departments."

Mr. Roosevelt continues:

Of course, that shows Gen. Mitchell knew absolutely nothing about the organization of the Navy Department.

Have you had your attention called to this in particular?

Mr. CROWELL. I recall it in particular.

Senator NEW. Do you know, as a matter of fact, whether or not Secretary Roosevelt was right in what he said in refuting Gen. Mitchell's testimony on that point?

Mr. CROWELL. I am very sure that there was an order issued within the last two months which practically dissolved the division of aviation in the Navy Department.

Senator NEW. I will ask you if you have seen the order?

Mr. CROWELL. Yes; I have.

Senator NEW. Is that it? [Handing a paper to the witness.]

Mr. CROWELL. I think so.

Senator NEW. Now, Mr. Chairman, I would like to put that into the record. This is the official order of the Navy Department which does just exactly what Gen. Mitchell said had been done.

There was no objection, and it was so ordered.

(The order referred to is as follows:)

AUGUST 1, 1919.

Interoffice order.

Subject: Discontinuance of Aviation Division.

1. In accordance with the policy of the Navy Department of merging aviation activities with those of other naval activities, the Aviation Division of this office will be abolished. As soon as practicable, the transfer of the several activities to the proper divisions of this office and the bureaus of the department will be effected.

2. Section F of the Planning Division becomes the aviation section and the director of naval aviation is moved to this section. He will have under him an assistant director and at least six other assistants for the time being, as approved by the chief of naval operations.

3. The present matériel sections of the Aviation Division, both heavier than air and lighter than air, will be transferred bodily to the Matériel Division of Operations, together with the units having cognizance of air stations.

4. The training and detail of personnel, photography, training of pigeons, aerography, and navigation instruments for aircraft will be transferred to the Bureau of Navigation.

5. The Aircraft Test Board will be transferred to the Board of Inspection and Survey.

6. All matters pertaining to the operation of aircraft and all correspondence relative thereto will be transferred, with the officers employed on this work, clerical assistants, and complete files, to the Division of Operative Forces.

7. Work in connection with gunnery exercises and engineering performances will be performed by the office of gunnery exercises and engineering performances.

8. Communications and radio for aircraft will be transferred to the Communications Division.

9. All correspondence and files will be transferred to the general file and correspondence room and will be handled in accordance with the present method of handling other correspondence and files of this office.

10. In all respects aviation activities will be administered in accordance with the revised orders covering the organization of the Office of Naval Operations.

11. The Chief of Naval Operations requests the assistance and loyal cooperation of all concerned in effecting this change in the administrative procedure with the least practicable delay and confusion.

W. S. BENSON,
Admiral, United States Navy,
Chief of Naval Operations.

Senator NEW. I don't know that I have anything else.

Mr. CROWELL. That split it up and divided the duties.

Senator NEW. Just what Gen. Mitchell said exactly.

The CHAIRMAN. If there are no other questions on this line I would like to ask the Secretary about some other matters. Mr. Secretary, there has come to us from time to time a great many rumors and sometimes actual statements to the effect that there were destroyed in France, by competent orders, I assume, a considerable number of airplanes and appurtenances which were serviceable. It has come to us from many sources, but it has been denied from some sources and repeated. Some of the statements are accompanied by circumstantial account of the burning, we will say, of a considerable number of airplanes owned by the United States Government. Some little time ago you returned from France and, as I remember it, on one of your recent trips you were particularly interested in the disposition of American surplus property, and it occurred to me that you might have the last word of information upon that topic, and if you could clear that up we would be very grateful to you.

Mr. CROWELL. I am sorry to say that I can not.

The CHAIRMAN. You can not?

Mr. CROWELL. No. I can not either affirm or deny that any valuable material was burned. I never saw any such thing over there, and the only thing I have seen about it was in the papers here.

Senator NEW. In addition to the published accounts I have seen what purported to be photographs of blazing piles of American planes in the process of destruction by fire.

Senator SUTHERLAND. I know of a soldier in the Air Service, from my State, who assisted in piling them up. He stated further that he witnessed their putting long rows of automobiles and motorcycles in a row and running a heavy truck over them to reduce them to scrap, so as to sell them for three cents a pound.

Mr. CROWELL. Personally, I think if we burned some of our planes it would be better than keeping them.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. Why?

Mr. CROWELL. The cost of keeping a plane in storage and considering the deterioration, I think it is cheaper to burn it.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. Could not the wing material and other parts be salvaged?

Mr. CROWELL. I do not know of any way to salvage it.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. It seems to me strange there is not anybody that can speak with authority on this subject.

Mr. CROWELL. Of course, there should be somebody that could.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. Who is there in the War Department that could give the committee or ought to be able to give the committee authoritative information upon this subject?

Mr. CROWELL. I will be very glad to investigate it for you. Off-hand, I can not tell you.

The CHAIRMAN. It is fair to say, that as I recollect it, Gen. Menoher denied the truth of the statements. He did not go into great detail in explaining how this impression gained credence.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. Well, Mr. Diffin and some other witnesses, in answer to side questions, said that they had been destroyed, and I think the committee ought to be able to find someone who can tell the fact about it and why they were destroyed, as well as under whose orders.

The CHAIRMAN. I think Gen. Menoher stated flatly that no useful planes were destroyed, but I can not recollect in detail what his testimony was. It was not gone into thoroughly. Some of these statements, Mr. Secretary, have been accompanied by photographs and some of them from noncommissioned officers of the aviation service who themselves were ordered to destroy property, and they persist in statements that the property was of value.

Mr. CROWELL. I can see how there might be a difference of opinion as to the value of those things. I saw many piles of airplanes myself that were fit only to be burned. Gen. Patrick, I think, could give information.

Senator NEW. Is Gen. Patrick here?

Mr. CROWELL. I do not know whether he is in Washington now. He is in this country.

Senator THOMAS. How could those facts be denied if they presented photographs showing the process of burning?

Mr. CROWELL. Well, of course, if they were valueless the photographs probably would not show that.

Senator THOMAS. I think someone stated in the testimony here that it was much cheaper to burn them than it was to bring them back to this country.

Mr. CROWELL. Of course, it would wholly depend on the condition of the plane. It is perfectly evident that if they had deteriorated to a certain point it would be cheaper to burn them than to move them away.

Senator NEW. Mr. Chairman, following up what the Secretary said a few moments ago about foreign Governments having representatives of their aircraft industry in foreign countries, I have here a letter from Luther Bell, who is at the head of the information department of the Manufacturers Aircraft Association in this country, which I would like to read to the committee. It is not long. Then I would like to have it go in the record. It is dated September 24 and addressed to me.

The letter read by Senator New is as follows:

MANUFACTURERS AIRCRAFT ASSOCIATION (INC.),
New York, September 24, 1919.

Hon. HARRY S. NEW,
United States Senate, Washington, D. C.

MY DEAR MR. NEW: Under date of September 20, we have received the following letter from Mr. Alvey A. Adeo, Second Assistant Secretary of State:

"The American embassy and consulate general at Buenos Aires, Argentina have notified the department that it would be useful and important for Ameri-

can planes and personnel to be sent to Argentina for exhibition purposes. Several European nations, notably the British, Italian, and French, have taken active steps in this line, and the British and Italians have been giving flights for some months past. The purpose of all this is avowedly commercial and it has brought much success.

"This department is advised by the War Department that it is not in a position to undertake the sending of aviators and machines to Argentina, but it suggests that your association might be interested in this matter.

"The department will be glad to go into the question further with you in case you are interested and in a position to act."

From Col. F. L. Case of the United States Army, our military attaché at Lima, Peru, we have received the following:

"With respect to aeronautics here, there has been very little done except the flying of one Farman plane by a Peruvian aviator who was trained in the Argentine, however, in the last few months there has been considerable agitation on the subject, and a civilian association formed, which, however, does not amount to much. The only real efforts are being made by a company organized under The Peruvian Corporation, backed by the Handley-Page people. Mr. G. H. Dyott has come out from England and has gone over Peru, and is handling this affair with the idea of putting in both military and commercial service. Two hydroplanes, Handley-Page, had been sent to Iquitos, and several others are expected to be sent to Callao with the idea of putting in a line north of Payta and one south to Mollendo. In addition to this three French planes are understood to have been shipped for the use of the Army. It is understood that these are Bleriot. It might be stated in passing that Mr. G. H. Dyott has state that he wants nothing to do with Americans or American planes."

Now, my dear Senator New, you appreciate as well as we do that the American aircraft industry is in no position to send an individual aeronautical mission to South America. You know that the activity shown in Argentina and Peru by Great Britain, France, and Italy is due to the fact that the respective Governments in those European countries are backing the aircraft industry in their effort to develop export trade.

Is it unreasonable to ask that the American Government display as much interest and that it take the initiative in sending missions with the proper official standing to the various South American countries? Our factories are doing the best they can to help themselves, notwithstanding the fact, as was pointed out during the recent Senate hearing, they are practically bankrupt from a productive standpoint. It is not too late, however, to galvanize the industry into comparative productiveness, and one of the quickest ways to this result would be to take advantage of the trade opportunities offered now in South America.

Senator NEW. Mr. Chairman, I have here a letter from Capt. De Lavergne, French air attaché to this Government. It is a letter written to me in response to one I wrote to him asking for information in the way of a statement from him of just what is being done in France. I would like to submit that for the record.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well.

Senator NEW. And in addition to that, I have a similar letter from Commodore Charlton, who is the British air attaché to this country. I thought I had it with me, but I find that I have left it in my office. I would like to be privileged to put that in the record as soon as I can get it.

The CHAIRMAN. There will be no objection to that, I assume.

(The letters referred to by Senator New were subsequently submitted and are here printed in full as follows:)

WASHINGTON, D. C., September 23, 1919.

MY DEAR SENATOR NEW: I beg to acknowledge receipt of your letter of September 20 and to give you a receipt for the bill inclosed.

It is with great pleasure that I give you all of my opinions concerning the separate air service. Let me say that I have spoken frankly.

I believe, however, that I do not speak English well enough to appear before the Senate Committee on Military Affairs. I should, perhaps, have too much difficulty in finding adequate words and expressing my thoughts clearly.

I give you in the following pages my private opinions. At the end of the war I had something like 1,000 hours of flight, and I speak as an aviator; that is to say, as a man who has lived in a squadron from the beginning of the war to the end. I have faith in aviation, and I know that in the future the country which has not done all possible for the improvement of its aircraft and for the development of its air units will be unable to enter a possible war with the slightest chance of success.

Will you allow me to explain my ideas?

Yours, very sincerely,

DE LAVERGNE.

FRENCH AERONAUTICS AND THE PRIVATE IDEAS OF A FRENCH FLYER.

France perceived as soon as the war was ended the vital necessity to keep up a strong aviation. Undoubtedly the men who had seen during the war the tremendous number of hours of flight which were accomplished daily by the whole army believed that it was possible to consider seriously aviation as the best means of transportation for commercial use.

If I emphasize that, it is to show that this very truth was not and is still not well grounded in all minds.

Then all of the efforts have this purpose: To prepare the field of action for commercial aviation. There was one difficulty, however. The whole aviation was in the hands of military men, all of the planes were military planes, and there had to be a special process to make this aviation civilian.

If our country had suddenly suppressed its military aviation and cut down all of the credits, the plants would have shut their doors and commercial aviation would have been finished.

Everybody knows, indeed, that the setting out of aviation manufactures is a question of months and perhaps of a year. The aim was then to maintain at all costs the aviation plants. Truly it was not difficult; some men who were at the head of the aircraft industry, having the same thought, made up their minds to lose, perhaps, a little money at first, with the certainty of earning it back in the future.

The main idea of Gen. Duval was to keep a strong aviation. If I refer to the statement of Mr. Keys before Congress, he has called Gen. Duval a military man dyed in the wool. But this clever military man has perceived immediately that if you leave the aviation in the narrow sphere of the Army or the Navy, the aviation will come rapidly to its death.

Gen. Duval then elaborated his program. One thing chiefly struck him and all of the fliers; it was that sort of rivalry which exists in all of the countries between the army and the navy. As a matter of fact, each of them, mewed up in their own office, worked apart at the same affairs.

Their technical divisions were closed to one another, and they had, however, the same field of action. During the war it was possible to see the Navy offering higher prices for an engine than the Army did. It was always this bad concurrence of competition which made them work just in the reverse as they should have.

Gen. Duval considering moreover that in peace time the needs of the Army and Navy as to aviation were too small to maintain an aircraft industry, centralized the technical sections and the aircraft production section of both of these ministries immediately.

This improvement is the main point of our new organization. It is stated in the official decree that the military aeronautics and naval aeronautics are independent and separated concerning the employment of their own units for tactical and strategical purposes, but they are compelled to meet one another in the technical section of the new organization, the name of which is, in French, "Organe de Coordination generale de l'Aeronautique."

DECREE.

Aircraft has, during the war, taken a great importance. We ought now to adapt it to the no less important part which it has in peace time.

But because of the multiplicity of the initiatives which are cooperating with its development and with its new use, the efforts and the means are scattered in several departments.

Now the future of aeronautics in France is secured only by the coordination of all of the efforts and the centralization of all general services.

Moreover it will gain the advantage of having a better production as to the personnel and the appropriations which are actually assigned to the same purposes in different departments.

For that purpose there is created an "Organ de Coordination generale de l'Aeronautique." (Abbreviation: O. C. G. Ae.)

1. There has been constituted an "Organe de Coordination Generale," attached temporarily to the war ministry. It is in charge of:

(a) The study, the realization, fabrication, acceptance, delivery, and of the repair, concerning all matériel of aeronautics.

(b) A settlement in France, colonies, protectorates, of a system of a means of aerial communication.

(c) The centralization and the study of all the legislation, administration, and technical questions concerning the development of aerial navigation.

(d) The control of aerial navigation.

(e) To prepare the mobilization of the aircraft industry and to maintain this industry in peace time.

2. The technical service of aeronautics. The aircraft production bureau, the aerial navigation office and the air attachés in the foreign countries are under the director of O. C. G. Ae.

The Technical Service and the Fabrication Service of O. C. G. Ae. will be an immense laboratory, studying all of the questions concerning military, naval, and civilian aeronautics.

THE CIVILIAN AVIATION.

You will see that in reading this decree the main purpose of it is to set out the civilian aeronautics. Almost nothing is said concerning the naval and military aviation, but particularly about civilian aeronautics.

A general program of civilian aeronautics has been elaborated by Col. Sacconney, who is the director of the aerial navigation at the Organe de Coordination Generale.

Col. Sacconney saw immediately that the creation of an aerial navigation in France depended upon the creation of the fields, hangars, etc. He chose, at first, the largest towns in France and projected to connect them to Paris by air.

The line Paris-Lille was experimented on in February, then it was run by the Breguet Civilian Co., and now it extends to Brussels.

The line Paris-Bordeaux, which has been experimenting for the past three months, is going to become a civilian line.

Paris-Strasbourg has given very interesting information concerning the flight in the darkness, and this experience was successfully performed every night in May, from Paris to Mulhouse.

By this time, Farman, with his Goliath, has organized a weekly service from Paris to Brussels.

But it was not enough to settle fields and hangars. There was the question of helping the civilian companies.

In fact, many civilian companies, at the end of the war, had been constituted, and it was impossible for them to live by their own money. The duty of the State was to take on its charge not only the expenses of the fields and hangars, but also to sell at a very low price the military planes which were able to be transformed into civilian planes.

This was done. Even some companies which did not have money enough, received their planes without paying anything, and some agreed with the State to share the benefits. It is so that the Latecoere Co., which has undertaken to work the aerial line Toulouse-Madrid-Rabat in Morocco, has received much money from the aerial navigation office. This line functions successfully since two weeks, and the time gained on the train and the steamship is of four days.

One of these companies is very interesting. At the head of it is a very good engineer, who had a splendid situation in civilian industry. He left it to consecrate himself to civilian aviation. His purpose is to utilize the planes and the aerial photography in their countless varieties. He was given 20 airplanes by the French Government for he had too small a capital. After very painful efforts, he is now out of his difficulty, and he is earning much money. He is going to make the land register book in many districts. He takes pictures for the illustrated magazines for the owners of the manufactures, and he has a special bureau of drawing for the maps and the plans.

Moreover, he carries passengers and he writes to me to-day that in two days he has carried 30 passengers from Deauville (the fashionable bathing resort) to Paris, at the price of \$100 per person.

CIVILIAN AVIATION AS A RESERVE OF MILITARY AVIATION.

It is quite obvious that the fact of keeping a very strong military aviation would cause a tremendous expense, and a nation could not support it. Now, all the French aviation is going to become civilian. Yesterday it was entirely military, to-day and to-morrow it will be practically civilian. In case of emergency it will become military again. This system is certainly the best. Here are the intentions of the French Government:

1. Each civilian company will receive for each pilot the sum of 1,000 francs monthly, provided that these pilots give the proof that they have flown a certain number of hours. The case of the bad season has been noted.

2. The planes belonging to the companies may be paid in part (a quarter of the whole price) by the Government, provided that those planes be accepted by the aerial navigation office, and considered as available planes, in case of war. After some time the companies will have to change their planes and to adopt new types. In case of war all of these airplanes fall into the hands of the Army.

With that system we are sure to have thousands of pilots already trained. The time of the special training for the war will be reduced to a minimum. We are sure, too, of having many and many planes in case of war, and chiefly of having our plants open and working continuously.

We know indeed that it is impossible to make an aircraft industry come out of the ground by a magic switch.

THE QUESTION OF THE SEPARATE AIR SERVICE.

I am a military man, and I do not believe that it is good to take the whole aviation out of the Army. As a matter of fact, the military aviation has special men, special planes, and a special armament. If the Army can not control them and train them in liaison with the other arms, you would have in the next war very good pilots perhaps, but no military pilots. I am speaking now of the auxiliary aviation, that is to say, the aviation of observation, photography, reconnaissance, etc.

If a separate air service is constituted in your country, you will be obliged to detach in the military and naval departments all the auxiliary aviation that they want for their domestic use. The liaison between aeronautics and the troops must be so strict and so continuous that it will be of danger to do otherwise.

THE INDEPENDENT AIR FORCE.

But if this auxiliary aviation must remain inside of the Army or Navy, there is another aviation. And this very important fact has escaped the sight of many men. We, who have flown among formations of 250 planes, who saw the people on the ground fly away before us; we who know that it is possible to drop down 6,000 bombs in 10 minutes upon a given point; we know that, in the future, the effects of the aviation in mass will be terrific.

I remember the last day of the war, when we flew over the German troops in retreat, at an altitude of a thousand feet. There were 220 of us carrying 30 bombs of 20 pounds each and three machine guns. It was terrible to see the scene on the ground.

One day I said to Gen. Duval, upon returning from action, that the bombs we had dropped represented the fire of all the guns of an army corps during five minutes and at 12 kilometers into the lines. (This was impossible for the guns.)

If I give that example, it is to emphasize the terrific power of the aviation. And it was only the beginning.

In the future, powerful squadrons will fight in the air like the Navy on the sea. And these powerful squadrons will be the Navy of the air, if I am allowed to use such a neologism.

This aviation will be an arm, absolutely separated from the Army or Navy aeronautics. As it seems to me that this aircraft is quite bound to the civilian aeronautics, it will be under the air minister.

It was said that the aeronautics has not won the war. Certainly it did not. But it does not mean that in the future the aviation will not be the decisive factor of the victory.

I take a striking example.

Suppose that a country has not its own independent aviation and this country is attacked by an enemy who has one.

Suppose that the first days of the war you may see on your central station two or three thousand planes carrying each a bomb of 2,000 pounds, several tubes of asphyxiating compressed gas and powdered phosphorous, which is set on fire two or three days after it has been dropped. Do you think that this country would be able to resist to mobilize its Army, and to send it to the borders, if it has only its observation planes to repulse the others? Certainly not!

The first battle of the next war will be in the fourth dimension, and it will decide the destiny of the countries.

It is for that reason that I am in favor of an air ministry, who alone is able to handle such a task; that is to say, to establish:

1. A civilian aviation.
2. An independent aviation.

SOME DIFFICULTIES ENCOUNTERED.

But there is a difficulty in having an independent aviation. It is in the question of the personnel. Certainly I admit that it will be easy to recruit all of the pilots you want. But after seven or eight years you will have in the new arm many officers who will be unable to fly, and the high ranks of this arm will be held by officers who will no longer have the necessary fitness. To illustrate: I see very well the entrance of the house, but you will not have the way out. You have to find the means to ventilate, as we say in France.

A good system would be to recruit only the very strongest men as to heart and nervous system. Then in a short time, when they had rendered good services and obtained a high rank, they would be retired with very good pay.

I have spoken about the pilots who do not have special qualities of intelligence. As to the distinguished officers, they should be kept carefully, even if they are not able to fly, to compose the staff of aviation.

In all cases it is necessary to have promotions by selection, a system which alone will give aviation the very youngest officers and chiefs which it needs.

This latter reason is again an argument in favor of the separate Air Service.

Capt. DE LAVERGNE, *French Air Attaché.*

SEPTEMBER 23, 1919.

SEPTEMBER 11, 1919.

MY DEAR COMMODORE CHARLTON: The Military Affairs Committee of the United States Senate is holding hearings on my bill, which proposes to create a department of aeronautics in the United States similar to that which your country now has in operation.

There has been a considerable diversity of opinion in the various statements I have read as to the success and general satisfaction of the separate air ministry in England, and I believe the only way to have this matter settled is to ask some one who has seen the air ministry in actual operation and has served as a part of it. For this reason I am taking the liberty of asking you to give me your ideas, at your convenience, on the following questions:

1. Do you consider that in a future war aviation will hold a greater or a less predominance than in the past one?
2. In what manner does what you have just related bear on the subject of an independent air service?
3. Do you expect that nations will submit readily to the expenditure needful to maintain, on a necessary scale for immediate use, a strategic force of the size and nature you imply?
4. Was not the independent nature of the air force on the western front a constant source of friction as between the air-force commander and the army commander?
5. How do you answer the objection that pilots of army machines and navy machines must be fully trained in the methods of the army and the navy, and must accordingly, for the efficiency of that training, belong part and parcel to those services?
6. It is being constantly reiterated that the separation of the air force in England has been so little successful that in all probability the Royal Air Force will, before long, be split up again into the several services and branches. Is there foundation for this statement?

7. Is it not a fact that at the present time the Admiralty are endeavoring to separate to themselves the branch of naval aeronautics?

Yours, very sincerely,

HARRY S. NEW.

Air Commodore L. E. O. CHARLTON,
British Air Attaché, Building D, Sixth and B Streets.

Following is the reply received to the letter sent by Senator New to Commodore Charlton:

SEPTEMBER 22, 1919.

"1. Do you consider that in a future war aviation will hold a greater or a less predominance than in the past one?"

There can be no doubt that in any future war the predominance of aeronautics will be supreme both at the commencement and throughout. In the war which is just over both naval and military aeronautics grew up with the expanded Army and Navy as domestic adjuncts to them both, and the service it performed was auxiliary to the other arms, and having for its sole object the advancement of the other arms and nothing else.

In the later stages of the war aviation utilized more and more whatever surplus energy it possessed for independent action against the enemy on the ground, and fighting in the air became, in its turn, almost a separate incident from the other methods of war. In all this, however, the action of the aerial arm was seldom strategic; not, in fact, until the creation of the independent air force did the aeroplane as a strategic arm come into existence, and the significance of this, though not stressed at the moment, is very apparent.

The independent air force, together with the efforts which were being made to bombard the enemy's capital from the English coast, seemed to connote on the part of the aerial arm a new function and importance, outweighing by far its former domestic purposes. This function being neither more nor less than the paralysis of the enemy's nerve centers and communications before or during the mobilization period in the case of a future war.

The domestic service auxiliary to the other arms will always be required and will always be developed, but over and above them, and first in importance, comes the strategic use of the aerial arm at the earliest sign of an inevitable outbreak of hostilities.

"2. In what manner does what you have just related bear on the subject of an independent air service?"

By what I have said, I have inferred that the supreme use of the aerial arm of the future is a strategic one at the commencement of war, and it seems patent that the strategic use of this arm can not be developed supremely unless it has an independent existence which will, without hindrance or interference from other services, permit of its full development. In plain words, if the strategical use of the aerial arm is of more importance at the commencement of war than its use as a domestic adjunct, then the air force as an independent service is a necessity.

"3. Do you expect that nations will submit readily to the expenditure needful to maintain, on a necessary scale for immediate use, a strategic force of the size and nature you imply?"

No; I do not think so, and that brings me to a point which, I think, dispassionately provides the final argument in favor of an independent air service. Granted that the use of aeronautics in future wars will be greater, and not less than in the wars of the past; granted that its use as a strategic arm at the very commencement will be of supreme importance, how then is it feasible, without an expenditure which will lay an impossible burden on the country, that the full force of this arm in its strategic sense be provided in due time? The answer, to my mind, lies with the machines in use for civil and commercial aeronautics; that, just as much as in time of war the Navy expands by pressing into its service all sorts of mercantile ships, so will the aerial arm expand by pressing into its service all sorts of civil and commercial airships, and that the first line of aerial reserve will be provided by these means.

Unless what I have said is altogether wrong, the airships in use by civil and commercial aeronautics are the lifeblood of aerial supremacy; but, without an independent air service having as one of its branches a bureau for civil and a bureau for commercial aeronautics, how can those interested in civil and commercial flying be depended upon and encouraged to develop their enterprises on the lines of the necessities of defense. Without central control, such

items as the airworthiness of machines, the efficiency of instruments, the competency of pilots, etc., would be of so widely divergent a nature and so conglomerate a whole as to be of little or no use at the very moment it was required, viz, at the moment of hostilities.

"4. Was not the independent nature of the air force on the western front a constant source of friction as between the air force commander and the army commander?"

No; there was never to my knowledge a single occasion of friction. The staff of the air force and the general staff of general headquarters had drawn up, in conjunction, a working method which answered perfectly. Briefly, it was for the military commander to demand his requirements from the air force commander, and it was the responsibility of the air force commander that he should comply fully with these demands. Let me take two instances, explaining this situation by simile:

(1) An attack is planned in which a certain number of divisions are due to go over the top at dawn toward limited objectives. At the conference beforehand, the air force commander is present and takes part in the discussions; as a result, the requirements of the military commander are made known to him, and they discuss in unison the possibility or feasibility of carrying them out. Any objections which exist are stated then and there and disposed of one way or the other. On the day of attack, the cooperation of the air force is assured to the full extent expected, and neither less nor more.

(2) During a quiet phase the enemy on a special sector of the front suddenly developed air tactics, including the bombing of Army headquarters. The military commander, of a somewhat excitable disposition, rings up the air-force commander, asks him what he is doing to permit such a state of affairs, and orders every machine into the air at once. The air-force commander, realizing the ruin that would immediately follow such a plan of action, and that on the chance of doing a very little good he would place his whole force out of action for a considerable period, in his discretion respectfully points out to the military commander the drawbacks of carrying out his direction. Discussion ensues, the military commander is impressed, agrees, and is further educated in the use of the aerial arm, and so on.

"5. How do you answer the objection that pilots of Army machines and Navy machines must be fully trained in the methods of the Army and the Navy and must accordingly, for the efficiency of that training, belong part and parcel to those services?"

My answer is that the whole question is one of training only, and that the methods of cooperation between the aeroplane and Army and Navy units are largely of a similar description and differ not in principle but in practice. The method of fighting in the air is the same in principle, the method of artillery observation is the same in principle, the method of reconnaissance is the same in principle, and I do not think there is a wider difference between an Air Service pilot operating with the Army and an Air Service pilot operating with the Navy than there is between a pursuit pilot and an artillery observation pilot or between a night bombing pilot and a day bombing pilot, or between a pilot trained to take oblique photographs and a pilot trained to burn enemy balloons. In other words, it is my opinion that divergences in training exist between two natures of pilot operating with the Army greater than exist between an Air Service pilot operating with the Army and an Air Service pilot operating with the Navy on similar work, either of fighting, bombing, photographing, or observing for artillery. If one training system can produce efficiently pursuit pilots and artillery observation pilots, then one training can equally well or better produce pilots to observe artillery for the Army or for the Navy, pilots to bomb enemy ships or enemy dumps, pilots to fight over land or over sea, pilots to reconnoiter fleet formations or land formations, and incidentally the expense of dualism and duplication in training and experimental establishments will be halved.

"6. It is being constantly reiterated that the separation of the air force in England has been so little successful that in all probability the Royal Air Force will, before long, be split up again into the several services and branches."

I can assure you that there is no ground whatever for such a statement and that, on the contrary, the amalgamation has proved a decided success and that only recently, in order to mark finally the complete separation of the Royal Air Force from the navy and the army new titles of rank have been approved by the King. Certain reorganizations are taking place, as is inevitable in an undertaking so large as the separation of service aeronautics from the other services, brought about hastily during a period of war; but these reorganiza-

tions serve only to emphasize and mark the fact of final separation, rather than a revision to the old order of things.

"7. Is it not a fact that at the present time the admiralty are endeavoring to separate to themselves the branch of naval aeronautics?"

There has always existed a strong reactionary tendency on the part of a strong section of senior naval officers. At the time of the amalgamation itself the fact that this opposition was not strongly developed is due probably, in chief, to the urgency of the occasion, which compelled all those connected with the unification, be they soldiers, flying men, parliamentarian or political leaders, to proceed with the utmost speed in a legislative sense.

At the same time the needs of the Navy as regards aeronautics are undoubtedly peculiar and are, as such, being more and more recognized. The questions of discipline and morale are intimately bound up with the status of individuals on board ship, and this alone occasions special provision.

I think I can best describe the action which is pending to meet this need as a case of "seconding" "en bloc" to the Navy such personnel as she requires for her special aeronautical necessities and endeavoring as far as possible to insure that the greater part of this personnel should be men of seafaring experience under a naval training system.

But all this and all questions akin to this have, to my mind, no bearing whatever on the general question of a unified air service, and to fail to realize this is simply to confuse issues. The domestic needs of the services in aircraft cooperation are cut and dried, and although development will inevitably take place, it will take place on cut and dried lines and can be reasonably foreseen because the utilization of the aerial arm in service cooperation of aircraft can not be divorced from the utilization of the other arms of the Navy and Army.

These domestic duties are details in the general great scheme of national aeronautics, with all that it implies in the way of experiment, development, production, supply and research in order to foster it in a broad and general sense on the right path, and so that it will minister to the national needs of defense and offense, and mercantile development, and not remain compartmented in a water-tight sense in any one service or in any two services.

Mr. Secretary, we are very much obliged to you for your statement. We would like very much to have you give us your ideas with regard to this other bill, but inasmuch as you are not in a situation to do so to-day we will have to call you later.

(Whereupon at 5 o'clock p m. the committee adjourned subject to the call of the chairman.)

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REORGANIZATION OF THE ARMY

HEARINGS

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE COMMITTEE ON MILITARY AFFAIRS UNITED STATES SENATE

SIXTY-SIXTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

ON

S. 2691

A BILL TO PROVIDE FOR UNIVERSAL MILITARY, NAVAL, AND VOCATIONAL TRAINING AND FOR MOBILIZATION OF THE MANHOOD OF THE NATION IN A NATIONAL EMERGENCY

S. 2693

A BILL TO CREATE A DEPARTMENT OF AERONAUTICS, DEFINING THE POWERS AND DUTIES OF THE DIRECTOR THEREOF, PROVIDING FOR THE ORGANIZATION, DISPOSITION, AND ADMINISTRATION OF A UNITED STATES AIR FORCE, CREATING THE UNITED STATES AIR RESERVE FORCE, AND PROVIDING FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF CIVIL AND COMMERCIAL AVIATION


S. 2715

A BILL TO REORGANIZE AND INCREASE THE EFFICIENCY OF THE UNITED STATES ARMY, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES

PART 22

Printed for the use of the Committee on Military Affairs

WASHINGTON
GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
1919



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REORGANIZATION OF THE ARMY.

TUESDAY, OCTOBER 21, 1919.

UNITED STATES SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON MILITARY AFFAIRS,
Washington, D. C.

The subcommittee met at 2.15 p. m., pursuant to call.

Present: Senators Wadsworth (chairman), Sutherland, New, Chamberlain, Thomas, Fletcher, and McKellar.

STATEMENT OF MAJ. GEN. CHARLES P. SUMMERALL, UNITED STATES ARMY.

The CHAIRMAN. General, give your full name and rank to the reporter.

Gen. SUMMERALL. Charles P. Summerall, major general, United States Army, commanding the First Division.

The CHAIRMAN. Will you be good enough to tell the committee about your assignments during the war?

Gen. SUMMERALL. Shortly after the declaration of war I was a member of a military mission that visited England and France and made a study of the training, organization, and employment of troops in the British and the French armies. After my return I was made a brigadier general and took command of the Artillery brigade of the Forty-second Division, and organized and accompanied it to France in October, 1917.

In December of 1917 I was transferred to the command of the First Field Artillery Brigade of the First Division. In June of 1918 I was made major general and took command of the First Division on July 17, 1918, just before the counter offensive at Soissons. I commanded the First Division in the offensive at Soissons, the occupation of the Saizerais sector, the offensive at St. Mihiel, and its first offensive in the Meuse-Argonne. The night the division came out, October 11, 1918, I was assigned to the command of the Fifth Army Corps, which had two divisions in line. I commanded the Fifth Army Corps during the remainder of the operations and until the latter part of February, 1919, when it was demobilized. I then took command of the Ninth Army Corps, headquarters St. Mihiel, and commanded that until the middle of April, 1919. I then took command of the Fourth Army Corps in Germany and commanded that until it was demobilized in the last of June, 1919. After that I performed various duties, including being a member of the inter-allied military commission at Fiume, and duty with the American

Commission to Negotiate Peace, during the months of July and August, 1919. I am now commanding the First Division at Camp Taylor, Ky.

The CHAIRMAN. You came home with Gen. Pershing?

Gen. SUMMERALL. I came home with Gen. Pershing.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. What rank have you now?

Gen. SUMMERALL. Major general, brigadier general in the Regular Army.

The CHAIRMAN. General, you are familiar, of course, more or less, with some of the proposals of a legislative kind that are pending before this subcommittee looking to the reorganization of the Military Establishment and the creation of a military policy, and we would be very glad to have your ideas on any phase of it that you think should be emphasized. We would be especially glad if you would proceed in your own way, and later on we might ask you some questions.

Gen. SUMMERALL. I have read the bills, and I have made notes on what seemed to me to be certain salient features.

The War Department bill provides for the organization of regular forces of the United States by the President. In time of war it is unquestionably necessary that the President should have full authority to vary the organization and composition of troops according to the ever-changing conditions. To a less degree it is necessary in time of peace. It is recognized, however, that in making the appropriations, as well as in controlling the Military Establishment, Congress should have something definite upon which to base its conclusions.

Without prescribing the details, I think the war has demonstrated generally what our organization should be, and I believe that no great mistake can be made in adopting an organization with certain reasonable elasticity based upon our experience in this war.

The subject of promotion by selection and elimination has different bearings in time of war and in time of peace. In time of war it is unquestionably necessary for promotion to be made by selection. Only the most efficient should be intrusted with the greatest tasks, and officers must be selected for the performance of duties so as to avoid unnecessarily jeopardizing the troops. Promotion by seniority would undoubtedly be fatal, not so much because of the fault of individual officers, but because officers do not have the same aptitude for the command of troops. Authority must, therefore, exist to promote and to assign according to the demands.

Furthermore, in time of war an officer shows by his performance whether or not his promotion was justified, and the authority which selects him meets at once the responsibility of using proper judgment. In time of peace these conditions do not exist entirely. While it may be evident that one officer has greater ability than another, there is not sufficient opportunity to prove that ability to make it mandatory for him to be selected over the other one. An unfair selection would undoubtedly greatly injure the morale of troops, although it might have been made in good faith. It would lessen the confidence of officers in the system and in the superior authority. It would discourage them, and it might react in other ways. There is always the possibility of unintentional favoritism, no matter how honest one may be in his purpose.

On the other hand, it is entirely evident in time of peace that certain officers are inefficient. By serving with them or by studying the efficiency reports of a certain number of officers, there is manifested a standard of efficiency, and it may be evident that certain officers have not by their conduct or their attainments even approached that standard. It would not be difficult, therefore, to determine with all fairness that certain officers are inefficient, due to a lack of application or aptitude or other disqualifications. Such officers should be eliminated or retired from the service, where efficiency is required.

I believe, therefore, that in time of peace we should have an effective system of elimination, whose details should be carefully worked out, and that otherwise we should promote by seniority up to the grade of general officer—up to and including colonel.

The total number of general officers bears such a small relation to the other officers that it is eminently proper to select general officers. In time of war promotion must be made entirely by selection.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. Including all grades?

Gen. SUMMERALL. There must be no limitation to it. It has become necessary to select lieutenants to command companies, because it was manifest that the captains were not sufficiently good to employ their men, whereas lieutenants were preeminently qualified, and the selection was justified by subsequent experience.

The strength of the Regular Army is a very difficult and very serious problem to solve. Before the war, the national defense act was passed by Congress, based upon very exhaustive studies of our military requirements. Unless our foreign relations have been changed by the conditions of peace in a manner with which I am not familiar, I am not aware of any great change in those military requirements for us in time of peace. The subject was very thoroughly discussed during the hearings on that bill, and reference has been frequently made to those needs during the present hearings.

We need a sufficient force to defend the Hawaiian Islands, because that is our base for the Pacific. We must defend the Panama Canal, because that is a military necessity. We must have a military force to defend our investment and fortifications in the Philippines, and a very small force to maintain our authority in Alaska. There must be in the country a sufficient force to preserve order in case of such disorders as have occurred in the last 25 years, and for such expeditions as may through unforeseen foreign relations be necessary.

The strength of that force within our borders must be determined and may be variable between limits. According to the original studies, it was seen that a division for Hawaii, a division for Panama, and not more than three divisions within the territorial boundaries, would be sufficient. To this must be added whatever is considered necessary for the Philippines and Alaska, maybe two or three regiments.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. That would be about 160,000 men, would it not—about five divisions?

Gen. SUMMERALL. Yes. The war has shown that certain auxiliary troops unknown to us before, are essential, and they should

be added to the organization provided by the national defense act. Subject to any foreign demands, of which I do not know, it would seem, therefore, that our peace strength would not greatly exceed the peace strength provided by the national defense act, which I think was 175,000 men.

The CHAIRMAN. Combatant?

Gen. SUMMERALL. Combatant; yes. I was speaking of combatant troops.

Senator SUTHERLAND. That would be about 225,000 in all, would it not?

Gen. SUMMERALL. Adding Coast Artillery, I would have to make a calculation, but it would amount to approximately 225,000 men. This could only be reduced at the expense of the strength of the expeditionary forces.

It is now proposed to institute universal training, which I consider to be necessary, and in the light of our experience in organizing for this war, I think we are in duty bound to adopt it. Whatever is required for training cadres must be added to our permanent establishment, since there is no other way of obtaining a minimum force to conduct this training or this system of national schools. Training is an indefinite word, and probably signifies a different degree of acquirement to different persons, according to the way they visualize or employ it.

A certain amount of training may be acquired within a given period of time and with certain facilities of instruction. If this time is increased and the instructional facilities are increased, the training will naturally be of a higher order, and therefore of more benefit to the country.

It is proposed to establish some 16 training centers, and that seems reasonable, with a division for each center. The strength of these cadre divisions must be a minimum for the training of the number of persons sent to that division. There is not a great deal of experience for us to base our conclusions upon, since in our training camps we had varying numbers of training personnel who had varying degrees of qualifications. To-day the First Division has a total of about 3,600 men. I would be willing to undertake the training of a complete division, if the replacements were added to me, with the personnel that we have. The training personnel, however, must consist of well-instructed and efficient men.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you not believe, General, that you could reenforce your trained personnel with experienced citizen officers?

Gen. SUMMERALL. I was speaking of the enlisted men. With reference to officers, we must have a certain minimum. This minimum could be largely reenforced by reserve and National Guard officers, who were willing to be called into active service for certain periods. There are many of them who are eminently qualified and would make excellent instructors. They could not replace the permanent personnel, nor would there be any great economy in having them do so, since they would draw the pay of their grade when called into service. If approximately two-thirds of the personnel of officers were permanent, I think the remainder might well be taken from the National Guard or reserve officers who wished to be called into service, provided we could get that many. That, I think, is a question which we would have to wait for experience to determine.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. I did not quite understand you a while ago, General. You said that with the First Division, as now constituted, you could train a division?

Gen. SUMMERALL. That is my problem; yes, sir.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. Do you mean to say that, taking your commissioned personnel and the enlisted personnel that you have, you could train a division?

Gen. SUMMERALL. Yes, sir. That is what I must do now.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. Would you utilize the enlisted man for any other purpose than as a nucleus upon which the new enlisted personnel should assemble?

Gen. SUMMERALL. No, sir. My personnel of enlisted men are largely noncommissioned officers and they would do nothing but train the new men, precisely as an instructor teaches in a school. We would require a larger proportion of Regular officers than of enlisted personnel, for the reason that we have no other sure reliance but those officers; and the division officers must be our officers in case of mobilization.

It would require some calculation, but I believe that for the whole Regular Army, for the training cadres, for the corps and Army staffs, and for the staffs of reserve divisions, if Congress intends to organize these trained men, there would be required several thousand more officers than are now allowed for the temporary personnel of the Army.

The CHAIRMAN. Several thousand more than 18,000?

Gen. SUMMERALL. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, General, a considerable proportion of the 18,000 are regarded as necessary for this fiscal year, according to the advice of the War Department, to complete the demobilization of the matériel on hand, and a very large percentage of them are doing work of that character, sitting on claims boards, and I believe it was the understanding of the War Department that when the demobilization and disposition of this tremendous stock of supplies is finished that they will not need so many officers in proportion to the number of enlisted men.

Gen. SUMMERALL. But, even reducing the officers in the permanent establishment for the expeditionary forces, and reducing the regular officers in the training cadre divisions, to approximately two-thirds of the number required to make a division, you would still require, to complete a sufficient personnel for the training cadres, at least 5,000 more officers than we have now—that is, 5,000 more than the 18,000. As we reduce the number we will correspondingly reduce the quality of the training and the availability of the trained men as well as the efficiency of these divisions upon mobilization. Any reduction will, therefore, be at the expense of efficiency. That will still require the utilization of a very large number of reserve officers and National Guard officers in the training divisions in excess of this number of Regular officers to which I have made reference.

For example, I would base my calculation of Regular officers on 3 officers to a company; a company to train 250 men should have 5 officers at least. Each platoon must have one officer to train that platoon, and there must be a captain for each company. If we only provide three Regular officers, upon which I base this estimate,

you would have to add two National Guard or Reserve officers for each company. This estimate would also leave only three officers with each company of the expeditionary forces. So I think my estimate would be found to be very low for any kind of efficiency. It seems large, but the undertaking is large. By cutting down the number of expeditionary divisions, and by cutting down the number of training cadre divisions, you can reduce the number of officers correspondingly.

Senator NEW. You said that it would require several thousand more officers than the 18,000?

Gen. SUMMERALL. Yes, sir. I should say between 22,000 and 25,000 officers, depending upon the number of Corps and Army staffs and reserve division staffs that Congress will authorize for these trained men, if we want to keep them subject to mobilization. If this is too great, then the reduction must be at the expense of training or of the availability of the troops.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. I do not think the average civilian understands the importance of the commissioned personnel, because we hear so many of them say, "We have too many officers in the Army." You heard it during the war, and you have heard it in peace times.

Gen. SUMMERALL. Yes, sir; in peace and in war the impulses must come from those who are in a position of authority. It is psychological. Every platoon in war must have a good platoon leader, an officer, and a good sergeant, or the platoon can not function, and that is the fighting element. Great casualties among officers and noncommissioned officers generally result in the stabilization of the advance, and it is natural. It has always been so.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. That is, the men who set the examples to privates?

Gen. SUMMERALL. Well, I have seen privates who will stand out and function anyhow, but we must not expect it, and it will not be the rule. In peace, the training must come from those who are qualified to train, and they must know a great deal more than those they train, in order to give the information that is essential. The officer and the noncommissioned officer are essential, and they must be of the right type. To send 250 of our young men to a company and not supply instructors for them would be largely a waste of their time and of the industrial or educational life of those men. Instruction must be adequate to be effective.

Senator NEW. In other words, if it is not done right, it had better not be done at all?

Gen. SUMMERALL. I won't say that, but any reduction of the facilities for training will correspondingly reduce the quality of the training.

With regard to the length of time that should be occupied in this training there should be no difficulty in our arriving at some conclusion based on the experience of this war as to a minimum for the training of troops for battle. I think it will be found that the average time in which our divisions were organized before going over was about eight months, and that the divisions had about six months' training in this country. Also I think it will be found that they had an average of about two months' training in France, and yet

we had to engage divisions whom we would have preferred to retain further in the training area or in the sector before putting them into the line.

Senator SUTHERLAND. You mean in a quiet sector?

Gen. SUMMERALL. In a quiet sector. Any training is better than no training, but I believe that six months is the minimum for the training which we now propose to give our young men, in order to make them available for mobilization and for any employment whatever of a serious nature. We would hope to give them some more training after mobilization. A three months' training will give them considerable efficiency, but in the light of our experience in this war I do not think that we can claim that it will fit them for battle conditions.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. What is the great benefit of training for battle?

Gen. SUMMERALL. Discipline.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. That is the main thing, is it not?

Gen. SUMMERALL. Doing what they have been told to do. After the armistice, for example, the divisions in the training areas were given terrain exercises and maneuvers, and in spite of all their training and their employment in battle we found very grave errors in carrying out the situation, which to all intents and purposes was a real battle, showing that troops never get sufficient training.

Whenever a division came out of the line after its losses it was taken back, reconstituted by the addition of replacements, and intensively trained until it was called upon to go back to the line.

Training consists in knowing what to do in all grades, and then having the habit of thought to do it under the great stress that comes over men during battle.

If we can not have six months' training, three months are better than none. But if we adopt the three months' training there will be a reduction in the efficacy of the training. It is realized that the strength of our permanent Army, the period of training and the number of men trained, must be based upon the exercise of reasonable economy. I do not think that anybody wants or advocates any expenditure that can be avoided, but in reducing our expenses below the requirements that I have named we shall correspondingly reduce the efficacy of the training and the availability of the units after they are trained.

The CHAIRMAN. I gather from your observations, General, that you favor the assignment of trained men to reserve units?

Gen. SUMMERALL. I am taking that for granted.

The CHAIRMAN. You see, the War Department bill does not provide for that?

Gen. SUMMERALL. Senator Chamberlain's bill, I think, does provide for it, and I am discussing the whole question of these bills as it is presented.

The CHAIRMAN. You are taking it for granted that we will use these men?

Gen. SUMMERALL. I am taking for granted that we will use these men, and will I speak on that?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Gen. SUMMERALL. When these men are trained, I think it is reasonable that they should pass to some sort of available organization for

a period. It is not greatly important how long this period is. Senator Chamberlain's bill provides for five years. It might be two years, or it might be one year, in the first reserve, and one year in the second reserve, or it might be two years in each reserve. That is relatively unimportant, just so long as we have a regular standing reserve. I think it would be very good to have them one year in a first reserve and one year in a second reserve, and that these reserves should be organized into divisions, localized in much the same way as the training divisions. These reserve divisions could be combined with the training divisions into reserve corps, and these corps perhaps into reserve armies, so that we should have something upon which to build our military establishment when war commences. The two great results of that arrangement will be a trained staff, ready to function, and the personnel to constitute the combat units upon mobilization.

That brings me to the subject of the age at training.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. Before you pass that, just for a moment, General.

Gen. SUMMERALL. Yes, sir.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. Don't you think that the expense of this war would have been very, very greatly reduced if some system of training of the young men had been in force before we went into the war?

Gen. SUMMERALL. Unquestionably, the expense in money would have been reduced, and I think also, without putting any blame anywhere, our losses would have been less. The fighting knowledge of the individual would have a great asset to him in accomplishing his mission without undue sacrifice.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. Not only the fighting quality, but the sanitary knowledge would have been of great benefit to him?

Gen. SUMMERALL. Senator Chamberlain's bill provides for calling the boys to be trained at 18 and the other bill makes the age 19. Senator Chamberlain's bill provides for a certain elective option on the part of the boy for two years. It is better to train at any age almost than not to train at all, and no doubt a great deal of good will come from training at 18 years.

It is my belief, however, that the older the man, up to certain limits, the greater will be his benefit from this training and the greater asset he will be to the country. For example, if we call 18 or 19 year old boys to train they will not be available in case of mobilization, in spite of the time and the expense of training them. Those who have been trained one year or two years are still very young to constitute an army for military operations. So that the men trained during the three years would be not over 21 years old, which would be very young for an army to be put into the field.

I believe greater good will come to the individual and to the country by increasing the training age to, say, 21 years, or what might accomplish the same result would be to change the phraseology of Senator Chamberlain's bill so as to have it elective up to the age of 21.

I think also that the option would tend to make the bill more popular among the people.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. What do you think of the effect of that industrially, General?

Gen. SUMMERALL. Throughout this bill there must be a sacrifice of something. I do not think the effect on the industrial life of our country would be serious, nor do I think that it would be proportional to the advantage to be gained to the men and to the country by having them come at a mature age. In all these debatable questions it seems to me there is one principal thing to consider, and in this case I think it is the benefit to the individual and to the country, from the point of view of a military asset.

Senator NEW. Might it not also be open to the objection that the boy trained at 18 would be held in the reserve longer by three years, presumably, than the man who was trained at 21? There comes a period when he is exempt from further service.

Gen. SUMMERALL. In my opinion a man is most efficient as a soldier between 25 and 30 years of age. I do not understand it to be the sentiment of Congress to mobilize for war a million or a million and a half of young men under 21 years of age.

Senator SUTHERLAND. At least not mobilize them first?

Gen. SUMMERALL. But they are the men who are available for mobilization if we train them at 18 or 19 years old. They are the men who are in the training cadres; they are the men in the reserve; and they are the only men who need not wait for the operation of the draft. Unless you are going to use them upon mobilization, there is not the same object in organizing them as a reserve. We must consider, I think, what we are getting from the expenditure, and we must remember that we were a long time getting troops ready for the line of battle in this war. It is not probable that we would again have allies to hold the enemy until we could prepare troops. I believe this training must have in view not only the training of our people, but rendering those who are trained promptly available for service if war should come suddenly. No matter what system of draft we incorporate into the bill, it would take some time for it to function.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. What if a bill of this kind were put through without any draft attachment to it, without any provision that authorized the immediate calling of men into the service, leaving that to Congress in case of sudden war? They differentiate between training and service. And a great many men favor training, but they oppose service, in the sense that a man may be called out under the draft. Why could not we separate the training from the so-called service or the so-called draft, and leave that to Congress? In other words, if you have four or five hundred thousand or a million men trained, and we become suddenly involved in war, Congress could act very promptly to get them into the service.

Gen. SUMMERALL. I doubt if Congress could act more promptly than the last Congress acted, or that we could render a draft effective more promptly than in our recent experience. I think this training must carry of necessity the spirit of service.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. Immediate service?

Gen. SUMMERALL. In case of necessity, yes. That is why I so much prefer increasing the age, so that our capital that we invest in these men, in case of sudden war, will become immediately available.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. Possibly I do not make myself understood. We put the draft through pretty quickly when we became involved in war?

Gen. SUMMERALL. Yes.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. Before the draft operated entirely upon untrained men. Now, if we had had trained men, trained under this universal military training, when the draft became operative, it would have operated upon trained men. Now, why could not we train young men, and leave to Congress the matter of drafting them into the service?

Senator NEW. Is not that practically what the War Department bill does?

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. I am just asking for information, because there is a question which is involved largely in the difference between the two bills.

Gen. SUMMERALL. I do not think we ought to take chances on this lapse of time between the arrival of war, of which we will have little warning, and the drafting of an army, and if we are going to make legislation with a view to securing a reasonably effective military force, I think we ought to make that force available.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. Out of the trained men?

Gen. SUMMERALL. Out of the trained men; yes, sir.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. But, General, if you had them all organized into divisions, as you have suggested, that would save a great deal of time if they were left a body of trained men, and Congress could then call them into action by subsequent legislation?

Gen. SUMMERALL. Yes, sir.

Senator SUTHERLAND. Would not that save you a great deal of time, to make those men practically immediately available?

Gen. SUMMERALL. Yes, sir. That is the point I have made. That is what I would prefer, and that is why I prefer training at an older age, so that these men are available for immediate mobilization.

Senator SUTHERLAND. Of course, there is a great deal of force in your argument on that question.

Gen. SUMMERALL. I may be mistaken, but I understand that it is not the intention of Congress to mobilize an army of young men whose age is not to exceed 21 years.

The CHAIRMAN. The question has never been presented to Congress, but I imagine there would be prejudice against it.

Gen. SUMMERALL. Yes.

Senator SUTHERLAND. It developed, when we were considering the last selective-service act.

Gen. SUMMERALL. I am trying to explain my views of what I think would be most advantageous to the country, and I believe that, as we sacrifice something for the industries or the financial requirements, all of which must be considered, we will correspondingly take away from the training and the availability of our forces. It may be necessary to do that, and Congress must be the judges of whether that is necessary or not.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. Some of the men who went into the front line had had very little training?

Gen. SUMMERALL. Yes.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. And some who had had a great deal of training?

Gen. SUMMERALL. Yes.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. Could you notice the difference in the effectiveness of the men who had had little training and the men who had had much training?

Gen. SUMMERALL. There was great difference in the effectiveness of divisions, measured by the length of time they could remain in line, the resistance overcome, and the losses sustained by them—a very great difference.

Senator SUTHERLAND. You think a great many of our men were sacrificed; that our casualties were increased by the lack of sufficient training?

Gen. SUMMERALL. I do not think our casualties were excessive under any conditions, considering the results attained. In fact, they were remarkably small, much smaller than we had any right to expect from the accomplishments of our forces, but casualties probably would have been less with better trained men, in some cases. There is no doubt, however, that divisions would have kept their organization, would have gained more ground, and would have stayed in line longer with the same number of casualties than was sometimes the case.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. If they had had longer training?

Gen. SUMMERALL. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. In other words, a half-trained division gets used up much quicker?

Gen. SUMMERALL. It gets used up much more quickly, and our aims are not accomplished against the enemy.

Senator SUTHERLAND. You mean they have not the same endurance?

Gen. SUMMERALL. They have not cohesion enough to stand losses and remain intact and to continue to gain ground in spite of losses. That is perfectly natural, and the troops are in no way to blame for it. They are just as good individually as other men, and as soon as they have experienced that training one division will become just as good as another, practically.

Senator SUTHERLAND. I find there is quite a good deal of objection on the part of a great many people against this proposed military training. I do not know whether the members of the committee get much correspondence on that subject or not, but I get quite a good deal of it, and from very substantial, patriotic citizens, against this universal military training.

Senator NEW. Oh, I get some, of course, a great deal of it. Senator Chamberlain, I have no doubt, gets more of it than I do, and those of us who have been identified with this subject officially for some time, no doubt, get more than just the ordinary run. But I do not know of any single subject that has apparently been more misunderstood by the general public than that of military training. They confuse persistently training with service. They think that immediately you begin to train—that you subject the boy to training—you have made a soldier of him forever.

Senator SUTHERLAND. He is subject to be called out any minute?

Senator NEW. Yes; that he is going into the Army; and that he is never going to be anything more than a soldier; and if the public mind could be educated up to the point to just realize that training

is merely to put the boy into shape to do what he would be compelled to do anyhow in case of war and that unless war comes he is never going to have to realize on that training, I think it would do away with a large part of the objection that is so vigorously interposed.

Senator SUTHERLAND. Or if they understand that they can realize on a great deal of this training in their civil life, that it would be of distinct advantage to the boy, and that it would be better for him in any vocation of life to have had this training.

The CHAIRMAN. Are there some other features of the bill which you are going to pass on to, General?

Gen. SUMMERALL. The question presents itself as to the employment of these cadre divisions during the period when there are no men to be trained, and it would seem that there would be ample occupation for them in our schools and colleges in conducting officers' training schools and service with the expeditionary troops when they were not absolutely essential to preserve the organization of the training cadres.

Senator SUTHERLAND. General, do you think it would be possible to evolve a scheme of training, limiting this training to the schools in the country, and give us a sufficient force for protection?

Gen. SUMMERALL. I do not think the training in the schools of the country alone would be sufficient, but I do think that provision should be made for training in our schools that would be general as a preliminary to this national training provided by these training cadres.

The CHAIRMAN. Of course, that is something that Congress has no jurisdiction over?

Gen. SUMMERALL. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. The State of New York has that now.

Gen. SUMMERALL. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. The high school boys all report for duty for military training.

Senator NEW. It is a very good thing.

Senator SUTHERLAND. If put into effect by the various States, the recommendation of the National Government would be very strong.

Gen. SUMMERALL. The bill does not go into the question of equipment and munitions. That is in itself a very extensive subject, and at least as important, if not more important, than the provision for training troops. Whatever expense is incurred there must be considered a proper proportion of expenditure for munitions and equipment for a considerably sized army.

The CHAIRMAN. That is a matter of appropriations, rather than statute law.

Gen. SUMMERALL. Yes; but it might have a bearing on the expense that the Government is willing to bear on the whole system.

The CHAIRMAN. It takes longer to make a 155 howitzer, General, than it does a soldier.

Gen. SUMMERALL. In other words, we should not think only of the training of troops. We ought to think of having on hand the equipment to utilize these troops when they are trained.

Senator SUTHERLAND. One would not be of much use without the other.

Gen. SUMMERALL. They have got to be balanced.

The CHAIRMAN. We gather that we have now on hand a good surplus of ordnance and clothing and subsistence; in fact, a good surplus of practically everything except airplanes, and of them we have none worthy of the name. It is suggested by the War Department, as I understand it, that for the next two or three years our appropriations for ordnance and clothing and supplies of a general character will be pretty small, until this surplus wears out by use; but undoubtedly that has got to be taken into consideration when we carry on any system over a term of years; the supply must be balanced with the number of men.

Gen. SUMMERALL. And all with due regard to what is reasonable for the country to bear.

The CHAIRMAN. General, had you finished on that subject?

Gen. SUMMERALL. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. I think this is an important part of the training, the thing I am going to mention now. I am very much interested in giving the citizen officer a chance to display his genius, if he has it, and I guess a good many of them have a little latent military genius, for a great many of them have shown it in war.

What method would you propose in connection with this training, or in connection with the reserve citizens' corps, to give the citizen officer, whether he happens to be a National Guard or a National Army or any emergency officer, a chance to display his ability to rise to higher grades?

Gen. SUMMERALL. I should like to see several thousand of them utilized in connection with this training. All should attend the training schools for reserve officers, and there should be some system by which the training schools and service with the training cadres together would show their qualifications for promotion.

The CHAIRMAN. Don't you believe that the most effective way to bring out the latent abilities of a citizen officer, as well as a regular officer, for that matter, is in the actual handling of troops in the field and maneuvers?

Gen. SUMMERALL. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. That is the best way in time of peace?

Gen. SUMMERALL. Yes, sir. His ability can be developed in the training camps, in the training cadres, and in maneuvers. We might not be able to have sufficient maneuvers to test them out as they deserve to be tested, and we should therefore not be limited to testing them in maneuvers.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. We have very few Army officers that had ever commanded a division when they went to France?

Gen. SUMMERALL. Yes, sir.

Senator SUTHERLAND. Very few that had ever commanded a brigade?

Gen. SUMMERALL. Yes, sir.

Senator NEW. Very few who had ever been under fire at all?

Gen. SUMMERALL. There were quite a number of them that at one time or another had been under fire.

Senator NEW. Well, comparatively few.

The CHAIRMAN. I mentioned that, General, because there is a very strong feeling which we have got to recognize, no matter whether we agree that it is warranted in whole or in part, existing amongst

what I term the citizen officers against any military system which in time of peace confines their opportunities only to the lower grades of any citizen reserve corps, and confines all the upper grades automatically to the officers of the Regular Establishment. As I have gathered it, the citizen officer, who has gotten confidence in himself now by reason of his experience, wants to compete with the regular on even terms. He is under a handicap in doing it, and he knows it, because he can not spend the time at it which the regular does, because that is his regular life work; but if we filled up a plan here which assures to the citizen officer the chance to rise to the command of combat units larger than battalions, regiments, even brigades, you will get a tremendously better response from them all, and there are 40,000 of those officers now on the reserve list of the Army.

Gen. SUMMERALL. Many of them have already shown their ability to command units, and they and all others who hereafter come in should have ample opportunity to show their ability and there should be ample guarantee to secure effective recognition of their ability and proper advancement. There should be no such thing as jealousy between the citizen officer or the reserve officer or the National Guard officer and the Regular officer. There must be fair dealing all around.

The CHAIRMAN. I think you are absolutely right, of course.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. General, in the organization of the Army, you have the brigade, the division, and the corps as the larger units. Will you just discuss to the committee the organization of these several units, as to staff organization? Corps have what staffs?

Gen. SUMMERALL. The corps has a chief of staff, who commands all staff officers, and the officers of all services at the corps headquarters. There is an assistant chief of staff, called the G-1, who is the administrative officer of the corps headquarters. He handles all questions of supply and communications, employment of transportation, and various other questions connected with executing the orders of the movement of troops.

There is an assistant chief of staff called the G-2, who is charged with the intelligence section of the corps. He has charge of all matters pertaining to information about the enemy, about our own troops, about the neighboring troops, everything that will be of value to the corps in planning an attack. In fact, the attack orders are based on the intelligence information furnished by the G-2 section.

There is an assistant chief of staff called G-3, who has charge of the G-3 section. He is charged with all operations, and is the tactical officer of the corps staff. He studies the plans for the employment of the troops, keeps in close touch with the employment of the neighboring troops, is in possession of all of the intelligence reports, and when orders are received for the movement of troops or for an assault, he obtains from the chief of staff and the corps commander the general intentions and draws up the concrete order for the movement and the employment of the troops.

Each of these assistant chiefs of staff has a number of assistants. The total of the corps staff in operations is generally about 75 officers, with a number of field clerks and non-commissioned officers and the necessary orderlies for the functioning of each section. Those are the general staff sections.

There is a corps adjutant, who has various assistants. He conducts the office of record, attends to all the correspondence of the corps, to all filing, and to certain details for each of the other sections.

Then there are the services. The ordnance officer has charge of the procurement and distribution of munitions and of all the corps dumps. He sees that ammunition is furnished as it is required for operations and that it is delivered to the troops or he notifies them where they can get it. He has assistants.

There is a chief surgeon, who has charge of the evacuation of the wounded and sick, and under him there are certain ambulance units and hospitals.

There is a corps judge advocate, who has to do with all courts-martial. He attends to the orders for the appointments of courts, studies the proceedings of the courts-martial, and presents them to the corps commander with his comments and recommendations.

There is a corps inspector, who has the duty of making inspections or investigations of any kind that the corps commander may desire to have made.

All of them have assistants, according to the extent of the operations.

Senator NEW. What comprises the army corps?

Gen. SUMMERALL. Actually it generally consisted of three divisions—two in line and one in support. According to our tables of organization, it might have contained as many as six divisions. At times the corps did contain four divisions, but never less than two and seldom less than three.

Then there are the corps troops, consisting of the pioneer infantry regiment or regiments, the engineer troops, the corps artillery, the signal troops, air service, tank corps, motor transport corps, ammunition trains, supply trains, the veterinary service, the remount service, the chemical warfare service, the headquarters troop, the military police, and various attached troops.

There is the corps signal officer, who has charge of all the communications of the corps; the quartermaster, who attends to the details of supply; the chief of artillery; the chief engineer; the provost marshal; and the chaplain.

The corps troops number about twelve to fifteen thousand men, and a corps of three divisions would have in the neighborhood of 95,000 men.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. That is practically the organization of a corps?

Gen. SUMMERALL. Yes.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. The division is organized along the same lines?

Gen. SUMMERALL. The division is organized along the same lines as to staff and services.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. All of that is a matter of regulation, is it not?

Gen. SUMMERALL. All of that is in the tables of organization. The field army has a much greater staff, and it adds a section of the General Staff, called the G-4, which has specifically to do with supplies.

Senator NEW. What comprises the division?

Gen. SUMMERALL. The division has two brigades of Infantry. Each brigade of Infantry is composed of two regiments of Infantry of about 3,500 men each and a machine-gun battalion. Then the division has a brigade of Artillery, composed of three regiments of Field Artillery, a trench-mortar battery, and an ammunition train. It has one regiment of Engineers, a battalion of signal troops, a machine-gun battalion, a supply train, a military police company, a headquarters troop, a sanitary train, consisting of four field hospitals, four ambulance companies, and a train carrying extra supplies, a pack train, a bakery unit, a machine shop, and various smaller units, such as the laundry unit, sales commissary unit, the clothing and bath unit, and a few other smaller services. The division totals about 27,000 men.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. And about 13,000 men behind a division for its support, noncombatant troops?

Gen. SUMMERALL. Pertaining to the service of supply. That varies according to the employment of the troops. It will be very great in active operations, and it will fall very low in the occupation of a quiet sector.

Senator NEW. But the division, independent of the service of supply, approximates 27,000 men?

Gen. SUMMERALL. Yes, sir; and it is generally maintained at that strength when it goes into combat.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. Were these units all pretty well organized when the armistice was signed?

Gen. SUMMERALL. Perfectly organized; yes, sir.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. Was the model of any army followed in the organization of these several units, or were they worked out upon American lines?

Gen. SUMMERALL. The history of that goes back to Gen. Pershing's arrival in France, where a study was made of the organization of troops in the British and French Armies. Advice was sought at the British and French general headquarters, and this organization was based upon the result of those studies. Our division was stronger than any other division of any other army. The French and the British divisions approximated 10,000 rifles, where we had about 15,000 Infantry in our division. Our Artillery was stronger organically than the artillery of their divisions, and our divisions could occupy a much greater front and could fight longer against the same amount of resistance than theirs could because of our division strength.

It was therefore a combination of what they had, based upon what we considered best, in the light of their experience. Our staff is modeled after the French staff.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. You mean the commanding officer's staff?

Gen. SUMMERALL. The division commander's staff and the corps commander's staff, and so on.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. In addition to these units in the staffs which you have described, the commanding officer in France had a staff which surrounded him.

Gen. SUMMERALL. The general headquarters had a staff, which I understand was also modeled after the French system.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. That was divided up just as the divisional staff.

Gen. SUMMERALL. Yes; only it had a G-5 section, which was a training section, in addition to what I have mentioned. Then there was the Service of Supply, which consisted of officers of the different services.

Senator SUTHERLAND. How many corps did you have over there, General, at the time of the armistice?

Gen. SUMMERALL. Seven Army corps. Most of our operations were performed by the First, Second, Third, Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Corps. The Seventh Corps was formed in September of 1918. About the time of the armistice there were organized the Eighth and Ninth Corps, and they functioned until the troops were demobilized.

The CHAIRMAN. They were made up in part of the units of the old First, Second, Third, and Fourth, were they not?

Gen. SUMMERALL. The staffs were taken from other staffs, or from line officers who had shown a special aptitude. Each staff expected to furnish officers to new staffs, as fast as they were created, and we had understudies who could take their places promptly. For example, there were three different chiefs of staff of the First Division between July and November.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you care to go on with a discussion of some other phase of the problem?

Gen. SUMMERALL. There were minor items in the bills which I think would probably not be worth my taking up the time of the committee. I think I have discussed the salient features that appealed to me as meriting an expression of opinion.

The CHAIRMAN. I want to ask you about one or two features of these bills and topics relating to the bills.

There has been a lot of discussion, General, about the method of commissioning officers, whether it shall be by services or in branches of the combatant forces, or whether it shall be upon a single list. Have you any observations to make upon that?

Gen. SUMMERALL. I think upon the whole it is better to commission officers in the different services, but I do think it is necessary to have officers serve for a short period with the different arms in combatant troops, in order to acquire a knowledge of the employment of the combatant arms.

The CHAIRMAN. How would you get rid of the inequalities in the matter of promotion which exist as between the different branches of the service, such as the Infantry and Field Artillery, and which cause so much pulling and hauling, not only in the War Department and about it, but also in the Congress from time to time?

Gen. SUMMERALL. We have had very good success in transferring officers from the other arms to the Field Artillery, and I see no reason why officers should not be transferred when grave inequalities exist.

The CHAIRMAN. Those inequalities have existed, and in spite of that opportunity to make transfers?

Gen. SUMMERALL. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Ordinarily transfers are made upon request, are they not?

Gen. SUMMERALL. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. They can be made as a matter of right, of course, by a superior command, but ordinarily they are made upon request, and several people who have had experience have suggested that the only cure for that situation was the single-list suggestion, applicable to the combatant services, such as are recited on page 27 of the bill, Infantry, Cavalry, Field Artillery, Coast Artillery, and Corps of Engineers—to create a pool of officers.

Gen. SUMMERALL. It is very important that there should not be any great inequality of promotion in the different arms; but I think the greatest efficiency will come from an officer staying with an arm after he is assigned to it, unless he requests the transfer because he especially desires the other arm.

The CHAIRMAN. The opportunity for the officer to stay with the arm in which he is best qualified could still come to him, could it not, by a renewal of assignments? I mean, could not we, in writing any such legislative provision, instruct the War Department to assign officers wherever they showed themselves to be best suited?

Gen. SUMMERALL. That might be done.

The CHAIRMAN. It certain would be in the interest of elasticity, and I am rather a believer in that, instead of certain limitations which you mention in your opening sentences.

Gen. SUMMERALL. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. To-day there is a degree of rigidity in that matter. A man is commissioned in the Infantry, and in the great majority of cases in the Infantry he stays all of his Army career. He may want to get out of the Infantry and into the Field Artillery, because there is a greater chance of promotion in the Field Artillery, but everybody wants to go into the Field Artillery, and they can not all get in.

Gen. SUMMERALL. I think some plan should be worked out by which promotion should be closely equalized in the different arms and maintained in that way.

The CHAIRMAN. This bill, you will also notice, in this same connection, omits from the list of branches which are regarded as the line of the Army, the Air Service.

Gen. SUMMERALL. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Some of us propose to insert Air Service as a branch in which officers should be commissioned permanently if we are to retain that system of permanent commissions. Do you not believe that the Air Service has now reached a point where it has become such a specialty amongst the fighting branches that officers should be commissioned in it rather than serve in it merely by detail?

Gen. SUMMERALL. My understanding of the Air Service is that it is generally adapted to the younger men and to men who have especial aptitude for it. I think also that members of that service, as in all services, should have military training, and therefore the efficiency of the Air Service can best be promoted by detailing from the rest of the Army young men of especial aptitude and relieving them from that detail when the conditions appear to make it desirable.

I think the Air Service for the Army should be a part of the Army, under military control, and that air units should be assigned

to the different units, divisions, corps, and armies, as an organic part of those units.

The CHAIRMAN. There are several matters that have to do with the commissioning of officers. Some of them as proposed in this bill are quite revolutionary. For example, on page 3 there is a provision that all general officers on the active list, whether they be in the service or in the line, shall be recommissioned into the line. That operates to establish the straight detail system for such positions as the Surgeon General, the Chief of Ordnance, the Chief Signal Officer, the Chief of Engineers, and the Quartermaster General.

Gen. SUMMERALL. I do not know why that provision is inserted. In general, it would seem to me that the chiefs of services ought to be technical men, with a good deal of qualification for those services.

The CHAIRMAN. Another phase of it, on which perhaps you would not want to comment, although we would be glad to have it, would be that if this was enacted into law it would take away from the Senate the power of confirming the nominee for Chief of Ordnance, Quartermaster General, Chief Signal Officers, because it abolishes those offices entirely and makes a complete change. Even the Surgeon General no longer exists.

I think that was an error, and the Secretary of War, when I called his attention to it before the committee, said that he had not noticed that, because there must be a Surgeon General of the Army, and there is one under this bill.

Gen. SUMMERALL. Undoubtedly those chiefs of services should continue, and I would think that there ought to be ample safeguards to secure the detail of the most suitable officers for them.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Have you any comment to make on the General Staff system as laid down in this War Department bill—the General Staff Corps and the Chief of Staff? That is a moot question, as you probably know.

Gen. SUMMERALL. That is a very difficult question and a very elaborate one. It depends entirely, I think, on the policy to be adopted with reference to the administration of the War Department. It is a simpler question in the administration of a military command. There is no doubt in my mind that the chief of staff of a division, a corps, and a field army must control every person at that headquarters below the commanding general himself.

There may be radical differences in the administration of the War Department, due to the peculiar status of the Secretary of War and to the relations of the supply departments to the industries of the country. I do not feel qualified to discuss the general situation in the War Department, but I would urge that any organization of the Army should insure that everybody about a corps or a division headquarters or a field Army headquarters should be subordinated to the Chief of Staff.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, that would be a matter of regulation under this bill?

Gen. SUMMERALL. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Because the President should direct the organization of all units?

Gen. SUMMERALL. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Which would include, of course, a field army, but in the War Department it is another thing?

Gen. SUMMERALL. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. General, this bill eliminates the Inspector General's Department. What comment have you to make on that as a matter of policy?

Gen. SUMMERALL. I could not speak for the War Department, but, with reference to division and higher headquarters, the inspector has been a member of the staff detailed from the line. I think there should be in such a staff an inspector, but he is absolutely subject to the division, corps, or field army commander, and I see no reason for his belonging to any particular department. There should be authority for such a detail, as he is a very important officer.

The CHAIRMAN. I had gathered that impression from my talks with officers at large. If you need an inspector in a division and need one in a corps, does not it follow logically that you need one in the War Department?

Gen. SUMMERALL. I do not know whether his duties could be performed by the General Staff in the War Department or not. In a corps or division he might well be an officer of the General Staff as far as his relations to the divisions or corps commander are concerned.

The CHAIRMAN. His relations to the Secretary of War here in Washington are perhaps a little different from what his relations are to the division—to what the relations of the division inspector are to his commanding officer. The Secretary of War is a civilian. The Inspector General, as I understand it, whether it has been prescribed in regulations or by law, in a sense acts as an independent source of information for him. He has a small group of officers organized and instructed as to how to carry out investigations.

Gen. SUMMERALL. That may be desirable in the War Department; I do not know; but in a military command it would be undesirable to have an officer acting independently of the Chief of Staff, for example. The inspector must be under the Chief of Staff just as the other General Staff or service officers would be.

Senator SUTHERLAND. You have no corresponding situation in the field?

Gen. SUMMERALL. No, sir. So I would not be able to give any valuable opinion on the necessity for an inspector general in the War Department.

The CHAIRMAN. You see, the War Department General Staff is, of necessity, a very large and sometimes elaborate piece of machinery, even in times of peace, and to my mind it is a question of grave public policy whether we ought to abolish the office of inspector general of the Army. He makes independent investigations at the request of the Secretary of War. Many of them are confidential. He investigates any kind of things that may come up, and the Secretary of War uses him as the agent to investigate the operation of a particular branch of the Army, rather than calling upon that particular service for a report, which would come up through channels and be approved or disapproved along the line. I myself am not afraid, not particularly afraid, of what is known as staff despotism, but the time might come in which the inertia of peace,

as it occurred years ago in the Army, under the old bureau system, where the machinery was so involved that it was mighty hard for anybody to follow clear through a particular matter until one reached the source of the trouble. It seems to me that the inspector general, under proper military regulations, of course, not to give him absolute independence, would fill a place there which is of value to a civilian Secretary of War.

Gen. SUMMERALL. It has always been a very highly regarded department. Its work, so far as I have seen it among the troops, has commanded great respect.

The CHAIRMAN. Ordinarily we have had a very able lot of officers in it.

Gen. SUMMERALL. An exceedingly able lot of officers.

The CHAIRMAN. And it is a very small corps?

Gen. SUMMERALL. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Were there any matters in the organization of the War Department itself that you desired to comment on?

Gen. SUMMERALL. I think I would not be able to discuss it.

The CHAIRMAN. Such as the Finance Department?

Gen. SUMMERALL. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. The Motor Transport Corps and these new branches?

Gen. SUMMERALL. Well, there is no doubt that a Motor Transport Corps, a Tank Service, and a—

Senator SUTHERLAND (interposing). Chemical warfare?

Gen. SUMMERALL. No. The Motor Transport Corps and the Tank Service, I think, are essential departments because they do handle specific things that are essential to the operation of armies in the field.

I do not conceive that the Chemical Warfare Service should be a special or a separate arm. The gas is largely thrown by the artillery. The attempts to deliver gas attacks at close range in open warfare, in my experience, did not lead to great results. In trench warfare there were a few concentrations, but I think they might easily be handled by the Engineer regiment with the division, or the Engineer troops with the corps. I think the Engineers should learn to handle that as a part of their training, and that the gas projectiles should be supplied by the Ordnance Department, the same as it supplies other artillery ammunition.

The CHAIRMAN. How about the research work, experimentation? That would require chemists, would it not?

Gen. SUMMERALL. I should think that would be a good deal like the research work for powders and fuses and explosives generally.

The CHAIRMAN. You think it should be left to the Engineers?

Gen. SUMMERALL. To the Ordnance Department.

The CHAIRMAN. We have been given to understand that it was the plan of the War Department to leave all of that to the Engineers.

Gen. SUMMERALL. It does not impress me now as being of sufficient magnitude to warrant a separate department.

The CHAIRMAN. Thirty per cent of our casualties were gas casualties, according to the statistics?

Gen. SUMMERALL. Yes; but I imagine that they were from projectiles fired by artillery. I do not believe that a great per cent

came from gas fired by the Chemical Warfare Service, although I could not answer as to that.

The CHAIRMAN. Of course that involves the protection against gas, the development of the gas mask, and any other features that would be evolved.

Gen. SUMMERALL. That must all be taken up. I had not thought it of sufficient importance to warrant the establishment of a separate department.

Senator SUTHERLAND. Do you think that the Transportation Department and the Motor Transport Corps should be consolidated under one head, or should they properly be separated?

Gen. SUMMERALL. I think the Motor Transport should be alone. It is a very great undertaking, and upon the successful operation of this Motor Transport will depend our success in war.

I do not know of any necessity to form a transportation branch for railroad and steamship transport. We have always utilized the civil corporations' employees to operate those things.

With reference to military railroads, I think they should remain under the Corps of Engineers. They should construct and operate them.

The CHAIRMAN. It seems to be conceded that in operations in the field the Engineers should have charge of railroads.

Gen. SUMMERALL. That is my opinion.

Senator SUTHERLAND. General, this is a little aside from the bill, but did there come under your observation over there any great amount of destruction of property after the armistice was signed, in order to get rid of it, or obviate the necessity of bringing it back to this country, or in order to make a better deal with the French, or for any other purpose?

Gen. SUMMERALL. None whatever came under my observation. On the contrary, I thought that every effort was made to salvage even very poor material, and to place it where it could be disposed of, with the exception of captured ammunition. Enemy ammunition was blown up, because it was dangerous to handle, and of no value to us. I saw large quantities of equipment, some of it salvaged material, that had been sold to the French, and I saw no destruction and heard of no destruction of our property over there.

Senator SUTHERLAND. Did you ever hear of any destruction of airplanes?

Gen. SUMMERALL. Only of those that were unserviceable. I have heard it said that unserviceable airplanes were destroyed. I would not have known much about what happened in the Air Service.

Senator SUTHERLAND. How about automobiles or motorcycles?

Gen. SUMMERALL. I heard nothing of the kind. I visited the Service of Supply in June. I saw the large depots, and there was a great deal of material there. I saw great numbers of trucks and cars turned in by divisions, waiting to be turned over to the French. I saw great depots of supplies waiting to be transferred, and they were being checked. I saw no evidence of any destruction.

The CHAIRMAN. Reverting again, General, to this question of supply, including transportation, have you ever given any consideration to proposals for having a centralized supply department, which would include purchase by such a department of all articles whose

use is common to two or three branches or services of transportation and storage; leaving with the other bureaus the purchase and procurement of their technical materials, such as with the Ordnance, for example, guns and ammunition and explosives, weapons of all kinds, and their appurtenances; leaving to the Signal Corps telephone, telegraph, radio, electrical, and other scientific instruments; and leaving to the Engineers the things which are used alone by the Engineers, and placing under the jurisdiction of the central supply department, a large Quartermaster Corps, the purchase of all standard things or things whose use is common to two or more services or arms!

Gen. SUMMERALL. I have heard reference to such a system, and it appealed to me as being good business procedure. I do not know why it should conflict with the efficiency of the supply.

The CHAIRMAN. There is a great dispute going on here now, as you have probably heard, between P. S. and T. on one side and the supply services on the other.

Gen. SUMMERALL. I do not know of such a controversy.

The CHAIRMAN. It has been reflected in testimony before this committee, with a good deal of emphasis. We are trying to solve it.

Gen. SUMMERALL. It is a very big question, and it would require study by those who are concerned with the procurement and distribution of supplies to see if it was a workable system. It would have to be determined whether it was workable as well as economical.

The CHAIRMAN. The contention of some of the supply services is that P. S. and T., a division of the General Staff, is invading their province in the matter of procurement. They all seem to agree that the General Staff, through its proper assistant chief or staff or division shall control and coordinate the purchase, policy, or procurement policy, but these service chiefs say "Now, after you have told us what you want, let us get it."

Have you any observations to make as to the limitations which should naturally and properly be imposed upon the General Staff in that particular problem?

Gen. SUMMERALL. No; I could not discuss that without a great deal of study and thought about it.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Sutherland, have you any further questions to ask Gen. Summerall?

Senator SUTHERLAND. I do not think of any.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, he has given us some very valuable information. General, you are an artilleryman, aren't you?

Gen. SUMMERALL. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Gen. Snow, the chief of Artillery, when before the committee pointed out something which he thought was not good policy, in that this bill confides to the Coast Artillery Corps all corps and Army artillery; and his contention was that corps and Army artillery, being mobile and being compelled to follow the field armies wherever they go, should be under the Field Artillery, and his suggestion was that we amend the bill in order to transfer from the Coast Artillery Corps the personnel assigned to it for the operation of the corps and and Field Artillery over to the Field Artillery branch.

Gen. SUMMERALL. I should think the test of that would be the employment of the arm. There is no doubt the moment it passes

to the field it comes under the chief of Artillery, who is the chief of Field Artillery. The chief of Artillery of a field army, a corps, and a division, belong to the Field Artillery, and he is handling field artillery. Now, it may well happen that we resort to the Coast Artillery to draw the personnel and guns, because everything in the country must help to win the war. We may take its equipment and put it in the field, but then it comes under the Field Artillery. If we are going to organize and maintain corps artillery and Army artillery, as such, and as separate from the Coast Artillery, then logically it ought to come under the Field Artillery.

The CHAIRMAN. That is just what we are going to do, in accordance with the tables submitted with this bill. We are to have three brigades of heavy artillery.

Gen. SUMMERALL. Then, logically, they ought to come under the Field Artillery, because the Field Artillery is going to employ them and therefore it ought to train them.

Senator SUTHERLAND. Do you think there ought to be a chief of each of these active arms, a Chief of Infantry, a Chief of Artillery, and Chief of Cavalry?

Gen. SUMMERALL. Yes, sir; I am very sure about that, Senator. You need not call him chief, necessarily, but there should be an officer in the War Department who is charged with the development, the training, the questions of policy, and so on, with reference to each arm.

Senator SUTHERLAND. Would he be a member of the General Staff?

Gen. SUMMERALL. There is no objection to that. He may well be a member of the General Staff. It is rather unimportant what he is called or what he belongs to, just so he has that duty.

Senator SUTHERLAND. Of developing his arm?

Gen. SUMMERALL. Of developing his arm.

The CHAIRMAN. It has been of great advantage to the Field Artillery to have a chief?

Gen. SUMMERALL. Yes, sir; and to the Coast Artillery, and it would be a great advantage to the Infantry and Cavalry, equally. There should be some person who is specifically responsible for each arm.

The CHAIRMAN. Reverting again to this Army artillery, under the tables submitted with this bill, with each field army there is to be a brigade of 155 millimeter guns—that is, the G. P. F., I assume?

Gen. SUMMERALL. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. And a brigade of heavy howitzers? I assume that to be the 9.2's.

Gen. SUMMERALL. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Or the 220 millimeter?

Gen. SUMMERALL. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Those are the organizations which Gen. Snow says should be under the Field Artillery.

Gen. SUMMERALL. That is entirely logical. The fact that we resorted to the Coast Artillery and to the matériel from the coast defenses, and took the personnel from the Coast Artillery because we had no other, as an emergency measure, does not change in any way the principle of the employment of these guns in the field. If we

had had them in the Field Artillery, we would have employed them.

Senator SUTHERLAND. That is quite a new development, General, anyhow, is it not—the use of these very heavy pieces of artillery?

Gen. SUMMERALL. Yes, sir; and it will be still further developed.

Senator SUTHERLAND. Is it not quite likely that that will be developed for our coast defenses somewhat—the use of heavy mobile artillery mounted on trains, somewhat similar to the way they were—

Gen. SUMMERALL (interposing). Yes, sir. I think it should be so developed.

Senator SUTHERLAND. While it is for the defense of the coast, would not it naturally come under the Coast Artillery?

Gen. SUMMERALL. Yes; but if you put it in the field army, it will then become part of the Field Artillery.

Senator SUTHERLAND. It will normally come under the Field Artillery, of course.

Gen. SUMMERALL. Yes, sir. If it was for coast defense, it should remain under the Coast Artillery. The moment it is transferred to the field army it goes to the Field Artillery.

The CHAIRMAN. But these units, just referred to, are to be assigned to the Field Artillery in time of peace?

Gen. SUMMERALL. Yes, sir; and they should be under the Field Artillery.

The CHAIRMAN. That seems logical to me.

Gen. SUMMERALL. Yes, sir; regardless of the personnel. For example, we have been using regiments of Cavalry as Field Artillery, and they were Field Artillery; they were not Cavalry.

Senator FLETCHER. What do you think about the development of the tanks, General?

Gen. SUMMERALL. I think the tank has the greatest possibilities, and we must develop it and should use it in very large numbers.

The CHAIRMAN. It is the answer to the machine gun, is it not, in many ways?

Gen. SUMMERALL. Yes; in many ways. It overcomes wire, and it is a great help to the Infantry to have those tanks going along, but principally, it is an answer to the machine gun.

Senator FLETCHER. Do you favor a separate tank corps?

Gen. SUMMERALL. Yes, sir. I want a separate tank corps, but I want tanks assigned to each unit also. I want a certain number to be an organic part of a division, but it is sufficiently important and it is sufficiently distinctive from other branches to warrant a separate corps.

The CHAIRMAN. General, you are about to embark now upon recruiting up a division, such as the First Division, and that involves, of course, a consideration of the attractiveness of the service; and that, in turn, involves questions of morale. Have you any observations to make to us about the morale of troops and how they can be maintained in time of peace and the service made attractive and in a way brought closer to the people? I think you will agree with me that prior to this war the Regular Army, to its own great misfortune, was, through force of circumstances, I do not know what particularly, kept away from the people. The people did not know their own Army and the Army did not know the people. What can we do about that?

Gen. SUMMERALL. If we adopt national service the problem is solved. Our Army in this war was known to our people, and had the affectionate devotion of the people, because every community and a great number of our families were represented in the Army. And through the aid societies a great many other people went to our camps and became interested and acquainted with our men, and saw what fine people soldiers were. That situation will continue if we have universal training. The soldier will never get the status to which he is entitled unless we do have universal training.

Without universal training we must endeavor to cultivate friendly relations with the people and the community by attracting them to our camps and by stimulating the mingling of our men with the people. If communities can be induced to entertain the soldiers and the soldiers can, in turn, entertain communities, there will naturally result many casual acquaintances that will ripen into friendships. That is happening right now in Louisville. That will assist locally, but the great mass of our people are removed from any such possibilities.

By means of recruiting parties that we are sending out we are trying to interest people in the Army and let them see something of our soldiers. Something will be done that way, but it will not penetrate very far into the communities not immediately identified with the camps.

The aid societies have been very instrumental in linking the soldiers with the civilians everywhere. They have formed high ideas of soldiers. They have expressed those ideas and have given our men the high reputation they deserved to have where they were known. They could still help some, but the only way that we will ever have our people thoroughly in sympathy with the Army is to have universal training. They will then understand it and see that the soldiers are just like all other men, deserving of their respect and their liking.

Senator SUTHERLAND. Do you think it will be possible, with reference to the Regular Army, to adopt some plan of vocational training which will make it more attractive?

Gen. SUMMERALL. Vocational training has been adopted and is being instituted now. I doubt if it makes the service very much more attractive for men to enter it. It will help the morale of the men in it and make them happier. Congress has done a most excellent thing in admitting men to West Point from the enlisted personnel of the Army.

Senator SUTHERLAND. What kind of ordinary school training do you give or have you ever given in the Army to men who were illiterates, for instance?

Gen. SUMMERALL. We have always had post schools that taught the elementary branches, and we now require the illiterates to take the elementary branches.

Senator SUTHERLAND. Whether foreign or native?

Gen. SUMMERALL. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. I was tremendously impressed here yesterday in seeing the drill of the company from Camp Upton of men who were illiterates.

Gen. SUMMERALL. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Perhaps you have seen them?

Gen. SUMMERALL. No. We had great success in France and Germany with our schools, and latterly I think they were doing very remarkable work in the vocational training. We taught them a great many practical things, and they were very much interested.

Senator FLETCHER. You have full authority to keep that up?

Gen. SUMMERALL. We are required to do so, and we are trying to induce men to attend.

The CHAIRMAN. It is in the law.

Gen. SUMMERALL. It is in the law, and Congress is giving us some money for it.

Senator SUTHERLAND. How many men have you at Camp Taylor now?

Gen. SUMMERALL. About 3 600.

The CHAIRMAN. That is all that is left of that wonderful division? That is about the figure they all stand at?

Gen. SUMMERALL. Yes, sir.

Senator SUTHERLAND. Are they coming in or going out? Are they coming in as fast as they are going out, or how is it?

Gen. SUMMERALL. Just now I think we are gaining, because the demobilization took place here at Camp Meade before we went down there. I think this provision by Congress that men can be discharged and get their \$60 bonus and their furlough has been very helpful to the men, and many of those whose enlistments would expire in a few months have taken their discharge and are reenlisting, although they have to reenlist for two years.

The CHAIRMAN. You are speaking now of the Regular soldiers?

Gen. SUMMERALL. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. That bill passed Congress the day before the First Division paraded in New York?

Gen. SUMMERALL. Yes, sir.

Senator SUTHERLAND. General, you were the originator of the Tobvhanha Artillery Camp, were you not?

Gen. SUMMERALL. Yes, sir.

Senator SUTHERLAND. Have you got all of that land together, and is it established as a camp?

Gen. SUMMERALL. Yes, sir.

Senator SUTHERLAND. Is it the purpose to maintain that as an Artillery camp, or do these other camps, which are now in operation rather take the place of that camp?

Gen. SUMMERALL. I have not been in touch with the policy of the War Department for the last two years with regard to training. I have heard of certain large areas which have been partly purchased and which I believe the War Department desires to purchase, such as Camp Knox in Kentucky and a camp in North Carolina.

The CHAIRMAN. Camp Bragg?

Gen. SUMMERALL. Yes. But I do not know to what extent the War Department has utilized or will continue to utilize our old ranges.

Senator SUTHERLAND. There is also a camp which has been under controversy for some time, Camp Benning, down in Georgia, which it is contemplated they will use as an Infantry school, I think comprising something near 100,000 acres of land. What do you

think of the necessity or advisability of having such a permanent camp as that maintained as an Infantry school for the purpose of conducting maneuvers and getting the different branches of the service together?

Gen. SUMMERALL. It would be extremely valuable. It is very essential that we should have specialist training for each arm, where we will keep abreast of the world in everything pertaining to the arm, and develop the best that we can find as the result of our own experience. And it is also essential that we should be able to bring the arms together to try out the coordination and cooperation as the result of these specialist developments.

Senator SUTHERLAND. It is necessary to have room so that they can move over a considerable area of the country?

Gen. SUMMERALL. Yes, sir. It should cover a large area, and they should be able to fire over a large area without endangering the surrounding country. Our vision has been very much broadened, I think, by the necessities of this war, and it would be a great pity if we were unable to put into effect the results of our experience and our studies.

The CHAIRMAN. You have been very kind, General. If there is nothing else, the committee will stand adjourned.

(Whereupon, at 4.50 p. m., the committee adjourned, subject to the call of the chairman.)

REORGANIZATION OF THE ARMY.

WEDNESDAY, OCTOBER 22, 1919.

UNITED STATES SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON MILITARY AFFAIRS,
Washington, D. C.

The subcommittee met at 2.15 p. m., pursuant to call.

Present: Senators Wadsworth (chairman), Thomas, Sutherland, New, Chamberlain, Fletcher, McKellar, and Sheppard.

STATEMENT OF MAJ. GEN. FRANK McINTYRE, ASSISTANT TO CHIEF OF STAFF, UNITED STATES ARMY.

The CHAIRMAN. General, give your full name and rank to the reporter, please.

Gen. McINTYRE. Maj. Gen. Frank McIntyre, executive assistant to the Chief of Staff at present. My permanent position is that of Chief of the Bureau of Insular Affairs of the War Department.

The CHAIRMAN. And, General, will you tell the committee about your assignments during the war?

Gen. McINTYRE. During the war I was at first performing my normal duties as Chief of the Bureau of Insular Affairs, to which was added the duties of censorship for awhile, and in July, 1918, I was assigned to duty with the General Staff.

The CHAIRMAN. And you have been in that position since?

Gen. McINTYRE. I have been in that position since.

Senator SUTHERLAND. What is your permanent rank?

Gen. McINTYRE. Major General. That is the only rank I have.

The CHAIRMAN. You are familiar, I assume, with the legislation that is pending before this subcommittee. We will be very glad to have your comments on it, on any phase of it that you regard as important.

Gen. McINTYRE. I desire particularly to call attention to about three or four points in the War Department bill. They are points that I consider essential, whatever may be the final determination of the committee on the larger matters involved in the bill.

Beginning with section 1, the provision occurring on page 2, beginning with line 6, which gives to the President the power to form such military organizations and such territorial field or tactical units or organizations as he may deem necessary, all organized as he may prescribe, from the units allotted is, I think, essential whatever may be the final strength of the Army determined on, and it is peculiarly essential at this time in reorganizing the

Army, and in connection with any system of training, universal or otherwise, that may be adopted. It is essential that the President shall have the power of strengthening certain units and taking from others, so long as he is within the limits of the forces authorized and the limits of the special services authorized.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes. This reads "from and within these several branches."

Gen. McINTYRE. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. He may organize or change.

Gen. McINTYRE. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. By that you mean that the Congress should be content to prescribe the number of officers and men in the Infantry?

Gen. McINTYRE. In the Infantry.

The CHAIRMAN. And permit the President to organize the Infantry into regiments and other units as he sees fit?

Gen. McINTYRE. As he sees fit.

The CHAIRMAN. And so with the other branches of the service?

Gen. McINTYRE. So with the other branches of the service. Practically the same authority is given a little farther down in this section with reference to the bureaus and offices of the War Department. It gives the President the authority to make such distribution or redistribution of the duties, powers, functions, properties and personnel of such previously existing departments, bureaus and offices as he may deem necessary for the efficiency of the military service, and authority to prescribe the duties, powers and functions of the officers of the services, units and organizations herein authorized or prescribed.

That is a much broader power than has even been given. It is not so broad as it was found necessary to exercise during the war, and in my opinion it is no broader than the President should have in time of peace. It is essential that he should have authority to take duties from one bureau or department and assign them to the other as the necessity may require it. It does not authorize the abolition of a bureau or the strengthening or weakening of its personnel, but it does authorize the assignment of duties. That would be illustrated, for example, by the question of construction. It is generally assumed under this bill that construction would go to the Engineer Corps. If that should not work satisfactorily, there is no reason why the President should not have the power to assign it to such other existing bureau as could do it. I mention that not intending to imply that that would happen.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you not think it is a part of proper public policy for the Congress to outline the duties in a general way of some of the more important services?

Gen. McINTYRE. I think not, for the reason that the established services and the duties that must be performed practically fix that. For example, we know when you give us a Medical Department exactly what that is for, and that practically allocates to that department the duties. There may at certain times be border-line duties which it might be advantageous to assign elsewhere.

The CHAIRMAN. For instance, I have in mind in connection with the Medical Department, the status of the Veterinary Corps.

Gen. McINTYRE. At the present time that is allocated to the Medical Department. Circumstances might arise which would make it

advantageous to assign part of that elsewhere. I think that the Senate bill in 1916, as a matter of fact, as it passed the Senate, did not so assign it to the Medical Department.

The CHAIRMAN. Was it in the Quartermaster Corps, or was it a separate branch?

Gen. McINTYRE. It was practically separate, in so far as it was provided for, I think, but it was left to the President to use the officers provided so that assignment of it to the Medical Department is a thing which might well change under certain conditions.

The CHAIRMAN. I had in mind really this age-long dispute about the supply system.

Gen. McINTYRE. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. I was wondering if it was not possible and proper for the Congress to outline the policy.

Gen. McINTYRE. I think it is, if they so desire. If Congress can arrive at a firm determination without any question as to its being a matter about which their own opinion would vary in a short time, I think that it might very well be done, but I have an impression, gained from the past, that their opinions do not differ widely from our own, and it is impossible for us to say just exactly how these duties should be allocated under new conditions and at some remote period from the present. In other words, it is a matter that we have to come to you and ask you to change.

Senator SUTHERLAND. It practically gives you the same freedom as you have now under the Overman Act?

Gen. McINTYRE. Within the department, not without.

Senator SUTHERLAND. Yes; within the department.

Gen. McINTYRE. It gives it to us within the department, but not without.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. Would not that section, when taken in connection with section 32, of the act, authorize the President to assign any officers in any branch of the line to duty in any other branch?

Gen. McINTYRE. Yes. It would do that. It would authorize him to assign him.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. Any place?

Gen. McINTYRE. Yes.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. You could take a lieutenant, for instance, and put him at the head of one of these staff corps?

Gen. McINTYRE. Oh, no. We limit that.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. Where do you limit that?

Gen. McINTYRE. We limit that in the bill, Senator.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. Where?

Gen. McINTYRE. It provides that the head of a staff corps must be a general. The President has to select generals with the consent of the Senate. We do not admit of putting juniors at the heads of bureaus.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. Yes. There is authority for that very thing to be done, because if you take this section 1, in connection with section 32 of the bill, it would authorize you to do anything in the way of detailing officers for any duty.

Gen. McINTYRE. For instance, you provide in this bill the head of each department or service, the senior officer is a general, and he must be a man that you have confirmed as a general officer. No

man can be assigned to the head of any corps or department of the service that you have not confirmed as a general officer.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. Will you point to that provision of the law which limits the power?

Gen. McINTYRE. Yes, sir. On page 3, line 2, is one of the limitations.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. What section?

Gen. McINTYRE. Section 2:

The general officers of the line who are authorized in this act for the various branches of the service shall be included in these numbers, and the assignment of general officers to any branch, corps, or department shall not create vacancies among general officers of the line.

That is a provision in which we say there shall be in the line of the Army so many lieutenant generals, and so many major generals, and so many brigadier generals, and then we say that the head of each department shall be one of those. What the provision you refer to would permit, Senator, would be the assignment of an Infantry officer to the Cavalry or a Cavalry officer to the Infantry, but that would, of course, as a matter of practice, be largely for instruction. Gen. Haig, in his comment, which has recently been published as a public document, on the lessons of the war, indicates that the one lesson that stands out above all others is the necessity of the officer's knowing the other man's job, and the only way you can learn the other man's job is by serving with him or in the position itself. So that it is contemplated that we, under this general power, would be enabled to assign an officer to any branch of the service practically.

Senator SUTHERLAND. What document is that?

Gen. McINTYRE. I can send you a copy of that, Senator. I do not know the number of the document. It is very recently published. I will send that to you.

Senator SUTHERLAND. We will be very glad to have it.

The CHAIRMAN. This provision would operate to abolish the office of Chief of Engineers, Chief Signal Officer, Quartermaster General, and Surgeon General.

Gen. McINTYRE. It does in this way only. It provides an officer who would in fact perform the duties of the Surgeon General. There is no objection at all, so far as I can see, to using the old nomenclature. That is what he would be called, anyway.

The CHAIRMAN. Of course, one of the significant things about it is that it draws from the Senate the power of confirming the nominees to those offices.

Gen. McINTYRE. You have, however, confirmed as a general officer the one to be assigned to it.

The CHAIRMAN. As a line officer we have.

Gen. McINTYRE. There will be one major general of the Medical Department, and you will have confirmed him.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Gen. McINTYRE. And of course that would be his job.

The CHAIRMAN. How about all the others?

Gen. McINTYRE. In the other corps, not to the same extent. Under this law the War Department could assign, as Chief of Engineers, any one of the engineer officers who might have the rank of major general.

The CHAIRMAN. Or any other officer who would have the rank of major general?

Gen. McINTYRE. Or any other. But that, of course, is assuming that we would do the rather unusual thing. Of course, we have power. There is no doubt under this bill you could do many things that would be rather absurd, but we can do those now if we start out and try. For example, we did not ask the confirmation of Gen. Pershing when we sent him to France to command the American Expeditionary Forces. Very important assignments can be made always without coming to the Senate to have them confirmed. If the Executive is disposed to abuse those powers, he can abuse them under almost any act you will draw.

The CHAIRMAN. He could not appoint an Infantry officer as Chief of Engineers without the consent of the Senate.

Gen. McINTYRE. No; he could not. I do not think he would do that anyway, unless it was in some very remarkable case, in which event the Senate doubtless would concur.

Senator FLETCHER. Is there any objection to providing for these chiefs as heretofore?

Gen. McINTYRE. I think not. The only objection is this: An officer confirmed in a position has a certain permanency which it is not desired he should have. He can not be removed without a reflection on the officer, or something of the kind. The idea is that the Executive should have just the same authority to assign a man as Quartermaster General that he would have to assign him to a much more important duty now.

Senator SUTHERLAND. It makes him much more directly answerable to the President?

Gen. McINTYRE. Yes.

Senator SUTHERLAND. To the Commander in Chief?

Gen. McINTYRE. Yes. When he comes in he can change him, as he does the Chief of Staff. He is expected to go out. The Quartermaster General is confirmed by the Senate, and that is not the case—

The CHAIRMAN (interposing). For four years.

Gen. McINTYRE. For four years.

The CHAIRMAN. Could not that objection be overcome by a provision of law granting the President authority to relieve the Quartermaster General and nominate a successor?

Gen. McINTYRE. That carries with it a reflection on the man, which would not come under this bill.

The CHAIRMAN. Would it be any greater reflection than if he were relieved without such a provision of law?

Gen. McINTYRE. I think so, because it is the exercising of a power of removal. In an ordinary case we assign an officer to any duty, and it is no reflection on him at all. We have had, for instance, commanding the Southern Department three general officers within the last year—I should say within the last six months—Gen. Dickman has been assigned; prior to that Gen. Holbrook; and prior to that Gen. Cabell. That is all in the day's work. Those officers are changed, whereas if those officers had been confirmed in succession by the Senate I am disposed to think that there would be some feeling that they were being removed from a position.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, I think the analogy is hardly accurate there, General. Those are field commands.

Gen. MCINTYRE. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. These are established instruments of government, all stationed here in Washington.

Gen. MCINTYRE. With reference to that point, inasmuch as it has come up, I would like to invite attention to this letter from Secretary Garrison to the chairman of the Committee on Military Affairs, Senator Chamberlain, in 1914, which goes over that matter and advocates everything which is advocated in this bill with reference to the staff corps and departments, and gives in detail the reasons therefor much better than I could give them now.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. His recommendations were not followed, however.

Gen. MCINTYRE. His recommendations were not followed.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. No.

Gen. MCINTYRE. But the reasons now have been emphasized by the events of war. But they were worked out in advance of this by a general line of reasoning as to what had happened in the Army previously.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. You do not think that the same powers ought to be conferred here in time of peace that were conferred during the time of war, do you? Because Congress practically deprives itself of authority over these officers under your proposed bill.

Gen. MCINTYRE. Not more than it does of much more important officers, Senator, under existing law. You confirm a line officer, and you thereafter turn him over to the executive with that rank; the executive uses him. It is proposed now that staff officers shall be treated in the identical way.

In his report for 1914, speaking of that matter, Gen. Wood comments on that recommendation, and I will read that short extract and then turn the letter to Secretary Garrison in, if you would like it.

The CHAIRMAN. We will be very glad to have it.

Gen. MCINTYRE. Gen. Wood says:

Whether this bill is enacted into law or not, I believe it is most essential that the field of selection for the heads of bureaus should be so amplified as to include all officers in the line of the Army above the grade of major. The present system tends in no way to promote the best interests of the service. The President is limited in his selection to a very small number of officers, whereas he should have a wide field from which to choose. I believe it is most important that the status of bureau chiefs as to detail should be similar to that of officers detailed in the staff corps or in the General Staff, namely, subject to release at any time the Secretary of War may deem such release desirable and that provision should be made for their transfer to duty with the arm or corps from which they came, in the grade and at the place they would have occupied had they remained in the arm or corps and received regular promotion. It is only through some such measure as this that the same measure of control can be exercised over these officers as is exercised over officers in the lines and detailed officers in the staff corps, including the Chief of Staff and officers of the General Staff.

And the Secretary of War with his letter in 1914 inclosed a bill. Now, in his bill—and that is one reason I bring it up—he did provide that these officers should be confirmed, and in that respect it differs from the bill that we are now submitting; that is, he provided that they should become a part of the line of the Army, but that the head of the staff bureaus should be nominated and con-

firmed by the Senate, and the entire bill is right here [indicating pamphlet]. It differs in some respects from the provisions embodied in this act, but in no principle, except that one of confirmation, if that be held a principle.

The CHAIRMAN. That is a rather important difference, General.

Gen. MCINTYRE. Not to my mind. I was not disposed to emphasize that as being of major importance. The important feature is, of course, that the President should have power to use these officers as freely as any other officers in the Army.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. I do not believe, General—I may be entirely mistaken—that your conception of this is the proper one, because I think, if you take Section 1 in connection with Section 32 of the bill, it would give power to the executive, and in the last analysis there is the Chief of Staff to appoint any man to the head of any of these staff corps, or to appoint him to any place.

Gen. MCINTYRE. Senator, it is distinctly provided in this bill that in time of peace general officers of the line shall be appointed from the next lower grade in the line of the Army, and a general officer of the line must be assigned to the head of each one of these corps or staff departments.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. Take the language of section 1, which gives to the President power to prescribe the duties, powers and functions of officers of the services, units and organizations herein authorized or prescribed, in connection with the language of section 32, which empowers the President to detail any officer to any military duty he may consider necessary and appropriate; would not that nullify all previous legislation as to such powers and enable the President to do any of these things?

Gen. MCINTYRE. No, sir; I think not. That provision was intended to cover the question of details in the service. It authorizes the President, for example, to do what we now come to Congress to get authority to do. If we desire to send a young officer to the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, for example, to study something that has a direct bearing on his profession, under the construction that has been placed or imposed on us by the legal department, we must come to you and get authority to do that. It is such matters as that. It is simply to enable the President to use the officers in the service. For example, we had a medical officer director of the Bureau of Health in the Philippine Islands, and it gave him a wonderful experience, and it gave him a great deal of information which was useful to the Army. After we had had two officers in that position, the Judge Advocate General held that we could not use an officer in that position.

This really leaves something to the discretion of the President in utilizing the officer if he believes that it is a proper military detail, but it does not enable us to put any officer at the head of a department except a general officer, and no officer can be made a general officer except a colonel.

Now, the other point, Senator, if I may say so—that is, that the powers given to the President are given to the Chief of Staff—I think there is quite a mistaken idea about that abroad. I venture to say that there is not a day that passes that matters do not come up from the Chief of Staff, and they are decided by the President.

and the Secretary of War, and quite frequently contrary to the Chief of Staff's opinion.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. In theory that is correct, but in practice my experience here for 12 years has been that the recommendation of the Chief of Staff is adopted by the Secretary of War and as well by the commander in chief. I venture to say that in 95 per cent of the cases that is a fact.

Gen. MCINTYRE. Well, in the percentage, of course, you would probably be correct, but the 5 per cent in which there is a difference of opinion would quite likely be on quite important matters.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. That is not the subject of criticism, particularly, but in the very nature of things the President can not give attention to the details of the whole Army.

Gen. MCINTYRE. The President can not, but the Secretary is nearer, and he is consulted freely.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. Every Secretary that I know anything about has been pretty close to the Chief of Staff, and it sometimes has led to his resignation from office. It brought differences between him and the Executive. I believe the President follows the recommendations of the Chief of Staff in nearly every instance.

Gen. MCINTYRE. Well, of course, it is intended that he should, but I simply wanted to bring out the fact that it is not done to any greater extent than the law contemplates.

The CHAIRMAN. While you are discussing that very point, General, will you turn to section 32. You have it before you?

Gen. MCINTYRE. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. And give us your understanding of the meaning of the language, commencing on line 12:

The detail of officers to college duty and the employment of retired officers on active duty shall be as now provided by law, but all other limitations or restrictions now imposed by law upon the assignment of officers for the performance of duties authorized by law are hereby repealed, except as otherwise specifically provided in this act.

Gen. MCINTYRE. Yes. The object of that was to repeal certain parts of the so-called Manchu law that went into such great detail as to be of very difficult application. Under this bill an officer can be separated from his own arm of the service not more than four years out of six, but under existing law a lieutenant must be present for duty with a company, with certain exceptions, at least two years out of six. Now, as Congress passed that, my own opinion was that it did not create a very great difficulty, but it was so construed by the Judge Advocate General, and that was acquiesced in later by Congress as to make it almost impossible of application; for example, as I understand it, a lieutenant is present for duty with a company when he reports to his regimental commander, whatever the regimental commander may use him for. He might put him on a detail or something with a detachment, but the Judge Advocate General held that "for duty" meant "on duty," which had the effect of construing that to require that that lieutenant be on duty with his company—that is, on no other duty which separates him from his company. So the provisions of this bill carries out the principle of the Manchu law, but it eliminates those little difficulties in its application.

The CHAIRMAN. The language is pretty broad—

but all other restrictions or limitations now imposed by law upon the assignment of officers for the performance of duties authorized by law are hereby repealed, except as otherwise specially provided in this act.

Gen. MCINTYRE. Those are the details that are repealed, the details of the Manchu law, which says not that the lieutenant shall be with his regiment for example, but that he shall be present on duty with a company.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well, sir. What was the next point you wanted to take up?

Gen. MCINTYRE. In section 31 it is provided that all staff officers, with the exception of those in the Medical Department and Corps of Engineers, shall be recommissioned with their present grades and dates of appointment in one of the branches of the line of the service. That provision is a provision to which I have previously called attention, advocated by Gen. Wood and by Secretary Garrison in 1914, and it is intended to carry into full effect the law of 1901, with reference to details to the staff corps and departments. That law passed in 1901 will, as it stands, become fully effective in 1943. This has been a more or less difficult situation since the passage of the 1901 law. Congress has expressed itself in favor of the detail system, but the detail system only becomes fully effective when the last permanent staff officer is retired. This section would make that fully effective at this time.

The CHAIRMAN. I notice in that section that you provide that "all appointments of officers in grades below that of brigadier general shall be by commission in the Infantry, Cavalry, Field Artillery, Coast Artillery Corps, Corps of Engineers, or one of the corps of the Medical Department, or chaplain, band leader, or professor at the United States Military Academy," etc. There has been a very strong insistence before the committee that the Air Service should be included in that list.

Gen. MCINTYRE. That was considered, and it was thought to be better not to do it, for the reason that the Air Service is essentially a young man's service, and that after a while only a certain percentage of those officers can be continued usefully in that branch of the service if permanently commissioned therein.

The CHAIRMAN. You could transfer them later, could you not?

Gen. MCINTYRE. Yes; but that would require some legislation, and always the difficulty of considering the man's personal interest, and it was thought better to enable the man to be selected and used in the Air Service. He comes up then with his contemporaries and when he ceases to desire to perform the duties in the Air Service, or ceases to be efficient in that strenuous duty, he can come back to his own service.

The CHAIRMAN. That would involve, we will say, taking a young second lieutenant of Infantry and assigning him to the Air Service in advance of any knowledge on the part of the War Department that he can become a flyer.

Gen. MCINTYRE. We could test that out more thoroughly in this way than we could if we appointed him originally, because we have the man during all the period of testing and instruction. He is there available for it, and we can assign him to the Air Service and

relieve him forthwith, if, after six months or a year, it developed that he had no aptitude or no taste for that service.

The CHAIRMAN. Are there not provisions of law to-day which prescribe the method of obtaining a commission in the Air Service?

Gen. McINTYRE. There are regulations that cover that. I do not know that there is a specific law.

The CHAIRMAN. There is some war-time legislation providing for the rank, we will say, of military aviator.

Gen. McINTYRE. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. And reserve military aviator.

Gen. McINTYRE. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. And it would seem to me that as service in the Air Service must be preceded by from three to six months' special training, followed thereafter by active service in the Air Service, or as long as a man can be used as a flyer, or properly used in an administrative capacity, that it would result inevitably in a separate service.

Gen. McINTYRE. It would be separate under this to the same extent that any of the departments are separate. It would be to the same extent that we make the Tank Service or the Quartermaster Department, or any of those departments.

The CHAIRMAN. It would be separate to a larger degree than the Quartermaster's Department, General. It is a new element.

Gen. McINTYRE. Yes; I appreciate it. I think personally that the question should largely be determined by the interests of these officers. I think that is what the department had in mind there, that the man's future opportunity would be much greater if he were not in a position where he would be cast off as soon as he ceased to be able to fly.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, now, for example, under the tables accompanying the bill, it is anticipated that in the Air Service, which was to be filled by detail alone, there was to be used 1,923 commissioned officers. Those 1,923 commissioned officers must be detailed away from the other branches of the service.

Gen. McINTYRE. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Does the law, in fixing the number of officers that shall compose the several branches of the service, take into account that 1,923 officers must be carried as surplus collectively in those branches in order to fill the Air Service?

Gen. McINTYRE. Yes. We have 1,923 positions in the Air Service. Originally the Air Service would select and recommend for appointment the greater part of those 1,923, all of the younger men. Wherever those men were commissioned they would be spotted as the selections of the Air Service, so that the Air Service would start in with that number of selected men. Those men, after four years of flying, we will say, will come back for two years with the Infantry or the Artillery, or such other period as you may fix, and then be available for detail into the Air Service, and in the meantime other men would be detailed in the Air Service to take their places. The men at the bottom might come up from the noncommissioned officers to the Air Service to a large extent, and lieutenants of the various services who desired to be detailed to that service. As a consequence of that detail system, you would in a short time have a far greater number

of flyers than you could get by having these vacancies filled by permanent men.

The CHAIRMAN. The object of my question is first to ascertain whether or not the totals set forth in this bill fixing the strength of the Infantry and Cavalry and Field Artillery include 1,923 extra officers?

Gen. McINTYRE. No.

The CHAIRMAN. Then, when you detail 1,923 officers to the Air Service, you create a deficiency in some or all of these branches?

Gen. McINTYRE. No, because when you detail those men to the Air Service, their places are taken in the Infantry by promotions and appointments. They are allowed for in the detailed numbers; but elsewhere in this bill it is provided that you shall have so many Infantry officers, and that means that the number of officers are to be assigned and on duty with the Infantry. In addition to that, you will have Infantry officers for detail in various staff departments, including the Air Service and the Tank Corps, and so forth, but they are accounted for elsewhere in the bill, but not in the number of Infantry officers. In other words, in the bill the number of officers in each branch of the service is provided for.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes; I see that.

Gen. McINTYRE. Yes. The number in the Air Service, while they are not commissioned in that service, are provided for just as those of the Quartermaster's Corps and of the Ordnance Department, and so forth. They are all provided for in the bill, but they are in addition to those given by number in the sections providing for Infantry, Cavalry, etc.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, I see the point. As to your observation that these men would serve by detail in the Air Service for four years and then go back to troops for two years and may thereafter return, or may not, do you think, General, that is the way to build up an Air Service, with all its possibilities for the future?

Gen. McINTYRE. I think so, Senator, and I think that is particularly true of the Air Service, or of any service which calls for that character of work, and which requires a period of release from that sort of work. In other words, if we do not provide that an officer on that sort of duty should go back to another class of duty for an interval, we will hereafter have to provide for it, even though we do not want him in the Infantry or the Cavalry or the Artillery. If we do not want this exchange of services at all, we have to provide relief for that man every so often. In other words, this enables us to give the man a relief from a peculiarly trying service in a way that will make him more useful when he comes back to it.

Senator FLETCHER. Is this detail which you propose, General, based at all on application or do you just do it arbitrarily?

Gen. McINTYRE. In a matter like that it would be on a man's choice. We have had people detailed to the Air Service heretofore. When the Air Service was part of the Signal Corps all of the flyers were detailed men from the line of the Army. They were men who wanted to do that work, and many of them—for instance, Gen. Foulois, who was before your committee, was an Infantry officer, and he was detailed to the Air Service. All of our old Air Service men were detailed from some branch of the line.

The CHAIRMAN. At the conclusion of the war, as I recollect the figures, there were only 132—I hesitate to give the number, but it was very small, comparatively—Regular officers doing actual flying in the Air Service.

Gen. McINTYRE. Yes; that would necessarily be true on account of the younger men taking to that branch of the service. A good many of the men who had been Air Service men had gotten along where the opportunity in flying was not so great as the opportunity which they would secure elsewhere, and that would be the trouble if you had this a permanent nondetailed corps, a military air service. It would undoubtedly happen that at the end of 10 or 12 years the men in the Air Service would lack opportunity in that field.

Senator NEW. General, this plan seems to take from the Air Service any man who has been in for four years. For that period he may be a good flyer. He is competent as a good flyer and all. Beyond that time he has, perhaps, reached the point where his nerves or something else makes it advisable for him to discontinue as a flyer, but it does end his usefulness to the Air Service, does it?

Gen. McINTYRE. Not necessarily.

Senator NEW. May not the very fact that he has been four years as a flyer put him in position to have ideas concerning the mechanical construction of a machine and give him a familiarity with it that makes him of value to the service in his capacity as inventor or designer, upon which he would realize if he continued in the service beyond the four years?

Gen. McINTYRE. Any man that has that aptitude and taste would get a further detail—it simply releases him for a while from that service.

The CHAIRMAN. Two years is a long while.

General McINTYRE. But he is spotted for that service. If a man is going to be exclusively a flying man, two years might be regarded as too long; but, of course, a military aviator, to be of value to the service, must have served in or know something about the other branches of the service, and in that interval he is acquiring valuable information.

The CHAIRMAN. He would be out of the air game, though?

Senator NEW. The way it strikes me is that in two years, at the rate of progress that the air game is developing, at the end of that time a man would be clear out of touch with it, and I do not think he would be of much use to it if detailed back to it for another period. In the two years' interval he would have lost so much time that it would not be profitable to have him detailed back.

Gen. McINTYRE. I think, Senator, that a man would keep pretty well in touch with the progress of the Air Service, even though detailed to the line of the Army, if that was his particular interest. If he was sufficiently interested I think he would get a relaxation from the strenuous part of the work, but I do not think he would lose interest in that branch of the service.

Senator NEW. Possibly not lose interest, but he would lose opportunity.

Gen. McINTYRE. To some extent; no doubt of that.

Senator NEW. If he were taken out of the Air Service and detailed to the Cavalry or to any other branch of the service, in that

two years he would have no opportunity to apply his knowledge of aeronautics.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. In other words, he would get rusty in two years.

Senator NEW. That is exactly what I mean. In that two years he would drop so far behind, certainly at the rate that aeronautics is progressing, that he would be clear out of it when at the end of two years he would be sent back to the service.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. I want to ask about section 2. General, I see in section 2 of this General Staff bill you provide for six lieutenant generals. There is no such officer in the Army now?

Gen. MCINTYRE. No. That was provided for on this principle: One was to be the Chief of Staff of the Army and five were to command the Army Corps that are provided for in this bill. Each one would have command of four divisions, and we provided officers on that scale.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. Why create that new rank? Do not major generals now command corps, and did not they command corps in France?

Gen. MCINTYRE. You authorized in your war legislation the President to appoint every corps commander a lieutenant general.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. But he did not do it.

Gen. MCINTYRE. He did not do it because the war did not last any longer. I think that it would have been done very shortly, but those men have probably earned it. But it is an old rank, and it is supposed to be the rank of a corps commander.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. You say it is an old rank. When did we have lieutenant generals, except as specially created?

Gen. MCINTYRE. We have had very few except as specially created, because as a matter of fact we have never had corps organized in time of peace in the Army. This bill provides for them, but we have not had them yet.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. Your whole bill is framed on an Army of 500,000, on the assumption that the Army will be constituted as 500,000 men?

Gen. MCINTYRE. That, of course, is the theory, but the framework of the bill is such that it could be fitted to any strength of the Army.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. Well, six lieutenant generals would do for an Army of 500,000?

Gen. MCINTYRE. Six would be ample for an army of 500,000.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. What would you do with them with an army of 175,000?

Gen. MCINTYRE. Well, it would depend somewhat on the duties which you assigned them to. If you assign them to the command of corps, even though the corps should be—even only one division of the corps should be an active part of the Regular Army—you might very appropriately give that rank to these officers.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. Just as though just now we have a division commander commanding a division of 3,500 men?

Gen. MCINTYRE. Yes.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. Commanded by a major general?

Gen. MCINTYRE. Yes.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. If you reduce the Army to 175,000, and you have six lieutenant generals, and each lieutenant general sh

command a skeleton of a corps, what would you do with all the major generals?

Gen. McINTYRE. Personally I think you should not have any more major generals of line than you have divisions. You should not have any more lieutenant generals than you have corps, unless you provide, as we contemplated, one lieutenant general for Chief of Staff. You would have a lieutenant general for a corps and a major general for a division.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. A corps for a peace Army of 175,000 men might not consist of over a few thousand men?

Gen. McINTYRE. No; but take the organization provided here; you would have 8,000 in an army of 175,000.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. You would have 8,000 in a corps?

Gen. McINTYRE. Eight thousand in a division.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. Yes.

Gen. McINTYRE. And 32,000 in a corps, and you would have your five corps. This war was fought with divisions of about 12,000 men, with the exception of our own, and six corps commanders; that was not out of proportion.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. One officer who testified here, when he was asked what they would do if created, he said they would draw their salaries.

Gen. McINTYRE. Some of them might do a little more than that.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. I am trying to find out, General, just what you want to do with all of these officers of high rank?

Gen. McINTYRE. Of course, now, another thing is, some of these positions have been earned.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. You mean in France?

Gen. McINTYRE. Yes.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. A special bill will protect them.

Gen. McINTYRE. But then we have to use them whether you provide for it by special bill or in this way. This would make a special bill to a certain extent unnecessary.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. But this makes a permanent army. Now, what are you going to do, if you have six lieutenant generals, what are you going to do with 32 major generals of the line, which is an increase of 23 in the permanent list of officers of that grade?

Gen. McINTYRE. It is not an increase of so many, because some of those will be at the heads of staff corps where you have now provided major generals of the staff. So that the increase is not so great as that.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. Well, it seems to me that the bill is increasing the higher grades in a permanent establishment at an enormous expense when you would really have to make duties for them.

Gen. McINTYRE. Of course, if you assume the 500,000—I do not think that the numbers have been increased out of proportion to the increase in the Army.

The CHAIRMAN. I gathered from an observation you made a moment ago, General, that you would expect to continue in an army of 175,000 the same number of divisions as you plan for an army of 500,000, thereby maintaining the same duties for 32 major generals to perform.

Gen. McINTYRE. No; we would not do that, sir. If you had an army of 175,000 you would have a number of major generals equal to the number of divisions actively employed. If you had other divisions inactive or on the reserve list, you might have this proportion, but they would not be regular major generals. They would either be reserve officers with that rank or regular officers of lower grade who would be assigned with that rank temporarily when these officers were in the service.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. Gen. Summerall, an officer of the Artillery and a very distinguished officer and a very able man, who is now commanding the First Division, says that the First Division is composed of about 3,600 men.

Senator NEW. Thirty-five hundred men, I think he said.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. What I am getting at is, will these major generals be called upon to command skeleton divisions of a few hundred men or a few thousand men? What becomes of your colonels?

Gen. McINTYRE. This bill provides for a command of 16,000 men for a major general. The division is 16,000 men, and that is the major general's command provided for in the bill.

The CHAIRMAN. Provided for in the tables that accompany the bill?

Gen. McINTYRE. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. But you see the tables are subject to regulation and change at the instance of the War Department, over which Congress has no control.

Gen. McINTYRE. No. We provide that every man have the rank which is provided in these tables.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes. We provide for 32 major generals.

Gen. McINTYRE. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. We do not say in the bill what those major generals shall do.

Gen. McINTYRE. No; but by reference to the tables you will see.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. Mr. Chairman, it does this, if you please: Section 1 of the bill lets them do as they please, to create organizations and units, and Congress is deprived of that power; so that under regulation they can put a major general to command a division of 2,500 men if they see fit. Is not that true, General?

Gen. McINTYRE. You can only do that under the bill by giving some other major general a very large force, if you assume that the War Department is going to distribute them in that way, but there are 16,000 men provided for in the bill for every major general that is provided. If we take 13,000 from one major general and give them to another, we will have one major general with 3,000 and another major general with 29,000.

Senator FLETCHER. Suppose the bill is changed so as to give only 8,000 men to a division.

Gen. McINTYRE. To a division?

Senator FLETCHER. Yes; to a division. Would not you need the same number of major generals?

Gen. McINTYRE. I should say yes. If you reduce the division, you should still have the major general, because you contemplate strengthening that division when you use it. You contemplate strengthening it in some way, and you would have a major general

if you authorized those commands. Of course, the number can be reduced if it is desired; but if you keep the division, a major general should be provided to command it.

The CHAIRMAN. Of course, that is theory, General, but in practice that has not occurred uniformly, not even in the greatest wars. There are occasions often encountered where men of a great deal less rank than major general command the equivalent to a division in action.

Gen. McINTYRE. Certainly.

The CHAIRMAN. If that can be done in war, it seems to me that it might be done in peace, in view of the fact in any event whether we pass this bill just as it stands or not, the divisions would be skeletonized to a very large degree. Then when war broke out and the divisions were filled up, and it was a serious situation where divisions were to be used at full strength, then we could promote those persons without the slightest trouble to temporary grades, as we did in this war. This contemplates carrying in peace a tremendously increased list of officers in the highest grades, and there will not be for them in time of peace commands adequate to their grades. They would be only potentially adequate. For a skeletonized division of 5,000 or 6,000 men, or 7,000 or 8,000 men, it seems to me that the senior brigadier should command that.

Gen. McINTYRE. There is no doubt of that, but the point is that you gain very little in economy by not providing the necessary overhead which would insure reasonable rank and opportunity to the men in the service. The amount saved by cutting out all of the general officers is trifling.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. Another thing. The chief of the Coast Artillery and the present chief of the various staff corps departments make a total of 11 officers, all of whom are major generals. It is proposed by this bill that these men—that they are major generals under the national defense act, you will remember.

Gen. McINTYRE. Yes, sir.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. What are you going to do with them?

Gen. McINTYRE. They are a part of these 32 that are provided there.

The CHAIRMAN. They will be recommissioned into the line?

Gen. McINTYRE. Yes; they will be recommissioned and take 11 of those vacancies.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. You would recommission them in the line?

Gen. McINTYRE. We recommission them in the line of the Army.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. You could do that the day after this bill was approved, couldn't you?

Gen. McINTYRE. Yes.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. So that there is no permanent rank in any of the staff corps or departments?

Gen. McINTYRE. No permanent rank. The idea of the bill was to do away with permanent commissions in any of the staff corps or departments, except the Engineers and the Medical Department.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. What do you do with the Medical Corps in this bill.

Gen. McINTYRE. In this bill we leave the Medical Corps precisely as it is.

The CHAIRMAN. Excepting that there is no Surgeon General?

Gen. MCINTYRE. We provide a major general there. We do not use that title, "Surgeon General," but that is immaterial.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. Why?

The CHAIRMAN. Just a moment. I think there is one very marked difference, and I will call your attention to it, about the language in section 10. It reads:

The Medical Department shall consist of a Medical Corps, the Dental Corps, the Veterinary Corps, and the Army Nurse Corps.

Then it says that "the Medical Corps shall consist of one major general."

He does not command the Dental Corps or the Veterinary Corps.

Gen. MCINTYRE. Oh, yes; he will.

The CHAIRMAN. How?

Gen. MCINTYRE. He is the senior officer on duty with that department, and he must necessarily command it. That point has been raised up here, Senator—I have noticed that—but if you will take the Army Register or the October directory of the Army, you will find that this has not been of sufficient importance to the Medical Department to even have it written right. You will see that while to-day in your law the Medical Department consists of a major general, two brigadier generals, and those several corps, that these officers are carried to-day in the Medical Corps. It has never been of sufficient importance to even put it right on the rosters.

The CHAIRMAN. The Army Register is not an authority.

Gen. MCINTYRE. I understand; but I was just calling attention to the fact that that was not a matter of such great importance as it has been emphasized, because they have never corrected it. The Army Register carries the Surgeon General to-day as a major general in the Medical Corps.

The CHAIRMAN. He is probably expecting to stand on the law which says that the Medical Department shall consist of a major general, to be known as the Surgeon General.

Gen. MCINTYRE. Personally, I think that the present form is all right. I have no objection to it.

The CHAIRMAN. I was wondering why it was changed.

Gen. MCINTYRE. I do not think there was any particular reason, except that it was desired to emphasize the fact that those senior officers were taken from the Medical Corps and officers of the Dental and Veterinary Corps were not eligible to command the department. It was intended to make them by law a part of the Medical Corps. In other words, that is what they come from and remain, but it is not material.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. You know, without my suggesting it, that there always has been more or less of a conflict between the Medical Department and the General Staff.

Gen. MCINTYRE. I think not.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. Then our committee has been misinformed for about 12 years on that subject.

Gen. MCINTYRE. I do not think there has been with the Medical Department particularly any trouble. I think that they have gotten more nearly what they wanted since we had the General Staff Corps than they ever got before.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. May I ask you who wrote this bill?

Gen. McINTYRE. This bill was written in the War Plans Division of the General Staff, but there were a number of bills written. It was a continuous study, and certain things would be sent up and they were disapproved, and eventually this bill in its final form was very largely written by the heads of the several divisions of the General Staff. That is, the Chief of Staff, the Director of Operations, the Director of the War Plans Division, and myself. And then, of course, it was submitted to the Secretary.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. Is not this rather the history of it: Did not the War Plans Division prepare and submit a bill which was disapproved by the General Staff or by the Chief of Staff?

Gen. McINTYRE. Well, it was disapproved by the General Staff.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. And then members of the General Staff instructed the War Plans Division just what they wanted in the bill; the bill was prepared, not according to the War Plans Division's idea but according to the ideas of the General Staff?

Gen. McINTYRE. That is very largely true.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. Is it not true that none of the men who are at the head of these staff corps or services was consulted in advance about the things that affected most seriously their particular branches of the service?

Gen. McINTYRE. No; that is not the fact.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. Men have testified, if I am not mistaken, to that, Mr. Chairman.

Gen. McINTYRE. They were in constant touch from the preparation of the first draft to the preparation of the last draft, and even after this bill was prepared they were consulted with reference to the number of men in their departments.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes; I think, General, every one of them who has been before us said that they were consulted as to the number of men, but every one of them has stated that they were not consulted as to any legislative provisions.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. Not at all.

Gen. McINTYRE. I think that is true. They were consulted very generally as to the bill. Just exactly what they were shown I personally do not know.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. They have testified that neither in the course of the drafting of the bill, as I recall it, nor after the bill was prepared, was the measure affecting their corps submitted to them.

The CHAIRMAN. Two or three testified that they had never seen the bill until it was printed.

Gen. McINTYRE. A great many did not see it, because it was not practicable to call into consultation all the people that it was desirable to consult before the bill had to be sent up.

The CHAIRMAN. What was the objection to the bill that was prepared by the War Plans Division?

Gen. McINTYRE. The principal objection was that the first bill provided for a period of 11 months' universal military training and thereafter a period of several years of universal service. It was considered an impractical proposition, which was both too expensive and too contrary to what it was believed that the public would accept.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. But you did not confine your changes to that particular feature of the bill?

Gen. MCINTYRE. I would have to look over it to verify what other changes may have been made. I am not sure of the others, but necessarily, if you take out of the military strength of your Army the entire population, you have to replace it by something. They practically provided for universal military training, and, of course, when you do not get your men in that way you must provide some other way of getting them. So it is quite obvious that the bill must have been changed very materially in order to meet that one radical change.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. But you provide for military training in this bill.

Gen. MCINTYRE. For three months.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. Yes, sir.

Gen. MCINTYRE. But not for service in peace.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. You could alter that provision of the bill without changing the whole bill.

Gen. MCINTYRE. I think you would have some difficulty, Senator. For instance, they provided for a much larger potential army and somewhat smaller permanent army. But that was really the essential difference.

Senator FLETCHER. Where do you think, General, you need these 20 divisions?

Gen. MCINTYRE. The 20 divisions are needed, in the first place, for the three months' training or whatever period you may determine on. You have 16 or 17 training camps which must be kept in condition, and that must receive these men for training. In each of those camps you must keep, if there be no other purpose in mind but training, you must keep the equivalent of a small division. It was thought that inasmuch as you keep an overhead of a division for training purposes, it would be an economy to increase that somewhat in enlisted men, and have a division which you could use, so that in any of the ordinary operations that we would be called upon for, it would not be necessary to interfere with the industry and commerce by calling in the entire population practically to take part in the war. That is, inasmuch as you must necessarily have those 16 divisions, by strengthening them very little, you have combat divisions, and they provide about the number of men that we have always estimated that we would need in any serious trouble. That is, we have estimated for years that we would need an Army of 1,250,000 immediately on the outbreak of any serious war, and the number of divisions provided will produce that number of men when increased from 16,000 to about 27,000 men with the necessary auxiliary troops.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. What is the meaning of this clause in the second paragraph of section 2. It goes on and says that the Chief of the Coast Artillery—this is what I want you to explain to me—"officers on the active list who are below the rank of general officer by detail as chief of staff corps or bureaus." That is the particular language I call your attention to:

Bureaus and the general officers of the staff, except those of the Medical Department, shall, on the passage of this act, be recommissioned as general officers of the line in the grade and with the dates of rank now held by them or heretofore held by them as head of the staff corps or bureaus.

What is the meaning of "officers on the active list who have held the rank of general officer by detail as chief of staff corps?"

Gen. MCINTYRE. That is particularly Gen. McCain. While that seems to be personal, because it applies to one man, it was in fact to give to former heads of bureaus the same rank that was given to the present heads of bureaus; that is, a man who served four years as the head of a bureau was to be treated just as well as the man who by accident was the head of a bureau now.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. And he is the only man in this category?

Gen. MCINTYRE. It happens that he is the only man. But the principle is general; that is, that he was not to be treated less favorably than the man who happened to be The Adjutant General now.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. In other words, he goes back to the line as a colonel?

Gen. MCINTYRE. He goes back to the line as a major general.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. Under this bill?

Gen. MCINTYRE. Yes.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. But otherwise he would go back as a colonel?

Gen. MCINTYRE. Yes. That is to give him the same consideration that he would have gotten if he was at the head of a staff department.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. That is really special legislation.

Gen. MCINTYRE. It applies specially, but it is not intended to. It was intended to apply to any man who was in that position. It so happens that there is but one man there.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you care to discuss, General, the General Staff Corps provisions?

Gen. MCINTYRE. I was very anxious to say that I think that it is very important that the General Staff be given, and the Chief of the General Staff be given the powers set forth in this section 3. Practically the only change it makes in the law is in the repeal of section 5 of the national defense act. It removes the difficulties which were created by the form which section 5 of the national defense act ultimately assumed. It in effect contains precisely what the Senate passed in 1916. The Senate provision at that time was practically this provision, worded somewhat differently, but there is no difference in the sense; but in conference certain provisions were put in section 5 which were not in the bills passed by either House, and those provisions have worked very badly, in that they have created a doubt of the power of the General Staff, and they were in fact most unfortunate throughout the war, and most particularly in the beginning.

The Senate gave to the General Staff a material increase in 1916. That was cut down in conference, and then the provision that not more than one-half of the General Staff should be on duty in Washington was inserted in conference, and that was most unfortunate, because at the beginning of the war and in making preparations prior to the war and before we had divisions to which to assign General Staff officers for the performance of General Staff duties in the field, this was the only place that we really needed a General Staff officer at all, and of course they were kept away from Washington by that law. This proposed section is really what in effect the Senate provided in 1916.

The CHAIRMAN. The proviso in section 5 to which our attention has been called more often than to any other one, is that proviso which prohibits the General Staff officer in effect from interfering with the initiative and responsibility of the supply corps.

Gen. MCINTYRE. Yes. The difficulty about that is this: The General Staff does not desire to do anything that is prohibited, but there is a difficulty in construing the prohibition, so that a supply bureau is very apt to regard anything which comes as a direction from the Secretary or the President through the General Staff as an interference.

For example, in the early days of the war each bureau desired to get the personnel which it believed that it needed in fighting the war. They were very active. If the General Staff had not put a curb on that, we could not have gotten any real fighting men to France at all. The transportation was being taken up, the clothing and equipment was being taken up, by the various staff bureaus. A great many men saw in the ambulance corps, in the forestry regiments, and in the railway regiments of the engineers opportunity to go into the war. Those people were getting the right of way. They were absorbing all of the equipment and everything. Now, was it an interference with those corps to tell them that they must stop that?

The CHAIRMAN. Oh, not at all.

Gen. MCINTYRE. I am trying to get at that; but they assumed that it was.

The CHAIRMAN. But how about the purchase of supplies?

Gen. MCINTYRE. That was interfered with decidedly during the war, as we all know. The various people who were to buy the supplies in peace time did not buy them; but, strange to say, the only way in which those functions have been preserved to the War Department at all was by action of the General Staff.

In December, 1917, the War Council was created. A reading of the duties assigned to the War Council shows that that organization was given from the supply bureaus the duties that were later performed by the General Staff, and which should have been performed by the General Staff. That is, it was given the power of supervising and coordinating. That was followed almost immediately by the introduction in Congress of acts creating a ministry of munitions, in which it was contemplated that those duties would be taken away entirely from the War Department. That is an extreme case. Some provided for certain action within and some for certain action without, so that in no case could these functions have been retained by the several supply departments. The public was insisting that some new agency should be created, and finally, when the War Industries Board was created, Mr. Baruch insisted that the War Department should be represented by one man; that he could not deal with every supply bureau; that the War Department should come as a unit to the War Industries Board and tell it exactly what they wanted in the several commodities, in order that they might be allocated to them with due regard to the rights of the Navy and the Allies and the urgent war industries of the country.

So that there must necessarily have been a taking from the supply bureaus by some one of these functions; but now it is desired, having preserved them to the bureaus, to give them back to them. But if

the General Staff had not during the war taken over these functions, I venture to say that the bureaus would have ceased by this time to have been military organizations, in so far as procurement is concerned.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. That was done finally by the department under the Overman Act?

Gen. McINTYRE. Some of it was done prior to the Overman Act, and the Overman Act was a legal justification of it; but a great many things the War Council did—the War Council was created in December, and other things were done before, and the following May the Overman Act was passed, which was legal justification of everything that had been done and the authority to continue.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. Why should this bill vary from the General Staff act of 1903? That was always looked upon as a most excellent statute.

Gen. McINTYRE. Yes; it varies from it mainly by the repeal of this section 5 of the act of 1916 and by a restatement of those things which seemed to be in conflict.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. You go further than that. You continue in force that portion of the act of May 4, 1917, which gave precedence of rank to the Chief of Staff over all other officers of the Army.

Gen. McINTYRE. This was written, of course, before Congress had enacted—had passed—Gen. Pershing's bill. There was no desire to put the Chief of Staff ahead of Gen. Pershing.

The CHAIRMAN. That bill itself repeals that.

Gen. McINTYRE. Yes; but as a matter of fact this provision not only follows that war-time provision, Senator, but it follows your bill. That is the provision which you have in your bill in 1916 word for word.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. In the national-defense act?

Gen. McINTYRE. Yes, sir; the one which you had passed through the Senate.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. No; that provision which gave the Chief of Staff precedence over all other officers of the Army is a rider to an appropriation bill in 1917.

Gen. McINTYRE. I know, but you had passed the same thing through the Senate. It did not get past the House.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. No.

Gen. McINTYRE. But you had passed it through the Senate in 1916.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. That may be.

Gen. McINTYRE. This wording is taken right from your bill.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. That may be.

The CHAIRMAN. Secretary Stimson pointed out what he thought was a very marked change, in that the paragraph on page 6 which describes the General Staff Corps, the phrase "under the direction of the Chief of Staff" was inserted, and he contended that that was a violation of the spirit of the General Staff act of 1903.

Gen. McINTYRE. Where is that?

The CHAIRMAN. On page 6, line 12. He was quite clear in that statement.

The words "under the direction of the Chief of Staff"; he pointed out that the staff system had two functions to perform—one might be

called administrative, as is now done under G 1, G 2, G 3, G 4, or whatever names for that in the War Department, and another function which he contended was entirely separate and distinct, and that was the planning for the national defense, which is done, or supposed to be done, by the War Plans Division and the General Staff, and his contention was that that work should not be done under the direction of anybody.

Gen. McINTYRE. Well, I do not think there is any material difference in the idea. I think it is more of a difference in the wording. The Chief of Staff assigns the officers; to a large extent the subject for studies must come down from the President, the Secretary, or the Chief of Staff, if it is desired to have a plan for such and such a contingency. Now that problem will go through the Chief of Staff to the War Plans Division, and the Planning Division, in cooperation with the other divisions of the General Staff, Operations and Supply, will draw up the plan or study. These officers are assigned by the Chief of Staff; they are a part of the General Staff and assigned to the chief of the unit, the commanding officer, so they will be under his direction, whether the words are written in there or not. I think the words are, as a matter of fact, superfluous.

The CHAIRMAN. They are regarded as very significant by Mr. Stimson. In other words, the General Staff Corps, or what is known as the War Plans Division, might be relegated merely to filling in the details of the plan imposed upon it from above, where the intent of the act was that they should be somewhat in the nature of a debating society. We think that not only the Chief of Staff but the President should have the benefit of its recommendations, and not only those but Congress. That does not mean that the Chief of Staff must O. K. anything or everything that they propose, but they should have the benefit of the views of that intelligent body of officers, so far as making their proposals of the broad scheme of national defense is concerned.

Gen. McINTYRE. I have no doubt that now, either under the present or under any plan, if the Military Committee desired any particular study and plan, I do not doubt but that it would be furnished just as described. That would be—

The CHAIRMAN (interrupting). We find from experience, however, that when we desire access to plans and studies that we know have been drawn up in the War Plans Division, and which differ radically from this bill, we can not obtain them without the permission of the Secretary of War.

Gen. McINTYRE. Well, that follows the usual rule and also follows the law.

The CHAIRMAN. And the impression that we got is that they are being operated; that that is the spirit of the War Department; that these people in effect are now expected to confine themselves to fill in details to the plans prescribed for them.

Gen. McINTYRE. I do not think that is so, Senator.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. Well, was that not true with reference to the preparation of the bill?

Gen. McINTYRE. With reference to the preparation of this bill, as it first came up, it was disapproved because of the feeling that it had no show. It was regarded as an impractical proposition. This,

as a matter of fact, was one of the final studies, and this was the study after suggestions had been made, as you say, from above.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. Now, General, under the act of May 12, 1917, the General Staff was increased to 91 officers. This bill increases that to 231 officers.

Gen. MCINTYRE. Yes, sir.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. It eliminates some of the lower grades and increases some of the higher grades. Why is that change thought to be necessary? If 231 staff officers were sufficient for a great emergency, why is it necessary to maintain the same establishment in peace times and put officers of higher grades in the General Staff?

Gen. MCINTYRE. The General Staff is organized, as recommended here, with a certain—may I borrow your table? I would like to explain that. Section 3 provides for the General Staff Corps. This bill provides for 21 divisions, and with those divisions there will be 84 General Staff officers. It provides for five Army corps, and with those Army corps there will be 50 officers, and that makes 134 of the officers provided. Now, if we do not get an Army corps, then we do not get that number of officers. It is a mathematical question of reducing the proportion. For example, if we lose a division, we lose 4 of the officers, and for every corps we lose 21. We provide in the War Department a detail of 97 commissioned officers. You provided in 1916 for commissioned officers 92—

Senator CHAMBERLAIN (interrupting). No; 91.

Gen. MCINTYRE. Ninety-one. I thought it was 92. So you see that the increase in the War Department's General Staff is not even in proportion to the proposed increase in the strength of our Army, but during the war the General Staff in the field and the General Staff at headquarters were so definitely fixed by experience that it is quite as well settled as the number of men in the corps—

Senator CHAMBERLAIN (interrupting). I realize the importance of the General Staff. However, I had sometimes feared that the General Staff, instead of confining itself to the purpose of the General Staff, has gone into fields that they should never have invaded.

Gen. MCINTYRE. That has been a criticism, and there has been an endeavor made to avoid that, and it has been a particularly great endeavor except during the war—except during the war.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. But they had the advice of their legal officer as to just what they could do under the general defense act, but the Secretary of War set that at naught by his own decisions, which continued the practice which had been criticized.

Gen. MCINTYRE. Well, like all of those questions, the question of fact enters. I at that time was wholly disassociated from the General Staff, but on the strength of those criticisms which have been made each chief of a bureau was called on for a statement as to the particular respect in which his functions were invaded, and the answers were practically that they were not being invaded at all.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. But Congress found differently, and it undertakes to enact a law in order to restrain that.

Gen. MCINTYRE. Those particular decisions did state that—

Senator CHAMBERLAIN (interrupting). And as I said, there is no way to reach it except by further restrictions or impeaching the Secretary, and nobody wants to do that.

Gen. McINTYRE. I hope you will not want any further restrictions. Let us try to put our house in order first.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. But instead of putting your house in order it got to be worse.

Gen. McINTYRE. I think since 1916, Senator, I think that the General Staff has taken over many functions which have been forced upon it. We had no opportunity, after the passage of the act of 1916, to try out in peace time the formation of the General Staff. Things were happening rapidly and it became absolutely necessary to do certain things. The General Staff was a body recognized by law, and it necessarily had to take over those things.

The CHAIRMAN. Gen. Goethals's testimony practically admitted that the P., S. and T. had to take over functions which did not properly belong to the P., S. and T.

Gen. McINTYRE. Before the P., S. and T. the War Council had taken over, under an order of the War Department—

The CHAIRMAN (interrupting). It was largely made up, however, by the chiefs of bureaus.

Gen. McINTYRE. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. As I remember Gen. Goethals's testimony, he stated that he had to do that, and Gen. March supported him in it, because we did not have at the time we went into the war a particularly developed supply system.

Gen. McINTYRE. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. And we are very anxious to erect a particularly developed supply system and prescribe its functions, not within too narrow bounds, but in a general way, so as to establish a policy both for the General Staff and the supply system. We are very anxious, General, to get rid of this friction.

Gen. McINTYRE. I think, in so far as most of the friction is concerned, we could get rid of it under this bill, by which we apply at once the detailed system throughout the Army. That is the policy of Congress to put in effect the act of 1901, put it in immediate full effect, and then by the assignment of duties as authorized by the President under this act. If it desired to do that, I think the duties can be assigned very much as they are now being performed.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. You know, General, that these committees of Congress act as a sort of buffer between the civilian, on the one side, and the Army on the other, and the civilian can not see the Army viewpoint, and the Army man can not see the civilian's viewpoint. If Congress gives to the Military Establishment all it asks for, the people who have to pay for it protest. We have a dual function—

Gen. McINTYRE. I appreciate that.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. And you appreciate, too, from your experience, that a distinctively military man does not usually see the reason for the civilian viewpoint.

The CHAIRMAN. Have you any other matter that you would like to bring up, General?

Gen. McINTYRE. Nothing especially, Senator.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. Now, I would like to ask just one or two questions I have down here before you pass on. I notice in many provisions of this bill there is a very large increase both in the com-

missioned personnel and in the enlisted personnel. Taking The Adjutant General's Department, for instance, the total number of officers allowed by the existing law is 51. Now you propose—that is, section 4—you propose in this bill to increase that number to 331, the additions being 20 colonels, 48 lieutenant colonels, 53 majors, 141 captains, 68 first lieutenants—the last two grades being new creations for the department. Why should we have that increase for a peace establishment?

Gen. MCINTYRE. Because the organizations have increased; and with reference to that, in this bill there have been assigned to The Adjutant General's Department a good many officers who have heretofore not been under The Adjutant General but have been attached thereto. They have been assigned, for example, for these recruit depots 60 officers. The Adjutant General has always had these officers, and they were officers from the Infantry, infantrymen or cavalrymen or artillerymen who were assigned to those duties. But this bill puts them right under The Adjutant General, where they always have been. Then there is the same way with the 25 recruit companies, 75 officers, and that accounts for 135. And then, of course, there are 21 divisions in 5 corps, and they all take officers after they are created.

The CHAIRMAN. Have not the functions of The Adjutant General, performed formerly by The Adjutant General, been taken care of very largely by the Chief of Staff's Department?

Gen. MCINTYRE. No; he performs every function to-day that he has ever performed, and in addition to that he has, in comparatively recent years, been given the prisons, the military prisons.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. That was done in the last four years?

Gen. MCINTYRE. Yes, sir.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. You have not provided in this law for the increase which you exercise now under the regulations?

Gen. MCINTYRE. Yes, sir.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. You have?

Gen. MCINTYRE. Yes, sir; so far as The Adjutant General is concerned that accounts for a large part of that—of the men that have been detailed to The Adjutant General's department.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. The reason I am asking these questions is I am afraid that if the commissioned personnel should go into this service prescribed by statute that you will not have any enlisted personnel to do the fighting?

Gen. MCINTYRE. I think, Senator, if this bill is enacted it is just what we want here; if you give us less I think that we can extend our feet according to the length of the sheet.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. I will confess really that I do not know what we want, and we have difficulty in finding out what the Army wants.

The CHAIRMAN. There seems to be more differences inside the ranks of the Army than there are outside.

Gen. MCINTYRE. I think we can trim that to some extent.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, take the Judge Advocate General's Office. He is authorized by law to have 32 officers. Do you increase that very largely?

Gen. MCINTYRE. Yes, sir; we do.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. Yes. What is the necessity for that? You propose to increase the total commissioned strength of the Judge Advocate's Department to 151 officers instead of 32 now authorized by law.

Gen. MCINTYRE. Of course, that is an increase there, but the Judge Advocate's Office must have more than before. They give 42 officers of the Judge Advocate's Department into the divisions, and each division commander is supposed to have court-martial jurisdiction and is given two officers. Heretofore we have never assigned a judge advocate to a tactical command in peace times.

Senator FLETCHER. Do you think that that should be done?

Gen. MCINTYRE. If we get the divisions; yes, sir. I feel personally that we could take some men from the Judge Advocate General's Office here. It is my personal opinion we can decrease that number.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. Let me call your attention to sections 6, 7, 8, and 9 under the law as it now is. There they have 362 officers assigned to the Quartermaster General's Corps as follows: One quartermaster general with rank as major general; two brigadier generals; 21 colonels; 24 lieutenant colonels; 68 majors; 181 captains, and no first lieutenants, but with 65 second lieutenants. Now by this law it is proposed to increase the Quartermaster's Corps by 501 officers, making a total number of 863.

Gen. MCINTYRE. Yes.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. Notwithstanding that, you create a finance department, with a large personnel, which is to do much of the work of the Quartermaster General's Department, and all those are in addition to the officers in the Quartermaster's Department. Why that immense increase?

Gen. MCINTYRE. A part of that was because of the divisions and corps, and in the increase of the Army. I will say, however, that personally I feel we could materially decrease both the number in the Finance and in the Quartermaster's Department.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. Was that number submitted to the Quartermaster General?

Gen. MCINTYRE. I have no doubt it was. I really think that that is—I think that in the staff corps generally—I think in a desire to meet their recommendations in this bill, that a great deal was yielded, and all of the staff corps were given a much larger personnel than the General Staff would give them, or more than I personally would give them.

The CHAIRMAN. That is a very significant statement, because it will help us a great deal if we can reduce some of them.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. For instance, I call your attention to the Quartermaster's Corps to an increase from 362 to 863. Notwithstanding that, you propose in this bill to create new organizations which are to take over some of the duties and responsibilities of the Quartermaster's Department.

There is a Finance Department with 17 colonels, 25 lieutenant colonels, 75 majors, 200 captains, a total of 318 commissioned officers.

Then there is the Transportation Corps, which consists of 1 brigadier general, 3 colonels, 10 lieutenant colonels, 15 majors, 75 captains, 16 first lieutenants, a total of 120 commissioned officers.

Then there is the Motor Transport Corps, consisting of 1 brigadier general, 8 colonels, 22 lieutenant colonels, 58 majors, 61 captains, 283 first lieutenants, and 649 second lieutenants.

All of the functions performed by those several bureaus were formerly performed by the Quartermaster Corps.

Gen. McINTYRE. Not wholly.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. But very largely.

Gen. McINTYRE. Yes; a great part of them. Take for instance, the Finance Department; that performs the duties of the old Paymaster's Department, and—

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. I have not referred to that—yes, I have.

Gen. McINTYRE. That does the work under the new arrangement; it does the work of the old Paymaster's Department, it pays the Army, and also the disbursing work of all the departments. Now, similarly with some of the other departments there, the Quartermaster department's duties are materially enlarged along two lines. It is taking over the purchases of the entire Army and the storage for the entire Army.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. But in the final analysis, however, with 362 officers formerly allowed to the Quartermaster Corps, these four organizations which have been carved out from the Quartermaster Corps are mentioned 2,383 officers for what was formerly done in the Quartermaster Corps, an increase of over 2,000 in a peace-time Army.

Gen. McINTYRE. I think that there was an endeavor to meet the desires of the several departments and operating services, and their estimates were used very largely.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. Don't you think, General, when the bill was formulated with reference to each of these corps that you submitted the provisions to the heads of the service bureaus?

Gen. McINTYRE. That is my understanding.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. That is, as to the numbers of men rather than as to the language of the bill?

Gen. McINTYRE. Yes, sir.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. In some of these I notice a very large increase of enlisted personnel. I do not just have in mind the particular ones, but you will notice in section 19, the Militia Bureau, you propose a permanent personnel of 1 major general, 9 colonels, 22 lieutenant colonels, 225 majors, and 100 captains, 357 commissioned officers, and 1,000 enlisted men.

Gen. McINTYRE. That was done very largely by including in that bureau and having under its direction all of the officers and men heretofore assigned to militia duty who were carried elsewhere under the law. The number, it is true, is increased, but it is actually made up very largely in that way; that is, the officers heretofore assigned to that duty have been the infantrymen and the cavalrymen, and so on. Now, such officers are credited and charged to that particular bureau.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. You make by these changes the overhead charge exceedingly heavy, as compared to what the legislation now on the statute book provides?

Gen. McINTYRE. Yes, sir; it does materially increase the number of officers. With 500,000 men we provide 29,000 officers. Formerly for 175,000 men we provided 11,000 officers.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. Yes.

Gen. McINTYRE. That is the proportion, in round numbers.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. Mr. Chairman, I have many other questions that I would like to ask, and would like to go into the subject more fully, but I do not care to do so now.

The CHAIRMAN. I wanted to ask the general about the systems of promotion. I would like to get the general's opinion on the proposal of promotion by selection and kindred subjects.

Gen. McINTYRE. I am in favor of promotion by selection, with proper safeguards. It was endeavored to put in this about every safeguard that was possible, if that system of promotion was to be adopted. In fact, there are many who think that the restrictions are so great that we would have in name a system of selection, but in practice it would be seniority under this bill.

The CHAIRMAN. There is no provision for elimination.

Gen. McINTYRE. Except the single additional provision there, that if he is jumped by 25 per cent of the officers of his grade he will be automatically retired or discharged, according as to whether the board finds his services to have been faithful or not.

An interesting thing to the committee possibly is this. In 1903, in selecting the first General Staff, it was, under the law, selected by a board of general officers. Twenty captains were selected, that being the number authorized. In the war just past, of those 20 captains, two were generals—the only two generals—seven were major generals, three were brigadier generals, three were dead; and that shows the results 15 years after the selection was made of a system of selection in the Army. I cite that because of the fact that opponents of selection, I think, overemphasize the possible prejudice. I think there is no prejudice and will be none in the Army. I think there has been no unfairness because of personal preference. I think that the result will not always justify the selections, for, in the first place, it is human to err; and, in the second place, because the man selected will not always run true to form. After a while he will lose the very qualities which perhaps justified his selection; but, generally speaking, I think that the result will be such as to surprise even those who now advocate promotion by selection. The case cited is the only case that I recall in the Army where there has been a selection by a board under practically what you provide in this law.

Senator FLETCHER. Do you think that the selection by promotion should extend down to captain?

Gen. McINTYRE. These were captains. I mentioned these 20 captains because they were of the age to participate in the war. The men above the grade of captains were older—

Senator SUTHERLAND. Would you have the selection as far down as the lowest grades?

Gen. McINTYRE. No; I think that the bill is all right in providing that the first application would be made when a man is appointed captain, and that would ordinarily be after some 10 years or more of service.

The CHAIRMAN. Additional questions could be asked of the detailed system and the permanent commissioned-personnel proposition. That has been before us. This question of promotion inevitably brings up a proposal for a single list. What observations have you to make on that?

Gen. McINTYRE. The single list, I think, is to-day favored throughout the Army. Personally I have always had a feeling for my own branch of the service and have not favored, on that account, a single list. I have in my period of field service been an Infantry officer. I still have the feeling that, it having been my choice when I entered the service, I would like to continue as an Infantry officer so long as I was eligible.

The CHAIRMAN. And the proponents of that principle use that very thing for favoring it.

Gen. McINTYRE. I understand so.

The CHAIRMAN. The very view that you entertain.

Gen. McINTYRE. The single list is the popular proposal in the Army.

The CHAIRMAN. And is that practicable? Could it be worked out practically?

Gen. McINTYRE. I think we can work it out.

The CHAIRMAN. I am very much encouraged to hear you say that, because I understood that the War Department is opposed to it; at least the Chief of Staff is.

Gen. McINTYRE. A great many people are opposed to it.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, as I understand, under the single list, there would be established what might be termed a reservoir of officers, we will say, in the combatant service, commissioned in the Army. If you want to leave out some of the specialties like the Medical Corps, the promotion of course would be uniform throughout the whole number as contrasted with the situation that confronts us to-day, in which the promotion is uneven in the various branches.

We understand that the Field Artillery branch is about seven years ahead—

Gen. McINTYRE (interrupting). Yes, sir; some years. I would like to see the Infantry put ahead, it being the branch that is entitled to it; at least that is my own view of it, on the merit of service rendered. I think that it is entitled to it.

The CHAIRMAN. And the Field Artillery would say the same thing about that branch?

Gen. McINTYRE. I do not think that it could with so much merit.

Senator FLETCHER. You think that in the last analysis we depend on the Infantry?

Gen. McINTYRE. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. The former Secretary, Mr. Stimson, pointed out what he thought, or what he believes, as it is commonly known to Congress; that is, the result of this channel of promotion being subdivided into several branches, that the branches were simply pulling and hauling for advantage, and that is reflected occasionally by it being brought to bear upon Congress—influence being brought to bear on Congress. Do you think that that is true?

Gen. McINTYRE. Undoubtedly.

The CHAIRMAN. And we could get rid of that with the single list?

Gen. McINTYRE. Yes, sir.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. At every session we have bills to equalize promotions, and all are unsatisfactory.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes; they are supposed to equalize them, and this is supposed to equalize them. Under the single-list basis, General,

officers would then be assigned to the branches, and I assume that as the thing worked along over a term of years that the officers would find themselves assigned eventually in the branches in which they did the better work, so that the effectiveness would not be materially changed. Is that about right?

Gen. McINTYRE. That is about right. It would, in effect, extend the detail system to all officers throughout the services.

The CHAIRMAN. And what do you think that the Corps of Engineers would think about that? They are combatant—at least, nobody says they are not, and I think they are—and yet they are the only combatant branch that has a permanent commissioned personnel.

Gen. McINTYRE. There is no reason why they should not maintain the same personnel with a single list.

The CHAIRMAN. Permanently?

Gen. McINTYRE. Permanently. It could be maintained under the single list. If it permitted of their being used and detailed with other line officers, you could absorb the shock of too rapid promotion, and I think that the Engineer personnel could be maintained permanently even under a single list.

The CHAIRMAN. You would have the flow of promotions inside the Engineer Corps keep pace with the flow of promotions with the increased general reservoir, and throw the Engineer officers into the general reservoir, and then merely assign them to the Engineer Corps?

Gen. McINTYRE. Well, you could practically keep them step by step with the other branches by working it out.

The CHAIRMAN. And you could do the same thing with the Medical Corps?

Gen. McINTYRE. There, Senator, you get into a discussion a little outside of the merits of the general proposition, because the Medical Corps advances the theory that they, first, coming from a different source and having used more years in preparation, are entitled to more rapid promotion.

The CHAIRMAN. But you could give them credit at the beginning of the service——

Gen. McINTYRE (interrupting). For a number of years.

The CHAIRMAN. They start at first lieutenants, generally, and they have been four years in college, generally, and three years in medical school, and in several instances a couple of years as internes in hospitals——

Gen. McINTYRE. It could be worked out.

The CHAIRMAN. I confess that the thing is very appealing to me. Do you think it is as important to have promotion by selection in time of peace as it is in time of war?

Gen. McINTYRE. No; it is not so important; but, Senator, one of the most serious criticisms—and practically the only serious criticism, merited criticism—of the Regular Army I know of is that we maintain in the Army officers who acquire a high rank and who are practically worthless for any purpose when the emergency comes.

Senator SUTHERLAND. Don't you think it would be possible to work out a practical system of elimination that could be applied?

Gen. McINTYRE. I would say that it is not impossible. Unfortunately, we have not cleaned our own house. That is the situation.

Senator SUTHERLAND. And some have maintained that a high average would be maintained under a system of promotion by seniority, coupled with a thorough process of elimination, coupled possibly with retirement, grades of retirement, rather than by the process of selection?

Gen. McINTYRE. I think that retirement would go a long way toward remedying the situation.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. That has been mentioned a good deal——

Gen. McINTYRE (interrupting). The difficulty has been this: That an officer hates to regard retirement as an appropriate punishment for any shortcomings. That is not the object of the retirement list, and its use as a punishment does not appeal to the Army generally. It is intended as a reward for a particular service faithfully rendered rather than to punish men who are neglectful of their duties or who are in any way inefficient.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. I can see the inevitable result of the process of elimination. It would be the same as the Navy in regard to the plucking board. As the elimination exists, the number in the several States which have been eliminated increases, with the result that there is a howl in Congress of injustice, and there is a demand for the repeal of the law.

Senator SUTHERLAND. We will have that under the process of selection, also.

The CHAIRMAN. The Navy differed in this respect, that the law provided that a certain percentage of officers must be plucked every year. It went along pretty nicely until it eliminated all of the unfit officers and commenced to eliminate fit officers. If it had gone on, there would not have been any Navy.

Senator FLETCHER. If my recollection is right, we have scarcely had a man who has agreed that three months is sufficient training.

Gen. McINTYRE. Well, three months, even by those who advocate it, is accepted as the minimum, and it is a compromise of the military point of view with the point of view of those people who furnish their sons at the age of 19 to the Army. It is really the point——

Senator FLETCHER. But we do not want to encourage a system that would not accomplish any material or beneficial results. If that is not enough to accomplish any real good, it seems to me like we ought not to install such a system.

Gen. McINTYRE. I think that it would perform excellent service. I think that three months would be of great advantage, and I think that one of the greatest advantages would be that with the trial, the people who now shy at the system will be among the first to ask to have it increased. At present it is a military proposition. I think that it will become, with a little try-out, a public proposition, and we will have that extended so that it will include all of the time that is necessary. I think that the tendency will be in that direction. I think, on that account, that three months is not a bad beginning.

Of course, in those three months we can do wonders for the average young man, and we can do most for those who are in most need of the proper training.

Senator FLETCHER. But they would have to be confined to intensive military training. It would not have any educational features whatever, would it?

Gen. McINTYRE. We could do something, but very little, in the educational way. It would be essentially an intensive military training.

Senator FLETCHER. Do you think it would be objectionable to require maneuvers once a year, so as to keep those who have been trained fit?

Gen. McINTYRE. It would be an advantage to do that, but our only way of judging what the people would want is by considering the experience of the National Guard encampments in the past. It has been very difficult, in the greater part of the United States, to get young men to go willingly for two or three weeks' training. The National Guard companies frequently fill up for even that short time with college students, during the holidays, and it has always been difficult, and unless we can improve it and popularize it, I feel that there would be the same objection to it.

It would, of course, from a military and national point of view, be a great thing.

The CHAIRMAN. Have you any proposition to make, or have you had any serious discussions as to how the National Guard may be used in connection with this system?

Gen. McINTYRE. The general tendency is to wait until the National Guard had some proposition looking to a modification of the national-defense act. The national-defense act, in so far as the National Guard was concerned, was such an improvement on anything we had ever had that it did not seem necessary to suggest any change.

The CHAIRMAN. You see, if you go to train 650,000 men three months each year, and then pass them back into civil life, and unattached to any reserve army, and thereby necessitating, on the outbreak of war, the organizing of these men into new units, you have the National Guard, and, it is true, under the national-defense act, that it is much better than before, but I am wondering if we can not capitalize the popularity of the Guard, the records of the famous regiments, and the affection which many of the people had for these units, if we can not capitalize them and make proper use of them, in connection with your system of universal training, in the creation of a citizen trained force for maneuvering purposes, so you will have a trained citizen army ready for the Department of War, to be called into actual service.

Gen. McINTYRE. The theory of the bill was that these men, with their training, would, in increased number, attach themselves to the National Guard, and possibly be attracted—in other words, to extend their military training, and it was the feeling that it was about all we could get.

The CHAIRMAN. I expect that the National Guard bill is about ready. We ought to have it here in a few days.

Senator SUTHERLAND. The point has been raised that the age should be 21, rather than 19, for the reason that if we were to mobilize an army at any time we would hardly go down to 19 at first, but would probably begin at 21, and these men would then be immediately available at any time.

Gen. McINTYRE. That, again, Senator, was the compromise with the industries and civil life of the country. It was felt that that was

the highest age at which we could get these men without disturbing the industries. If you take 21 or higher, you must begin with exemptions of married men and of a good many classes which we do not consider at 19, such as studying for the ministry, etc., that you exempted under your draft bill for the war.

Taking them at 19, then you will have the minimum of exemptions, and, of course, the man has completed his nineteenth year almost as soon as he has completed his training and he is approaching 21, of course.

Senator SUTHERLAND. And in the course of two or three years you have a batch of men 21 years and over who have had this training?

Gen. McINTYRE. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. And subsequently, after that, a larger number would be added?

Gen. McINTYRE. Yes; and taking them over 21, that was the difficulty.

The CHAIRMAN. There was less disturbance to the industrial——

Gen. McINTYRE. There was less disturbance at 19 than at any other age, unless we went lower, and then we would lose all——

The CHAIRMAN. There would be more objection at the age of 18 than there would be at 19. We found when we were passing the other act that they were too young to fit into the Army before that.

Gen. McINTYRE. These young men will be given very largely what you give for the first three months to a cadet who goes to West Point. In order to make it of the best possible service it has got to be fully up to the standard of military schools and colleges. They have to be treated properly and must be given careful consideration, and then three months ought to show a decided improvement.

The CHAIRMAN. We are very much obliged to you, General.

Gen. McINTYRE. I thank you very much, Senator.

(Thereupon, at 4.40 o'clock p. m., the committee adjourned until the following day, October 23, 1919, at 2.15 o'clock p. m.)

REORGANIZATION OF THE ARMY.

THURSDAY, OCTOBER 23, 1919.

SUBCOMMITTEE ON MILITARY AFFAIRS,
UNITED STATES SENATE,
Washington, D. C.

The subcommittee met pursuant to call at 2.15 o'clock p. m., in the committee room, Capitol, Senator James W. Wadsworth, jr., presiding.

Present: Senators Wadsworth (chairman), New, Sutherland, Chamberlain, and Fletcher.

Present also: Brig. Gen. Richard C. Marshall, jr.

STATEMENT OF BRIG. GEN. RICHARD C. MARSHALL, JR., CHIEF OF CONSTRUCTION DIVISION, UNITED STATES ARMY.

The CHAIRMAN. General, please tell the committee of your assignments during the war.

Gen. MARSHALL. When war was declared I was serving a detail in the Quartermaster Corps in the Construction and Repair Division of the Quartermaster General's office, being assistant to the officer in charge. I continued with that division when it was separated from the Quartermaster General's office, and have been continuously with it. My regular commission is in the Coast Artillery.

The CHAIRMAN. We would like to have you express your opinion about any of the pieces of legislation that are pending before us, and especially about its effect upon the Construction Division, if you want to discuss that first.

Gen. MARSHALL. There are several bills before both the House and Senate which contemplate different control of construction work for the Army, one bill contemplating that it be placed under the Engineer Corps, and another contemplating that it be returned to the Quartermaster Corps. Since this indicates the contention in the War Department itself over the subject of construction, I have prepared some notes on it, from which I should like to read and remark upon as I go along, if there is no objection.

The CHAIRMAN. That is all right. Proceed as you wish.

Gen. MARSHALL. In order that anyone may intelligently consider the Construction Division of the Army, it is necessary to know its antecedents, the work it actually does, the work the existing laws place upon it, and the work the coming laws will place upon it.

Prior to the World War the operation of utilities at the several posts, arsenals, and factories under the War Department, and the

construction work at these several places was done by each department concerned. The Ordnance Department constructed its arsenals and operated the utilities thereat. Similarly, the Signal Corps for its work; the Quartermaster Corps did this work for itself, for the Surgeon General's office, and for the line of the Army, which includes the Engineer Corps. The only notable exception to this being the construction of Washington Barracks, which was made a special exception.

Until the outbreak of the World War, generally speaking, the operation of the utilities and the construction work was of minor importance; there were relatively few posts as big as a regimental post constructed, and they were constructed at such intervals as to make the work in any one year fairly limited; the average for the Quartermaster Corps for 10 years being \$9,500,000; the average for all departments of the Government for the same 10 years being approximately \$12,000,000. This covers the cost of operation of public-service utilities, maintenance, repair, and new construction.

I have used the expression "operation of utilities." In order that there may be no doubt about its definition, I will state that it means, the operation of an electric power plant, distributing system, substations, or whatever is necessary to supply electricity for light, power, or other purposes at any military post, station, camp, cantonment, arsenal, factory, hospital, or other military possession. Similarly, operation of a water pumping plant, filter plant, purification plant, water-distributing system, or whatever else is necessary for the supply of pure water to the Army's possession wherever it might be. Operation of sewer systems, including sewage-disposal plants and the disposition of the effluent in an innocuous manner into public waters. Fire prevention and protection, including fire companies, vehicular fire apparatus, ordinary hand fire apparatus, sprinkler systems, alarm systems, or whatever else may be necessary for proper fire protection. Upkeep and repair of roads of every character from concrete to dirt at all Army posts, stations, etc. Upkeep and repair of all buildings, including the plumbing and all fixtures within the buildings. Disposition of all surplus drainage and incident sanitation; operation of an ice-making plant, the distribution of the ice, the operation of a refrigeration plant for the beef and all perishable foodstuffs; operation of central heating plants for heating in every case the entire hospital areas, and in many cases entire establishments, including providing of hot water from the centrally operated plant.

The foregoing is what is meant by the operation of utilities and compares favorably in scope and extent to the most modern city management that has been inaugurated in this country.

This work requires, for those projects which must be retained for a minimum army, a trained personnel of some 10,000 enlisted men and civilians who are now charged with the operation of utilities at approximately 500 projects scattered throughout the United States. The operation of these utilities is a matter of prime importance and the extent of this work is comparable with that which might be expected from the department of public works in some five cities.

At the outbreak of the war, the War Department found itself operating, so far as operation of utilities and construction are con-

cerned, as it had before the war, to wit: The several departments doing their own work. This soon led to the different parts of the War Department competing with one another, which in turn led to a consolidation of all of this work under one bureau of the War Department, namely, the Construction Division of the Army. It took, perhaps, a year before this became effective in all of its details as a great many departments had contracts outstanding which it seemed wise not to disturb.

At the beginning of the war, the major project in the eyes of the public was the construction of the necessary places to mobilize and train our new armies. This led, in May, 1917, to the separation, in part, of the Construction and Repair Division of the Quartermaster General's office from the jurisdiction of the Quartermaster General, except in certain particulars. The operation of utilities was not separated from the Quartermaster General's office in May, 1917, at the time the construction was separated. The independent set up for construction was made because it was manifest that work of such magnitude and importance to the Nation could not be done unless the officer in charge of the same had direct access to the final authority in the War Department. It seems to me that this lesson that the war has taught us is fast being lost sight of, that is, the experience of the past war has left us with the lesson that a distinct field of operation in the War Department must be under the control of distinct organizations. The war developed distinct classifications of activities not theretofore provided for in the Army organization. Before being called upon to exercise its distinct function in the past war, instances might be cited in which certain activities or branches of the service were included under the jurisdiction and authority of a corps or bureau merely because there was some apparent relation to that corps or bureau.

Before the war, Military Aeronautics was placed under the Signal Corps probably upon the theory that it had something to do with observation and communications. Actual operation demonstrated the necessity for placing this distinct class of work under a distinct department. Later developments required the separation again of the two distinct branches of the Aircraft Production and Military Aeronautics because they did distinctly different types of work. When it became necessary to house the new army, the Construction Division was separated from the Quartermaster Corps and given a separate entity because of the distinct nature of its work. Another instance of this character was the separation of the Chemical Warfare Service from the Ordnance. There had been other similar instances, but the main thought associated with these divisions of the work is that when put to a supreme test of emergency, former theories of organization were not effective. Practice and experience have developed the various units or organizations that we now find in the War Department.

Although construction was separated from the Quartermaster General in May, 1917, and the operation of utilities was not, it soon became evident that the relation between construction and operation was so close that they were in fact interdependent, and in October, 1917, the operation of the utilities was placed under the Construction Division.

It was not until the Construction Division emerged from under the wing of the Quartermaster General's office that proper development of the utilities operation was formed. Then, the local utilities officers were disassociated from the camp quartermasters and made directly responsible to the military commander of the reservation and to the division now called the Construction Division, to supervise the work and provide the funds required therefor.

At various times it has been proposed to place all construction work for the War Department under the Corps of Engineers, and thus eliminate the Construction Division as a staff unit. This principle has been conceived upon the theory that construction work for the Army consists merely of engineering problems and therefore should be controlled by the Corps of Engineers, and upon the theory that the volume of work was not sufficient to warrant the overhead incident to a separate staff unit. The Engineer Corps has never in the history of this country, nor of the Army, had to do with construction work for the Army nor with the construction or operation of its utilities. The Corps of Engineers has a very distinct function in immediate association with the field forces of an army and is distinctly military in its character—I repeat, and is distinctly military in its character. The work of the Engineer Corps calls for a skilled military engineer trained along military lines, directing the work of military organizations under military conditions. It is a character of work frequently performed under fire, requiring all of the military discipline of the Army for its operation, and a work for which civilians are totally unfitted until that military discipline is attained. On the other hand, one trained to direct work under a strict military discipline would meet embarrassment in an effort to adapt himself to the direction of concurrent work of a similar nature under commercial rules. The frame of mind is different.

The public mind turns to the Engineer Corps as constructors of the Army, because they do river and harbor work. The character of work that they do is very special, has little or no commercial competition in connection therewith, and is usually done, perhaps of necessity, but still done in a costly manner. No longer ago than last Wednesday night the Chief of Engineers stated in an open meeting of the American Society of Civil Engineers, in effect, that this work on rivers and harbors was so special that it would take the civil engineers as long to become accustomed to it as it would he, the Chief of Engineers, to become accustomed to their work, so that interchange between civil life and the Corps of Engineers, in his judgment, would not be practicable. Thus the officers of the Engineer Corps, men of the highest standing, do not get either in their military training or in their river and harbor work a commercial conception of either engineering or construction, nor is it necessary that they should in order to perform their normal military work. I do not believe that it is necessary to substantiate this with facts. I believe it to be so nearly common knowledge in the engineering world as to need no elaboration. However, if this committee doubts this statement of fact, I urge upon them to call as witnesses before it the representatives of the American Society of Civil Engineers, or of the higher engineering body, Engineering Council, or representatives of the General Contractors' Association.

In the ordinary everyday military life, the work of the Construction Division is more intimately associated with that of the Quartermaster Corps than with the Engineer Corps. Before the war, we were accustomed to look upon the Quartermaster Corps as perhaps the largest staff department of the Army. It is my belief, and I believe this will be substantiated by more than 75 per cent of the officers of the Army, that the Quartermaster Corps came more nearly to giving the Government a dollar's worth for every dollar expended than any other bureau of the War Department. Expressing this in another way, the officers of the Quartermaster Corps came more nearly conducting their business in a commercial way than did any other branch of the War Department. At military posts, it is necessary for the Quartermaster Corps to supply the soldier with all of his necessities of life, such as clothing, food, equipment, etc., and in that he does do it, his line comes nearer rubbing elbows with that of the utilities officers than anything that the Engineer officer has to do. Generally speaking, Engineer officers are with the Military Establishment in a military capacity, or with troops for the construction of such military features as is necessary in the training of troops.

In the event of any maneuver, it is necessary that the military organizations move away from the place and go into the theater of operations. There should not be left behind a new organization to care for the large properties that the Government has, but there should be an organization remaining that will know local conditions and affairs and thus preserve the interests of the Government. The Engineers will have to remain behind in no event. The Quartermaster will have to do it to a certain extent. The utilities officers will have to do it in its entirety. Therefore if utilities and construction were to lose its entity and be under any bureau of the War Department, it would be distinctly in the interest of the Government for it to be made a part of the Quartermaster Corps, as the Government would, in the future, as in the past, come more nearly getting a dollar's worth for a dollar.

At the outbreak of this war, every department of the Regular Army was wholly inadequate in numbers to meet the emergency. More officers were immediately needed for the military functions of the Engineer Corps than its existing personnel. Not a single Regular Engineer officer was available to the Construction Division. In another great war the same thing would inevitably happen again. Every Regular Engineer officer who was familiar with the training or the routine work of Engineer troops would again be more urgently needed in the theater of operations than on construction in the interior, and an impromptu organization would again have to be organized to assume the latter. If it be suggested that a construction branch of the Engineer Corps be developed, containing only officers who are not trained for service with troops but only trained for construction, the very suggestion illustrates the entire difference between the two performances and the difficulty of trying to combine their diverse methods under the same head. The civilian construction work of the Army as performed by the Construction Division is a distinctly different type of construction work from that to be performed with troops in the field. This class of work requires for its competent execution that machinery which is engaged on construc-

tion work at all times in commercial practice and which must attain a high degree of efficiency in order to maintain its existence. This work was never thus performed within the theater of military operations and the entire construction machinery of the country is available for its performance. To obtain the best results from the latter agency it is necessary that when called on to aid the Government, its work be directed along the lines to which it is accustomed by an agency accustomed to directing such work.

The Construction Division was organized during the stress of war with the assistance of men of large experience along lines specially qualifying them for the duties which they were required to perform. This organization was conceived and built up by these men. It is made up of not only the men at the top, but the rank and file of engineers, designers, construction men, utility managers, auditors, accountants, clerks, stenographers, and all those necessary to perform every part of the work. By an organization is meant the results of the welding of all these units into a human machine working to a common end and with the teamwork necessary to follow the twistings and turnings necessary to progress. It is the impress of these top men and the many under them that gives the Construction Division its value, and that should be retained as one of the valuable assets of the experience of the war. To lose this asset to the Army through the submersion of the Construction Division in any other corps or bureau because of the theory that all engineering and construction problems should be handled by Army Engineers would prove an unpardonable act of shortsightedness.

Upon principle the War Department should recognize that if its construction work in time of war could be done by civilian agencies it could be done by those same agencies in time of peace. By following this practice the antagonism, misunderstandings, and general jarring and discord which were in evidence in the Army during part of this war would be avoided. Also, with the work handled by an organization experienced in civilian construction work and business methods, the best contractors, engineers, and constructors will be willing to undertake the Government construction work to a far greater extent than has been the condition in the past.

It is generally recognized that the Navy Department has organized along efficient lines. A study of its organization in comparison to that of the War Department shows a distribution of functions which supports the proposition that civilian construction should be under a distinct bureau. The Navy Department has a Bureau of Construction and Repair, which does its shipbuilding. It has a Bureau of Steam Engineering, which has charge of the motive-power construction. Its Bureau of Yards and Docks designs, maintains, and executes all land construction, operation, and repairs, such as buildings and dry docks, etc., at navy yards, naval bases, etc. Thus it will be seen that it has its technical military construction organizations in its Bureau of Construction and Repair and its Bureau of Steam Engineering, and it has its commercial building and operating organization in its Bureau of Yards and Docks, to which the Construction Division may be likened.

It might be well to briefly outline the work of the Construction Division so far as construction is concerned during the war. The authorized construction work totaled more than \$1,000,000,000. It

is commonly supposed that the construction work for the Army was the camps and cantonments. As a matter of fact, in point of cost this comprised less than 50 per cent of the authorized construction work during the war. More than 50 per cent of the construction work was in the nature of shops, factories, storage, and terminal facilities, which are very different from the usual conception of a layman of storage of property. For example, one such storage project has over 50 miles of railroad. The work of the Construction Division in magnitude, speed of accomplishment, number of workmen employed, and materials involved dwarfs any other construction or engineering project the world has ever known. At 547 sites scattered from the Atlantic to the Pacific, 581 separate operations employing over 400,000 men were simultaneously under way. The Panama Canal, which required 10 years to construct, cost approximately \$375,000,000, whereas the work of the Construction Division for one year and a half exceeded three times this amount. Other than loans to the nations associated with us and pay of the Army, the war cost the Government \$12,000,000,000. The Construction Division had the responsibility of about 10 per cent of the total cost of the war in a commercial way. This accomplishment is the more wonderful and amazing when it is considered that executives and thousands of workmen who might ordinarily be used were diverted to the armies of the world or industries necessary for their operation. While the work was being done there was a shortage of material and congestion of transportation facilities unequaled in the world's history. Notwithstanding these obstacles, this monumental task was accomplished not only economically but with such dispatch as to meet all requirements for construction for the Army program of the United States.

As an example of the work done other than that of the camps and cantonments, there were constructed seven ammunition storage depots; nine plants for assembling ammunition. These include shell-loading plants for fixed ammunition, bag-filling plants for loose ammunition, two cartridge factories, one plant for loading aerial bombs, and one for manufacturing incendiary bullets. Twenty chemical manufacturing plants, with their buildings, facilities, and equipment for the manufacture of T. N. T., picric acid, tetryl, toluol, sulphuric acid, phosphorus, mustard gas, tear gas, sodium cyanide, and liquid nitrogen. The various factories or factory additions for the manufacture of Liberty motors, tank tractors, automatic pistols, etc., and laboratories and experimental stations.

The warehouse area of the terminals approximate 698 acres of storage space. These storehouses vary from one-story brick, tile, or concrete buildings to nine-story concrete buildings. Adjacent to the terminals, piers, and docks are equivalent to $7\frac{1}{2}$ miles of wharves for loading ships. These examples have been taken to show the diversified character of the work done.

On the last page of the tabulation I have placed before members of the committee is given, in round figures, the different parts that were separable from the construction work, such as the maximum number of men employed at one time, 427,000; total hospital capacity provided, 186,500; number of sewer tanks, 150; total holding capacity, 20,000,000 gallons, and so on.

The CHAIRMAN. Would you like that table put in the record?

Gen. MARSHALL. Yes, sir; I have it here as a part of this to go in the record, but I thought for the committee to glance at it would give them some conception now. For example, the question of power plants, 60 power plants and 200 substations with a capacity of 20,000 kilowatts and 150,000 kilowatts, respectively, which will illustrate the size of things.

In order that the committee may have a record before it in round numbers the following might be stated:

Number of employees used.....	427, 000
Total number of buildings erected for shelter of troops.....	54, 800
Total hospital capacity provided.....	186, 500
Docks (linear feet).....	39, 000
Lighters.....	142
Derrick barges.....	61
Standard gauge railroads (miles).....	987
Storage and depot warehouses (acres).....	898
Remount capacity, animals.....	217, 000
Water systems:	
Number of systems.....	275
Water mains (miles).....	800
Pump capacity per day (gallons).....	650, 000, 000
Number of water-filter plants.....	68
Filter capacity in gallons per day.....	40, 000, 000
Clear-water storage (gallons).....	67, 000, 000
Raw-water storage (gallons).....	3, 000, 000, 000
Sewer systems:	
Sewage tanks.....	150
Total holding capacity (gallons).....	20, 000, 000
Incinerator and water-disposal plants.....	50
Sewers (miles).....	1, 000
Refrigeration:	
Number of plants.....	57
Ice-making capacity (tons).....	517
Storage capacity (tons).....	17, 755
Bakeries: Daily capacity (pounds).....	2, 000, 000
Power plants:	
Number of central stations.....	60
Number of substations.....	200
Central-station capacity (kilowatts).....	20, 000
Substation capacity (kilowatts).....	150, 000
Transmission lines (miles).....	500
Distribution lines (miles).....	3, 000
Roads:	
New roads constructed (miles).....	1, 081
Lumber used (board feet).....	2, 647, 000, 000
Cement used (barrels).....	6, 200, 000

The foregoing gives some conception of the construction work performed during the war. Each and all of these projects had utilities, which the construction division operated. The value of property in existence to-day at which utilities are being operated is approximately \$800,000,000, and during the war comprised no less than 458 separate projects, not including all of the Regular Army posts. I have previously described what this utility operation means. I might well bring to the attention of the committee that there has not been a single case of water-borne disease traceable to water. The construction division was responsible for the installation of the water systems and also for their operation, which served a population of more than 6,000,000 people. Similarly there has not been an

epidemic nor disease due to insanitation. The fire loss at these camps and cantonments were 46 cents per capita per year. For the entire country the reports show the loss to have been \$2.10, this in spite of the fact that it was freely predicted that these wooden cities presented a potentiality of fire risk, not only from the point of view of money value but the loss of human life, especially in the hospitals, in which there has been no loss of life due to fire, due to the work of the construction division. The question of sewage disposal of municipalities of the size of our camps and cantonments, some arsenals, and factories of the character we have constructed is always one of great concern to the communities in which they are located, it is often the cause of injury to individuals and expensive litigation from others whose riparian rights must be respected. In all of these projects the disposal of wastes has been handled in such a manner to date there has not been a single suit brought against the Government for improper sewage disposal.

Turning now to the future there are a number of collateral, confirming reasons for construction work for the Army and the operation of utilities to be done by a separate staff corps, but the fundamental one is the amount of money to be expended and the consequent economy that may be effected—in short, the size of the job. Before showing what the size of this job is it can be definitely asserted that it is of such a size that no commercial concern would give a second thought to its being handled by other than a separate organization, having direct access to its board of directors or general manager. Indeed, I am personally cognizant of commercial firms who are doing this with a construction program no greater than 20 per cent of that confronting the War Department, and are willing to pay the head of such organization \$25,000 a year. This is not said with the view of raising the pay of any Army officer. Before going into appropriations made prior to the war and showing per capita cost I will give a synopsis of expenditures which will confront the War Department for construction and operation of utilities.

For purposes of determining what housing confronts the War Department the following shows what will be necessary under the national defense act. Also the several bills before Congress have been examined and those which apparently provide the greatest personnel and the least personnel are for the purposes of this discussion called the War Department bill (S. 2715) and the Dent bill (H. R. 8870). The housing necessary under each is stated.

The War Department bill provides for 28,382 commissioned officers and 509,914 enlisted men, of whom approximately 5,800 are noncommissioned officers entitled to separate quarters. The Dent bill provides for 18,400 commissioned officers and 294,000 enlisted men, of whom approximately 3,350 are noncommissioned officers entitled to separate quarters. There is also shown the cost under the national defense act which provides on a peace basis for 11,876 officers and 221,045 men, of whom approximately 2,520 are noncommissioned officers entitled to separate quarters.

There are at the present time in the United States and its possessions permanent quarters for 4,389 officers, 1,739 noncommissioned officers, and 118,574 enlisted men. Assuming that 15 per cent of the

officers will be on detached duty and on a commutation basis, and also that 75 per cent of all of the existing quarters, regardless of their location, will be available for permanent housing, additional quarters must be provided for the following permanent personnel:

	War Department bill.	Dent bill.	National defense act.
Married officers.....	14,583	8,923	5,462
Bachelor officers.....	6,260	3,825	2,241
Married noncommissioned officers.....	3,147	1,432	851
Bachelor noncommissioned officers.....	1,349	614	365
Enlisted men.....	415,184	201,720	129,586
Total.....	440,513	216,514	138,614

This is exclusive of the student Army under universal military training.

Two plans are considered: One proposes to remodel the temporary structures built during the war emergency so that they will house this personnel, and the other contemplates new and permanent buildings.

In order to make the temporary buildings livable, it will be necessary to paint and repair them, seal and line the walls of the barracks, add two-story porches, replace tar paper roofing with permanent covering, put in new floors and foundation posts where necessary, and replace the sliding sash with hung sash, and also to provide walks and make improvements to the roads, surface drainage, and grounds.

The enlisted men's barracks will be heated as at present with stoves, and the men will use the existing lavatory facilities which are located in adjacent buildings.

Each bachelor officer will be provided with two rooms and a bath and eat in a common club and mess building apart from his sleeping quarters.

Married officers will be housed in barracks which will be converted into 2-family houses. These houses will have steam heat, toilet facilities, and be finished inside and out similar to the barracks for enlisted men. It will cost to convert a 66-man barracks, which was originally built for about \$5,000, into a 2-family house the sum of \$9,650. A 150-man barracks, which originally cost about \$14,000, can be converted into a 4-family house for \$28,000 additional.

Senator NEW. Give me the original cost of that again, will you?

Gen. MARSHALL. Fourteen thousand.

Senator NEW. That is the original cost?

Gen. MARSHALL. A 150-man barrack, remodeling that for a 4-family house would cost \$28,000.

Senator NEW. Which would be twice what the original cost was?

Gen. MARSHALL. Yes; you would get a 4-family officer house out of it.

The CHAIRMAN. That involves putting in bathrooms, modern plumbing, ceiling inside, new roofs, new floors where worn out, and concrete posts underneath?

Gen. MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Senator NEW. I just wanted to be sure I had that figure right.

Gen. MARSHALL. The saving effected by remodeling the existing buildings is only about 25 per cent.

The CHAIRMAN. As compared with what?

Gen. MARSHALL. With its original cost.

The CHAIRMAN. You could put up a new 4-family building for \$21,000?

Gen. MARSHALL. For \$28,000 plus \$3,500 would be \$31,500, of that same type of construction. You would only save about 25 per cent of the original cost of the building. That is all saved in the remodeling to convert it into officers' quarters.

In addition to the conversion of temporary barracks to permanent quarters, certain other buildings such as laundries, warehouses, refrigerator plants, etc., must be made suitable for permanent use. The hospitals will be reduced in bed capacity to meet the requirements of the peace-time personnel and the space thus made available will be used to house officers and men. Nothing is included for the remodeling of hospital buildings except to provide permanent roofs.

The cost of remodeling existing temporary buildings to accommodate the proposed personnel of the Army under each bill, taking full credit for existing water systems, sewers, roads, and other general utilities, is as follows:

Cost of remodeling existing buildings to provide accommodation for personnel.

Contemplated by—	Total.	Cost per capita.
War Department bill (S. 2715), including universal military training	\$213,000,000	\$360
Dent bill (H. R. 8870), including universal military training (for purpose of comparison)	131,000,000	357
Dent bill (this does not include universal military training)	106,000,000	488
National-defense act (including universal military training, for purpose of comparison)	91,000,000	315
National-defense act (this does not include universal military training)	66,000,000	476

You will find that in Table A, on the first page, remodeling existing buildings, including provision for 150,000 men under universal military training, \$213,000,000.

The CHAIRMAN. Where did you get that number, 150,000 men, under universal military training?

Gen. MARSHALL. We just took the Senate bill on the three-months basis, 600,000 men; we took 150,000 at a time.

The CHAIRMAN. I do not believe you are justified in estimating that way.

Gen. MARSHALL. I realize that is a fact; but I had to assume some basis for it, and that was probably the minimum. A man has to be housed; the same housing is required, whether you take them for four months at a time or three months at a time, or what not.

Senator NEW. You just took the six months' total and divided?

Gen. MARSHALL. In the four periods, divided it into 150,000. It costs to take these buildings and do a small amount of work to them, like replacing the roofs—they leak now and are going to pieces—and

just rebuilding the buildings without redesigning them as for the permanent personnel, \$150 per capita.

The CHAIRMAN. I am afraid we never could work out a system of universal training which would involve four training periods in one year.

Gen. MARSHALL. I am, too. I quite agree with that, but I had to assume some basis for figuring and I just assumed this, because it was the one that was before you; that is all; not because I agreed with it or did not agree with it.

Senator FLETCHER. Suppose you had to double that number; say, 300,000?

Gen. MARSHALL. That would increase this cost \$25,000,000.

Senator SUTHERLAND. Suppose you had 350,000 in one three-months period?

Gen. MARSHALL. You would have to provide just as much housing as if you kept them for a year, except for the heating, perhaps. You would have to have the barracks just the same.

Senator FLETCHER. You could not get along with tents?

Gen. MARSHALL. Yes, sir; but you would find the tents would be more expensive than this type of building.

Senator SUTHERLAND. In the long run?

Gen. MARSHALL. In the long run; yes. We found the life of a tent on the Mexican border to be about four months.

Senator SUTHERLAND. With proper care?

Gen. MARSHALL. Yes; that is just about the length of life of canvas, and there is no question, as a matter of economy, which is more economical.

The CHAIRMAN. Over a period of years?

Gen. MARSHALL. Yes.

Senator FLETCHER. You are figuring on placing these in some 16 camps?

Gen. MARSHALL. In the existing cantonments.

Senator FLETCHER. And the cost to change those to meet that situation would be as stated?

Gen. MARSHALL. Yes. Now, Mr. Senator, there are few of us who realize that before the war the Army never exceeded 102,000 men. There are very few of us who really realize that. We have to get down and think about it positively in order to realize that to be a fact.

Senator SUTHERLAND. That was about 85,000 enlisted men?

Gen. MARSHALL. That was officers and men. No, sir; that was 97,000 enlisted men, and the housing that we have got for the Army now nowhere nearly equals what the enlisted personnel under the national-defense act contemplates.

Senator NEW. In other words, you are absolutely required to put up a lot of new buildings for an army of 225,000, if you have no more than that?

Gen. MARSHALL. If you convert the present buildings it will cost you \$66,000,000—by converting the present buildings, not by putting up new buildings, it will cost \$66,000,000. Under the national-defense act, if Congress adopts that as the military policy of the country.

Senator SUTHERLAND. What was the average size of the Army for several years prior to the war?

Gen. MARSHALL. For 10 years prior to the war, from the fiscal year 1907 to 1916, it was 84,299 officers and men.

Senator NEW. That was the average?

Gen. MARSHALL. For those 10 years.

The CHAIRMAN. As I recollect, our Army posts have a capacity of approximately 72,000 men.

Gen. MARSHALL. In this country. The total capacity that we have for all Army posts, whether occupied or unoccupied. There are a great many of them, you know, that have been unoccupied for years, but counting every one of them we have everywhere it is 118,000 and some odd.

Senator NEW. That includes the Philippines?

Gen. MARSHALL. The Philippines, Panama, Hawaii, and Alaska.

Senator NEW. Everywhere?

Gen. MARSHALL. Abandoned and occupied.

The CHAIRMAN. Of course, those abandoned posts are little one and two company posts?

Gen. MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Which can never be occupied again?

Gen. MARSHALL. Which can never be occupied again.

The CHAIRMAN. What is the practical capacity from a military standpoint of the Army posts we now have? Something less than 118,000, I would assume.

Gen. MARSHALL. I would say the practical capacity would be—the Coast Artillery posts, plus half a dozen of the larger ones, I would say that would be the practical capacity, and that will run, on a guess, around 25,000 to 30,000, but I have exact figures later.

The CHAIRMAN. You mean there were never 50,000 beds of the old permanent capacity, now abandoned?

Gen. MARSHALL. It is in such small units. I think I cover that a little later.

The CHAIRMAN. Go ahead.

Gen. MARSHALL. I have tried to treat this fairly exhaustively so as to come to a conclusion.

This provides for the permanent establishment in quarters made by converting the present temporary structures, and the estimates, where indicated, also include the cost of accommodations for the men who are to receive universal military training. On the basis that there will be 600,000 men trained yearly, accommodations will have to be made for 150,000 men if the period is only three months long. This is the minimum.

All of the above estimates are based upon the use of present underground improvements and existing roads and railroads, warehouses, hospitals, laundries, and other existing auxiliary facilities, and contemplates only such repairs as are absolutely necessary to buildings other than quarters.

Such a plan is at best a temporary expedient and one which involves a large annual maintenance cost. Neither the officers' quarters nor the enlisted men's barracks, when converted, will be entirely satisfactory for the permanent housing of troops, nor is it thought that the men occupying them for any length of time will be contented. The buildings will be hot in summer and cold in winter, and difficult to keep sanitary and free from vermin.

In order to retain in the service the type of officers essential to the success of the Army, suitable permanent quarters must be provided.

Commutation of quarters will not do. An officer is not going to be contented and will not stay in the service if he has got to live in the city and get to his troops at 7 o'clock in the morning and leave them at 5 or 6 o'clock in the afternoon and go back to the city. The life is not worth living. A commutation of quarters will not take the place of quarters in kind. This is also true of the enlisted man. Unless he can be guaranteed satisfactory housing accommodations the difficulty of securing the type of man desired becomes almost impossible.

In 1908 legislation was passed by Congress fixing the cost of officers' quarters as follows:

General officers, not to exceed.....	\$15,000
Field officers, not to exceed.....	12,000
Line officers, not to exceed.....	9,000

The cost of the same quarters to-day is at least 70 per cent greater than it was at the time the bill was passed.

The cost of providing standard quarters for the entire Army personnel authorized under each of the above bills which can not be quartered in existing buildings, on the basis of present-day prices, is as follows:

	Cost of new permanent buildings for the Regular Establishment.	Cost per capita.
Under War Department bill.....	\$717,000,000	\$1,628
Under Dent bill.....	383,000,000	1,770
Under national defense act.....	241,000,000	1,738

Furnishing the same kind of barracks and quarters as were furnished prior to the war. Understand, I do not think any such thing will ever be authorized nor do I advise any such a thing, but that is what it would cost under the War Department bill to provide barracks and quarters if they were provided the same kind of barracks and quarters that were provided prior to the war.

The CHAIRMAN. Those are net expenditures after deducting the existing permanent quarters?

Gen. MARSHALL. Yes, sir. That is, if the same character of quarters with all of the space that we have in our Army posts were provided. I do not contemplate, and I think no one recommends, providing such an elaborate outlay.

Senator SUTHERLAND. What proportion of that cost did you include in your estimate on your cost under the War Department bill? You testified in regard to the cost of construction under the present bill.

Gen. MARSHALL. Under the national defense act.

Senator SUTHERLAND. No; under this pending bill. I think your testimony was under the appropriation bill.

Gen. MARSHALL. Yes; it was on the appropriation bill.

Senator SUTHERLAND. What part of that would be contemplated by you as a legitimate part to be defrayed from year to year should you contemplate such a program?

Gen. MARSHALL. I have got that stated in here to be approximately \$50,000,000 a year for five years.

All of the above are exclusive of universal military training. To provide for four groups of 150,000 men for a three months' training period in the existing buildings, remodeled as contemplated for enlisted men, will cost \$25,000,000 in addition to the above.

In considering this large sum it must be remembered that it must be substantially offset by the sale of certain of the old Army posts which are no longer needed by the War Department. A complete list of these properties is in preparation and it is estimated that approximately \$150,000,000 may be realized therefrom. The exact amount is predicated upon the final decision of the War Plans Division as to the specific posts which are no longer needed.

These abandoned posts can be utilized to a great advantage in many ways. They are specifically adapted for use as colleges, sanitariums, hospitals, homes for the aged and infirm, and similar institutions. A number of them, such as Fort Sheridan, Ill.; Columbus Barracks, Ohio; and Governors Island, N. Y., have become so valuable as city real estate that it will not be economical for the Government to continue them as posts, and a sale of these lands would go a long way toward paying for the cost of permanently housing the Army in divisional units on lands purchased during the emergency for the camps and cantonments.

In order to dispose of these properties, my office is now drafting legislation to create a corporate body, in which shall be vested the title to these properties and which shall have plenary powers to dispose of them as best conserves the interest of the Government. The corporation to deposit all money received, into the Treasury, where it will be credited to the cost which has been incurred in providing permanent housing for the Army.

In addition to the credit for the sale of obsolete posts, there will be a tremendous annual saving in administration costs due to the concentration at a few large posts, activities which are now widely scattered.

The Government must either provide officers with suitable quarters or pay them an allowance in lieu thereof. Under the War Department bill this amounts to approximately \$25,000,000 per year, based on legislation now before Congress. This sum is 22.7 per cent on the cost of converting existing buildings into officers' quarters, or 11.7 per cent on the total cost of remodeling existing buildings to accommodate officers and men of the proposed Army, and in addition the 150,000 student soldiers under universal military training. In other words, by providing the necessary officers' quarters the Government will save the cost of their construction in about 4 years, or the sum which must be paid to officers if quarters are not furnished them would in 9 years equal the cost of remodeling existing buildings for all the officers and men and students in training. It is manifestly a good business proposition for the Government to build the necessary quarters.

It is seen that the cost of building new and permanent quarters for housing the Army is about $3\frac{1}{2}$ times that of converting existing buildings for this purpose. These two plans represent the maximum and minimum housing requirements for the Army. It is probable that a modified plan contemplating the use of remodeled existing buildings for enlisted men and bachelor officers, and new and permanent quarters for the married personnel, may be to the best interest of the Government. My office is now working on the details of such a scheme, which will be submitted later. Regardless of which plan is decided upon, a large amount of construction work must be done at once.

Cost of construction, operation, maintenance, and repair for the Army for fiscal years 1907 to 1916.

Fiscal year.	Total men and officers.	Total appropriation for the Army.	Total spent for construction, operation, maintenance, and repair by all departments.	Per capita cost per annum.	Per cent of total appropriation spent for construction, operation, maintenance, and repair.
1907.....	73,857	\$96,358,254	\$9,659,115	\$131	10.0
1908.....	70,455	103,462,769	12,642,870	190	12.3
1909.....	78,813	127,695,135	17,662,137	224	13.8
1910.....	75,166	132,991,946	19,805,091	262	14.7
1911.....	77,735	118,787,138	11,659,989	151	9.8
1912.....	85,801	118,154,697	9,558,653	111	8.0
1913.....	86,452	117,535,033	8,056,762	93	6.8
1914.....	92,482	118,326,774	8,165,847	88	6.9
1915.....	100,381	128,524,416	11,061,827	110	8.6
1916.....	101,856	132,514,719	11,612,459	115	8.8
Total.....	842,990	1,194,350,881	119,684,750
Average 10 years.....	84,299	119,435,088	11,968,475	142	10.0

The foregoing takes up the single topic of housing the Army and shows that under the existing law (the national-defense act) not less than \$66,000,000 will have to be expended if the temporary buildings are used, and this will produce results certain to be unsatisfactory. To produce housing similar to that used before the war for the Army authorized under the national-defense act, making due allowance for those who will be absent on detached duty, will cost \$241,000,000, so that if Congress rests upon the national-defense act as a proper source of military preparedness the expenditure for construction work will be no less than \$15,000,000 per annum on a five-year program. This does not include the operation of utilities, nor does it include construction other than housing for the Army which prior to the war was the approximate equivalent of expenditure for housing of the Army. For the 10 fiscal years 1907-1916, inclusive, the Regular Army averaged 84,299 men and officers. Each bureau handled its own construction, operation, maintenance, and repair.

For these 10 years previous to the war there was expended for new construction, operation, maintenance, and repair by the several departments an average of \$11,968,000 per annum, or \$142 per capita. The strength of the Army and the total amount appropriated for all departments for all construction, operation, maintenance, and repair

is shown on the table, copy of which each of you have and which I will now explain.

In the first column is the fiscal year, which ends on June 30 of the date stated, so that none of these figures apply to a time subsequent to June 30, 1916, and hence have not reflected in them war costs; they are not reflected in these figures. The first column shows the total number of men and officers; the next column the total appropriation for the Army; the total number of men and officers and the average for this 10 years, 1907 to 1916, is 84,299. Average total appropriation for Army purposes, \$119,435,088; total spent for construction, operation, and repair by all departments, \$11,968,475. That is the per annum average for the 10 years. The per capita cost per annum for those 10 years is \$142, and the total cost per annum is 10 per cent of the total appropriation for the Army. That does not include construction of fortifications; it includes such things as the construction division has done during this war, and which I have described in my previous testimony.

Note at foot of table:

From the above it is seen that the average cost of construction, operation, maintenance, and repair for the 10 years previous to the war, 1907 to 1916, inclusive, is \$142 per capita. The present-day equivalent, due to 70 per cent increase in cost of labor and material, is \$241 per capita per annum.

An analysis of the figures for the fiscal years 1913, 1914, and 1915 shows that about 40 per cent was spent for construction work. The remaining 60 per cent was for operation, maintenance, and repair, equivalent to \$85 per capita per annum before the war, or \$144 per capita per annum at present-day prices.

During the war the construction, maintenance, and repair work and the operation of all utilities of the several departments and bureaus in this country were consolidated under the jurisdiction of the construction division. The Army was increased to more than 40 times its prewar strength and the Construction Division made responsible for an expenditure which for the fiscal year of 1918 alone, totaled more than \$612,000,000, or about 51 times its prewar volume. The total work during the war under the jurisdiction of the Construction Division represented an expenditure of more than a billion and a quarter dollars, or about one-twentieth of the total cost of the war, including the loans to the Allies.

Since the armistice, it has been necessary to complete a number of projects which were already under construction and to authorize new projects for the storing of supplies accumulated during the emergency and other similar work. Over \$60,000,000 of such new work has been authorized since November 11, 1918, and at the present time there is in the course of construction and under the jurisdiction of the Construction Division more than \$54,000,000 worth of construction work.

Senator NEW. Now tell us, will you, if you set forth from here on, later, what this is? If you do, you need not answer this question, but if you do not, tell us what that consists of.

Gen. MARSHALL. I can have a list put in the record of exactly what they are. I have not got it with me.

The CHAIRMAN. Give us some of the big items.

(The list referred to is as follows:)

List of projects on which the Construction Division is now carrying on work, approximate cost for each project, and estimated time of completing the physical work.

[Closing up the accounts will require 30 days' additional time on each project.]

Project.	Estimated cost.	Estimated time of completion.
Fort Sill, Okla.	\$74,200.00	Jan. 15, 1920
General Hospital No. 19, Azules, N. C.	63,500.00	Dec. 31, 1919
General Hospital No. 28, Fort Sheridan, Ill.	437,850.00	Dec. 1, 1919
Walter Reed General Hospital, Takoma Park	188,187.53	Feb. 1, 1920
Army War College	93,000.00	Dec. 1, 1919
Washington Barracks	150,000.00	Dec. 15, 1919
Morrison naval base, No. 2 Road, Camp Eustis	880,000.00	Dec. 1, 1919
Coast defenses of Portland, Me.	12,000.00	Feb. 1, 1920
Coast defenses of Boston, Mass.	22,515.00	Jan. 1, 1920
Coast defenses of Long Island Sound	22,250.00	Feb. 1, 1920
Coast defenses of Chesapeake	206,750.00	June 30, 1920
Coast defenses of Charleston, S. C.	28,512.00	Feb. 1, 1920
Coast defenses of Savannah	1,500.00	Dec. 15, 1919
Coast defenses of Puget Sound	27,649.00	June 30, 1920
Alcatraz Island	18,675.00	Do.
Fort Myer, Va.	15,000.00	Jan. 1, 1920
Sea-coast defense station, Staten Island	1,250,000.00	Sept. —, 1919
Honolulu, Hawaii	2,500.00	Dec. 1, 1919
Fort Ruger, Hawaii	225,000.00	June 30, 1920
Fort Shafter, Hawaii	6,000.00	Dec. 1, 1919
Fort De Russy, Hawaii	225,000.00	June 30, 1920
Fort Kamehameha, Hawaii	261,300.00	Do.
Fort Armstrong, Hawaii	274,900.00	Do.
Schofield Barracks, Honolulu, Hawaii	1,560,381.00	Do.
Manila Arsenal, P. I.	12,000.00	Dec. 1, 1919
Corregidor, P. I., air service coast defense station	367,000.00	June 30, 1920
Camp Stotsenburg, P. I.	182,500.00	Do.
Fort Mills, P. I.	141,500.00	Do.
Mexican border projects	4,000,000.00	Apr. 1, 1920
Fort Sam Houston, Tex.	800,000.00	Do.
Corrozoal and Gatun, Canal Zone	110,700.00	Dec. 15, 1919
United States Disciplinary Barracks, Fort Leavenworth, Kans.	301,056.00	June 30, 1920
Fort Leavenworth, Kans.	75,600.00	Nov. 1, 1919
Erie Proving Ground	220,000.00	Jan. 1, 1920
Holt Manufacturing Co., Peoria, Ill.	922,000.00	Do.
Chicago storage depot, Chicago, Ill.	460,000.00	Jan. 15, 1920
Arsenal, Honolulu, Hawaii	266,220.00	Mar. 15, 1920
Arsenal, Rock Island, Ill.	428,800.00	Apr. 1, 1920
Arsenal, Benecia, Calif.	151,100.00	Mar. 1, 1920
Arsenal, Watervliet, N. Y.	200,000.00	Jan. 1, 1920
Arsenal, Watertown, Mass.	617,000.00	Mar. 1, 1920
Frankford Arsenal, Philadelphia, Pa.	1,300,000.00	June 30, 1920
Langley Field, Hampton, Va.	943,959.44	Apr. 1, 1920
Ellington Field, Houston, Tex.	50,000.00	Jan. 1, 1920
Aberdeen Proving Ground, Md.	1,039,000.00	June 30, 1920
Erie Proving Ground, Fort Clinton, Ohio	1,001,905.00	Feb. 1, 1920
Savanna Proving Ground, Savanna, Ill.	1,429,475.00	Apr. 1, 1920
Birmingham Coke & By-Products Co., Birmingham, Ala.	2,500,000.00	Mar. 1, 1920
Donner Union Coke Corporation, Buffalo, N. Y.	7,500,000.00	June 1, 1920
Domestic Coke Corporation, Fairmont, W. Va.	3,000,000.00	Do.
International Coal Products Co., Clinchville, Ga.	2,000,000.00	Feb. 1, 1920
West Penn Power Co., Springdale, Pa.	2,500,000.00	Do.
St. Louis Mo., interior storage depot	30,849.00	Nov. 1, 1919
Columbus, Ohio, Army reserve depot	599,695.00	Jan. 1, 1920
Jeffersonville, Ind., interior storage depot	500,000.00	Mar. 1, 1920
Philadelphia, Pa., quartermaster terminal	13,392,000.00	Feb. 1, 1920
South Amboy, N. J., ordnance depot	175,000.00	Dec. 1, 1919
General Hospital No. 43, Hampton, Va.	65,750.00	Oct. 25, 1919
Air Service barracks, Brooklyn, N. Y.	1,000,000.00	Jan. 1, 1920
Fort Benjamin Harrison	85,000.00	Do.
Air Service barracks, New Orleans, La.	140,000.00	Do.
Charleston, S. C.	350,000.00	Nov. 1, 1919
Total	54,897,194.97	

Gen. MARSHALL. The three biggest items are the three coke ovens and by-product plants that are under course of construction.

The CHAIRMAN. Who are they for?

Gen. MARSHALL. They are under construction. They were entered into by the Ordnance Department.

Senator NEW. Where are they?

Gen. MARSHALL. One is down near Birmingham, one out in West Virginia, and one is near Buffalo—one near Fairmont, W. Va.

Senator FLETCHER. One near Muscle Shoals, Ala.?

Gen. MARSHALL. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. I was going to ask you, do you understand what the disposition of those plants is?

Gen. MARSHALL. The contract provides for their disposition after they are operated for a certain length of time, and the contractor shall then take them back upon a certain basis outlined in the contract. Just what the basis is I do not recall, but the contractor is under contract to do that.

The CHAIRMAN. It is fair to say we shall not keep those?

Gen. MARSHALL. Yes. If my recollection does not serve me false it is positively provided that the contractor shall take them. I do not think he has an option. I think those contracts were drawn so he has no option.

The CHAIRMAN. Now tell us about some of the other Army work.

Senator SUTHERLAND. The contractor in each plant, then, is a coal operator?

Gen. MARSHALL. By-products; yes, sir; a coke and by-product corporation.

Senator SUTHERLAND. You expect to operate these plants under the ownership of the Government prior to their taking them over?

Gen. MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Senator SUTHERLAND. Then eventually they take them over?

Gen. MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Senator FLETCHER. And pay the Government?

Gen. MARSHALL. Yes, sir; under whatever the terms of the contract are. Those I do not recall.

Senator NEW. You gave us a figure considerably in excess of a billion dollars having been spent on construction work. Does that include such plants as Muscle Shoals and Nitro?

Gen. MARSHALL. Not Nitro; no, sir.

Senator NEW. Your department had nothing to do with that?

Gen. MARSHALL. No, sir; we have, I say, nothing to do with that except in a certain way.

Senator NEW. But that does not include the cost?

Gen. MARSHALL. No, sir.

Senator NEW. Was Muscle Shoals included in that item?

Gen. MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Senator NEW. Do you remember what that item was?

Gen. MARSHALL. Sixty-four million or thereabouts; somewhere in the sixty millions.

Senator SUTHERLAND. Do you know what the Nitro plant cost?

Gen. MARSHALL. No, sir; I just saw in the newspapers it cost \$70,000,000, but I do not know whether that is correct or not.

The CHAIRMAN. What other items are there, General?

Gen. MARSHALL. I reckon the next biggest item was the terminal at Philadelphia, which is about a \$12,000,000 proposition, which is not yet completed.

Senator NEW. Just what is that?

Gen. MARSHALL. It is a warehouse proposition.

Senator NEW. A quartermaster storehouse?

Gen. MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Docks?

Gen. MARSHALL. Docks, piers, railroads, offices, power plant, and pumping plant.

Senator SUTHERLAND. What is to become of that plant? It is designed for the shipment of quartermaster stores abroad?

Gen. MARSHALL. Shipping and storage; yes, sir.

Senator NEW. And is a permanent thing?

Gen. MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Senator SUTHERLAND. It would not be required permanently by the Army, would it?

Gen. MARSHALL. No, sir; there are a great many of those, Senator. There is one at Boston, one at New York, one at Philadelphia, and one at Norfolk, Charleston, and New Orleans. All of them are the most modern terminals, not only in this country but in the world, and their disposition and operation is something I dare say will be a matter of legislation later on. I have very positive views as to how they should be handled, and they will not be needed by the Army in anywhere near their entirety. As I have said in here, their total warehouse area is 690 acres, more than a square mile in warehousing storage, and they are tremendous concerns and should play a large part in our commercial life rather than in our military life.

The CHAIRMAN. What other items have you got?

Gen. MARSHALL. Mostly storage items at different places. We are constructing on the Mexican border, which is coming near completion now, at some 50 or 60 different places, barracks for the men who are on the border, cantonment construction. Most of that is completed. But that was a \$4,000,000 project in its entirety. That ran from Nogales, Ariz., to Brownsville, Tex., along that whole border.

Senator NEW. Is your department doing that under your own auspices and management or letting it to contractors?

Gen. MARSHALL. Either in lump-sum contracting or doing it under our own auspices. It depends on the locality.

Senator SUTHERLAND. Have you got some construction work at Fort Benning?

Gen. MARSHALL. No, sir; we had some, but we stopped on July 11.

Senator NEW. Suddenly?

Gen. MARSHALL. Suddenly. I think that the date we stopped it was July 5, as a matter of fact, but I think the law was dated July 11. It all stopped July 5. The law, I think, was signed July 11.

Senator FLETCHER. The estimate of the cost, which is quite an element in your plant, was given by Gen. March in the items wherein he figured the total cost, the present pay for an Army of 500,000 men would be \$790,660.

Senator NEW. The total pay; you mean the total expenses?

Senator FLETCHER. I am reading exactly as printed here. Then, he says the total cost of the two together—that is, the universal training and the Army—would be in the neighborhood of \$900,000,000 per annum, but it seems in none of his estimates, so far as I can gather, has he included anything for housing.

The CHAIRMAN. Not for new construction.

Senator FLETCHER. For these items Gen. Marshall has been telling us about. They do not seem to have been included in this estimate of \$900,000,000.

Senator NEW. I am sure they are not.

Senator SUTHERLAND. He evidently must have included items of maintenance and operation?

Gen. MARSHALL. Yes; I suppose he must have. I do not know how those figures were compiled, but information was available and, I dare say, included in some form.

Senator FLETCHER. They appear on pages 47, 48, and 49 of our hearings, and I was just looking to see if they had made any estimate for these items you are now covering.

The CHAIRMAN. In those estimates pay, subsistence, and transportation are the three big items.

Senator NEW. So that they are at least \$241,000,000 out of the way for the first year?

Gen. MARSHALL. That is, on permanent construction; \$66,000,000, sir, if the present buildings are converted.

Senator NEW. Worse than that, because his estimate does not contemplate the division into four periods of the training quarters on which you base your estimate of \$66,000,000. You are estimating here for 150,000, that is all.

Senator FLETCHER. That is quite a different item.

Senator NEW. That is an entirely different proposition from the one Gen. March makes.

Senator SUTHERLAND. But he divides the total cost of permanent improvements for those men over a period of four or five years.

Gen. MARSHALL. Five years is what I took as a reasonable period. You can take any other period you wish.

Senator SUTHERLAND. It will not be that much for one year; it will be substantially one-fifth of that amount, something like \$50,000,000?

Gen. MARSHALL. Yes; that is what I finally conclude; it would be about \$50,000,000.

Senator NEW. Before you leave that, you say here, if provision is made for 150,000 men under universal military training, quartered in permanent buildings, add \$25,000,000 to the cost shown in Table B.

Gen. MARSHALL. Yes; in present buildings.

Senator NEW. This contemplates certain permanent buildings. If we are devising here a new military policy, we are going to do it on a permanent plan.

Gen. MARSHALL. The word "permanent" I perhaps used in a technical sense. If you take these wooden buildings and convert them, as is contemplated in my testimony, and keep them up, why, they are permanent, just like any frame buildings that you keep up is a permanent building, but I have called them temporary. The percentage cost of upkeep is high and the total cost is perhaps, in dollars and cents, no more than the upkeep for permanent buildings; but permanent buildings, in the sense of the old Army brick posts, cost considerably more than these frame buildings and the percentage upkeep is less, but the total amount of money is not a whole lot more than the cost of upkeep on frame buildings.

Senator NEW. I quite understand that, and I know frame buildings are contemplated. They may be permanent.

Senator FLETCHER. We will be proceeding on the idea, however, that we would utilize these cantonments and camps without very large expenditure. That is the impression I got. But it seems that 25 per cent—

Gen. MARSHALL (interposing). That is, so far as officers' quarters alone are concerned.

Senator FLETCHER. That is limited to officers' quarters?

Gen. MARSHALL. Yes, sir. When you take a barrack building and have to take out the entire insides of it and put in new foundations and put in the plumbing necessary for an officers' quarters and those things, why, the amount of the building that you save is about 25 per cent of its original cost.

Senator FLETCHER. That does not apply to all the buildings for the enlisted men, does it?

General MARSHALL. Oh, no, sir.

Senator FLETCHER. Some of those you could use without very much expense?

Gen. MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

The expenditures already made do not provide permanent accommodations for the future personnel of the Army. There still remains a large amount of construction work to be done in order to satisfactorily house the officers and men and provide other necessary facilities. Until the future military policy is determined no exact estimate can be made. For an Army of 300,000 men, based on prewar figures, ordinary construction, operation, maintenance, and repair will amount to about \$72,000,000 per year.

In 1913 the investment in land and buildings for housing the Army at the Regular Army and Coast Artillery posts was approximately \$1,275 per capita. Based on present conditions, allowing an increase of 70 per cent because of the present high cost of labor and material, this would be increased to \$2,167 per capita. About 9 per cent of this amount is represented by the original cost of the lands. The remainder is in buildings and improvements. The Government has purchased the cantonment sites and now has available the necessary land for its permanent camps. To provide quarters and improvements similar to those used by the Army before the war on land already owned would therefore cost to-day approximately \$1,900 per capita.

I want to repeat to you that I think no one contemplates providing such permanent improvements—comparing the prewar conditions with what they would cost if continued.

There exist in the United States and its possessions permanent accommodations, at Regular Army, Coast Artillery posts, for 124,702 men and officers. It is estimated that 25 per cent of these quarters are located at posts which have already been or will be abandoned, leaving net housing accommodations for 93,527 men. If it is assumed that the Army strength will be 300,000 men, and that 93,527 can be accommodated in existing quarters, additional quarters must be provided for 206,273 officers and men. Estimating on the basis that standard Army construction, similar to that used at the Regular Army posts will be provided at a cost of \$1,900 per capita, this will

involve an expenditure of approximately \$400,000,000. If the temporary buildings in the camps are converted and made suitable for permanent occupancy the cost will be approximately \$448 per capita, or a total of \$100,000,000. The above estimates do not include any allowance for the accommodation of students under universal military training.

The Construction Division has not only charge of the construction required for several bureaus of the War Department, but it is also responsible for the operation of all utilities such as water, sewerage, electric lights, roads, and fire protection serving them. From the tabulation of the expenses for the 10 fiscal years 1907 to 1916, inclusive, we have segregated as far as the records will permit the cost of operation from the cost of construction, and this segregation indicates that during that 10-year period the cost of operation was \$85 per capita per annum. Adding 70 per cent due to increases, cost of labor and materials, operation now would cost \$144. This figure confirms the experience that we have had during the war. I say confirms because it is naturally to be expected that where the Army is housed in large units that this cost per capita will be considerably less than when it is housed in scattered units, so that the figures we now use will be \$100 per capita per annum.

Instead of \$144, which will be expected at this date if the cost were the same as it was before the war, and that represents in a measure the saving per capita per annum, the difference between those two figures, that is realized by having the troops concentrated in these large camps.

From the foregoing it is seen that the Construction Division at the present time has more than \$54,000,000 worth of uncompleted work under construction; that for an Army of 300,000 men the expenditures which will of necessity be made for operation, maintenance, and repair will approximate \$30,000,000 per year; that new construction for the proposed housing of the Army ultimately costing from \$66,000,000 as a minimum to \$717,000,000 as a maximum will probably entail no less than \$50,000,000 per annum on a 5-year construction schedule.

The \$66,000,000 is the cost of converting buildings, if the national defense act were the military policy; \$717,000,000 for permanent construction if the War Department bill were the permanent policy, and they are the two extremes, and I submit that neither extreme will be the one that is adopted. It will be somewhere between them. Where, nobody can foretell. The only thing you can do is to assert your best judgment, not on a mean of them, but somewhere in between them.

Senator NEW. We must hope and pray?

Gen. MARSHALL. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. You can make a pretty good guess whether or not the solution will be nearer the higher or the lower.

Gen. MARSHALL. I take it it will be about one-third of the way.

The CHAIRMAN. Starting from which end?

Gen. MARSHALL. Starting from the low end.

Construction work, other than housing for the Army before the war, approximately equaled in amount the sum spent for the housing of the Army, for the reorganized Army.

In other words, before the war we did so much construction work for housing the Army that cost so much. We did other construction work, and it was about the same amount. On account of the big housing program that is before us immediately after the war, the other construction work will not be so great as housing, so I am figuring it will be 40 per cent of it, for want of better figures. It will be at least 40 per cent of this amount, and probably more, because initial construction must be started for such special branches as the Air Service, etc., and is here taken at \$20,000,000 per annum, thereby making the total annual program for expenditures under the Construction Division of \$100,000,000.

The operation of utilities or 300,000, main Army, will be no less than \$100 per capita per annum, which is \$30,000,000. A new housing construction program, taken at \$50,000,000 on a five-year period, and other construction work at \$20,000,000, making the total annual program for expenditures under the Construction Division \$100,000,000.

In this connection your attention is invited to the fact that the greatest appropriation of the Quartermaster Corps prior to the war in any single year approximated \$99,000,000, of which \$47,000,000 was pay of the Army. Thus it will be seen that the total expenditures for the Construction Division in the future is greater than the total amount of the Quartermaster Corps in its biggest year before the war and almost twice of what it had to expend for clothing, subsistence, transportation, and construction.

The question of the relationship of the War Department and the commercial world on construction work is one of prime importance if the War Department is to utilize the entire resources of the country in case of national emergency. It may be of interest to know that there have been two wars in the history of our country wherein it may be said that the life of the Republic was in jeopardy, to wit, the Civil War and the war just past. In the first year of the Civil War the United States expended more money than had up to that time been expended for military purposes in its entire national life. In the first year of the present war there was appropriated by Congress more funds for the conduct of the war than had theretofore been appropriated for all governmental purposes during the entire national life of this country. This statement was made by Hon. Swagar Sherley to Gen. Johnson Hagood and made by him to me. This seems to be the price of unpreparedness. So far as construction work for the Army is concerned, I propose to present to Congress the benefits of the lessons had by this war. These lessons have not been segregated from the mass of notes by me alone, but they have been segregated from the experience of the war gained by men of national reputation who have been in intimate contact with them. They have been compiled in my office, and I am trying to present them here. The most notable single lesson is that which has been rendered to above, to wit, the experience of the past war has left us with the lesson that distinct fields of operation in the War Department must be under the control of distinct organizations. Illustrations were used, all too familiar to all of us, that certain bureaus of the War Department did not produce results until the above-enunciated principle was carried out; in fact, by separating from the various bureaus of the War Department those

organizations which did have distinct fields of operation, to wit, Aircraft Production and Military Aeronautics from the Signal Corps; Construction Division, Embarkation Service, Motor Transport Corps, from the Quartermaster Corps; Chemical Warfare Service from the Ordnance Department, etc. When subjected to the supreme test of an emergency no department could respond in an emergent way unless its size were such that its subject matter could come within the compass of its chief. Now that the war is over, this lesson is seemingly but all too soon forgotten, but it is undoubtedly one that, unless observed, will produce in any future wars where the life of the Republic might be in jeopardy the same conditions that have heretofore attended the past wars. In short, in planning the reorganization of the War Department consideration should be given to the experiences derived from the present war, rather than theoretical or visionary plans. There may be another way of doing the same thing than the way that was adopted during the war; but if any staff department did have a way that was adopted that actually produced results what's the use of theorizing?

The foregoing statement was made with the idea of inviting the committee's attention to the importance of what is now called "reserves." War always demands the best efforts of a nation. War must be brought to the quickest possible termination. It, therefore, requires the accomplishment of seemingly impossible tasks. The best results from an individual or a group of individuals or much larger bodies can only be secured in civilian life when they can be employed along the lines and methods with which they are familiar. The only methods which are successful are those which have been proven successful in commercial life. Much time and money have been lost in the development of an organization from a group of individuals.

In time of war the resources of the entire nation must be concentrated on bringing the war to a successful conclusion. The nation must be diverted from the pursuits of peace to the prosecution of the war with a minimum of change in the normal activities of the individuals and groups of individuals. To this end the War Department must be geared up to accomplish these results along the lines most nearly approaching the normal activities and office methods of the manufacturing and producing part of the people. In order to accomplish this the department must in its peace-time dealings with the people deal in conformity with normal peace practice, and so establish mutual working relations.

The accomplishments to this end should be the constant endeavor of the Government. One of the serious detriments at the beginning of this war and one of the greatest elements of our unpreparedness was the lack of experience in dealing between the Government and the civilian business. Looking back at the years preceding the war, there has been a current of aloofness between the Government and the general business world. The existence of the military establishment can be justified only on the grounds of its ability to meet war conditions and so accomplish national safety. Its organization must therefore be based upon and judged by its ability to meet war and not peace conditions. Its elementary parts must be subdivided with reference usually to their ability to expand to war needs. Money

expended on a war department that is not organized to meet war, and war only, is wasted. The failures of the supply program have been patent among the bureaus in proportion to the diversities of the activities concentrated in one chief. When these activities concentrated in one chief are such that that chief can maintain proper relations between the recognized civilian organizations, a reserve is created outside of what we now commonly look upon as a reserve. This can be accomplished best by a sufficient number of those in civil life being actually enrolled in a reserve and supplying that tie between the civilian organizations and the War Department that can be utilized to the advantage of the National Government in time of stress.

The officer personnel of the Construction Division was made up of experts from civil life and from the engineering, building, and contracting organizations that formed our national commercial life along those lines. As illustrating their thought on the subject, many of them and those who were at the head of the Construction Division are delaying their applications to join the reserves until they feel that they may be assured that their efforts will be along the line of their normal activities and not diverted therefrom. Upon the Construction Division being made a permanent corps many of its present officers will remain in the Army, and nearly all of its commissioned personnel will become reserve officers. If this is not done, very few of the men of the division are willing to be transferred to other corps or go into the reserve corps of the Quartermaster or Engineer Corps, and so lose their identity with construction work and risk assignment to work for which they are not qualified. This does not mean that the reserve corps can not be filled up, but it does mean that a reserve corps can not be filled by men who had the actual experience of this war in positions of high administrative capacity.

I want now to sum up in a few words my recommendations:

First, the Construction Division should not be placed under the Engineer Corps.

Second, the Construction Division should not be placed under the Quartermaster Corps.

Third, the Construction Division should be continued as a separate Staff Corps.

To place the Construction Division under the Engineer Corps would delegate to the latter work for which it is not qualified either by experience or training. To do so would be unsound in theory and untried in fact. The Engineer Corps has never done the construction work for the Army.

To return the Construction Division to the Quartermaster Corps would place upon the Quartermaster Corps an added burden which it should not be called upon to carry. The Quartermaster Corps will be tremendous as it is, its volume of work at least three times what it was previous to the war. The volume of work the Construction Division has to do is greater than the entire work of every nature of the Quartermaster Corps previous to the war.

The least expenditure for the Construction Division for construction work and for the operation of utilities that may be expected with a 300,000-man Army is \$100,000,000 per annum. This statement is based on computation from the actual expenditures that

were made before the war, and it is not a fanciful figure. No commercial concern in this country would jeopardize the efficiency and economy with which this volume of work is to be done by placing it as a subdivision of a subdivision. It is entitled to and must have direct access to final authority in the interest of efficiency and cutting of red tape. It can not have such access unless it is a separate staff unit.

Therefore, in the interest of economy, in the interest of preserving to the Government the business methods of the Construction Division; to make available to the Government the experience gained by having carried forward to successful completion the greatest construction program in the world and the experience gained by the greatest utility organization known to this country; in order to organize this purely commercial function of the War Department in keeping with the common-sense business practice of the commercial world, it is recommended that in reporting the bill for the reorganization of the Army there must be included a separate staff unit known as a Construction Corps, its duties to be defined and the provision for its personnel to be such that its present officers may be retained in the service in their several grades held during the war.

The CHAIRMAN. Have you prepared any certain provision for insertion in the bill?

Gen. MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Senator NEW. I would like to hear you read it if you have it before you.

Senator SUTHERLAND. I suggest that he put in the hearing at the proper place that table of projects now under way.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes; can you supply that?

Gen. MARSHALL. Yes.

Senator NEW. We would like to have that.

The list of projects referred has already been inserted.

Gen. MARSHALL. Do you wish me to read this proposed legislation?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, I think we would like to have you do so.

Gen. MARSHALL. That is the proposed amendment to the bill 2715:

PROPOSED AMENDMENT TO SENATE BILL 2715 TO REORGANIZE AND INCREASE THE EFFICIENCY OF THE UNITED STATES ARMY.

Insert the words "A Construction Corps" in the preamble, immediately after "Tank Corps" where it first appears, page 1, line 11.

Insert a new section reading as follows:

"SEC. —. The Construction Corps: The Construction Corps shall consist of one chief of construction with the rank of brigadier general, who shall be chief of said corps; fourteen colonels; fourteen lieutenant colonels; eighty majors; one hundred and fifty captains; thirty-five first lieutenants. At least two-thirds in each of the several grades shall be appointed from officers who served in the same grades in the Construction Division of the Army prior to June 25, 1919.

"The total enlisted strength of the Construction Corps and the number in each grade shall be as follows: Eighty-two construction sergeants, sergeants senior grade; one thousand five hundred and forty-five construction sergeants, sergeants first class; three thousand eight hundred and eighty-four sergeants; nine hundred corporals; one hundred and ninety cooks; two thousand seven hundred and sixty privates, first class; and one thousand four hundred and fifty-five privates: *Provided*, That the rates of pay and allowances in the

several grades of enlisted men shall be the same as those of similar grades for the Quartermaster Corps: *Provided further*, That all work pertaining to the construction, maintenance, and repair of all buildings, structures (other than fortifications), and utilities and the preparation of plans therefor in accordance with the requirements of the several bureaus, corps, and departments of the War Department for the Army, and of the operation of such utilities, the acquirement of real estate and the issuance of licenses in connection with Government reservations, shall be done by or under the direction of the Construction Corps, and all appropriations made for such purposes under any corps, department, or bureau of the War Department shall be available for the purpose for which made and disbursed through said Construction Corps, and together with property acquired therefrom, shall be accounted for to the chief of construction."

The CHAIRMAN. On what basis have you reached that table of personnel?

Gen. MARSHALL. On the basis—if you want to go on the basis of personnel, I might talk about it a little before we go on to this particular personnel, if you have no objection.

Under the Senate bill as introduced for the Quartermaster Corps, Finance, Transportation, and Motor Transport Corps there is a total of 2,383 officers. In this proposal I have here—by the way, Construction is not included in any one of them; the Construction was included under the Engineer Corps—if you add to this 2,383 officers the 294 officers I have here, it makes 2,677 officers for all of the functions the Quartermaster Corps had prior to the war. The Quartermaster Corps officers prior to the war were 296. This number is nine times the number that it had before the war for these five different functions of the Quartermaster Corps as it was before the war.

Senator SUTHERLAND. Do you know what number of officers were included in the Engineer tables to cover this construction work?

Gen. MARSHALL. No; you can not segregate them. I have been through it. I have been through a memorandum that appeared in the hearings before the House Committee on Military Affairs, Sixty-fifth Congress, third session—the bill for the support of the Army for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1920, pages 1820 to 1832, inclusive—which is a memorandum of the Chief of Engineers submitted to the War Plans Division in either November or December, 1918, outlining his personnel and the number of officers that can be segregated in that particular memorandum.

Senator NEW. That can be segregated in construction work?

Gen. MARSHALL. Yes; that I could segregate myself. That number is 371 plus some others.

The CHAIRMAN. And you ask for how many?

Gen. MARSHALL. Two hundred and ninety-four. How many are included in the Engineer's memorandum I don't know. You see there were a number of captains in that tabulation they had there, in which they may have had a duality of duties. But this does not include the operation of utilities under the Engineer Corps; as I understand it, it includes construction work only and not utilities.

The CHAIRMAN. Where is utilities?

Gen. MARSHALL. As I understand it, it remains in the Quartermaster's under the plan they had.

Senator NEW. Have you examined the Quartermaster's tables?

Gen. MARSHALL. Yes; and I can not segregate.

Senator SUTHERLAND. Would it be fair to assume that the number of men you provide for in your separate plans would be deducted from those two branches?

Gen. MARSHALL. Oh, yes. The Engineers and the Quartermaster's—from the tables of organization—all I can possibly segregate is 176 in the Engineers' organization tables, which should not be confused with the memorandum I referred to. But that does not provide for officers in the Chief of Engineers Office; it provides for officers in the field. And I say further that in that memorandum I have referred to that out of divisional command of the Chief of Engineers is recommended there should be one lieutenant colonel, four majors, and three captains.

The CHAIRMAN. How many do you want?

Gen. MARSHALL. A major and two assistants.

The CHAIRMAN. State that again, please.

Gen. MARSHALL. One lieutenant colonel, four majors, and three captains, under the Engineer memorandum.

The CHAIRMAN. That is three officers?

Gen. MARSHALL. Yes; under my plan of organization.

The CHAIRMAN. The Engineer Corps would want eight officers to do this job?

Gen. MARSHALL. Yes, sir; at least eight.

The CHAIRMAN. And you want only three?

Gen. MARSHALL. Yes, sir. They may have cut that down in this bill; I don't know.

Senator FLETCHER. What use would you make of these privates first class and privates?

Gen. MARSHALL. We would use them as carpenters, laborers, and helpers on sanitation work and sewage-disposal plants, and around the pumping plants and power plants, places of that character. You see, this contemplates the operation of utilities by soldier personnel and not a civilian personnel.

Senator FLETCHER. You would have no civilian personnel?

Gen. MARSHALL. Not in the operation of utilities; no.

Senator SUTHERLAND. Were you not consulted by the General Staff in the making of these tabulations of organization?

Gen. MARSHALL. In the latter part of November of last year I was directed to put in a memorandum showing the personnel that we would require for the construction division under the bill that they were then preparing, which I believe is identical with the bill that you have before you now, and I did submit such a plan, calling, at that time, for 294 officers and thirteen thousand-odd enlisted men; but the number of places where there are enlisted men has decreased since then, so now I have a few more than 10,000 included in this.

Senator NEW. How many enlisted men have you now in the service?

Gen. MARSHALL. Four thousand, or thereabouts; I don't know what the exact number is. We asked for the 13,000 until this thing settles down, but we were told to use civilian employees, so that between the enlisted men and civilian employees we have between 9,000 and 10,000.

(An officer accompanying Gen. Marshall then said: "Thirteen thousand, with the civilians and soldiers.")

Senator NEW. In your request for 10,000 enlisted men you contemplate doing away with all civilian employees?

Gen. MARSHALL. Unless there might be one or two places where an official expert had to be had, which would be temporary or quasi-temporary; but, generally speaking, yes.

The CHAIRMAN. In any event, it is apparent that, whether Congress adopts the proposal of the War Department for an Army of 500,000 or goes back to the national defense act, we will have for several years, 10 years at least, a lot of building to do.

Gen. MARSHALL. A lot of building; as I say, for 220,000 men the operation of utilities would run a hundred dollars per capita. It ran \$144 per capita before the war.

Senator NEW. This table sets all that out very well.

Gen. MARSHALL. As I say, it is difficult—this is one of the things that it is difficult for anybody to realize how small our Army was before the war. We looked upon the national defense act as having been accomplished before the war, when, as a matter of fact, it was not.

Senator FLETCHER. Do you think you can get these 10,000 men for this work?

Gen. MARSHALL. Oh, yes.

Senator FLETCHER. On Army pay?

Gen. MARSHALL. Yes. You train them up. They come in as privates and become first-class privates and corporals, and perhaps sergeants; and when you once get the tendrils of the Army into your system you don't care how good you are, you stay there.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. Would they have an opportunity to go out into civil life?

Gen. MARSHALL. Oh, yes; when the term of enlistment is up they can go out if they want to; but I do not anticipate any difficulty in filling the enlisted personnel; I think it will be very attractive to them.

The CHAIRMAN. It is closely akin to vocational training?

Gen. MARSHALL. Very closely akin to vocational training, and if vocational training is adopted one of the most fruitful sources of vocational training that will be adopted will be in connection with these men. I do not know whether the committee wants an analysis of figures or not, but in getting up this paper that I have here I have had to dig out a whole lot of figures, and I have gone through the appropriation bills for the last 10 years so as to get an average. One year does not tell much, but if you have 10 years' average you have pretty nearly what is going to happen in the future. I have here a table that shows the average total appropriation for the Army for those 10 years was \$111,943,000. Appropriated for the Quartermaster Corps, \$93,000,000 average for the 10 years. That is in the Quartermaster Corps alone, showing that the Quartermaster Corps was \$93,000,000, and for the whole Army it was practically \$112,000,000, showing the enormous size of the Quartermaster Corps in comparison to the rest of the Army in the matter of expenditures.

Of that \$93,000,000, \$44,000,000 was pay of the Army leaving \$49,000,000 for clothing, subsistence, transportation, and construction.

The Engineer Corps appropriations, so far as the Army is concerned, during the same year, were \$4,295,000 on the average. The river and harbor appropriation, of course, is a different matter. That averaged about \$34,000,000 per annum during those 10 years.

The average strength of the Army during those 10 years was 84,299.

The CHAIRMAN. If you care to, you can put that into the record.

Seantor FLETCHER. I think it would be a very interesting table.

Gen. MARSHALL. I will put this in:

Total expenditures for the Army, Quartermaster Corps, and Engineer Corps for fiscal years 1907 to 1916, inclusive.

Fiscal year.	Total appropriation for the Army.	Appropriated for expenditures by Quartermaster Corps.	Pay of the Army.	Appropriated for expenditures by Quartermaster Corps, deducting pay of the Army.	Total appropriated for expenditures by Engineer Department for Army purposes.	Appropriated for rivers and harbors.	Total strength, officers and men.
1907.....	\$96,358,254	\$99,083,852	\$31,002,686	\$38,082,686	\$3,221,345	\$17,664,050	73,857
1908.....	103,462,769	81,585,684	35,918,499	45,667,185	3,419,120	43,315,483	70,455
1909.....	127,695,769	98,621,002	42,613,623	56,007,278	5,435,263	18,032,945	78,513
1910.....	132,991,946	105,069,906	49,727,954	55,341,852	5,109,279	22,190,264	75,166
1911.....	118,787,138	95,389,190	46,055,900	49,333,289	4,982,370	49,391,141	77,735
1912.....	118,154,697	95,121,415	46,628,990	48,502,424	3,880,379	30,883,836	85,801
1913.....	117,535,033	95,471,226	47,866,535	48,604,691	3,173,478	42,757,311	86,452
1914.....	118,326,774	91,636,500	47,054,960	41,581,640	6,363,029	51,118,889	92,483
1915.....	128,524,416	98,840,565	48,729,020	50,111,545	3,783,000	29,638,100	100,381
1916.....	138,514,719	98,975,162	49,366,732	49,608,430	3,863,000	37,856,000	101,381
Total.....	119,435,088	930,774,502	444,964,899	485,811,020	42,850,263	342,903,021	842,990
Average, 10 years..	111,943,508	93,077,450	44,496,489	48,581,102	4,295,026	34,290,302	84,299

Gen. MARSHALL (continuing). The detail assignments of 294 officers can only be given if you know where the construction work is going to be done.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, of course. I forgot to ask you this—

Gen. MARSHALL. Of course we had the usual officer at each camp or cantonment, with his assistants, with either two or one assistant, according to the size of the cantonment, and at the small Regular Army post, of course, we contemplate that the line officer shall do that work in addition to his other duties. We do not contemplate having an officer of the Construction Division at a two-company post. The expense involved is not warranted. I can assert, I think definitely, without any fear of being cut, that 294 is the minimum, and I can give you as the best example of that, that I asked for 294 for the War Plans Division, and they gave me 294, the first time I think that the personnel asked for has been given.

I can give a tentative layout of these officers if you want it put in the record, but it changes. When a construction job changes from this place to that place the officers have got to go from this place to that place. So it is not like a definite assignment for a company or regiment. We have definite assignments to the offices in Washington and departmental headquarters, and have a certain number of special camps, we have a certain number of cantonments, and a certain number of Regular Army posts, and that gives the number of officers that are specifically stationed in the constructions projects that can not be specifically named.

The CHAIRMAN. I forgot to ask you, is that estimate of 294 officers for construction work based upon an army of 500,000 men?

Gen. MARSHALL. It is based upon the 300,000-men army and it is not going to change materially on a 250,000-men army or 400,000-men army or 500,000-men army; anywhere from 200,000 to 500,000 men will require just about the same number of officers for the Construction Division.

The CHAIRMAN. I should think there would be more repairs and more utilities to be operated in an army of 500,000 men than there would be in an army of 250,000 men.

Gen. MARSHALL. It is just in volume, not much in number. You take an officer in charge of the utilities at cantonments where you have got that cantonment occupied with 12,000 men, you have to have three officers, and if you have it occupied with 20,000 men you have about the same number of officers.

Senator SUTHERLAND. How many men have you at Camp Taylor?

Gen. MARSHALL. I do not know.

Senator SUTHERLAND. I understand that they have only about 3,600 men in the First Division.

Gen. MARSHALL. I presume we have pretty nearly 200 men at Camp Taylor.

Senator SUTHERLAND. And that would be enough?

Gen. MARSHALL. That would be enough if they had 15,000 there. You see the question of cleaning out sewers and operating a public plant and operating substations—those things are pretty nearly the same whether you have 50,000 men or whether you have no men. I do not mean to say no men, but say only 5,000 men.

Senator SUTHERLAND. The same with a heating plant for a house, you have to have the same amount of heat for a house whether there are 2 people occupying it or 20 people?

Gen. MARSHALL. Yes; it is just the same thing.

During the war we had at those places about six officers. They were all full to overflowing and everything had to be handled so expeditiously and instantly that it was necessary to have that many officers. So we had six officers; but in time of peace, when things have not got to be done on the minute and can be foreseen, we estimate that three officers at a cantonment is ordinarily sufficient. Some of them did have a pumping plant, an electric plant, a sewage disposal, central heating plants, and in those places we may have to have as many as four, because we may have to have an expert on some particular subject; but, except two camps, there is no probability that we can see that we will have to have more than three.

The CHAIRMAN. General, you have given study to this whole question of the organization of the Quartermaster's Department, as well the Constuction Department by itself. Have you anything to express as to the proposal for placing transportation back under the Quartermaster's Department?

Gen. MARSHALL. Well, I can not give any opinion on any actual knowledge such as I have about the Construction Department; I just do not know. It would seem to me that transportation has been one of the big items. It is contemplated to transfer a great deal more supply functions in the Quartermaster Corps than it has had before; it is going to run into such tremendous figures that it is going to be difficult for it to be followed out by one man. On principle, I think it ought to be done. I think that the principle that I have enunciated here, and have perhaps repeated too often,

is a sound one, that the War Department fell down at the beginning of the war because the separate and separable operations that were self-contained were not under one chief, that it was bigger than the chief could possibly compass. No man can compass the subject matter that the Quartermaster General and the Chief of Ordnance had to contend with at the beginning of the war; no man could compass them. If you have a single operation, unless you have access to final authority you can not forge ahead; you can not do it, it is not in human nature. When you get to a certain size to stand an intermediary, it can not be done; if you are going to place the responsibility on that individual who is the chief of an operation, if there is an intermediary between him and the final authority you can not expect the result from him that you can expect and demand if he has direct access to the official authority. And I believe upon that principle—and I believe that principle is a sound one so far as the War Department is concerned—that transportation should be separated from the Quartermaster Corps.

But, as I said, I have not the facts and figures as to corps and numbers and those things—which is, after all, the true test—all the rest of them are just contributing reasons, but the true test is the size of the job, I think, and it is upon the size of the job that the money returns to the country depends, rather than upon the other. I think that is the true test, and I have not the detailed figures to give an opinion on that basis.

The CHAIRMAN. Are there any further questions?

Senator SUTHERLAND. I think he has covered the subject admirably.

The CHAIRMAN. We are glad to have heard you. Have you any more observations to make?

Gen. MARSHALL. Well, I might have this observation to make, that before the war our General Staff plans were almost all on combat side, that very few of our plans were on supply side. Therefore in writing the law for the General Staff I believe that it will be necessary to write into the law a positive provision for a supply section of that General Staff, which will not have any operating duties, but will have to do the same kind of planning for supply that was done by the general combat people of the General Staff before the war, and I think that is a necessary part of legislation, and that these men in that supply section should come largely, not entirely but largely, from the supply bureaus.

The CHAIRMAN. That is a thing, of course, that Congress would prefer to leave to the War Department, to the Secretary of War, and Chief of Staff. Neither this bill nor any other bill has ever attempted to organize the General Staff in a division?

Gen. MARSHALL. I do not know. It says "shall have a war college," it tells what that shall be. Why was that necessary?

The CHAIRMAN. Well, that was necessary from the legislative side.

Gen. MARSHALL. It was?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes; because that was not part of the General Staff.

Senator SUTHERLAND. This bill asks for still greater authority, the leave to do anything within the limits of the number of men.

Gen. MARSHALL. I do not think it ought to be left to—
The CHAIRMAN. Left to regulation?

Gen. MARSHALL. No. Not left to regulation. I think the question of operation of combat troops and the question of supply are coordinate ones and of sufficient importance for Congress to take cognizance of them in legislation.

Senator FLETCHER. Do you think we ought to have a separate supply department to supply everything to the Army?

Gen. MARSHALL. No, sir; I do not think that can be done. I think there are certain technical supplies that technical bureaus have to handle independently of a general supply bureau.

Senator FLETCHER. For instance, you take your own business, when you are making contracts, suppose you had to go to the supply department—

Gen. MARSHALL. The contractor could not get along; the contractor is accustomed to doing work in a certain way.

The CHAIRMAN. You do practically all your construction by contract?

Gen. MARSHALL. We do all of it on lump-sum contracts, now, practically all of it.

The CHAIRMAN. You do not have to produce the material.

Gen. MARSHALL. We do not have to produce the material, but during the war we did it on a cost-plus basis, and we had to produce a great deal of that material. The producing of that material had to be carried out in the most intimate relationship with the contractor and had to be produced in the way he was accustomed to have it done; otherwise, if it had not been done in the way he was accustomed to have it produced he would not be able to function, and it would have thrown everything out of gear. Therefore we had contractors in the construction department who did the procuring of materials such as the contractor had to get from the Government in the way that the contractor was accustomed to, just as nearly as it was possible to do it, and if such a thing as that was interfered with by a supply bureau, a program such as we had could never be carried out, taking the time element into consideration, and the time element is the essential part of the construction.

Senator FLETCHER. Some officers advocating establishing a supply bureau?

Gen. MARSHALL. Yes.

Senator FLETCHER. All supplies for all departments, including the Surgeon General's?

Gen. MARSHALL. Including the Surgeon General's Office? The Surgeon General does not advocate it, and I do not advocate it. I think the consolidation of procurement has a great deal of merit in it, and I think that merit has been clouded by such things as you have made reference to.

Senator FLETCHER. Going too far?

Gen. MARSHALL. Going too far; yes. I think it has a great deal of merit in it and I do not think we want to lose sight of that merit; but, at the same time, the proposition of the Surgeon General and the Chief of Ordnance, as I understand it—and other bureaus, too—is that there are certain technical things that they can not just simply draw the specifications for and leave somebody else to go out and

buy. You do not get results. And I believe that the other point of facts is correct on that.

The CHAIRMAN. You have no emphatic objection, have you, to the establishment of a supply department charged with the purchase of materials and articles whose use is common to two or more branches of the service, or whose use is standardized throughout the service?

Gen. MARSHALL. No; I have no objection and think it ought to be done with certain limitations.

The CHAIRMAN. That would leave all technical things to the bureaus?

Gen. MARSHALL. Yes; as I have indicated. A contractor, for instance, who is building a building and who wants nails, and who is accustomed to get nails through his purchasing agent, tells his purchasing agent that he wants so many nails and the purchasing agent gets it. Now, if that purchasing agent is not in some place of direct access to the supplying agency, somewhere where he can be communicated with, somewhere in touch with him, he can not help him out in that situation. In that case, that contractor is going to get out out of gear with the game, as it were. For instance, he says, "I want a carload of this particular kind of nails day after to-morrow morning." If he does not have those nails the day after to-morrow morning it means that thousands of workmen are thrown out of their jobs. Unless you have somebody in the closest sympathy with him, his job is wrecked, and it costs many times the cost of sending those nails by express or special train, and it is a very important item. If you had to explain that to a dozen different people the time of explanation takes more than the time of getting the nails. Nails might be the wrong particular kind of material, but this is in illustration of what I mean.

I say that within limitations the proposition of consolidating procurement is sound, and it has a tremendous amount of merit; but I think—well, I think the horse has the bit in his teeth and is running away. That is the proposition, generally speaking, I think.

Senator SUTHERLAND. What do you think of the relative merits of promotion by seniority, and promotion by selection, General?

Gen. MARSHALL. During the war we had promotion by selection. I had promotion by selection in my outfit. I do not think anybody was promoted that was not entitled to promotion. But I know now that men who were entitled to promotion did not get it simply because their case never really got a hearing. On theory, promotion by selection should be to the best interests of the Government; but how you can work it out in practice I just can not see, with 20,000 men involved; I do not see how you can avoid that personal knowledge that is bound to influence the people who are doing the selecting.

Senator SUTHERLAND. You believe in a process of elimination, though, do you not?

Gen. MARSHALL. Yes, sir; I believe in a process of elimination.

Senator SUTHERLAND. With a well worked out scheme for the elimination of the unfit?

Gen. MARSHALL. Yes.

Senator SUTHERLAND. You believe the best results could be obtained by the seniority rule?

Gen. MARSHALL. Yes; but it has a practical proposition—

* Senator SUTHERLAND. During a time of peace, anyhow?

Gen. MARSHALL. Yes, sir; I do. I am sorry to have to say it because I have tried by best to see some way of working out selections, because selection is so admirable in theory.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you have a board inside your corps that recommended promotion by selection?

Gen. MARSHALL. No board was ever formally ordered, but for selection from major up there were five officers and myself that went through the entire list of officers any time any such promotion was made, and usually the promotions were made by concurrence of us all. Sometimes there was one or maybe—no I don't think there was ever more than one who thought that somebody else should be promoted other than the one that was promoted.

For majors and below, that is captains up to majors, the chief of the division would get them with him, and then all chiefs of divisions would get together and determine upon the relative merits of all of those they had under consideration, and those that in their judgment—they came to a common recommendation of those that they had under consideration at that time. During the war that was the way, generally speaking.

The CHAIRMAN. You acted just as carefully as you could?

Gen. MARSHALL. Yes; I did.

The CHAIRMAN. And yet you are conscious of making some mistakes?

Gen. MARSHALL. Yes; I am conscious of the fact that some men that deserved promotion did not get promotion; and there was no reason why we should not have promoted them during the war, and if cases had come to the attention of the division chief or myself they would have been promoted. I think the least thing they could do in a case of promotion during the war was to recognize services by a promotion of at least one grade from that in which a man entered, and, so far as I was concerned, that was just the way I felt about it and I carried it out so far as the rules of the War Department and the recommendations that came up from the chiefs of divisions would permit.

The CHAIRMAN. Is there any other matter you want to emphasize?

Gen. MARSHALL. No, sir; I believe not.

Senator FLETCHER. Let me see if I get this correctly: All this construction work that was done similar to what would be done in this corps was done under the Quartermaster Corps?

Gen. MARSHALL. No, sir; no, sir. Before the war each bureau or department did its own work, both construction work and the operation of utilities; the Quartermaster Corps did it for itself, for the line of the Army, the Surgeon General's office, and included in the line of the Army is the Engineer Corps, of course, so far as housing and that kind of work is concerned. During the fall of 1917, while the war was in progress, this was all consolidated—taken out of the hands of the several departments and consolidated in the Construction Division.

Senator FLETCHER. I understand that; but if this corps was not established where would this work be done under this bill?

Gen. MARSHALL. Under this bill the President would have authority to center it in one place, and I dare say that that was what was contemplated—that it would be centered in one place.

The CHAIRMAN. The statement has been made here by the Chief of Staff that it would be given to the Engineers.

Senator SUTHERLAND. Do your expenditures now go through the Finance Division?

Gen. MARSHALL. Some of them; yes.

Senator SUTHERLAND. I notice in your proposal as it is that you wanted all these expenditures to be made by yourself?

Gen. MARSHALL. Yes, sir; if there is no separate finance.

Senator SUTHERLAND. Do I correctly understand you to mean that they should not go through the finance department?

Gen. MARSHALL. Yes, sir; when we have a construction job we want the man right on the job to pay the contractor right there at that time. He could be a finance officer.

The CHAIRMAN. How do you do it now?

Gen. MARSHALL. Now we send it to the zone finance officer. During the war we did it right on the job. They can pay our bills right on the construction job; that is the way they ought to be paid; they ought to put an officer on that construction job who will have nothing else to do but that; but if you subject the contractor to the situation that he has to take his voucher and go to a finance officer, who is somewhere else, that contractor is not going to bid on the job.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, that is a matter of adjustment between the finance officer and you, is it not?

Gen. MARSHALL. Yes; I think it is.

The CHAIRMAN. The Finance Committee is rather favorably impressed with the idea that there shall be a central disbursing officer for the whole War Department, and we have to trust to the judgment of the War Department and their making some sort of a liaison between them?

Gen. MARSHALL. Yes; if a separate finance department is established. The particular part I wanted to talk about is that at least two-thirds in the Construction Corps shall be appointed from officers who served in the same corps of the Construction Division of the Army prior to June 25, 1919.

Now, the division at the beginning of the war tried to get Regular Army officers as constructing quartermasters for the 32 camps and cantonments. They sent a list of officers asking that they be detailed to that duty. Gen. Littell was then chief of that division. That was turned down, and we were told to get our officers from civil life, which we did, with some few exceptions, where we could get an officer from a department commander or something like that. So that the Construction Department from its inception was composed almost entirely of people from civil life, differing from other branches of the service.

Aside from myself, after Gen. Littell went out, and Col. Hartman there were not any other Regular Army officers in our office here. All the officers with the grade of colonel were from civil life—every one of them aside from Col. Hartman and myself. And that is the outfit that largely we now have.

So that that provision in here applies, I believe, more strictly to the Construction Division than any other one of these war-time bureaus. The others, so far as I know, their high-ranking officers are from the Regular Army. In the Construction Division that was not so.

The CHAIRMAN. General, do you ask for just what you want here or do you not go further and say "at least two-thirds in each of the several grades shall be appointed from officers who served in the same grades in the Construction Division of the Army prior to June 25, 1919"? Now, this is a proposal for permanent legislation?

Gen. MARSHALL. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. You do not want that to last for 20 or 30 years?

Gen. MARSHALL. No. Only in the original outfit—of the first appointments.

The CHAIRMAN. The original appointments?

Gen. MARSHALL. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. You do not want that to continue?

Gen. MARSHALL. No; we do not.

The CHAIRMAN. Well we can remember that point. You need not attempt to correct it now.

Gen. MARSHALL. Well, that is the principal point in there that I want to emphasize.

The CHAIRMAN. That brings up another question. I gather from that that you desire a permanent commissioned personnel?

Gen. MARSHALL. Oh, yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Like the Medical Corps and the Engineers?

Gen. MARSHALL. Oh, yes. All of the work is of a technical character and it is nonmilitary. We are sometimes called the landlords of the Army. We do not go with the Army in war. When the Army moves we stay put—noncombatant in every sense of the word. I guess that was what I was brought up to be. I have been with the Army now for some 19 years.

The CHAIRMAN. What was your original branch of the service?

Gen. MARSHALL. The Coast Artillery.

The CHAIRMAN. And you were detailed?

Gen. MARSHALL. I was detailed in the Quartermaster Corps, in the construction branch of the Quartermaster Corps, from 1908 to 1912, and from 1915 to now. I am not in the Quartermaster Corps now, however, except it was separate from the Quartermaster General's Office in 1917.

The CHAIRMAN. You want a permanent commissioned personnel?

Gen. MARSHALL. Yes. I think it is necessary that it should be so. I think the very basis of it is that officers of the line are not accustomed to this kind of work, and if they do become accustomed to it, then by the time that they are getting familiar with it and know their jobs they go away somewhere else.

Senator SUTHERLAND. Do you think there would be some advantage in having them brought into this part of the work and going back to the line afterwards?

Gen. MARSHALL. There might be some advantage, but it would certainly be a great expense. It would be done at a much greater expense, and I think that has been demonstrated by the figures here.

The cost of operation of these utilities during the war has been at these large places just about the same in amount of money as it was before the war at the small places; that is, \$85 per capita. That has been in spite of the high cost of everything. That, I believe, is due to the fact that the men who were doing this work were doing the things that they were accustomed to do all through their life, and

that they were expert in what they were doing and needed no coaching as to what was to be done in order to accomplish this, that, or the other.

Senator FLETCHER. The more experienced they are the more efficient they are?

Gen. MARSHALL. Yes.

Senator SUTHERLAND. You believe in a division of labor, then?

Gen. MARSHALL. When the Army gets to be as big as it is I believe it is necessary.

(Thereupon, at 4.30, the committee adjourned until to-morrow, Friday, October 24, 1919, at 2.15 p. m.)



Col. Wilmore Brown 360
REORGANIZATION OF THE ARMY

HEARINGS

BEFORE THE

**SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE
COMMITTEE ON MILITARY AFFAIRS
UNITED STATES SENATE**

SIXTY-SIXTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

• ON

S. 2691

**A BILL TO PROVIDE FOR UNIVERSAL MILITARY, NAVAL, AND
VOCATIONAL TRAINING AND FOR MOBILIZATION OF THE MAN-
HOOD OF THE NATION IN A NATIONAL EMERGENCY**

S. 2693

**A BILL TO CREATE A DEPARTMENT OF AERONAUTICS, DEFIN-
ING THE POWERS AND DUTIES OF THE DIRECTOR THEREOF,
PROVIDING FOR THE ORGANIZATION, DISPOSITION, AND AD-
MINISTRATION OF A UNITED STATES AIR FORCE, CREATING
THE UNITED STATES AIR RESERVE FORCE, AND PROVIDING
FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF CIVIL AND COMMERCIAL AVIATION**

S. 2715

**A BILL TO REORGANIZE AND INCREASE THE EFFICIENCY OF
THE UNITED STATES ARMY, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES**

PART 23

Printed for the use of the Committee on Military Affairs

WASHINGTON
GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
1919

6 25 1919

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REORGANIZATION OF THE ARMY.

FRIDAY, OCTOBER 24, 1919.

UNITED STATES SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON MILITARY AFFAIRS,
Washington, D. C.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call of the chairman, at 2.15 p. m., in the committee room, Capitol, Senator James W. Wadsworth, jr., presiding.

Present: Senators Wadsworth (chairman), Sutherland, New, Chamberlain, and Fletcher.

The CHAIRMAN. Proceed, Dr. Talbot.

STATEMENT OF DR. WINTHROP TALBOT.

Dr. TALBOT. My name is Winthrop Talbot, M. D. I am a physician, an educator, and a consultant in industrial management. I have given a great deal of attention to the training of boys in camps, having established the first organized camp for boys and carried it on for 25 years, and the first open-air school for boys, for 10 years.

The CHAIRMAN. Where were those activities carried on?

Dr. TALBOT. They were in New Hampshire. Of late I have been deeply interested in the matter of industrial relations, especially regarding foreigners. I collated the statistics on Adult Illiteracy, published as a bulletin by the Bureau of Education; a bulletin on Teaching English to Foreigners; and a reference handbook on Americanization. Of late I have been instructing teachers for the University of Wisconsin, teaching English to foreigners, and have just come from utilizing a number of Army men in teaching English to 500 foreigners, the largest workers' class in any industrial establishment. I am representing the Military Training Camps' Association, as are Dr. George L. Meylan and Prof. George F. James, who will also speak on the educational aspects of Senate bill 2691.

Mr. Chairman, I have prepared some data relating to manhood training in connection with national defense, and if I may be allowed will follow the notes I have made.

The CHAIRMAN. That will be satisfactory.

Dr. TALBOT. They contain data that might well be printed, but which it would be difficult to give orally.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes. We can put that in the record of the hearing, and your testimony from now on can be regarded somewhat as comment and enlargement upon it.

Dr. TALBOT. In the first place, I will speak of the problem as we have it before us—manhood training for national defense. In this

country we have of males 18 years of age approximately 1,000,000, of whom 100,000 are technically illiterate. Two hundred thousand more have not had more than two years of schooling, many of them not so much as one year; they are nearly illiterate. Less than half of the million have gone through the graded schools. Fifty thousand do not speak our language at all. Over 500,000 live in our crowded cities. Physical defects are general. Two hundred thousand of the million would be rejected as unfit to serve the country because of physical, moral, and mental defects, which might be removed or remedied in large measure by supplying proper manhood training between 18 and 20, which are the years of most receptive growth. Seventy-nine and two-tenths per cent of our males of 18 are engaged in gainful occupations and are contributors to their families in some degree at least.

The boy of 18 has not passed beyond the school age, but has usually been out of school for three years. His ideals, his standards are being established and it is highly important that these should be right ideals and standards. With regard to the schooling of boys, and children in general, I might say that the task of schooling in America is enormous. Fifty years ago, in the United States, there were 12,000,000 children of school age; 7,000,000 enrolled in the schools; 4,000,000 in average daily attendance. The schools reached one-third of the total population for three and one-half months each year. To-day there are 27,000,000 children of school age, 20,000,000 are enrolled, 15,000,000 are in average daily attendance, and the schools reach one-half the population for nearly six months each year. That is an enormous advance and very encouraging. But we must realize, however, the facts as they are. Out of 27,000,000 children between the ages of 5 and 18, 5,000,000 are not enrolled in the schools at all and 7,000,000 more are not in regular daily attendance. Nearly two millions and a half do not go to school in their lives; 5 out of 10 of those who do go to school leave for good at the age of 14 or 15; only 2 out of 10 of those who are in regular attendance get so far as the second year in high school; only 4 per cent of all males are graduates from any university, college, technical, or professional school. Nineteen States do not require the full school year. Eight States require less than 100 days; one State still fails to make schooling obligatory. I will state there that this will probably be remedied in legislation of 1920, but the fact remains that general obligatory schooling does not exist in that State.

Senator FLETCHER. You mean all the States except one have compulsory education?

Dr. TALBOT. Yes, sir; at the present time. The advance has been considerable in the last five years. I think five years ago there were four States which did not require obligatory education.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. What one has it not?

Dr. TALBOT. One State has a law which is and yet is not a compulsory law. It is a State law, but every locality has the option of abrogating that law if they like, so that it is not a State law in effect.

Senator NEW. What State is that?

Dr. TALBOT. Mississippi.

Senator NEW. Mississippi?

Dr. TALBOT. Yes. Less than 10 per cent of all males get any vocational or trade schooling. When our Army was recruited it was found to be impossible to supply an immediate shortage of 100,000 mechanics, and training courses had to be set into operation immediately.

The mechanism of our schools is intended to supply to all the tools of learning—reading, writing, and numbers. Higher and technical instruction is given only to those who can afford to attend for longer periods of time. Higher schooling is in no case obligatory and is possible to few. Only in small measure do the schools provide any physical training or handwork—perhaps 20 minutes a week on the average, certainly not more than this—nor can they hold the majority of boys long enough to give trade training. Yet a nation requires young men of sound physique and with training to carry on the half thousand kinds of trades and vocations needed to maintain an army of defense. But schools are only one factor in education. Children in the United States are in school less than 4 per cent of their time from birth to 21.

Mentality.—There are many young men of low mentality in our country. In the draft, 4,000 of the lowest grade had to be discharged because of total unfitness. These were imbeciles and idiots. Of the men that were accepted, 36,000 were so defective that they could not be sent overseas and were placed in development battalions or discharged. The average intelligence of this group was that of children of 10 years of age.

The CHAIRMAN. Is that statement taken from some of the records of the Medical Department?

Dr. TALBOT. That statement is made by Dr. Henry H. Goddard.

The CHAIRMAN. What connection had he with the draft?

Dr. TALBOT. He was directly concerned with the intelligence tests of recruits.

The CHAIRMAN. He was working for the War Department?

Dr. TALBOT. Yes. He is probably the greatest authority on that subject in this country, especially with regard to the feeble-minded. Twenty per cent of all drafted men had inferior intelligence. Fifteen per cent were very inferior.

In the face of these flagrant facts it is plain that our educational system needs to be provided with a supplementary means of training older youth for manhood and for citizenship, and this the so-called national service bill supplies. Such an enactment is essentially in line with the democratic requirements of American education, simplifying, and extending into young manhood the schooling of the child. It provides for every young man of 18 or 19 years of age the equal chance he needs to equip himself for American manhood. For six months the Nation guarantees him by this proposed act definite and practical training in a useful vocation. He is given book training. He is instructed in the school of the citizen. He is trained in habits of health and is developed physically under watchful oversight and proper instruction. He is made strong, self-reliant, and resourceful. He learns initiative and teamwork. He becomes a citizen able to bear arms in defense of his country. His tuition is intensive by specialists. For the ensuing four years he is granted an additional month each year in the open to further perfect himself in military qualities. If ambition so directs him he can reach any grade

as an officer and instructor by diligent application. He becomes a member of the National Reserve, thus insuring the national defense, without becoming an enlisted soldier.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. Are you referring to a contemplated law or any particular bill?

Dr. TALBOT. I am referring, sir, to the educational possibilities under the so-called national service act, Senate bill 2691. I would like to say a word about this whole matter of camp training. Having followed it from the very beginning, perhaps I may speak with a certain degree of assurance. In the early eighties outing camps for boys were first established by Mr. Ernest Balch and Rev. John F. Nichols. In 1887 I established the first camp for boys, organized to supplement the book work of schools, giving graduated physical training out of doors, vocational instruction on the farm and in the shop, and nature study. The benefits of this camp training were so striking that men came to the camp to get experience and then go out and establish other camps. The Young Men's Christian Association took up the matter and established similar camps. Three of my first boys established the Groton School Camp, which was the first camp for handicapped boys in cities, and became a model for camps of boy clubs all over the country. In 1904 I enjoyed the privilege of gathering camp leaders for the first time in a camp conference, held again in 1906. This conference led to the formation of the present Camp Directors' Association with a membership reaching many thousands of boys.

As a direct outcome of the boys' camp movement and consequent wide-spread interest in outdoor life came the organization of the Boy Scouts of America with its present 500,000 of enrolled members. Meantime a similar movement for the training of girls along parallel lines was being instituted. During the past year there are recorded 700 private camps for boys and for girls, 6,000 Y. M. C. A. camps, as many more boys' club camps, and several thousand Boy Scout camps. The camp as a recognized means of education has come to stay. The military training camps were established in 1912, first for boys and quickly for men, and the training of reserve officers. A total of 86,000 line officers were commissioned through the training-camps system. It is probable that the officer-training camps contributed as much as any one factor to the supply of officer personnel throughout the war and to the efficient leadership of the troops. These camps led directly to the establishment of similar training for enlisted men in Army vocational instruction at a time when thousands of mechanics were needed at once for the Army and there were none available. The great Students' Army Training Corps with courses given in all higher educational institutions was installed and manhood training was seen to be the Nation's greatest need. The early declaration of the truce brought all this educational advance to a close except within the Navy and the Regular Army, where it is progressing steadily and rapidly.

Thus in 33 years there has been a sound, wholesome, unbroken, and extraordinarily rapid growth of this new conception of the well-rounded education of youth. It reaches and can reach only perhaps one-fifth of all the school population, but every child in the land should have equal opportunity. Excellent as is this early training in organized outdoor life for boys, and for girls, too, there comes a

time when something more is needed. The admirable scout activities have accomplished their ends. Private initiative and school endeavor have contributed their best. The evident craving of young men for organized camp vocational training under military organization points the way for the right kind of provision to be made now for national defense.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. Would you make that compulsory or leave it optional? That is the serious question in the whole movement.

Dr. TALBOT. I believe, sir, with the natural growth of the movement, especially if I understand aright the plans that are in contemplation for the Regular Army this year, that within a comparatively short time it will come to be considered a great privilege to have the schooling such as the Army proposes to give this winter. And I think that it will not be long before it could be made obligatory—I don't like the word compulsory, Mr. Chairman—obligatory, since we have fully accepted the principle of obligation in education. We oblige boys to go to school in many States until they are 16 years of age. The principle of obligation in education has been accepted and this is merely extending the obligation a little further. Many States are contemplating making schooling obligatory up to 17 at the present time. One or two States have already passed legislation making schooling obligatory up to the age of 17. One or two have passed and receded from that position as being a little premature; but the principle of obligation in schooling, I believe, is accepted now by the whole country.

Senator FLETCHER. Will you give us an idea, Doctor, on this—some of us would like to have an idea of the curriculum in these camps? What do they do; what course do they pursue?

Dr. TALBOT. Yes; I think I can. It is an interesting history. Along in 1850 or 1860 some missionaries went out to the Sandwich Islands and there established schools for the natives. George and Edward Beckwith established these schools with Richard Armstrong, who later became superintendent of public instruction. His son, Gen. Samuel Chapman Armstrong, was trained in these excellent schools. A decade later, when the problem of Negro education in the South was put before him at the close of the Civil War, his mind reverted to the splendid instruction that he himself had had under his father and the Beckwiths, and he developed a similar method of instruction for the Negro and the Indian, with which you are doubtless well familiar, at Hampton, Va., which has been copied at Tuskegee and other institutions in the South, and in agricultural schools in the North and West, and was the inspiration for my work for white boys, because it seemed a pity that white boys should not be having as good an opportunity as colored boys and Indians. The general program laid down in such schools for all races now, I believe, is entirely practical for application in the Army and in a citizens' army on a very large scale, because it has gone entirely beyond the experimental stage. There is nothing to experiment about; all we have to do is to adapt it to larger numbers. I hope, Mr. Chairman, that before you conclude your hearing you will have set before you the plans which I understand are being put through for schooling the regular soldier and which are along absolutely these same lines. Lately, as I understand it, they have proposed giving six hours a day, from the 1st of November until the 1st of April, for definite schooling in book

work and vocations and physical training; and after the 1st of April, until the 1st of June, four hours a day. But I know little about the matter and am not prepared to speak upon that definitely.

Senator NEW. Let me ask you, if I may—

Dr. TALBOT. Yes, sir.

Senator NEW. What if anything is being done now to pursue the methods established by Gen. Armstrong in the South and at Hampton particularly for training colored youths? Anything except the maintenance of Hampton Institute?

Dr. TALBOT. Of course, Tuskegee is built on the same plan and many other smaller institutions. These schools are training teachers to go out and establish similar small schools all through the South and have been for 40 years or more.

Senator NEW. It is essentially a school movement?

Dr. TALBOT. Essentially a school movement.

Senator NEW. Yes.

Dr. TALBOT. And they require bookwork, physical training, vocational work.

Senator NEW. Manual?

Dr. TALBOT. Yes. Training in the shop and out on the farm, especially on the farm, and they have the training of the boys in military formations. They don't use the rifle. The drilling of the recruits is very intensive and very fine. The principle, I think, is that it is cheaper—it costs less—to have an educated skilled workman than to have an ignorant unskilled workman; and, of course, the same thing applies to the soldier.

Senator FLETCHER. I think they have been doing splendid work at Tuskegee. I am more familiar with that; more so than I am with Hampton. They have done some fine things there and will do some fine things yet. It is unfortunate to lose a man like Booker Washington, but I think they are pursuing his views.

Dr. TALBOT. They have a very able man there in charge. Maj. Moton was trained under Gen. Armstrong and Booker Washington.

Senator FLETCHER. I know about that work, but what I was curious about was about the character of work that you are doing in these camps that you are speaking of—the girls' camps and the boys' camps.

Dr. TALBOT. I think I can give you a clear idea of that. I went to Camp Dudley, the oldest of the Y. M. C. A. camps, the other day, thinking that this question might come up, and I believe that if you will look at this list it will give you a clear-cut idea of the activities of a typical boys' camp.

The following is a list of camp activities:

Baseball, tennis, basket ball, track and field, football, quoits, volley ball, rowing, canoeing, swimming, diving, life-saving tests, Roosevelt club, carpentry, building construction, engines and motors, camera club, rifle club, signal corps, wireless, military training, topography and map drawing, hikes and camping trips, excursions, campcraft, woodcraft, camp cooking, tracking and trailing, forestry, astronomy, agriculture club, nature study, Wantanoit club, junior Audubon club, outdoor chemistry club, dramatics, minstrels, circus, orchestra, glee club and choir, historical pageant, camp paper, woodcraft league, boy scouts club, handicraft club, tutoring, discussion and current

topics club, reading club, historical association, Bible study club, vocational club, service training club, lectures.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. Those are the course of study and of effort?

Dr. TALBOT. Yes. They have many instructors. That is rather typical. Dr. Meylan would be able to tell you even more specifically because he has a camp for boys at the present time and has been president of the Camp Directors' Association.

If I may, Mr. Chairman, I should like to speak about one matter that is basic, and that is the number of males of 18 years of age. Many estimates have been made, and I should like to explain what an estimate of the number of males in the United States means. In 1910 the census figures given is 939,876 of boys 18 years old. It is interesting to know, however, the fact that boys 17 years of age numbered 900,649; 19 years of age, 889,036. In other words, there were many who did not know their real age or for especial reasons preferred to say that they were 18, that the number at 18 is very much larger than for 17 or 19. Again, there is a similar accumulation at age 21. In general, in answer to an age question, the answer is on an even number rather than an odd number. So that, in making my estimate, I have taken the three years of boys 17, boys 18, and boys 19 years of age, averaging that number, and the result is 915,147. The estimate of the total population of the United States for July 1, 1920, based on census estimates for 1917, 1918, and 1919, would be 108,489,388. Now, it is probable that the ratio of males 18 years of age to the total number in 1920 will correspond closely with the ratio of males 18 years of age to the total number in 1910. Estimating on that basis the number of males 18 years of age in 1920 would be 1,088,127. I speak of that because it is important a little later.

If I may speak of physical defects, a certain number of males 18 years of age are not included in the provisions of the proposed national service act because of physical, mental, or moral inability to take advantage of it. Among these are included the blind, deaf, mute, crippled, insane, and criminals and prisoners under court sentence.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. Right there, Doctor, have you any estimates as to the number of these deficient that are the result of the social diseases which we investigated here at one time?

Dr. TALBOT. I can give you some figures on that point, and I think possibly Dr. Meylan can give you some others.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. Yes, sir.

Dr. TALBOT. There are no records that are available concerning the deaf, the mute, and the crippled.

The number of blind in 1910, 15 to 19 years of age, was 2,200, of whom 1,218 were male. Possibly 300 were 18 years of age. No records seem to be available of the number of deaf, mute, or crippled of this age. The number of male insane committed to hospitals in 1910, 15 to 19 years of age, was 1,471. Possibly 300 were 18 years of age. The number of males 18 years of age registered as blind, deaf, mute, crippled, and insane is at least 1,000. Its benevolent institutions in general were 78,618 male children under 21, and it is doubtful if more than 1,000 of these were 18 years of age. The number of those physically incapacitated and not registered in institutions is conservatively estimated at ten times the number registered,

or 20,000. Thus there would be each year a total of approximately 22,000 exempted for these physical and mental causes.

An important aspect, and one which has not been brought to public attention, are the number of prisoners and juvenile delinquents committed. The number committed in 1910 is 11,033, or 0.5721 per cent, a little over half of 1 per cent of the population of the same age. I should like to read a list of the offenses, because it throws a good deal of light upon an important aspect of this whole matter of manhood training for national defense.

Delinquency and crime.—The number of prisoners and juvenile delinquents 18 years of age committed in 1910 was 11,033, or 0.5721 per cent of the population of the same age. Many of these offenses committed were of a minor type.

Adultery.....	18	Keeping houses of ill fame.....	8
Assault.....	645	Larceny.....	2, 020
Burglary.....	607	Malicious mischief.....	57
Concealed weapons.....	235	Nonsupport.....	9
Contempt.....	11	Obscenity.....	39
Delinquency.....	47	Profanity.....	42
Disorderly conduct.....	2, 573	Prostitution.....	99
Drunkenness.....	698	Rape.....	59
Embezzlement.....	21	Robbery.....	78
Forgery.....	78	Trespassing.....	532
Fornication.....	85	Truancy.....	2
Fraud.....	523	Vagrancy.....	1, 173
Gambling.....	222	Violating city ordinances.....	150
Homicide, grave.....	26	Violating liquor laws.....	68
Homicide, lesser.....	78	All others.....	652
Incorrigibility.....	75		
Injuries to common carriers.....	103	Total.....	11, 033

The numbers are large only under disorderly conduct, larceny, trespassing, and vagrancy.

Of the total number, 11,033, of persons 18 years committed for these offenses, the number of males was 87.9 per cent of 9,665 committed in 1910.

In 1910, the whole number committed was 493,934, of whom 445,368 were males. Twenty-five thousand four hundred and twenty-two persons younger than 18 were committed as prisoners or juvenile delinquents. The number above the age of 18 was 457,479.

The total number of persons in penal institutions, January 1, 1910, was 136,472, of whom 124,424 were males.

It will be seen that we have maintained a constant prison population of 125,000 males and that each year we commit to penal institutions nearly half a million males, of whom 10,000 are of service age, and 25,000 are approaching that age. Many of these youths become habitual offenders. It is an impressionable age and a period which craves physical expression. It is conceivable that the service camp would act as an important deterrent to crime and delinquency since 80 per cent of commitments are for offenses which arise from idleness, poor training, absence of guidance, and lack of wholesome interest.

It is probable that by supplying right incentives and training to boys of this age we should save two-thirds from commitment, and deter most of the younger element as well. Thus we should remove the main supply of the whole criminal element, for it is conceded that seeds of viciousness are sown in youth, especially in the years just after leaving school.

The total number of males 18 years of age unavailable because of physical, mental, or moral disability may be estimated at not over 50,000.

Marriages.—In 1910, 13,321 males of 18 were reported as married.

Employment in gainful occupations.—In 1910 the total number of males 16 to 20 years of age was 4,564,179; of these 3,615,623, or 79.2 per cent, were engaged in gainful occupations. Although most of these thus engaged are contributors to the family income, yet probably few at the age of 18 would be deterred by this fact from taking advantage of the opportunity for further education provided by the bill.

Senator FLETCHER. You haven't any figures to show the number of delinquents as coming from the idle, or as coming from the employed?

Dr. TALBOT. I am afraid we will have to rely upon common knowledge and experience. There are no figures available, apparently. I have searched diligently for them. May I say a word about illiterates? We must realize that nearly one-third of our population are near illiterates. They are not wholly unable to read, but are nearly so. They have had very little schooling. We think of ourselves as a literate Nation, but we are not.

The following table shows the number and distribution of illiterates among males 15 to 24 years of age:

	Number.	Per cent of population.		Number.	Per cent of population.
Illiterates of all classes, 15-24 years of age.....	1,070,487	5.9	Geographic division:		
Native white: Native parentage.....	252,889	2.6	New England.....	51,615	4.3
Foreign or mixed parentage.....	35,995	.9	Middle Atlantic.....	189,806	4.5
Foreign-born white.....	305,237	14.5	East North Central.....	65,159	1.8
Negro.....	460,720	22.0	West North Central.....	34,647	1.5
			South Atlantic.....	296,874	12.0
			East South Central.....	219,228	12.8
			West South Central.....	186,488	10.3
			Mountain.....	27,742	5.5
			Pacific.....	17,928	2.3

In 1920 we may look for but slight reduction in the number of these technical illiterates. By the term "technical illiterate" is meant a person who can not read a word in any language. They have been deprived of all schooling whatever by force of circumstances, and have grown up into manhood handicapped for life and a drag upon the Nation. Another 200,000 have barely learned to read. They write even their names with difficulty. They have had only one or two brief terms of schooling. They, too, have been almost wholly debarred from their American birthright of schooling. These are the near illiterates.

The CHAIRMAN. How many did you say there were?

Dr. TALBOT. Two hundred thousand.

The CHAIRMAN. You estimate that for 1920?

Dr. TALBOT. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Age of 18?

Dr. TALBOT. Yes.

It is proposed to afford in the preparatory camps an opportunity for these young men to get the elements of schooling.

Each year 50,000 young men reach the age of 18, in this country, who are unable to speak the American language.

Inability to speak English.—In 1910 there were 12,944,529 foreign-born whites 10 years of age and over. Of these, 2,953,011 were unable to speak English, and 1,683,949 were males. The number of males between the ages of 15 to 19 unable to speak English was 130,930; 20 to 24, 310,276; 20 years, 62,578. Of the foreign-born whites 20 years old, two-fifths were unable to speak English—40 per cent; of the males of this age, 44.3 per cent.

The number of persons unable to speak English in 1910 was more than double that in 1900—1910, 2,953,011; 1900, 1,217,280; 1890, 1,371,044.

Owing to the largely increased immigration from 1910 to 1914, despite recent decrease of immigration, the total number of persons in 1920 unable to speak English is likely to be largely increased.

It has been proved that within three months it is possible to acquire sufficient knowledge of the language to comprehend ordinary speech and converse with some degree of fluency.

The CHAIRMAN. We saw that demonstrated here in front of the Capitol the other day by a platoon of soldiers from Camp Upton, not one of whom could speak a word of English three months ago, and each of whom spoke English readily to us and had all of their drill commands in English and repeated all the commands readily, and some of them complicated commands.

Dr. TALBOT. I can indorse that from my own experience in teaching illiterate workmen in Milwaukee.

The CHAIRMAN. It was an astonishing experience.

Dr. TALBOT. The ability to read, write, and speak a common tongue determines national unity. The greater number of our industrial problems arise fundamentally from the lack of this ability. Without it true democracy, which is based upon mutual understanding and power to share in thought, is impossible. The national service bill, in establishing obligatory preparatory educational camps for the unschooled and non-American speaking, recognizes the fundamental needs of these young citizens, and provides the most effective method which has been proposed thus far to supplement the activities of the schools in removing the national stigma of adult illiteracy and inability to speak a common language.

I have included a table taken from the Surgeon General's report showing the tendency of young men in the Army to become sick. The boys under 20—by admission to the sick report—are notably larger than those over 20. The percentage constantly noneffective is nearly twice as great as those from 20 to 24.

The Surgeon General says:

In the United States Army, 1905 to 1913, the ratio per 1,000 mean strength was as follows:

Age	Admission to sick report.	Deaths.	Discharge for disability.	Constantly non-effective.
Under 20.....	1,332	3.35	30.1	48
20-24.....	1,039	2.47	24.1	24
25-29.....	727	2.22	18.3	20
30-34.....	572	2.88	16.8	25
35-39.....	518	4.18	13.6	24
40-44.....	493	7.11	11.2	23
45-49.....	495	9.29	9.6	23
50 and over.....	665	16.12	16.4	34

Admission to sick report among very young soldiers decreases rapidly and steadily up to the age 40-44. This is contrary to conditions in civil life, where sickness increases steadily with years. The constantly noneffective are at a maximum among soldiers less than 20 years of age. This is true also of the proportion discharged for disability. Owing to the fact that classification of troops by age is not attempted in reports of the Army, we know little with regard to the influence of age upon health in the Army.

The CHAIRMAN. How do you account for that fact?

Dr. TALBOT. I account for it in this way: It is a phenomenon which is familiar to those of us who have had extensive experience with growing boys. The boy of 17 or 18 has been growing rapidly. His bones have been lengthening. The centers of ossification of the bones are still active. The nerves have been lengthening rapidly. The veins have been lengthening. The arteries have been lengthening and there has been increased strain upon the heart. I have found that boys of 14 or 15 will stand with less fatigue a longer walk than will boys of 17 or 18, for the simple reason that they are lighter in weight and active; they are not growing particularly rapidly and do not get as tired. But from 18 on there is a marked difference and I think that Dr. Meylan will speak to you further from his vast experience with boys of that age on just this point, because it has an important bearing upon the whole method of Army training for a citizens' army, as contrasted with the training of regular soldiers.

The question was asked in regard to venereal diseases. The per cent of all rejections by local boards for venereal diseases of the total number registered was 1.3. Out of the total number of rejections, 467,694, 6,235 were for venereal diseases. The per cent rejected in the first draft for physical disability 29.11.

The CHAIRMAN. Just a moment.

Dr. TALBOT. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. It turned out, however, that a great many thousand cases of venereal diseases escaped the observation of the draft boards and were discovered after the men had been inducted into the service.

Dr. TALBOT. Yes, I am aware of that.

The CHAIRMAN. So that that figure is rather more favorable—that percentage of 1.3 is actually more favorable than the actual per cent.

Dr. TALBOT. Yes.

Dr. MEYLAN. That is true of other things, too, such as heart trouble, flat feet, and so forth, and they filled up the camps with men who broke down immediately after they got into the Army.

Dr. TALBOT. The per cent rejected in the first draft for physical disability was 29.11. The per cent rejected in the second draft, February 10 to November 1, 1918, for the same cause was 8.10 or 172,000 out of 2,124,293.

Of the total number examined physically, 3,208,446 in all, 2,259,027 or 70.41 per cent were found physically qualified; 88,436 or 2.76 were remediable; 339,377 or 10.58 could be used for limited service; and 521,606 or 16.25 per cent were physically disqualified.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. Have you an idea or have you any statistics to show how many men who entered these cantonments and camps physically deficient were made physically efficient by the course of treatment they had in the camps?

Dr. TALBOT. I have tried to find figures on that point, but I have never been able to find any published figures. It may be that the Army has these figures.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. The Surgeon General testified here at one time, or, rather, some one from his office, of the restoration to efficiency of men who came into the service from civil life afflicted with venereal diseases. They were practically all made efficient, as I now recall, by the treatment they received.

Dr. TALBOT. As a physician I rather question the fact of a syphilitic person being made fully efficient.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. No; not fully efficient.

Dr. TALBOT. They might have been relieved of active symptoms and made useful.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. Were so far restored as to render service during the war?

Dr. TALBOT. Yes, sir.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. Under the old enlistment rules a man that was so afflicted was not received at all into the service; but they did take them into the service during this war, and restored many of them to useful occupation during the service. I don't know whether you had any figures on that or not.

Dr. TALBOT. No, sir; I have not been able to get any.

I would like to contrast the training for manhood, which would naturally be the training in a citizen army with the Regular Army training. I would call attention to the difference which exists between training men of physical and mental maturity who have enlisted in the Regular Army or who have been drafted to the colors in war times and training all young men of 18 years.

The proposed national act.—A war draft accepts only those who are physically fit. The service bill excuses only those who are physically, mentally, and morally unable to be trained, and expressly includes young men who are physically unfit, provided they are able to take advantage of the training. There is a world of difference. This act would establish proper standards of health and manliness for the Nation and would make it obligatory for all boys to take advantage of the best type of physical training under right conditions. Naturally such training will have to be well safeguarded.

Let us bear in mind also that enlistment in the Regular Army implies a high degree of initial fitness before a man is accepted. The enlisted man is usually a few years older and has greater powers of endurance. Regular Army training deals with the problem of making stronger those who are strong already. Training under the national service bill implies a process of developing all, and especially obliging those below par to become fit. Accepted methods of army training, even as improved by the experience of the war, would naturally receive large modification in instructing and training these younger men, often weaker, and in many cases more deficient than army recruits.¹

I think emphasis should be placed upon that, the difference between training for a citizens' army and the training for a regular army, because if care is not taken such training would result badly.

The CHAIRMAN. Be too severe.

¹ Report of Provost Marshal General, 1918.

Dr. TALBOR. Be too severe; yes, sir.

It is one thing to keep a Regular Army of trained men in condition. It is quite another problem to educate young men to become effective for national defense. In the one case the soldier enlists by choice to undertake military labor, is presumably fit, mentally and physically, for technical military training, and is interested to become a soldier. A citizen reserve, on the other hand, is a cross section of the whole male youth of the Republic who never intend to be soldiers, who probably never will need to serve as soldiers, of whom four-fifths are already engaged in gainful occupations and are contributors to family needs, who are of every grade of physical, mental, and moral unfitness, and whose only willingness to serve comes because they have become convinced that the kind of training they will receive will be of material use and advantage to them in their future lives as citizens and workers.

The existence of facts like these will naturally affect the whole theory of training which must be adopted for national reserves. Every thoughtful military man, informed of the temper of the people and acquainted with the technique of sound physical development and the psychology of youth in the United States, will agree with the necessity of training these young men primarily as men, superadding and including also whatever technical military instruction may prove to be practicable without killing interest. The vital objection, for example, to putting military drill into schools is that it is untimely and it is uncommon for the boy who has suffered from military drill in schools to retain enough interest as a man in later years to take part in National Guard or other military activities.

The provisions of this act are so drawn as to avoid blunders as to program.

The CHAIRMAN. You are speaking of Senator Chamberlain's bill?

Dr. TALBOT. I am referring to Senator Chamberlain's bill.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. You spoke of the service act. Do you mean the selective-service law or are you referring to the bill that we have pending before us now?

Dr. TALBOT. Yes; that known as the national-service act, Senate bill 2691.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. That is the bill you refer to?

Dr. TALBOT. That is the bill I am deeply interested in, because it seems that through its provisions it is possible to bring about universal military training for national defense, which we have not to-day.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. I was a little afraid we might be confused as to terms, when you speak of the national-service act, and I think Senator Fletcher was a little concerned about it, too, whether you meant the national-service act—the draft law—or whether you referred to the bill for universal military training now pending.

Dr. TALBOT. Perhaps I am in error, but I have used that term, taking it from the bill itself—"This act shall be known as the national-service act," I think is the first sentence in it.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. Yes, sir.

Dr. TALBOT. The program proposed is that approved in entirety by the educational thought and experience of the land as calculated best to promote the ends in mind.

What are these ends? The promotion of health. Training in citizenship, supplementary schooling, vocational instruction, and finally such knowledge of military practice and the rudimentary school of the soldier as may make it possible for vast and effective armies of defense to be summoned in case of need and be prepared to take the field speedily after brief special instruction.

National service camps would then be planned to present to the boys of 18 a wonderful opportunity. Every boy would be carefully advised, after a thoroughgoing examination, of what he needs to develop himself properly in taking his course in this new People's University. He would be given as careful a physical and mental examination as though he were entering a university. He would be assigned to the kind of physical training which he needed to build up his body, under trained physical instructors and medical oversight. He would be given such book instruction as he needed most. If he were lacking in the elements of reading and writing, as the case with one-third of all American youth, such instruction would be given in special preparatory camps. If his needs were more advanced he would get the aid he needed in the class rooms of the regular camps. Every type of vocational instruction of an essential sort would be open to him, and every loafer would learn a trade. The fact that all the training was done under the helpful stimulus of camp-military discipline, would ensure the inculcation of right habits of living and working. Since the time available would be necessarily brief the instruction would be of an intensive sort, time would be economized and utilized to the limit, and progress would be stimulated by the emulation which would arise between competing units. Emulation is a tremendous source of interest and inspiration to men in camp life. Then, finally in the part of the day devoted to military schooling the very drill, which ordinarily would be stupidly monotonous and uninteresting, would come as an agreeable and enlivening exercise of the most virile type, and the best efforts of every boy would be called forth to render himself proficient as a soldier for his country's defense. In times of peace, when the artificial stimulus and drive of war is absent, effective military training is possible only through some such program, and this is the program contemplated by the National Service Act.

In the world conflict between ignorance and selfishness on the one hand and knowledge and fraternity on the other, there is no doubt as to where America stands. Our basic American principle is equal opportunity for each in the service of all. Americanism, I submit, may be defined as, "Equal opportunity for each in the service of all." * * * It is our national privilege and obligation to defend this and other principles of Americanism. Moreover it is our duty to be prepared. America is protected by the Navy and by the Army in the first line of defense, and by State militia in a second line of defense, but is fully safeguarded only by the possession of vast organized citizen reserves of trained, strong, and competent manhood and womanhood.

War experience has proved that we must revise radically our conception of the meaning of military defense and consequently of methods of effective training for defense. The technical training of the sailor and of the soldier is safe in the hands of naval

and military experts. The creation of additional and adequate citizen reserves is demanded as a matter of common sense and is provided in the National Service Bill now under discussion. * * *

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. Aside from the military features and advantages to be obtained from a military viewpoint, what has been your experience in training young men as to the ability of the trained man to secure employment as against the man who has had no training?

Dr. TALBOT. There is no comparison, sir. The trained man can get a job any time, I venture to say. I have given a great deal of time and work to installing employment systems in some of our largest concerns in this country and I never yet have found any lack of opportunity for the trained man to get a job.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. The employers look at his physical development and look at the discipline he has had to undergo, don't they?

Dr. TALBOT. Absolutely. If a man comes into your office you look at him and in a moment you can tell whether he is a trained man or not a trained man. In a large concern you have always use for the trained man. More and more we have less and less use for the untrained man. It might interest you that even so far back as 1912 the demand for shovels had decreased over one-third, owing to the fact that mechanical means for digging had been introduced, trench diggers, scoops, and steam shovels. The untrained man is gradually being eliminated from industry, even from digging ditches. We don't need him and we don't want him. The fewer we have of him in industry the less the cost of conducting industry, and if the soldier comes out of the Army without specific vocational training would he not be under some handicap? If the soldier gets no vocational training in the Army he will be under a handicap later in competing with trained men in civil life. That is the great advantage in having vocational instruction, both in the Regular Army and in an army of citizen reserves. The establishment of the reserve is a problem for the whole people to consider, to determine through their Representatives in Congress.

It is a problem in national education. Ultimate national defense requires growth in civic standards, vigorous health, individual productive ability, and finally military fitness.

Attention should be directed to changed methods in the conduct of modern war. The industry of war is the sum total of the essential industries of peace. All the basic peace activities of a nation are utilized in war; therefore, if we train men to vigorous manhood and as well-equipped workers, we are also providing the best type of military reserves. The better the citizen worker, the better the citizen soldier. For the modern army, just as for modern industry, it is the individual man that counts. It has become clear to us at great cost that military success, like industrial prosperity, depends not upon assembling masses of men to do blindly as they are bid, but upon organizing a trained and intelligent personnel, equipped to provide and handle intelligently costly material and complicated machines, through interested and disciplined teamwork.

We have learned from the war that self-protection as a Nation requires better training of the manhood of the Nation for national

service. We need men as individuals trained to effective teamwork for common advantage, and thus be prepared in case of national need for speedy transference from pursuits of peace to serve splendidly the Nation's cause as soldiers. Preparation and organization for national service is needed, rather than the establishment of great armies.

The war has also taught the lesson that the best soldier must be a thinking unit, specifically trained to some specific vocation or vocations.

I believe, if my recollection is correct, that in the Infantry, 44 per cent of the men required specific training, and in the other arms of the service, the adjunct parts of the service, the percentage is 88 per cent of men requiring specific vocational training.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. Have you any fear at all that the training which is proposed, which in the last analysis makes the soldier would tend to the cultivation of the military spirit?

Dr. TALBOT. Not from what I hear from the boys who have come home; no, sir.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. Well, I am in accord with you, but I wanted your views because the pacifists, and we have had a good many of them before this committee, say that whenever you undertake to train boys and units of boys you immediately commence to build up a militaristic spirit.

Dr. TALBOT. Senator, I am looking for new experiences all the time and if I can meet a man who has come back from the other side who wants to go into the fight again it would be a new experience to me.

Haphazard training is now in the military discard. If the young soldier has learned to work harmoniously and effectively in modern industrial team activities, he can quickly learn to handle weapons. Just as the day of the unthinking bondsman has gone forever in industrial organization, the same is likewise true in modern military organization. Selective service has replaced by its principle of individual obligation the antiquated methods of industrial and military compulsion.

I call attention to the fact that the national service bill seems to provide the necessary mechanism for organizing and training these adequate citizens reserves for national defense. Only through the best type of education and training can strong reserves become available. One hundred and forty-three years of discussion of national defense have shown that the Nation rejects absolutely the erection of a national system of military training and the formation of a vast military machine, such as is its inevitable result. The printed evidence given before the Committees on Military Affairs of Congress is convincing testimony to this conclusion, but it also demonstrates that training for manhood and for citizenship as a military measure wins general approval, consent, and support. In discussing and understanding this act for the military defense of the Nation it is of the highest importance for us all to recognize that while providing for personnel it makes for civic and industrial preparedness. The bill is primarily an educational measure.

Prevention of war is like prevention of any other disease. The body politic like the human body must not only be put in a healthy condition, but it must also be insured so far as possible against con-

tion. The existence of organized citizen reserves industrially trained and gainfully employed in the arts of peace is the surest and most adequate form of complete national defense. Following five other recent legislative plans, this act is seen to include the best elements of all and to avoid the faults of each. It provides necessary further training for our young men supplementary to schooling. It provides opportunity for the unschooled. It affords specific vocational instruction for every youth. It insures universal sound physical and health training. It gives every youth in the land practice in elementary camp and field activities. It enables him at any time to learn quickly to handle whatever new arms of defense may be further developed. The chief purpose of the proposed national service act is to restore, expand, and make part of manhood education intensive, specific vocational instruction and universal physical and health training.

Henceforth we are to train men as citizens to insure peace. True national defense depends upon this fact. Young men in order to become serviceable citizens, productive workers, and independent earners, need obligatory opportunity for growth in health, in understanding, responsibility, mentality, initiative, vocational skill, teamwork, and above all in knowledge of and interest in the affairs of the community, the State, and the Nation.

Prof. James has some very interesting remarks to make to the committee on just that point.

These essential civic qualities were shown in the war to be equally essential military qualities. The national service bill aims to establish an essential educational mechanism now lacking. Although the Federal Government makes no attempt to organize, direct, or control the schooling of the youth of the several States, it may however supplement, extend, and amplify prior school training by providing a period of life in camp under well-disciplined military direction to effect adequate and complete protection of the people.

The war proved to us that our youth are not being adequately trained either for civic responsibility or as workers. The selective draft revealed to the public the startling amount of disease and weakness in our young manhood. It succeeded in impressing the public where the warnings of physicians and educators have been persistently ignored for years. It was a dramatic and revolting revelation of a growing national menace. It also made clear the stigma of widespread illiteracy and near-illiteracy under which we are struggling as a people. It showed that we are not a people unified by a common language, but a polyglot populace, and finally it discloses the millions of our young men who are ignorant industrially.

We learned too, that an army is not a mere body of soldiers but great industrial machine, and that there are 550 special industrial vocations listed in Army activities, each one of which has its counterpart in civil industrial life. We learned that if a boy has absorbed the principles of right-thinking and of right-living, if he has accumulated a large reserve of useful information and special skill gained through experience and practice, and of which he has also clear understanding as to principles and theory if he has interest, initiative, resourcefulness, endurance, and common sense, he is already a soldier in the main.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. One of the good signs is that the ladies themselves are taking an interest in it. Miss Cocroft was here the other day and at her request we introduced a bill for training women, not only the young women, but the mothers of the land.

Dr. TALBOT. Personally I have no doubt, Senator Chamberlain, that if this measure finally becomes effective that the results will be proven to be so splendid that you will have to supply a similar training for the girls.

Senator NEW. "The children will cry for it."

Dr. TALBOT. "The children will cry for it."

A brief additional course of technical military practice will insure effectiveness in the field. If, then, in the camp we provide the kind of training which makes for citizenship and industrial service, we are not only training equally for military service, but we are making citizens as well.

America is a peace-loving nation. It has no use for large standing armies. With the whole world in arms, still we reject the idea of a huge military establishment. The Nation is weary of war and none more than our soldiers who have been abroad. Yet military defense must be provided, because democracy unprotected invites aggression. The war has convinced us that to maintain on a war footing in times of peace the millions of men required for adequate national defense would be intolerable and unthinkable, but the advantages of camp training in making young men manly, self-reliant, and responsible citizens of the Republic have been indisputable. The Nation looks with favor upon legislation for national defense which will insure the greatest degree of manhood training for American citizenship primarily.

We may disregard therefore any plan for national defense which is undemocratic, which tends to the erection of a military class or clique, and which is not definitely a means of training youth to good citizenship. The Army therefore must be a citizens' army providing for all American youth equality of opportunity in patriotic service.

The CHAIRMAN. Will you give your name to the reporter?

STATEMENT OF DR. GEORGE L. MEYLAN.

Dr. MEYLAN. George L. Meylan, professor of physical education and medical doctor of Columbia University.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. Columbia University?

Dr. MEYLAN. Yes, sir.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. New York?

Dr. MEYLAN. Yes. I have been director of various camps since 1892—my own camp, White Mountain Camp, since 1907, and am ex-president of the Camp Directors Association of America; also of the American Physical Education Association. For seven and one-half months I was director of sports and recreation for the French army under the auspices of the Union Franco-Americaine, which is the American Y. M. C. A. joined with the French organization doing this work.

The CHAIRMAN. In what year was that?

Dr. MEYLAN. From September, 1917, until May, 1918.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. You were in France during that time?

Dr. MEYLAN. Yes; and then was post surgeon of the Columbia University Student Army Training Corps; with the appointment of contract surgeon during the life of the Student Army Training Corps, from September, 1918, to January, 1919.

I will not go into any discussion of the advantages of health and physical training for young men. I presume we are all agreed upon the advantages of such training to the individual and to the Nation. So I will limit my brief remarks to two propositions. First, that the young men of the country to-day are very inferior physically to what they might be, and that the national service bill offers the best remedy for this condition. We know that the examination of recruits for the National Army resulted in the rejection of almost 30 per cent, it was 29.11 per cent at the first examination by the board, and then 5 per cent more were rejected by the Army surgeons when those men went to the camps. And of those who were accepted there was a number—I haven't any accurate figures for that, but I have been told by Army officers who had to do with these men that they estimated it was 10 to 15 per cent more who, even after having been accepted, failed to render useful service as soldiers because of physical defects.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. That was practically 45 per cent?

Dr. MEYLAN. Yes; who failed to give adequate military service for physical reasons.

Now, we have had the same experience examining boys and young men in the gymnasiums of secondary schools, colleges, Young Men's Christian Associations, and other institutions for the last 25 years. This was not a surprise to physical educators who have been examining boys and young men for many years past, because they have found the same conditions exactly. As an example; I have just completed examining 543 students of the freshman class at Columbia University. Three hundred and eighty-eight of that number had one or more remediable physical defects, and 8 per cent had some permanent physical defects. But 388, which is 71 per cent of the total, had one or more remediable physical defects. And when we consider the character of an entering class in a college, how much above the average are the homes they come from, better standards of living, better incomes, and that they are the more ambitious young men of the country; and yet we find in that class, that selected class, representing only one-half of 1 per cent of all the young men in the country, that 71 per cent have remediable physical defects.

The CHAIRMAN. What is the average age of those men, Doctor?

Dr. MEYLAN. Eighteen years. One thing that has surprised me greatly in examining students for 17 years, is the large number who are unaware that they have defects, because they haven't been examined by a physician perhaps in 5 or 10 years, and many of those physical defects have appeared and perhaps have even become fairly serious without having been detected by the individual or his parents. Anything that doesn't cause pain to attract attention is very likely to be overlooked.

Many students who do not have defects requiring medical or surgical treatment are far below what is considered normal in physical development and training of the body, they lack ability to handle themselves under ordinary conditions of everyday life. I don't mean an athletic ability to punt a football 70 yards or to run a hundred

yards in 10 seconds or to do any of the many athletic feats, but simply the ability to handle one's body under the conditions of everyday life. A friend of mine who had to do with the American unit in France brought out that point in a very realistic way with a group of American Army officers in France. He said, "What difference would it make in a squad of soldiers who had to make an attack across no man's land and the distance across there was a half-mile, if those men could run that distance 10 seconds faster than they had been able to do it before?" And these Army officers said, "Why, it would probably, in many cases, change from failure to success in the attack and would decrease the casualties 10 per cent." Well, now, that is simply one little point to show what it means to have a man able to handle his body efficiently and quickly under ordinary conditions of everyday life, to run fast, to jump over an obstacle, to climb a tree or down a rope if necessary, to be able to swim if he falls in the water. That is what I mean by physical training. I don't mean just athletic ability that we hear about in collegiate athletics, which has a value, too, but only as a specialized thing for a limited number of individuals. I am speaking of fundamental physical training that every boy and young man in a democratic country has really a right to get some way or other, not depending on chance but to have it as a part of his normal education.

Senator FLETCHER. Do a large number of these remediable defects appertain to the eyes?

Dr. MEYLAN. No; the largest number of these statistics that I have relate to teeth.

Senator FLETCHER. Teeth.

Dr. MEYLAN. Yes; there were more than half that had defective teeth. Eyes is one of the highest. And obstructions of the nose and throat, enlarged tonsils—diseased tonsils.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. The modern theory of that is that they are the fundamentals of later diseases—in later years?

Dr. MEYLAN. There is a great deal of trouble that is associated with diseased tonsils, and then there are a certain number of hernias—ruptures—and here I record only the serious cases of flat feet. If all cases of flat feet were recorded, the number of defects would be very much larger, but only those are included who have flat feet so bad that the individual is unable to stand or walk a reasonable length of time.

On the basis of my experience, and this is my thirtieth year of teaching and examining of over 14,000 young men, I am firmly convinced that over 60 per cent of the young men 18 years old in the United States are more or less handicapped for life because of remediable physical defects or lack of physical development, lack of fundamental physical training. I don't mean by that that they are all crippled or seriously defective, but more than 60 per cent of them could be made far more efficient as citizens and wage earners than they are if their remediable defects were removed and their bodies were properly developed and trained. Now, that was the first proposition. The second is that the provisions of the national service bill—

The CHAIRMAN. Just a minute before you proceed with that second topic. Does your experience indicate that we are going uphill or downhill in the matter of physical condition as a race, as a nation?

Dr. MEYLAN. We are improving.

The CHAIRMAN. We are improving?

Dr. MEYLAN. Very slowly. There has been a very definite improvement in the last 10 years as the result of increased attention to health education, outdoor life, and exercise. But it will take a long time to get the benefits of that to the whole population. Thus far it has reached only the more intelligent, educated classes.

The second proposition that I wanted to speak of briefly is that the provision for medical examination and physical training in the national service bill would insure to all young men the following advantages:

First, detection of remediable physical defects. You see, I made the point that many of these young men don't know that they have these defects. We have even had boys nearly blind in one eye, and they didn't know it. They had never been tested and were not aware of their defect. Second, the correction of these defects. That is a provision of this bill. Third, normal physical development. You would be surprised how many young men grow up to manhood without attaining normal physical development. Just as illustration, a normal young man of 18 or 20 should be able to chin a bar—pull himself up to his chin by the arms at least three or four times. Now, there are many young men who grow up without any opportunity for development of the arms and shoulders—muscles of the upper part of the body—who could never chin themselves once—not even once. That is one of many illustrations to show lack of normal physical development. There is nothing the matter with them, except that they never had a chance to develop their muscles in the normal way.

Senator FLETCHER. Never learned how to sit correctly or stand correctly or walk?

Dr. MEYLAN. Or walk, and move and hold themselves properly. We have young men in college, who actually don't know how to run. I had an argument with a man the other day about that. He said all boys know how to run. I didn't know those boys until they came to college at the age of 18, but every year we have two or three who really don't know how to run. That is third. Fourth, they would get training in body control, as I have just explained. The ability to handle the body under the ordinary conditions of everyday life, on the ground, off the ground, over obstacles, and in the water. That includes good carriage, control of the body, as a whole, ability to handle the body under all the conditions of everyday life, no matter what his occupation may be, whether he is a banker, salesman, a minister, or carpenter, or if he is called upon to serve his country as a soldier. That is the one thing that American and French officers kept telling me over and over again when I discussed this question of physical training with them, "Why, that is the most important thing for a soldier, a fellow who can handle himself." That is why they had to spend months and months with those recruits before they could teach them the technique of a soldier. At first they had to have men physically capable, and this was accomplished through physical training.

I don't know whether this ought to go in the record, but I discussed this matter with Gen. Wood in 1917, just after we entered the war. I asked him to give an address to the Association of Camp

Directors of America, of which I was president at the time. We all felt we wanted to do our share for preparedness, and some of the camp directors thought perhaps it would be wise to introduce military training in their camps in the summer time. We represented about 5,000 boys and young men, and we thought the best thing was to ask Gen. Wood to come and advise us in the matter, and this is what he told us: "The way you can help most is to give sound physical training to these boys and young men; make efficient men of them physically, and then we can make soldiers out of them, and good soldiers, in a comparatively short time."

And then, fifth, training in games and recreation. I will not elaborate on that, but it is recognized more and more that the men who have learned to play as boys—I don't mean poker or games of that kind, but I mean physical games, recreation—and who have acquired a taste for them and can continue to play those games through life, have a splendid asset in maintaining their health and vigor and working capacity for a long time.

And, last, knowledge of hygiene and health habits, derived from camp life and hygiene instruction. Now, all that would be offered in that six months' camp training that is proposed in this bill.

We have all seen the physical benefits of camp training in the National Army. Many of these benefits are not measurable, but the Surgeon General has reported that the average gain in weight was 10 pounds.

Senator NEW. Let me ask you about that. I have seen it stated several times that there was such an average gain on the part of American soldier during his life in the service. Now, is that authentic?

Dr. MEYLAN. I have no proof for it, only I have seen it repeatedly in print, and I have heard it referred to often. I have not seen the report of the Surgeon General himself over his signature.

Senator NEW. Now, if there is such an official report anywhere, I would like to see it. I believe it to be true.

Dr. MEYLAN. It may not be 10 pounds, but there was a large gain, certainly 7 or 8, if it was not 10. And I think that we are all agreed, from our own personal experience with relatives and friends, that the young men who were in our Army were almost without exception greatly benefited physically. They came out stronger and better physically than they went in.

Senator NEW. No question about that.

Dr. MEYLAN. I had the privilege of making the same observations in the French Army; before going to France I had very definite notions as to the limits of physical endurance and resistance to cold and hardship from my own experience with athletes, but I was surprised when I came in contact with those French soldiers in that very cold winter of 1917-18—

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. 1918-19?

Dr. MEYLAN. Seventeen and eighteen. I happened to spend five days, for instance, at Christmas time in the Argonne Forest and the thermometer was very low; it was bitter cold, and I saw these men coming out from six days in the front line trenches to the rest camp 3 miles back; they arrived there at 9 o'clock in the morning, and just stripped to the waist and tried to break the ice in the little creek running down the valley there to wash themselves—and they didn't

seem to feel the cold. From my experience in athletics and camping, I had no idea that human beings could be hardened by exposure and training—living outdoors for several years—to the degree of resistance manifested by these soldiers. And then in endurance, whole regiments, whole divisions marching in the mud with their 85 to 90 pounds on their backs for 20, 25, and even 30 miles a day; why, that is way above what we considered the maximum of endurance even for athletes.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. An untrained man could not stand it for an hour.

Dr. MEYLAN. Not at all. But it shows what can be done. In this connection I have seen repeatedly figures—I can not vouch for them, any more than I have seen them printed as official figures—that France and England mobilized approximately 10 per cent of their population, and we know, of course, they mobilized all they could. In fact, I saw men in the French Army who would never have been accepted for the Army before the war. Simply a necessity; they took almost any man that could walk. And similar so-called official figures, that Germany mobilized about ten or eleven million men, and she had a population officially of 66,000,000, which gives her 15 per cent of her population mobilized in the army. Switzerland mobilized 450,000 men during the war. Her population is a little over 3,000,000. That is again 15 per cent. Now, here is a point that I believe is worthy of attention. France and England had no system of physical training for the youth. Of course, France had compulsory military training when young men reached the age of 20, but no physical training in school, no opportunity for normal physical development up to that time. England, of course, didn't have universal military training. Germany and Switzerland have had for 40 years a universal system of physical training in the schools from the kindergarten clear up to college; this training is not military, but is correlated with the military training in the army; in other words, they used the same exercises in marching and calisthenics, the same commands, and that sort of thing, so that when young men are called to the army at 20 they are not raw recruits, but they already know how to march and how to do a great many of the things that are necessary in the army. If the difference from 10 to 15 per cent in the number who are physically capable for military service is due entirely to the fact that these two countries have had for 40 years back universal compulsory physical training for all boys and girls, all through the schools, while France and England have had almost nothing in that line, the value of universal physical training for youth should receive attention in the consideration of this bill—

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. Did you say what percentage of the English population went in?

Dr. MEYLAN. About 10 per cent, the same as France.

Senator NEW. Ours, less than 5.

Dr. MEYLAN. Only about $3\frac{1}{2}$, I believe, on the basis of 108,000,000 population. We had only 4,000,000. I have asked some men if they thought that we could have gotten even 11,000,000, which would be 9 per cent. They said it would be hard to find in this country 1,000,000 men thoroughly competent physically for military service. That would be only 10 per cent. Germany and Switzerland mo-

bilized 15 per cent. The same percentage would have made for us an army of sixteen and one-half million men.

Senator NEW. Four times what we had?

Dr. MEYLAN. Yes.

Senator FLETCHER. We had some 13,000,000 registered.

The CHAIRMAN. Twenty-four million registered, up to 45 years old.

Senator NEW. Yes; between the ages of 18 and 45.

Dr. MEYLAN. Another important point bearing on the proposed bill is that the value of camp training is rapidly growing in popular favor. I have seen a slow and gradual development of that attitude on the part of the mothers about sending their boys—boys of 10 to 18 years—to camps. The number has increased tremendously and the parents who have had that experience are very enthusiastic. It is a very common experience with me to have a boy, for instance, come to camp at 13 or 14 and then when he returns home in the autumn his parents are so delighted with the change that they say: "We regret we didn't decide to send him before." That is a common experience. But, as Dr. Talbot told us, I think, he estimated only fifty to sixty thousand boys were in camp last summer.

Dr. TALBOT. Many more than that. There were probably a hundred thousand boy scouts in camp alone.

Dr. MEYLAN. Those are such short camps—only two weeks.

Dr. TALBOT. Over 700 private camps and from six to seven thousand Y. M. C. A. camps, and then the Boy Scout camps.

Dr. MEYLAN. In those camps that run two months there were probably between fifty and one hundred thousand. That is a very small proportion of all the boys in the country. But camping is growing so rapidly that I believe if we do not succeed in getting this very valuable bill enacted soon, if we have to wait a year or two years or three years, that this increasing number of parents who are having the experience of seeing the benefits derived from camping for their own boys and girls—because girls' camps are growing just as fast as the boys' camps—will exert a strong influence in creating public sentiment in favor of the bill.

Senator FLETCHER. About what does it cost a boy to attend one of these camps one season?

Dr. MEYLAN. They vary all the way from the Y. M. C. A., which are supported partly by funds, and the boys pay only seven to twelve dollars a week. In the private camps the rates are from \$15 to \$30 a week.

Senator FLETCHER. And how long are the boys supposed to go?

Dr. MEYLAN. The season is usually nine weeks. Some of the camps run eight, some nine, and some ten weeks, but the great majority have a nine-weeks season.

Senator FLETCHER. And do they only attend one season?

Dr. MEYLAN. We have boys who return for as many as six years. The average number of years is between three and four, for boys in my particular camp. Dr. Talbot tells me that in these scout camps, which represent the largest number of boys, the charge is about \$10 a week.

Senator FLETCHER. Do you think the public mind is gradually being brought around to appreciate the advantages of these camps, and that they are growing in favor?

Dr. MEYLAN. Yes. For instance, this summer the camps experienced a more rapid growth in numbers than in any year since they were started, 35 years ago, and much of that was attributed to the general experience with the boys who had been in the Army camps. That influenced the parents to send their young boys and girls to camp.

The CHAIRMAN. Have you any other observations to make, Doctor?

Dr. MEYLAN. That is all.

The CHAIRMAN. They were very interesting, indeed. We were glad to have you.

STATEMENT OF DR. GEORGE F. JAMES.

(Formerly dean of the College of Education, University of Minnesota, later Nevada; educational director under the War Work Council of the Young Men's Christian Association for the Western Department; assistant director of the Group for Occupational Direction in the Army Educational Corps of the American Expeditionary Forces.)

The CHAIRMAN. We shall be very glad to have you proceed in any way you desire.

Dr. JAMES. I am just back from France. I came over on a boat that carried the last organized unit of the Expeditionary Force that came in the original company formation in which it left this side.

As I listened to the men talking down below, on the lower deck, in the course of that voyage, Mr. Chairman, it occurred to me that we are going to have a considerable modification of our American vocabulary. We are going to introduce all over this country, in the villages and in the streets of our great cities, such familiar words as "beaucoup," "bon jour," and "toot sweet."

One other word we have not introduced but have used to an extent during this war much greater than ever before, and that is the word that describes why I have come here this afternoon. It is the word "liaison."

I am indeed a sort of link in the chain that connects the civilian and the Army officer in the matter of education, and the work on this side with the work on the other.

So what I have to say this afternoon, and it will be very brief, is not merely from the point of view of a university teacher of more than a quarter of a century, but with the thought that has come to me, picked up out of the cloistered quiet of academic halls and put down in the midst of great Army and Navy camps.

From an experience of a year and a half within the Army, coupled with study and education in previous years, I firmly believe that in behalf of this proposed act there can be advanced four arguments, any one of which would thoroughly justify its adoption, all four quite distinct from the specific argument of military preparedness on which the proposed act primarily rests.

Of these four reasons for the adoption of the act, the first has been so accurately expressed by Dr. Meylan that I shall do no more than to say that in my opinion if the advantage of health of body, physical development, systematic muscular training, corrective and preventive measures for the upbuilding of our youth, which lie within the possibilities of the bill, were all, they would of themselves be sufficient for its adoption.

The second great reason that occurs to me is the development of the civic quality in our American youth. Under this I reckon four elements. I do not hesitate to put as the first of these elements the quality of emotional patriotism—the throb which we feel when we look out and see the Stars and Stripes flying, a quality that is in us because we look on that as something more than an ordinary piece of cloth, and certainly very far from what some of our degenerate brethren in these days call a rag. The emotion of patriotism, to my mind, can in the young man of 18 be better, more quickly, more thoroughly and permanently developed under the conditions of camp life than in any other way.

I am reminded, sir, of an evening at San Diego, when 1,500 young Jackies of the Navy gathered in the great open-air theater while a searchlight was playing on the Stars and Stripes, and sang the patriotic songs of our country. The emotion of patriotism comes first.

Second, the quality of civic comprehension; that is, the recognition of the basic principles and forms of our own Government; and that those can be apprehended by the youth under the system of training proposed here I have myself seen in the experience at Camp Lewis in training in an intensive course of only three weeks' duration, but through daily lectures and discussions, more than 25,000 men. It certainly was an inspiring sight to see them march in by companies into one hall or another all over that great camp and to see driven home to them in a clear, impressive, and concise fashion what our country should mean to us.

Third, of the qualities that go to make the civic feeling is the sense of civic responsibility. It would have seemed strange in other days to have thought of the development of this quality in military camps, but that I have seen coming out, month by month, here and there, just as these young soldiers were trained in military discipline and military procedure.

There is one other element of this civic feeling that ordinarily, roughly, we call good-fellowship. It is a fine quality. It means teamwork. Gentlemen, I have seen that grow in so many camps and so many parts of this country and over on the other side, all through France, where, in their moments of leisure, the young men brought there from this country would gather together and a discussion would be started, stories would be told; and always the man from Texas was telling what was happening down there and how it looked to him, and the man from South Carolina was comparing things with the man from Minnesota. There was developing a sense of civic solidarity which meant very much for those men who felt the restrictions and sufferings of their military experiences on the other side; and certainly a quality that is most essential in our normal life at this time of turmoil and of class and mass discussion.

Sir, I look upon this proposed act as the best means of national insurance for the preservation of the integrity of our institutions that can be possibly devised.

The third argument that comes to me in favor of the adoption of the proposed act I would call roughly the need of greater general education for the mass of our youth. I gathered once at Camp Kearny 500 out of a new draft of something like 9,000 men who came into the camp from some of the better States and some of the average Western States of our Union, all in need of special training.

and those 500 men were quickly classified as to their degrees of illiteracy. They were brought into the proper groups, separated from the rest of the recruits coming in at that time, put under systematic instruction three hours every morning with their military duties occupying the afternoon, until gradually they went out in groups of 10, 20, 40, or more. At the end, sir, of a marvelously short period of training they were sent out from the Pacific coast into the eastern cantonments ready presently for service abroad.

I have seen over on the other side that the illiterate can be trained in three months so that for the purpose of his soldier's life he is not handicapped by his previous ignorance, either of speaking or of writing or of reading the English language. More than that, he may be given such a determination to go on that we can expect him, as I expect him, coming back to this country with opportunities, to make of himself a better rounded man gradually through his own effort and his own intelligent application.

That is only one group. The great mass of the young men of 18 are represented by the boys who went out from school with a maximum of only four or five years of real study. That is about all they have. What is the result? Presently they lose the reading habit. That is a great loss. At least they lose the reading habit in any sense of the word that is really worth while. They lose command of the facilities of education that every man needs in his daily occupation. I believe very thoroughly that to put in six months or nine months, even a portion of the day each day, on systematic general instruction would be no economic loss. It would be a tremendous economic and certainly a magnificent spiritual gain for the whole country for a million young men brought in each year at this age.

President Butler, of Columbia, spoke most eloquently on one occasion of four forms of inheritance that every young American is entitled to. He said he is entitled to go out into the world, level eyed and free from superstition through the teachings of science. He is entitled to go out into the world and see it illumined by the great masters of literature. He is entitled to go out into the world of his fellows historically minded, so that he is guided by the results of human experience heretofore. He is entitled to go out and see the beauty of the world and enter into his aesthetic inheritance.

We can not do half we would like to do in six months, but, gentlemen, we can do a tremendous lot even if we have only an hour a day, for hundreds and thousands in a well-planned course under the right kind of guidance.

Lastly, I say without any hesitation that the vocational argument for the proposed act is in itself a sufficient reason for its adoption. Mark you, gentlemen, we have come to have a very different conception of public education. Very slowly we have come to believe that every American child is entitled at public expense to systematic elementary schooling during the early years, and we are not going to allow presently in any State anything to interfere with the getting of that elementary instruction. That was only a beginning. We have come now to see that it is not sufficient to make a boy ready to be a good man, but he has to be a man good for something. We recognize that unless we prepare the boy and the girl for the occupational affairs of life we are not doing our full duty. We can no longer leave that to the family. We can not leave it to any

private society. We can not leave it to organized industry. It is something that society has to take over for itself and accomplish through its own agencies of public education.

We have made a little start in this. In the course of this last winter, gentlemen, some six or eight States adopted the principle—as your own State, sir, of New York did—of systematic supplementary vocational schooling in conjunction with actual wage earning labor for children who leave the public schools at an early age, this instruction to be continued up to the age of 18.

If six or eight States do that one winter, we can expect that kind of a microbe to spread all over the country. Malevolent microbes spread. Why should not beneficent microbes spread as well? I fully believe that presently we shall be saying that no community has done its duty by the young until every boy and every girl of 18 has had specific preparation for the kind of work that each wants to do in life. We have made a little beginning in that, sir, in our public schools now, but we have made only a beginning. This proposed act affords an opportunity to say first of all to the boy of 14, before he leaves school, “think over very carefully what you want to do, now. Go into one occupation or another on the basis of your best interest and selection. Watch yourself very carefully, and if you do not like your work consult somebody and you can probably get into a better kind of a job, but always work seriously in whatever you are doing. Why? Because presently the country is going to say to you, ‘You are not compelled, you are not called, you are not summoned, you are not forced—you have the opportunity to come into a scheme of education, military, physical, ethical, civic, literary, and vocational; and, boy, if you will only think, you can, when that time comes, go into the kind of vocational training that you want, and with this military training you can make yourself a better workman; you can be started at the end of that period with such increased capacity for gainful and rewarded labor as will have made it a great economic privilege aside from every other consideration for you to have been there in that time.’”

I have said what I believe, sir.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. Doctor, there is one question I would like to ask you. I do not know but your five points cover what I am about to ask. Would not this bringing together of the young men from every class of society democratize our people and make the men of the upper class, so-called, sympathize with the men who occupy a class below in the social scale?

Dr. JAMES. Without a doubt. I have seen that so often in the Army.

Then the question arises, Senator: Do I as a man, able to put my children into good schools and to have them stay there as long as they need to stay there—do I want my boy at 18, just ready for college, we will say, to be taken away from the college at which he has, perhaps, already matriculated, with the thought of entering into camp life for six months? Would not that be an interference with my plans for his progress? And I promptly answer, No. Whether the boy is already engaged in some gainful occupation in a wage-earning capacity, or whether he is just finishing high school and wants to go on to college and acquire professional training does not matter at all. In either case it would be not a loss, but a gain

for him to have this experience; and so far as specific college work is concerned, Senator, it can easily be arranged so that he would actually get in book studies such training as the college might properly recognize with credits appropriate to that period.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. It seems to me that another benefit to come from this intermingling of the young men of the country would be that they would learn in these camps that positions of birth or education or training do not count so much as the merit of the individual, that every man in the last analysis must make good, himself.

Dr. JAMES. Exactly.

Senator FLETCHER. With reference to the period of training, this bill proposes three months and the Chamberlain bill provides six months. Do you think this training would be of very material value if it extended only over a period of three months to include the necessary military training as well?

Dr. JAMES. I can not think it would, Senator. I am not in position to say that three months would make a healthy youngster into a soldier. That is for an expert to say. But I am quite sure that if you can do it in three months you certainly can not do anything else in that time.

It is the other things that really matter. It is after all a selling proposition, is it not? I can go out—I know I can—and I am going to do it, too, incidentally—I can go out to an Illinois farmer and sit down with him and talk to him about his 17-year-old boy and this proposed act, and I can persuade him that it is a good thing. I can go to a workman in the city and sit down and show him that it is a good thing for his boy. In a word, I believe that when the American people know this proposition it will receive general sanction.

Senator FLETCHER. As I understand it, it would be very much more advantageous to have a greater period of training, but I had in mind the expense, and that is why it is important for us, if we can, to fix a period. Do you think a six months' period would interrupt industries to amount to anything?

Dr. JAMES. I was just thinking that the six months' period is economic, surely, because you can equip a camp and you can use it for two groups in the course of the year.

The CHAIRMAN. Not in all climates, Doctor.

Dr. JAMES. I am not so sure, Mr. Chairman, that we could not. We could have a camp in Minnesota, and the climate in Minnesota is about as rigorous a climate as we have.

The CHAIRMAN. In winter?

Dr. JAMES. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Your outdoor work would be pretty badly handicapped. They found that out at Camp Devens. When the snow was 18 inches to 2 feet deep it was pretty hard to get the best results from the number of hours devoted to it.

Dr. JAMES. The larger number, of course, would prefer, anyway, to take the summer six months rather than the winter six months. The southern camps might be large enough for the smaller number, which would choose the winter period.

Senator FLETCHER. This has been a very interesting hearing. Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes. It is very instructive. Thank you, Doctor. (Whereupon, at 5 o'clock p. m., the committee adjourned until Monday, October 27, 1919, at 2.15 o'clock p. m.)

REORGANIZATION OF THE ARMY.

MONDAY, OCTOBER 27, 1919.

UNITED STATES SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON MILITARY AFFAIRS,
Washington, D. C.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to the call of the chairman, at 2.15 p. m., in the committee room, Capitol, Senator James W. Wadsworth, jr., presiding.

Present: Senators Wadsworth (chairman), Sutherland, Chamberlain, Fletcher.

The CHAIRMAN. Give your name and present assignment to the reporter, please.

STATEMENT OF COL. E. L. MUNSON, WAR PLANS DIVISION, GENERAL STAFF.

Col. MUNSON. E. L. Munson, colonel, War Plans Division, General Staff.

Mr. Chairman and gentlemen, in presenting this bill (H. R. 9204), on behalf of the War Department, it is not a matter of increase in pay, but merely a readjustment of the dollar. It is to meet the increased cost of living in part only. The situation as it exists in the War Department at this time is shown by this chart. There were up to Saturday night last 1,951 resignations of Regular Army officers. Of this number 356 were men of permanent commissioned service and 1,595 were provisional officers, who, however, had a permanent status in the Army had they chosen to remain after they had served the probationary period of two years.

Senator SUTHERLAND. And had taken examinations?

Col. MUNSON. Yes, sir; they had taken examinations and been approved.

Senator SUTHERLAND. And commissioned?

Col. MUNSON. Yes, sir. The resignations included all ranks below that of a colonel, and naturally the type of man who was resigning was a man who had believed in himself, his ability to make good in civil life. They were men of force, initiative, energy, self-reliance, and possessed of the military qualities that are so desirable in officers.

The effect of these resignations is not only upon the present but upon the future. At the present time there have been accepted resignations of more than one officer in every six in the Army, and they are continuing in increments, which vary very little from what they were several weeks ago.

There is also great difficulty in filling up certain places, and I would like to call your attention to the Medical Department at the

present time. There are 1,800 officers who have been willing to remain in the service until June 30 of next year, provisional or temporary officers. Of all those men, 453 have decided that they would be willing to remain in the service permanently if they could. Of those only 53, or less than 3 per cent, are within the legal requirements under the law. There are 725 vacancies in the permanent regular Medical Corps, and inviting these 53 men and with the men that the Medical Department could get in touch with in private life, a total number of 120 applicants stated that they would go into the regular Medical Corps, these 120 were invited and 67 showed up. The 67 were examined and 28 of them passed. The 28 were ordered to the Army Medical School in this city on October 1, together with other officers of longer service, but who had not had the Army Medical School training. Within the first 15 days of this month 26, or 36 per cent, of those 72 officers either refused to accept commissions, after they had won them, or resigned the commissions that they had.

The CHAIRMAN. What did you say, Colonel, as to the authorized strength of the Medical Corps?

Col. MUNSON. It is 1,500, plus a small number, a fractional number. They are a little more than half full at the present time.

The CHAIRMAN. What is that on the basis of, the national defense act, with all of its increments?

Col. MUNSON. It is on the basis of the present allowance, whatever that is. It is 1,541, I think.

The CHAIRMAN. You are speaking of the Regulars alone?

Col. MUNSON. The Regulars alone.

Now, when these officers resigned, the resignations in many instances give reasons; many do not, but simply request that they be accepted. Out of 124 medical officers who resigned—and, by the way, many medical officers would resign if they thought their resignations would be accepted, because in many instances they have not been accepted due to the fact that the hospitals could not be left with sick lying in the beds and no medical officers to look after them—out of 124 consecutive resignations, 91 distinctly stated that they could not live in the service, they could not live on their pay.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. Of what rank?

Col. MUNSON. All ranks up to and including the grade of major: first lieutenants, captains, and majors. There have been 10 accepted resignations of majors in the Medical Corps, 16 of captains and 82 of permanent first lieutenants.

Senator FLETCHER. What is the pay of a major?

Col. MUNSON. The base pay is \$3,000; of a captain it is \$2,400; and of a lieutenant it is \$2,000.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. That is the base pay?

Col. MUNSON. That is the base pay.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. Are you going to furnish us details to show what is added to the base pay in the way of commutation, quarters, rations, etc.?

Col. MUNSON. Yes, sir; we can give you those details, and will ask permission to put them in the proceedings.

The CHAIRMAN. Longevity?

Col. MUNSON. And longevity; yes.

(The matter referred to is as follows:)

Base pay and longevity—Rates of pay allowed by law to officers of the Army, annexed to the Army Register conformably to the resolution of the House of Representatives of Aug. 30, 1842.

Grade.	Pay of officers in active service.					
	Pay of grade.		Monthly pay. ¹			
	Yearly.	Monthly.	After 5 years' service.	After 10 years' service.	After 15 years' service.	After 20 years' service.
General.....	\$10,000.00	\$833.33	10 per cent.	20 per cent.	30 per cent.	40 per cent.
Lieutenant general.....	9,000.00	750.00				
Major general.....	8,000.00	666.67				
Brigadier general.....	6,000.00	500.00				
Colonel.....	4,000.00	333.33	\$366.67	\$400.00	\$416.67	\$416.67
Lieutenant colonel.....	3,500.00	291.67	320.83	350.00	375.00	375.00
Major.....	3,000.00	250.00	275.00	300.00	325.00	333.33
Captain.....	2,400.00	200.00	220.00	240.00	260.00	280.00
First lieutenant.....	2,000.00	166.67	183.33	200.00	216.67	233.33
Second lieutenant.....	1,700.00	141.67	155.83	170.00	184.17	198.33

Grade.	Pay of retired officers. ²					
	Pay of grade.		Monthly pay.			
	Yearly.	Monthly.	After 5 years' service.	After 10 years' service.	After 15 years' service.	After 20 years' service.
General.....	\$7,500.00	\$625.00				
Lieutenant general.....	6,750.00	562.50				
Major general.....	6,000.00	500.00				
Brigadier general.....	4,500.00	375.00				
Colonel.....	3,000.00	250.00	\$275.00	\$300.00	\$312.50	\$312.50
Lieutenant colonel.....	2,625.00	218.75	240.62	262.50	281.25	281.25
Major.....	2,250.00	187.50	206.25	225.00	243.75	250.00
Captain.....	1,800.00	150.00	165.00	180.00	195.00	210.00
First lieutenant.....	1,500.00	125.00	137.50	150.00	162.50	175.00
Second lieutenant.....	1,275.00	106.25	116.87	127.50	138.12	148.75

¹ Officers below the rank of brigadier general receive 10 per cent on the yearly pay of the grade for each term of 5 years' service, not to exceed 40 per cent in all (R. S., 1242, 1243), except colonel, lieutenant colonel, and major.

² The maximum pay of a colonel is \$5,000, that of a lieutenant colonel \$4,500, and that of a major \$4,000 (Act May 11, 1908.)

³ Retired officers receive 75 per cent of the pay of their grade, salary and increase. (R. S., 1274.) No increase of longevity after retirement unless retired for wounds received in battle. (Act. Mar. 2, 1903.)

NOTES.

1. An aid to a major general is allowed \$200 and an aid to a brigadier general \$150 per year in addition to the pay of his rank. (R. S., 1241.)

2. Any officer below the grade of major, required to be mounted, shall receive \$150 per annum additional if he provides one suitable mount at his own expense, and \$200 if he provides two mounts. (Act May 11, 1908.)

3. Lieutenants of the Medical Corps are entitled to pay of captain after three years' service (act Apr. 22, 1908). After 5 years' service for those commissioned after June 2, 1910 (act June 3, 1910).

4. An acting judge advocate detailed by the Secretary of War is entitled to the pay of captain. (Acts July 5, 1884; Feb. 2, 1901.)

5. Ten per cent increase on pay of all officers serving outside the United States, except Canal Zone, Panama, Porto Rico, or Hawaii. (Act Aug. 24, 1912.)

6. Chaplains appointed prior to Apr. 21, 1904, are entitled to pay of captains; appointed subsequent to Apr. 21, 1904, entitled to pay of first lieutenant for first seven years of service, thereafter to pay of captain; retired from active service prior to Apr. 21, 1904, entitled to the retired pay of captain; appointed prior to Apr. 21, 1904, and retired from active service subsequent to that date, but prior to completion of 7 years' service, entitled to the retired pay of captain. (Acts Feb. 2, 1901; Apr. 21, 1904; 10 Comp., 75, May 7, 1914.)

7. When assigned to active duty, retired officers below the grade of lieutenant colonel receive the full pay and allowances of their grades, and a colonel or lieutenant colonel receive the same pay and allowances as a retired major would receive under a like assignment. (Acts Apr. 23, 1904; Mar. 2, 1905; and June 12, 1906.)

8. When assigned to duty at educational institutions under the provisions of the act of Nov. 3, 1883, retired officers below the grade of lieutenant colonel receive the full pay and allowances of their grades, and a

colonel or lieutenant colonel receive the full pay of a major with the allowances of their respective grades. (Act Mar. 3, 1909.)

Retired officers above the grade of colonel receive only their full retired pay when assigned to active duty or detailed to duty with an educational institution. (Acts Mar. 2, 1905, and Mar. 3, 1909.)

The President is hereby authorized to detail such numbers of officers of the Army, either active or retired, not above the grade of colonel, as may be necessary, for duty as professors and assistant professors of military science and tactics at institutions where one or more units of the Reserve Officers' Training Corps are maintained * * *. Retired officers below the grade of lieutenant colonel so detailed shall receive the full pay and allowances of their grade, and retired officers above the grade of major so detailed shall receive the same pay and allowances as a retired major would receive under a five detail. (Act of June 3, 1916.)

8. Aviation officers of the Signal Corps while on duty that requires them to participate regularly and frequently in aerial flights are entitled to an increase in the pay of their grade and length of service under their commissions as follows: Aviation officers, 25 per cent; junior military aviators, 50 per cent; and military aviators, 75 per cent. Each junior military aviator and each military aviator duly qualified and while so serving shall have the rank, pay, and allowances of one grade higher than that held by him under his commission, provided that his rank under said commission be not higher than that of captain. (Act June 3, 1916.)

Commutation of quarters.

Allowance, \$12 per room.	Rooms.
Enlisted men.....	1
Second lieutenant.....	2
First lieutenant.....	3
Captain.....	4
Major.....	5
Lieutenant colonel.....	6
Colonel.....	7
Brigadier general.....	8
Major general.....	9
Lieutenant general.....	10
General.....	11

Now, of 151 consecutive resignations that came in from all branches of the Army 115 of them distinctly testified that the reason they resigned was because they could not live on their pay, because they could do much better in civil life, and the reason why they are resigning is shown by this chart. The black line there is the cost of living and the other colored lines show the components which make up this resultant. You will notice the steady rise, the very rapid rise, since 1914.

Senator FLETCHER. You had better describe that, because we can not put that into the record. You had better describe that anyway so that he will understand it.

Col. MUNSON. There has been a very rapid rise in the cost of living, beginning in 1915, when it rose from 100 per cent to an average of 173 per cent up to the last month. This has risen again 2 per cent since this chart was drawn.

The cost of living is further shown by this other chart. Here we have taken an income of \$2,400 in 1914, and its factors of outgo grouped about in this day [indicating], leaving a possible balance for emergencies of \$400; that is to say, if an officer had his travel expenses or sickness, or something special, or he wanted to take leave, there was a possible margin of safety. At the present time the bare necessities of life have wiped out this margin of safety and have gone up in cost to \$3,478 instead of \$2,000.

The CHAIRMAN. Instead of \$2,400?

Col. MUNSON. Four hundred was the margin of safety. It is \$2,000.

The CHAIRMAN. Excuse me; you are right.

Col. MUNSON. The Army man has endeavored to meet this situation by curtailing his outgo of these necessities, but there are certain things you can not curtail on; a man must eat so much, and while he can reduce to a certain extent the more expensive articles of

food, that he has done. In his sundries he can cut out entertaining, and that he has done. There are no social amenities in the Army at the present time. It can not exist. The Army has ceased to be what we want to make it—a people's Army—because the Army man can not afford to come in contact with civilians and accept hospitality which he himself knows is a charity. Unless he can return it, he won't accept it, and the tendency is the undesirable thing of having the Army withdraw by itself.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. Did you take this into consideration, Colonel, in times like these, where there is great demand not only for common labor but for experienced men in every walk of life, is it not a fact that a good many of these resignations are put in by whom who have better facilities than those afforded them, because of changed conditions?

Col. MUNSON. Some do; but most of them would have stayed in for love of the service if they had not been forced out by this economic pressure. Senator Chamberlain, the Army, like some other groups, is between the millstones, and the pressure forces them out. They can not stay unless they run behind or unless they have money of their own or are willing to incur obligations in the hope of some day paying them up.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. My experience on this committee for about 12 years is that there come times when officers resign because they think they can better their condition temporarily in civil life.

Col. MUNSON. That is true.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. But when those conditions change for the worse, they try to go back into the Army.

Col. MUNSON. That may be; but we will have no difficulty in showing you that the cheapest kind of labor in civil life is better paid than many grades of officers, and I would like in this connection to give you as an example, and have you put on record the fact that, at the house where I live, within 10 days the lady who owns the house put in 12 tons of coal. The charge was 75 cents a ton to move it from the sidewalk to the cellar. The colored coal heaver started in his work at 8.30, as I left the house. He asked and received at 3 o'clock \$9. He was asked if he would chop some wood, and he said no, that he had more coal to put in around the block. We know that that man made \$9, which is considerably more than a lieutenant gets with all his allowances, and he did it in six hours.

Senator FLETCHER. I think you had better, for the record, show what this diagram which has just been referred to indicates, as follows: The average family budget in 1914 was divided into food \$862, rent \$354, clothing \$264, fuel and lights, \$112, sundries \$408, leaving a surplus of \$400.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. That was in 1914.

Senator FLETCHER. Yes; in 1914. In 1919 the budget was as follows: Food \$1,655, rent \$452, clothing \$528, fuel and lights \$178, sundries \$665, and no surplus.

Col. MUNSON. I would like to call attention to the fact that the figures that are used here are Government figures; as far as possible they are War Department figures, and in many instances we have used the Bureau of Labor Statistics. For example, this other chart illustrates an increase of 73 per cent, which, by the way, is now 75 per cent, in the cost of living, and throughout the country it indi-

cates how this increase is distributed. Food is 38.8 per cent of this 73 per cent, which is more than half the increase of the budget, and if the 30 per cent is given the officers, which is asked, it won't carry the additional cost of this food alone. It won't carry that single item if the Army continues to carry the other additional items itself.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. I think you had better read those figures into the record.

Col. MUNSON. The increase in the cost of living, amounting to 73 per cent, is as follows: Sundries, 12.8 per cent; fuel, heat, and light, 3.2 per cent; clothing, 13.2 per cent; shelter, 5 per cent, and food, 38.8 per cent.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. That is in the increase within what length of time?

Col. MUNSON. Since 1914. These figures are for the United States as a whole, and in one way they are misleading, in so far as they are of Army application, because they take in little hamlets where some of the people have gone to town and to more congested centers, and the small-town rents are much lower. The Army is located largely near the centers of population, and if they are in camps, where the surrounding communities are not large, they produce an artificial congestion through the families of officers and men coming to be near their relatives, so that utilities and food promptly start to go up.

The CHAIRMAN. In the shelter item, it is to be remembered that at an army post an officer gets his quarters.

Col. MUNSON. Yes, and he gets an allowance when he is not in post, but that allowance does not begin to pay the cost of his accommodations.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, I understand that is so when he is away from the post. How about the fuel, heat, and light in post?

Col. MUNSON. They get those in the post, but very few of the officers are now in post.

The CHAIRMAN. Then this table is applicable to officers who are not in post?

Col. MUNSON. Yes, sir. The family budget is also shown in this way [chart]. This shows the increases by items, showing where the increases have gone up, and the Bureau of Labor Statistics tell me that this item of clothing, which just doubled during the war, will be increased a great deal more, but that is the way it is at present.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. Explain that chart.

Col. MUNSON. Of the increases since 1914, clothing has gone from 100 per cent to 200 per cent.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. It has doubled?

Col. MUNSON. For a family.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. That is for clothing throughout the United States?

Col. MUNSON. That is for clothing throughout the United States. The chart also covers food, rent, fuel, and light and sundries. That also is for a family.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. That would not be for the Army entirely?

Col. MUNSON. No, sir; the family figures are those of a civil proposition, but I would like to state here, that in the zone quartermaster's supply depot down here on the corner, during the months

of June, July, and August, officers' uniforms, cotton gabardine, and light and heavy wool went up 30 per cent. Thirty per cent in 90 days. I would also like to state that the Army rations went up 30 per cent in 90 days—June, July, and August.

The CHAIRMAN. What is the ration now?

Col MUNSON. Fifty-three cents for the year up to July.

Senator FLETCHER. You have only got clothing. What is the next item?

Col MUNSON. Food, 192 per cent; sundries, 163 per cent; fuel and light, 157 per cent; shelter, 128 per cent.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. That is fuel and light, 157 per cent, is it not?

Col. MUNSON. One hundred and fifty-seven per cent. This is the hundred line here. The total is 157 per cent, and of all items, 173 per cent.

Senator FLETCHER. You mean there is 73 per cent increase?

Col. MUNSON. On all the cost of living.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. One hundred and seventy-three?

The CHAIRMAN. No. Seventy-three.

Col. MUNSON. Seventy-three over a hundred.

Senator FLETCHER. Taking the hundred as the standard in 1914, there is 73 per cent increase?

Col. MUNSON. Yes, but there had also been a rise before 1914, since the pay bill had gone through in 1908. Now, we tried to get a budget for the city of Washington. We could not, but we got the nearest city to us, which is Baltimore, as shown in this chart, and we were able to find that in 1914, where the Army officers stationed in Baltimore paid \$100, the Army officers now stationed in Baltimore pay \$183.99. In other words, his dollar is only worth a little over half a dollar when he goes to buy food and other things that go to make up the household budget.

Senator SUTHERLAND. Would the increase here be greater or less than that?

Col. MUNSON. I think it would be more in Washington, because you have a greater congestion.

The CHAIRMAN. Higher rents?

Col. MUNSON. Higher rents. Our experience has been, from the officers who have given their experience—and there are very many—that they are not getting, or not quite getting, as much as they received for half the money in 1908. Their money now has only a 50 per cent purchasing power. An officer of the grade of major, with a nominal pay of \$4,000, will only have \$2,000 actual purchasing capacity when he converts that into shoes and bread and clothes and rent and all of those things. In other words, the average Army officer, after 20 years now finds himself demoted to where he was when he started—demoted financially.

And that brings up another point, gentlemen, that this burden has fallen on all grades. The younger man does not have as much money, but, on the other hand, he does not have as many expenses as the average man who is older. When the average man gets older he accumulates a family, first the wife and then the children, and as the children grow up they become heavier obligations, so that the senior officer, the older officer, has expenses not for himself but for his

family. He himself does not eat any more, but he has more people to feed.

In the same way I would like to call your attention to the fact that the officer, even in his present difficulties, is further faced with a depreciation of his future protection. Many of us have got life insurance. We paid one-hundred-cent dollars into that life insurance. We did not consider the number of dollars that we were going to get out of it. We had a vague idea of how much shelter and how much food would be provided for the people we are trying to protect. We have still got the sack over in the corner labeled, we will say, \$1,000, but that sack is only half full now, because that \$1,000 will only pay half the liabilities that it would before. An Army officer before, if he had \$10,000 worth of protection in February, 1908, has only \$5,000 worth of protection now. These older officers are too old to get new insurance. The rates are too high, so that they are unable to buy this additional insurance. Therefore they find their future provisions, or rather the future protection of their loved ones, halved.

I would like to mention here the fact, too, that there seems to be an idea that the increase of rank which the Army has enjoyed during the war has borne all of this increased expense. That has not been the case. There were, to be exact, 71.8 per cent of officers who received promotion at all. Nearly 3 out of every 10 (28.2 per cent) got no promotion whatsoever. The average increase in grade for the Army as a whole up to the time of the armistice was 1.01 grades. A grade is worth from five to six hundred dollars.

The CHAIRMAN. You are speaking now of the regular grades?

Col. MUNSON. I am talking about the regulars; yes, sir. Even the increased rank did not carry these—

Senator SUTHERLAND (interposing). Is that temporary or permanent?

Col. MUNSON. Temporary.

Senator SUTHERLAND. That is temporary rank?

Col. MUNSON. That is temporary; yes, sir. So that the increase in rank, while it helps, did not begin to carry the load, when we look at the cost of living we have here.

Senator FLETCHER. Have not a good many of these increases now ceased, and they go back to the lower grade?

Col. MUNSON. About one-half of them have been reduced, and most of them will go back before the end of the present month. So that, in many instances, this increased rank was only carried a few months. It was not for the period of the war at all. They did not promote very much until the war was six or eight months old.

This chart shows 22 articles of food, and the average price sold by over 2,000 dealers. These 22 articles of food include four cuts of beef, ham, tea, sugar, coffee, flour, potatoes, and staples of that sort, and this shows that since 1913 they all have gone up 92 per cent.

Since we have been making this investigation—we have been carrying this on for some months—we have drawn this other chart over three times, to keep pace with the cost of living.

You will notice from this that the purchasing power of the officer's dollar and your dollar is halved.

The CHAIRMAN. Half of what it was before?

Col. MUNSON. Yes, sir. This chart shows the cost of farm products and food as a whole since 1908. You will notice down here

[pointing] in 1908, when the pay bill went through, that there was a rise before the war began. We will come to that again in a minute.

On this side of the line are the increases by months during the present year up to July 1, showing that there is no tendency for foods and farm products to fall. Of course, the great increase began in the second year of the war.

Senator FLETCHER. What is the red line?

Col. MUNSON. The red line is food and the other is farm products as a whole.

Senator SUTHERLAND. Is that based on retail prices, Colonel?

Col. MUNSON. Those are the current market prices from the Bureau of Labor Statistics. They work out in two ways. They state the wholesale prices and they also state the retail prices, but I can not tell you from this chart—

Col. RICHARDSON (interposing). That is wholesale.

Col. MUNSON. This is wholesale; yes.

Senator SUTHERLAND. There has been quite a reduction in the price of hogs and some other farm products, but it may not have been carried to the consumer.

Col. MUNSON. Not yet. There is no immediate reflection of any reduction, apparently.

Senator FLETCHER. The chart indicates that the price of food has moved right along parallel to the price of farm products.

Col. MUNSON. Yes. Now, this next chart represents the cost of foods at Washington Barracks commissary. It represents the year 1908 and the year 1919. It is from June, 1908, to October 15, this month, 1919, from which you see that the officer's dollar will now buy 20 cents' worth of corn meal, for example. These are staple articles. They are picked not because they are extreme at all, but because they represent the best examples of subsistence practicable.

The CHAIRMAN. You might read some of those into the record.

Col. MUNSON. From June, 1908, to October 15, 1919, corn meal increased 500 per cent; flour, 446 per cent; bacon, 427 per cent; steaks, round, 400 per cent; rolled oats, 350 per cent; steaks, choice, 328 per cent; potatoes, 326 per cent; ham, 310 per cent; bread, 289 per cent; eggs, 285 per cent; rib roasts, 256 per cent; beans, navy, 250 per cent; milk, evaporated, in tins, 234 per cent; sugar, 218 per cent; butter, 216 per cent; corn flakes, 200 per cent.

This next chart is perhaps as illustrative a chart as we have. It shows the cost of the ration. The ration is a plain diet. It contains the staples of food that everybody eats. The purchases are made by the Government in large quantities, and the question of middle men is largely eliminated. This chart does not show the full condition at the present time, because the ration cost at the present time is up in here [indicating] at 55.6 cents, but up to the last month the average for the year was 53 cents for a ration which in 1908 cost 19.7 cents.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. What is the established ration now?

Col. MUNSON. How much it costs now?

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. No; what is the base ration that is fixed by statute?

Col. MUNSON. I will ask the sergeant to call that off.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. What is the amount allowed for a ration now?

Sergt. WILLIAM T. YOUART. A ration is computed in different weights. Each and every article is given a different weight. For instance, meat 20 ounces a day, and flour the same thing. A ration is made up of different weights.

Col. MUNSON. Sergt. Youart is a quartermaster sergeant,

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. That is correct, but what is the commutation of a ration now?

Sergt. YOUART. Fifty-five cents.

Col. MUNSON. Fifty-five and six-tenths cents.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. That is allowed in lieu of a ration where commutation is made?

Col. MUNSON. There is a very interesting feature in this chart, gentlemen, from the fact that in 1908 the Army pay had to be increased simply because there had been a rise in the cost of living. Now, you will notice up to 1914 there was an increase of about 20 per cent since 1908, or about 3 per cent per annum, and similar conditions had obtained before 1908. The statistical people working on this matter of foods at the present time tell me that we have got to estimate that that is one of the continuing factors in the cost of living. In other words, that every seven years we are going to have about a 20 per cent increase in cost of living, or a 20 per cent depreciation of the dollar, whichever you choose to consider it, and that this curve is going to continue, in their opinion, for a very considerable period of time, and would have continued in that way irrespective of war—would have gone on if the war had not happened.

The CHAIRMAN. Do they contend that the prices from now on, from the present level, will continue to rise at the rate of 3 per cent a year?

Col. MUNSON. Unless you can find some way to stabilize the dollar.

The CHAIRMAN. That is contrary to history—that prices will continue to rise after the abnormal prices of the war.

Col. MUNSON. They say that production will not keep pace with the rapidity with which metals will be mined—gold and silver—and that there will be a disparity between the two. They will not keep pace, and you have got an era apparently of lower production and of lower value of money.

Senator SUTHERLAND. There should be, however, a reduction in the course of time.

The CHAIRMAN. I was thinking of these things following the Civil War, in 1865, and even then prices had reached a terrific level, even in some articles higher than to-day, but there came a tremendous reduction, which incidentally burnt a good many fingers.

Col. MUNSON. If you can develop machines to take the place of human labor, you can of course bring the cost of production down.

This next chart is merely illustrative of the market and food situation in Washington to-day. It shows what happened four and one-half years ago, when the war began, and what is on now. We have had this chart redrawn, because there is a constant shrinkage. The last chart we drew, a month ago, showed five eggs, and we had to cut that down to four. This chart was drawn three weeks ago, and since that time milk has gone up, so that the milk bottle is not full.

It is merely a graphic way of showing the difficulties that the Army's menage, like all other households, are laboring under.

The question of clothing is illustrated in this next chart. An outfit that a man could buy, in 1914, for \$58.70, now costs \$118, and the quality tends to be poorer. Woolens, for example, are not as good as they were then. You can not buy certain woollen cloth in the market. That same thing has applied to Army uniforms, and, as I said, we have seen an appreciation in their price of 30 per cent in 90 days.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. There seems to be an apparent drop there, in March, 1919, to \$106.15, as against \$117 for November, 1918. How do you account for that?

Col. MUNSON. Well, I would hesitate to account for it. My own personal opinion is that there was a higher demand in November, when the people were getting ready for a cold winter, and that there was a greater demand for the clothing, and, consequently, prices went up.

Senator FLETCHER. In other words, starting in July, 1914, that \$58.70 went until in July, 1919, it was \$118 for the same goods?

Col. MUNSON. Yes, the same outfit. This illustrates prices that the Government sells the clothing of the enlisted man for [indicating another chart]. This is what is charged against them, and you can see the increase there, of these articles, right straight through. We have endeavored, there, to include the extreme, the very highest and very lowest articles, and it, of course, bears a very close relation to the sales costs in civil life.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. I do not suppose you have to do with this. Colonel, but many of these staple articles had been accumulated in large quantities during the war, in Europe. Now, we are disposing of innumerable staple articles at a very great loss. Why were not those held and distributed through the Army?

Col. MUNSON. I am not sure that they are things that the Army man would want, or the enlisted man would want.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. They are blankets and coats. I think they are being sold.

Col. MUNSON. I think they are being sold at Army prices, are they not?

Col. RICHARDSON. Yes, sir.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. Are they being sold to civilians at the prices that you have in here?

Col. MUNSON. Yes, sir.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. I hope so.

Col. MUNSON. And, I think, more than that, there is a slight excess charge, here in Washington, of 10 per cent to cover the cost of handling.

This next chart shows the question of fuel. Most of the Army is not in posts where fuel is given in kind. The money allowance will not buy the same amount of fuel outside, for, instead of buying from the Government at wholesale rates, you have to buy from local agents and pay all kinds of additional prices.

Senator FLETCHER. You had better state what that is.

Col. MUNSON. From 1913 to 1919 there has been an average increase in the cost of coal, of 53 per cent.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. It will be worse than that after this strike?

Col. MUNSON. Yes, sir.

Senator SUTHERLAND. The cost of coal has gone up, relatively, less than a great many other items.

Col. MUNSON. Less than a great many. It is less than a good many items.

Senator SUTHERLAND. It is less than clothing.

Col. MUNSON. While the Army pay has stood as a flat proposition for officers, and while there has been no large increase for the non-commissioned officers above the grade of corporal, this next chart shows what has happened in the Government with respect to wages in civilian trades. These figures are given us by the construction division of the Quartermaster General's Office, and they show how these employees of the War Department have had their pay go up to meet the needs of the situation that has developed, the financial situation. These charts do not apply particularly to Washington or to Boston or to Chicago, because all over the country the construction division of the War Department pays union pay, but this is the average for the United States, north, south, east, and west. In Washington, for example, the rates are very much higher than the averages as shown here.

Senator FLETCHER. I am afraid that chart will not go in our hearings, will it, Mr. Chairman?

The CHAIRMAN. I think all of these charts can be put in. [Appendix I.]

Senator FLETCHER. It would be very difficult to get the colors in there.

The CHAIRMAN. The colors can not go in.

Senator FLETCHER. My idea was for you to state for the record what these charts indicate, because I think you ought to put down here, in a general way, what each chart shows.

Senator SUTHERLAND. We may want to refer to those figures later.

Col. MUNSON. Bricklayers have gone up from 61 cents an hour to \$1 an hour. The general increase is 63 per cent. Carpenters have increased 100 per cent. Painters have increased 80.3 per cent. Plumbers and steam fitters have increased 74 per cent. Electricians have increased 102 per cent. Laborers have increased 65.4 per cent. Plasterers have increased 43.8 per cent. Sheet-metal workers have increased 90.1 per cent—that is, since 1907.

There has thus been a steady increase, and it very closely relates to the increasing cost of rations, it so happens.

I would like to call attention at this particular time and insert as part of the record, what conditions are in civil life as evidenced in two advertisements:

Laborers wanted, 50 cents per hour.

This is from the Washington Times of Sunday, October 26.

Another one:

Permanent employment under good working conditions. Wages for motor-men and conductors for the Washington Railway & Electric Co., electrical department, beginning at 46 cents an hour and up to 51 cents an hour.

It so happens that on the same day in the Washington Star occurs this advertisement, under the heading of "Wanted situations, female."

Army officer's daughter desires position; social secretary; willing to read aloud; do shopping.

I think you can see there where the pressure is falling.

Now, while this flat rate has been maintained in the Army the increase shown on these next two charts has occurred in various trades in civil life. These do not go back to 1908. If they did they would show a much greater increase, but beginning with this dotted line, which is for 1916, you can see the proportion of increase there. From 1915 the increase in employees' wages making boots and shoes has gone from—

Senator SUTHERLAND (interposing). That is the average wages?

Col. MUNSON. Yes; the increase in wages has gone up to 280 per cent in boots and shoes. Silk has gone to 165 per cent.

The CHAIRMAN. These are the operatives in those industries?

Col. MUNSON. These are the operatives in those industries.

The CHAIRMAN. The wages of the operatives?

Col. MUNSON. The wages. The woolen manufacture has gone to 166 per cent. The automobile industry has gone to 147 per cent. Hosiery and underwear have gone to 174 per cent; cigar manufactures have gone to 208 per cent; men's clothing has gone to 187 per cent.

Iron and steel—which is of particular interest right now, in view of the fact that you have a strike on—has had an increase to 210 per cent from 1915 to the present time.

Car building and repairing to 147 per cent; cotton manufacture to 203 per cent; cotton finishing to 176 per cent; leather manufacture to 189 per cent; paper manufacture to 179 per cent. I use these industries because they are representative of the basic industries of the country.

This next chart is particularly illustrative of the present situation in steel, where the men are striking for more money. You will note that, in spite of the increase in the cost of living, and in spite of the increase in expenditures, the wages of steel workers have not only met that right along but have exceeded it. So there is very obviously no great economic difficulty that exists among the steel workers.

In the Army the officer's condition or opportunity financially may be shown very well by this next chart. This chart happens to be a curve plotted from the reports of the class secretary of 1901 of Princeton College, as compared with the class of 1901 graduated from West Point.

Although the Princeton men began much lower in salary, at the end of four years they were equal with the West Point men. They were beyond it when the panic began in 1907. In 1908 the Army pay was raised, and that gave the latter curve a further rise, but in 10 years the Princeton man had got where the Army man got by 1916. These university men were on their way to rapid prosperity, to a high degree of earning capacity, as shown by the trend of the curve.

The CHAIRMAN. You mean the Princeton men?

Col. MUNSON. I mean the Princeton men. The Army group was pretty nearly but not quite to its zenith. We could not carry that curve completely through, because we had no further figures from the Princeton men to compare with the West Pointers.

The CHAIRMAN. Officers pay income taxes, too, do they not?

Col. MUNSON. Yes, sir. That will be shown right here. This chart shows the taxes paid for 1916 by officers of the Army; and among its curves, as well as those for other walks of life, it includes officers who have means of their own and whose wives have means of their own, on which they made returns. You will notice, for example, that 10 per cent of Army and Navy men combined, had an income that aggregated \$7,000. That is, their families paid on that \$7,000. Their wives may have had some money, or they may have been left something, or maybe they dealt in the stock market. Nobody but a few generals gets as much as \$7,000, including all allowances. About 10 per cent of manufacturers had an income of over \$50,000.

With regard to the disposition of funds proposed, that would go to the enlisted men in this proportion and to the officers in this proportion [indicating another chart].

The CHAIRMAN. You have not stated yet, Col. Munson, what the proposed increase is. You had better state it right now, so it will fit the description.

Col. MUNSON. I would like to insert as part of the proceedings here the letter of the Secretary of War approving the Stiness bill, H. R. 9204, which gives those figures. It amounts to approximately \$61,000,000. Now, I would like to call attention to the fact that a dollar nowadays is a relative thing; that this sum of \$61,000,000 is not as formidable as \$61,000,000 would have been a few years ago. It does not represent any more of the taxpayer's product or time than half that amount of money would have meant eight years ago. Do you care to have this read?

The CHAIRMAN. Just as you say, Colonel. I just wanted you to state to the committee in conjunction with this chart what the proposed increases were.

Col. MUNSON. Suppose I read this? It will take not over 5 minutes.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well.

Col. MUNSON (reading):

WAR DEPARTMENT,
Washington, September 20, 1919.

TO THE CHAIRMAN COMMITTEE ON MILITARY AFFAIRS,
House of Representatives.

SIR: Receipt of H. R. 9204, a bill to increase the pay of the commissioned and enlisted personnel of the Army, Navy, Marine Corps, Coast Guard, and Public Health Service, relative to which you request report and statement of cost, is acknowledged.

In reply thereto I beg to inform you that I am in full accord with the provisions of the bill. Officers of the Army received an increase in pay in 1908. Since that date the cost of living, rent, and uniforms has increased as much as 100 per cent, and in some cases even more. In many instances officers of the Army are not able to provide for themselves and their families with the pay now received.

The increase proposed for officers, while not proportionate to the increased living expenses of officers, will nevertheless go a long way toward affording some relief from the present situation.

While it is believed that the cost of living will be decreased soon, it can not be expected to go below the prewar—i. e., 1914 cost. This bill does not provide an increase corresponding to the present cost of living, but one that, it is believed, will correspond to the increase in cost of living from 1908 to 1914.

Following is a statement showing increased annual cost of so much of the House bill 9204 as pertains to the Army:

The maximum authorized strength of the Regular Army in time of peace under the national defense act, exclusive of Philippine Scouts, is approximately 236,291 enlisted men and 11,755 officers, the average per capita cost being \$407.44 and \$2,280.50, respectively, per annum. The enlisted men of the Philippine Scouts are not considered in this statement, the proposed increase not being applicable to them, as their pay is fixed by the Secretary of War under section 36 of the act of February 2, 1901. The foreign service increase is computed on the total pay of enlisted men, viz, \$30 per month for a private in his first enlistment. The pay of enlisted men on the retired list is computed at the prewar rates, and is exclusive of the increases authorized by the act of May 18, 1917.

Pay of 11,785 officers:

At proposed rates of pay-----	\$39,868,114	
At present rates of pay-----	30,308,980	
Difference-----		\$9,559,134

Foreign service increase of pay of 600 officers:

At proposed rates of pay-----	177,879	
At present rates of pay-----	136,830	
Difference-----		41,049

Pay of 1,156 retired officers:

At proposed rates of pay-----	4,132,700	
At present rates of pay-----	3,179,000	
Difference-----		953,700

Pay of 236,291 enlisted men:

At proposed rates of pay-----	144,411,607	
At present rates of pay-----	96,274,405	
Difference-----		48,137,202

Foreign service increase of 15,000 enlisted men:

At proposed rates of pay-----	1,833,480	
At present rates of pay-----	1,222,320	
Difference-----		611,160

Pay of 4,511 retired enlisted men:

At proposed rates of pay-----	5,131,171	
At present rates of pay-----	3,420,781	
Difference-----		1,710,390

Total-----61,012,635

The effort of the Government to reduce the cost of living generally should be taken into consideration, but the War Department believes that favorable action should be taken on the bill.

Respectfully,

NEWTON D. BAKER,
Secretary of War.

This letter was signed by Gen. March, as Acting Secretary of War, in the absence of Secretary Baker. Secretary Baker has sent another letter to the chairmen of both the Senate and House Military Committees, in which he reaffirmed the contents of this letter and asked for early consideration.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. Are men of the Navy provided for in that bill?

Col. MUNSON. The Navy is provided for in the Stiness bill, and they are holding hearings before the House Naval Committee and have done so for a matter of two or three weeks. They are also holding hearings in the Interstate Commerce Committee of the House in connection with the possible improvement of the situation in the Coast Guard and Public Health Services.

The distribution of pay is shown as follows in this next chart. Very little of it, relatively speaking, goes to the higher officers.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. Had not you better read that into the record?

Col. MUNSON. Yes, sir. The increase in pay for the rank of general of the Army, two, is about \$6,000; the increase in the pay of lieutenant generals of the Army, two, is \$5,400. The increase for major generals is \$43,200.

The CHAIRMAN. Assuming how many?

Col. MUNSON. What is the number?

Col. RICHARDSON. Eighteen under the national defense act.

The CHAIRMAN. A total of 18?

Col. RICHARDSON. A total of 18.

Col. MUNSON. Brigadier generals, \$70,200; colonels, \$775,200; lieutenant colonels, \$723,690; major, \$1,441,440; captains, \$2,601,504; first lieutenants, \$2,713,380; second lieutenants, \$1,179,120—a total of \$9,559,134.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. When you come to look over your testimony, Colonel, would you put in there along with these aggregate increases for the different ranks the number of men it is intended to cover?

Col. MUNSON. Yes, sir.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. For instance, you say the increase for captains would be \$2,601,504, but there is nothing here to indicate how many captains that would be.

Col. MUNSON. Yes, sir; I will put that in.

Thirty per cent increase over present rates of pay and total cost of the commissioned personnel of the Regular Army under the national defense act with the restrictions on the longevity increase to colonels, lieutenant colonels, and majors (act May 11, 1908, 35 Stat., 108), removed.

	Number.	Annual base pay.	Base pay including 30 per cent increase.	Average longevity pay.	Average annual pay.	Total.
General.....	1	\$12,500	\$17,550		\$17,550	\$17,550
General.....	1	10,000	13,000		13,000	13,000
Lieutenant generals.....	2	9,000	11,700		11,700	23,400
Major generals.....	18	8,000	10,400		10,400	187,200
Brigadier generals.....	39	6,000	7,800		7,800	304,200
Colonels.....	340	4,000	5,200	\$2,080	7,280	2,475,200
Lieutenant colonels.....	387	3,590	4,550	1,820	6,370	2,465,190
Majors.....	1,232	3,000	3,900	1,170	5,070	6,246,240
Captains.....	3,011	2,400	3,120	624	3,744	11,273,184
First lieutenants.....	4,412	2,000	2,600	65	2,665	11,757,980
Second lieutenants.....	2,312	1,700	2,210		2,210	5,109,520
Total.....	11,755					39,872,664

It is estimated that second lieutenants have had less than 5 years of service; 25 per cent of the first lieutenants between 5 and 10 years; captains between 10 and 15 years; majors between 15 and 20 years; and lieutenant colonels and colonels more than 20 years.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. And so with the other officers.

Col. MUNSON. This next chart shows graphically the distribution of this proposed increase among the officers. You will notice that out of nine and one-half million proposed, six and one-half million dollars goes to the company grades; that the amount to the upper grades is relatively insignificant. Less than a third goes to grades above captain. It cuts no great figure at all in the total.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. What about the enlisted men?

Col. MUNSON. The enlisted men we will take up in just a moment. I have a chart, which should be on the way from the War Department now, and which gives the total.

The CHAIRMAN. It is an unusual increase, and the enlisted men are to have an increased total of \$50,458,752, and the officers' increase of \$10,553,883, altogether?

Col. MUNSON. We will have in a moment a chart showing the status of officers with regard to enlisted men.

The situation with regard to many of these worthy enlisted men, the backbone of the Army, is pitiable. They are not able, like an officer, to leave the service by resignation. They have a contract with the Government for a term of years.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. Who are those?

Col. MUNSON. The enlisted men.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. Oh, yes.

Col. MUNSON. And they are held to that contract. Many of them have families. They have been able to maintain an existence during the war through the temporary family allowance which has been granted. This family allowance will terminate the month after peace is declared, so this source of assistance will be withdrawn, although it is much more needed now, as a result of higher prices, than it was when the war began and when the family allowances were granted.

These enlisted men are being held in the service at a time when the same class of men who go out receive double or more than double of what they can get for the corresponding work in the Army. We have prepared here a table and will submit it to the committee—it is on its way—showing exactly the comparison between the emoluments in the Army and the emoluments in civil life for similar classes of work. We have stated there the pay, the \$15 allowed for quarters, the commutation value of rations at present, \$16.11; heat and light, \$8.71; clothing, \$3.68; medical attendance, \$1.08; and these figures were given us by the attending surgeon in Washington, based on the practice here among the officers and men, and gives a total emolument of \$125.58 for the highest paid class of noncommissioned officers of the Army. We compared that with similar occupations in civil life which these men would engage in if they left the Army—the pay—and the table shows the source of information, as to whether it was the Quartermaster General or Chief Signal Officer, or Chief of Engineers, Surgeon General, or whatever office gave us this data. The highest paid grade of the Army, as above, has the base pay of \$181, and includes quartermaster sergeant (senior grade), band leader, master signal electrician (Signal Corps), master electrician (Coast Artillery Corps), master engineer (senior grade), and master hospital sergeant. The total emolument for that rank was \$125.58.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. Including his base pay?

Col. MUNSON. It includes everything. It does not include service pay, if a man has been in for a long time.

These men just mentioned compared with callings in civil life, according to the information furnished to us by their respective chiefs, inspector of subsistence, meat and groceries, band leader, telephone operator, etc., electrical engineer, engineer, pharmacist, manager large drug stores.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. Will you put that into the record?

Col. MUNSON. Yes, sir; we will put that all in the record. I had hoped to have a summary here, and I may ask to put some one else on the stand until my data comes here in that respect.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. You can put them into the record together?

Col. MUNSON. Yes, sir.

EMOLUMENTS OF ENLISTED MEN MUCH LESS THAN IN CORRESPONDING EMPLOYMENTS IN CIVIL LIFE.

The remuneration of enlisted men, by which is meant not only their pay proper but the added value of their allowances for rations, clothing, heat, light, quarters, and medical attendance, aggregates a total which is far less than they could earn in the civil occupations and trades in civil life to which their military duties approximately correspond.

The comparison in this respect is graphically shown in chart W (A), drawn from data secured from the most reliable sources. To simplify the graph, groups are made of the military grades receiving the same Army pay and comparing them with the group pay which the same men would receive in civil pursuits at prevailing wages.

These figures for civilian wages are the minimum. Where union wages are given, they are based on the eight-hour day and without including the increase earned through work overtime or on Sundays or holidays. The wages for common laborers are considerably less than offered in advertisements in the issues of the Washington Star and Times of October 25.

Group 1 includes quartermaster sergeants, senior grade; band leaders; master signal electrician sergeants; master electricians, Coast Artillery Corps; master engineer, senior grade; master hospital sergeant. The remuneration of this group is standardized at \$125.58 per month. It is compared with inspector of subsistence, meat, and groceries; band leader; telephone operator, etc.; electrical engineer; engineer; pharmacist; manager large drug store. The average remuneration of this group is \$250 per month, or 100 per cent more than paid for the similar duties they perform in the Army.

Group 2 includes hospital sergeants; master engineer, junior grade; engineer, Coast Artillery Corps. The remuneration of this group is \$115.58 monthly. It is compared with pharmacist, manager small drug store; draftsman; engineer, steam locomotive. The average remuneration of this group is \$200 monthly, or 73 per cent more than for corresponding duties in the Army.

Group 3 includes regimental sergeant major; regimental supply sergeant; sergeant major, senior grade; quartermaster sergeant, Quartermaster Corps; ordnance sergeant; first sergeant; chauffeur, first class; battalion sergeant major, Engineers; electrician sergeant, first class; sergeant, first class (engineer, Signal Corps, Quartermaster Corps, etc.); assistant engineer, Coast Artillery Corps. The monthly remuneration of the above is standardized at \$95.58. It is compared with office managers; chief clerks; foremen; chauffeurs; assistant chief clerks; telephone trouble man; foreman; stationary gas engineer. The average remuneration of this group in civil life is \$189.09 per month, or 97 per cent more than the Army would pay for corresponding duties.

Group 4 includes battalion sergeant major; squadron sergeant major; sergeant major, junior grade; master gunner, Coast Artillery Corps; sergeant bugler; assistant band leader. The monthly remuneration of the above is \$92.58. It is compared with assistant chief clerks, surveyors, draftsmen, musician, assistant band leader. The remuneration of this group in civil life averages \$166.66, or 80 per cent more than paid for similar duty in the Army.

Group 5 includes sergeant, staff; chauffeur, Signal Corps; stable sergeant, Engineers; supply sergeant, Engineers; mess sergeant, Engineers; color sergeant; electrician sergeant, second class; band sergeant; musician, first class. The monthly remuneration of the above is \$73.87. It is compared with overseer; clerk; blacksmith; carpenter; chauffeur; stable boss; stock keeper; caterer; overseer of labor; telephone man; musician, first class. The remuneration of this group in civil life averages \$115.55, or 56 per cent more than for similar duties in the Army.

Group 6 includes sergeant, line; stable sergeant, line; supply sergeant, line; mess sergeant, line; cook; horseshoer; radio sergeant; fireman, Coast Artillery Corps; corporal, band; musician, second class. The monthly remuneration of the above is \$67.87. It is compared with overseer; stable boss; stockman; caterer; cook; horseshoer; wireless operator; fireman, stationary engine; musician, second class. The remuneration of this group in civil life is \$105.57, or 55 per cent more than for similar duties in the Army.

Group 7 includes corporal, staff; mechanic, Coast Artillery Corps; chief mechanic, Field Artillery; musician, third class; corporal, line; saddler; mechanic; farrier, Medical Department; wagoner. The monthly remuneration of the above is \$65.87. It is compared with assistant overseer; general mechanic; musician, third class; harness maker; farrier; teamster. The remuneration of this group in civil life averages \$93.33, or 42 per cent more than paid for similar duties in the Army.

Group 8 includes bugler, private, and private, second class, Ordnance. The Army remuneration is \$59.87 per month. It is compared with musician, third class, and laborers in civil life, at an estimated monthly pay of \$90, or 52 per cent more than is paid for similar duties in the Army.

Grades.	Army pay and allowances.					Civilian pursuits.		Per cent, equalize Army and civilian pay.			
	Pay.	Quar- ters.	Ra- tions.	Heat, light.	Cloth- ing.	Medi- cal at- tend- ance.	Total.		Occupation.	Pay.	Source of information.
Quartermaster sergeant, senior grade	\$81.00	\$15.00	\$16.11	\$8.71	\$3.68	\$1.08	\$125.58	Inspector of subsistence, meat, groceries.	\$200.00	Quartermaster General	59
Band leader.....	81.00	15.00	16.11	8.71	3.68	1.08	125.58	Band leader.....	300.00	Academy of Music.....	139
Master signal electrician, Signal Corps.	81.00	15.00	16.11	8.71	3.68	1.08	125.58	Telephone operator, etc.....	200.00	Chief Signal Officer.....	59
Master electrician, Coast Artillery Corps.	81.00	15.00	16.11	8.71	3.68	1.08	125.58	Electrical engineer.....	250.00	Quartermaster General	99
Master engineer, senior grade.....	81.00	15.00	16.11	8.71	3.68	1.08	125.58	Engineer.....	250.00	Chief of Engineers.....	99
Master hospital sergeant.....	81.00	15.00	16.11	8.71	3.68	1.08	125.58	Pharmacist, manager large drug store.	300.00	Surgeon General.....	139
Hospital sergeant.....	71.00	15.00	16.11	8.71	3.68	1.03	115.58	Pharmacist, manager small drug store.	200.00	do.....	73
Master engineer, junior grade.....	71.00	15.00	16.11	8.71	3.68	1.08	115.58	Draftsman.....	200.00	Chief of Engineers.....	73
Engineer, Coast Artillery Corps.....	71.00	15.00	16.11	8.71	3.68	1.08	115.58	Engineer, steam locomotive.....	200.00	Quartermaster General	73
Sergeant, first class, Medical Department.	56.00	15.00	16.11	8.71	3.68	1.08	100.58	Pharmacist.....	180.00	Surgeon General.....	79
Regimental sergeant major.....	51.00	15.00	16.11	8.71	3.68	1.08	95.58	Office manager.....	250.00	Estimated.	182
Regimental supply sergeant.....	51.00	15.00	16.11	8.71	3.68	1.08	95.58	do.....	250.00	do.....	182
Sergeant major, senior grade.....	51.00	15.00	16.11	8.71	3.68	1.08	95.58	do.....	230.00	do.....	182
Quartermaster sergeant, Quartermaster Corps.	51.00	15.00	16.11	8.71	3.68	1.08	95.58	Chief clerk.....	240.00	Quartermaster General	10
Ordnance sergeant.....	51.00	15.00	16.11	8.71	3.68	1.08	95.58	do.....	200.00	Estimated.	109
First sergeant.....	51.00	15.00	16.11	8.71	3.68	1.08	95.58	Foreman.....	200.00	Chief of Field Artillery	109
Chauffeur, first class.....	51.00	15.00	16.11	8.71	3.68	1.08	95.58	Chauffeur.....	100.00	Chief Signal Officer.....	8
Battle line sergeant major, Engineers.	51.00	15.00	16.11	8.71	3.68	1.08	95.58	Assistant chief clerk.....	150.00	Estimated.	57
Electrical sergeant, first class.....	51.00	15.00	16.11	8.71	3.68	1.08	95.58	Telephone trouble man.....	130.00	Chesapeake & Potomac Telephone Co.	86
Sergeant, first class (Engineers, Signal Corps, Quartermaster Corps, etc.).	51.00	15.00	16.11	8.71	3.68	1.08	95.58	Foreman.....	200.00	Quartermaster General	109
Assistant engineer, Coast Artillery Corps.	51.00	15.00	16.11	8.71	3.68	1.08	95.58	Stationary gas engineer.....	150.00	Union wage scale.....	57
Battalion sergeant major.....	48.00	15.00	16.11	8.71	3.68	1.08	92.58	Assistant chief clerk.....	150.00	Civil service.....	62
Squadron sergeant major.....	48.00	15.00	16.11	8.71	3.68	1.08	92.58	do.....	150.00	do.....	62
Sergeant major, junior grade.....	48.00	15.00	16.11	8.71	3.68	1.08	92.58	do.....	150.00	do.....	62
Master gunner, Coast Artillery Corps.	48.00	15.00	16.11	8.71	3.68	1.08	92.58	Surveyor, draftsman.....	150.00	Chief of Field Artillery	78
Sergeant bugler.....	48.00	15.00	16.11	8.71	3.68	1.08	92.58	Musician.....	160.00	Academy of Music.....	109
Assistant band leader.....	48.00	15.00	16.11	8.71	3.68	1.08	92.58	Assistant band leader.....	240.00	do.....	109
Sergeant, staff.....	44.00	9.00	16.11	(1)	3.68	1.08	73.87	Overseer, clerk, blacksmith, carpenter.	120.00	Quartermaster General	62
Chauffeur, Signal Corps.....	44.00	9.00	16.11	(1)	3.68	1.08	73.87	Chauffeur.....	100.00	Chief Signal Officer.....	35

REORGANIZATION OF THE ARMY.

1479

[illegible]

Included in quarters.

We have gone through all ranks in the Army and compared Army pay and civilian pay for the same work in that way. We have understated rather than overstated. We have endeavored in all this study to err on the side of conservatism. For example, in the matter of privates among the enlisted men we have classed all privates as laborers only, which is not so. Many of them may be candidates for commissions. Many of them are expert men or are bright men who are awaiting a chance to prove their abilities.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. The question is often asked members of this committee on the floor of the Senate, "What is the pay of the same class of enlisted men and officers of the same grade in other armies?" That is, the armies of the great powers, like Great Britain, France, Italy, Japan, etc. Have you access to figures which will enable you to put those into the record?

Col. MUNSON. Yes, sir; we can put them in in great detail.

(See Appendices II, III, IV, V, VI, VII.)

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. Not that they should form a basis at all for what we should do in this country, because we do not know conditions there, but we are asked that question frequently when the bill comes up for discussion.

Col. MUNSON. Yes, sir. The British Army has recently had an increase of approximately 50 per cent in its pay, retroactive to July 1 of this year. That bill carries with it a proviso that on July 1, 1924, the pay rate shall be investigated, and, if necessary, revised, and that such revision shall thereafter occur at intervals of every three years, but that variations of less than 20 per cent shall not be taken into consideration in connection with the modification of the pay scale.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. They have an annual army bill over there in Great Britain, I think.

Col. MUNSON. This legislation covers for the first period, five years. It contemplates enough for five years after the increase. The rates of pay in these various foreign armies bears a very close relationship to the standards of living in those countries, and the same thing in a way should apply here.

As we have tried to emphasize, we are not asking for anything in addition to what we have had. We are asking merely for assistance in carrying part of this present financial load over the hill. If there should come a time when decreases in costs of living would occur, so that any excess should be absorbed, the Army is perfectly contented to go back to its old basis of pay of 1908. In fact, it would much prefer to have that ratio established, if you have some way of doing it at the present time. In other words, give us back the purchasing power of our 1908 dollar. I would like, speaking of the purchasing power of the dollar, to call attention to the fact again, if I have done it before, that the Chinese dollar is now worth more than the American dollar, because there is more silver in it, and in the earlier days, when we first went to the Philippines, the Chinese or Mexican dollar was worth about 37 cents. The American troops in Tientsin are very much oppressed by this fluctuation in the currency. Not only do things cost more, but they are not able to transmute American money into Chinese dollars to advantage.

This chart [indicating] covers the entire cost of the Stiness bill—shows the emoluments of enlisted men of various grades, as com-

pared with what these same men could get in civil life. They go by groups, and if I may I will give you the comparison; it is a short one:

The remuneration of enlisted men, by which is meant not only their pay proper, but the added value of their allowances for rations, clothing, heat, light, quarters, and medical attendance, aggregates a total which is far less than they could earn in civil occupations and trades, in civil life, to which their military duties approximately correspond.

The comparison in this respect is graphically shown in chart W (A), drawn from data secured from the most reliable sources. To simplify the graph groups are made of the military grades receiving the same Army pay and comparing them with the group pay which these same men would receive in civil pursuits at prevailing wages.

These figures for civilian wages are the minimum. Where union wages are given they are based on the eight-hour day and without including the increase earned through work overtime or on Sundays or holidays. The wages assumed for common laborers are considerably less than actually offered in advertisements in the Washington Star and Times of October 25.

Group 1 includes quartermaster sergeants, senior grade; band leaders; master signal electrician sergeants; master electricians, Coast Artillery Corps; master engineer, senior grade; master hospital sergeant. The remuneration of this group is standardized at \$125.58 per month.

It is compared with inspector of subsistence, meat and groceries; band leader; telephone operator, etc.; electrical engineer; engineer, pharmacist, manager large drug store. The average remuneration of this group is \$250 per month, or 100 per cent more than paid for the similar duties they perform in the Army.

Group 2 includes hospital sergeants; master engineer, junior grade; engineer, Coast Artillery Corps. The remuneration of this group is \$115.58 monthly. It is compared with the pharmacist, manager small drug store; draftsman; engineer, steam locomotive. The average remuneration of this group is \$200 monthly, or 73 per cent more than for corresponding duties in the Army.

Group 3 includes regimental sergeant major; regimental supply sergeant; sergeant major, senior grade; quartermaster sergeant, Quartermaster Corps; ordnance sergeant; first sergeant; chauffeur, first class; battalion sergeant major; engineers; electrician sergeant, first class; sergeant, first class; engineers, Salvage Company, Quartermaster Corps, etc.; assistant engineer, Coast Artillery Corps. The monthly remuneration of the above is standardized at \$95.58.

It is compared with office managers, chief clerks, foremen, chauffeurs, assistant chief clerks, telephone trouble men, foremen, stationary gas engineers. The average remuneration of this group in civil life is \$189.09 per month, or 97 per cent more than the Army would pay for corresponding duties.

Group 4 includes battalion sergeant major; squadron sergeant major; sergeant major, junior grade; master gunner, Coast Artillery Corps; sergeant bugler; assistant band leader. The monthly remuneration of the above is \$92.58.

It is compared with assistant chief clerks, surveyors, draftsmen, musicians, assistant band leaders. The remuneration of this group in civil life averages \$166.66, or 80 per cent more than paid for similar duty in the Army.

Senator SUTHERLAND. Those figures do not agree with the figures on your chart. In group 4 is \$150.80.

The CHAIRMAN. Are they all tabulated in written form?

Col. MUNSON. They have all been tabulated here.

The CHAIRMAN. Why not, to save time, put the rest of them in the hearing? You have illustrated it, and we will have them in the record anyway.

Col. MUNSON. This was worked up without being compared with this chart. I could just insert this.

The CHAIRMAN. We can see how it is from what you have read thus far. I had to step out of the room just a moment when you were discussing the difficulties of the enlisted men. Did you make any distinction in these studies between the married and the unmarried enlisted men?

Col. MUNSON. No, sir; I did not. But I would like to bring out here this matter of the privates. You have got to consider the question of the emoluments in relation to recruiting. You have got, in other words, to induce these men to come into the Army. You have got some men in, and you can hold them to the terms of their contracts. You have some officers going out. You have got to have some adequate incentive or inducement to get the enlisted men in here from civil life. A bugler, private, and private, second class, Ordnance, receive \$59.87, as compared with musicians, third class, and laborers in civil life, at an estimated monthly pay of \$90, or 52 per cent more than is paid for similar duties in the Army.

Now, it is a question deserving of the earnest consideration of Congress as to what you have got to give to promote recruiting to a point where you have a somewhat thicker line between the Government and the forces of disorder.

The recruiting program has fallen off recently, and it requires very serious consideration in relation to the amount of money that is going to be required to furnish an adequate attraction to bring men in, to more than counteract the attraction of civil life, to remain in civil life. So that the pay of these lower groups have got to be considered, not only from the standpoint of their making a living, but from filling the Army.

The CHAIRMAN. Three months ago the War Department—and I mean by that the Secretary of War and the Chief of Staff—were extremely optimistic about recruiting?

Col. MUNSON. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. The Secretary of War assured the committee that there would be no trouble at all in recruiting the size of the Army in the War Department bill, which was 509,000 enlisted men. It is to be remembered that when they made up their minds about the possibilities of recruiting it was at the time when the overseas divisions were coming home and were being mustered out and demobilized, and every young chap in these divisions who had become captivated by military service was caught, and he enlisted anew.

Senator SUTHERLAND. Before they went back to their homes and their families?

The CHAIRMAN. Well, they went back to their families. He got the \$60 bonus and went back to his family and came back and re-enlisted. Now, the recruiting has gone from 5,000 a week down to a few hundred. In other words, we have gotten back under normal conditions again.

Col. MUNSON. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. And your soldier material has become exhausted. You have gotten about 12,000 recruits in that period, and since that period your figures are near 10,000.

Col. MUNSON. May I call your attention to the fact that approximately 1,560,000 men left the Army before the recruiting program was established?

The factor of recruiting from recruiting depots is more or less of a constant. They are getting about a certain number week by week. That number is perhaps sufficient to keep the Army alive. It is not enough to develop the full plan and recruit your needs. Approximately one-half of the Army went out without any effort to sift it out and retain any of it.

The CHAIRMAN. According to this chart which I have here from the War Department, in the week ending October 18 you recruited 3,250 men?

Col. MUNSON. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. You have recruited 130,208 since the recruiting campaign started last February?

Col. MUNSON. It did not start to any extent in February.

The CHAIRMAN. It was the 1st of March?

Col. MUNSON. Because our branch had to do with the organization of the machine, and we did not have an effective machine created for two months. The recruiting really began effectively about the first week in April.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes. The week ending October 18 showed a slight increase over the week ending October 11, the previous week?

Col. MUNSON. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Which was 2,730.

Col. MUNSON. The significant point of that recruiting chart, if I may call attention to it, is that this factor here of enlistment at recruiting stations in cities is more or less of a constant. Your problem, I would say, in recruiting is to increase the size of that constant all the way down—draw more men from civil life.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes. You were going to say something more about the enlisted men; or had you some witnesses here whom you would like to be heard on that?

Col. MUNSON. We have plenty of witnesses.

I would like to ask, if I may, to have Col. Richardson to present any views that I may have left out—very briefly.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well; we will be glad to hear you, Colonel.

STATEMENT OF COL. ROBERT C. RICHARDSON, JR., CAVALRY.

Col. RICHARDSON. The general condition in the Army to-day is one of extremely lowered morale and discontent; and it is brought about chiefly by the inadequacy of the pay. The reaction is felt in the Army by the impaired efficiency of those who remain and by the resignation of those in a position to go into civil life.

Gen. Munson has brought out the number of resignations. All of those resignations are not, however, for financial reasons, but the vast majority of them certainly are, chiefly because the officers can not make both ends meet. As for the resignations, there are in the service a great many officers of experience who would resign if they had the opportunity, but they feel that they are so tied down by their financial and family responsibilities that they can not resign. One reason, I think, for the extraordinary number of resignations of what we might call the permanent, Regular Army—that is 356 out of a total of 1,900 and some odd—is due to the fact that during the war our soldiers came in contact with men from civil life. Their civilian companions recognized their ability and upon the conclusion of the war they offered them positions which were promptly accepted. Again, there are many others who have also been offered positions, but who felt that they could not get out. Lastly, there is still another group of officers who have received no offers at all, some of whom would be glad to resign.

Furthermore, I feel that if we had a graded retirement in our service a great many would retire, in the hope of being able to improve their financial conditions on the outside.

But the injured morale is one of the serious things with which we have to contend. Officers on the posts, in the camps, in fact, no matter where they may be, are undergoing the distressing mental condition of being unable to provide for their families the necessary comforts to which they supposed, when they entered the service, they were entitled. That has impaired their efficiency very much, and it seems to me that the remedy is to get some kind of a dollar that will buy 100 cents' worth.

So far as the enlisted men go, the Government, to my mind, absorbs the high cost of living for them with respect to food, clothing, shelter, and fuel. It does not absorb, however, the increase in cost of the sundries, and the very best statistics we have show that the increase in his sundries has been about 20 per cent. Consequently, whereas his actual pay, \$30 a month, may cover some of his sundries, it does not cover them all. On the other hand, he is constantly seeing on the outside men of less capacity—especially if he is a technician or capable of handling tools well—he sees men with less capacity offered twice the pay that he gets. To prove this statement, one has only to refer to the advertisements of our daily papers. If he is a private, an unskilled laborer, he sees unskilled labor getting twice as much as he receives, with all his emoluments, from the Army.

The effect of such a situation is that, unless he can discount his love for the service, the pay of labor is acting like a magnet to draw him out of the service.

The remarks that I have made with reference to the officers are also applicable to the married enlisted man. He has the very same problems to meet. I personally think that it is a very much harder proposition for him, because he can only get a certain amount of commodities to-day for a certain amount of money, and all of us have got to eat about the same.

Senator SUTHERLAND. But they get their family stores through the post exchanges?

Col. RICHARDSON. Through the commissary, sir. I will bring that out a little later.

Senator SUTHERLAND. That helps some.

Col. RICHARDSON. That helps some. The result of these conditions has been that 26 per cent of the officers of the Cavalry arm resigned, 25 per cent of the Field Artillery, and 19 per cent of Cavalry.

Senator SUTHERLAND. Are those of permanent rank?

Col. RICHARDSON. Yes, sir. The Regular Army is composed of what we might term the officers of permanent and of provisional appointment, but they are all officers of the Regular Army, who have been accepted and given commissions. The provisionals are to be reexamined at the end of two years.

Senator SUTHERLAND. A great many of them take these provisional appointments, with no definite purpose in being in the Army, probably?

Col. RICHARDSON. I think that is true for some of them. I would not say that about a great many, but I do think that applies to some. It seems to me that as far as the officers of the Army are concerned the essence of the matter lies in the reduced standard of living, that has been brought about by the fall in the purchasing power of the dollar. When Congress fixed our pay in 1908 it gave us enough money to guarantee us a standard of living with reasonable comforts. To-day the dollar has so depreciated that we have fallen below that standard, to a degree that is humiliating to a man of education, imbued with the desire to provide for himself and his dependents. The reduced standard of living therefore is, it seems to me, the justification of our request for an increase in pay. The increase is designed to bring our standard up to that which Congress thought was reasonable for our comfort in 1908; and in order to do that we are simply asking for a dollar that will give us 100 per cent purchasing power.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. As it is now, you can not save a cent?

Col. RICHARDSON. On the contrary the majority of officers are falling behind. It is almost an impossibility for them to meet their obligations unless they have outside means.

I will now take up somewhat in detail the question of the allowances. Some of the allowances are not at all adequate. You were asking about buying from the commissary. The officers and the enlisted men all have the privilege of buying from the commissary. That includes staple foods. We can not buy fresh meats or fresh vegetables, or eggs, and supplies of that nature. We must go out in the market and buy the same as anybody else.

In order to show exactly how much saving this privilege is to the officers, I obtained from the commissary sales slips of officers of all grades. These I averaged, and I find that the average commissary bill of an officer in Washington is about \$42 a month. Then from the articles that were purchased I made a unit list, with a unit price. Prices for the same articles were then obtained from a first-class grocer and the two unit prices compared. The saving on the unit prices was \$5.56 by purchasing from the commissary.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. That would be about \$37 that they would charge for the same list?

Col. RICHARDSON. Yes, sir; about \$5 a month. So the savings on account of the commissary are not as large as a great many believe; and, furthermore, officers are not always placed where they can supply their families from the commissary. In my own case, for

two years I have been unable to supply my family from the commissary, but, of course, I realize that for the last two years there have been rather extraordinary conditions.

Senator SUTHERLAND. According to your answer to the Senator's question, that was reduced \$5.

Col. RICHARDSON. No, sir; the Senator meant, if I interpreted him correctly, that we save five dollars and some odd cents on the unit price. For example, if I were to buy \$100 worth of provisions in the commissary I would save to as many times \$5.56 as the unit price was contained times into \$100. With a unit price of, say, \$16 covering a selected group of articles, the saving in the commissary would be about \$30. Is that not what you meant, Senator?

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. I hardly think you understood me. I understood you to say each man—taking all grades—each officer spent at the commissary about \$42 a month.

Col. RICHARDSON. Yes, sir.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. How much do you say he would have paid at first-rate groceries now?

Col. RICHARDSON. He would pay about \$56.

Senator SUTHERLAND. You said \$37.

Col. RICHARDSON. He would pay about \$56. As for the other allowances which we have, I might mention that of medical attention. But the saving is not a great deal. In order to arrive at a figure, we asked for data from the attending surgeon in Washington covering a period of three months—July, August, and September. We ascertained the number of visits made by the attending surgeons on duty, together with the number of office patients treated. For the latter \$2 was allowed in estimating, and for visits \$3. Upon this basis the total that these doctors would receive if in civil life would be \$25,000 for 1,862 visits and 10,017 office patients. If we add to this figure the cost of medicines and supplies, it would bring it up to \$26,445 for the three months, or an average of \$8,815 per month. If to that be added the dental treatments, allowing \$5 a treatment, then the total value of supplies and treatments monthly is \$16,275.

Next we took the population from which these officers draw their patients—the active officers, the enlisted men, the dependents of officers, the dependents of enlisted men, retired officers and their dependents—and, figuring the average, we found that the cost for each person is about \$1.08 per month, or \$12.96 per year. If we charge the entire cost to the active officers, which really is not fair, because the retired officers have the privilege as well as the active officers, and omit the enlisted men and their dependents, we find that for every active officer it is a saving of \$63.96 a year, which is about the interest on a \$1,000 bond.

As regards commutation of quarters it has been brought out in the testimony that the present rate of commutation of quarters, \$12 a month, is inadequate in any city in which we may be. I might state that approximately 70 per cent of the officers of the Army are at the present time drawing commutation of quarters. In former days the officers, with a few exceptions, lived at posts, but we have admitted the principle of the regrouping of our Army into divisions, and there are no suitable quarters at these division camps for the officers. Consequently they are obliged to remain at the camps, and although actually on duty with troops, they must

maintain their families in near-by cities. In time of war this was "duty in the field," and there is no assurance that such interpretation will not be placed on this character of duty, after the emergency has ended. Under the regulation, officers on "duty in the field" do not draw commutation of quarters. Congress provided for this condition of affairs by what is called the dependents' act, and it is my belief it was the spirit of Congress when it passed that act that officers should be given not only the commutation of quarters according to their grade, providing they were maintaining dependents, but also their full allowance of fuel and light, but in some cases the comptroller decided differently.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. I do not think he is right, either.

Col. RICHARDSON. If an officer is maintaining his dependents and is stationed in a city like Washington, where he himself occupies a room but is unable to bring his family here, he can only draw heat and light for one room. Part of the time I was in France I was able to draw heat and light for only one room, although I drew commutation of quarters for my full allowance of rooms. The main difficulty is the restriction upon fuel, light, and heat, and it seems to me the entire question of commutation of quarters could be cleared up provided the dependents' act read a little differently. Officers either live in Government quarters or they do not. Therefore if the act read, "when an officer is not actually furnished quarters by the Government he will draw commutation of quarters and heat and light for his full allowance of rooms, irrespective of the duty on which he is employed"——

Senator NEW. That is what was intended.

Col. RICHARDSON. That was intended; I know that was the spirit; but in practice when officers are on duty in the field they do not draw commutation of quarters. If the dependents' act, which has passed the Senate, I believe, does not pass the House and is not revised slightly, it will mean that the officers on duty in the camps with the division will be unable to draw commutation of quarters if such duty be construed as "duty in the field." Nevertheless they must maintain their families in near-by cities.

The CHAIRMAN. Even that is inadequate?

Col. RICHARDSON. Yes, sir. You can not get suitable quarters for \$12 per month.

I might read, in support of that statement, the incident of an officer from Chicago. This officer states, and he voices the experience of a good many of us:

1. Attention is invited to the fact that a certain amount of personal pride and diffidence prevents the average Regular officer from submitting for the perusal of his superior officers and their office force, many of the homely and necessary economies and makeshifts to which he has been driven during the last year and to make both ends meet, pay the necessary expenses of himself and family, and still be able in the matter of dress, and in his social status among his associates, both in the civil and military, carry himself as an officer and a gentleman, attempting to give a "quid pro quo," so that when social courtesies are extended to him he can repay in a suitable manner.

2. Some of the personal experiences of the undersigned may be stated as follows:

3. On the pay of a first lieutenant, 10 years ago, it was possible to employ maid part or all of the time to assist in the housework. Under the present pay of a lieutenant colonel this can not be afforded, as due to the wage demanded and the increase in the cost of living, it is impossible to keep a household or a servant at all.

4. The privilege of entertaining, which helps so much in keeping up the morale of the officer corps, has had to be met by practically abandoning all pretense along that line by refusing invitations, which must, as one of the conventions of society, be returned, if a person is to maintain his self-respect. It is realized that this curtailing of social intercourse involves a loss of dignity; a loss of many desirable acquaintances, and must inevitably react unfavorably socially and professionally upon the officer, but the necessity of meeting one's obligations, providing food, shelter and clothing for one's family leaves no other choice. Actual living expenses necessary, curtailed to the minimum during the past six months incident to a change of station, has compelled an expenditure of approximately \$200 more than pay received.

5. On the arrival of the undersigned in Chicago, there was finally secured an apartment in an apartment house consisting of a living room, also to be used as a bedroom; a kitchenette, with a small alcove containing a dining-room table, and a bathroom, which was also to be used as a dressing room. These quarters, less than were formerly allowed a noncommissioned officer of the higher grades at posts, rented for the sum of \$75 per month, gas and electricity not included. Not a ray of sunshine penetrated this apartment all day.

6. During the search for apartments it was ascertained that there were apartments obtainable and easily rented at from \$175 to \$300 monthly—manifestly beyond the room allowance of even a general officer. In view of this it would seem pertinent that allowances for quarters be increased also, along with pay.

7. Attention is also invited to the fact that practically every change of station for an officer with a family costs, in addition to what he receives from the Government in the way of mileage, from \$100 to \$200. This expense consists of breaking up housekeeping, sending the family to a hotel, and paying from \$3 to \$5 daily for rooms for several weeks, and an exorbitant price for meals, until a suitable place can again be found to set up housekeeping. This, in addition to the railroad fare for the family of 3½ cents per mile per person, will easily run up to the additional expense as stated before.

8. The fact exists now that a man in the Regular Army, even if he has only mediocre ability, faces a losing game under the present circumstances, and this can not but act unfavorably upon the "esprit de corps" and morale of the Army. The younger men with brains will not be appealed to by an Army career, because of the lack of provision which is now made for officers in the Army in the way of pay and allowance, and the younger commissioned corps will be filled with men of third and fourth-rate ability. The lieutenants and captains of to-day are the colonels and generals of to-morrow, and if inferior human material only, as a rule, is attracted to the subordinate commissions to-day, it means that the country will pay in the coming years for inferior leadership in times of stress and emergency.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. Before we got into the war an officer stationed here, or in any city, was allowed, according to his rank, a certain number of rooms. If he did not occupy those rooms he was allowed so much for each room?

Col. RICHARDSON. Yes, sir.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. As I recall it that would only apply to the men detailed for duty in garrisons and cities?

Col. RICHARDSON. Detailed in the cities where there were no public quarters.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. When he is in the field there is no provision for it made?

Col. RICHARDSON. No provision at all.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. We undertook to amend the law here so as to provide for a man who is in the field.

Col. RICHARDSON. Yes, sir.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. To allow him the same privileges and rates as to commutation of quarters that were given to a man detailed for duty in a city, or where there were public quarters. But, now, I understand, a captain over there, for instance in the field and

with troops, is by the decision of the comptroller or auditor, or somebody, denied that right under the statute?

Col. RICHARDSON. No, sir; he was allowed to draw—an officer, for example, with a division, or who is actually engaged on duty in the field—is allowed, under the dependents act, his commutation for the number of rooms, according to his grade, together with his fuel, heat, and light; but where officers were stationed in Paris, Tours, or Chaumont, the comptroller decided that those cities did not come under the dependents act.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. Why?

Col. RICHARDSON. I do not know.

Senator NEW. And those officers did not get their commutation?

Col. RICHARDSON. Yes, sir: they got it for their rooms, but could not draw it for fuel, heat, and light.

Senator NEW. What is the distinction?

Col. RICHARDSON. Because he claimed that the officers stationed in those three cities came under a previous act of 1907.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. That they were not in the field?

Col. RICHARDSON. Yes, sir. Now that same thing will happen again unless the dependents act is extended. It may be claimed that the officers on duty with divisions in division camps are on "duty in the field," hence they do not draw commutation of quarters. They are not in the field. So the point is, with the regrouping of our Army into these camps, the Government either must furnish officers on duty thereat suitable quarters in kind or give them commutation, else they can not support their families. The minute you put an officer in camp he has to maintain two households. He has to maintain himself in camp, where he has certain obligations that he must meet, and at the same time he has to support his family in a near-by city, or wherever they may be.

The purchasing power of the dollar has decreased to such an extent that our pay has in reality shrunk. In 1908 a second lieutenant received flat pay, \$1,700. If to-day he had the same purchasing power he ought to be getting 3,541 of those little tickets we call dollars. That would be an increase of \$1,241. The amount of increase which is proposed under the Stiness bill, however, that we ask for a second lieutenant is only \$510, or less than one-third of what would be necessary to reestablish his purchasing power. That would raise the present pay of a second lieutenant to \$2,200, or conversely his 1908 pay, if the dollar then had only its present purchasing value, would in 1908 have amounted to only \$816.

The CHAIRMAN. What makes you hesitate to ask for a larger increase in view of that statement?

Col. RICHARDSON. Well, because the Army recognizes the fact that we have certain advantages over a man in civil life. We have the retired pay. In cases of panic or hard times we have no mental distress as to our position at all, and it is only just that the Army should be willing to bear some of the burden and not ask the Government to bear all the burden.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. The base pay of a second lieutenant was \$1,700 in 1908?

Col. RICHARDSON. Yes, sir.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. His allowances, commutation, and other allowances would amount to how much in 1908?

Col. RICHARDSON. That is the same as to-day, sir. Do you want it plus commutation?

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. I want what he would get all together.

Col. RICHARDSON. In the same line of reasoning, a first lieutenant would have only drawn \$960; his pay has actually shrunk to \$960; a captain's pay has shrunk to \$1,102; a major's to \$1,440; a lieutenant colonel to \$1,680; a colonel to \$1,920; a brigadier general to \$2,880; and a major general to \$3,840. Of course, that is the base pay, exclusive of their allowances, commutation of quarters, heat, light, and fuel.

Senator NEW. I do not understand just what you mean by that, that they have shrunk, you say?

Col. RICHARDSON. I say shrunk in the sense that he only has that purchasing power to-day.

Senator NEW. By reason of the increased cost of living?

Col. RICHARDSON. Yes, sir.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. I wish it might be possible for you to put in the record from second lieutenant up to the higher grades the amounts that they get now in base pay and additional pay for commutation, etc.

Col. RICHARDSON. Yes, sir.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. I think I asked it a while ago, but I should like to have it for my own information.

Col. RICHARDSON. A second lieutenant gets \$1,700 base pay. His allowances of quarters is \$288, if he is drawing it. One hundred and eighty dollars—

The CHAIRMAN. What is the next item?

Col. RICHARDSON. As I understood the Senator, he wanted the total?

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. I want to know what he gets in actual money. Seventeen hundred dollars base pay, then commutation of quarters, heat, and light, and whatever else he does get.

Col. RICHARDSON. Two thousand one hundred and sixty-eight dollars.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. Altogether?

Col. RICHARDSON. Altogether.

The CHAIRMAN. If he is drawing commutation?

Col. RICHARDSON. If he is drawing commutation of quarters. And I might add there are no second lieutenants to-day with over five years' service, but if he has over five years' service he gets longevity.

The high cost of living has also permeated the Military Academy. We have lost by resignation from the Military Academy 169 cadets in the last two years, as against 113 who resigned in the previous 10 years. I examined a number of resignations from the Military Academy recently and, out of eighteen that I examined that came in on October 4 eleven of them gave financial reasons, that they saw no future in the Army, no career, and that the question of living induced them to submit their resignations and try to get out and compete in commercial life.

I might also say that in the Quartermaster's Department we had a number of captains employed upon certain classes of duties, captains drawing \$2,400 a year. It was necessary to discharge them on demobilization, and replace them by civilians. In order to secure competent help to replace these officers the Quartermaster found him-

self in a position where he had to pay salaries ranging from \$3,000 up to \$12,000. Three thousand dollars is the lowest, which is \$600 more than captains were getting.

Senator SUTHERLAND. Those were, however, for short periods?

Col. RICHARDSON. I can not answer that definitely, sir, for how long, but they are still employed on that duty now. It seems to me that an increase of pay is due the officers, if you wish to retain a certain type of officer in the Army. It is very true that we have 26,000 or 27,000 applications for commissions in the service. An analysis of them will show where they come from. Some of them are very fine men that we would like to retain. There is a large class that have put in their applications to tide them over who have no thought or interest in the Government at all; it is all self interest. There is another large class who were noncommissioned officers in the war and they naturally would like to retain commissions; they do not wish to be demoted to the grade of sergeant again.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. I think it is fair to say, in reference to the employment of civilians, that only one man in the service gets \$12,000, and that is the Director of Sales.

Col. RICHARDSON. Yes; there is only one.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. Now, with reference to the \$3,000 men, you will remember that in the camps and cantonments, after the armistice was signed, the enlisted personnel were being utilized at \$33 a month to do work that the civilians got all the way from \$125 to \$250 a month for, and the enlisted men and noncommissioned officers protested against being held in the service to do work which civilians would do at a higher rate, and therefore they took in civilians to do the work and allowed the enlisted men to be demobilized. Is that not a fact?

Col. RICHARDSON. I think that is true; yes, sir.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. It was rather in the nature of a protest of the enlisted personnel against being held in the Army to do civilian work?

Col. RICHARDSON. Yes. But I am referring to this particular instance of replacements of officers in the Quartermaster's Department.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. You only refer to that?

Col. RICHARDSON. Yes, sir. But I do not think it is fair to say that the number of applications of men for commissions is any criterion, because you will always have, in every position that is open, 10 applications for one man that goes out. It seems to me you have got to remember that the type of officer that you need is a man who has a broad fundamental education, and one capable of intellectual expansion, because those men who are lieutenants to-day are going to be the lieutenant colonels and colonels and generals to-morrow, and you have got to look forward a little bit and have men that can develop intellectually. If, however, we place no premium on intellectual attainments, all right; you can get all the lieutenants you want at present, but I do not believe you can get the type of officer that is most desirable in the Army unless some help is extended to them.

The Army does not ask for a permanent increase. They are perfectly willing this should be as an emergency to tide them over this revolution in our economic life.

The CHAIRMAN. That leads me to ask you a question, perhaps to start a discussion on another phase of this. I was speaking to Gen. Munson yesterday about it in a conversation. You say that it is to tide over this emergency, and we do not know how long the emergency will last; no one can tell exactly. A great many people seem to believe, students of finance and economics, that after a reasonable number of years the cost of living will go down somewhat. You further state, if this is to tide over the emergency you would be willing to have the pay reduced later on by an act of Congress. As I attempted to say to Col. Munson yesterday, that will probably never be done. It is not in the cards to reduce the pay of soldiers by an act of Congress, in my judgment. Things do not work that way. In view of that situation is it not possible for us to set up some scheme which shall, in part, at least, automatically meet the fluctuations in the cost of living?

Col. RICHARDSON. Yes, sir; there are several ways you can do it.

The CHAIRMAN. I am thoroughly convinced you have got to have more pay, both for officers and enlisted men, but I was wondering if in addition to an increase in pay, no matter what that increase may be, whether 30 and 50 per cent as asked in this bill, or 20 and 30, or 15 and 30, we might add a provision under which the officers, we will say, should receive a ration from the Government, which he could commute—fifty-five cents; if he was married, receive another ration for his wife; if he had children, another ration for each child, all commutable. Now, if the cost of living went down and the ration, instead of costing fifty-five cents to the Government cost only 35 cents to the Government, that is all he would get. If it went up to 55 or 60 cents, he would get the 55 or 60 cents. For the married enlisted men the same way, he, of course, gets his own ration from the Government to-day, but he gets no ration for his wife and none for his children, and could we not apply that same principle, or something like it, to them?

Col. RICHARDSON. Indeed you could.

The CHAIRMAN. That would work out quite a considerable increase?

Col. RICHARDSON. I have made an estimate of that. If I may be permitted to make an observation, I personally do not think it is wise to discriminate between married and unmarried officers. An officer is an officer, and a great many unmarried officers have dependents. I wished to preface my statement with that, because I based the estimate on that assumption, so I allot to each grade a certain number of rations—a second lieutenant is allowed two rooms, two rations; a first lieutenant three; a captain four; a major five; a lieutenant colonel six, and so on.

The CHAIRMAN. A second lieutenant, two rations?

Col. RICHARDSON. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. That would be \$1.10 increase a day right there at the present price, at 55 cents a ration.

Col. RICHARDSON. I figured at 55 cents a ration that he would get \$401.50 a year on his salary.

The CHAIRMAN. At the present cost of rations?

Col. RICHARDSON. Yes.

Senator NEW. A little over \$400 a year?

Col. RICHARDSON. At 55 cents.

Senator NEW. A second lieutenant, at 55.

Col. RICHARDSON. Of course, he gets no longevity on that. That is flat.

The CHAIRMAN. He gets no longevity?

Col. RICHARDSON. No, he gets 10 per cent increase when he has been in five years. That is simply a flat increase to his pay.

The CHAIRMAN. Grade by grade?

Col. RICHARDSON. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. It does not affect the longevity, you would let the longevity stand?

Col. RICHARDSON. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. How would it work with one of these sergeants?

Col. RICHARDSON. It depends on what you would give them. I think a married enlisted man ought to have two rations.

The CHAIRMAN. And the grade of private?

Col. RICHARDSON. No; I do not think so. I will tell you my reasons. I do not believe the Government contemplates privates marrying. It depends on the term of enlistment. If we have a short term of enlistment, it does not seem to me to be up to the Government to provide for the married private; but I do think noncommissioned officers should be well cared for, because we depend on the noncommissioned officers; you want those men to stay; you want efficient officers and noncommissioned officers, and if you have them you can train all the privates in the world in a short period of time.

Senator SUTHERLAND. The chairman's suggestion, I assume, was for the purpose of promoting matrimony and raising a large family. It is a good public policy.

Col. RICHARDSON. But I do think our noncommissioned officers should be well taken care of.

The CHAIRMAN. I had that in mind when I used the term "married enlisted men"; I had in mind the noncommissioned officers' row in the old posts, where the sergeants—most of them—had their families.

Col. RICHARDSON. Their rate of commutation of quarters is very small. They get \$15, and you can not get any place for \$15 in any city to-day, and we want them to live decently; we do not want to be ashamed of them.

The CHAIRMAN. \$15 for what?

Col. RICHARDSON. Per room.

The CHAIRMAN. How many rooms do they get?

Col. RICHARDSON. One room.

The CHAIRMAN. Regardless of the grade?

Col. RICHARDSON. Regardless of the grade. The highest noncommissioned officer receives one room.

The CHAIRMAN. Have you any suggestion, or has Col. Munson any suggestion, as to how we might apply such a scheme to the enlisted men?

Col. RICHARDSON. Yes; I think on the same basis, the basis of rations and increase of commutation of their quarters.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. But that would not automatically reduce itself at the end of the emergency?

The CHAIRMAN. As fast as the cost of the ration reduces itself?

Senator NEW. That is the only way I see you can reduce the thing equitably.

Col. RICHARDSON. I have another scheme that you might consider: Have the Government buy its commissary supplies as at present, either in the open market or by contract, but sell them only to the officers and enlisted men, for their families, at the 1908 rate, when you fixed our pay.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. Why should not they do that?

Col. RICHARDSON. Then if the cost of living comes down, the Government gets them cheaper, and the prices will be approaching those at which they are selling them to the officers.

The CHAIRMAN. But that would not apply in a practical sense to the officers whose families could not under the circumstances have access to the commissary sale store.

Col. RICHARDSON. It is not as desirable as giving them the ration, because there you give them some definite amount in money every month.

The CHAIRMAN. That could be revised once in three or six months by the Quartermaster General?

Col. RICHARDSON. Yes; it could be revised every month or every quarter; say the value of the ration for the next three months is so much.

The CHAIRMAN. I interrupted you. Go ahead with that enlisted-man business again.

Col. RICHARDSON. I was going to say on the same basis on which I figured the officer, you could give the enlisted man two rations.

The CHAIRMAN. Regardless of his grade?

Col. RICHARDSON. Yes, sir; I mean give to each enlisted man who is allowed under the regulations commutation of quarters, who is considered eligible to be married, that is really the implication in the regulations.

The CHAIRMAN. That would leave the privates out?

Col. RICHARDSON. That would leave them out.

Senator SUTHERLAND. What percentage of them is married?

Col. RICHARDSON. That is a hard question to answer. I do not know. I do not believe anyone knows. Most of the enlisted men in the higher grades are married.

Senator SUTHERLAND. The noncommissioned officers?

Col. RICHARDSON. Yes, sir; the noncommissioned staff.

Senator SUTHERLAND. The others will get married now and then, I suppose.

Col. RICHARDSON. Yes, sir. Of course the ration scheme is an expedient which will help out the officers a great deal more than the enlisted men. I mean it does not help the corporals or the privates at all.

The CHAIRMAN. I did not mean to suggest it as the last word.

Col. RICHARDSON. No, sir; I know.

The CHAIRMAN. I meant to suggest it as an adjunct, as it were, as an auxiliary, toward meeting this complaint in regard to the cost of living, which applies to the Army officer as it does to me and as well to the enlisted man.

Col. RICHARDSON. I think the scheme would help out very much, provided in addition you would increase the commutation of quarters.

The CHAIRMAN. For both officers and enlisted men?

Col. RICHARDSON. Yes, sir. You can not get a room for \$12 a month anywhere. You take a captain who is supposed to have four rooms. He is allowed \$8; he can hardly get one room in this city or any city for that amount.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. You can hardly get them at any price in Washington.

Col. RICHARDSON. The result is the officers are separated from their families. I know that in most of the desirable rooming houses for officers in the city one has to pay at least \$40 for a room and bath.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. I have seen officers and men going around here for three months trying to find a room.

Col. RICHARDSON. I might say from my personal experience that I was here two months before I succeeded in getting anything for my family. I have only seen them one month in the last two years. An officer stated before the House Committee the other day that out of his 15 years' service, due to the exigencies of the service, he had seen his wife but eight years. Furthermore, an officer is put to great expense by traveling and moving around the country. There is absolutely no provision made for his family, and in many instances he can not afford to take them. [See appendix 2.]

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. An officer here, living with his family, is detailed to duty to San Francisco, for instance.

Col. RICHARDSON. He get \$216.15 mileage.

The CHAIRMAN. That is all he gets, so his family has to pay for the transportation of their household goods or sell them here at a loss?

Col. RICHARDSON. Not their household goods. The Government authorizes a baggage allowance to be sent by freight, so many pounds per grade. A colonel is allowed, I believe, 7,000 pounds by freight.

Col. MUNSON. It is possible I can give that information. We made a budget of a captain with a wife and a child of five and a child of fifteen, ordered to the Philippines from the city of Washington, and using all sources of income of the Government; the officer arrived in San Francisco \$183.50 to the bad. That assumed that he and his wife and two children occupied two separate berths; that they had only one day in San Francisco before embarking for the Philippines at a hotel, and that they lived at \$1 a meal and 75 cents for other meals en route. It provided nothing for transportation, taxes, quarters, or anything of the sort.

The CHAIRMAN. Colonel, are you prepared to lay before the committee some suggestion as we were discussing a moment ago?

Col. RICHARDSON. I can do so; yes, sir. I have made an estimate here showing that if you allow the officer rations as indicated, the cost to the Government would be \$7,876,605 a year, and if you increase their commutation of quarters to \$20 a room it would mean an additional cost to the Government, including retired officers, of \$3,411,634, or a total increased cost to the Government of \$11,288,000.

The CHAIRMAN. Based on the number of officers in the national defense act?

Col. RICHARDSON. Yes, sir. Based on the number of officers in the national defense act. This total cost is more than the cost of an increase of 30 per cent.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes; I think it might come out more for the time being, but I live in the hope, you know, that some day the price of living will go down a little.

Col. RICHARDSON. I hope so, too, although I might quote Mr. Irving Fisher, a leading economist at Yale. There was a very interesting article in the June number of the Review of Reviews, in which he gave the history of the rise in prices and showed we had a rise in the thirteenth century, one again in the fifteenth century, again in the early part of the nineteenth century, and again after the Civil War, again in 1896, again in 1907, and again to-day; but to-day is the highest which has ever been. The object of his discussion was to show that the tide of prices has constantly risen and that economic life has always readjusted itself to meet this tide; that although the various commodities may fluctuate up and down like the waves of the sea, that nevertheless the general tide rises and never goes back; there is a readjustment of our life to it, and in order to meet that he suggests a very interesting plan.

Senator SUTHERLAND. He proposed changing the amount of metal in the dollar?

Col. RICHARDSON. Yes; and withdrawing specie. For instance, the dollar certificate is worth 48 cents to-day. That figure would be announced. I might say in conclusion that I do not think it is fair to officers to compare their wages with those of professional men in civil life or with the wages of labor. I do not think that is a fair comparison at all, because officers are supposed to be men of intellectual attainments. They come into the Army knowing the amount they are going to get, but there is a certain love of the service and a desire to serve, and also the assurance that we will be taken care of in our old age by retirement, and that must be discounted to a certain per cent, but the character of the officers needed is the same to-day as it has always been, and if you will permit me, I should like to read what Washington wrote to the Congress September 24, 1776, apropos of this very same question:

COL. MORRIS'S ON THE HEIGHTS OF HAERLEM,

24 September, 1776.

To the PRESIDENT OF CONGRESS.

SIR: From the hours allotted to sleep I will borrow a few moments to convey my thoughts on sundry important matters to Congress. I shall offer them with the sincerity which ought to characterize a man of candor and with the freedom which may be used in giving useful information without incurring the imputation of presumption.

We are now, as it were, upon the eve of another dissolution of our Army. The remembrance of the difficulties which happened upon that occasion last year and the consequences which might have followed the change if proper advantages had been taken by the enemy, added to a knowledge of the present temper and situation of the troops, reflect but a very gloomy prospect in the appearance of things now and satisfy me beyond the possibility of a doubt that unless some speedy and effectual measures are adopted by Congress our cause will be lost. It is in vain to expect that any more than a trifling part of this army will again engage in the service on the encouragement offered by Congress. When men find that their townsmen and companions are receiving twenty, thirty, and more dollars for a few months' service, which is truly the case, it can not be expected, without using compulsion; and to force them into the service would answer no valuable purpose. When men are irritated and their passions inflamed they fly hastily and cheerfully to arms; but, after the first emotions are over, to expect among such people as compose the bulk of the Army that they are influenced by any other principles than those of interest is to look for what never did and, I fear, will never happen; the Congress will deceive themselves, therefore, if they expect it.

A soldier reasoned with upon the goodness of the cause he is engaged in and the inestimable rights he is contending for hear you with patience and acknowledges the truth of your observations, but adds that it is of no more importance to him than to others. The officer makes you the same reply, with this further remark: That his pay will not support him and he can not ruin himself and family to serve his country when every member of the community is equally interested and benefited by his labors. The few, therefore, who act upon principles of disinterestedness, comparatively speaking, are no more than a drop in the ocean.

It becomes evident to me, then, that as this contest is not likely to be the work of a day, as the war must be carried on systematically, and to do it you must have good officers, there are in my judgment no other possible means to obtain them but by establishing your Army upon a permanent footing and giving your officers good pay. This will induce gentlemen and men of character to engage, and till the bulk of your officers is composed of such persons as are actuated by principles of honor and a spirit of enterprise you have little to expect from them. They ought to have such allowances as will enable them to live like and support the character of gentlemen, and not be driven by a scanty pittance to the low and dirty arts which many of them practice to flich from the public more than the difference of pay would amount to upon an ample allowance. Besides, something is due to the man who puts his life in your hands, haazrds his health, and forsakes the sweets of domestic enjoyment. Why a captain in the Continental service should receive no more than 5 shillings currency per day for performing the same duties that an officer of the same rank in the British service receives 10 shillings for I never could conceive, especially when the latter is provided with every necessary he requires upon the best terms and the former can scarce procure them at any rate. There is nothing that gives a man consequence and renders him fit for command like a support that renders him independent of everybody but the State he serves.

With respect to the men, nothing but a good bounty can obtain them upon a permanent establishment, and for no shorter time than the continuance of the war ought they to be engaged, as facts incontestably prove that the difficulty and cost of enlistments increase with time. When the Army was first raised at Cambridge I am persuaded the men might have been got without a bounty for the war. After this they began to see that the contest was not likely to end so speedily as was imagined and to feel their consequence by remarking that to get in their militia in the course of the last year many towns were induced to give them a bounty. Foreseeing the evils resulting from this, and the destructive consequences which unavoidably would follow short enlistments, I took the liberty in a long letter written by myself (date not now recollected, as my letter book is not here) to recommend the enlistments for and during the war, as-igning such reasons for it as experience has since convinced me were well founded. At that time \$20 would, I am persuaded, have engaged the men for this term. But it will not do to look back, and if the present opportunity is slipped I am persuaded that 12 months more will increase our difficulties fourfold. I shall, therefore, take the freedom of giving it as my opinion that a good bounty should be immediately offered, aided by the proffer of at least 100 or 150 acres of land and a suit of clothes and blanket to each noncommissioned officer and soldier, as I have good authority for saying that, however high the men's pay may appear, it is barely sufficient in the present scarcity and dearness of all kinds of goods to keep them in clothes, much less afford support to their families.

If this encouragement, then, is given to the men and such pay allowed the officers as will induce gentlemen of character and liberal sentiments to engage, and proper care and precaution are used in the nomination (having more regard to the characters of persons than to the number of men they can enlist), we should in a little time have an army able to cope with any that can be opposed to it, as there are excellent materials to form one out of. But while the only merit an officer possesses is his ability to raise men, while those men consider and treat him as an equal and in the character of an officer regard him no more than a broomstick, being mixed together as one common herd, no order nor discipline can prevail, nor will the officer ever meet with that respect which is essentially necessary to due subordination.

The CHAIRMAN. Have you some other witnesses?

Col. RICHARDSON. Yes, sir. Also I should like to have introduced as a part of the hearing a memorandum on the relation of the cost

of living and Army pay to military efficiency. It is really a digest of the whole matter.

The CHAIRMAN. Do these tables or charts go with it?

Col. RICHARDSON. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. They may be included in the record.

(The memorandum referred to is here printed in full as follows:)

APPENDIX I.

MEMORANDUM ON THE RELATION OF COST OF LIVING AND ARMY PAY TO MILITARY EFFICIENCY.

MORALE BRANCH, WAR PLANS DIVISION,

GENERAL STAFF,

Washington, D. C., October 21, 1919.

Subject: H. R. 9204 (a bill to increase the pay of the Army).

There has been introduced in the Congress a bill (H. R. 9204) which provides "That the base pay of all officers, active and retired, of the Army, Navy, Marine Corps, Coast Guard, and Public Health Service be, and the same is hereby, increased 30 per cent per annum, and the pay of all enlisted men, active and retired, is hereby increased 50 per cent. * * *"

The object of this memorandum is to show why such legislation for the Army is necessary.

Briefly, the Army is suffering economically from the great depreciation of the dollar. If money could be given something approaching its former value, or if the cost of the ordinary necessities of life could be lowered to approximately what it was before the present war, no other relief would be necessary or desired. But if a readjustment of the purchasing power of the dollar can not be assured, the only recourse would seem to be to restore in part at least the modest standards of existence formerly attained by officers and men by a greater aggregate in nominal pay.

In 1908 Congress legislated to improve the pay of the Army. Presumably it had in mind certain standards of comfort which it deemed appropriate, and which at that time could be provided by a certain number of dollars. If such standards were requisite then it is fair to presume that they are equally proper now. But the number of dollars then authorized will now not provide them; they will only provide half as much.

GENERAL CONDITIONS IN THE ARMY.

The Army is in a very serious condition. The extraordinary high cost of the necessities of life has so reduced the standard of living to which officers heretofore have always been accustomed, that there has resulted a profound state of discontent and low morale in the service.

The situation also is an emergency. The condition is one which is not solvable through delay. Resignations have drained, and are rapidly continuing to drain, the Army of its best blood. What is needed is prompt action whereby this present hemorrhage can be checked, so that the vigor and future efficiency of the Military Establishment may be reserved. Since the armistice, the resignations of over 1,900 officers of the Regular Army have been accepted. This is more than one-sixth of all the officers authorized in the service. Their training has been expensive, and represents an investment of the Government the value of which now becomes a loss. In the great majority of cases, the reason for resignation, if expressed, is given as financial.

To date, 26 per cent of the officers of the Coast Artillery have resigned, 25 per cent of the Field Artillery, 19 per cent of Cavalry, and 19 per cent of Infantry. These are the combatant arms that form the strength of the Army, and upon which reliance must be had in the case of foreign or internal difficulties.

It is obvious that those who resign are men of high initiative, force, energy, and self-reliance—military qualities which the Army can ill afford to lose. This drain, affecting chiefly the officers of more desirable type, not only affects present efficiency but bodes ill for the quality of leadership of the Army of the future.

Officers find that under present conditions they simply can not live on their slender pay, the purchasing power of which has been halved, and maintain themselves and their families in a modest and decent manner. They are finan-

dially embarrassed, to a degree which jeopardizes efficiency. Reports from all over the service indicate that they are being swamped by the high cost of living. They state that the cost of food, clothing, shelter, fuel, lights, and sundries consumes the pay and allowances and often more, without permitting them to make any provision for the future, forcing them to draw upon their meagre savings, preventing them from educating their children and from indulging in the most modest and ordinary recreations. They are driven to the most homely and necessary makeshifts which personal pride and good breeding tend to forbid that they make public. The reports of the morale officers and others however tell the story quite plainly and indicate a state of great depression and mental distress.

The actual result upon the service of these conditions has been that the officers who remain are worried and discontented to such an extent as to impair their usual efficiency, whereas those who have the opportunity submit their resignations and enter civil life where the business world is apparently only too eager to get them. Both of these situations are deplorable and indicate the urgent need of intelligent and constructive action.

This increased cost of living presses heavily on all grades alike. The senior officer receives more pay, but his expenses are much heavier. In the nature of things, he has not only a much larger family but his children are at an age when they not only require higher education but have the expenses of adults as to cost of food and clothing. His family divisor for the family income is thus much larger, probably double, that of the junior officer, and this at a time when his purchasing power is halved. More than that, he finds that any protection for his family which he has attempted in the past to create through insurance and which he has paid for in 100-cent dollars has dwindled by 50 per cent through loss of value of the dollar, and this when he has arrived at an age when insurance rates are prohibitive, even if he had a surplus in his pay from which to provide them. Not only have his former standards of living been greatly reduced but the future of his family and his own peace of mind correspondingly impaired.

What applies to officers in respect to difficulties in cost of living applies also to enlisted men. The economic pressure rests particularly heavily on the non-commissioned officers, especially those with families. This worthy class has rightly been called the "backbone of the Army," and it is particularly in the higher grades and on the best type of men that the burden is especially heavy.

Act of Congress May 18, 1917, provided the following additional pay for enlisted men:

- Base pay not over \$21, an increase of \$15.
- Base pay not over \$24, an increase of \$12.
- Base pay \$30, \$36, and \$40, an increase of \$8.
- Base pay of \$45 and over, an increase of \$6.

This class has been financially helped by the "family allowances" which the Congress authorized during the war, but which are for the emergency only. This means that they automatically cease one month after the formal declaration of peace. In the meantime the cost of living has increased far above what it was at the time these family allowances were authorized.

In the field even the meager commutation of \$12 per month for the one room authorized ceases.

Many of these married enlisted men are separated from their families, due to inability to get accommodations at or near their stations, due to the exorbitant prices of the latter. They have no money to pay railroad fares to visit their families or have the latter visit them. There are many such domestic tragedies in the families of worthy men whose bravery and faithful service entitle them to the consideration of the country.

With the dollar buying but 50 cents' worth under former standards, these men are hard put to it to exist. Many have been forced to give up their insurance. They see plenty of opportunities open to them in civil life at far higher rates of pay which would insure reasonable comfort for their families. Despite love for the service, an inexorable economic pressure must tend to force them out of it, taking with them the training and experience that it has cost the Government large sums to confer and which are essential to military effectiveness. Such action may be expected as their enlistment periods terminate and their contracts with the Government expire.

It is regrettable, but true, that the American dollar has sunk so low in purchasing power as to be worth less than Chinese money. This particularly

affects our troops in Tientsin and adds to the further burdens of cost of living there.

Extract of a letter from an officer on duty in Tientsin, China, dated 15th of September, 1919: "Living in Tientsin is high, but it is the cost of things in general rather than the food. Our house cost \$108 per month exclusive of the coal and light, which I have to furnish. Within the past week the Navy and marines serving in China have been granted a base pay of \$2.32, which means that for every dollar of our money one draws in native currency \$2.32. This is very wonderful, of course. The reason for this is that originally the Chinese dollar had a purchasing value of \$0.50 of our money. Very recently our money has fallen in the exchange so low that it is one day below par and the next day just above the native dollar. This has practically reduced our salary one-half."

THE HIGH COST OF LIVING IN ITS RELATION TO THE ARMY.

The high cost of living is so universally felt that it is everywhere recognized. It affects all classes of society, but as far as the Army is concerned the essence of the situation is stated in the following quotation from an analysis made by a committee of the Council of National Defense:

"The only complaints of the high cost of living which have justification are those which are based upon the inability of the present income to maintain persons on reasonable standards of living at the present prices. * * * Such well-founded complaints mean that increase of income has not kept pace with increased cost of living, and therefore simply enforced a reduction in the standards of living." (Analysis of the High Cost of Living Problem, p. 6, August, 1919, Council National Defense.)

This is precisely the condition of the Army. Its pay was fixed in 1908, without any provision made to adjust it to changes in the cost of living; and the very nature of its work prevents the personnel from influencing in any way the productivity of the Nation, upon which depends in a large measure the cost of life's necessities. The pay remains stationary, whereas the purchasing power of the dollar goes steadily down as the prices rise. This is equivalent to reducing proportionately the pay of the Army. The Army offers no chance to increase earnings by greater industry.

General rise in the cost of living.—Since 1908 the increase in the cost of living has steadily advanced until the present time, when a comparison of the prices of the necessities of life shows an average increase of approximately 110 per cent to date. Since 1914, when the World War began, Government statistics show an average increase of some commodities of approximately 73 per cent. This means that the 1919 dollar buys only 48 cents as much as the 1908 dollar, and 58 cents as much as the 1914 dollar. More specifically, since 1914—

	Per cent.
Food has increased.....	92
Clothing has increased.....	100
Fuel and light have increased.....	57
Shelter has increased.....	28
Sundries have increased.....	63
All items.....	73

Food.—Food has gone up 92 per cent. As far, therefore, as this item is concerned, the purchasing power of the dollar is cut in half.

The rise in food may be best exemplified by comparing the cost of the Army ration at various periods. It has risen from 19.65 cents in 1908 to 53.82 cents in September, 1919, or an increase of 170 per cent. As the ration represents the sum total of staple foods appropriate to the balanced diet, its components are purchased in large quantities to the best advantage, and neither the cost of transportation or local conditions enter as factors. It is perhaps the best standard of fluctuation in costs, in so far as the power of money in respect to the purchase of foods is concerned. If we take 1908 as a standard, therefore, an officer's dollar to-day goes only as far as 37 cents did 11 years ago in buying at the commissary. The increase for officers' pay proposed in H. R. 9204 does not equal the increased cost to the officer of food alone.

It is true that officers and enlisted men have the privilege of buying from the zone supply officer at wholesale prices, but it must be borne in mind that they pay the increased prices there also. Furthermore, he can not buy at the commissary fresh fruits, vegetables, and in most cases fresh meats, but

must purchase these commodities from the retailer the same as anyone else. It is only upon the staple articles, therefore, that a saving is made. And this saving is not as large as supposed. For example, a comparison was made between the unit price of food staples in the commissary in Washington with the identical articles of food purchased from a first-class grocer. The food staples selected for comparison were taken from the charge sales slips of officers of the following rank, for one month:

1 brigadier general.....	\$56.49
1 colonel.....	54.65
1 lieutenant colonel.....	30.35
1 major.....	41.23
1 captain.....	40.93
1 lieutenant.....	32.75

An average of \$42.73 per month. It is not that the colonel ate more than the lieutenant, but that he had more in his family to feed. A comparison was then made between the unit prices of the articles on these slips with those at the grocer's, whereupon it was found that the unit cost of 71 various articles at the commissary was \$16.43 and at the grocer's \$21.99, or a saving of \$5.56 per month. This figure represents the largest saving, for it is arrived at by selecting a few slips at random. If all of the sales slips could be averaged, it would be found that a smaller variety of articles is purchased.

The cost of food is the largest items in the average family budget, as the best statistics show an expenditure of 43.1 per cent of the income for this necessity. As applied to the Army, this means that an officer drawing \$2,400 in 1914 spent on his food \$862 yearly. That amount bought only the minimum necessary for his existence and that of his family, plain, simple diet. To-day, if they continue to eat the same amount and quality, he must expend \$1,655, leaving them only \$745 for all of the other necessities of life. Officers are not entitled to a ration, as is popularly supposed.

Clothing.—Between July, 1914, and July, 1919, the cost of clothing has increased over 100 per cent. This is a conservative figure. The Council of National Defense report places the increase as high as 150 per cent. Further increases are predicted for fall and winter. In a trial budget for one man for one year, based on comparative prices in July, 1914, and in July, 1919, it was found that the same articles of clothing which in 1914 cost \$58.70 cost to-day \$118, or an increase of over 100 per cent.

The Government absorbs the high cost of clothing for the enlisted man but not for the officer and his family nor for the family of the married noncommissioned officer. The Government makes no clothing allowance for the officer.

To illustrate again with the officer's pay above: The average per cent of the family budget paid for clothing is 13.2 per cent. In 1914 this represented an outlay of \$264. To-day this same amount of clothing costs \$528. Uniforms have probably suffered more from profiteering than civilian clothes. Food and clothes have eaten up \$1,655 plus \$528, or \$2,183, leaving but \$217 for all other expenses.

Shelter.—Although rent charges vary considerably from place to place, the estimate of an increase of 28 per cent, as a whole, may be taken as broadly representative of the country. And to quote from the report of the committee of the Council of National Defense which investigated rent conditions for Congress, "The period of high increasing rents and of high and ascending prices of houses appears to be fairly certain of continuing for some time to come" (p. 183).

As affecting the Army, it was formerly the custom for the majority of officers to live at Army posts, where quarters were provided. The war, however, has increased the number of officers of the Army and has brought about an entirely different situation. The number of officers is in great excess of the actual quarters in Army posts, so that the majority of the officers live in cities and draw commutation of quarters. Besides, the military situation of the country has changed, which will hereafter make it imperative for a large part of the officers to pay for their shelter out of their commutation. That is to say, the principle of regrouping our forces into division is admitted, and in none of these division areas, with perhaps minor exceptions, are there any quarters. Officers are hence required to rent houses for their families in near-by cities, and not infrequently they are obliged to maintain two establishments—one for themselves at the camp and another for their families in town. It further happens that the duties of officers require them to live largely in the

more congested centers, where rents are high. In smaller communities near camps the number of officers and men requiring quarters promptly produces such congestion and operates to greatly increase the cost of rentals.

It is not possible for officers to rent suitable quarters with their commutation allowance. The allowance for quarters was authorized by act of Congress March 2, 1907, since when, despite the increase in rent values all over the country, it has not been changed. It fixed the rate at \$12 per room, exclusive of bath.

Desirable rooms for officers and their families can not now be obtained at anything like this price. As an instance in point, an officer in Chicago (a lieutenant colonel whose commutation was \$72), was compelled to pay \$75 for a small apartment consisting of a living room (used also as a bedroom), a kitchenette with a small alcove containing a dining-room table, and a combination bathroom and dressing room. Nor did the rent include gas and electricity, and, as he states, "not a ray of sunshine penetrated this apartment all day." A captain in Washington writes that he is paying \$219 for board and lodging for his wife and child in a boarding house where they have a small, dingy room. He states, "This is as modest and cheap a place as I can possibly live and maintain any degree of self-respect."

In Washington, the minimum price of a room in which an officer would be even comfortable is \$25 to \$30 per month. The Army and Navy Club, for example, charges at its minimum \$45 per month for a small room without bath. Increase in rents prevents the officer from procuring for his commutation allowance more than one-third to one-half the number of rooms which Congress in 1907 thought appropriate for his grade. The same conditions exist everywhere, as the budgets of officers show. Examples might be cited ad infinitum. (See Budgets of Officers.)

In this connection, attention is invited to the fact that whereas an act of Congress approved April 16, 1918, authorized commutation of quarters for the dependents of commissioned officers while the said officers were in the field, this is a measure that affords only temporary relief, inasmuch as it was authorized only "during the emergency" and while officers were in the field. Under the regrouping, the Army officers will not be in the field, but nevertheless they will be obliged to maintain their families in nearby cities. It is to be hoped the bill to continue this commutation, which has passed the Senate (S. 2623), will also pass the House. Should it become a law it will materially help a class of officers on certain duties, but it will not relieve the general burden of the quarters question as a whole for officers.

Fuel, heat, and light.—The cost to average families of fuel, heat, and light combined was in July, 1919, 57 per cent above the average in 1914. Some statistics (Council National Defense) place this increase at 80 per cent.

The Army is not especially affected by the changes in the cost of fuel, heat, and light if living on a post, for the allowance is adequate. Then, too the Secretary of War can from time to time revise the rates. But the case is different when an officer is living in a city, as most of them are to-day. He is not allowed to purchase his fuel from the Government, but must buy it in the market, paying all increases and dealers' profits. The Government rates are fixed according to the cost of the fuel purchased wholesale, and it is upon these rates that officers draw their money allowance for fuel, heat, and light.

Sundries.—Under this heading is included household furnishings, travel expenses, life insurance premiums, fire insurance, books and reading material, sickness, maid service, recreation, telephone, water, etc. The estimated average increase in the cost of sundries since July, 1914, is 63 per cent.

The great increase in food, clothing, and shelter just discussed has practically eliminated from the officer's budget any provision for most of the so-called sundries. Unless he has private means he and his family must lead an ascetic life. They must deny themselves amusements and do their own domestic work. But one of the greatest expenses to which a married officer is subjected is the transportation of his family from one station to another. In the last 10 years, and especially since 1917, the exigencies of the service have necessitated frequent changes of officers, and as it is only proper and fitting that an officer live with his family, it means a very great financial burden to him for their traveling expenses. Railroad fares have increased from 2 to 3 cents, plus the war tax. In locating at a new station the officer usually must seek temporary accommodations at a hotel for himself and his family. Even the rates at a medium-class hotel mean a grievous drain on the slender funds an officer may have.

The Government allows the officer mileage for himself only. The British Government, in contrast, provides that "The cost of removal of officers' families and their baggage (within the authorized scale) by land on change of station will be borne by the public."

PURCHASING PRICE OF THE DOLLAR.

As already stated, the Army is not asking for an increase in pay, but an adjustment of the purchasing price of the dollar.

Statements showing the present purchasing value of Army pay as compared with the purchasing value in 1908.

Pay of a second lieutenant in 1908-----	\$1,700
Pay required in 1919 to give him a salary only equal in purchasing power to his 1908 pay-----	3,541
An increase in dollars of-----	1,841
The amount of increase proposed under the Stiness bill (H. R. 9204) is only-----	510
Raising the present base pay to only-----	2,200
Or, conversely, his 1908 pay of-----	1,700
If the dollar then had only its present purchasing value would, in 1908, have amounted to only-----	818

Using the same reasoning the 1908 base pay has shrunk in buying value by grade as follows:

First lieutenant to-----	960
Captain to-----	1,152
Major to-----	1,440
Lieutenant colonel to-----	1,680
Colonel to-----	1,920
Brigadier general to-----	2,880
Major General to-----	3,840

A major of 20 years' service then has the purchasing power of a first lieutenant of 1908.

The above is figured upon the actual fact that the dollar to-day has lost by depreciation in purchasing power 53 per cent, or in other words is only worth 48 cents. This figure is arrived at by the Navy Department from analysis of its records of past and present costs.

All economists agree that a new price level has risen and that prices as a whole will never fall to where they were before. Individual commodities may fluctuate, rising and falling like the waves of the sea, but the tide, a general increased level, has risen to stay. Hence, the purchasing power of the dollar will continue low unless some readjustment is made.

RESIGNATIONS.

The conditions described above have resulted in the resignations with few exceptions, of 1,932 officers since the armistice, a period of 11 months. These resignations are distributed throughout all of the grades below colonel. Taking the maximum strength of the Regular Army as a basis, namely 11,753 officers and 236,291 enlisted men approximately, the total resignations to date means that more than one officer out of every six has resigned.

Of the total resignations, 348 were submitted by officers belonging to the Regular Army proper, that is whose commissions were permanent. In other words, these officers had chosen the Army as a career but were for the most part, forced out of the service by the inadequacy of their pay and through their desire to improve their condition of life. Many of them had many years of service. This number (348) greatly exceeds all of the voluntary and involuntary resignations from the Regular Army for the 10 years 1908-1917. During that period, 252 resignations were accepted by the War Department, but a large proportion of these were for the "good of the service," and can not therefore be included in making a just comparison with the 1918-19 figures.

The remaining resignations (1,584) were submitted by officers who held provisional appointments. These young officers obviously had thought, at one time, of choosing the Army as a career also but they found after a probational period of two years or less, that the financial restrictions are so distressing as to nul-

lily the other advantages of the service. These young men had an assured status which would have permitted them to remain in the service had they desired to do so. Obviously they found neither the present situation nor the future prospects sufficiently attractive.

Both the permanent and provisional officers feel that as professional men and executives, they have positions open to them in civil life which are much more attractive than anything that the Army with its comparatively low rate of pay can offer them.

A few quotations from the resignations will illustrate the feeling regarding the inadequacy of the pay.

A lieutenant colonel writes: " * * * my obligation to my family requires that I seek more lucrative employment in order to assure my son's future. The present pay or any increase contemplated will no longer permit the standard of living formerly obtaining in the service and as I am entirely dependent upon what I earn I feel that the retention of my commission would be an injustice to those whose future I must guard." This officer had 18 years' service.

A colonel, General Staff, writes: "Have an opportunity to engage in educational work which offers better prospects and remuneration than does my commission as an officer of the Army." This officer had 20 years' service.

A lieutenant, Medical Corps, writes: "I find it impossible to support my family consisting of a wife and one minor dependant on my present salary."

These examples might be quoted extensively but the tenor of all of them is to the effect that it has become impossible to live with appropriate comfort on the present Army pay.

To be more specific, in the Medical Corps, out of 124 resignations, 91 gave as reason either financial distress in the Army, or desire to enter private practice with the prospects and hope of better reward.

In addition to the resignations, using the Medical Corps as an example, it is finding it impossible to fill all of the other vacancies. The condition is very serious. The following figures are eloquent:

Total vacancies in the Medical Corps----- 900

NUMBER OF CANDIDATES FOR THE REGULAR ARMY.

Medical Corps examination, August, 1919-----	120
Number actually appearing for examination-----	67
Number qualified as a result of the examination-----	28

This exhausted all candidates for appointment in the Medical Corps who were qualified under the law and who applied for the last examination.

The Army Medical School has lost, since October 1, 1919, 31 officers from the faculty and students, out of a hypothetical student body of 72, authorized to take the present course. This grave condition will continue unless some readjustment of the pay of officers is made. Otherwise it will be impossible to retain the proper type of medical officer.

Nor do the resignations fully express the desire of officers to resign. Many of the older officers would resign, if they did not feel that their responsibilities were too great to permit them to change their careers after years of service. There are many applications for retirement on 30 years' service.

When they entered the Army, economic conditions were such that they were practically assured of a decent standard of living and could count upon reasonably providing for the protection and education of their families. The revolution in our economic life in the past 10 years and especially since the war has swept away this guaranty and they are compelled to accept conditions of living that they would repel if younger men. This explains why the proportion of younger officers is so much greater than the older officers. Nevertheless, when the proper opportunity presents itself, officers of long experience are resigning. This means a great loss to the Army, for all of their experience and talent is turned into channels of civil life.

A typical example of the modern conditions under which officers are living will serve to show why many resign:

The commanding officer, Fort McDowell, Calif., writes under date of September 27, 1919: "There is no officers' nor bachelors' mess building at this station and the bachelor officers take most of their meals at the exchange restaurant, paying the regular prices. There is no other place for them to mess, and no other place for transient officers to get their meals. In taking command here last month there was no place for me to mess, my household goods not having arrived from the East. Of 20 officers in this depot, not a

since one has a cook and all are doing their own work, it being impossible to keep help of any sort on this island except at almost prohibitive prices. Up to this morning I had succeeded in keeping a Japanese cook at \$80 per month but he departed, maintaining he could secure higher wages elsewhere in doing harvesting work. He did nothing but cook for three, no housework nor laundry * * *."

Resignations of West Point Cadets.—On October 3 and 4, 18 resignations of cadets reached the War Department. Of these, 11 expressed the desire to leave the service for financial and business reasons. In the last two years (1918, 1919), 169 cadets have resigned, whereas during the preceding 10 years only 113 resigned. The fact that young cadets should renounce a military career at its very threshold is cause for serious concern, especially when the barrier seems to be inadequate pay. These are the young men who will eventually be the leaders of the Army, and it is very desirable that this good material be retained by the Government.

To sum up the basic cause of the present low morale of the Army and of the extraordinary number of resignations is beyond a doubt a rising cost of living and a stationary rate of pay. The present pay of the Army was fixed in 1908 (sec. 1261, R. S., as amended by act May 11, 1908). Since that date there has been no revision of the pay.

Attention is called to the provision in the new British warrant granting an increase of pay to the British army.

"1. The new rates shown in the following tables are granted in consideration of the present high cost of living, and the rates of pay, half pay, and retired pay will be subject, after five years to revision, either upward or downward to an extent not exceeding 20 per cent, according as the cost of living rises or falls. After July 1, 1924, a further revision may take place every three years."

The British Government has recognized that the purchasing power of the dollar is a varying quantity, and has made a just provision for the officers and men of the army:

INCREASE OF THE PAY OF FOREIGN ARMIES.

Great Britain.—On September 15, 1919, the British war office made public a royal warrant increasing the pay of the officers and enlisted men of the army. The British base pay is somewhat smaller than that of the United States for the corresponding grades, but the allowances are more numerous. The pay of the corporal and sergeant is higher than in our Army. Also the higher grades among the officers are more generously paid.

Japan.—The Japanese army has received a graded increase from 50 per cent for the lower grades to zero for lieutenant general.

Argentine.—The pay of the army officer on starting his career is somewhat smaller than that of the corresponding grade in the United States, but as his services increase, the advantages accrue, and reach their maximum on the officer's retirement.

Italy.—Italy increased the pay of her officers in February, 1918, from 30 per cent to approximately 11 per cent in the high grades.

No data is at hand regarding the French Army, although it has been reported that the Government has increased the pay of the army.

All of the above countries are poorer than the United States, but still they have recognized the necessity of meeting the high cost of living and tried to raise the purchasing power of the army personnel to conform to local costs and standards.

WAGES AND SALARIES IN CIVIL LIFE.

Although officers of the Army are professional men and paid as such, still it is desirable and pertinent to point out by comparison of the relative high wages and salaries that are being paid in civil life for nonprofessional work and labor. The great disparity between financial reward for intellectual attainments and that for mechanical labor will be all the more apparent.

In the great majority of the country's industries wages have not only kept pace with the advancing cost of living, but in some cases have exceeded them. The average wage increase in July, 1919, was 77.2 per cent higher than in July, 1914; that is, the general rise in the cost of living, namely, 73 per cent, has been met in the industries by a rise in wages of 77.2 per cent. The pay of the Army has remained stationary during this period. The wageworker is better off; the Army far worse off.

Examining the wage increases by trades, the very figures of the War Department bureaus employing labor are illuminating. Bricklayers receive an average of \$1 per hour; painters, 75 cents per hour; plumbers, \$1 per hour; plasterers, 90 cents to \$1 per hour. These figures are the union wage and do not include bonuses and overtime. For example, the Water Transport Division of the War Department paid for some time stevedores an average weekly wage of \$61, although the wage scales, representing as they do the minimum, would not show any such return.

CONCLUSION.

With all of the above in mind, it seems proper to recommend at this time an increase in the pay for the Army. The proposed increase will not by any means restore all the reasonable comfort which Congress in 1908 felt that officers should have, but it will help to ameliorate the financial difficulties under which officers now labor. It will partly share the burden which the Army is now carrying alone. It will also serve to stop the enormous number of resignations, thereby saving excellent officer material to the Government.

Action of this nature is essential to maintain the efficiency of the Army as a whole and to insure the entrance and retention of the best type of officer. On September 24, 1776, Washington wrote to Congress apropos of paying the officers properly in order to obtain a suitable type, as follows:

"* * * there are in my judgment no other possible means of obtaining them but by establishing your Army on a permanent footing and giving your officers good pay. This will induce gentlemen and men of character to engage, and, till the bulk of your officers is composed of such persons as are actuated by principles of honor and a spirit of enterprise, you have little to expect from them. They should have such allowances as will enable them to live like and support the character of gentlemen." And again: "The officer makes you the same reply, with the remark that his pay will not support him, and he can not ruin himself and his family to serve his country when every member of the community is equally interested and benefited by his labors."

More pertinent still are Washington's remarks in his letter to Congress, January 28, 1778:

"A small knowledge of human nature will convince us that, with far the greatest part of mankind, interest is the governing principle, and that almost every man is more or less under its influence. Motives of public virtue may for a time, or in particular instances, actuate men to the observance of a conduct purely disinterested, but they are not of themselves sufficient to produce a persevering conformity to the refined dictates and obligations of social duty. Few men are capable of making a continual sacrifice of all views of private interest or advantage to the common good. It is in vain to exclaim against the depravity of human nature on this account. The fact is so—the experience of every age and nation has proved it, and we must in a great measure change the constitution of man before we can make it otherwise. No institution not built on the presumptive truth of these maxims can succeed."

APPENDIX II.

RATES OF PAY FOR BRITISH ARMY.

MORE ARMY PAY—NEW RATES FOR ALL RANKS—PERIODICAL REVISION—THE COST OF LIVING.

Two royal warrants were issued as army orders by the war office on Saturday—one laying down new rates of pay, half pay, and retired pay of officers, and the other dealing with increase of pay and pensions for soldiers.

The following is the text of the order referring to officers' pay:

ROYAL WARRANT—RATES OF PAY, HALF PAY, AND RETIRED PAY OF OFFICERS.

George R. I.:

Whereas we deem it expedient to revise the general scheme of emoluments of British officers of our army:

Our will and pleasure is that the provisions concerning the pay and non-effective pay of our army contained in our warrant for the pay, appointment,

promotion, and noneffective pay of our army, dated December 1, 1914, and in such other warrants granted since that date as are still in force, and the regulations governing the allowances of our army issued with our warrant of September 28, 1914, as modified by such other warrants granted since that date as are still in force, shall be amended and modified as laid down in general conditions and tables appended to this our warrant.

The new rates and conditions shall take effect as regards pay, half pay, and allowances from July 1, 1919, for all officers serving on the date of this our warrant, and as regards retired pay from April 1, 1919.

The rates and conditions laid down in this our warrant shall also apply to all officers commissioned after the date of this our warrant, unless otherwise specifically provided, except that such officers shall not have the option of drawing any pay or retired pay under previous warrants where the rates under those warrants are higher than in this our warrant.

Given at our court at St. James's this 13th day of September, 1919, in the tenth year of our reign.

By His Majesty's command.

WINSTON S. CHURCHILL.

GENERAL CONDITIONS.

1. The new rates shown in the following tables are granted in consideration of the present high cost of living, and the rates of pay, half pay, and retired pay will be subject, after five years, to revision either upward or downward to an extent not exceeding 20 per cent, according as the cost of living rises or falls. After July 1, 1924, a further revision may take place every three years.

2. In any case in which transfer from the rates of pay and allowances hitherto in force to the new rates involves a loss of emoluments the officer may continue in receipt of the rates of pay and allowances hitherto in force until such time as, on change of appointment or on account of increment or promotion, or abolition of special war emoluments (e. g., army of occupation bonus), the new rates are equal to or exceed the old. An officer who has once accepted the new rates of pay or half pay will not be allowed to revert to the old rates (see also paragraph 17 of Table XIV).

3. The new rates will not be taken into account in the assessment of gratuities under article 497, pay warrant, under the royal warrant of February 10, 1919 (published in army order 85 of 1919), or in accordance with the terms of any special contract in connection with service during the Great War. Where dependent upon rates of pay, these gratuities will be calculated on the rates of pay in force prior to July 1, 1919.

4. For the most part consolidated rates of pay are abolished, and in such cases staff officers, in common with regimental and departmental officers, will be eligible to draw allowances under the usual conditions according to the classification of their appointments, or according to their ranks if not otherwise classified.

5. Engineer and corps pay under the new scheme will be drawn only by such officers of the Royal Engineers and Royal Army Service Corps as qualify for these additional emoluments under the conditions laid down in the tables appended hereto.

6. The following are abolished for all officers who draw the rates of pay and allowances provided in this warrant:

- (a) Guards pay.
- (b) Armament pay.
- (c) Special rates for officers commissioned from the ranks.
- (d) The bonus for the armies of occupation granted by Army Order 54 of 1919.

(e) Children's allowance as from January 1, 1920, for all officers whether they draw the new rates or continue to draw those in force prior to July 1, 1919.

Up to December 31, 1919, officers will not become ineligible for children's allowance by reason of the fact that the increase in pay may raise their emoluments beyond the limits laid down for the grant of the allowance. The same ranks and staff grades and classes as are now eligible will continue to be eligible.

7. Additional pay, extra-duty pay, working pay, charge pay, and specialist pay. The existing rates and conditions will continue for the present, except when specifically modified by the present warrant, but as subject to early revision. Where a rate of extra pay includes armament pay (e. g., for Hong-

kong—Singapore R. G. A.) the rate will be reduced by the amount of armament pay hitherto applicable to the rank.

The additional 1 shilling a day for the senior major and the 5 shillings, etc., a day for adjutants, provided in the existing warrant, will continue to be issuable.

8. Command pay: The rates hitherto in force are doubled, unless otherwise specifically provided for by the present warrant.

9. Rewards for distinguished or meritorious service: The future application of the funds now provided to meet the cost of rewards under article 633, pay warrant is under consideration.

10. This warrant does not apply to officers of the West African Regiment or of the Royal Malta Artillery, to non-European officers, or to any officers who, although drawing consolidated rates of pay, are not specifically provided for in this warrant. Such officers will, pending further instructions, continue to draw pay and allowances under the warrants hitherto in force.

In Tables I to XV the expression "total service" means "commissioned service on full pay," and the expression "service as such" means "full pay service in the rank indicated."

TABLES OF TOTAL EMOLUMENTS.

These tables are given for the purpose of showing approximately, for the convenience of officers, the total emoluments issuable at present under the new scheme. They refer to officers serving at home and not occupying Government quarters or drawing rations in kind. They must not be regarded as the authority for any of the rates, which are laid down in the royal warrant and the various regulations.

A "married" officer is one who is or has been married, and is 30 years of age or over.

All officers serving on September 13, 1919, who were then or had been then married, irrespective of age, are eligible for allowances as "married."

In addition to the emoluments shown, children's allowance is given until December 31, 1919, under Army Order 44 of 1918—maximum £96 per annum.

An outfit allowance will be given on first appointment to a permanent regular commission. The amount will be announced shortly.

Income tax at civilian rates after April 4, 1920. (For taxable allowances see Army Council's Instructions on this warrant, par. 6.)

Normal rates for regimental officers (Cavalry, Royal Artillery, Foot Guards, Infantry, etc.)

Rank.	Pay.	Rations.	Married.			Unmarried.		Total per annum. ¹	
			Lodging.	Fuel and light (average).	Furniture allowance.	Lodging.	Fuel and light (average).	Married.	Unmarried.
	s. d.	s. d.	s. d.	s. d.	s. d.	s. d.	s. d.	£	£
Second Lieutenant.....	13 0	2 1	3 6	1 0	2 0	2 0	0 6	394	320
After 2 years' service.....	16 0							448	375
Lieutenant.....	16 0	2 1	3 6	1 0	2 0	2 0	0 6	448	375
After 7 years' service.....	19 0							503	429
Captain.....	23 6	2 1	4 6	2 0	2 0	2 3	0 6	622	517
After 15 years' service.....	26 0							657	563
Major.....	31 6	2 1	4 6	2 0	2 0	3 0	0 11	768	684
After 5 years as such.....	37 0							868	784
Lieutenant colonel.....	47 6	2 1	4 6	2 0	2 0	1 0	4 4	1,242	1,184
command pay ²	10 0								

¹When Engineer or Royal Army Service Corps pay is drawn these rates are increased by: Second Lieutenant, £36; lieutenant, £36; captain, £54; major, £91; and lieutenant colonel, £127.

²Lieutenant colonel's command pay in Royal Engineers and Royal Army Service Corps will normally be 6s. a day.

With soldier servants (or £36 a year per servant in lieu in certain arms) and with chargers and forage when mounted.

Appointment.	Pay.	Rations.	Servant.	Married.			Unmarried.			Total per annum.	
				Lodging.	Fuel and light (average).	Furniture allowance.	Lodging.	Fuel and light (average).	Married.	Unmarried.	
WAR OFFICE STAFF.											
Director, grade A.....	£ s. d. 4 15 0	s. d. 2 1	s. d. 4 0	s. d. 11 0	s. d. 3 7	s. d. 2 0	s. d. 11 0	s. d. 2 7	£ 2,110	£ 2,092	
Director, grade B.....	3 14 6	2 1	4 0	8 6	2 10	2 0	8 6	1 10	1,713	1,699	
Deputy director.....	3 6 0	2 1	2 0	5 6	2 10	2 0	5 6	1 10	1,467	1,413	
G. S. O. 1 and A. A. G.....	2 17 9	2 1	2 0	5 6	2 0	2 0	4 0	1 7	1,317	1,262	
G. S. O. 2 and D. A. A. G.....	1 18 9	2 1	2 0	4 6	2 0	2 0	3 0	1 2	1,080	81	
G. S. O. 3 and staff captain.....	1 10 9	2 1	2 0	4 6	2 0	2 0	3 0	0 10	780	712	
Staff lieutenant, Class I.....	1 4 9	2 1	2 0	3 6	1 0	2 0	2 3	0 10	644	583	
Staff lieutenant, Class II.....	1 1 9	2 1	2 0	3 6	1 0	2 0	2 3	0 10	590	527	
GENERAL OFFICERS.											
In command.											
G. O. C., first class.....	10 0 0	2 1	6 0	16 6	4 5	9 0	16 6	3 5	4,312	4,298	
G. O. C., second class.....	7 10 0	2 1	6 0	13 9	4 0	9 0	13 9	3 0	3,372	3,378	
Major general (divisional commander).....	5 0 0	2 1	4 0	11 0	3 7	7 0	11 0	2 7	3,329	2,275	
Brigadier general.....	3 4 6	2 1	4 0	8 6	2 10	2 0	8 6	1 10	1,531	1,477	
Not in command.											
General's appointment.....	7 0 0	2 1	6 0	16 6	4 5	2 0	16 6	3 5	3,120	3,068	
Lieutenant general's appointment.....	6 0 0	2 1	6 0	13 9	4 0	2 0	13 9	3 0	2,698	2,644	
Major general's appointment.....	4 10 0	2 1	4 0	11 0	3 7	2 0	11 0	2 7	2,055	2,011	
Brigadier general's appointment.....	3 4 6	2 1	4 0	8 6	2 10	2 0	8 6	1 10	1,531	1,477	
Brigadier general i/c administration.....	3 10 0	2 1	4 0	8 6	2 10	2 0	8 6	1 10	1,630	1,535	
Table money and free forage for the number of horses authorized in addition.											
TYPICAL STAFF GRADES.											
G. S. O. 1 and A. A. G.....	2 15 0	2 1	2 0	5 6	2 10	2 0	5 6	1 10	1,266	1,212	
G. S. O. 2 and D. A. A. G.....	1 16 0	2 1	2 0	4 6	2 0	2 0	4 0	1 7	894	834	
Brigade major.....	1 13 0	2 1	2 0	4 6	2 0	2 0	3 0	1 2	832	780	
G. S. O. 3 and staff captain.....	1 8 0	2 1	2 0	4 6	2 0	2 0	3 0	1 2	740	661	
Staff lieutenant:											
Class I.....	1 2 0	2 1	2 0	3 6	1 0	2 0	2 3	0 10	534	532	
Class II.....	0 19 0	2 1	2 0	3 6	1 0	2 0	2 3	0 10	540	477	

Appointment.	Pay.	Rations.	Servant.	Married.			Unmarried.		Total per annum.*
				Lodging.	Fuel and light (average).	Furniture allowance.	Lodging.	Fuel and light (average).	
ROYAL ARMY MEDICAL CORPS.									
Lieutenant.....	£ s. d. 1 0 0	s. d. 2 1	s. d. 2 0	s. d. 3 6	s. d. 1 0	s. d. 2 0	s. d. 2 3	s. d. 0 10	£ 538
Captain.....	1 5 0	2 1	2 0	4 6	2 0	2 0	3 0	1 2	622
Captain after 5 years.....	1 7 6	2 1	2 0	4 6	2 0	2 0	3 0	1 2	652
Captain after 10 years.....	1 10 0	2 1	2 0	4 6	2 0	2 0	3 0	1 2	698
Major.....	1 15 0	2 1	2 0	4 6	2 0	2 0	4 0	1 7	815
Major after 15 years.....	2 0 0	2 1	2 0	4 6	2 0	2 0	4 0	1 7	907
Lieutenant colonel.....	2 10 0	2 1	2 0	4 6	2 0	2 0	4 6	1 7	1,142
Lieutenant colonel after 20 years.....	2 12 6	2 1	2 0	4 6	2 0	2 0	4 6	1 7	1,187
Lieutenant colonel after 25 years.....	2 15 0	2 1	2 0	4 6	2 0	2 0	4 6	1 7	1,233
Colonel.....	3 0 0	2 1	2 0	5 6	2 10	2 0	5 6	1 10	1,449
Major general.....	4 10 0	2 1	4 0	11 0	3 7	2 0	11 0	2 7	2,056
ROYAL ARMY ORDNANCE CORPS. ¹									
Ordnance officer, fourth class.....	1 8 6	2 1	2 0	4 6	2 0	2 0	3 0	1 2	749
Ordnance officer with 15 years' service.....	1 11 0	2 1	2 0	4 6	2 0	2 0	3 0	1 2	765
Ordnance officer, third class.....	1 16 6	2 1	2 0	4 6	2 0	2 0	4 0	1 7	843
Ordnance officer after 15 years' service as such.....	2 1 0	2 1	2 0	4 6	2 0	2 0	4 0	1 7	996
Ordnance officer, second class.....	2 12 6	2 1	2 0	4 6	2 0	2 0	4 6	1 7	1,187
Ordnance officer, first class.....	3 0 0	2 1	2 0	5 6	2 10	2 0	5 6	1 10	1,354
Major general.....	4 10 0	2 1	4 0	11 0	3 7	2 0	11 0	2 7	2,055
ROYAL ARMY VETERINARY CORPS.									
Lieutenant.....	1 0 0	2 1	2 0	3 6	1 0	2 0	2 3	0 10	538
Captain.....	1 5 0	2 1	2 0	4 6	2 0	2 0	3 0	1 2	635
Captain after 2 years' service as such.....	1 7 6	2 1	2 0	4 6	2 0	2 0	3 0	1 2	652
Major.....	1 12 0	2 1	2 0	4 6	2 0	2 0	4 0	1 7	779
Major after 5 years' service as such.....	1 19 0	2 1	2 0	4 6	2 0	2 0	4 0	1 7	837
Lieutenant colonel.....	2 0 0	2 1	2 0	4 6	2 0	2 0	4 6	1 7	1,080
Colonel.....	2 15 0	2 1	2 0	5 6	2 10	2 0	5 6	1 10	1,212

¹ Commissaries, deputy commissaries, and assistant commissaries of ordnance, see under Quartermasters, etc.

Quartermasters, acting masters, directors of music, commissaries, deputy commissaries, and assistant commissaries of ordnance, assistant inspectors of ordnance machinery, assistant inspectors of armours, assistant inspectors of Royal Engineer machinery, assistant paymasters, inspectors of Army schools.

Rank and service.	Pay per day.	Rations.	Married.		Unmarried.		Total per annum.	
			Lodging.	Fuel and light allowance.	Lodging.	Fuel and light allowance.	Married.	Unmarried.
	s. d.	s. d.	s. d.	s. d.	s. d.	s. d.	£	
On appointment.....	19 0	2 1	3 6	1 0	2 0	2 3	503	
After 4 years' service.....	21 0	2 1	3 6	1 0	2 0	2 3	539	
After 6 years' service.....	23 0	2 1	4 6	2 0	2 0	2 3	612	
After 8 years' service.....	25 0	2 1	4 6	2 0	2 0	2 3	649	
After 12 years' service.....	30 0	2 1	4 6	2 0	2 0	3 0	740	
After 15 years' service.....	35 0	2 1	4 6	2 0	2 0	4 0	831	
Lieutenant colonel.....								
							£	
							440	
							477	
							516	
							552	
							586	
							774	

Charge pay (2s. 6 d., 10s. per day) and specialists' pay (2s. 6d. per day) in addition for a considerable percentage of officers (from £45-£180 per annum additional).

TABLE 1.—PAY OF WARRANT OFFICERS, NONCOMMISSIONED OFFICERS AND MEN.

1. For purposes of pay, warrant officers, noncommissioned officers, and men, the depots of whose units are situated in the United Kingdom, the Channel Islands, or the Isle of Man, will in future be divided into two main sections:

(i) Those drawing normal rates. These comprise Cavalry (including Household Cavalry), Royal Artillery (horse, field, and garrison), Infantry (including Foot Guards), Army Cyclist Corps, Machine Gun Corps, Labor Corps, School of Musketry, Military Provost Staff Corps, and Corps of Military Police, except tradesmen in each case; also such categories of Royal Engineers, Tank Corps, Royal Army Service Corps, Royal Army Medical Corps, Royal Army Ordnance Corps, Royal Army Veterinary Corps as are not classified as tradesmen;

(ii) Those drawing tradesmen's rates, viz., tradesmen of all arms, school-masters, Army Pay Corps, military accountant clerks and other clerks rated as such under war office authority.

2. The normal rates are as follows:

	Per day.	
	s.	d.
Regimental sergeant major, master gunner, first class, and all other warrant officers, Class I (except as stated in Table 2)-----	14	0
Regimental quartermaster sergeant-----	12	0
Quartermaster corporal major-----	12	0
Quartermaster segeant instructor-----	12	0
Squadron, battery, or company sergeant major-----	10	0
Squadron corporal major-----	10	0
Squadron quartermaster corporal-----	10	0
Squadron corporal major roughrider-----	10	0
Squadron sergeant major roughrider-----	10	0
Squadron corporal major instructor or squadron sergeant major instructor in fencing and gymnastics or in musketry-----	10	0
Battery or company sergeant major instructor-----	10	0
Squadron, battery, or company quartermaster sergeant-----	9	6
Color sergeant or staff sergeant-----	9	6
Sergeant cook, corporal cook (household cavalry)-----	7	6
Sergeant, corporal of horse (household cavalry), corporal of horse trumpeter, sergeant trumpeter, sergeant drummer, sergeant piper, or sergeant bugler-----	7	0
Lance sergeant-----	5	6
Corporal or bombardier-----	5	0
Lance corporal or lance bombardier-----	4	3
Trooper, gunner, driver, private, bugler, bandsman, kettle drummer, trumpeter, fifer, piper, or drummer-----	2	9
Ditto, after 2 years' service as above-----	3	6
Boy, until he attains the age of 18, or is placed on the recognized establishment of the band-----	1	0

3. Soldiers (excluding boys) up to and including lance sergeant drawing the above rates will be eligible in addition for proficiency pay at the rate of 6d. per day under the conditions shown in Table 4.

4. Soldiers of the Military Provost Staff Corps and of the Corps of Military Police (except tradesmen) of the rank of sergeant and below will draw a rate of pay of 6d. per day in excess of the rates shown in paragraph 2.

¹ Includes additional pay of 6d. per day for keeping the pay and mess book under article 898, pay warrant.

5. The rates for tradesmen of all arms and departments are as follows:

	Group.				
	A	B	C	D	E
	Per day.	Per day.	Per day.	Per day.	Per day.
	<i>s. d.</i>	<i>s. d.</i>	<i>s. d.</i>	<i>s. d.</i>	<i>s. d.</i>
Warrant officer, Class I (except as stated in Table 2).....	16 0	16 0	16 0	16 0	16 0
Regimental quartermaster sergeant.....	14 0	14 0	14 0	14 0	14 0
Quartermaster sergeant.....	12 0	12 0	12 0	12 0	12 0
Quartermaster sergeant instructor.....	12 0	12 0	12 0	12 0	12 0
Quartermaster corporal.....	12 0	12 0	12 0	12 0	12 0
Troop, company, or squadron sergeant major, or staff quartermaster sergeant, company sergeant major instructor.....	12 0	12 0	12 0	12 0	12 0
Troop, company, or squadron quartermaster sergeant, or staff sergeant.....	11 0	11 0	11 0	11 0	11 0
Sergeant.....	9 0	9 0	9 0	9 0	9 0
Lance sergeant.....	8 0	7 9	7 6	6 9	6 0
Corporal.....	7 3	7 0	6 9	6 0	5 6
Lance corporal.....	6 6	6 3	6 0	5 3	4 9
Sapper or private—					
Class I.....	5 0	4 9	4 6
After 2 years' service.....	6 0	5 9	5 6
Class II.....	4 6	4 3	4 0	3 9
After 2 years' service.....	5 6	5 3	5 0	4 9
Class III.....	4 0	3 9	3 6	3 3	3 0
After two years' service.....	5 0	4 9	4 6	4 3	4 0
Boy, when handy at a trade.....	1 6	1 6	1 6	1 6	1 6
On enlistment.....	1 0	1 0	1 0	1 0	1 0

6. The trades of all arms and departments classified in five groups (A-E) are shown in detail in Table 3. After a soldier has been enlisted for a trade in one of the groups he will be eligible for advancement in that group to a higher class or rank, but will not be transferred to any other group unless he is re-mustered in another trade in a different group. Soldiers of the rank of private will be classified according to qualifications. There will be universal standard tests for each trade for all arms, and soldiers will be placed in their appropriate class according to their qualifications. Should a soldier after having been placed in a class subsequently fall below the standard prescribed for that class, or fail to show diligence in his duties he will be disrated to a lower class or he may be removed from the tradesman's groups altogether.

Increments dependent on service will be subject to a satisfactory standard of military efficiency. Service in a class will count for increment in any higher class to which the soldier may be promoted.

No soldier will be paid under paragraph 5 who does not belong to a trade shown in Table 3.

7. Service during which a soldier is paid under paragraph 2 will count for increments under paragraph 5, in the case of transfer to a tradesman's group.

8. Clerks hitherto paid under articles 821, 865, 880, and 1009, pay warrant, will be paid as tradesmen. In the absence of instructions to the contrary promotions by time will continue as laid down in those articles, but no increments will be given for length of service in a particular rank. The question of increments and conditions of promotion generally for clerks are under consideration, and are subject to revision.

9. The term "regimental quartermaster sergeant" in the tradesmen's groups denotes quartermaster sergeants who are in charge of stores or equipment for a group of companies or equivalent units, and such other cases as may be specially authorized by the army council.

GENERAL CONDITIONS.

10. Detailed tables for each arm and branch, where the ranks or appointments are not provided for in paragraph 2 or 5 are appended in Table 2.

11. As from July 1, 1919, noncommissioned officers of the Royal Artillery, Royal Engineers, and Royal Army Ordnance Corps will be graded as follows for pay:

Royal Artillery: Corporal and first corporal of the band become lance sergeants; bombardier and second corporal of the band become corporals; lance bombardier becomes lance corporal.

Royal Engineers: Corporal becomes lance sergeant; second corporal becomes corporal.

Royal Army Ordnance Corps: Lance sergeant remains lance sergeant; corporal becomes lance sergeant; second corporal becomes corporal.

12. Men and boys who are unskilled at any trade on enlistment will be paid at normal rates (paragraph 2) while learning a trade, and until they have passed the necessary trade test for classification as tradesmen.

Men who have a trade on enlistment and are enlisted for service under one of the tradesmen's groups will be paid in their group under Class III from the date of enlistment, although not actually working at their trade while doing their recruit drills. After passing their recruit drills they will be paid the rate of the class for which they are qualified.

13. (a) Engineer pay, corps pay, war pay, proficiency pay as hitherto provided for in the pay warrant, service pay, and army of occupation bonus are abolished for soldiers who draw pay under this warrant. Additional pay and working pay remain as hitherto, unless specifically modified by the present warrant, but are subject to revision at an early date. Soldiers drawing pay under this warrant will have no claim to any additional or working pay which may be abolished in consequence of such revision.

(b) Additional pay under the following articles of the pay warrant is abolished for all those who draw pay under this warrant: Articles 748, 750 (b) (d) (g) and (k), 905, 906, 910, 920, 1003, 1011, 1022, 1029, and 1030. Additional pay above 6d per day under article 750 (a) is also abolished.

(c) Working pay under articles 845 and 946 to 951, pay warrant, is abolished for those who draw pay under this warrant. Where a soldier is employed on tradesmen's duties he will receive the appropriate pay for the trade, according to rank, group, and class, in substitution of pay under paragraphs 2, 3, and 4 of Table 1.

(d) The deductions of 1s 6d per day provided for in articles 872 and 876 of the pay warrant are abolished for those who draw pay under this warrant.

14. The existing separation, parents' and dependents' allowances and the concession granted by Army Order 1 of 1918, under which the allotment from a soldier's pay in order to qualify for separation or dependents' allowance is issued from public funds, will continue until December 31, 1919. The future of these allowances from that date is subject to further consideration for all who are now entitled to them.

15. As from October 1, 1919, field allowance for warrant officers serving other than in an area of active operations will be drawn on the same conditions as in peace as laid down in the Allowance Regulations, and Army Order 337 of 1914 is modified accordingly. Warrant officers serving in an area of active operations will continue to draw field allowance under present conditions. The definition of an "area of active operations" will be promulgated from time to time by the army council.

16. The system of charging national health insurance contributions against the accounts of soldiers is discontinued, and the soldiers' contributions will be borne by the public for all those who draw pay under this warrant.

17. Hospital stoppages will in future only be deducted where the disability is due to the soldier's own fault.

18. On or after the date of this warrant, soldiers enlisting, reenlisting, extending their color service, reengaging, voluntarily rejoining the colors or continuing in the service beyond 21 years will draw the new rates of pay from the date on which they enlist or enter upon their new engagement, except that those reenlisting under Army Order 124 of 1919 on or before the 20th of September, 1919, may elect to draw pay and allowances under the provisions of that army order. Prior service with the colors will count for increments of pay in the rank of private.

19. Subject to paragraph 18, soldiers now serving will be entitled to continue in receipt of their present rates of pay, if higher than those now approved, under the same conditions as hitherto in force during continuance of their present engagement, but this confers no claim to the continuance of special war emoluments or concessions, e. g., army of occupation bonus and war pay, beyond the date of their general abolition.

20. The sums payable by soldiers purchasing their discharge are under consideration and are subject to increase in view of the higher rates of pay now approved.

21. In view of the increased rates of pay now approved the establishments of ranks in the tradesmen's groups are liable to reconsideration, especially

with relation to the cases where soldiers are enlisted in, or are promoted shortly after enlistment to, higher ranks than private.

TABLE NO. 2.—RATES OF PAY NOT SPECIFICALLY COVERED BY PARAGRAPHS 2 AND 5 OF TABLE NO. 1.

(The paragraph numbers refer to corresponding articles in the pay warrant dated December 1, 1914.)

I. WARRANT OFFICERS, CLASS I.

The pay will be that of a warrant officer, Class I., as shown in paragraph 2 or 5 of Table 1, according as to the warrant officer is classed for normal or tradesman's rates, except that in the following instances the rate of pay will be—

	Per day.
	s. d.
Master gunner, second class, Royal Artillery-----	13 0
Subconductor, Royal Army Ordnance Corps-----	15 0
Staff sergeant, major, Royal Army Service Corps-----	15 0

II. WARRANT OFFICERS, CLASS II, NONCOMMISSIONED OFFICERS AND MEN.

797. Garrison and district staffs: Pay will be according to rank as laid down in Table I, without increments for length of service as quartermaster sergeant.

	Per day.
	s. d.
813. Cavalry, assistant at the cavalry school-----	10 0
815. Royal Artillery—	
Master gunner, third class-----	12 0
Sergeant of the band-----	7 0
First corporal of the band-----	5 6
Second corporal of the band-----	5 0
Musician-----	2 9
	3 6

818. European noncommissioned officers serving with the Hongkong-Singapore Royal Garrison Artillery and Sierra Leone Company of Artillery: The rates of pay are under consideration and pending further instructions the rates hitherto in force will continue. Any increased rates approved later will have retrospective effect from July 1, 1919.

855. West India Regiment (Europeans): The normal rates will apply. The question of additional pay for service on the West Coast of Africa is under consideration.

The sergeant master tailor will be paid as a tradesman.

857. West African Regiment: The rates of pay for European noncommissioned officers serving with the West African Regiment are under consideration, and pending further instructions the rates hitherto in force will continue.

West Coast of Africa: Pending further instructions, warrant officers, noncommissioned officers, and men serving on the West Coast will receive the rates of pay and coast pay hitherto in force. New rates of additional pay for service on the West Coast will be promulgated shortly, and these, together with the rates under paragraphs 2 and 5 of Table 1, will be issuable with retrospective effect from July 1, 1919.

885. Regular establishment of the special reserve, etc.: The rates shown in paragraphs 2 and 5 of Table 1 will apply.

III. ROYAL ENGINEERS, TANK CORPS, ROYAL ARMY SERVICE CORPS, ROYAL ARMY MEDICAL CORPS, ROYAL ARMY ORDNANCE CORPS, ROYAL ARMY VETERINARY CORPS, AND ARMY PAY CORPS.

Warrant officers, Class II, and noncommissioned officers down to and including sergeant, if classified as tradesmen, will be paid at the rates for their ranks

¹ Or 13s., according as he is classed as a trades man or otherwise.

shown in paragraph 5 of Table 1. If not tradesmen they will be paid as in paragraph 2 of Table 1.

Noncommissioned officers below the rank of sergeant and privates will be paid according to their trade group; those not classified in a trade in any group will be paid as in paragraph 2 of Table 1.

	Rate per day.
	s.
823. Royal Engineers, quartermaster sergeant.....	14
861. Royal Army Medical Corps, quartermaster sergeant.....	12
872. Royal Army Ordnance Corps: Armorer staff sergeants will be paid as staff sergeants without increments for length of service in the rank.	

IV. EXPERIMENTAL ESTABLISHMENTS.

	Rate per day.
	s. d.
995. Experimental quartermaster sergeant.....	12 0
Experimental staff sergeant.....	9 6

V. ESTABLISHMENTS FOR ENGINEER SERVICES.

	Rate per day.
	s.
1003. Military foreman of works or military mechanist:	
Quartermaster sergeant.....	14
Staff sergeant.....	11

VI. EDUCATIONAL ESTABLISHMENTS.

	Rate per day.
	s.
1018. Staff college:	
Staff sergeant, without additional pay.....	11
Draftsman, as tradesman, without additional pay.....	
1020. Royal Military College:	Per day.
Lithographer, as tradesman, without additional pay.....	s. d.
Sergeant of the band.....	7 0
Corporal of the band.....	5 0
Private of the band.....	2s. 9d. to 3 6
1023. School of Military Engineering and School of Electric Lighting, quartermaster sergeant instructor.....	14 0
1024. School of Musketry, sergeant instructor.....	8 6
1025. Gymnasla, sergeant instructor.....	8 6
1026A. Camel Corps School, Egypt, pay of rank in arm or corps to which the noncommissioned officer or man belongs.	

TABLE 3.

Group A.—Armament artificer, chemist, computer, diver, draftsman, electrical engineer, electrical engineer (wireless), engine fitter, fitter, fitter (wireless), instrument maker and repairer, lithographer, millwright, operating-room attendant, pattern maker, pharmacist, railway engine driver (war), shipwright, surveyor, toolmaker, turner.

Group B.—Acetylene welder (Royal Army Service Corps and Royal Army Ordnance Corps), armorer and gunsmith, barge builder, blacksmith, body-maker (motor), boiler maker, bricklayer, cabinet maker, carpenter and joiner, clerk, or specially selected categories),¹ coach painter, cooper, coppersmith, dental mechanic, dispenser, gas fitter, grinder (precision), hospital cook, laboratory, attendant, machine-gun artificer, mason, military accountant clerk, miller and machine hand, motor-cycle fitter, molder, optician, panel beater, permanent linesman, plumber, steel erector, switchboard operator, telegraph operator, telephonist (fortress), trained nurse, watchmaker (Royal Army Ordnance Corps), wheeler, wireless operator, wood turner, X-ray attendant.

Group C.—Clerk (including orderly room sergeants and orderly room clerks and wage clerks),¹ coach trimmer, cutler, donkeyman, driver, internal combus-

¹ Clerks who are classified as such after the prescribed tests only are included. Soldiers employed temporarily as clerks are not treated as "tradesmen" during such employment but receive such additional pay as may be applicable under the pay warrant.

tion (lorry and car), driver, steam (lorry and steam tractor), engine driver (marine engineers, crane driver, steam driver), engine driver (stationary, steam, internal combustion, derrick or pile), excavator, farrier, field linesman, glass grinder, ledger keeper and storeman, masseur, mental attendant, miner, motor driver (Royal Army Service Corps), nursing orderly, oxy-acetylene welder (Royal Engineers and Tank Corps), painter and paper hanger, photographer, plasterer, plate layer, printer, riveter, rock driller, and powderman, saddler and harness maker, saddle tree maker, schoolmaster, shoeing and carriage smith, shoemaker, shorthand typist, signaller, slater, stonemason, storeman, (technical and departmental), tailor, tinsmith, vulcanizer, well borer, whitesmith.

Group D.—Baker, blockman, brakesman, butcher, diver's linesman, drill (machine and hand), forward observer (sound ranging), leather stitchers, lighterman and waterman, mercurial rubber, observer (meteorological), painter, pipe fitter, push-cycle repairer, quarryman, rigger, sanitary orderly, sawyer, shunter, signaler (seaman), station master, stevedore, survey post observer, timberman, wireman (permanent line), traffic controller, wood machinist.

Group E.—Blacksmith's mate, blacksmith's striker, bricklayer's mate, carpenter's mate, cleaner, coppersmith's mate, electrician's mate, fettler, fireman, fitter's mate, glazier, hammerman, holder-up, motor cyclist, pioneer (R. E.), plasterer's mate, plumber's mate, riveter's helper, sailmaker, seaman, shipwright's mate, stoker, stonemason's mate, tent mender, timberman, tyre presser, upholsterer.

TABLE 4.—CONDITIONS FOR THE ISSUE OF PROFICIENCY PAY.

1. All soldiers (except boys) up to and including lance sergeants who draw pay under subsection (i) of paragraph 1 of Table 1 are eligible for proficiency pay, with the exception mentioned in paragraph 8 below. Soldiers up to and including lance sergeants who draw pay under table 2 and are not paid at tradesmen's rates are also eligible. Soldiers who draw pay under subsection (ii) of paragraph 1 of Table 1 are not eligible for proficiency pay.

2. The rate of proficiency pay is 6d. per day.

3. In order to become eligible for proficiency pay a soldier, of whatever rank, must (a) have at least 1 year's service with the colors; (b) be in all respects physically capable of performing the duties of his rank in the arm of the service to which he belongs; (c) attain a standard of professional and educational proficiency as laid down from time to time by the army council.

4. Proficiency pay will be issuable irrespective of the length of the engagement under which the soldier is serving with the colors.

5. Lance sergeants, corporals, and lance corporals will not be entitled to draw proficiency pay in virtue of their rank, but will in all cases be required to satisfy the conditions laid down in paragraph 3.

6. Proficiency pay may be withdrawn by a soldier's commanding officer if, in his opinion, the soldier falls below the requisite standard. It may be restored if the soldier subsequently reattains the standard from the date of his reattaining it.

7. A soldier transferred to another arm in which proficiency pay can be granted will continue in receipt of any proficiency pay which he may be drawing at the time of transfer pending the result of the next classification in his new arm.

8. A soldier enlisted for service as a tradesman and drawing normal rates of pay while he is learning a trade is not eligible for proficiency pay.

9. The general conditions of articles 1066, 1067, and 1068, pay warrant, will apply to the grant of proficiency pay under this warrant.

TABLE 5.—SOLDIERS' SERVICE PENSIONS.

1. A private's pension will be 1½d. a day for each complete year of qualifying service.

2. For each complete year of qualifying service in higher ranks, there will be added to the private's rate according to class for pension under article 1134, pay warrant, ½d. a day for each year as Class IV; 1d. a day for each year as Class III; 1½d. a day for each year as Class II; 2d. a day for each year as Class I (including warrant officer, Class II); 2½d. a day for each year as warrant officer, Class I.

The maximum rates of pensions are as follows:

	Per week.
Private -----	26
Class IV -----	31
Class III -----	36
Class II -----	41
Class I (including warrant officer, Class II) -----	46
Warrant officer, Class I -----	58

3. Any broken period of qualifying service of less than 12 months in a rank will count as qualifying service in a lower rank, e. g., a noncommissioned officer with 2 years 5 months in Class I will count 5 months on to his service in Class II.

4. Qualifying service for pension will be unforfeited color service only, including service in the great war, mobilized or embodied service in the special reserve or territorial force, given after attaining the age of 18 years.

5. The additions under paragraph 2 will not be given for any higher rank than that held on discharge, and that rank must have been held throughout the 12 months immediately preceding discharge.

6. A total of 21 years' service is necessary to give a right to pension, but a minimum of 10 years' qualifying service is also required. To be eligible for pension a soldier must be serving with the colors on final discharge, or on ceasing to count service.

7. A soldier reengaged to complete 21 years, or who has reenlisted to complete a term of service which with former service makes a total of at least 21 years, who is allowed to take his discharge prematurely, after 18 years at his own request, may be granted a pension, if eligible, assessed as in earlier paragraphs, but with a reduction of 10 per cent. If discharged for inefficiency after 18 and less than 21 years, he may be granted a pension at such rate—not exceeding 90 per cent of the rate as assessed in previous paragraphs—as the army council may approve on the recommendation of the commissioners of Chelsea Hospital according to the merits of each case.

8. An additional pension of 5d. per day will be granted (subject to good character as a pensioner) at age 55 and a further increase of 4d at age 65.

9. Soldiers granted pensions under this warrant will remain eligible for the additional pension awarded in respect of gallant conduct provided for in article 1157 pay warrant.

10. In the case of reenlisted soldiers, past service will not count if there has been an interval of more than five years. (This does not refer to pensioners reenlisted during the Great War.)

11. These new regulations will apply to all soldiers admitted to pensions in future. Soldiers who have been granted service pensions during the Great War, and those who were service pensioners before that war and have given satisfactory paid military service during that war (including service as officers), will have their present pensions reassessed under the rules in this table, according to their service on original discharge to pension; but the increased pensions will not be issuable while pensioners are serving with the colors or as officers, and are drawing pay as well as pension.

12. Service with temporary rank during the Great War will count as though it were substantive rank if the soldier is subsequently promoted to the substantive rank; or it may count as service in any lower substantive rank to which the soldier may be promoted. (Thus, if a private were a temporary sergeant during the war and afterwards never rose above the substantive rank of corporal, time as temporary sergeant would count as time as corporal for pension.)

13. The conditions governing the grant of annuities for meritorious service under article 1228, pay warrants, are under consideration.

14. A soldier now serving retains his rights under the pay warrant and any other royal warrants now in force if more beneficial to him than the terms of this table; but a soldier must be dealt with either under this table as a whole, or under previous regulations as a whole.

I. ARMY COUNCIL'S INSTRUCTIONS ON THE FOREGOING WARRANT.

Soldiers of the South African overseas contingent in receipt of full British rates of pay and those who do not elect to remain on Union rates, and British soldiers transferred or appointed from units, the depots of which are situated

in the United Kingdom, the Channel Islands, or the Isle of Man, to serve with the following units raised outside the United Kingdom, may come under the provisions of this army order: The Royal Malta Artillery; the Malta Division Royal Engineers (militia); the King's Own Malta Regiment of Militia; the Bermuda Militia Artillery; the Bermuda Volunteer Rifle Corps; the West India Regiment; the British West Indies Regiment; the Cape Corps (Infantry); the Cape Auxiliary Horse Transport Company; the Cape Colored Labor Battalion; the South African Native Labor Corps; the Chinese Labor Corps; the Imperial Camel Corps.

II. CLASSIFICATION OF TRADESMEN.

1. For the purposes of immediate classification of sappers or privates under paragraph 5 of Table I, pending the introduction of a universal standard test for all arms, the following rules will apply:

(a) Where a man has already been classified for engineer or corps pay a provisional classification under this warrant may be carried out on the same lines, viz:

This warrant.	Pay warrant.					
	Classification for—					
	Engineer pay.	Corps pay.				
		R.A.S.C.		R.A.O.C.	R.A.M.C.	R.A.V.C.
		Horse.	M.T.			
Class I, corresponds with....	Very superior	First rate.			
Class II, corresponds with....	Superior	Second and third rates.	First and second rates.	Third rate.	
Class III, corresponds with....	Skilled, proficient.	Fifth, sixth and seventh rates.	Fourth, fifth, sixth, and seventh rates.	Third and fourth rates.	Fourth and fifth rates.	Fourth rate.

Men temporarily classified as above will be reclassified with retrospective effect from July 1, 1919, as soon as the necessary tests can be held.

(b) Where no such classification exists, e. g., in the case of Royal Artillery or Cavalry artificers, tradesmen will be brought on pay provisionally as Class III in the group to which their trade belongs, and will be reclassified with retrospective effect from July 1, 1919, as soon as the necessary tests can be held.

(c) Where corps pay is drawn at rates lower than those shown above as corresponding with Class III, a man will draw provisionally the normal rate of pay under paragraph 2 of Table 1. unless he is already definitely classed as a tradesman, in which case he will draw Class III rates under paragraph 5 of Table 1.

2. In the absence of instructions to the contrary the number of soldiers in each class will be determined by the number qualified for that class within the total numbers allowed for the particular trade. There will be no establishment for each class.

3. Pending further instructions clerks, other than military accountant clerks, will be passed under group C.

III. SPECIAL RESERVE AND TERRITORIAL FORCE COUNTING OF SERVICE.

In the absence of special instructions the present rules as to the counting of service for purposes of increments of pay dependent on length of service will continue to apply (i. e., only mobilized service counts).

IV. PROFICIENCY PAY.

1. The standards of professional efficiency for the grant of proficiency pay will be published as soon as possible both for cavalry, artillery, and infantry and for the soldiers drawing normal rates in arms or corps for which proficiency pay was not previously issuable.

2. Soldiers already drawing proficiency pay, Class I, may draw provisionally the new proficiency pay, provided they have at least one year's color service. They will, however, be required to pass the tests for professional efficiency when they are published in order to continue drawing proficiency pay, but in the absence of instructions to the contrary they will not be required to pass the educational tests as a condition of continuing to draw proficiency pay.

3. Soldiers in receipt of Class II proficiency pay or those reenlisting will be required to satisfy all the conditions attending the grant of the new proficiency pay.

V. TRANSFER TO NEW RATES.

Where the rates of pay under this warrant are more favorable than those under previous warrants paymasters should take steps as early as possible to adjust the soldiers' accounts. Where the rates are less favorable than those drawn hitherto no adjustment will be made until the new rates equal or exceed the old.

VI. PENSIONS.

Revision of pensions of those eligible will be undertaken by the commissioners of the Royal Hospital, and applications for revised pensions need not be submitted by the pensioners.

ENGLISH AVIATORS.

RATES OF PAY, FLYING CORPS, OFFICERS, NONCOMMISSIONED OFFICERS, AND MEN.

Officers.

Flying officer, on appointment, 12s. per day; a shilling per day for each year of service up to a maximum of 16s. per day; plus flying pay.

Flight commander, on appointment, 17s. per day; increasing by 2s. per day for each year of service up to a maximum of 23s. per day; plus flying pay.

These increases only apply after June 30, 1914.

Squadron commander, 25s. per day; plus flying pay.

Men.

	s.	d.
Third air mechanic.....	1	0
Second air mechanic.....	2	0
First air mechanic.....	4	0
Corporal.....	5	0
Sergeant.....	6	0
Flying sergeant.....	7	0
Warrant officer.....	7	6

Flying pay, 8s. per day; while under instruction, 4s. per day.

APPENDIX III.

RATES OF PAY FOR JAPANESE ARMY.

[An 2280—Combat personnel, 41. Oct. 10, 1919.]

A. By Army Order, No. 25, April 21, 1919, the following increases in pay were granted to officers of the Japanese Army:

	Per cent.
Majors, company officers, warrant officers, and civilians paid yearly less than \$1,000.....	50
Colonels, lieutenant colonels, and civilians paid yearly between \$1,000 and \$1,500.....	40
Lieutenant generals, major generals, and civilians paid yearly between \$1,500 and \$2,500.....	30

B. In addition, Army Order, No. 30, May 13, 1919, prescribes the issue of bonuses to those military and civil men of the army who hold appointments and posts abroad or who travel abroad as follows:

To those residing abroad.....	Per cent.
To those traveling abroad.....	30-50
	50

Revised Japanese Army pay table.

Classification.	Pay.		Bonus.			Total.		Quarterly allowance with incl.	Monthly total.
	Per year.	Per month.	Rate.	Per year.	Per month.	Per year.	Per month.		
	Yen.	Yen.	P. ct.	Yen.	Yen.	Yen.	Yen.	Yen.	Yen.
General.....	7,500.00	625.00				7,500.00	625.00	25.00	650.00
Lieutenant general.....	5,000.00	415.66	30	1,500.00	125.00	6,500.00	541.66	24.37	566.03
Major general.....	3,900.00	325.00	30	1,200.00	100.00	5,100.00	425.00	16.25	441.25
Colonel.....	2,940.00	245.00	40	1,176.00	98.00	4,116.00	343.00	14.00	357.00
Lieutenant Colonel.....	2,196.00	183.00	40	1,000.00	83.33	3,196.00	266.33	12.25	278.58
Major.....	1,548.00	129.00	50	774.00	64.50	2,322.00	193.50	11.24	204.75
Captain.....									
First class.....	1,260.00	105.00	50	530.00	52.50	1,890.00	157.50	7.12	164.62
Second class.....	1,080.00	90.00	50	540.00	45.00	1,620.00	135.00	7.12	142.12
Third class.....	900.00	75.00	50	450.00	37.50	1,350.00	112.50	7.12	119.62
First lieutenant:									
First class.....	684.00	57.00	50	342.00	28.50	1,026.00	85.50	6.00	91.50
Second class.....	552.00	46.00	50	276.00	23.00	828.00	69.00	6.00	75.00
First band master:									
First class.....	972.00	81.00	50	486.00	40.50	1,458.00	121.50	6.00	127.50
Second class.....	900.00	75.00	50	450.00	37.50	1,350.00	112.50	6.00	118.50
Second lieutenant:									
Junior:									
First class.....	480.00	40.00	50	240.00	20.00	720.00	60.00	5.25	65.25
Second class.....									
First class.....	684.00	57.00	50	342.00	28.50	1,026.00	85.50	5.25	90.75
Second class.....	612.00	51.00	50	306.00	25.50	918.00	76.50	5.25	81.75
Second band master:									
First class.....	828.00	69.00	50	414.00	34.50	1,242.00	103.50	5.25	108.75
Second class.....	756.00	63.00	50	378.00	31.50	1,134.00	94.50	5.25	99.75
Third class.....	684.00	57.00	50	342.00	28.50	1,026.00	85.50	5.25	90.75
Fourth class.....	612.00	51.00	50	306.00	25.50	918.00	76.50	5.25	81.75
Warrant officer:									
Special A.....	684.00	57.00	50	342.00	28.50	1,026.00	85.50	4.80	90.30
Special B.....	612.00	51.00	50	306.00	25.50	918.00	76.50	4.80	81.30
First class.....	540.00	45.00	50	270.00	22.50	810.00	67.50	4.80	72.30
Second class.....	468.00	39.00	50	234.00	19.50	702.00	58.50	4.80	63.30
Third class.....	396.00	33.00	50	198.00	16.50	594.00	49.50	4.80	54.30

Classification.	Quarters inside barracks.				Quarters outside barracks.					
	Pay per month.	Bonus.		Monthly total.	Pay per month.	Bonus.		Monthly total.	Quarterly allowance, 60 per cent.	Monthly total.
		Rate.	Per month.			Rate.	Per month.			
	Yen.	Yen.	P. ct.	Yen.	Yen.	Yen.	P. ct.	Yen.	Yen.	Yen.
Sergeants major:										
First class.....	19.50	50	9.90	29.70	30.00	50	15.00	45.00	2.85	47.85
Second class.....	17.10	50	8.55	25.65	27.00	50	13.50	40.50	2.85	43.35
Third class.....	15.00	50	7.50	22.50	25.50	50	12.75	38.25	2.85	41.10
Sergeants:										
First class.....	12.90	50	6.45	19.35	23.00	50	11.50	34.50	2.25	36.75
Second class.....	10.80	50	5.40	16.20	21.00	50	10.50	31.50	2.25	33.75
Third class.....	9.00	50	4.50	13.50	19.00	50	9.50	28.50	2.25	30.75
Fourth class.....	7.80	50	3.90	11.70	18.00	50	9.00	27.00	2.25	29.25
Corporal, first class.....	5.70	50	2.85	8.55	16.00	50	8.00	24.00	1.87	25.87
Corporal, second class.....	4.65	50	2.32	6.97	15.00	50	7.50	22.50	1.87	24.37
Acting corporal.....	2.34	50	1.17	3.51						
Superior private.....	1.95	50	.97	2.92	13.50	50	6.75	20.25	1.50	21.75
First and second private.....	1.56	50	.78	2.34						

APPENDIX IV.

RATES OF PAY FOR ARGENTINE ARMY.

AUGUST 28, 1919.

Attached hereto are tables covering the pay for army officers, noncommissioned officers, and officers and noncommissioned officers on the retired list, pensions to dependents, and pay to military attachés.

It will be noted that the pay of the army officer, which, on starting his career, is less than that of the corresponding grade in the United States Army, but as his services increase the advantages accrue and reach their maximum on the officer's retirement.

An officer, after 35 years' service, may, upon his own application, retire with the next highest grade. For instance, after 35 years' service a colonel can be retired with the rank of a brigadier general, and receives \$636.77, while a colonel in the United States Army, unless appointed a brigadier general, retires as a colonel and receives \$312.50. The amounts given in the translations of army pay tables are in United States currency.

Army pay for officers not on retired list.

	Basic pay not on active service.	Bonus for active service.	Total pay, active service.	Pay of officers not on active service plus 10 per cent, 4 years in grade.	Total pay on active service plus 10 per cent for 4 years in grade.
Lieutenant generals.....	\$679.22	\$148.58	\$827.79	\$679.22	\$827.79
Generals of division.....	573.09	148.58	721.67	573.09	721.67
Generals of brigade.....	488.19	148.58	636.77	488.19	636.77
Colonels.....	339.61	127.35	466.96	373.57	500.92
Lieutenant colonels.....	254.71	84.90	339.61	280.18	365.08
Majors.....	212.26	55.19	267.45	233.49	288.68
Captains.....	144.33	33.96	178.29	158.76	192.72
First lieutenants.....	110.87	29.72	140.09	121.41	151.13
Lieutenants.....	99.76	27.59	127.35	109.74	137.33
Sublieutenants.....	89.15	25.47	114.62	98.07	123.54

NOTE.—From sublieutenant to general of brigade the officers enjoy an increase of 10 per cent on basis pay once they have accomplished the minimum time of four years in grade toward promotion.

Army pay, noncommissioned officers.

Sergeants major.....	\$63.68
First sergeants.....	55.19
Sergeants.....	46.70
Corporals (first class).....	38.71
Corporals.....	29.72

The corporals, corporals (first class), sergeants, first sergeants, and sergeants major shall receive during their first five years of service as noncommissioned officers a "premio de constancia" (reward for service), which shall be respectively of \$50.94, \$63.68, \$76.41 and \$101.88 annually and payable by the month.

They shall receive in the course of the following five years a "premio de constancia" which shall be respectively of \$63.68, \$76.41, \$101.88 and \$127.35. During the next five years the "premio de constancia" will be respectively of \$76.41, \$101.88, \$127.35 and \$152.82. After 15 years' service and until retiring the "premio de constancia" will be, respectively, of \$101.88, \$127.35, \$152.82, and \$203.76.

Scale of pensions for officers according to law No. 4707.

[Progression between the minimum and maximum of pension. Per cent of the basic pay plus bonus for active service.]

Years service:

15	50
16	52
17	54
18	56
19	58
20	60
21	63
22	66
23	69
24	72
25	75
26	78
27	81
28	84
29	87
30	90
31	92
32	94
33	96
34	98
36	100

Note—Pay is understood to be the total determined in Table No. 1 corresponding to the respective rank.

Officers and enlisted men, who, due to illness or physical defects produced on active service, or by acts of the service are rendered disabled for the continuation of their career, are retired whatever may be the time of their service with the pension corresponding to their years of service. If they have been less than 15 years in the service, they are paid pension corresponding to that period.

If the disability produced by an act of the service should be loss of sight, an arm or a leg, the pension will be the maximum determined by the scale.

Those who, due to wounds received in action or in acts of the service, are disabled for continuation of their career are retired with pension corresponding to immediately superior rank.

Scale of pensions for noncommissioned officers and troops.

[Per cent of basic pay plus "Premio de constancia."]

Years creditable service:

15	50
16	55
17	60
18	65
19	70
20	75
21	80
22	85
23	90
24	95
25	100

PENSIONS TO DEPENDENTS OF OFFICERS, NONCOMMISSIONED OFFICERS, AND PRIVATES.

The dependents of a deceased officer, noncommissioned officer, or private who are entitled to a pension are: The widow, the legitimate children, the children born out of wedlock who are recognized, and the widowed mother.

Scale of pensions (Art. 12, Chapter II, Title IV Ley 4707).—1. To dependents of officers or privates killed in action or who die from consequences of same, providing that death occurs within the year: Two-third parts of the maximum pension corresponding to grade of deceased officer, noncommissioned officer, or private.

2. To dependents of deceased officers who having served 10 years have not reached 15-year limit (the minimum to obtain retired pension) shall receive half the retired pension corresponding to 15 years' service, providing that at time of death officer was on active service.

3. To dependents of officers or privates, whose death is due to accidents or illnesses contracted in the service, or by reason of an act in the service before or after years necessary to entitle them to pension of retirements, two-third parts of pension which the officer or private would have received.

4. To dependents of officers who have died while on active service or when retired, half the pension which the officer enjoyed, or which he would have enjoyed if he had been retired on the day on which his death took place.

REPORT ON PAY AND ALLOWANCES OF ARGENTINE MILITARY ATTACHÉS ABROAD.

[B. C. 1813. Aug. 27, 1919.]

The following table shows pay and allowances of officers of the Argentine Army sent abroad as military attachés:

Lieutenant general.....	\$1, 543. 68
General of division.....	1, 302. 48
General of brigade.....	1, 109. 52
Colonel.....	771. 84
Lieutenant colonel.....	578. 88
Major.....	482. 40
Captain.....	328. 03
First lieutenant.....	250. 85
Lieutenant.....	226. 73
Sublieutenant.....	202. 61

NOTE.—Military attachés abroad shall receive besides their pay \$100 Argentine gold (equivalent to \$96.48 United States) for entertainment and traveling expenses per month. Furthermore, in order to pay expenses on getting ready to leave for station and on arrival there and traveling expenses the attaché shall receive two months' pay which corresponds to his rank, and also first-class tickets for himself and family, and a second-class ticket for a servant; also return tickets for all.

As will be noted, the pay and allowances of military attachés are decidedly more than for those of the United States abroad.

APPENDIX Z.

RATES OF PAY FOR ITALIAN ARMY.

Monthly salaries paid to officers in the Italian Army.

	Up to Feb. 1, 1918.	Since Feb. 1, 1918.
	<i>Lire.</i>	<i>Lire.</i>
General.....	1, 079. 69	1, 219. 19
Lieutenant general.....	865. 90	964. 46
Major general.....	723. 37	827. 99
Colonel.....	580. 84	671. 52
Lieutenant colonel (after having been 5 years with this rank).....	509. 68	593. 38
Lieutenant colonel.....	438. 42	515. 14
Major (after having been 5 years with this rank).....	402. 78	476. 02
Major.....	367. 25	437. 01
Captain (after having been 10 years with this rank).....	352. 85	421. 35
Captain (after 25 years of having been commissioned as an officer).....	352. 85	421. 35
Captain (after having been 5 years with this rank).....	324. 04	390. 07
Captain.....	295. 23	358. 68
Lieutenant (after having been 15 years with this rank).....	266. 12	325. 64
Lieutenant (after 15 years of having been commissioned as an officer).....	258. 84	317. 39
Lieutenant (after having been 10 years with this rank).....	258. 84	317. 39
Lieutenant (after having been 5 years with this rank).....	207. 85	259. 30
First and second lieutenant of the Royal "carabinieri" after 3 years of commission and officer band director.....	178. 43	225. 92
Second lieutenant.....	149. 01	182. 22

Lire=\$0.193.

APPENDIX VI.

RATES OF PAY FOR BELGIAN ARMY.

1. The following is the translation of an article appearing in *Le Soir*, September 13, 1919:

THE MEASURES IN FAVOR OF OUR DEMOBILIZED MILITARY, MUTILATED, WOUNDED,
AND THEIR FAMILIES.

[Statement made by the minister of war to all demobilized soldiers.]

(a) An indemnity of 100 francs, plus 25 francs a year for service during the war.

(b) Leave for 40 days, during which time the soldier is entitled to all the allowances he would have if serving with a unit.

(c) An allowance of 200 francs for buying civilian clothes.

(d) The soldier who served during the entire campaign will, on returning home, receive the sum of about 500 francs and a final sum of about 1,150 francs.

These indemnities are to be paid to all soldiers, those in the rear as well as those who were at the front.

The allowances for the families will be 300 francs for the relatives and 100 francs for each child and for each child which shall be born. This is to be paid all soldiers whether their service was at the front or behind the lines.

Chevrons (for length of service).—The chamber has voted for an allowance of 100 francs for the first chevron and 50 francs for each subsequent chevron. The soldier who has had 8 chevrons will receive an allowance of 450 francs. This will be paid to him at the age of 50 for one, at the age of 55 for the others, according to the number of chevrons.

In case of the death of the wearer of a chevron, the allowance will be paid to the widow if the soldier died during the war, even at Liege.

The military students.—These have not received the 200 francs accorded to other soldiers for their civil clothing.

The minister remarks concerning the students that they have been on leave since January and have received their promotions and their soldiers' pay.

The invalided.—These will be divided into two classes, and their cases will be regulated by law. The total cripple will receive 3,600 francs per year, with an additional 10 francs a month for each child.

APPENDIX VII.

RATES OF PAY FOR CANADIAN ARMY.

Rates of pay and allowances, permanent force, Canadian Militia.

1908				1919			
Rank.	Pay per day.	Allow- ances per day (ap- prox- imate).	Total per month (approx- imate).	Rank.	Pay per day.	Allow- ances per day.	Total per month (approx- imate).
Private:				Private:			
Unmarried.....	{ 50 cents on enlistment. 60 cents after 3 years. 75 cents after 6 years.		{ \$15.00 18.00 22.50	Unmarried, with de- pendent.....	\$1.10.....		\$33.00
Married.....	{ 50 cents on enlistment. 60 cents after 3 years. 75 cents after 6 years.	{ \$0.75	{ 37.50 40.50 45.00	Married.....	do.....	\$0.80	87.00
Corporal:				Corporal:			
Unmarried.....	{ 80 cents on promotion. 90 cents after 3 years. \$1.05 after 6 years.		{ 24.00 27.00 31.50	Unmarried, with de- pendent.....	\$1.20.....		36.00
Married.....	{ 80 cents on promotion. 90 cents after 3 years. \$1.05 after 6 years.	{ .75	{ 46.50 49.50 54.00	Married.....	do.....	.80	66.00
Sergeant:				Sergeant:			
Unmarried.....	{ \$1 on promotion. \$1.10 after 3 years. \$1.25 after 6 years.		{ 30.00 33.00 37.50	Unmarried, with de- pendent.....	\$1.50.....		45.00
Married.....	{ \$1 on promotion. \$1.10 after 3 years. \$1.25 after 6 years.	{ .85	{ 55.50 58.50 63.00	Married.....	do.....	.80	75.00
Lieutenant:				Lieutenant:			
Unmarried.....	{ \$2.25 on appointment. \$2.50 after 4 years. \$2.75 after 8 years.		{ 67.50 75.00 82.50	Unmarried, with de- pendent.....	\$3.....		90.00
Married.....	{ \$2.25 on appointment. \$2.50 after 4 years. \$2.75 after 8 years.	{ 1.25	{ 105.00 112.50 120.00	Married.....	do.....	1.70	130.00
Captain:				Captain:			
Unmarried.....	{ \$3 on promotion. \$3.50 after 4 years.		{ 90.00 105.00	Unmarried, with de- pendent.....	\$4.....		120.00
				Married.....	do.....	1.70	160.00
							211.00

Married.....	{ \$3 on promotion. \$4.50 after 4 years.....	1.35 {	180.50 145.50 {	Major: Unmarried.....	\$3.....	140.00
Major: Unmarried.....	{ \$4 on promotion. \$4.50 after 4 years.....		120.00 135.00 {	Unmarried, with de- pendent.....	\$3 and \$50 per month.....	200.00
Married.....	{ \$3 on promotion. \$4.50 after 4 years.....	1.65 {	165.50 184.50 {	Married.....	do.....	231.00
Colonel: Unmarried.....	\$3.....		150.00	Colonel: Unmarried, with de- pendent.....	\$7.50.....	225.00
Married.....	\$3.....	2.00	210.00	Married.....	\$7.50 and \$40 per month.....	285.00
					do.....	338.00

The following appendices are specimens of the many resignations which are being received:

APPENDIX 2.

CAMP LEWIS, WASH.,
October 8, 1919.

From: First Lieut. E. B. Moore, United States Army, Ordnance Officer, Fifty-ninth Artillery (C. A. C.).

To: Chief of field service, Ordnance Department, Washington, D. C. Attention Maj. W. F. Downing. (Through channels.)

Subject: Transfer.

1. On account of the fact that the Thirty-first Artillery Brigade, C. A. C., has been ordered to Camp Lewis, Wash., as a permanent station, where there are no quarters or high schools available or provisions made where married officers can be with their families and live on an officer's (first lieutenant's) pay, and as it is financially impossible to bring my family of three west or maintain separate homes for any length of time on such salary Lieut. E. B. Moore urgently requests immediate transfer to Watertown, Boston, or Springfield, Mass., where he can provide for, live with, and maintain his family which is now in the East.

2. The necessity of this request is regretted exceedingly and he wishes to state that the comradeship, courtesy, and cordiality of all the officers and men of the Thirty-first Brigade is of the very highest order.

E. B. MOORE.

[First indorsement.]

HEADQUARTERS FIFTY-NINTH ARTILLERY, COAST ARTILLERY CORPS,
Camp Lewis, Wash., October 10, 1919.

The above statements are undoubtedly true but as these conditions affect line officers as well as staff officers stationed at this camp it is not believed that Lieut. Moore should be given a preference.

H. P. WILBUR,
Colonel, Field Artillery, Commanding.

[Second indorsement.]

HEADQUARTERS THIRTY-FIRST ARTILLERY BRIGADE,
COAST ARTILLERY CORPS,
Camp Lewis, American Lake, Wash., October 13, 1919.

To the COMMANDING GENERAL,
Camp Lewis, Wash.:

1. Forwarded, disapproved, as the services of Lieut. Moore in the brigade can not be spared at this time.

2. The situation which confronts Lieut. Moore is similar to that experienced by many other officers in this brigade, as well as married enlisted men; and undeniably constitutes a distinct hardship, accentuated at this time by the increased transportation rates and the prevailing excessive cost of living. Within the last six months this brigade has had two changes of station—one, of over 3,000 miles, from New York to San Francisco; the second, upwards of 1,000 miles from San Francisco to Camp Lewis. For a married subaltern or enlisted man the transportation expenses of his family involved in such changes of station represents many times any possible saving in salary that he can effect in the same time.

3. The Railroad Administration has granted a "furlough rate" of approximately 1 cent a mile to members of the Military Establishment traveling on leave. This concession has been very much appreciated by all concerned; but as a matter of equity, there is far more reason why the Government should grant a special low rate to the families of officers and enlisted men who change station under orders—for men on furlough travel to suit their own pleasure or convenience, while the last named are obliged to travel to suit the convenience of the Government. Recently the Pacific Fleet was transferred from the Atlantic to the Pacific coast, since which date I have been informed a special rate has been accorded to the families of officers and bluejackets changing station in accordance therewith. A similar concession to families of members of the Army, as a temporary measure of relief, is respectfully urged.

4. In an indorsement on a Special Morale Report upon this same subject, forwarded from these headquarters September 29, 1919, I stated:

"It is a fact that many Congressmen with whom I have talked, as well as the public generally, believe that the Government provides quarters for all officers' families and pays all their necessary traveling expenses on a change of station. As this belief is general, and is founded upon what public opinion considers (and in fact is) only a fair and proper provision, like that made by great corporations for their employees under similar conditions—it would appear that there should be no great difficulty in enacting a law to that effect."

The above-quoted suggestion is believed to be the right solution to this problem, but pending possible legislative action, it is recommended that this matter be taken up with the proper agency (the Railway Administration or the Interstate Commerce Commission), and authority for "furlough rates" for members of Lieut. Moore's family be secured from Springfield, Vt., to Camp Lewis, Wash. His family consists of wife and two children—one 13 years old, the other 16 years old.

WM. C. DAVIS,
Brigadier General, United States Army, Commanding.

APPENDIX 3.

HEADQUARTERS NORTH ATLANTIC COAST ARTILLERY DISTRICT,
Boston, Mass., September 20, 1919.

From: Lieut. Col. W. W. Rose, Coast Artillery.

To: The Adjutant General of the Army, Washington, D. C.

Subject: Resignation.

1. I hereby tender my resignation as lieutenant colonel, Coast Artillery and captain, Coast Artillery Corps, to take effect on September 30, 1919.

2. It is with great regret that I take this step after more than 18 years' service. The Army has meant much to me and I shall follow its progress with great interest. But my obligation to my family requires that I seek more lucrative employment in order to assure my son's future. The present pay or any increase contemplated will no longer permit the standard of living formerly obtaining in the service and as I am now entirely dependent upon what I can earn, I feel that the retention of my commission would be an injustice to those whose future I must guard.

W. W. ROSE.

[First indorsement.]

HEADQUARTERS NORTH ATLANTIC COAST ARTILLERY DISTRICT,
Boston, Mass., September 21, 1919.

TO THE ADJUTANT GENERAL OF THE ARMY.

1. The necessity for favorable action on this application is deeply regretted. I regard the case as one of necessity since this officer has received an unusually good offer for employment in civil life, which, in the interest of future welfare and that of his family, he is bound to accept.

2. Col. Rose is an excellent officer; he has performed his duties here, as adjutant, with great tact, good judgment, rare ability, and high efficiency. I have had him under my command on former occasions and he has performed his duties always in the manner stated above. He is the kind of a man who one wishes to retain in the Army, but nevertheless under the circumstances I feel constrained to recommend favorable action.

JOHN W. RUCKMAN,
Brigadier General, United States Army, Commanding.

[Second indorsement.]

HEADQUARTERS NORTHEASTERN DEPARTMENT,
Boston, Mass., September 20, 1919.

TO THE ADJUTANT GENERAL OF THE ARMY.

1. Forwarded, and with reluctance approved and recommended. Col. Rose is the kind of officer that we need and should be retained in the service. I hate to see him go, both from a selfish standpoint as to the loss in this department, but especially in the interest of the service.

2. His case is typical of an alarming situation. Many, many officers have come to me in the last year, officers whom I would select for important duty,

and tell me they can not stay and must resign. I have urged them to remain, that the present conditions must be alleviated, that everything is in a state of flux; but their minds seem to have been made up. Several officers of excellent reputations in the service who have reached, or are about to reach their 30-year period, seem to have one anxiety, and that is to be on the retired list.

3. In fact, I have never seen since I have been in the service, the morale among the Regular officers so low, as far as the future is concerned, as it is to-day. An officer below field rank to-day can not ask a gentle woman to be his wife, unless she has independent means. This is much more marked away from an Army garrison than it is in it; but it is a condition, not a theory. A man who accepts a commission to-day is taking a veil of poverty and must deny himself any idea of the hostages to fortune because they will have to grow up with less comforts than the average laborer's wife and children.

4. Something has got to be done and that quickly, because in this reorganization officers like Col. Rose are essential.

C. R. EDWARDS,
Major General, United States Army, Commanding.

APPENDIX 4.

OCTOBER 3, 1919.

Memorandum for Morale Branch, War Plans Division, Room 371, State, War, and Navy Building.

Subject: Living conditions for officers in Washington, D. C.

In compliance with telephone request from the War Plans Division (Capt. Shaw), the following is submitted:

I reported for duty in Washington on July 30, 1919, upon my return from Europe, where I served as assistant chief of staff, Second Army, and later in the same capacity in the Third Army, and with the exception of 14 days' leave have, together with my wife and one child (5 years old), been living in a small, dingy room at the Ulster Inn (1627 Nineteenth Street NW.). This is as modest and cheap a place as I can possibly live in and maintain any degree of self-respect.

On the 1st of September I was notified that the cost of my board and lodging would be raised \$14 per week on October 1, without any improvement in accommodations. After much begging—yes, actually begging—for a reduction, I was compelled to accept a raise of \$12 per week. I have exhausted every known means in an endeavor to find a suitable place to live, within my income, but my efforts have been in vain.

Living under these adverse conditions and facing a reduction in rank which will make it impossible to live on the pay given, a mental condition has resulted which certainly is not conducive to efficient work. I am not a "quitter," but such an outlook fails to add any zest to my efforts to render good service to the Government. That my condition is typical of officers recently arriving in Washington, can, I believe, be easily verified, if officers of my rank or of superior rank with larger families, are communicated with.

Statement of monthly account.

(Figures are approximate.)

Income: Captain's pay (regular rank), including commutation for quarters, heat and light.....	\$316. 85
Expense:	
Board and lodging.....	\$219. 00
Insurance.....	22. 50
School (child absent).....	50. 00
Storage on household goods.....	16. 40
	307. 90
Balance.....	8. 95

This balance, \$8.95, is left for clothing and other necessary living expenses.

A. D. CHAFFIN,
Lieutenant Colonel, General Staff,
(Regular rank, Captain, General Staff.)

APPENDIX 5.

DEPARTMENT OF MATHEMATICS,
UNITED STATES MILITARY ACADEMY,
West Point, N. Y., August 26, 1919.

From: First Lieut. Solomon F. Clark, Field Artillery, United States Army.

To: The professor of mathematics, United States Military Academy.

Subject: Request for relief.

1. I request relief from duty in the department of mathematics and at the post of West Point.

2. My reason is, it is impossible for me to live at West Point and support my wife and mother, both of whom are dependent upon me, with pay of first lieutenant. Actual figures as to living expenses are as follows:

Income: Monthly pay as first lieutenant..... \$166.66

Expenses:

Board at Army mess (counting dues, initiation fee, etc.), minimum of	100.00
Insurance	13.00
Assistance to my mother	50.00

Total..... 163.00

3. It may be seen at a glance from these figures that it is utterly impossible to live under such conditions and avoid debt. Assignment to married quarters, instead of bachelor building, or to a commutation status off the post, would better the situation, but not materially enough to allow me to live on my pay.

4. If relieved from this post I can be assigned to troop duty or to another station where living conditions are better, until the present crisis has passed.

S. F. CLARK.

A true copy.

R. L. RUTSANDOF,
Colonel, Cavalry.

APPENDIX 6.

WAR DEPARTMENT,
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF ENGINEERS,
Washington, October 27, 1919.

Memorandum for Col. E. L. Munson, Chief Morale Branch, General Staff,
War Department.

Subject: Pay of officers and enlisted men.

1. I have just read your memorandum relating to the above subject, which is extremely illuminating and appears to be conclusive as to the necessity of the proposed increase.

2. There is one phase of the question that to my mind appears not to have been given sufficient emphasis, a phase which is of the greatest importance. This refers to the enforced expenditures which an officer must make in changing station. When an officer receives orders to change station, his first move is to dispose of his lease, which usually runs for a year, place his family in a hotel, and pack up his household goods. If he is very fortunate, he can get rid of his lease with a loss of about two months rent. If not so fortunate and he has to leave without disposing of his lease, he is quite liable to be stuck for the complete year.

3. With his family in a hotel, his expenses mount up very rapidly until he leaves his station. On arriving at the new station, he again places his family, including himself, in a hotel and starts out to find some sort of a living place. If unusually fortunate, he should be able to do this by the time his furniture arrives, which will usually be from one to two months after date of shipment, depending on the distance of shipment. It is believed that it is necessary, on the average, for an officer to maintain himself and his family in a hotel, on these moves, at least six weeks. In addition to the actual expenses of the move, which includes railroad fares, hotel bills, and other incidentals, there is a heavy item for breakage and wear and tear on furniture and other personal effects.

4. The average length of a tour of duty in one station would be interesting information on this subject, and as a fairly typical case I will cite my own movements since 1910.

5. In December, 1910, I was ordered to Mobile, Ala., from Leavenworth; took my family there, and after considerable difficulty and several weeks of search found a fairly decent house. I remained in Mobile for three months, when I was ordered to temporary duty at Galveston with an expeditionary brigade. I remained at Galveston for four months, maintaining my home in Mobile and myself—the two separate establishments costing much more than to maintain a single home. I then returned to Mobile, and after three months was ordered on change of station to New Orleans. It so happened that my orders for this change of station arrived at a time when my family—consisting of Mrs. Sherrill, her mother, nurse, and one child—were en route to Mobile. It was, therefore, necessary to place them in a hotel on arrival while packing up. On going to New Orleans we had to go to a hotel again until a house could be secured. I estimate that this move cost me not less than \$750. After remaining in New Orleans two and one-half years I was ordered to Manila in 1914, which again involved a long delay between the date of orders and the date of arrival at my new station. After remaining in Manila for some two months I was ordered to Corregidor, which, though but a short distance, involved as complete a move as for a much greater sea voyage, with the consequent breakage and incidental loss of property. After remaining eight months at Corregidor I was ordered direct to Panama, this involving an extremely long and expensive trip in transporting and caring for my family. After remaining for two years in Panama I was ordered—August, 1917—to Boston, where I remained only a month, maintaining my family in a hotel at great expense all the time. From there I was ordered to duty at Camp Upton, and was again forced to move my family to a neighboring village and again maintain two separate establishments. From there I was ordered to France, and from France to the office of the Chief of Engineers; in all, in a period of nine years, 11 changes of station.

6. I feel sure that I would be conservative in saying that these moves have cost me in the last nine years not less than \$750 a year, an expense that is forced by Army conditions and which is in nowise provided for in Army pay. An officer's mileage is a mere bagatelle as compared with his expenses in changing station. It is believed that it would be advisable to pay officers' and enlisted men's actual expenses when traveling on military duty not involving a change of station, and to pay the actual expenses of moving his family when the move involves a change of station.

7. The saying, familiar in civil life, that three moves equals a fire, has, in my experience, amply justified the facts, for every time a piece of furniture or household equipment is moved there is a loss in damage that can not be obviated.

C. O. SHERRILL,

Colonel of Engineers, Chief Military Construction Division.

APPENDIX 7.

OCTOBER 30, 1919.

Memorandum for: Col. E. L. Munson, Morale Branch, General Staff, Room 367.
Re: Extract from a letter from Maj. Dupont B. Lyon.

In a letter recently received in this office from Camp Travis, Tex., the following statements are made: "It may be said that this is done for economy's sake; then why not practice the preaching? For example, there is a second lieutenant just discharged. He has been in charge of the plumbing; he drew \$140 and they had his services for 24 hours a day. He was reemployed as a civilian to take the same position at \$200 and works eight hours per day; also I can recall a captain at Fort Sam Houston who at the salary of \$200 had charge of the property branch. He was discharged and a civilian employed to take his place at \$350 a month."

_____, Adjutant General.

APPENDIX 8.

FORT SNELLING, MINN., October 7, 1919.

Memorandum for Maj. Straub.

In compliance with your verbal request, the following memorandum of living expenses is submitted for your information:

Food	\$80.00
Ice	1.50
Laundress, \$3.10 per week; help, \$6.	36.40
Children's car fare to school	4.00
Clothing (five in family)	40.00
Insurance (life and fire)	37.10
Daily papers	1.40
Total	200.40

The above is the monthly expenditure for essentials only and allows nothing for the wear and tear on household furnishings, children's school books, car fare (except for children attending school), magazines, church dues, amusements, railway fare. We have changed station 13 times in 16 years, involving approximately 1,400 miles by rail for each move. No sea travel included; hotel bills and many other incidentals too numerous to mention.

There are five of us in the family. The ages of our children are 15 years, 13 years, and 11 months.

W. G. MURCHISON,
Captain, Forty-ninth Infantry.

APPENDIX 9.

COMPANY M, ELEVENTH INFANTRY,
Camp Gordon, Ga., October 20, 1919.

From: Joseph J. Goffard, first lieutenant, Eleventh Infantry, Camp Gordon, Ga.

To: Morale officer, Camp Gordon, Ga.

Subject: Living expenses.

1. Living expenses for myself and family are as follows, per month:

Rent, heat, and light	\$50
Food for wife and child	45
Food for myself	35
Clothing for wife and child	25
Clothing for myself, including tailor	15
Laundry	15
Insurance	12
Car fare	12
Stationery, stamps, newspapers, and journals	3
Telephone	3
Ice	5
Amusements	10
Miscellaneous	25
Total	265

JOSEPH J. GOFFARD,
First Lieutenant, Eleventh Infantry.

The pay of this officer is \$166.67 per month.

APPENDIX 10.

HEADQUARTERS FORTY-FOURTH INFANTRY,
Presidio of San Francisco, Calif., October 29, 1919.

From: Commanding officer.

To: Commanding general Western Department, San Francisco, Calif.

Subject: Effect of cost of living on morale.

1. Referring to paragraph 3, mimeograph 805, Western Department, inclose herewith reports from two field officers of the Forty-fourth Infantry.

2. The small pay received by enlisted men as compared with high wages paid civilians, coupled with the high cost of living, is causing many of our best men, especially those who have dependents, to ask for furlough to the Army Reserve or discharge by favor.

Very few of those whose service expires care to reenlist, for the reason they can get high wages in civil life and thus better support families or assist parents.

It is, as well known, extremely difficult to get recruits, and those secured are not of a high grade in intelligence or education.

The conditions stated have a tendency to make men, who, by force of circumstances, must remain in service, rather discontented with their lot, and this is not conducive to good service or high morale.

3. In regard to officers, the regiment has already lost several fine provisional officers by resignation, and is about to lose more, because the officers either find it impossible to properly support families on their pay or because their talents are so much better paid in civil pursuits.

These officers, being fond of the service, would have remained if encouraged by adequate pay.

The loss of good material for officers will have a permanent effect upon the service, as these men when, successfully started in civilian life, will not return in peace times, to the conditions imposed by small army salaries.

Most of the officers of lower grades in the regiment find it extremely difficult to pay their living expenses from month to month, while some have had to borrow at times. Under such financial stringency, officers can not feel at ease and give their best services, but must chafe and be discontented, which is detrimental to good morale.

WM. K. JONES,
Colonel, Forty-fourth Infantry.

APPENDIX 11.

HEADQUARTERS COAST DEFENSES OF THE COLUMBIA, *Fort Stevens, Oreg., October 23, 1919.*

From: Coast defense commander.

To: Commanding general Western Department.

Subject: Report in compliance with mimeograph 805, Western Department, 1919.

1. The cost of living includes service, food, clothes, change of station, education of children, pleasure.

Service either at military posts or in towns or cities has increased 300 per cent and over; as a result officers' families are compelled to perform their own services, such as cooking, waiting, and cleaning house. This in itself reduces the morale of the command in an extraordinary degree. It is not believed that the Government intends that such a situation should exist, and this view is justified by the conditions which were created and existed in the past.

Professional and business men in civil life increase their fees to meet the contingency. The cost of food has increased 250 per cent; witness the cost of ration itself from 20 cents to over 60 cents.

The cost of clothing has increased so much that the numerous uniforms formerly required have been reduced to one; and as a result there is no such thing as a dress uniform, a full dress or an evening dress uniform. The pay of an officer is too small to cover so much expenditure.

Change of station involves expenditure which must be met from pay.

The cost of maintenance of children, their food and clothing, are items which accentuate the condition; and their education adds one more difficulty in the long train.

Pleasure is obtained at an increased cost, and must be greatly limited or cut out altogether.

An officer's pay should be such that he is enabled by rigid economy to make some saving. This is not now possible in the case of married men.

2. Following are quotations from letters submitted by officers and enlisted men in these defenses:

OFFICERS.

Lieut. Col. W. S. Dowd, Coast Artillery: Family consists of myself, wife, and four children, 5 to 13 years old. Living expenses for the last five months have been as follows:

Food-----	\$100
Laundry-----	30
Clothes-----	75
Miscellaneous-----	25
Total-----	230

In 1913 food expenses with three children were \$50 a month. Annual charges on life insurance, etc., amount to \$400. Expenses of moves, due to damage, have been \$150 a move. Expenses for servants not included in above.

Pay as a captain, at \$280 a month, will not enable me to save money for higher education of children; and each move, with additional travel expenses and average damage to household goods, will only result in further debt.

Maj. A. C. Thompson, Coast Artillery Corps: As the pay of privates in the Army has been doubled since that of the other members of the Army was fixed and the pay of workmen more than doubled and as the cost of living has doubled, it would seem only equity to double the pay of officers and noncommissioned officers without further argument.

My own pay is not sufficient to live well, carry insurance, and make the provision for the future that men are expected to make. Neither is my pay what an educated man who has applied himself assiduously to his business in civil life for 20 years could reasonably expect. Yet the civilian profession does not involve the surrender of his civil rights or the inconvenience of having no fixed place of residence or unusual risks of life or limb.

Maj. H. H. Sharpe, Marine Corps: In my own case I have found that the pay of my grade is not sufficient to enable me to live as the needs of my position demand.

Capt. R. V. D. Corput, Coast Artillery Corps: My present rate of pay as an officer in the United States Army is actually inadequate for an officer of my age having a family to support and educate.

Capt. F. A. Green, Coast Artillery Corps: I made a comparison between officers and men of the Army and the civilians holding somewhat the same positions and find the following conditions to exist:

A married enlisted man (private) draws \$33 per month, including pay as a first-class gunner, and if he has one child and has the benefit of the family allowance, which is \$25 per month, brings his pay up to \$58 per month, which includes clothing and rations for the man, and in this post, due to the large number of officer cantonment quarters available, he is also furnished with quarters, light, and water, provided he lives on the post.

The following is the scale of wage paid to civilians in this vicinity:

Clerks in drug stores, 65 cents per hour, for an eight-hour day, and a bonus of one month's pay for each 12 months' service.

Drug clerks, 65 cents to \$1 per hour and bonus as stated above. This is, I am informed, an increase of 110 per cent since 1916.

Bank clerks, \$150 to \$200 per month.

Accountants, \$150 to \$300 per month.

Grocer clerks, \$125 to \$175 per month.

Bookkeepers, \$150 to \$250 per month.

Autotruck drivers, \$1 per hour for eight hours and time and one-half for overtime.

Steel workers and shipbuilders, 56 cents to \$2 per hour for eight hours and time and one-half for overtime.

Common labor (general), 75 cents per hour, eight hours per day; skilled labor (general), 75 cents to \$2 per hour for eight hours, time and one-half for overtime.

Scale paid by county and city: Common laborer, street work, 75 cents per hour plus 50 per cent for overtime; skilled laborer, street work, 75 cents to \$1.50 per hour for eight hours, time and one-half for overtime.

Employers state that it is nearly impossible to hire and keep men at these prices. One druggist informed me that prior to 1917 he had hired schoolboys to work after school at the rate of \$15 per month, but that at the present time if he hired these boys he would have to pay an increase of 300 per cent, for they were now making \$55 per month and work the same hours. In practically all cases it was found that men averaged not more than four days' work each week, and in some cases men only work two days each week and make thereby enough to live on the rest of the week.

It will be seen by the above statements that men working at common labor in the streets can make as much as \$12 per day by working 12 hours.

The present Army bill sets the base pay of a captain at \$200 per month plus allowance for quarters, heat, and light, and up to the present time the base pay or the allowances for quarters has not been changed, while the allowances for heat and light have been changed slightly for the better. On this pay a captain could just about break even until 1917 (it has been said that an officer could not afford to marry until he had reached the grade of major, this prior to 1917). The following is a rough estimate of an officer with a wife and one child during this period:

Board.....	\$80
Servant.....	30
Clothing for officer and family.....	40
Miscellaneous.....	30
Total.....	180

In view of the fact, that since 1917 up to the present time everything (food, clothing, and hire of servants) will average an increase of about 100 per cent, it is no longer possible for an officer of the grade of captain to keep a servant, and it becomes necessary for the officer's wife to do all cooking and housework, and the standard up to which officers lived must necessarily be lowered.

Since the officer's wife is deprived of modern conveniences (such as electric cooking appliances and electrical appliances) which are in general use by others, due to the fact that electricity is furnished for lighting purposes only, and since gas is not furnished it becomes necessary to do all cooking over a coal stove.

An officer frequently has a change of station, and the 7 cents per mile will not cover the transportation of a family of three, to say nothing of the breakage of china and the damage to furniture.

Our children are growing up and in the not very distant future will require an education which is, like everything else, growing more expensive daily. I do not see how it will be possible to meet the additional expense with the pay of the Army as it is at present, and it is my opinion that all officers with families who have no other income will be compelled to quit the Army and turn to other pursuits to be able to make a living and to educate their children.

ENLISTED MEN.

Pvt. —: At present I draw \$15 soldier pay and \$10 extra-duty pay. My wife gets \$30 allotment a month. It costs me all I draw to live at the present time the way food and clothes are. I had a Liberty bond in the bank and it is all gone long ago. On the outside I can get \$7 or \$8 a day at my work, logging. I have my father's farm to go to and can make \$75 or \$80 to the bank each month above expenses.

Sergt. —: My pay as a soldier and the pay allowed for civilian employees speaks well enough as to the present pay of the enlisted men now in the service.

Mechanic —: I am married and my wife lives at Tacoma, Wash. The following expenditures per month: Cost of living, \$35; house rent, \$15; fuel, \$10; other needs, \$20; clothing, \$15.

In order to live and meet expenses my wife has to work. If I were in civilian life, I could earn \$8 per day in the shipyards.

Pvt. —: I am married and my wife lives in Seattle, Wash. The following are the expenditures each month: Cost of living, \$35; fuel, \$15; house rent, \$15; clothing, \$30; other needs, \$25.

In order to live and meet expenses my wife has to work. If I were in civilian life, I could earn \$6 per day as common laborer.

Corpl. —: My pay as it is now is only enough to live on, and it is out of the question to save anything. In civil life I am sure I could better my salary 50 per cent or 60 per cent.

Corpl. —: My mother and my three sisters are dependent on me for support. It is impossible for them to live on the money, as the prices of food and other needs are so high. My mother and sisters live at Hannibal, Mo. In civilian life I could earn \$7 per day as repairman in a garage.

W. O. RAFFERTY,
Colonel, Coast Artillery Corps.

[First indorsement.]

OFFICE OF THE MORALE OFFICER,
HEADQUARTERS WESTERN DEPARTMENT,
San Francisco, Calif., October 30, 1919.

To: The Chief Morale Branch, General Staff, Washington, D. C.

S. F. BATTARNS.

APPENDIX 12.

WASHINGTON BARRACKS, D. C.,
October 20, 1919.

From: Sergt. Ellis Loney, Air Service, No. R-151534, Quartermaster Corps.
To: Maj. George Mumteanu, Morale Branch, W. P. D., S. W. & N. Building.
Subject: Increase of pay.

1. The questionnaire handed me by Quartermaster Sergt. William T. Youart is duly accomplished and inclosed herewith. I am writing this letter in addition, for the reason that there is not sufficient space on the questionnaire to answer certain questions as I would like to answer them.

(a) I am paying \$15 per month for two small rooms. These rooms are really not fit to live in. The roof leaks, the doors do not fit, and the floors are too rough to think of putting down rugs, and there is no bath. I have made every effort to obtain better rooms, but I can not pay the price.

The cost of food for my wife alone is about \$35 per month. I do not draw the money value of my rations, as it would not board me and would only increase my living expenses. I never as much as eat a Sunday or holiday dinner with my wife.

I have purchased no dress clothing for my wife this season. It's all that I can afford to supply her with plain clothes for every-day house wear.

My fuel will cost me about \$8 per month, if I buy coal from the Quartermaster Department. But I understand that the Quartermaster Department has discontinued the sale of coal to soldiers.

(d) When I was discharged at Fort Sill, Okla., July 29 last past, I was offered a position with an oil company at Burke-Burnett with a salary of \$240 per month. I declined the offer, as I, like most old Regular Army men, wanted to remain with the service.

(h) My wife has applied for a position and expects to work long enough at least to enable her to purchase clothing for street wear, etc.

(j) I soon found after reenlisting that I would be unable to keep up any part of my insurance, so have never renewed my policy.

(k) I have received no assistance from any one toward the support of my family, but am using money that my wife and I have saved during the past 14 years, for the purpose of buying a home after my retirement. To date I have drawn \$200 from our accounts.

(l) While I was oversea, my wife had great difficulty in getting her allotment checks. She went months without pay, and had to go to work as a cook in an officers' mess in order to live. In my reenlistment, she has never received a check. I have made three trips to the Bureau of War Risk, but so far no results. She has two checks due.

(m) I am sure that I will be unable to keep my wife in Washington after the family allowance has been discontinued, unless she goes to work, and her health is not the best; besides she is like myself, has passed her fortieth birthday.

(g) When I reenlisted August 11, last past I did not realize what it cost to maintain a home, under the present condition of high prices. etc. I went to France in August, 1917, and returned home May 24, 1919. I was commissioned a second lieutenant while in France, and with my long period of service made my pay about \$212 per month, and with the allowances for quarters, heat, and light, about \$248 per month. I was able to send my wife \$150 per month and to pay my expenses, too. I was on this side about two months before I was discharged, but was pay still was \$198.33 per month, with certain allowances in addition, and I did not notice the cost of living to any great extent. But since reenlisting have found that I simply can not keep my wife on my present pay, so will make an effort to be discharged just as soon as the peace treaty has been ratified.

To sum up, I am just living and that is all. A trip to a cheap "movie" theater would be a real treat.

ELLIS LONEY.

APPENDIX 13.

1. Expenses to feed my family, consisting of wife and four children :	
Breakfast for 6, approximately-----	\$0. 70
Dinner for 6, approximately-----	1. 00
Supper for 6, approximately-----	. 90
For one day, approximately-----	2. 60
For one month (30 days)-----	78. 00
For clothing and shoes, per month, about-----	28. 00
For insurance, per month-----	14. 00
School expenses, per month-----	2. 00
Total expenses, per month-----	122. 00
2. My pay amounts to the following :	
Initial pay-----	\$45. 00
War pay-----	6. 00
Reenlistment pay-----	12. 00
Family allowance-----	42. 50
Ration money-----	16. 50
Total amount-----	122. 00

3. At the present rate of my income I am just able to live, but not able to save for future needs.

4. I am subject to change of station and due for service in the Philippine Islands. What am I going to do with my family? I have no funds to take them along with me, they can not remain in quarters at my former station, commutation of quarters can not be granted, so, if I am ordered away to another station, I would have to pay rent for my family out of the pay I am receiving, the future looks very bad for me.

PAUL MILLER,
Quartermaster Sergeant.

APPENDIX 14.

UNITED STATES ARMY BASE HOSPITAL.
Camp Meade, Md.

Kauffman, Eminett C., master hospital sergeant, Camp Meade, Md.

(d) Family lived with wife's brother from July 1918 to May 1919, who furnished rent, heat, and light.

(e) Allotment came regularly until June, 1919. No allotment since that time. This was due, in part, to discontinuance blank, because of discharge, and new application, because of reenlistment, not being mailed in same envelope. About two months ago a letter was forwarded by Mrs. Kauffman to the N.W.R.I., who stated that the matter would be investigated. A second letter was forwarded a few days ago. The nonreceipt of allotment, with attendant deduction of \$15 a month from my pay, together with \$12.96 insurance premium and \$15 for liberty bonds, leaves but \$58 per month. These conditions have required the spending of the little which was saved while living with Mrs. Kauffman's people, and selling of the bond, with probability of selling the second within a short time. The borrowed money has delayed the loss of the bond for the time being. These bonds, together with three of the fifth issue, were purchased at a sacrifice in order to have something for the additional expenses which will be required when the children are sent to college. The payment of the allotment and allowance will permit the savings to remain.

(f) As long as I am able to keep the family in the post, with no long moves, will be able to get along without the family allowance. The following is the life of the family of the Army man. Taking my family as a typical example : Was married in Manila, having sent for my bride, who lived in New Jersey ; this, the best move of my life, took my savings, which paid for transportation, etc., and furniture, which I purchased from an officer who was returning to

the United States. This left me about \$100 in arrears. After the boy was born, the mother was unable to nurse the child, and special milk had to be procured from Manila, which prohibited any savings being made. Because of the health of the infant it was necessary to return to the United States from the Islands, and was ordered to Fort Hancock for duty. Upon arrival in Sandy Hook, was over \$100 in debt. In order to return to the United States, with the small baggage allowance, it was necessary to sell the furniture which we had purchased in Keithley. I surrendered my life insurance policy in order to again start housekeeping. After two years my mother became seriously ill with a paralytic stroke, which required a trip and attendant expenses. I returned to the post owing \$70. In April of the following year, was ordered to Fort D. A. Russell, Wyo., was not able to take family with me because of lack of funds. I took the family to her home, where she remained until September, when she joined me at Cheyenne. In 1912, was ordered to Honolulu. I took the family with me and arrived there with \$18. The commissary sergeant gave me, on his personal account, sufficient credit to purchase commissaries for the remainder of the month. Within the next two years, with close figuring, had a bank account of \$50, which together with final statements and a month's pay, which was needed to send the family to Mrs. Kauffman's brother in New Jersey. This move was made necessary because of the illness of her mother and the expectation of my going overseas, which I had applied for. This, again, put me in debt. I am now living in the camp, under the advantages of commissary prices, and will be able to pay up debts, as soon as allotment is received, with a small savings. This, of course, will not restore the bond which has been lost, through use. It is probable that history will repeat itself and, as soon as a little is laid aside, another move will be in order, and it will be required to start over again. My furniture is at present in storage, costing \$4 a month for charges. Request will be made for its transportation to this camp, in accordance with existing orders. There is an added expense to Army life in the wear and tear on household goods in the constant and long moves. These moves are normal and are to be expected. This is the average story of the Army man.

(g) I will provide schooling for the children if it requires the throwing away of 19 years' service, including 5 years double time.

(h) Should I get a long move now, the family would have to again return to her brother and secure help from him as to rent and heat and light. I have been fortunate in having a brother-in-law with a large home.

(i) Was not commissioned during the war. Was recommended for commission in line; did not encourage the recommendations, as I felt that I would be more needed in the Medical Department, my ideas being strengthened after reading literature of the Sanitary Service of the English and French. My training had been entirely in the supply, administrative, transportation, clerical, and sanitary matters. I was recommended also for the Adjutant General and Quartermaster Departments before the formation of the Sanitary Corps. I was three times recommended for commission in the Sanitary Corps, twice after taking an examination for the same. There are several in the Hawaiian department and Philippines whose experience was similar. The chief surgeons in these departments, desiring an efficient force, discouraged the loss of their men and in cases stated that the only way for us (the noncommissioned officers of the Medical Department in his department) to get the commission was to write to some one in Washington to have action taken on the recommendations already made. Regulations prohibited such a course, and this regulation was called to our attention by a Hawaiian department order about this time. It was either remain as we were and obey the orders or take it for granted that in case we wrote no trouble would come of it and the desired recommendation would be acted on. At least six put the training first and made application for return to the States, but did not succeed and set fast. We were finally returned to the States for the purpose of accepting a commission, after a strong positive communication from the Surgeon General's Office. We arrived here on October 27, 1918, and lost out. Was given a reserve commission in the sanitary section of the Quartermaster Corps in April of this year.

(j) I am on my seventh enlistment. I have never decided to reenlist until brought face to face with actual decision. The same is true now. The above offer is tempting and I may decide to buy out when the provision is restored. I like the service but family comes first as long as the emergency is off.

EMMETT C. KAUFFMAN.

APPENDIX 15.

Extract from monthly Report of Fifty-first Artillery (Coast Artillery Corps) morale officer, Fort Hamilton, N. Y., September 30, 1919.

The one single cause of discontent among the men can not be removed by regimental action. Men are seeking to be discharged or to be furloughed to the reserve, not because they find soldiering distasteful but because of the big discrepancy between the pay they receive and the high wages which are obtainable by even common labor on the outside.

APPENDIX 16.

FAVORING INCREASED PAY FOR ACTIVE SERVICE MEN.

Whereas the American military policy has been to maintain a small but highly specialized force as a nucleus for an enlarged force of less highly trained men in time of emergency; and

Whereas the American policy has changed only as it has become necessary to increase the force, due to an enlarged international responsibility and a greatly extended military and naval establishment; and

Whereas the continuation of this policy and the maintenance of this establishment is dependent upon the efficiency and the esprit de corps of the personnel of the service, and logically they must be kept with a reasonable degree of personnel comfort in order to perform their duties satisfactorily; and

Whereas the present loss to the service of trained officers and men is directly attributable to the greatly increased living costs without a corresponding increase in service men's pay, and the continued neglect by the Federal Government to recognize the condition, and the decided advantages that such men can secure in the merchant marine and kindred industries; and

Whereas any form of Government lowering of living costs will not be immediate, while the advantages in civil life are present and economic needs are pressing and urgent: Therefore be it

Resolved, That the American Legion of the State of Washington, in convention duly and regularly assembled, does most earnestly recommend that Congress take cognizance of this condition; and be it

Further resolved, That the bill (H. R. 9204) by Mr. Stiness is the best bill before Congress to remedy the condition; and be it

Further resolved, That Congress and the Departments of War and of the Navy should take such action as will pass the bill at the earliest possible time; and be it

Further resolved, That this resolution be presented to the National Convention of the American Legion for further indorsement and that this resolution be forwarded to the national chairman, American Legion, to the House and Senate Military and Naval Affairs Committees, to the Congressmen from Washington, and to the Secretary of War and to the Secretary of the Navy.

APPENDIX 17.

FORT SNELLING, MINN.,

October 21, 1919.

DEAR COL. PENN: I am exceedingly sorry that I have been unable to write to you sooner, but we no sooner arrived here than I had to start school. I was unable to enter the university, as I hadn't a year of Chaucer nor a year of geometry, outside of those two subjects I was all right; anyway I started to school in St. Paul when, after I had gone there for almost six weeks, I was told that I was supposed to go to Minneapolis. When I went over to Minneapolis they informed us that we were in no exact county, so we would have to pay tuition which would amount to \$90 a term, three terms a year. Then I have my car fare to pay and my lunch to buy, therefore it costs me exactly \$45 a month to go to public school, when I've already finished high school. I really don't know what we'll do when daddy is reduced, which is bound to come very soon.

I haven't much time these days, either. I leave for school at 7 o'clock and get home a little after 5; at 6 we have supper, and after supper I have my night work to do.

I don't know a girl in this school I go to; its a very rough crowd of boys and girls. Perhaps you know about South Minneapolis. There are six policemen on each floor to keep them from stealing, gambling, and drinking. I am so discouraged that I believe I shall give up school and wait until we are ordered away from here, but chances are we won't go for a school year or so, and I will have forgotten most of my "school habits" and "school brains" by that time.

Col. Penn, I wonder if you could possibly have daddy assigned to some regiment, either in Honolulu or in the Philippines. There is a lovely university in Honolulu that I ought to be able to go to, and unless father is stationed in some other country I don't see how they can afford to send me to a university, as things are so extremely high in the United States; so won't you please try to have daddy assigned to one of the regiments there that I might finish my education?

I think that Fort Snelling is very lonesome. There are no girls within from 6 to 9 miles from here, so that I'm left completely to myself.

The people of St. Paul and the people in Minneapolis are certainly jealous of each other * * *.

**STATEMENT OF LIEUT. JAMES W. SHERRILL, MEDICAL CORPS,
UNITED STATES ARMY, PATHOLOGIST, WALTER REED HOSPITAL.**

The CHAIRMAN. If you have any observations, we would be glad to hear them.

Lieut. SHERRILL. I speak from my own condition as a lieutenant in the Army. I have been in now for 17 months, and to-day I sent in my fourth request for resignation, because I find that I am wholly unable to live on the salary I am getting, and furthermore I am in debt for the time I have been in the Army. I am unmarried, and I find that I am unable to become married on my present salary; find it would be wholly impossible. Of course, I have a dependent mother, whom I have been giving a certain amount of money—\$80—which is inadequate for her and my younger brother, who is in school, and, as I said, I sent in to-day my fourth request, those being my reasons; that I can not live on my salary.

The CHAIRMAN. What is your present salary as a first lieutenant?

Lieut. SHERRILL. For the 15 months I have gotten \$3,200. I get a base pay of \$166 a month, and including quarters I get about \$203 a month.

The CHAIRMAN. Where do you quarter?

Lieut. SHERRILL. Right now I am in Takoma Park.

The CHAIRMAN. In private rooms?

Lieut. SHERRILL. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you mind saying how much you pay for them?

Lieut. SHERRILL. I changed the 1st of this month, because I had to make a reduction. I am paying now \$50 for my room and two meals a day, and then I have my noon meal, which is a lunch, which usually amounts at the canteen to 25 to 50 cents, which makes it about \$60 a month. That is the cheapest I have been able to live. I was here in Washington four months during the summer of 1918, at which time I paid \$42.50 for a room, and my meals ran all the way to about \$50 a month, making in all about \$90 a month.

The CHAIRMAN. You do not mind my asking these questions, do you?

Lieut. SHERRILL. No, indeed.

The CHAIRMAN. How much did you have to invest in your uniform?

Lieut. SHERRILL. I have that item right here that I turned in with my resignation. If you will like to hear it, I will give the total amounts of my expenditures. I have been in about 17 months, counting the remainder of this month and part of June, 1917.

My room, board, and laundry for the 15 months averaged a little less than \$75, a total that included the high rate that I paid in Washington, amounting to a little less than \$75 a month, or \$1,130 for the 15 months. My laundry for 66 weeks, at about \$1 a week, which is about \$66. Insurance, war-risk insurance, 15 months, at \$6.80, \$102, and I have some civilian insurance, \$3,000, which amounts to \$210 for the 15 months. Clothing and equipment, which is equipment I have bought on entering the service, which I paid for with money I received before coming into the Army, and I have not been reimbursed for it: Two wool suits, at \$40, \$80; three khaki suits, at \$12.50, \$37.50; one raincoat, \$12; two blankets, at \$7.50, \$15; two pair of shoes, at \$6, \$12; bedding roll, sheets, and towels, and such things as that, equipment for which I have paid \$37; two pair of leggins, at \$7.50, \$15; shirts and underwear, \$20; miscellaneous I have put down at \$20, but that does not cover it all. That is a total of \$248.65.

The clothing, since I entered the service, which is entirely inadequate and which needs replacement, one overcoat, \$100. You see, these prices are moderate, because I had to buy as cheaply as I could. One wool suit, bought last February, \$55; one cap and one hat, \$10.50; two wool shirts, at the commissary, at \$3.15, \$6.30; three pairs of shoes, \$14.38; miscellaneous, \$30; total, \$216.18. Interest on the money which I spent for medical education, which I borrowed and am paying for at the rate of 8 per cent, the principal of which I have been wholly unable to pay one cent on, interest on \$3,100, 15 months, at 8 per cent, \$310.

As to my dependents. For my mother I allow \$80 per month. That is for payment of taxes and everything which she has, and for part payment of my younger brother, who is in school. I have only been able to allow \$80 a month, which amounts to \$1,200. Miscellaneous, that includes everything that I have spent that I can not account for, including new medical books and newspapers, magazines, and it includes six days' vacation, car fare, stamps, contributions, and dues, at a very low estimate I have put \$300, \$15 a month. That is a total of \$3,732.68. My salary has been \$3,200, leaving a total deficit of \$532, and I am wholly unable to keep that up, and I have made my fourth request for resignation. Those estimates, I think you will concede, are very low.

The CHAIRMAN. Had you been a line officer your expenses for equipment would have been much higher?

Lieut. SHERRILL. Yes; much higher, because I would have had to have side arms, and things like that.

The CHAIRMAN. And boots?

Lieut. SHERRILL. Well, of course, I had to buy those anyway. I was ordered overseas.

The CHAIRMAN. So really your expenses in that respect are a little bit below the average?

Lieut. SHERRILL. Yes; I think they are, very much. I bought no field equipment except bedding roll and a few towels and sheets.

Senator SUTHERLAND. I should like to know where you get three pairs of shoes for \$14.

Lieut. SHERRILL. That includes one pair at \$6, and two pairs at \$4; but, of course, they are these rough shoes.

Senator SUTHERLAND. You got those from the commissary?

Lieut. SHERRILL. Yes, sir. I can not get those now at that price; they have gone up to \$6.

I was interested in one statement in respect to salaries. For instance, my pay as a lieutenant, as a physician, is \$6.97 a day. When I went in the Army I was quite sure that in all probability the salary would be increased, maybe a slight amount. If the war had continued, of course you would have taken your chance of living that long, but in the chances of war you would have been a major inside of 12 months. As a single man at this time I would have been drawing that compensation, whatever it is, and it would have been adequate for awhile. Now, it is wholly inadequate. As it is, I get \$6.97 a day. I picked up this piece of paper here and saw the item which says "The bricklayers for brick veneer work, \$9 a day, Visitors House, Walter Reed Hospital." I am engaged there as a pathologist at \$6.97 a day. I do not begrudge the bricklayer his \$9 a day.

Senator SUTHERLAND. How long had you been out of medical college?

Lieut. SHERRILL. Slightly more than two years.

Senator SUTHERLAND. You went into the service within six or eight months, after you got through the medical college?

Lieut. SHERRILL. I had to interne a year before I could get into the Medical Corps. I interned one year, and then went direct into the Army.

Senator SUTHERLAND. Since you came into the service or before?

Lieut. SHERRILL. That was before. It had to be, because it is required before you could enter the corps.

The CHAIRMAN. Are there any other questions to be asked Lieut. Sherrill? I think he has made a case.

Senator New. He surely has.

STATEMENT OF FIRST LIEUT. FRANCIS X. MCGOVERN, MEDICAL CORPS, UNITED STATES ARMY, STATIONED AT WALTER REED HOSPITAL.

Lieut. MCGOVERN. I have been asked to appear before this committee along the same lines of the lieutenant preceding me, having submitted my resignation from the regular medical corps, and having been refused, having submitted my resignation on the ground I could not support myself and wife on the amount of money I was receiving from the Government.

I have not estimated my little budget on the year's salary, but I have taken it on the basis of a month's salary, enumerating my expenses for the month.

It costs me for one room and board for myself and wife \$96. This is a very small figure, which is being allowed to me because I have had the room for a long period of time and the landlady has not

raised it. Allowance to my wife, \$40 per month, with which she is supposed to clothe herself and provide herself with what other necessities she needs. Laundry bills \$8; tailor bill \$4. Government insurance, \$6.70; outside insurance, which I had before I came into the service, and which I am still trying to carry, \$11; barber bill, \$3; and meals which I do not get at the boarding house and which do not come under the \$96, cost me \$10.50, averaging 35 cents day for lunch.

The CHAIRMAN. That is the midday meal you do not get at home?

Lieut. MCGOVERN. Yes, sir. That totals \$189.27 a month. Then my brother and myself are trying to educate another brother, and I allow him \$10 a month for that. That pulls the entire figure up to \$199.20 a month, and my salary is, as lieutenant, \$203 and some odd cents a month. Aside from the things I have enumerated, I have to have the following: I have to have incidentals of various kinds, soap, toilet articles, shaving equipment, stamps, writing paper and other miscellaneous expenses, incidentals, and sundries. I have to keep up with the medical end of the game. I have got to have medical journals and periodicals; I have got to buy new books which are being constantly printed as a result of the war if I am going to keep up and be efficient in the profession as a surgeon. I have got to keep myself clothed. Not alone that, but my clothes have to be of a certain kind and character, and always have to be neat in appearance and of good make, and, finally, I have got to have some kind of recreation. At the present rate of pay it is absolutely impossible for myself and wife to have any form of recreation whatever.

This \$96 a month for room and board is one room. We have lived in the same room for a year and a half, and it is quite logical, quite obvious, that we could not accept any invitations to call, because it would be too humiliating to return the call and have others come and visit us in this one room where we live, where we read, sleep, and do everything else.

I have had to call on money that I had when I came into the service. Last August, through hard work and worry on account of these financial conditions, my health broke down and I was required to take a sick leave of 30 days, and I had to borrow the money to take the sick leave. I could not take my wife with me. I had to get away quickly. I had to maintain myself while on the leave; my wife remained in Washington while I was away. If I were ordered to go from Washington to San Francisco to-morrow, in order to bring my wife with me I would have to borrow money to get there. I could not report for duty otherwise.

I have a little advertisement I discovered in the Washington Times of Wednesday, the 22d. The ad reads:

Wanted, men to prepare as firemen, brakemen, colored train porters, \$150 to \$200 a month to start. No experience necessary. No strike. Inter Railway Co., Indianapolis, Ind.

There is an inexperienced brakeman on a car line who starts for the same salary that the Government has been paying me as a surgeon; and I am a surgeon; I operate three times a week at Walter Reed Hospital. They are paid the same amount of money I am getting from the Government; that I have gotten for the last three

years; and if conditions remain as they are to-day, I will get for the next two and one-half years, because I have to remain five years as a lieutenant before I qualify for promotion.

I might emphasize the fact the previous officer made, that a brick-layer gets \$9 per day, while I am working in the operating room, at the same place, doing surgery, and get \$6 per day some some odd cents for doing it.

STATEMENT OF Q. M. SERGT. WILLIAM T. YOUART, QUARTERMASTER CORPS, UNITED STATES ARMY.

The CHAIRMAN. How long have you been in the service?

Sergt. YOUART. Since 1898.

The CHAIRMAN. Are you married?

Sergt. YOUART. I am.

The CHAIRMAN. How many children have you?

Sergt. YOUART. A wife and three children.

The CHAIRMAN. Where are you stationed?

Sergt. YOUART. Washington Barracks.

The CHAIRMAN. Tell us what you care to say about this situation.

Sergt. YOUART. Well, there is very little that can be said about the value of the dollar. I think it has been gone over very thoroughly. There are, however, a few things I should like to mention relative to the enlisted man's existence during the present state of affairs. Unfortunately, some years ago I lost two enlistment periods—our pay is based on enlistment periods—and that automatically reduced my pay. It gave me a base pay of \$45 a month, and, including the fifth enlistment period, means \$16 additional; in other words, \$61. That is the income per month for 21 years' service. There is a slight increase that has recently been made of \$6 a month for this emergency, but that does not happen to be sufficient to pay my insurance; that is, the war-risk insurance. Part of my pay has got to be added to that in order to pay the premium.

My wife receives a small allowance, \$37.50; with the \$37.50 and my pay of \$61 is the entire income to provide clothing, food, etc., for myself, wife, and three children. It is utterly impossible to do it.

The CHAIRMAN. How about your clothing?

Sergt. YOUART. My clothing is furnished by the Government.

I make the food purchases from the commissary, in every practical case. I went so far as to get comparative prices from different dealers, and I compare those with similar grades in the subsistence department, and make the purchases from the most economical point of view. I am not able to purchase any clothing. If I were not granted quarters, fuel, and light, I do not see how I could possibly remain in the service. It is a physical impossibility to provide sufficiently. Take the matter of providing a family of five. I will merely use the same figures that Col. Munson used in computing the value of the ration. The figure, I believe, was about 55 cents a day. Take it at \$17 a month, approximately. The Government will allow five soldiers five times \$17, \$85. That is more than my pay, consequently it is impossible to give my family as much food as what the corresponding number of soldiers are getting, not considering clothing and transportation. As far as transportation is concerned, I am practically on the same status as a commissioned officer; I am moved auto-

matically; I receive my change of station separately from any organization. I have to take my wife and children with me or leave them behind at some post as charges; possibly might have to move them into some community.

At present I would not be able to transport them. I just returned from the Philippine Islands, and I am able to tell you something about those expenses. I left the Philippine Islands on the 4th day of July, this year.

Senator SUTHERLAND. You came back on a transport?

Sergt. YOUART. Yes, sir; and I tried to travel very moderately. I bought a section—an upper and lower berth. I used the upper berth with one child, and my wife and two children in the lower berth. We came on through, and the entire trip cost me something over \$600.

The CHAIRMAN. Ten months' pay?

Sergt. YOUART. Yes, sir. You might ask where the \$600 came from. I was in the Philippines four years and we get a slight increase over there of 20 per cent, but that was not sufficient, so I entered into the employment of a cinematograph company—a moving-picture establishment—and I worked there for over two and one-half years. I went to the quartermaster's office in the morning about 7 o'clock and worked continuously until 1 p. m. I went home, had lunch, and at 2 o'clock I was back in the cinematograph office; stayed there and conducted that business until about 5 o'clock in the evening, went home, had supper, and went back and put on seven moving-picture shows that night, and got back to my home about 11 o'clock at night. That practice continued for nearly two and one-half years constantly, every night and every day.

Senator SUTHERLAND. How much did you get for that?

Sergt. YOUART. I received \$30 a month for that; \$30 extra. By saving that money I was able to bring the family along east with me; otherwise I do not know exactly how it would have been possible.

I have seen some cases over there where the expenses were so great the men were unable to move their families back, and when they were ordered back to the United States after completing a tour of duty of three or four years, not because they wanted to but because of the necessity, they asked to have the order revoked and be permitted to remain in the Philippine Department, because it was impossible for them to move their families back. They could not get back. There were quite a number of cases of enlisted men utterly unable to come back to the United States, because when they arrived at San Francisco they did not know where they were going. They might be ordered clear up to Narragansett District, New York, down in Florida, and the expense of moving the family is a great deal. Now, the soldier does not get mileage. He is furnished transportation in kind for himself and subsistence at the rate of \$1.50 a day while he is actually traveling, and it is utterly impossible to subsist himself while traveling on the \$1.50. The ticket merely covers his own transportation; there is no provision whatever made for any member of his family. We do not enjoy the mileage privilege. Nevertheless, we get our stations changed very frequently, ordinarily about once every 18 months, and possibly at the longest every 2 years. At least, that has been my experience, with the exception of the present tour in the Philippines, which extended over a period

of four years. But during that tour of duty I had numerous changes.

When I first went over I was sent to Corregidor, that is the sea-coast fortification, and in 1916 there was a consolidation of the offices of the quartermaster and the construction quartermaster. That made some surplus material and I was sent to Mindanao, which is a 10-day trip by interisland transport. Some short time afterwards, about nine months, I was ordered back to Manila, to be present at a course of instruction that was being held in the depot quartermaster's office. Mindanao being an isolated place, I asked to be relieved from that station, and was told I would be in a short time, and after these instructions were over I went back to Mindanao, stayed down there until the post was abandoned some six or seven months later, then was ordered back into Manila again. So you see I traveled from Manila down to the southern part of the archipelago, back to Manila, down again, and then eventually back to Manila, and there was quite an expense attached to it.

My baggage allowance is 3,000 pounds. In order to equip a home you can not do much with 3,000 pounds, including packing and crating material; you have not got very much after you pack a few necessities—beds and such things as that. In order to equip the home you have to have more, and the result is you have excess baggage. In this particular movement I paid \$17 extra freight to bring my freight here.

There is a great deal of expense connected with a noncommissioned staff officer. I do not believe his duties and his position in the Army are too well known.

The idea is more or less along the line that the Government takes care of the enlisted man entirely, that it gives him his quarters, food, and so on. That is very true as to a certain class of enlisted men, new men coming in the Army are without much expense. But after they are in, say 10 or 12 years, I think over 90 per cent of them get married; later on they have a family increase, and they get to the highest noncommissioned grades and there they seem to stop. There is no chance for further advancement. There is no opportunity for being advanced further. I am barred from the commissioned grade on several counts; I am married for one, and over age for another.

We have another noncommissioned grade a little higher than myself that has recently been created, I believe in 1912, when the Quartermaster Corps was created, known as Quartermaster sergeant, senior grade. At that particular time it was our understanding from Gen. Aleshire that the post quartermaster sergeant would be taken care of in creating senior grade quartermaster sergeants, but it later developed that an appointment as senior grade quartermaster sergeant was open only to a man with mechanical experience and the old post quartermaster sergeant found himself shut out. The examination for the senior grade appointment is confined almost exclusively to engineer—or motor transport and electricians, and such like, consequently a man who has followed this work as I have is not prepared to take that examination, and there is no further advancement for me. In other words, I am just marking time for the remainder of my service, and the only increase I get is at the completion of every enlistment period an automatic increase of \$4 a

month, which is a very slow method of trying to accumulate anything.

Senator NEW. To pile up an income?

Sergt. YOUART. I do not think it is necessary to say anything about how we have to provide food on \$61 for five people. I think the matter is pretty well known by your committee, but I do think enlisted men should have an increase in pay, or some steps should be taken to relieve their present situation.

I have been thinking seriously on the matter of providing a ration for the family, I believe the wife should get a ration and the children one-half ration. No provisions of that kind is made in our service, but I hardly think that would work out satisfactorily. That is the scheme adopted by the British Army.

Senator NEW. What is the base pay of the British soldier?

Sergt. YOUART. They have got absolutely no grades that correspond with my grade. Their first grade is sergeant major, who draws about \$55 a month. If we give the married sergeant two rations, that is not going to help very much. In other words, to-day, that would be only \$17 additional.

The CHAIRMAN. Seventeen dollars a month?

Sergt. YOUART. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. What percentage is that of \$61?

Sergt. YOUART. It is not quite one-third of it.

The CHAIRMAN. You get \$61.

Sergt. YOUART. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. You would get 50 per cent increase under this bill, then you would get \$30.50 increase.

Sergt. YOUART. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. As compared with two rations at \$17?

Sergt. YOUART. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. I do not know whether you have thought it over much, but could you not get a combination of the two, so as to provide that degree of elasticity that is desired?

Sergt. YOUART. I think it would be a very good idea, and I think it would help matters considerably; but why not give the children a fraction of a ration?

The CHAIRMAN. My original suggestion, which was rather a groping one, and the other was that of the colonel who was on the stand a while ago, that the rations be added to correspond with the number of the family, in whole or in part.

Sergt. YOUART. I think in part would be fair, gentlemen. Take a family of six—that is, four children—the soldier already receives his ration, and give the wife another ration, and base the children's rations a good deal as they do in railroad tickets, a child under a certain age a half ration.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you think that would cause a feeling among the enlisted men in the Army that there was a discrimination against enlisted men of the same grade?

Sergt. YOUART. It is bound to cause some little feeling. In other words, take two men with the same length of service, one married and one unmarried; if one has, say, two children and a wife he naturally would receive more money, but his obligations are a great deal more—his responsibilities. I do not think any broad-minded man could have any serious objection or fault with it, as it stands

to reason that a man with a family has got the responsibility to provide for them, and if \$50 or \$60 takes care of a single man, it is an absolute fact that the married man can not take care of his responsibilities for the same \$60.

If there could be some sort of provision made that the children, let us say, would receive a half ration. I find my youngest child to be 3 years of age; it might seem that such a child should not be as expensive in food as the older children, but I do not see much difference between it and a 10-year-old child.

The CHAIRMAN. There is very little.

Sergt. YOUART. There is very little. And take a 10-year-old child, there are days that they actually consume as much as grown people. They may have their off days, but as a rule there is not a wide difference.

Senator SUTHERLAND. If you buy milk and cream these days, it costs money.

Sergt. YOUART. It is absolutely impossible at the present time for my family to buy any fresh milk. I realize it is quite a necessity in the diet of the younger members of the family, but we can not afford it; prices are going up again, I believe; 18 cents a quart was the last. I have got to confine my family exclusively to milk we get from the commissary—evaporated milk.

The CHAIRMAN. Your statement has been very interesting, Sergeant. We have been glad to hear you.

STATEMENT OF FIRST SERGT. WILLIAM LAWRENCE, THIRTY-SEVENTH CAVALRY, UNITED STATES ARMY.

The CHAIRMAN. How long have you been in the Army, Sergeant?

Sergt. LAWRENCE. Eight years and three months.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you mind telling how old you are?

Sergt. LAWRENCE. Twenty-eight years old.

The CHAIRMAN. I see you saw service abroad.

Sergt. LAWRENCE. Yes, sir; 21 months.

The CHAIRMAN. Are you married?

Sergt. LAWRENCE. Yes, sir; I have been married four years and a half.

The CHAIRMAN. You are a quartermaster sergeant?

Sergt. LAWRENCE. First sergeant.

The CHAIRMAN. What is your pay?

Sergt. LAWRENCE. \$45 a month, base pay.

The CHAIRMAN. What are you getting from longevity or new enlistments?

Sergt. LAWRENCE. \$8.

The CHAIRMAN. That makes \$53 a month?

Sergt. LAWRENCE. Yes; and a \$6 increase for the war.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you get something for expert rifleman?

Sergt. LAWRENCE. Not now. I lost that after a year.

The CHAIRMAN. That would be \$5, would it not?

Sergt. LAWRENCE. That would have been \$58; yes, sir. That would be \$5 a month for the expert rifleman.

The CHAIRMAN. So to-day you get just what?

Sergt. LAWRENCE. I get \$59 a month.

The CHAIRMAN. How much of a family have you?

Sergt. LAWRENCE. My wife.

The CHAIRMAN. Does she live in noncom. quarters?

Sergt. LAWRENCE. Yes, sir. That is a matter I would like to bring before the chairman.

Senator SUTHERLAND. How long have you been married?

Sergt. LAWRENCE. Four and one-half years. At the grade of first sergeant he is allowed quarters, if they are available. They are available at the present time at Fort Myer; but to-morrow, if a senior noncommissioned officer would come in that post, I would have to vacate the quarters and would be allowed no commutation.

The CHAIRMAN. You happen to be at the foot of the list now?

Sergt. LAWRENCE. Yes, sir. The first sergeant is only allowed quarters when they are available, and he is allowed quarters in kind; he is not allowed commutation of quarters.

The CHAIRMAN. What do your quarters consist of over there?

Sergt. LAWRENCE. They consist of five rooms, with a cooking range.

The CHAIRMAN. In a two-family house?

Sergt. LAWRENCE. In a three-family house.

The CHAIRMAN. What are those three rooms?

Sergt. LAWRENCE. Two rooms and a bath, one kitchen, and one front living room.

The CHAIRMAN. You sleep in the living room?

Sergt. LAWRENCE. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. And you use the kitchen for a dining room?

Sergt. LAWRENCE. Use the kitchen for a dining room and kitchen.

The CHAIRMAN. How do you find it goes on \$59?

Sergt. LAWRENCE. I find it does not go at all.

Senator NEW. The \$59 goes all right, does it not?

Sergt. LAWRENCE. It goes; yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Tell us something about it.

Senator SUTHERLAND. You look mighty well, sergeant.

Sergt. LAWRENCE. That is the outdoor life, sir. That is the reason I remained in the service the eight years I have. I just re-enlisted in order to bring my wife from California, or I would not be in the service at the present time if I could have gotten her here, and there is no need of my bringing before the committee the cost of living at the present time. I think that has been gone over very well. I found in France that I had to allot to my wife out of my \$69, I allotted \$60 to her, leaving me \$9 to get along on a month in France. I found I could not take out any War Risk insurance; it would not leave me anything.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you subscribe to any Liberty loans?

Sergt. LAWRENCE. Yes, sir; I have \$450 Liberty loans.

The CHAIRMAN. What do you figure it costs you to live this way?

Sergt. LAWRENCE. I figure at the present time it costs me \$72 a month to live, with my pay of \$59 and my allowance of the War Risk insurance due of \$15, which is \$74. It costs me \$72 for the two of us to live, and I am occupying Government quarters, which I may at any time be ordered to vacate. I do not see how I could get along if I had to rent quarters.

Col. MUNSON. Am I right in saying that family allowance has ceased?

Sergt. LAWRENCE. One month after the emergency.

The CHAIRMAN. How much does that family allowance amount to?

Sergt. LAWRENCE. \$15.

The CHAIRMAN. So you lose the \$15 if nothing is done in the meantime?

Sergt. LAWRENCE. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Are you otherwise satisfied with the service?

Sergt. LAWRENCE. I like the service, sir. I would like to remain in it, but I do not see how I can. As I stated before, I would not be in the service at the present time only I reenlisted for a year in order to bring my wife from California.

Senator NEW. I suppose, having enlisted at 20 years of age, you have no trade?

Sergt. LAWRENCE. No, sir; I have no trade. I came right out of high school and enlisted at the time of the Mexican trouble in 1911. I like the service and would be glad to remain in it if there were sufficient pay. I think it has been said before the committee by Col. Richardson that officers and noncommissioned officers are the backbone of the Army. There is no incentive for a noncommissioned officer. A corporal, for instance, gets \$3 more than a private, and a sergeant \$2 more than a corporal.

The CHAIRMAN. Base pay?

Sergt. LAWRENCE. Base pay; yes, sir. The first sergeant is responsible to his captain for the entire troop, a troop of cavalry, 105 men, he is responsible for the discipline. I think a man on the outside, in charge of 105 men, would surely draw more than \$59, with the additional allowance of clothing.

The CHAIRMAN. There are 105 horses to look after, too?

Sergt. LAWRENCE. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. That is almost as much trouble as the men, is it not?

Sergt. LAWRENCE. Yes, sir; in fact, more.

Senator SUTHERLAND. You get your food and clothing in addition to that?

Sergt. LAWRENCE. I get my food and clothing. That is another matter, brought up before the House committee by one of the members, "Was it true the enlisted man had no expenses?" The enlisted man is issued a suit of clothing, as I am issued here, just as you would buy it in a ready-made tailor shop, and naturally it does not fit him. The officers will not allow him to go out, or he does not desire to go out, looking like a sack of oats. It cost me \$4 to have this coat cut down after it was issued. That is just stating my own case, the case of every man. He has to keep his shoes shined; he is supposed to wash his face and must purchase the soap; he must have his hair cut. That is surely an expense which must be borne by the enlisted man.

The CHAIRMAN. You pay for your own laundry now?

Sergt. LAWRENCE. Yes, sir; and it costs me \$2.50 for that one item, and every other man at he post.

The CHAIRMAN. Colonel, in the cantonments the laundry was done for the men, was it not, by the Government?

Col. MUNSON. It never has been done; in the hospitals only.

The CHAIRMAN. What other expenses have you got? Do you smoke?

Sergt. LAWRENCE. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Most of the men do smoke?

Sergt. LAWRENCE. All of the men do smoke.

The CHAIRMAN. What is the average cost of that?

Sergt. LAWRENCE. According to what you smoke, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. That is true. I am trying to figure out what a man is entitled to have for his personal comfort and little incidental things in addition to the things that are absolutely life necessities.

Sergt. LAWRENCE. I think, speaking as a general rule, the majority of the enlisted men are not married; I am speaking in their case. The noncommissioned officers should be raised in order to make something for him to look up to, to work for. When I three years and six months in the service I reached the grade I hold at the present time, and have remained there. There is nothing for me to look forward to. I do not wish to go in the Quartermaster Corps; I was not built for deck service; I like the line. I think the pay of the line should be raised in order to hold good men in the line. You surely need good men in time of war in the line, as I think you found out.

The CHAIRMAN. What was your observation, Sergeant, as to the state of mind of the privates, unmarried, on the \$30 base pay?

Sergt. LAWRENCE. I think the present private is very well satisfied.

The CHAIRMAN. You do not hear in your troop complaints of men going into debt because they are compelled to?

Sergt. LAWRENCE. No, sir; I do not hear of any privates going into debt. You do not find very old privates in the troops.

The CHAIRMAN. No; of course not; they are younger men, nearly all single?

Sergt. LAWRENCE. The larger majority of them only remain for one enlistment. If you want to hold a noncommissioned officer in the Army, there should be something for him to look forward to. You require a corporal to take charge of a cavalry squad of 12 men. He gets \$3 more a month for being responsible for those 12 men than a private. It would be much better for him to remain with the privates. If I was not married I would sooner be a private than a first sergeant, responsible for 105 men. I would rather have somebody responsible for me.

As I say, I would not be in the Army at the present time, as the officers and everybody else acquainted with the Army say, you have got good men, hold them as noncommissioned officers. How are you going to do it on the present pay? Surely a foreman on the outside, just responsible for the labor work of 105 men, would draw probably three times as much pay as I do. Soldiers are required to be on duty 24 hours; he can go off for his recreation only when the military authorities deem it necessary. The laboring man works 8 hours a day; he knows when he is to go on and when he has finished.

The CHAIRMAN. If he is a bituminous miner, he may get down to 6 hours a day and 5 days a week?

Sergt. LAWRENCE. Yes, sir. The soldier is required to go wherever ordered. If the regiment were moved now, I would have to move my wife. As I stated before, I had to reenlist to get the bonus and some travel pay in order to get my wife here to join me after we returned from France. You will find that is the case of a good many men you have in the Army now under the voluntary enlistment. They just reenlisted in order to get that money, but will not remain another year.

The CHAIRMAN. What do you think of Sergt. Youart's suggestion as to the rations?

Sergt. LAWRENCE. I think it is a very good suggestion, but I do not think that is sufficient. I do not think that would work harmony in the Army between the married and unmarried men.

The CHAIRMAN. You are inclined to disagree with him on that?

Sergt. LAWRENCE. I do not believe it would keep harmony in the Army.

The CHAIRMAN. The married man would get more pay than the single man of the same grade?

Sergt. LAWRENCE. I would not encourage marriage; we would not get along in the Army if we had nine-tenths of the men married; you would not be able to find them half the time.

Senator SUTHERLAND. I should think they would stay put better married than unmarried.

Sergt. LAWRENCE. You would have to keep a sort of switchboard, I think, on each troop, to call them up.

As to the duties a soldier is required to perform: We returned from France, were brought down here, and remained a week in Washington doing riot duty. I do not think we drew anywhere near the police pay while we were on that duty. We may be called on to do it to-morrow.

The CHAIRMAN. It is probably true that the Army can never compete with civilian employments—that is, in dollars and cents—right through. There have got to be other elements taken into consideration that will induce men to stay in the Army, but of course if the pay is too low they can not stay there.

Sergt. LAWRENCE. I think the plan is to increase the pay of the non-commissioned officers. I wish to draw the attention of the chairman to the pay of a first sergeant. I do not think it is at all adequate to the duties he is required to perform. I believe any officer of the line who would be called before the committee would state the same facts. It is the common word that the company is as good as the first sergeant; if the first sergeant is no good, of a troop or battery, the company or battery is no good.

The CHAIRMAN. I think that is conceded.

Sergt. LAWRENCE. I am not saying that because I am a first sergeant myself. I think this is the proper chance to bring the matter before the committee.

The CHAIRMAN. We have been very glad to have you do it. Are there any other questions to be asked the sergeant?

Senator SUTHERLAND. No; I think, however, he has stated his case very well.

Col. MUNSON. I should like to put in one question here as a matter of record.

The CHAIRMAN. We shall be glad to have you put it in the record. (Whereupon, at 5:43 p. m., the committee adjourned subject to the call of the chairman.)

REORGANIZATION OF THE ARMY.

TUESDAY, OCTOBER 28, 1919.

UNITED STATES SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON MILITARY AFFAIRS,
Washington, D. C.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to the call of the chairman, at 2.15 p. m., in the committee room, Capitol, Senator James W. Wadsworth, jr., presiding.

Present: Senators Wadsworth (chairman), Sutherland, New, and Thomas.

The CHAIRMAN. Will you please give your full name to the reporter.

STATEMENT OF COL. HENRY J. REILLY.

Col. REILLY. Henry J. Reilly; recently in command of the One hundred and forty-ninth United States Field Artillery; now in command of the Seventh Illinois Infantry National Guard.

The CHAIRMAN. What were your assignments during the war?

Col. REILLY. I went across with the One hundred and forty-ninth Field Artillery, Forty-second Division, in October, 1918. I served in command of that regiment until the middle of the Argonne, October 16, 1918, when I was given command of the Eighty-third Infantry Brigade of the same division. I continued in command of that until toward the end of November, when I was relieved because of the Washington order that there would be no more promotions after the armistice. I had been recommended three times to command an artillery brigade and twice to command an infantry brigade. I went back to my regiment, served with it on the march to Germany, and in the Army of Occupation, with the exception of a period in the hospital, until April 18, when we came home. I was mustered out May 12. I was in all the engagements of the Forty-second Division.

The CHAIRMAN. Prior to the war what had been your military experience?

Col. REILLY. I was a private in Company H, Twenty-second Kansas in 1898 for a short period, but was refused on muster in because I was under age. I served a year in Troop C, Cavalry, New York National Guard, 1899-1900; I entered the Military Academy in 1900 as a cadet and graduated in 1904; served as a second and first lieutenant of the Second, Thirteenth, and Fifteenth United States Cavalries from 1904 until January, 1914, when I resigned. During that time I had two tours of duty in the Philippines.

I was in Mexico twice in 1913 and saw something of their method of combat. The latter part of the Russo-Japanese War I was in Manchuria, Korea, and Port Arthur. I was not allowed to go to the real front, but saw a good deal of the Japanese Army.

Senator NEW. There as an observer?

Col. REILLY. I took a leave. I could not get there as an observer because I was a lieutenant, so I took a leave and went. Incidentally,

Gen. Pershing—at that time a captain—was our military attaché in Tokyo. He helped me get across. I entered the National Guard of Illinois as captain of the First Illinois Field Artillery on my return from Europe in the fall of 1915. I went to the border with that regiment in 1916. In May, 1917, I was made colonel of that regiment, which shortly afterwards became the One hundred and forty-ninth United States Field Artillery. I was in Europe from September, 1914, until October, 1915; part of the time in the American Ambulance with the British and French armies, and the rest of the time as war correspondent for the Chicago Tribune, in France, and later with the German and Austrian-Hungarian armies in Poland. I was there again from November, 1916, until the last of April of 1917, as war correspondent for the Chicago Tribune with the British and French armies.

THE CHAIRMAN. Have you any general observations to make about the legislation that is pending before us or the military policy generally?

COL. REILLY. I have certain ideas. One of the things which has struck me repeatedly has been that in most of the legislation thought of, and in most of the testimony about a possible military system, too much attention is paid to detail and not enough to some of the general principles.

To go back a little, the only purpose of an army is efficiency on the battle field. Everything which makes for efficiency on the battle field ought to be had, and everything which does not make for such efficiency should be dispensed with. In the dispute which has gone on—if I can put it that way—between the regular service, the National Guard, and National Army, since we returned from Europe, I think all sides are just in some of their views and unjust in others. I think the Regular Army is absolutely right with respect to the inevitability of performance of duty, regardless of any human being or any human event, and I think that point of view can not be too much emphasized. It is not ordinarily understood in civil life, not because civilians are not just as courageous and as fine people, but because the worst that can happen in civil life is so far below the strain that is put on an individual in battle that the necessity to emphasize the inevitability of the performance of duty does not exist. On the other hand, I think the Regular Army failed to understand that the methods of handling human beings and getting the best results from them have advanced considerably in the last 100 years, and that whereas perhaps formerly discipline had to be gotten primarily by promise of punishment if a man failed, nowadays it can be gotten primarily by appealing to a man's sense of duty, honor, and patriotism.

To my mind the trouble with our Regular Army is that we have too many customs and ideas left from the time we were British Colonial troops—ideas of the British Regular Army founded on the caste system rather than on democracy.

In the National Guard, and also in the National Army—while I did not serve in the National Army I had a number of very fine officers come to me from the National Army who served in my regiment throughout—the necessity to treat human beings as human beings is understood, but the idea that duty must be performed is not understood. Now, if we could have a force based on the principle of universal service without any exceptions of any kind for

anybody, in which every individual would be taught the Regular Army idea of the inevitability of the performance of duty regardless of everything, and in which the officers and noncommissioned officers would have the latest American ideas on getting discipline and interest by trusting men rather than by punishing them, we would have a model force.

I notice in some of the literature gotten out by some of the societies a great deal about democracy and having an army impregnated with civilian ideas. Now, I think there is a difference between the two. A man entering the service ceases to be a civilian, but he does not cease to be a citizen. I think the system should be such that citizenship would be emphasized, but most civilian ideas left behind. If you examine the Franco-Prussian War, in which the Germans always beat the French in the end, you will always find that where the French Regular Army fought—not the hastily raised troops of the latter part of the war—they were always superior, as far as the smaller units were concerned, to the Germans. The French Regular Army in 1870 was more or less like our Regular Army at the time of this war—a long-term army of professional soldiers, with a high sense of duty and the same idea of the inevitableness of the performance of duty. However, it was weak in higher command. The higher command did not know its business, and this for the reason that its personnel had grown up in a system in which there was no chance to learn. They had all fought in Algeria. They had had too much minor warfare. They were familiar with a battle field of a certain kind and they thought they knew warfare. They did know minor warfare, but they did not know grand warfare. They had troops absolutely reliable, so far as stamina, discipline, and having been put already to the test of the battle field was concerned. However, the Germans, with troops of inferior stamina and discipline, inevitably beat them. I think we have an example of the same kind in this war. In the first part of the war the British Regulars showed themselves to be superior individually to the Germans everywhere they met them. British Regular regiments had more stamina under the conditions of combat than German regiments. However, the Germans inevitably beat them. To my mind the reasons were the same as those of 1870. The British Regular officers having served in Africa and India had been on many battle fields, but everything they had seen was minor warfare. They thought they knew war, but they did not. The long-service soldier has a certain stamina that the short-service soldier can never have. I think the same is true of our Regular Army. I think the Civil War showed that. The Regular troops throughout the Civil War, the Regular division of the Fifth Corps, always stood the racket better than anybody else.

Now, in trying to raise an army I think we ought to hunt some way to get that same stamina on the battle field and at the same time get a leadership equal to the best foreign leadership. I think our Regular Army is absolutely correct, especially the Military Academy at West Point, in its ideas of duty and discipline; but I think the Regular Army, including the Military Academy, is wrong in their failure to learn to govern the human being by other means than simple force.

I do not know whether I have brought the point I want to make out or not, but I do think we are between two dangers. It is in-

evitable that a man who spends his time in one profession, be it warfare or any other profession, in time becomes more or less narrow; he puts too much emphasis on the things he knows to be good in that particular profession, and the revolt against Regular Army discipline now taking place on the part of the citizens who served, a majority of whom, incidentally, were never in action, and a decided minority of whom were in action a number of times, the reaction is being carried too far. The revolt should be against the methods used to obtain the desired discipline, not against the discipline. I think there is a middle ground. I believe that the very necessary stamina on the battle field, which can only come from real discipline and is not a question of courage, can be produced by democratic means in a democratic army made up of citizens who, rather than give up any of their ideas of citizenship, will go on the battle field to enforce them. A army made up of trained citizens but not civilians, actuated by real belief in American principles, is what we want.

Senator FLETCHER. How would you bring that about?

Col. REILLY. I think that can be brought about by universal military service for one year without any exception. If a man supports his mother I would take him anyhow, but have the Government pay his mother what he earned in civil life. If everybody can not be taken for a year's service, I would sooner have only six months' service than let anyone escape. I do not think the European war has shown that—

Senator NEW. Do you mean in training or in service?

Col. REILLY. Both. Service includes training, but training does not include service. In Australia they had the training and not the service. The result was that all forces raised by Australia during the war were voluntary. So service in Australia was not equitably distributed. Some people served and gave everything and others stayed at home and gave nothing.

Senator FLETCHER. Did the Australians make good soldiers?

Col. REILLY. Yes, sir. They made excellent soldiers. The best soldiers, to my mind, will always be the citizens of a country in which the individual has a stake and realizes it.

Senator NEW. Australia was the one country of the allies in which there was no conscription?

Senator THOMAS. Was there not a conscription there for a short time?

Senator NEW. I think not; I think they never would stand for it.

Col. REILLY. No, sir.

Senator THOMAS. I had the impression that it prevailed, but was resubmitted and then voted down.

Col. REILLY. I may be mistaken, but from what I understood, while they had the compulsory training in peace they did not have it in the war.

Senator THOMAS. You are more apt to be right than I am; that is just an impression.

Senator FLETCHER. What extent of service would you recommend?

Col. REILLY. I would like to see it at least one year, for the reason that I do not believe a man is a good soldier merely because he knows how to do things; he has to get a certain viewpoint. A short period in uniform and in training will not give that point of view. The man still remains a civilian in uniform. I do not want to get

the distinction between a civilian and a citizen mixed. That is one of the troubles with the National Guard; a man goes to an armory and puts on a uniform once or twice a week. He goes out each summer for a couple of weeks. He remains a civilian in uniform, though he has learned a great deal. This war has shown that a man does not change his point of view and get the soldier's point of view until he has been in the service for a number of months. I think the service must be long enough so that when the man puts aside his civilian clothes he will say to himself, "I am going to forget for the time being that I have a home, a mother, and a sweetheart. I am going to settle down to learning to be a soldier and thinking of that and nothing else."

Senator FLETCHER. Would that include vocational training?

Col. REILLY. No, sir. I believe in vocational training, but I think that should be afterwards or before; never at the same time.

Senator FLETCHER. What age would you have?

Col. REILLY. I have no fixed ideas on that at all. I think the age ought to be arranged on a sliding scale to conform to the situation of different individuals in different communities and in different kinds of trade.

Senator NEW. Colonel, if you propose to require the man to serve for a year as a soldier and then require him to take vocational training afterwards, are you not using up a good deal of his time?

Col. REILLY. Well, I would let the vocational training be voluntary; I would give him the opportunity. If necessary to require both I would sooner see the service cut to six months than mix it with vocational training, though to my mind a year is the minimum length of time in which a man can be made a soldier.

The CHAIRMAN. It has been pointed out by officers of experience before this committee that the soldiers in this war whose average training extended over six months before they went into action were reasonably well trained for battle.

Col. REILLY. Well, they were reasonably well trained, but I think one thing we must remember is that when we got abroad and faced the Germans we were not facing an army such as the German or French Army faced in 1914 or 1915; we were facing a less efficient force, with less desire to combat.

The CHAIRMAN. You think there was a change in the morale of the German Army?

Col. REILLY. I know there was a change in the morale of all those armies, due to the large number of casualties among the professional officers and noncommissioned officers—the younger men. This resulted in too many units being made up of older men who had many family and business ties. I do not mean that age alone counts so much, but interests which come with age do—I think the whole course of the campaign shows this. You do not find the same determination, you do not find the same activity, and you do not find the same vicious attacks in the latter part of the war that you found in the beginning.

The CHAIRMAN. On either side?

Col. REILLY. On either side. When we came in, to my mind both sides were very much worn down. The fact is that when we came in with our freshness and our strength, these two factors alone were almost enough to turn the balance. They did it rather than any extraordinary quality or skill on our part. In other words

I have no sympathy with the point of view that the French and British could not beat the Germans, but we came in and did it with one hand tied behind our back. If we alone had tackled the Germans in 1914, we would have been badly beaten.

The CHAIRMAN. Have you any ideas to express about promotion?

Col. REILLY. Yes; I have.

Senator FLETCHER. Before you get to that may I ask you if you think public sentiment in this country would support a measure providing for universal military service extending over a year or even six months?

Col. REILLY. Well, of course I do not know much about the country as a whole; I only know what I have seen in Illinois since I have come back. I have been around the State a good deal, due to American Legion meetings; soldiers' home-comings, at which I have spoken. As a consequence, I have talked to a good many people. At the Illinois State convention of the American Legion a resolution for universal service was adopted—not universal training but universal service. The discussions were not whether we should have service; that was hardly talked about. It was as to how long the service should be and in what form. Even that was short, it finally being decided it would be better to leave to Congress how long the service should be.

The CHAIRMAN. I think I have not remarked on a previous occasion that at the New York State convention of the American Legion a resolution was adopted in favor of universal military training.

I was going to ask you if you had any observations to make on the question of promotion.

Col. REILLY. Yes; I think one of the greatest troubles in the Regular Army is promotion by seniority, because it tends to kill all ambition—all desire to work. I do not mean not to do anything; to do more than is absolutely required. A young officer comes out of the Military Academy full of ambition and desire to go ahead and to be a better officer. He soon finds that nothing he can do will get him ahead, and also frequently finds that too many of the older officers, having lost their ambition, look upon him as a disturber of the peace. The Regular Army is one of the best arguments against socialism I know of. It tends to kill all initiative. I do not mean to say that all the older officers have lost their ambition, because, of course, that would not be true.

I knew some old officers, when I was a boy, who had been in the Civil War, and who had more ambition, determination, and activity than many of the young officers. There are some of the same type now, but on the whole the tendency is the longer an officer serves to a realization of the fact nothing he does can better him and that the more he contents himself with the mere performance of the prescribed duties the easier his life will be, as the less chance of running foul of some superior is thereby diminished. If a man is married and has children he lives in hope of being a brigadier general some time—not because he expects to command a brigade on a battle field, but because the greater pay will enable him to give his family many things they really need. The tendency is more and more to passive compliance and to being a rubber stamp. I do not blame that on the individuals to whom it has happened, but on the system. I think promotion by seniority is one of the causes. On the other hand, straight promotion by selection would not do.

The CHAIRMAN. Why?

Col. REILLY. It would come to a question of political pull.

The CHAIRMAN. You think that would be the result, do you?

Col. REILLY. I do. For this reason—in a commercial organization the men at the top have to make the organization a success. Therefore, they are on the lookout for men that can do things. Now, the Government owns the Army. Therefore, no one is responsible directly for its efficiency.

Senator NEW. What do you think of the proposition to promote a percentage by selection and greater percentage by the established seniority method?

Col. REILLY. I believe in some such system. I think the French, prior to the war, had a system by which a certain percentage were promoted by selection. No man could be promoted more than one grade at a time, nor could he be promoted to the next higher grade until he had served a certain length of time in the subordinate grade. An average officer was sure to reach a decent grade before retirement, even if not selected.

Senator NEW. Do I correctly understand that under that method a first lieutenant, say, got a probationary appointment as a captain, and in case of successful discharge of his duties, was confirmed in his place as captain?

Col. REILLY. No, sir. They did not have that, but I think that would be a good idea.

Senator NEW. Why would it not be a good idea?

Col. REILLY. I think it would be a good idea. All promotions should be probationary for a while. What the French did was this: Say there were so many vacancies in the grade of captain, in the Infantry. To fill these vacancies a certain percentage of first lieutenants of Infantry would be selected; but no first lieutenant of Infantry could be picked who had not served a fixed length of time as a first lieutenant. After the selections had been made the balance would be by seniority. That meant that there was a minimum age and a minimum amount of experience required before any officer could reach any grade by selection. Even though he might be selected each time he could only become a general officer after having passed through all the grades and having spent enough time in each to learn it thoroughly.

Senator NEW. What do you think of elimination?

Col. REILLY. Well, elimination ought to go along with some such method as I have described. The trouble with elimination has always been that when a board sat down to consider eliminating some one too often the subject would be an officer who had been in the Army 25 years, we will say, and who had three children and a wife. Of course they would get no further than consideration of this point and would not bring out the fact that for 25 years he had contented himself with performing the minimum amount of duty which would keep him out of trouble. While on that subject there is one other thing, if I may mention it—and I hope I am not treading on dangerous ground—

The CHAIRMAN. You can not tread on dangerous ground in here.

Col. REILLY. I think the system of appointment to the Military Academy is wrong. I do not think it ought to be by Congressmen. I think we ought to have universal service and every year appoint so

many men from each regiment to the Academy. I believe in that for this reason: In the first place, while I believe firmly in the Academy, I think you can divide the men who go there into two classes: Those who go because they really want to be soldiers, they are the ones who make good soldiers; and the men who go there without any particular liking for the Army but because of the certain career which is offered.

Senator NEW. I think every Senator would be glad to see that or some other system adopted which would relieve him, but I can see just one objection to the plan you propose, and otherwise it is a good one. The one objection is that you would get your boy into the academy too late in life; he would not go in there until after he has been a soldier, and until after he has been a soldier long enough to evince some aptitude for it and some liking for the calling. Then, by that time, he has presumably reached the age of 20 or 21 years at least. Put him in the academy, that gives him rather a late start, do you not think?

Col. REILLY. I believe you can get them in at an earlier age.

Senator NEW. Then you would begin your training very early?

Col. REILLY. I would not make a positive rule. I think that is one difficulty with the Army. It is like Spanish law—everything is laid down too exactly. For example, most organization bills provide for so many privates, so many mechanics, so many horseshoers, and so many corporals, etc., for each organization. The result is an entire lack of elasticity, which prevents the Army varying the minor details of organization so as to meet the changed conditions constantly arising. What is worse, it never gives the average officer a chance to develop willingness to accept responsibility. Most of the failures on the other side, to my mind, did not come from lack of native ability or from a lack of personal courage, but from having lived so many years under a system that permitted no exercise of responsibility. Consequently, when the tremendous responsibilities of war were thrust upon many an officer, he failed. In many cases they did not know they were failing. They failed not so much because they did things they should not have done, but because they did nothing.

Senator THOMAS. Speaking of West Point, I have had a peculiar experience recently. I have been overrun heretofore with applications from youngsters who wanted to enter West Point and Annapolis. I had two vacancies in the academy at Annapolis and one at West Point. A week ago or two weeks, with some 30 men on my list for the Navy and about half that number for the Army, so far I have not been able to get anybody. In other words, the interest and desire to go seems to have collapsed.

Senator NEW. You probably noticed in the papers this morning a statement that there had been 270 some resignations from the Naval Academy during this year. I think it is astonishing.

Senator THOMAS. Of course, some of those applicants have passed the age in the meantime, and consequently can not enter for that reason, and one or two have been appointed by Congressmen from my State, but most of them had had a change of heart. They do not want to go now.

Col. REILLY. I always did think what I have just said about appointments to the academy more or less from the time I was a cadet.

Senator THOMAS. I think the way we are doing it has many defects and is subject to criticism. It is pretty hard to turn a fellow

down who is ambitious and wants to go and is making his appeal, and that becomes embarrassing when you have more appointments than the law allows; that is, one appointment and one or two alternates, and I have been compelled to keep them as they come, keep a list and appoint them according to the date of their applications, as the best means of giving each fellow a show. That is not satisfactory, however, because I may have to appoint a man who will not reflect credit on the service, and yet to do it any other way is a sort of discrimination that makes a boy awfully resentful.

Col. REILLY. What I was thinking of was not that Congress did not exercise its choice wisely; I was not thinking that. I was thinking that too often the boy does not know, himself, whether or not he wants to make the Army his career. He goes to the Military Academy not knowing. He has the usual American idea, thank Heaven, of not wanting to drop out of something he has started; consequently he goes on until he graduates, even though he does not like it. Too often, where he does not dislike it, he is far from being enthusiastic. Perhaps, after graduation, he gets married. Then it is too late. While that type of man always does his duty, while he is courageous on the battle field, and while no complaint can be made of him, he is not a first-class officer, because his heart is not in it.

Senator NEW. He finds he has no aptitude for it, and he does not like it, but he is too proud to try to get out.

Col. REILLY. Yes. Now, if after six months' service as a private in the Army he still wants to go to the Military Academy and into the Army, the chances are overwhelmingly in favor of his making an excellent officer.

Senator NEW. I think that is an excellent suggestion, if it is not open to the one objection I raised a few minutes ago, and that is by that means you get him to the academy a little too late in life. You certainly want to graduate a second lieutenant before he is 25, or even 24 years old.

Col. REILLY. Though I would prefer not, I would cut the course to three years, if necessary, rather than abandon this idea.

Senator NEW. If you can graduate him at 21, or 22 at the latest, he is all the better for it. Take the Naval Academy, there the age put upon the admission is fixed lower than it is at West Point.

Col. REILLY. Seventeen.

Senator NEW. Yes; seventeen. They want to be certain that the midshipman is graduated there by the time he is 21.

Senator FLETCHER. You have a large number going in at 18 and coming out at 19 in this training, and 19-year-old boys would be available.

Col. REILLY. The average age of the cadets entering the Military Academy, I am pretty sure, is between 19 and 20.

Senator NEW. I think they ought to be taken as young as possible.

Col. REILLY. There is another advantage. I think it helps every man to have been through what he puts somebody else through. It would help the Army very much if every man who comes in knew that the officers above him had been through the same thing. As a matter of fact, the first year at West Point is much harder than anything a private goes through, but privates do not know that. Take the average troop of Cavalry or company of Infantry. If you should require the men to keep their rifles the way a cadet must keep his they would almost mutiny. They know nothing about that,

however. From the point of view of morale, it is very important to have the private know that the officer has been a private himself, if for no other reason than that it tends to narrow the gulf which exists and which I do not think should exist.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you observe the difference between a French officer and a French soldier?

Col. REILLY. Yes. I have seen them in peace times also. In every army the system in vogue should be based on the characteristics of the people; in other words, what is the best for the German Army is not the best thing for the English Army, and the best thing for the French Army is not necessarily best for the American Army. I think that this general principle should be well understood and followed in any system we may have. The French Army is made up of professional officers and noncommissioned officers, with privates furnished by universal service. In peace times the relationship which exists between the officer and enlisted man is upon a better basis than in our Army or the British Army. The trouble is too many of our customs of the service date from the time when we were British colonial troops, and are therefore more British in spirit than American.

Senator NEW. What do you mean by a better basis—do you mean closer accord?

Col. REILLY. Closer accord; recognition of the fact that an officer is not an officer by the grace of God but an officer because he knows more.

Senator NEW. And the social distinction between the officer and private is not so distinct as it is here?

Col. REILLY. No. In France in peace times enlisted men may be seen in the best restaurants. They would not think of putting out a soldier, whereas in this country the Regular Army always had trouble—and the Navy, too—because the civilian had the idea that the enlisted man was not entitled to the privileges of an ordinary citizen.

The CHAIRMAN. He had an idea that the enlisted man was low caste?

Col. REILLY. Yes; there was always trouble about a man in uniform going into dance halls and restaurants and such places.

Senator FLETCHER. That has been largely dissipated by the last war, has it not?

Col. REILLY. I hope so. I hope the 4,800,000 men in the country who served won't stand for it.

Senator THOMAS. We tried to remedy that, I think, by the act of 1916 by imposing heavy penalties against discriminating against men in uniform. There was a time when a man in the uniform of private in the Army was discriminated against; for instance, in playhouses.

Col. REILLY. Yes; and that is another reason why I believe in universal service. With universal service, everybody has to serve in the Army. That means the public will know the Army better and have a fairer view of it. It also means that the Army will continually be subject to criticism and will therefore have to be up to date and democratic, because if it is not the people will know it and they will not permit it.

Senator FLETCHER. People seem to dread the idea of universal service partially because they think it means the development of the military spirit and militarism. You do not think that?

Col. REILLY. No, sir; they talk about Prussianism. You could not make the Prussian Army unless you had Prussians. The only way you can make the American Army a Prussian one is to change the spirit of the people of the United States. If you change the spirit of the people of the United States to that of the Prussians, they will be Prussianized, whether you have an Army or not. I believe if there is any one thing which will make people better citizens and better Americans, it is universal service. I think there are too many people in the country to-day who want to take everything and give nothing in return—they do not understand citizenship nor the obligations attached to it.

The CHAIRMAN. You have been in the Regular service for 10 years or more?

Col REILLY. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. And you have been in the National Guard for about the same length of time?

Col. REILLY. About five years.

The CHAIRMAN. And you were in this war two years?

Col. REILLY. Well, I counted that in the National Guard service.

The CHAIRMAN. What have you to suggest on bringing the citizen soldier and the Regular soldier closer together?

Col. REILLY. I think the best thing of all is universal service, and for the reasons I have stated. Then every citizen serves, and he learns to know what kind of people the Regular soldiers are. His serving makes every family interested. I would encourage the families to be interested. I would not stop the men from getting passes to go to their homes, but I would encourage the families to come out to the cantonments. When first called out my regiment was at Fort Sheridan for a while, so the training camp could use the Artillery matériel for training purposes. They used my matériel half the time and I used it the other half. I invited all the families of the men to come up there every Sunday to have their midday meal with them. This gave them a chance to see how their boys lived. The camp was practically turned over to the families of the men. I did not stop passes. I let those men who wanted to leave camp go; not a certain percentage, but all who wanted to except those on duty. I found that the first Sunday that camp was so overflowing with mothers, sisters, and sweethearts that you could hardly turn around. Every Sunday thereafter it was the same thing. When those women saw the kitchen, how the food was cooked, ate it afterwards, saw the sleeping arrangements, the care taken with respect to health, they became intensely friendly. I really think that a lot of the subsequent popularity of the regiment—and we got more than we really deserved—was due to the fact that the families came out to the camp and saw what was going on. I think the same thing should be done once a week or twice a month. Then, instead of the men looking upon the camp as merely a place of hard work, they would regard it as their home and a place of which they were so proud they would want to show it off. Under these conditions I think most of the imaginary horrors of militarism and belief that men are brutally treated in the Army would disappear. Also, if there is a tendency on the part of any officer to do anything he had no business to do, it could not stand before such an amount of publicity.

Examine the old conditions. An officer in the Regular Army would be a poor officer who just did his duty and nothing more.

Most of the enlisted men under him were men who had less education than he and therefore he could easily maintain his supremacy. In a universal service Army the officers know that amongst the men under them there is a considerable number who have as good an education as have they. They know that many of them are later going to be leaders in public life. Necessarily officers are going to be much more careful in every way and are going to pay much more attention to their duties.

The CHAIRMAN. Were all your men from Illinois?

Col. REILLY. All from Illinois; yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you believe in the localization of units?

Col. REILLY. I do for the universal service Army. I believe in the French system. They have the metropolitan army and the colonial army. The metropolitan army has a cadre of trained officers and trained noncommissioned officers. It is the army in which the young Frenchman must do his military service. There are 19 army corps in France and one army corps in Algeria. The corps in Algeria is filled up by young Frenchmen born in Algeria. These corps and all their constituent units are localized. This army is only used in case of a real national emergency. They would not use them in colonial wars. They are for grand warfare, such as that of the last war. The colonial army is more or less what our Regular Army is, it is recruited by voluntary enlistment. The men are well paid. This army does all colonial service.

So thus, not only for military reasons but also as a reward for the faithful soldier of long service who has not education enough to become an officer.

They keep approximately 30,000 or a peace strength corps of the colonial army in France. I think we ought to have some such system as that. We ought to have an army into which the men who are adventurous, who want to fight, and who want to lead an outdoor, active life would be tempted to go. Make it attractive enough so that the best of them would want to make it a life's work. Have a warrant officer grade higher than that of noncommissioned officer, and make it a position that would be worth spending 25 years in the Army to get. Do this not only for military reasons but also as a reward for the faithful soldier of long service who has not education enough to become an officer. Pay these warrant officers so well that they could be married and live with self-respect. Then old soldiers would not be in the condition of that quartermaster sergeant you had here yesterday. Such an army could be recruited easily from the universal service force, because the men who liked the service would naturally drift to it. I think if we had an army made up in this way we would not have to fear any other army in the world. In fact everybody would be afraid of us.

The CHAIRMAN. How would you make use of the National Guard?

Col. REILLY. I think the National Guard could be made use of in this way. To better explain I will go back to the recent war. For several years prior to the war there was a great argument in France as to what should be done with the reservists. It was figured out that there were enough of them due to the universal service system having been in operation so long, to fill existing units to war strength, to put enough in the depots to make good all casualties, and to have a balance of several hundreds of thousands.

Some of the French General Staff predicted that the Germans would organize their similar balance into additional units, with the consequence that when war came they would strike not only with their prewar units at war strength, but also with these units. Another school of thought denied this, maintaining that German strategy demanded the striking of a hard blow immediately, and therefore there would not be time to organize such reserve units. Extremists of this school went so far as to say that the Germans would not wait even to bring existing units to war strength. The mobilization of the French Army and its concentration on the eastern frontier of France was based on the idea that the Germans would strike without any reserve units. They were wrong, with the result that the whole French Army, which was facing east, was outflanked by that part of the German Army which came through Belgium.

The Germans had not only raised their existing units to war strength, but also carried out their carefully prepared plans to form reserve units. They struck with—well, nobody knows exactly, but possibly with double the number of troops expected.

In 1915 in France there was considerable discussion about organizing surplus reservists into reserve units. They finally did it. In this country, where we have so many young men, any system we may have will produce a large number of reservists after the system has been in operation for a number of years.

Now, to my mind, after a man has finished his active and first reserve service, he could volunteer to do his second reserve service in a modified National Guard. It might be arranged to let him serve in the National Guard in lieu of some of his first reserve service. In any case the National Guard should be the means of absorbing a considerable part of our surplus reservists. I think the standard of discipline and training of the National Guard has got to be far higher than it was prior to this war. On the other hand, I think the fact that we had these units was of the greatest value, as it gave us a far greater striking strength than we would have had otherwise. I do not approve of the Regular Army system as it has been. I think it ought to be modified. On the other hand, I think the National Guard system, as it has existed has a great many fundamentally erroneous principles.

Senator SUTHERLAND. And your view is to improve the National Guard system and have it the backbone of our defense?

Col. REILLY. No, sir. The backbone of the Army should be the Army under Federal control; but I do think the National Guard system can be used as a valuable means of absorbing many of the large number of reservists which any system of universal service will produce. It also gives a chance to the patriotic civilian who wants to give a certain part of his time to military affairs, but can not give all of it. That material is too valuable to be wasted.

Senator SUTHERLAND. Have you any other observations to make, General?

Col. REILLY. Yes, sir; I would like to say something about the General Staff system if I may.

Senator SUTHERLAND. Very well.

Col. REILLY. I believe we ought to have a General Staff, but a real one. I think the trouble has been that we had something we called the General Staff; but it never had the full powers which a general staff ought to have. It was made up of officers who, while officers of

experience, and good officers, had never had any special training for the General Staff. The result was that due to lack of power in the first place, lack of proper training for its personnel in the second place, and a lack of sufficient personnel in the third place when war came we practically had no General Staff in the real sense of the word. The consequence was that a great many mistakes were made, and a great many things were done which should not have been done. The critics, however, instead of recognizing these facts content themselves with damning the General Staff system. To my mind there is just as much necessity for a General Staff in the Army as there is for a controlling body in any business.

Senator SUTHERLAND. A board of directors?

Col. REILLY. Yes.

Senator SUTHERLAND. An executive committee?

Col. REILLY. An executive committee, something of that kind, for this reason: The only object of an army is to fight on the battle field. The men who do the fighting are the only ones who really know what an army ought to be and what it really needs. A man may be an excellent line officer, he may have been with combat troops or in a number of engagements, but if he leaves troops and remains away 10 years he is so out of touch he is no longer fit to decide how combat troops should be supplied, armed, equipped, trained, organized, and disciplined.

The French and Germans found that out in this war. The French Army is very much against the French general staff as it existed. However, it is not proposed to do away with the general staff system. They know such a body to be necessary. They are going to insist that the general staff officers are officers who have served with troops, and that after serving on the general staff they go back to troops. Of course, another point is that if the officers of the general staff know they are going to have to swallow the medicine they prescribe, they are going to be more careful.

Senator SUTHERLAND. You give them a tour of duty?

Col. REILLY. I do not believe in a permanent General Staff. The General Staff should be made up of line officers detailed as they are now. In our country, due to the lack of a General Staff, until Mr. Elihu Root got it started, we had a system of independent Staff Corps. They were made up of very honorable, hard-working, conscientious officers; many of them graduates of the Military Academy; many of them men who had had 10 to 15 years or more with troops; many of them had served in the Civil War and had also chased Indians. However, after they had been for a number of years in Washington or the various cities in which were the department headquarters, they got completely out of touch with troops. The inevitable result was that, due to a lack of any coordinating body, each department worked primarily for itself and became almost independent and without any real understanding of the needs of the line of the Army, the people who do the fighting.

These powerful and virtually independent departments resented any General Staff control, and fought such General Staff as we had from the beginning. Just before this war they had succeeded in almost wiping the General Staff out of existence. This, to my mind, is one of the main reasons for the many mistakes and errors which were made by us. In other words, our mistakes can not be charged

to a General Staff system, because we entered the war virtually without one.

Senator SUTHERLAND. There was no coordination?

Col. REILLY. There was no coordination at all.

Senator SUTHERLAND. They were competing against each other?

Col. REILLY. They were competing against each other, and the same old trouble was emphasized, each department thinking primarily of itself. I do not mean that there were wrong motives back of this: I do mean that a condition existed which did not emphasize the needs and desires of the combat troops the way they should have been emphasized. We noticed in Europe that even good officers with plenty of line experience, who had had no opportunity to be with a combat division at the front, made a great many mistakes as General Staff officers, not from a lack of willingness, but simply because they did not understand the point of view and the needs of the men doing the fighting. The only way they could understand it was to actually serve with troops. When the armistice was signed the General Staff of the American Expeditionary Forces was just commencing to function properly. This was not the fault of any individual. It was the fault of a vicious system. If the war had gone on and the people on the General Staff had gradually been replaced by men who had been in the combat divisions, then the men at the front would have gotten the things they really needed and would have been properly handled.

To my mind to permit the bureaus in the War Department to have control or to be supreme in any way would be the same as if the Government bureaus told Congress what it should do instead of obeying it. Congress represents the people of the United States. A real general staff ought to represent the fighting men of the Army. They are the ones and the only ones who can say how the Army ought to be trained, equipped, disciplined, armed, organized, and supplied.

Senator SUTHERLAND. Do you think that their duties should be administrative?

Col. REILLY. As well as planning for war.

Senator SUTHERLAND. They should not do any operating, should they?

Col. REILLY. I think their duties ought to be divided into two general classes, operations and the preparation thereof in every way, and sufficient administrative power to insure control and obedience on the part of the bureaus. In other words, I think that the Chief Quartermaster, the Chief Surgeon, the Chief Signal Officer, the Chief of Engineers, The Adjutant General and all other bureau and staff corps chiefs should receive their orders from the General Staff. Some of our divisions were most poorly handled in France, handled because the division commander delegated his power to staff subordinates. He would let the Chief of Engineers run everything in connection with field fortification and other engineering his own way. He would let the Chief Surgeon run everything in connection with the Medical Department his own way. He would let the chief gas officer and the chief horse officer and every other expert attached to his headquarters do the same thing. These men would be given the right to issue orders. Naturally they did, and the inevitable lack of cohesion, confusion, and lowering of morale resulted.

The power of command disappeared, real control was now existent. A division commander ought to retain complete control of his division. He should call for and listen to the advice of each expert with respect to his own department and then take it or not, as he sees fit. He, of course, should be held responsible for the results. I think it ought to be the same for the Army as a whole. We should have a large General Staff made up of officers who had demonstrated their fitness, who had gotten a special training before functioning, and who must return to troops on the completion of their tour. This General Staff should be responsible for the Army of the United States. The Staff Corps and bureaus of all kinds should take their orders from that governing body; the same way that the chief engineer of a railway gets his orders from the board of directors and does not dare defy them.

Senator SUTHERLAND. Have you finished that branch of the subject?

Col. REILLY. Yes, sir.

Senator SUTHERLAND. Have you touched upon the question of promotion by selection?

Col. REILLY. Yes; I advocated a certain percentage by selection and a certain selection by seniority.

Senator SUTHERLAND. What other observations do you wish to make?

Col. REILLY. I do not think I have anything more, except I have noticed in some publications, and also in the press, a tendency to compare this war with the Civil War and to draw conclusions from these comparisons to my mind is very dangerous, because the conditions were entirely different. For instance, in a Statistical Bureau publication the statement is made that on the first day at St. Mihiel we fired many times as much artillery ammunition as was fired in the Wilderness campaign. That statement while true, leads to an erroneous conclusion. I happened to have commanded two regiments of field artillery in that action and as a consequence to know that far from the volume of fire in any locality being great, it was so feeble in each sector as to cause anxiety. The original fire ordered was not heavy enough, due to an insufficient supply of ammunition. The original order contained no preparatory fire, only accompanying fire, and yet when changed at the last moment to include a preparatory fire, the total allowance of ammunition was not increased. Erroneous conclusions have been drawn with respect to the risk taken by officers of different grades, in this war and in the Civil War. In the Civil War a brigade of Infantry was only supposed to be 3,000 men. As a matter of fact, it was frequently 2,000 or even 1,500. A brigade of Infantry in this war was 8,000. In the Civil War a regiment of Infantry was about 1,000 men. In this war a battalion of Infantry was 1,000 men, a regiment of Infantry 3,600. The Civil War army corps was about 30,000. In this war a division was 27,000.

Senator SUTHERLAND. Have you any further observations to make?

Col. REILLY. No, sir; I do not believe I have.

Senator SUTHERLAND. We are very much obliged to you.

(Thereupon the committee adjourned subject to call of the chairman.)

REORGANIZATION OF THE ARMY

GEN. JOHN J. PERSHING

JOINT HEARINGS

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEES ON MILITARY AFFAIRS

CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES

SIXTY-SIXTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

ON

S. 2691

A BILL TO PROVIDE FOR UNIVERSAL MILITARY, NAVAL, AND VOCATIONAL TRAINING AND FOR MOBILIZATION OF THE MANHOOD OF THE NATION IN A NATIONAL EMERGENCY

S. 2693

A BILL TO CREATE A DEPARTMENT OF AERONAUTICS, DEFINING THE POWERS AND DUTIES OF THE DIRECTOR THEREOF, PROVIDING FOR THE ORGANIZATION, DISPOSITION, AND ADMINISTRATION OF A UNITED STATES AIR FORCE, CREATING THE UNITED STATES AIR RESERVE FORCE, AND PROVIDING FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF CIVIL AND COMMERCIAL AVIATION

S. 2715

A BILL TO REORGANIZE AND INCREASE THE EFFICIENCY OF THE UNITED STATES ARMY, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES

PART 24

Printed for the use of the Committee on Military Affairs

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REORGANIZATION OF THE ARMY.

FRIDAY, OCTOBER 31, 1919.

COMMITTEES ON MILITARY AFFAIRS,
CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES,
Washington, D. C.

The committees met at 10.30 o'clock a. m., in the caucus room, House of Representatives Office Building, Hon. James W. Wadsworth, jr., presiding.

Present: Senators Wadsworth, Warren, Sutherland, New, Knox, Lenroot, Spencer, Capper, Chamberlain, Hitchcock, Flint, Thomas, Kirby, and McKellar; and Representatives Kahn, Anthony, Greene, Morin, Crago, Hull, Sanford, James, Kearns, Miller, Dent, Quin, Olney, Harrison, and Fisher.

Senator WADSWORTH. The committee will be in order. Gen. Pershing, the Committees on Military Affairs of the Senate and House of Representatives have met this morning in joint session to consider the various propositions that have been laid before the Congress looking toward the reorganization of the military forces of the United States and the adoption of a military policy for the country. The committees are exceedingly glad to have you with us this morning, and would be very happy indeed if you would convey to us your ideas and opinions as to the legislation that is pending respecting the reorganization of the Army, and the military policy in general, and to have you express your views in any manner you see fit.

If you so desire we will be glad to have you proceed with any statement you may have prepared, and at its conclusion, or possibly at any point in it, the members of the committee would like to ask some questions. For the time being we will be glad if you will proceed in your own way.

STATEMENT OF GEN. JOHN J. PERSHING.

Gen. PERSHING. Mr. Chairman, I am very glad to have the opportunity of appearing before the Joint Committees on Military Affairs of the Senate and House of Representatives. I have had, as you know, but a very short time to prepare myself to discuss this very great problem. But perhaps as I go along we may be able to pick out the various points that the committee desires to develop.

The obligation of deciding upon a definite policy of national defense and of working out the details of a system is a matter of national interest. We have just emerged from the greatest war in history, whose successful conclusion was due to the tremendous effort of our people. Their very clear attitude and pronounced determination to provide men and money to the extent of their resources have placed our country in a new light before the world. Our position

and influence in world affairs are no longer measured by our wealth and population, nor yet by our free and liberal form of government, but by our purpose to maintain the high principles of justice and humanity upon which our institutions are founded. This influence bears a direct relation to the solidity of our Government and our readiness adequately to defend our rights.

Our success in the war was not due to our forethought in preparedness, but to exceptional circumstances which made it possible to prepare after we had declared war. It is my belief that if America had been adequately prepared, our rights would never have been violated; our institutions would never have been threatened.

In discussing preparedness it is to be remembered that our traditions are opposed to the maintenance of a large standing army. Our wars have practically all been fought by citizen soldiery. But we have always failed to train our citizen soldiers in time of peace, and have waited until war was upon us before making any move toward adequate preparedness. This principle of a citizen army imposes upon the individual the obligation to prepare himself to serve his country in time of need. It is a debt that falls upon all alike.

As a military policy we should have, first, a permanent Military Establishment large enough to provide against sudden attack; second, a small force sufficient for expeditionary purposes to meet our international obligations, particularly on the American continent; third, such force as may be necessary to meet our internal requirements; fourth, a trained citizen reserve organized to meet the emergency of war.

In addition to the preparation of our young manhood for service in defense of their country in time of war, military training would bring them many other important benefits which our Government should hasten to provide. Such training would develop the physical vigor and manliness of our youth and sharpen their mentality. It would teach self-discipline and respect for constituted authority. Experience shows conclusively that it encourages initiative and gives young men confidence in themselves. Through the preparation for service to the country it increases their patriotism. It broadens their views through association with men of all classes and is thoroughly democratic. It prepares young men for the duties of citizenship. Such training is especially needed among our alien population, a large percentage of whom are illiterate. If these men were taught our language and were made familiar with the spirit of our institutions we should have less lawlessness and fewer I. W. W's.

All these benefits have been bestowed upon the men who composed our forces during the war, who now comprise our most patriotic citizens. If for no other reason than this, the benefits of this method of training should be universally extended to all our young men.

Mr. Chairman, I will take up the bill known as the War Department bill, Senate bill 2715, and House bill 8287. I think, if you will permit me, I will pass right along through the various sections and then we can go back and take it up in detail, if that suits the committee.

Senator WADSWORTH. You may proceed in your own way, General.

Gen. PERSHING. I am in favor of the retention of the Inspector General's Department. It seems to be essential to have a corps of

trained inspectors who can be used when needed by the Secretary of War or by the commanders of various units, both in peace and war.

There are many investigations which really require the action of a trained inspector. While the General Staff, of course, is capable of inspecting, as far as tactical training and efficiency are concerned, and are expected to do that, it seems to me that there is a place in our Army for the Inspector General's Department.

It proved to be a very important department during the war. The inspectors were used by me for special purposes, even during battle, and were used by subordinate commanders in a corresponding capacity.

As to the finance department, it seems to me it is closely connected with the supervision of purchases made by the various departments, and that good administration would indicate that all purchases that are common to two or more departments should be under the direction of some organization such as a purchasing agency; but all purchases that pertain to one department alone, especially those which are more or less technical in their nature, should be made by that department, and the bills paid by that department.

Attached to this purchasing agency would be the finance department, maintaining a general supervisory control over Army finance and allotting the appropriations to the various departments.

In reference to the Transportation Corps and the Motor Transport Corps, from our experience in France it is believed to be in the interest of efficiency, and it would also avoid duplication of overhead expenses to have a Transportation Corps which would include all classes of transportation, rail, water, motor transport, and animal-drawn transport. There is objection to having it function under any one of the established departments, because it must view the problem in the interest of all departments alike.

It is interesting to note that Marshal Petain, in considering the reorganization of the French Army, goes a little further than that and contemplates placing the transportation of munitions also under this corps, that is, in the zone of operations.

In reference to the Air Service, the future development in air transportation, of course, can not be foreseen, but we expect a very rapid development. During the war this service developed very rapidly, and there is every reason to believe we may look forward to a great future for it. This service is recognized by England, France, and Italy as possessing great possibilities, and it seems to me that America should not lag in encouraging aviation, but should keep pace with the progress of other nations, or better still, keep ahead of them.

Of course, at present it is especially valuable for military purposes, yet its limitation to this service is not indicated. If Congress is of the opinion that general aviation should be encouraged, as I am, then the appropriations for commercial, naval, and military aviation might very well be included under one head, to be used first for the development of observation, reconnaissance and combat service in the Army and Navy, and, second, for the development of commercial aviation, which would include the procurement of planes for all purposes and the encouragement of invention, and all that sort of thing.

Concerning the Tank Corps, there is no doubt that the tank is a very valuable weapon for use with the Infantry and that its develop-

ment should be encouraged. It performed very valuable service for us, but was especially valuable to our Allies. We had no tanks of American manufacture; all tanks we used were obtained from the British and French.

The Tank Corps should not be a large organization, only of sufficient numbers, I should say, to carry on investigations and conduct training with the Infantry, and I would place it under the Chief of Infantry as an adjunct of that arm, and I would call the Chief of Infantry the Inspector of Infantry.

The Army Nurse Corps has performed most excellent service abroad. It contained many women of superior ability, and it seems to me, as a recognition of the splendid service of the American women in that corps, they should be given some rank, or, at least, assimilated status. The bestowal of authority upon them would give the Nurse Corps a military status necessary to carry out the instructions of the medical officers and would also have the effect of attracting to the corps the best class of women.

With reference to the distribution of duties, powers, and functions of staff departments, it has been demonstrated during the war that certain discretion as to the organization of the different corps and departments should rest with the President. This is quite necessary in time of war, and it seems to me that it should be continued during time of peace. While he need not have the authority to create new bureaus or to discontinue those in existence, he should have the power to alter the organization of bureaus, departments, and arms of the service to meet the changes which may be necessary properly to prepare our forces for war.

It is understood that this authority is lodged in the President as to the organization of the various bureaus and arms of the Navy Department, and that the system has made for efficiency.

Section 2 is in reference to general officers of the line. It seems to me the number of general officers of high rank provided for in this bill is rather excessive, undoubtedly so if the number of men provided for in this bill should be reduced.

As to rank, our traditions and practices in the past have been to confer the rank of general and lieutenant general during war or for war service. Ordinarily, in time of peace, I do not think it advisable to confer these higher ranks. This bill should provide that in time of war temporary appointments to the grade of lieutenant general and general may be made by the President, and, further, that officers may be assigned to duty without regard to seniority in the several grades. I think that is a necessary provision.

As to the paragraph providing that "the Chief of Coast Artillery, officers on the active list who have held the rank of general officer by detail as chief of staff corps or bureaus, and the general officers of the staff, except those of the Medical Department, shall, on the passage of this act, be recommissioned as general officers of the line in the grades and with the date of rank now held by them or heretofore held by them as head of a staff corps or bureau," I am of the opinion that this would be unwise. The effect of the provision as worded would be that the heads of the staff departments or bureaus, some of whom have had very little experience in the command of troops, would become major generals of the line of the Army and that they would pass over the heads of some of the major generals

of the line who have had active service at the front, and of brigadier generals of the line with similar service, and in some cases such officers would pass over 200 or more of the colonels who now rank them in the permanent grade of colonel. It seems to me that is unwise at this time and unjust.

Section 3 provides for the General Staff Corps. Previous to the war our General Staff never really functioned as such. This was mainly because there were very few officers who had been trained for the duties of the General Staff and none who had ever had opportunities to perform those duties under war conditions.

The failure of the General Staff to function naturally increased certain opposition to it by the chiefs of bureaus. At the beginning of the war we had no adequate organization to meet the situation that confronted us. Upon the arrival in Europe of the early contingents it was found necessary to create a General Staff from the ground up, adapting from the armies of our Allies those features that seemed best fitted to our own organization.

Officers were selected here and there, especially, wherever possible, those best known for their efficiency and peculiar fitness for the duties, but there were too few of them for the Army we were to have abroad, and it was necessary to establish a General Staff School for the training of officers for these duties.

We have come out of the war with General Staff experience and trained officers who have had actual experience in war, so that now there should be no difficulty in establishing a smoothly working staff machine. Many of the criticisms aimed at the General Staff at home are well founded, principally because the General Staff sections have undertaken to perform duties which should have been performed by the regularly established bureaus of the War Department. But in all fairness it should be stated that this was largely due to the fact that many of these staff officers had no training in their duties, and in their zealous endeavor to accomplish results they probably here and there exceeded the purpose for which the General Staff is created. The necessity, however, for overstepping these limits of General Staff work was due principally to the weaknesses found in the bureaus themselves, which, in turn, were due to our general lack of preparedness for war.

Sections 4 to 14 inclusive refer to the chiefs of departments. With reference to the chiefs of the various bureaus mentioned in section 4 to 14, I am of the opinion that they should be selected from among the officers of their respective bureaus, but some provision should be made, if possible, by which any officer so detailed, if found inefficient, could be relieved at the discretion of the President. I mean to say, instead of retaining such an officer for four years at the head of a bureau there ought to be some method by which he could be ousted and a new man, an efficient man, put in his place.

In regard to the detail system, the original situation which brought about the detail system in the various staff services, was due to conditions found to exist prior to, and during the Spanish War. It was pretty clearly demonstrated at that time that officers serving permanently in Staff Corps lost touch with the line of the Army to such an extent that they were unfamiliar with the needs of the Army, and especially unfamiliar with the require-

ments of the Army in time of war. They were unfamiliar with the duties that would be required of them as staff officers in time of war. While these particular departments themselves might run more smoothly, as far as the interior working of the departments is concerned, with a permanent personnel, yet that does not mean that we would get the efficiency that would be required of such supply services or bureaus in connection with the troops in time of war. In other words, they might still fail to be efficient servants of the fighting Army.

Experience seems to indicate, however, that after officers have efficiently served one or two details in a particular bureau—I should make it at least two details—that their appointments might be made permanent, with the understanding that these officers should, after each period of four years in the bureau, be attached to line organizations for a period of one year provided they were not naturally thrown with line organizations during that time. I think that permanent appointments to any of these corps should not be made in the lower grades.

Section 15 refers to the Tank Corps, and I have covered that in my discussion of section 1.

Section 16 refers to chaplains. There are two very different views as to having rank for chaplains. I am not in favor of rank because it seems to me that the bestowal of rank on a chaplain in a certain sense removes him from the possibility of intimate contact with the enlisted men, and officers, too, that he should have; his position is clearly indicated by the cross which he wears on his shoulder, and I think nothing else is needed.

This view was held in France by some very distinguished divines who served with the Army, and I made that recommendation to the Secretary of War after due deliberation and consultation with many of them. They believed that the insignia of the cross is quite sufficient to designate the position, and that it "really aided" in the performance of the duties that fall to the chaplain.

I believe, however, that the chaplains should have assimilated rank for the purposes of pay, allowances, and privileges.

Section 17 makes provision for band leaders. The maintenance of thoroughly efficient bands in the Army is to my mind a most important thing and should be encouraged. It adds a lot to the pleasure of the troops, and in periods of rest is a form of entertainment that makes for efficiency. I should be in favor of giving the band leaders the rank provided for in this bill.

I pass now to section 20. The provisions of the bill in regard to detached officers are very excellent, but I would be in favor of increasing the number to 2,000. It seems to me this number is necessary not only to provide the extra details required at present, but also for purposes which can not now be foreseen, and especially to enable us to expand our school system without depleting the number of officers serving with troops, which is a very important point.

Section 21 refers to school detachments. As to this paragraph, I should recommend a very liberal attitude in providing detachments for the various training schools.

Section 22 refers to the United States Military Academy. I should regret to see any step taken that would impair the efficiency of West Point. This institution has furnished the Army for more than a

hundred years with officers upon whom has fallen the training of our armies and the maintenance of our military traditions. While it does not necessarily follow that a graduate of West Point is per se better equipped than officers who have received education at other institutions, yet there is in that training such a solid foundation of character, discipline, and patriotism, in addition to the education and purely military features, that it should be given every encouragement. We should continue to give it every encouragement, as we have in the past.

The wisdom of the reduction of the course to three years is to my mind rather doubtful. In order, however, that all officers entering the Army, whether through West Point or not, should be on the same footing, it seems to me that all should be required to take the preliminary course in our training camps or serve one year in the Army. I believe in making this provision that we shall be touching the one weak side of West Point. We would place the young man who now goes to West Point without the opportunity to have actual experience as a soldier, or to come in close contact with men in the ranks, in a position to know what the relation should be from actual service with them.

During the course at West Point every opportunity not inconsistent with the duties there should be given the cadet to associate with his fellows in the outside world. This would give him a chance in early life to broaden out and to learn from association with young men in colleges or in other institutions, or in the world at large, to know men and to judge character.

As to the academic side of West Point, it has always been a school more adapted to the education of Engineer officers than otherwise, and with the reduction of the course to three years it seems to me that a readjustment of the course of study might be made that would omit some of the more technical branches necessary for the Engineer officer and provide that the Engineer officer should complete his training at one of the technical schools before entering the Army. In any event I think there should be a readjustment of the course, and that methods could be improved.

Sections 23, 24, 25, and 26 relate to the Infantry, Cavalry, Field Artillery, and Coast Artillery. These sections confer upon the President power which I think wise. We found during the war that many changes had to be made in organization to meet changing situations, and I can see no objection to bestowing upon the President during peace time the authority given in this bill. He has this authority already with reference to the Navy, and the adoption of an elastic system in the Navy has proved very satisfactory. In as much as the distribution of officers and enlisted men among the several combatant arms and among the several grades is set forth in detail in the several sections, it is believed that Congress would retain all necessary power.

The appointment of a Chief of Coast Artillery has proved very beneficial to that arm. It provides a competent head to supervise instruction, equipment and training, and I think this same provision should be extended to the Field Artillery, Infantry, and Cavalry, under the designation of Inspector of Field Artillery, Inspector of Cavalry, and Inspector of Infantry. These men should become advisors to the Chief of Staff and the General Staff in all that pertains to their particular arms.

The Officers' Reserve Corps is provided in section 27. It need not be pointed out, I think, that there should be a large reserve force of officers provided, not only for the reserve troops, but for the various staff corps and departments, including the General Staff. These officers should be very carefully examined as to their capabilities. I think it would be wise to divide them into three classes, according to their availability for service: First, availability for service in time of peace in connection with the training of troops; second, availability for service during grave national disturbances; and, third, availability for service in war.

Every reserve officer should have a definite assignment, not only to a corps or an arm, but to some particular unit or headquarters, depending upon his qualifications for such a position. The promiscuous appointment of reserve officers with rank and without assignment is unwise. These reserve officers should be required, of course, to pass certain standards of examinations before receiving appointments, and I would give special preference to those men who have performed their duties during the war efficiently.

Sections 28 and 29 refer to total enlisted strength and unassigned troops. In considering the total strength of the Army, it seems to me that all of us, the Army officer as well as the legislator, should take into consideration the cost to the country. We can not afford to adopt the proposed strength if it involves any such expense as is indicated by this bill. After a more or less casual study of the strength required for all purposes, I am of the opinion that we can place the outside figure at from 275,000 to 300,000, officers and men.

The subject of original vacancies is covered in section 30. In the matter of original vacancies in the Army it is very important that the claims of worthy noncommissioned officers, many of whom have had long service and have performed their duties as commissioned officers satisfactorily, frequently with high rank, should be given some special consideration.

Section 33 refers to details. With reference to that section it seems to me that as a general principle all staff officers should return occasionally to serve with the line, and that line officers should not be kept away from their particular arm for too great a period. But I am of the opinion that this can be regulated administratively, without the evil effects of enacting it into law. The attempt to regulate these matters by act of Congress imposes very difficult conditions on the Army. At times the law can not be met without great impairment of efficiency. It seems to me, with a general understanding that such a general policy will be carried out by the Army, the details of it may very well be left to the administration of the Army itself, that is, under the Secretary of War.

The subject of promotions is covered in section 33. That question has long been a very troublesome one. It seems to me that many objections to the present system can be removed by placing all officers of the Army, without regard to arm, upon a single list for promotion. Most of the jealousies and differences of views as to Army legislation have arisen from inequality of promotion. The difficulty of presenting to Congress a program for the Army has as a basis the desire of the different staff corps and different arms to advance their own interests and to obtain thereby an increase in promotion over their fellows.

There has been on the part of the line for a long time a feeling that the staff corps have obtained excessive promotion as compared with the line, and there have also been jealousies between different arms of the service, which exist to-day, because promotions have been distributed unequally. I can see no reason why officers of either the Infantry or Cavalry should not receive promotions in the Field Artillery or the Coast Artillery, for instance. In fact, those officers who have been promoted into those branches of the service have usually and with few exceptions made good and have very ably acquitted themselves. The advantage of a single list is such that I do not believe the opposite view can be successfully defended.

However, it might not be and I do not think it would be necessary to make many transfers between the arms, because of the large number of detached officers which are necessary and which are in part called for in this bill. If provision is made for a sufficient number of detached officers to perform necessary duty, we would at the same time be relieved of the necessity of making very many transfers from one arm to another.

But, as a matter of principle, I am strongly in favor of some service in the different arms by our officers. This principle was put into practice by many corps and division commanders at the front in order to give the Infantry officer a more intimate knowledge of what the Artillery was doing and the Artillery officer a more intimate knowledge of what the Infantry required, and that exchange of officers increased our general efficiency very much.

To conclude, I would add that I am very strongly in favor of the single list, and I think it should be adopted now in order to remove all of the differences of opinion that exist to-day and to enable all officers of the Army to take a large view of our requirements as a whole.

Mr. Chairman, I have not made any notes on the rest of this bill, and if it is agreeable to the committee, I will continue at a later period, perhaps this afternoon, my own observations on the balance of the bill. Perhaps it might be well for us now to go into more detail on the subjects I have touched upon.

Senator WADSWORTH. The first topic you discussed was that of universal military training. I assume that that is a topic which is susceptible of a good deal of development and discussion, and if it is satisfactory to you, the members of the committee will first ask you some questions in regard to that.

Gen. PERSHING. That is perfectly agreeable to me, Mr. Chairman.

Senator KIRBY. There is a fixed opinion in the minds of the people, Gen. Pershing, that the citizen soldier is the best soldier in time of emergency, and your own idea as expressed here would be to reduce the Regular Establishment to something like 250,000 men.

The people, in my opinion, are not going to take kindly to the idea of taking a million young men 19 years of age and train them for one year for fighting purposes unless the necessity is greater than it appears to be now. That is a matter I want fully developed, because, so far as I am individually concerned, that is one of the most vital points in this whole proposition.

In this last war, of course, we were fortunate in having a little time to prepare, but we are so situated that our shores can not be invaded by an army of appreciable strength in a short time. We

made soldiers in three months and we made officers in three months. Why should we train a million men a year and take them out of their industrial and professional life and out of the social life of the community against the possible contingency of meeting a great army? Why should we train all men?

Gen. PERSHING. In the first place, I do not think it quite fair to state that we made officers in three months. As to the people not taking kindly to this plan, I think it is a question of having them fully understand its tremendous advantages.

Senator KIRBY. We commissioned them and put them in charge of troops.

Gen. PERSHING. But that does not make an efficient officer.

Senator KIRBY. That is true; some of them never become efficient, just like some lawyers, or any other professional men.

Gen. PERSHING. That is very true, sir. It seems to me, the lessons of the war, if they teach us anything with reference to preparedness—and I think they do teach us a very important principle, and that is, that we should make some preparation in peace times in order to be prepared for war.

Senator KIRBY. I agree to that.

Gen. PERSHING. To meet the emergency of war.

As an additional reason for the military training of our youth, I believe that it would have a very excellent effect upon our young men as citizens. It would be, in a sense, a training school for citizenship, and one does not have to argue that, it seems to me, very much, because it is evident to-day throughout the United States that there are large numbers of men, especially of alien origin, without ordinary education, who do not even understand our institutions, and who do not appreciate what a free government means, but who are permitted to reap all the advantages without fulfilling the obligations that we think fall upon them, that of preparing themselves as citizens.

In the exercise of the draft law, it is a matter of record that some 32 per cent of the drafted men were illiterate, according to their own confession. I am inclined to think that if anything like a reasonable test were applied, that that percentage would be largely increased. All of that indicates that the States, or those responsible for the education of our youth, are not taking the pains to educate them that they should take. And the uneducated person is so easily led by all sorts of fanciful theories, some of them revolutionary, that this question becomes, to my mind, a very burning one, and I believe that with a short period of universal training we could reach the heart of this matter and very soon prove its efficacy.

Senator KIRBY. The thing that I want to stress—and this is where the fight is going to come on this military bill; and so far as I am concerned, I am not indicating how I feel about it myself—the public school teaches a man democracy as he grows up, with the people he lives with and associates with, and he broadens his scope and his horizon.

Gen. PERSHING. What about the 32 per cent of illiterates?

Senator KIRBY. That is what I was going to get to. The public school teaches him democracy, but it takes all of life to teach him citizenship, from the time he is born until he is dead. These auxil-

itary factors that enter into it may be beneficial, but it takes him all his life to learn how to be a citizen. To me it seems that the Army is not here to educate the man. It is the Army's business to fight; that is what it is organized for, and to protect the country. And I believe the educated citizen makes the best soldier, but I do not believe the Army is the place to educate him, except in the method of fighting and in the duties of fighting. That is the point I was trying to get at.

Gen. PERSHING. It seems to me, however, you are surrounding a young man with an opportunity for development which he can not get in any other way. You take him out of his little local environment and place him in association with men of all classes. He touches elbows with them. He is taught that all men are really equal; that the rich man's son and the poor man's son each owe an obligation to their Government. In other words, he learns that ours is a real democracy. He is given, in those training camps, a certain education by these associations, if you please. He may be taught, and should be taught, to read the English language, and he should be taught something, as much as possible, of our institutions. In a large sense we are supplementing his education. It seems to me the advantage of having our young men train for a short period under these conditions is so great, both from the standpoint of the individual and of the Government, that the expenditure required for the purpose is practically negligible.

Senator McKELLAR. General, what do you estimate the cost to be of such universal training as you suggest?

Gen. PERSHING. I really have not gone into the details of appropriations in connection with this matter.

Senator McKELLAR. Would it not cost practically as much as to maintain a soldier, or more? In other words, if we train a million men a year it would cost in the neighborhood of \$2,000,000,000, if the same cost applies as applies to the maintenance of an Army. If we apply that cost it would cost \$2,000 per man. In times of peace, however, I think the cost has been found to be about \$1,300 or \$1,400, so it would be somewhere in the neighborhood of \$1,500,000,000 a year.

In view of what you said about the cost of an Army in times of peace, what have you to say in reference to this immense cost, especially at a time when we are overburdened with debt because of the war?

Senator WADSWORTH. Perhaps I might interrupt there to say that the estimates submitted to the committee in connection with the War Department bill, so-called, which bill provides for a period of three months training for the 19-year-old men, set forth that approximately 650,000 or 700,000 19-year-old men, physically capable, would be trained for this three months period and that the cost to the Government including transportation and subsistence would be \$94,000,000 per year. That is the figure submitted of the cost of the training provided for under the terms of the so-called War Department bill.

Gen. PERSHING. I had not really gone into that detail, and I think that answers your question.

Senator McKELLAR. I imagine the cost would be much greater than \$94,000,000.

Senator FLETCHER. What is your view, General, regarding the three-months period of training?

Gen. PERSHING. Senator, I should prefer to see it made six months. You can do so much more relatively in six months than you can in three. In three months you can do a great deal and lay a good foundation, but in six months you get relatively further along than in three months, and a six-months' period of training would prepare our men better to meet the requirements of trained troops in battle than three months. If they were trained only three months you would have to do a lot of training after war was declared, before these men would be ready to go into battle.

Senator CAPPER. Are you familiar with the Australian system of universal military training?

Gen. PERSHING. In a general way.

Senator CAPPER. Did not that system provide good soldiers in war.

Gen. PERSHING. The Australian turned out pretty well during the war.

Senator CAPPER. What, in a general way, is their system?

Gen. PERSHING. I do not remember enough about the details of it to enter into a discussion of it at this time. It involves universal liability to training. Starting at the age of 12 all boys receive physical training in schools. Training as recruits begins at 14 years and is progressive until the age of 25, the annual amount of training being about 16 days. Liability ceases at age of 26.

Senator SPENCER. General, do you remember approximately when it was that any of the selective-service draft men in substantial numbers were actually ready for active service on the front line, about what month it was?

Gen. PERSHING. It appears from the record here that the Seventy-seventh Division was organized on August 30, 1917, and that it went into the battle line on August 20, 1918.

Senator SPENCER. That would mean that from April 6, 1917, until August it took that time for the first selective-draft men who had had no previous military experience to become fitted for active service on the line. Would that be right?

Gen. PERSHING. I do not quite understand your question.

Senator SPENCER. I understood you to say that the selective-service draft men were first actually fitted for active service about the latter part of August and went into active service in August?

Gen. PERSHING. Yes; August, 1918.

Senator SPENCER. What I wanted to ask was this: In your judgment, if we had had universal military training in the United States for some years prior to 1917, would that time have been shorter, and would those men have been able to have gone into the fighting line much quicker than they were able to do under the circumstances?

Gen. PERSHING. I am quite sure of it.

Senator SPENCER. Substantially less time?

Gen. PERSHING. I certainly think so.

Senator FLETCHER. General, have you formed any idea as to the portion of our battle losses due to lack of training?

Gen. PERSHING. It would be difficult to make an estimate, but it is fair to conclude that we had more losses than we would have had if all our men had been properly trained.

Mr. KAHN. I think Senator Spencer got a little mixed in the dates. As I understand you, it was about August 30, 1917, when the Seventy-seventh Division went to the cantonment for training, and it was August 20, 1918, when they got into battle. Is not that correct?

Gen. PERSHING. Yes.

Mr. KAHN. So that they had a full year's training before you were able to send them into the battle line?

Gen. PERSHING. Yes.

Mr. KAHN. Would you couple with military training vocational training?

Gen. PERSHING. As far as possible, Mr. Kahn.

Senator SPENCER. Let me get these dates right. From the time we entered the war, on April 6, 1917, it was approximately 16 months until August, 1918?

Gen. PERSHING. That is exactly correct.

Senator SPENCER. Before the first men who had no previous military training were qualified for active service upon the line?

Gen. PERSHING. Those dates are correct. Let me go into that a moment. The draft organizations, those divisions organized from the drafted men, were sent to their training camps and their training was begun. But under a policy adopted here—possibly with good reason, I do not know—men were taken from those divisions by War Department bureaus in large groups for the organization of staff and supply units. In some cases numbers varied from 6,000 and 7,000 to 15,000 and 20,000 from one division, and in some instances I have heard that a greater number were taken from a division than it originally had.

So that the training was not continuous. It was broken, and those vacancies caused by drawing men from the divisions were filled by new drafted men, and the personnel was constantly shifting. You would not call a division trained until all its units had completed the training.

So it would not be just to say that all the individuals of any one division—and I think that applies to all divisions—had sixteen months' training before it entered the battle line.

Senator SPENCER. What I wanted to get the benefit of your judgment upon was as to whether if we had had universal military training in the United States for years prior to 1917 it is reasonable to assume that our fighting power would have been much more quickly available than it was when we had to depend upon citizen soldiery without any previous military training?

Gen. PERSHING. There is not the slightest doubt about that.

Senator McKELLAR. If there is a difference, why was it that our men, previously without universal military training, made so much better soldiers that they were able to win this war from the Germans, who had always had universal military training? How can these two things be true? Our soldiers had not been trained prior to this war, or practically none of them. They were trained for this emergency, they were carried away from their homes, across the ocean 3,000 miles, and defeated the trained armies of Germany.

Gen. PERSHING. You overlook the point that we had, as I tried to bring out in my preliminary statement, a very advantageous set of circumstances, which permitted us to train men from the time we entered the war until the spring of 1918. The lines were held fast in

France by the armies of our allies. If we had had an army ready to throw into the battle line in the spring of 1917 it is possible that we could have ended the war that year; it is not beyond imagination at all.

Mr. ANTHONY. Is it absolutely correct, to quote Senator Spencer's statement, that the first men without previous military training to reach the line were those selected-draft men who reached the line in 1918? Is it not a fact that many thousands of men who volunteered their services, without previous military training before the war, reached the line before that date.

Gen. PERSHING. Yes; that is, to a certain extent, true. Most of the volunteers came in before the first draft was inducted into service.

Mr. ANTHONY. Is it not also true that many of the National Guard troops reached the front lines before that date?

Gen. PERSHING. Yes.

Mr. ANTHONY. And participated in the fighting?

Gen. PERSHING. Yes. I will give you the facts about that. The First Division, which contained a number of untrained men at the beginning of the war, entered the line in Picardy and fought the battle of Cantigny.

Mr. ANTHONY. Why was it possible to prepare these thousands of volunteers for battle service quicker than it was the other troops who came in through the draft?

Gen. PERSHING. These men who entered the regular divisions—using the First Division as an example—had a long period of training. They came in early, and their training was facilitated by the fact of their association with trained soldiers. Those recruits were thrown into the ranks among the trained Regular soldiers, and the recruits learned very rapidly.

Mr. ANTHONY. So that the use of practically a million volunteers by the War Department advanced the training of the men in the course of the war very rapidly, as a matter of fact?

Gen. PERSHING. I do not quite understand your point.

Mr. ANTHONY. The use of over a million volunteers by the War Department after the declaration of war resulted in great military benefit?

Gen. PERSHING. Where they had opportunity for training, it is fair to say that.

Mr. ANTHONY. They were trained, were they not?

Gen. PERSHING. Where they had an opportunity to train with the regular divisions.

Mr. ANTHONY. They were trained and readily assimilated and prepared for battle, as you say, before the men who were taken in by the selective draft.

Gen. PERSHING. I do not understand what you are driving at.

Mr. ANTHONY. What I am driving at is this: That the men who volunteered their services, over a million of them, received their training and were prepared for battle and many of them were on the line before the men who were sent in through the selective draft.

Gen. PERSHING. I do not know as to the numbers, but I do know, as a principle, that the men who are put into organized units do acquire a facility and an efficiency much quicker than those trained under other circumstances.

Senator WARREN. What proportion of the Regular Army proper was in the First Division, if any?

Gen. PERSHING. What proportion of units?

Senator WARREN. The proportion of the old Regular Army who would be instructors?

Gen. PERSHING. Really a very small proportion.

Senator WARREN. How about the State troops?

Gen. PERSHING. Also a very small proportion.

Mr. KAHN. The State troops comprising the National Guard had been in training on the Mexican border for fully six months, and in some cases almost a year before they went to the front, so that they had had a thorough training.

Gen. PERSHING. An excellent training, Mr. Kahn.

Mr. KAHN. And the men who were drafted in large numbers were taken to fill up those National Guard regiments so as to make a complete division of them. Many drafted men were filtered into the Army in that way; as you say, they were thrown in with trained men and readily assimilated the training and so were ready for battle probably before the divisions that were composed entirely of untrained men?

Gen. PERSHING. Undoubtedly.

Mr. KAHN. How long were the National Guard regiments down on the Mexican border?

Gen. PERSHING. I was in Mexico when that was going on, and I think it was close to a year.

Mr. KAHN. It was close to a year; that is quite right.

Senator HITCHCOCK. What was the date of the Cantigny engagement?

Gen. PERSHING. May 28, 1918.

Senator HITCHCOCK. Can you give the committee any idea as to how these new troops were filtered into the old organizations—what the units were?

Gen. PERSHING. The regular units were filled by men from the draft or by volunteers who came in and increased the size of the companies to the prescribed limit.

Senator HITCHCOCK. Every company would have some old trained soldiers and some volunteers?

Gen. PERSHING. Yes.

Senator SUTHERLAND. Were not quite a number of soldiers thrown into the line who had had less than six months' training, or less than three months' training?

Gen. PERSHING. There were quite a number thrown in without much training.

Senator SUTHERLAND. How did they perform their part?

Gen. PERSHING. Not as well as trained troops would have done. They did well because they all had fight in them, and they all were an aggressive, vigorous, eager lot of men, who only lacked an opportunity for training to make them the best soldiers in the world.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. Did not that condition naturally lead to greater casualties?

Gen. PERSHING. I should not doubt that it did, Senator.

Senator SUTHERLAND. They were put in from sheer necessity?

Gen. PERSHING. Absolutely.

Senator SUTHERLAND. They developed more rapidly under those actual combat conditions than if they had been back in the training areas?

Gen. PERSHING. Yes; but it is pretty costly to train men under those conditions.

Mr. KAHN. It results in a greater number of casualties?

Gen. PERSHING. Yes.

Mr. DENT. What kind of soldiers did the 32 per cent of illiterates make in this war?

Gen. PERSHING. I do not know that I had any occasion to make a comparison along that line.

Mr. DENT. Did you observe any distinction?

Gen. PERSHING. No; we selected men because of their efficiency; it depended on the man's capabilities. I do not know that any of the illiterates ever reached the grade of officer.

Mr. DENT. I would like to ask you another question on the subject of the National Guard. Do you recall the strength of the National Guard when it was on the Mexican border?

Gen. PERSHING. Not accurately.

Mr. DENT. Was it not about 160,000?

Gen. PERSHING. Something like that.

Mr. DENT. Then during the war it increased by voluntary enlistments to what extent; do you recall that?

Gen. PERSHING. No; I have not those figures.

Mr. DENT. I think it was nearly 400,000.

Mr. SANFORD. Did these men who have been referred to as being illiterate remain illiterate to the end of the war?

Gen. PERSHING. No.

Mr. SANFORD. What did you do to overcome that?

Gen. PERSHING. We undertook to give them special instruction in the English language and in arithmetic, and they picked up a lot of general information through association with their fellows.

Mr. SANFORD. Were there any men who came back who could not speak English or write English at all?

Gen. PERSHING. I could not say positively as to that, but I think not.

Mr. HULL. At the outbreak of the war the General Staff sent to the committee a bill asking for the draft of men from 19 to 26 years of age. The military committee and Congress raised that age, and the intention at that time, so it was said, was to make the first army of 1,500,000 men out of the boys under 21 years of age. In your experience over there would you have had better results or worse results if you had had that kind of an army?

Gen. PERSHING. You mean if we had had an army——

Mr. HULL (interposing). Of boys under 21.

Gen. PERSHING. The question has been discussed considerably, and personally, all other things being equal, I myself would like to see these young men taken for training at the age of 21. But there are practical difficulties in the way, and I think if we adopt the system that it would be wise to fix the age at 19. The young man at 19 is more pliable, perhaps, and it would not interfere with the continuation of his college work, but would take him at the end of his high-school course.

Mr. HULL. You, as a military man, prefer an army older than that to fight with; is that what we are to understand from your answer?

Gen. PERSHING. The point I want to make is that it is not a question of fighting qualities, it is not a question of eagerness to fight, nor ability to learn; but the men are just a little bit more mature, and perhaps a little bit stronger physically. But I do not know that I am prepared to make a point of the thing.

Mr. HULL. But that is a very important point for us to know about, and if there is anyone who knows about it it ought to be those who had service on the other side.

Gen. PERSHING. Those are my own personal views about it.

Mr. HULL. Then, those of us who prevented those younger boys being taken did not do any harm to the fighting forces?

Gen. PERSHING. It was a question of furnishing us men.

Mr. HULL. We gave you men from 21 to 30. We raised the ages and made another fighting force.

Along that same line, if it be true, which I think from your answer you admit is true, that a man is a better fighter when he has matured than he is at a younger age, how is Congress to prevent the use of an army of boys under 21 for fighting, provided we allow them to conscript boys under that age? I have asked everyone I can get hold of that question and no one can answer.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. If you take the young men of 19 and train them, they would be practically 20 years old before they completed their training?

Gen. PERSHING. Yes; they would be.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. In some instances it would take over a year, so they would be practically 20 years and 6 months old, or 21?

Gen. PERSHING. I think we would be entirely safe in taking a chance on that, because it would only apply to one particular class anyway.

Mr. KAHN. As a matter of fact, Congress passed a law providing for the conscription of all men between the ages of 18 and 45, before we got through with the war, so that Congress itself enacted legislation to take the younger men, and did it because of the necessities of the situation.

Gen. PERSHING. Yes, sir.

Mr. KAHN. I want to ask you whether the psychology of that legislation had any effect on the enemy?

Gen. PERSHING. Unquestionably, sir; without any doubt at all; and I heartily approve of the action of Congress taken at that time.

Mr. HULL. There was no objection to it at that time in Congress because the military necessity made it necessary for Congress to pass the bill. The question in my mind is whether it is better as a military proposition to use the older men to fight first and use the younger men last.

Gen. PERSHING. If by older men you mean beginning at 21, I should prefer them.

Mr. QUIN. On this question of universal training, we all know about what number of young men it would take from the activities of life. There is great pressure in this country for production, especially on the farms and in industrial activities, and we need more men for that purpose than we have. If we are going to take 700,000 men each year from the farms and the factories of this country for

six months or a year, how could we reconcile that with the propaganda for reducing the high cost of living?

Gen. PERSHING. Can you consistently fail to take advantage of the splendid opportunity you are giving these young men for broadening themselves, by association with their fellows? They get in three months or six months a view of life which they probably never would get otherwise. It would be a large step toward preventing class distinction. Are you not giving to them value received, and are you not by that method increasing their efficiency as laboring men? I think you are.

I think they go back into civil life better prepared, more aggressive, more imbued with a spirit of leadership and initiative than if they had not had this training, and even if we were assured of never having another war, I should be in favor of some such system as this, simply for training young men to be more law-abiding citizens. There is too little regard for law and order.

Mr. QUIN. I could not agree with your premise. I come from a section of the country where we have the black man in large numbers, and it is actually demonstrated that it is a very dangerous thing to train him as a soldier. He has come back into society now and is a menace to the white race. What would you do under this plan for universal training to keep those sections of the country, some of them in the South and some of them in the Middle West and in the North, from being menaced in such a way? That is not hearsay, but it is an actual reality which I am relating to you.

Gen. PERSHING. I am not entirely familiar with that situation nor with the result that would be produced by giving these men this sort of training. But from a broad standpoint I think any additional education we give the colored man would be an advantage to the Nation.

Mr. QUIN. So far as education is concerned, those sections are educating him in free schools. The proposition is that this military training has demonstrated that it develops a real danger. He is coming back home with all that virus in him.

Gen. PERSHING. I do not know that that can be entirely attributed to his military training. May it not be attributed, to some extent, to the peculiar circumstances under which he served abroad? I am not prepared to analyze it entirely or give you a complete answer, but it seems to me that that feature of it should be considered. You remember that the relations that exist over there and the attitude toward the colored man are different from what they are with us.

Mr. QUIN. Would you object, after you had had time to analyze it and study it, to put a complete answer to that in the record?

Gen. PERSHING. Of course, I think the question is going to come up, if Congress in its wisdom concludes to adopt any system of military training; and if I should be called upon to assist in the preparation of the details of a bill I should be very glad to comply with your request. I may state, however, that my information is that few, if any, of the colored men who were in the Army have been engaged in any of the recent racial troubles.

Senator McKELLAR. Will you include in your observations on that—for I would like to have your opinion about it, which I value very highly—a statement of what would be the effect on the country's industrial, commercial, and agricultural life to take out each year

some 700,000 or a million young men, most of whom are now employed? If you do not care to answer that now, I wish you would include it in answer to Mr. Quin's proposition. My question goes further than this. It seems to me at any time it is a very serious thing to take this number of men out of our industries, and out of our agricultural life and out of our commercial life and out of our professional life, interfering with the education of such young men. I think it would have a very serious effect on many things.

Gen. PERSHING. There are several times a million young men taken out who are attending school between the ages of 17 and 19. It seems to me this is only a continuation, of a particular sort, of our educational system.

Senator McKELLAR. You regard that as a part of their education rather than military training?

Gen. PERSHING. Yes, I do; and I would attach more importance to that side of it than I would to the military side of it, as important as that is.

Senator McKELLAR. You would have the educational training and the military training go along together?

Gen. PERSHING. Quite so.

Senator McKELLAR. Would you approve of such a plan for our Regular Army by which the men in the Regular Army, those who voluntarily enlist, should have educational training at the same time.

Gen. PERSHING. I should certainly approve it.

Senator McKELLAR. I think it ought to be done by all means.

Gen. PERSHING. Without any question, Senator, and I believe that is the view of the War Department at present, and that steps have already been taken to carry out in the regular service some such plan as we adopted immediately after the armistice in France, with most excellent results.

Senator NEW. Would you make that compulsory or voluntary?

Gen. PERSHING. I would make it compulsory. I think the same principle applies there as applies to the education of the youth generally.

Senator McKELLAR. If we should train the boys who enlist in the Regular Army they would all pass out pretty well educated?

Gen. PERSHING. Without any question. We have shown by our experience in France that under the system of schools we had there—and we established there the so-called University of Beaune, south of Chaumont, where my headquarters were located—that under military discipline, where the young man was held to strict hours and was given a certain amount of military training, enough to keep him in good physical condition, and had allotted certain study hours and certain recitation hours, that we could do in six months as much as is done in the average college during the whole college year. That is the view of many of the leading educators who were with us over there and assisted us in carrying out that program.

I happen to have data in regard to that school system in France right here at hand. The total attendance in the organized school system in the American Expeditionary Forces was approximately 225,000, of which number 181,000 attended the post school and 27,000 attended educational centers, while over 8,000 attended the University of Beaune, of which I have just spoken; over 6,000 attended French universities and about 2,000 attended British universities. This is in

addition to the local schools carried on within the units themselves, where the men were given an opportunity to learn English and arithmetic and be able to read their various manuals, and all that sort of thing.

The attendance upon the courses that we called institute courses totaled 890,000, and we had a system of extension lectures at which there was an attendance of 750,000. To show you how many men were affected by the system, there was a grand total of 1,670,000 out of 2,000,000 men in attendance upon those courses. It shows the possibilities of education not only in the Regular Army but in the training camps, conclusively.

Senator McKELLAR. You spoke of the fact that the War Department was now considering plans. Would you be willing to see that the committees get the plan of educating the men enlisted in the Regular Army?

Gen. PERSHING. Yes.

Senator McKELLAR. And furnish it to us?

Gen. PERSHING. I will be very glad to provide it; yes, sir.

Senator WADSWORTH. Your suggestions with respect to universal military training as contained in your preliminary statement have one very marked provision which is not contained in the bill before us. As I understand it you propose that after these men shall have received a certain period of training they shall then be organized into reserve training units. The War Department bill, I may remind you, makes no such provision. Would you care to enlarge upon the desirability of the organization of a reserve training army?

Gen. PERSHING. From a military standpoint, which is, of course, the particular feature we are interested in, not minimizing, of course, the educational features attached to this program—from a military standpoint all those men should be placed in some sort of an organization and be given a definite status, the officers as well as the enlisted men.

Right in that connection, although I had not intended to come to it yet, sir, I may as well state my views now about it—we have a very great asset in our trained units that have had experience in the war. I am referring to the units of the National Guard as well as the units of the so-called National Army. They have returned with traditions, with history, with pride of service, with higher ideals of citizenship, which is important, and all of which together make a very valuable asset in any organization that is to be used as a basis for training. I think those divisions should be continued in existence, with the officers that served with them, retaining them in the rank they had, as far as their efficiency proved that they were capable of performing the duties of their respective ranks; and I would hold those divisions and designate them as reserve divisions into which could be put the young men as they left the training camps. I would try to get together the officers and men who formerly composed these divisions; by doing so the traditions and the esprit of those organizations would be kept alive for the rest of time, and we would build up a reserve which would be available any time the country needed it.

Senator WADSWORTH. Those men would lead lives as civilians, but would all belong to some unit organized and officered, with appropriate headquarters and with supplies sufficient to outfit them in case

of emergency, and only upon declaration of war by Congress would they be called into the service.

Gen. PERSHING. Yes; that would be my understanding. They would be as fully organized as possible, with the skeletons of all their units ready for expansion if necessary. I do not know that it would always be necessary to maintain a full quota in some of the particular staff auxiliaries. However, as you say, Senator, they would be citizens, locally attached by name to a particular organization, which would be officered locally, but would be a part of some larger unit, which in turn would be a part of a division, or perhaps a corps.

Senator WADSWORTH. Would you advocate keeping alive the names of these divisions that have become famous?

Gen. PERSHING. Undoubtedly; that is one of the principal things. Not only would I keep alive the names, but I would get back the personnel as far as it is possible to do so. Let us take, for instance, the Twenty-eighth division, which served through the battle of the Meuse-Argonne and had a large number of replacements, several thousands. Those replacements would go back to Missouri or California or wherever they came from. But all men of the Twenty-eighth Division from Pennsylvania who returned with it would form a nucleus in their old units of these local organizations in that State.

Senator WADSWORTH. Localized to the State of Pennsylvania?

Gen. PERSHING. Yes.

Senator WADSWORTH. From which they originally came?

Gen. PERSHING. Yes. There is one point in there—I do not know whether you want me to take it up just now—that is in regard to the status of such organizations.

Senator WADSWORTH. You mean whether they should be maintained under the militia clause of the Constitution, or the Army clause?

Gen. PERSHING. Yes.

Senator WADSWORTH. That is quite an extensive topic for discussion and comment at this particular time.

Mr. MILLER. General, referring again to the matter of universal training, would it be your idea that in the training of these youths of 19 years of age that while undergoing their training they should be subjected to the same rigorous military discipline within the camps to which the recruits of the National Guard or the troops of the so-called National Army were subjected, or would you relax the rigors of that training so far as discipline and punishment are concerned?

Gen. PERSHING. Of course, Mr. Miller, discipline under those circumstances is really very necessary; but in dealing with the youth of those ages there might be some relaxation as to the imposition of punishment.

Mr. MILLER. That is what I was getting at.

Gen. PERSHING. I take it you would not have ordinarily many of the offenses in an aggregation of young men like that that we have in the Regular Service, or that we had during the war in all of the divisions made up, as they were, of all classes of men, as these would be, too; but the surroundings would be such that you would have nothing much to deal with, except minor offenses.

Mr. MILLER. Do you not also think, General, that if it were universally known that that was the accepted theory of the military

authorities it would tend greatly to popularize military training with the people?

Gen. PERSHING. Yes; I would emphasize, Mr. Miller, the educational and school features of this system more than I would the military feature.

Mr. JAMES. Suppose Congress provides for an Army of 509,000 men and we only have 300,000 volunteers. Would you favor any system that would draft these young men in peace times, who had had universal military training, to fill up the Army?

Gen. PERSHING. I beg your pardon; I did not quite understand your question.

Mr. JAMES. There was a bill introduced some time ago, which provided that after these men had completed their training, if there were not enough volunteers to fill up the Regular Army, if there was a shortage of 200,000 men in the Regular Army, we could draft the men who had had the universal military training and compel these men to serve in the Army, the Navy, or the Marine Corps. Do you favor that sort of a provision in time of peace?

Gen. PERSHING. I would make the standing Army a volunteer Army.

Senator WADSWORTH. Entirely.

Gen. PERSHING. Entirely; yes, sir.

Mr. KAHN. At this point I would like to insert in the hearing in connection with this matter a letter I received this morning from Mr. McIlvaine, of the Training Camps Association, asking that section 9 of the universal service bill, to which Mr. James has referred, be not considered.

Senator WADSWORTH. I had understood that they had withdrawn that section from consideration.

Mr. KAHN. Yes.

(The letter referred to is as follows:)

MILITARY TRAINING CAMPS ASSOCIATION OF THE UNITED STATES.

OCTOBER, 29, 1919.

HON. JULIUS KAHN,

House of Representatives, Washington, D. C.

DEAR SIR: As the introducer in the House of Representatives of the national service act, H. R. 8086 (the so-called Chamberlain-Kahn bill for universal military training), this association desires to request you to take the necessary steps to inform the House and its Military Affairs Committee that our association recommends the elimination of section 9.

Yours, very truly,

TOMPKINS McILVAINE,

*Acting Chairman Executive Committee,
Military Training Camps Association.*

Senator WADSWORTH. General, have you any figures showing the percentage of the physically defective men who were discovered within the draft ages?

Gen. PERSHING. I have no accurate figures. We can get them for you.

Senator WADSWORTH. My recollection of the testimony is—and I think it is exceedingly important—that altogether there were approximately 40 per cent of the men who were physically defective, some of them so much so that they could not serve at all, and others to a degree which compelled them to indulge only in limited service.

and the great majority of the 40 per cent were suffering from physical defects that were remediable, that could be cured within three, four, five, or six months.

Gen. PERSHING. I am decidedly of the opinion that there is a great lack of appreciation on the part of our people of the necessity of some sort of physical training, preceded by a physical examination of the youth. I believe that our schools are very deficient in that respect, as little or no attention is paid in our country schools or homes to physical defects. By establishing a system of universal training which pays particular attention to the physical development of the individual, it seems to me we are meeting a very great need and we are increasing the productive power of the manhood of the country.

Mr. OLNEY. In the framing of an Army bill would you not recommend that the illiterates, where they are sent to the training camps, should not be rejected but trained in elementary education and given vocational training along with military training, and taught to speak and write English? If that were done, would not these men be better equipped to go back into civilian life, and would not the handicap to which they would be otherwise subjected be overcome to a certain extent?

Gen. PERSHING. I am decidedly of that opinion.

Mr. OLNEY. I would like to incorporate resolutions adopted by the Ninetieth Division, composed of men from Texas and Oklahoma, who went on record unanimously as being in favor of universal military training, the period of training not to exceed one year.

Gen. PERSHING. I am very glad to hear that. I am not surprised at action such as that by men of that splendid division.

(The matter referred to is as follows:)

NINETIETH DIVISION ASSOCIATION,
Dallas, Tex., October 25, 1919.

Hon. RICHARD OLNEY,
Washington, D. C.

DEAR SIR: Inclosed is a copy of a resolution framed and adopted by the Ninetieth Division Association at its first annual reunion in Dallas October 11, 1919. That this resolution bespeaks the attitude of practically every member of the association is evidenced by the fact that not one single vote was cast against it in the recent reunion.

The Ninetieth Division Association is composed of 24,000 members of that division who have banded themselves together to perpetuate the fellowship of the men of the division. The Ninetieth Division was the National Army Division composed of men from Texas and Oklahoma. It had a year's overseas service, saw 72 days of actual fighting, and was a part of the Army of Occupation.

We feel that our convictions and expressions in the matter of military training should bear great weight, for we have no interests at stake as do the National Guard and Regular Army personnel.

Respectfully, yours,

IKE S. ASHBURN, *President.*

Resolved, That the Ninetieth Division Association, composed of 23,470 men, former members of the Ninetieth Division, feels that it owes a duty to express its attitude upon the subject of military training and the reorganization of our Army; that it firmly believes in a reasonable amount of universal military service not exceeding one year, because:

(1) Such service is essential to the safety of America and the integrity of its policies.

(2) It is morally just and does not at all impair the ideals of democracy.

But,

(3) On the contrary, it promotes democracy, in that rich and poor, employer and employee, are compelled to serve together and to understand one another.

(4) Military training, not exceeding one year, given at a proper age, and as a part of the education of our youths, would be of tremendous benefit to them physically and mentally.

(5) All Americans should be trained to understand they owe a duty to their country as a consideration for the privileges accorded them as American citizens, and such duty would be well taught under a system of universal service.

(6) Universal service does not involve militarism, nor even encourage it.

(7) Training in the Army promotes an understanding of the military needs of our country and such training would be conducive to intelligent legislation toward keeping our country in a state of effective preparedness.

Resolved, further, That the Ninetieth Division Association is in favor of an adequate Regular Army as a nucleus for the proper training of its citizens for military service.

Resolved, further, That the association favors a system of training camps to be organized and run in conjunction with the maintenance of a Regular Army, and a system of universal training, and that provision be made for the appointment as officers of meritorious soldiers and graduates of training camps; and

Resolved, further, That our president be instructed to mail a copy of this resolution to each Member of Congress, to be considered as a request from this association to support legislation embodying the policies herein advocated.

Mr. GREENE. May I ask a question that suggests the underlying philosophy of the Army as a national institution, and as it may be modified in any sense by proposals in this legislation? It is rather characteristic of us Americans that we run to extremes, and either have an Army that is a fighting machine, or else, in the endeavor to draw some by-product of benefit from it in another line, we begin to turn it into a post-graduate course for æsthetic culture and education. If we go too far along that line are we not likely to lose something of the fighting edge of an army?

Gen. PERSHING. As far as education applies to the Regular Service, after a man has received his preliminary training, a great deal of his time is unoccupied, and I have always thought that we should utilize his spare time by giving him some educational advantages, and I do not think you would lose anything of the training necessary to make a fighting organization by giving the men in the Army that training during their odd hours.

Mr. GREENE. Your definition most happily describes what I was contemplating. The education should be incidental, or a by-product, and not the main purpose of putting men into the Army?

Gen. PERSHING. No; not the Regular Service.

Mr. GREENE. I only introduce that here as a suggestion.

Gen. PERSHING. I think it would, and should be a great inducement for men to go in.

Mr. GREENE. Exactly; but we are in some danger of having many beautiful schemes for popular education thrust upon us which, if adopted, would soon make the Army a college rather than a fighting institution, and I think, perhaps, we would be safer in having some middle line.

Gen. PERSHING. I quite agree with you.

Mr. Chairman, there is one other point I would like to bring out at this time, and that is the moral side of it. From our experience in the war, in the association of young men under the conditions of training that we had, there was developed in them a very high moral sense, due largely to the impression on their minds of the patriotic

obligation they were laboring under. It was especially notable in the Army in France, where there was really self-imposed discipline, and where men who had, perhaps, never had any high moral conceptions as to personal conduct became very particular in that regard.

Speaking very plainly, a high moral standard was established, and when the time came to send our troops home we found very little disease resulting from immorality; so little that we were able to send our Army home absolutely clean.

It seems to me, therefore, that the moral standard you would get from placing young men under these conditions and teaching them the necessity of a moral life is something that would appeal to all classes as a very strong argument in favor of universal training.

(Thereupon the committee took a recess until 2.30 o'clock p. m.)

AFTER RECESS.

The committee met at 2.30 o'clock p. m., pursuant to the taking of recess.

Senator WADSWORTH. The committee will please be in order.

General, do you want to amplify any of your observations that you made this morning on the last topic which we were discussing, namely, universal military training?

Gen. PERSHING. There was one point that I think should be brought out, Senator, and that is with reference to the class of young men that we term illiterate, and those that are physically below the standard that we expect them to have. I think to get the best results that we should go far enough in providing military training to give to these men a special course, a preliminary course, say, of three months. That would remove their absolute illiteracy, and in those cases of physical deficiency we might bring them to such a standard that they could go on with their regular training with those who are entirely physically qualified to take it from beginning to end.

Senator WADSWORTH. You advance that proposal on the theory, I presume, that a great many of these physical defects are remediable within a short period if properly taken in hand?

Gen. PERSHING. I do; and I think that the records we have compiled will bear me out in the statement that a very large percentage of young men are found in many respects physically defective. It has been stated that this percentage would run as high as 60. However, I am not well informed as to the exact percentage, but it is large enough and serious enough to demand serious attention by Congress.

Senator WADSWORTH. Are there any questions on this topic?

Senator NEW. General, one question that was asked this morning by Senator McKellar concerning the work that was done by our untrained forces in France against the trained forces of Germany compels me to ask you just one question before dismissing that subject, and that is this: Would it have been possible for a military force raised on the spur of the moment, untrained and undisciplined, to have withstood the attack of a force of half of its size composed of troops so highly developed as, for instance, the Germans were in 1917?

Gen. PERSHING. Certainly not, sir. An untrained army invites loss and disaster.

Senator NEW. That is all.

Gen. PERSHING. May I add right here that the average training of our men was about 11 months, that is to say, from the time our divisions were organized until they entered the line, it was something like an average of 11 months. Therefore the large percentage of them had received excellent training. There were, of course, many who were put into the divisions after their organization to replace, as I said this morning, drafts that were made by the various bureaus here at home for special service, and many of those men did not receive the requisite amount of training that we should like to have. However, the general statement is true that the training of a large percentage of our men was about 11 months.

Senator NEW. I merely wish to refute the impression which the question left in the minds of some—that an untrained force, a force that is raised by appeal over night, is competent to resist the offensive of trained and disciplined troops. Training and development are necessary?

Gen. PERSHING. They are absolutely necessary, Senator, and we must not run away with the idea that you can fight well-trained armies with raw levies.

Senator NEW. That brave men are all sufficient.

Gen. PERSHING. Brave men are not all sufficient. They must be trained. Our men had to be given the most intensive training under the strictest discipline in order to prepare them for battle in the limited time available.

Senator WADSWORTH. General, as I recollect it, the next point in your preliminary statement was that of the Inspector General. Are there any questions that the members of the committee would like to ask on that point?

Mr. KAHN. General, we have had an Inspector General's Department ever since we have had an Army, have we not?

Gen. PERSHING. As far as I can recollect now, I think practically ever since we have had an Army. I have not had occasion to look it up, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. KAHN. I think when von Steuben came over here to help the Continentals he was appointed inspector general of the Continental Army, and we have had one ever since. Would, in your opinion, the inspections that are frequently required to be made, be made to the satisfaction of the Army if they were made by officers just detailed for the purpose of making that one inspection?

Gen. PERSHING. No, sir; they would not. The duty of an Inspector General requires a peculiar fitness, requires perhaps a legal turn of mind, certainly an investigating turn of mind; and these inspections follow a particular system that has grown up in the years that the Inspector General's Department has been in existence, so that an average man would not be equipped or qualified to bring out the salient points that his superior would wish brought before him; and if the Inspector General's Department as it exists to-day were abolished, we would have to establish in some other department a system along exactly the same lines and call for practically the same qualifications in its personnel.

Mr. GREENE. One of the large purposes served by the office of the Inspector General is a certain degree of standardization of the service, is it not, as to many details which might otherwise pass by custom

and practice into different forms through the different arms of the service?

Gen. PERSHING. That is quite so.

Senator WADSWORTH. The next, General, I think, was the Finance Department.

Gen. PERSHING. Might I add just one word there?

Senator WADSWORTH. Yes, indeed.

Gen. PERSHING. The Inspector General's Department, as used in France, carried with it a little more than just the inspection and report of deficiencies and defects. The inspector carried with him the authority of his immediate chief to correct irregularities that came within his notice, and in doing so he used the name of his chief, of his immediate commanding officer, and thereby acted in a sense as an instructor; and this power was of very great value to the commanding officer under whom he served. The inspector encountered, of course, a great many young officers who would be unfamiliar with many of the regulations and customs, and especially as to the care of men, which the Inspector General was able to invite their attention to, and correct, by pointing out the way. So in that way the Inspector General's service was of additional importance to me and to the other commanders.

Senator WADSWORTH. We are very glad to have that.

Now, about the finance department, General. There has been quite a discussion on that question. Some of the officers connected with the supply bureaus claim that the present system, which rests upon the Overman Act, so-called, for its authority, takes away from the supply bureau a certain valuable degree of responsibility in making disbursements in payment for the goods and articles which they are charged with procuring. As I understand it, the system to-day is that the head of the finance department is practically the disbursing officer for the entire War Department. He pays the troops; he pays the officers; he pays all bills. He does no procuring whatsoever. I understood your suggestion this morning to be that he should do the disbursing for the centralized supply department, which is to be charged with the procurement of goods, whose use is common to two or more branches of the service, but that the disbursing for the technical departments should still be done by those technical departments.

Gen. PERSHING. Yes; that is my idea.

Senator WADSWORTH. It brings up a very interesting discussion as to the proper business methods—that is, the business side of the War Department—and the contention has been made by some that sound business policy demands that those officials charged with the procurement be not charged with payment; that the two be separated, as is the case in most industrial organizations; and that the disbursements, even for the purchase of technical supplies, such as those for the Signal Corps, or for the Ordnance Department, or for the Medical Department, should not be left to those respective corps, but should, like all others, come under the Chief of Finance.

Gen. PERSHING. I understand, Senator, that the practice in the finance department to-day—I get this from Gen. March—tends toward leaving to the departments the purchase of their own technical supplies, and leaves the payment therefor in their hands, and that has not been fully established as a practice now, they intend

Senator NEW. That is all.

Gen. PERSHING. May I add right here that the average training of our men was about 11 months, that is to say, from the time our divisions were organized until they entered the line, it was something like an average of 11 months. Therefore the large percentage of them had received excellent training. There were, of course, many who were put into the divisions after their organization to replace, as I said this morning, drafts that were made by the various bureaus here at home for special service, and many of those men did not receive the requisite amount of training that we should like to have. However, the general statement is true that the training of a large percentage of our men was about 11 months.

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Mr. GREENE. One of the large purposes served by the office of the Inspector General is a certain degree of standardization of the service, is it not, as to many details which might otherwise pass by custom

to control War Department finances, so that it seems to me the finances of the department would be much more economically administered than if you controlled them by a special agency.

Mr. ANTHONY. You believe that the finance department should be attached to the purchasing bureau, whatever it may be, whether in the Quartermaster's Department or existing as a separate bureau of purchase? You believe that the finance department should be attached to the purchase department?

Gen. PERSHING. Yes.

Mr. ANTHONY. Whether the department is the old Quartermaster Bureau or whether it should be a new purchasing bureau, that you spoke of, in either event you believe that the financial feature of it should be attached to that bureau?

Gen. PERSHING. I should not say "in either event," because I should be opposed to having it in the Quartermaster Department.

Mr. ANTHONY. The chief argument made by Gen. Lord, as I remember, when before our committee, for the ratification of a separate finance, was that it gives opportunity for an additional audit of the accounts before they were paid, and I believe that it should be attached to the purchasing bureau, as you say, but I wanted to know if you think that it is necessary for an additional audit on Army accounts made by the paying officer?

Gen. PERSHING. Well, an additional audit of the War Department expenditures would not hurt anything, it seems to me, if you can do it at the same time you are controlling War Department finance in general.

Mr. KAHN. Of course, before we got into the war each department had its own purchasing agency, and each department paid the debts it incurred. For instance, the medical division would buy drugs, and they had their own money to pay for the drugs they bought. They contend that by reason of having had their own money, they could go to the seller of the goods and make a much better price for the Government, because they were able to assure him that they could pay cash immediately upon the delivery of the goods. So that every bureau of the War Department had its own money out of the appropriations that Congress made. Now, as I understand, your idea is that there should be one department that should handle all the funds for the War Department, with a modification to this extent, that various bureaus should be allowed to purchase certain supplies that they required for their bureau, and pay for those supplies themselves.

Gen. PERSHING. That were not also required by other bureaus?

Mr. KAHN. Yes, sir.

Gen. PERSHING. That is exactly what I have in mind.

Mr. GREENE. If you follow that, then I suppose that the other part of the argument is in favor of a separate finance division, in that it follows the analogy of civil life, of industrial and commercial institutions, that the contracting for goods and the taking over of goods is one function of business, and that the finance, the estimates for capacity to pay, or paying bills afterwards, is a distinct field, and that if all the purchases are paid for by the finance department, then the concern at any moment knows exactly how much money it has on hand, how much money has been allotted for this, that, or the other

to come to that. That is the tendency. And I can see no objection to it. In fact, it seems to me that good business would rather indicate it, because the purchase of technical classes of supplies requires a certain knowledge of those supplies. This especially applies where payments are made as certain percentages of a contract are completed, as in ordnance or in construction. In order to expedite such purchases, it seems to me that the department purchasing them ought to have the power to pay for them. But in order to avoid competition between the departments and to enable the different departments to allot their purchases in different parts of the country, instead of all running to one set of factories, for instance, and to have general supervision and direction of purchases, that we should have this general purchasing agent. I am connecting up these two things and placing everything pertaining to finance supervision under a general purchasing agency. Right at this point, if I may, it seems to me feasible to elaborate my ideas on the purchasing bureau.

Senator WADSWORTH. Very well.

Gen. PERSHING. When we went to France we found our various departments there competing with each other in the markets of France. Of course we had to buy a great many things there that our own Government was not prepared to supply, and I organized administratively what was known as the general purchasing agency, and placed a business man who had come into the Army for the war in charge of it. To that agency there were detailed experts of the various departments that had to make purchases in France. So that when a particular department desired to make a purchase of a certain article this was discussed by the purchasing board, and if any other departments required some of the same class of supplies then their purchases were lumped and one department made the purchase so that we avoided competition between the different departments. Now, in addition to that, this agency became an industrial agency. I mean by that it sought out the resources, the military resources that were available to us in France, Italy, England, and Spain, and we were enabled thereby, through the work of that organization, to purchase a large quantity of supplies which we were unable to get from the States.

It seems to me, therefore, that if we should organize here some such agency as that, call it what you please, it being a business agency, that the financial department should become a part of it and be under the control of its head.

Mr. QUIN. Would you make that part of the Quartermaster's Department?

Gen. PERSHING. No; I would not.

Mr. ANTHONY. General, before the war the finances used to be under the Financial Division of the Quartermaster's Department, as I understand it. You do not propose to separate it entirely and to carry it as a separate bureau, but to attach it to a new creation which you call the purchasing bureau?

Gen. PERSHING. Yes, Mr. Anthony, but there is a difference between what you have in mind as a finance bureau and what we have in mind. This finance department or division, whatever you please to call it, would be generally under the control of the Secretary of War or under such person as the Secretary of War might designate.

to control War Department finances, so that it seems to me the finances of the department would be much more economically administered than if you controlled them by a special agency.

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Gen. PERSHING. Yes.

Mr. ANTHONY. Whether the department is the old Quartermaster Bureau or whether it should be a new purchasing bureau, that you spoke of, in either event you believe that the financial feature of it should be attached to that bureau?

Gen. PERSHING. I should not say "in either event," because I should be opposed to having it in the Quartermaster Department.

Mr. ANTHONY. The chief argument made by Gen. Lord, as I remember, when before our committee, for the ratification of a separate finance, was that it gives opportunity for an additional audit of the accounts before they were paid, and I believe that it should be attached to the purchasing bureau, as you say, but I wanted to know if you think that it is necessary for an additional audit on Army accounts made by the paying officer?

Gen. PERSHING. Well, an additional audit of the War Department expenditures would not hurt anything, it seems to me, if you can do it at the same time you are controlling War Department finance in general.

Mr. KAHN. Of course, before we got into the war each department had its own purchasing agency, and each department paid the debts it incurred. For instance, the medical division would buy drugs, and they had their own money to pay for the drugs they bought. They contend that by reason of having had their own money, they could go to the seller of the goods and make a much better price for the Government, because they were able to assure him that they could pay cash immediately upon the delivery of the goods. So that every bureau of the War Department had its own money out of the appropriations that Congress made. Now, as I understand, your idea is that there should be one department that should handle all the funds for the War Department, with a modification to this extent, that various bureaus should be allowed to purchase certain supplies that they required for their bureau, and pay for those supplies themselves.

Gen. PERSHING. That were not also required by other bureaus?

Mr. KAHN. Yes, sir.

Gen. PERSHING. That is exactly what I have in mind.

Mr. GREENE. If you follow that, then I suppose that the other part of the argument is in favor of a separate finance division, in that it follows the analogy of civil life, of industrial and commercial institutions, that the contracting for goods and the taking over of goods is one function of business, and that the finance, the estimates for capacity to pay, or paying bills afterwards, is a distinct field, and that if all the purchases are paid for by the finance department, then the concern at any moment knows exactly how much money it has on hand, how much money has been allotted for this, that, or the other

departments to purchase with, and knows exactly what its outstanding liabilities may be, and can render a report to the board of directors at any time. Now, then, Congress standing in the place of the board of directors, has heretofore found a great deal of difficulty in knowing exactly what the War Department finances were, because they were scattered through these different bureaus, and never seemingly concentrated in one accounting place. Now, if you follow the plan that articles that are common to two or more bureaus shall be accounted for by one agency, and that all the rest may buy their special and technical material for themselves, then we lose by those fractions whatever would be gained by centralization of the accounting.

Gen. PERSHING. No, sir; I would have the finance division maintain control over those purchases to the extent of having brief abstract reports of purchases and payments made to the central control so that the Secretary of War or the Congress would at all times, or might at all times, be fully advised by the particular person who is at the head of the finance division.

Mr. GREENE. But he knows that the larger part of his jurisdiction, he knows what has been done because he did it himself.

Gen. PERSHING. Yes.

Mr. GREENE. These purchases made by the supply bureau, he would only know of by report.

Gen. PERSHING. By report.

Mr. GREENE. Now, there is a divided jurisdiction, a divided responsibility. He can account for what he did himself and have a report of what other people did. Is there any business reason why one bureau could not pay for it, although the other bureaus might make their own special purchases?

Gen. PERSHING. My idea is gained from our experience in France, and from a discussion of this subject with the heads of departments here, who say that they would be enabled to obtain better prices and be enabled to serve the Government better if the seller knew that he was to be paid cash immediately for material.

Mr. GREENE. But they are all dealing with the Government, whose credit is the best of anybody's in this hemisphere. It is the same paymaster, in any event. Any obligation on the part of those who make special purchases for their special bureaus would be in exact terms with those who buy for the general supply, and immediately upon the approval of the debt, the money would be paid. Would not that be just as good as having the cash in hand in each division?

Gen. PERSHING. It seems to me, and I do not see any very serious obstacle in the way of the finance department making the payment, as a matter of fact, but for expedition, it seems to me, possibly we might gain some advantage by allowing each department to make the payment. You would also be in a position to put pressure on each separate purchaser by placing the entire responsibility on him.

Mr. QUIN. I would like to ask a question. Do you think it is well to take from civil life an experienced, practical business man to put at the head of this finance or purchasing division and have it separate from the Quartermaster Department? I believe that myself, from this war, and I want to know what your judgment is.

Gen. PERSHING. May I ask you a question in return, in order that we may make it perfectly clear?

Mr. QUIN. Certainly.

Gen. PERSHING. Would you have this appointee a political appointee? And what would be the tenure of his office? What would be his position in the War Department?

Mr. QUIN. I would have him appointed by the President, of course, at the suggestion of the Chief of Staff. He should be made an officer, an Army officer, any man that we could get who would leave private life and take the position for patriotic reasons.

Gen. PERSHING. You would appoint him in the Army?

Mr. QUIN. Yes.

Gen. PERSHING. Give him rank?

Mr. QUIN. Yes.

Gen. PERSHING. That leads me to observe that there are a great many men in the Regular Army, and we found as we went along, a great many men in the reserve, who have eminently valuable qualifications, and it seems to me that rather than pick out a civilian and appoint him permanently, and appoint for him a civilian staff permanently of the Army, that it would be better to train up in the service a corps of officers along business lines, who would, when war was declared, have a certain business training through that bureau and who would be able to carry on the supply end of the War Department.

Mr. QUIN. General, I think your conclusions are correct, but it is so hard to find that kind of man in the service because he goes out of West Point right into the Army and is not trained in business activities and in competition and so forth.

Gen. PERSHING. We have trained up a great many men during the last two years, and have developed business qualifications in a large number of Army officers who have been able to take over purchasing bureaus and handle purchasing problems, and they have handled large business affairs with a great deal of efficiency.

Mr. KAHN. A large number of officers in the Army come into the Army not from West Point but from civil life?

Gen. PERSHING. Yes.

Mr. KAHN. So that you would be able to find that kind of material to fall back on, anyhow?

Gen. PERSHING. May I follow that out just a little bit further? This agency or bureau—it does not make any difference what you call it—would, in time of peace, through its organization, keep in touch with the industrial and producing centers and with the possibilities of the country as to manufacture and supply. They would know where to go to get food supplies or to buy a million pairs of shoes; they would know where to start manufacture of clothing, machinery, motor trucks, guns, munitions or whatever it is, and we would not be in the position in case of another war that we found ourselves at the beginning of this war.

Mr. DENT. What is the objection to the execution of your scheme for the procurement and payment through the Quartermaster Department? Why can not the Quartermaster Department handle that?

Gen. PERSHING. I think if you are going to make a separate finance department it should, as I said, be a part of this central

control over procurement. That seems to be a very logical business conclusion.

Mr. DENT. You could put that in the Quartermaster Department, give them a central control?

Gen. PERSHING. I do not think that would be expedient. The Quartermaster Department is inclined to be a little top-heavy anyway. I would take it out for that reason, entirely from the Quartermaster Department.

Mr. DENT. Then what would the Quartermaster Department do, under your scheme?

Gen. PERSHING. As to its finance?

Mr. DENT. As to its duties, any of its duties, if it is deprived of the power of procurement?

Gen. PERSHING. There are a great many functions left to the Quartermaster Department in the line of procurement of supplies and so on. It provides the commissary supplies for the Army, clothing and many things.

Senator WADSWORTH. General, under your definition, the very fact that it supplies the clothing for the Army, we find ourselves having a purchasing agency charged theoretically with purchasing the things which are in common use to two or more branches, deprived of the function of purchasing clothing. I think the suggestion has been that whether we use the Quartermaster Department as a foundation upon which to build or whether we erect a new purchasing agency, that that agency or department shall be charged with the purchasing, we will say, of all clothing and all food, because both those articles are used by the whole service. That would result, if we erected a new department and still kept the Quartermaster Department, in taking away from the quartermaster the purchasing of clothing.

Mr. DENT. That is what I had in mind, if that was carried to the legitimate end I do not see what function the Quartermaster Corps would exercise.

Gen. PERSHING. Well, the Quartermaster Department receives the clothing for the Army; it receives the food and distributes it.

Mr. DENT. It would simply be the storekeeper.

Gen. PERSHING. If you want to put it that way, but it would also, under this plan, continue to buy these and many other articles.

Mr. KAHN. It also inspects all the material it purchases.

Mr. ANTHONY. General, I want to call your attention to the fact that during the war the different activities of the Quartermaster Department were broken up and the duties given to various different bureaus in the War Department. We found that the cost of administration of those duties mounted up into tremendous figures. Figures have been shown us that indicated that the performance of those quartermaster duties by those new creations gave us an additional overhead of about \$20,000,000, if I remember correctly, just in the administration of those offices, and that the creation of these additional bureaus and the particular offices that represented them at the different posts made—for instance, at one interior post where formerly a quartermaster officer handled it there were five officers, a transport officer, a zone officer, quartermaster office, and two or three more to do those duties that used to devolve on one officer, and that the per capita cost of the administration in those posts increased from \$1.60 to \$20 per soldier.

So, along the lines of economy, can not we consolidate those activities in one bureau in the Quartermaster Department, whether we call it the Quartermaster General or purchasing officer, or whatever it may be? Would it not be practicable to combine them under one administrative officer?

Gen. PERSHING. Of course, it would be possible to do that, but my idea is that in the organization that we are discussing we must have in mind its use in time of war, and for that reason I would be in favor of taking from the Quartermaster Department some of its functions.

Mr. MILLER. General, the point you are on now we are all very much interested in. It came out in the hearings before our committee, the idea of organizing, taking the young men from the academy and schooling them in business pursuits to make suitable material for the purchasing of Army supplies. We were immediately confronted with the fact that just as soon as those young men are educated at the military academy and they have been thoroughly schooled in business pursuits, they are attracted by the large salaries of commercial interests, and thus induced to sever their relations with the Army, and we lose the services of those men. Have you anything to suggest as to how those men could be retained in the Army? Would you make additional regulations regarding those men, or would you leave them at liberty to resign and quit the Army as soon as they received a very flattering offer? That has been the experience, has it not?

Gen. PERSHING. Yes. Well, it seems to me that we should have the organization that has been suggested and train up our officers, as far as possible, for the duties required in that organization. If there were deficiencies at the outbreak of a war, we naturally would go to civil life and pick out the men trained for business that we could find, to put in these places.

Mr. MILLER. And those who had severed their connection with the Army would probably return in case of emergency?

Gen. PERSHING. We would probably get a great many back.

Mr. MORIN. Do you not think the remedy for that situation would be to pay the officers adequate salaries so that they could remain in the Army and maintain their families as they should?

Gen. PERSHING. You are referring to any special class of officers?

Mr. MORIN. I am referring to the question that Mr. Miller asked about the men leaving the Army and giving them better inducements.

Gen. PERSHING. I heard yesterday of a man in the Army who had developed great business ability, and had been offered \$20,000 a year to resign and go into private business. The Government could not enter into competition with that.

Mr. QUIN. But is it not a fact that most of the Army officers who are resigning are doing so on account of small pay?

Gen. PERSHING. I think that is a correct statement, and it seems to me that the very great increase in the cost of living, or in other words, the decrease in the purchasing power of the dollar, has caused Army officers a great deal of inconvenience. In fact, those who have families in many cases find it very difficult to make both ends meet, and I should be in favor of giving a flat increase of some sort to all officers in the Army, whether it be by increase in allowances or commutation of quarters, or provision for an extra ration or rations according to rank, or whatever system seems to be most expedient to

meet the temporary emergency. Some increase should also be given to the soldier with a family.

Mr. HULL. General, I think we are all agreed with what you say, that there are three things essential to prepare this country for defense—supplies, trained men, and trained officers. We succeeded in supplying the trained officers and the trained men on the other side. We did not succeed, did we, in supplying these men with material to fight with? We failed on that, did we not—that is, ourselves? We got it, but from other countries.

Gen. PERSHING. We had to purchase much equipment abroad.

Mr. HULL. Our supply system was a failure, to some extent at least?

Gen. PERSHING. Well, I am not ready to criticize the supply system as an entire failure.

Mr. HULL. But we had to borrow to defend ourselves. We had to go outside. Now, that leads me to a very interesting statement that you made. The education of men at West Point would furnish men who would take over this supply system, and at least supply the trained officers that seem essential to any prepared plan.

Gen. PERSHING. They would not necessarily come from West Point; they might come from any source from which we obtain officers.

Mr. HULL. The General Staff, however, before the war, never went into that proposition as they should. They never came to Congress and told us, did they, of the necessity of supplies?

Gen. PERSHING. I think if you refer to ordnance, that representations were made that we were unprepared from that standpoint, sir. I think the state of unpreparedness was called to the attention of Congress.

Mr. HULL. But they had no comprehensive plan, and, so far as I can understand, they never made a study of that supply system and how to make it function. If you had, I do not find it in these bills. We have bills telling how to get trained men and trained officers, but have not a comprehensive supply system submitted to Congress, have we?

Gen. PERSHING. We have bureaus which before the war were capable of procuring supplies, and the representations were undoubtedly made to Congress as to the necessity in the line of supplies, and a great many of those were furnished.

Mr. KAHN. General, section 120 of the national defense act provides for a census of the industrial plants of the country and the right to commandeer them for the Government in case the Government should become involved in the war. Congress passed that law upon the recommendation of the War Department, but that law only went into effect a few months before we got into this war, and so it did not have a full opportunity to be put into operation. But Congress did legislate and the War Department did recommend legislation.

General, to come back to the question of the finance department, you remember that in 1912 we had the Quartermaster Corps, we had the commissary department, we had the pay department—three different branches of the War Department that were doing some of the work of the Quartermaster Corps.

Gen. PERSHING. Yes.

Mr. KAHN. It was suggested that by a consolidation of these three branches of the War Department we would save money, millions of dollars a years in overhead charges. Now, as has been stated by Mr. Anthony and by Mr. Dent, by again dividing the functions of the Quartermaster Department, you again get a great many added officers, with increased expense. Do you think that that increased expense would be warranted by the added efficiency of the War Department to function in time of war?

Gen. PERSHING. I am inclined to think it would, sir, and as to the purchase of certain classes of supplies that are general in their nature, if one department could purchase them to better advantage than the central agency, it would be wise to leave within that department the purchasing power. We followed that principle in France, of course.

Mr. GREENE. But there, General, we were not preventing the emergency. Is it not a fact, however, that in the ordinary peace-time experience of civil institutions every effort is made to consolidate all the functions and agencies that draw upon the purse of the institution, in order that the utmost check may be kept upon the finances, and does it make much difference, after all, as to the names of the departments or bureaus in which this power may be located? What difference does it make, after all, if the purchasing agency is in the Quartermaster Corps or out of it, if neither one is swollen to an extent which is beyond the proper centralization, what matters it as far as effectiveness is concerned? And is it not better to tend to concentrate? Would it not be better, for instance, having war in mind, which all this legislation must be predicated upon, if you had the nucleus in the Quartermaster Corps of every one of these functions which must be expanded in time of war, have you not already formed when the war comes a corps of officers to use?

Gen. PERSHING. It would be a question, it seems to me, of giving those men the special training that they would require, giving them the special training in peace to enable them to perform their functions in war in an independent manner.

Mr. GREENE. If they have this one corps, and there were sufficient representatives of each one of those functions to administer the Army in time of peace, then the probability would be that they would be limited in numbers on account of peace-time economies, but the nucleus would be there which could be expanded in time of emergency?

Gen. PERSHING. Yes.

Mr. GREENE. No overhead would be built up?

Gen. PERSHING. I see very clearly your point, and I would not be in favor of expanding these independent branches, corps, or arms, so that you would have a large overhead. I have always opposed that, and would continue to oppose it as a matter of principle. I am only looking forward to the adoption of such an organization as will make us efficient in war. I am reviewing it from the combatant side. My experience in War Department affairs as such has been very limited. I am only viewing it from the side of the Army, from the point of view of the Army as to its efficiency of operation in the field.

Senator WADSWORTH. Closely related to this discussion, General, is the status of the Transportation Corps, which was the next topic

mentioned by you this morning. I believe you urged the combination of the Transportation Corps and the Motor Transport Corps, and all other kinds of transportation into one department.

Gen. PERSHING. Yes, sir.

Senator WADSWORTH. That would take from the Quartermaster Department, as at present, animal-drawn transportation, and put it in the general transportation corps?

Gen. PERSHING. Yes.

Senator WADSWORTH. The contention has been made, General, by some men who have studied this pretty carefully, that transportation is a central element of supply, and that the department charged with the procurement of supplies and the storage of supplies, if built upon a sound business foundation, must also be charged logically with the transportation of those supplies, particularly as storage and transportation must go hand in hand. Have you any comment to make upon that suggestion?

Gen. PERSHING. If you would carry that out to its logical conclusion you would have to have a transportation corps for each one of the supply departments; your ordnance, which carries to the front a larger tonnage than any other department; your engineers, which would be next, and the Quartermaster next.

Senator WADSWORTH. I did not make myself clear, General. I did not have such a suggestion in mind. I still had in mind this proposal of a centralized supply department or purchasing agency, and in connection with that suggestion, which has been made to us before, that we have such a centralized supply department, I wanted to know your opinion as to whether or not transportation was not an essential element in that supply?

Gen. PERSHING. I can see no serious objection to placing it as a part of that department in time of peace, but in war time it would have to be an independent organization.

Senator WADSWORTH. The next topic, as I remember it, that the General took up this morning, was that of granting commissions in a limited way to nurses in the Army Nursing Corps.

Mr. KAHN. This morning you said you would recommend the giving of the rank to the Army nurses. Was not the custom among the other countries that participated in the war to give nurses the relative rank and pay of some officer in the Army, but not to designate them as lieutenants or captains, etc.?

Gen. PERSHING. I think that is the practice in the British service.

Mr. KAHN. In the British service?

Gen. PERSHING. Yes.

Mr. KAHN. Did it work out satisfactorily?

Gen. PERSHING. As far as I know, it has been very satisfactory to the British.

Mr. KAHN. Do you think it would be better to create some special rank for the nurse corps rather than the ranks that prevail in the combat troops of the Army?

Gen. PERSHING. Well, I have thought about it a good deal, and it is rather a puzzling question, Mr. Chairman. Whatever would give the nurses a position by which they could enforce compliance with their instructions is what should be done. You find a good many men in the hospitals who are not inclined to obey the orders of a

nurse, fellows who are perhaps not any too well disciplined under any circumstances, and the nurses have had in many cases a rather hard time in getting along with some of those men. I am only interested in getting them a standing that will enable them to carry out their duties efficiently.

Mr. KAHN. In favor of giving them some rank, but you have no preference as to what it will be?

Gen. PERSHING. I must say, I have not.

Mr. GREENE. Is it not an axiom of the service that any man who is carrying an order of his superior in that duty to another person carries the order of the superior regardless of rank, and if the order is disobeyed he is disobeying the order of the superior?

Gen. PERSHING. There is a lot of conflict involved in that question.

Mr. GREENE. I understand there is. I am speaking only of the general principle. If you designate somebody in a hospital to do something irrespective of grade or rank, that order would have to be carried out, and anybody who sought to interfere would be disobeying the order?

Gen. PERSHING. That very frequently happens.

Mr. GREENE. Does it make any difference how many stages of rank intervene between you and the one to whom the order is directed, as to who it is brought by when it comes from the one source, the one who could give such an order?

Gen. PERSHING. In those cases where certain duties are allotted to juniors, they are in a better position to carry out those duties if they have the rank which would naturally give them control over the persons who are under control.

Mr. GREENE. The order gives them control, however?

Gen. PERSHING. I can not say it always does.

Mr. GREENE. Officially it does?

Gen. PERSHING. There is a great deal of difference between giving an order and having it carried out. If an officer is ordered to execute an order involving some one of superior rank, who questions the order, and there is no one on the spot to settle the difference, it involves some difficulty.

Mr. GREENE. Would the giving of military rank such as is embodied with the combat troops to people in hospitals tend eventually to win them away to more regard for their rank than for the duty they were assigned to? It has been found I believe in the service that while a dentist is a first lieutenant, he will stand back of the chair and draw a tooth, but as he begins to go up the grades he is more interested in assigning somebody else to that function than he is to performing it himself. Is not that same thing true in regard to veterinarians and other people who are not distinctly military men, but are engaged in civilian auxiliary functions attached to the Army? Is there not danger in permitting military rank and grade to be scattered too promiscuously through those services?

Gen. PERSHING. You refer to the dental rank?

Mr. GREENE. I only used that as an illustration. We all have to come to the dentist sooner or later, and the Army finds it out as soon as anybody else.

Gen. PERSHING. I know certain colonels in the Dental Corps who do not hesitate to draw teeth.

Mr. GREENE. Are those exceptions that prove the rule, General?

Gen. PERSHING. Well, this whole question is a very interesting one, but if you require certain things to be done by a military individual which compels him to exercise authority over others, he must have, or he is better off if he has the rank to do it. If he actually speaks for his superior and by his authority, rank does not matter so much.

Mr. GREENE. Then, if you apply that logically, the sentry on post No. 2 should have the same rank, and yet everybody knows it is death to anyone to disobey his orders.

Gen. PERSHING. That is the reason we give him a gun.

Mr. GREENE. But he is a private.

Gen. PERSHING. If we would give nurses guns we would not need to give them rank.

Mr. GREENE. I dare say. This question is interesting in this sense, that when we try to establish military grades of greater numbers than we have now, we are confronted with the popular misunderstanding of the subject which makes them fail to distinguish between men of different rank.

Gen. PERSHING. I quite appreciate your point in the matter, and the same criticism is very frequently made by the Army people themselves, but as I said with reference to this question of giving rank to nurses, the only point I would make is to place them in a position where they might not be embarrassed so much in the performance of their duties.

Senator WADSWORTH. As I understand it, General, they request a little sign of rank, an insignia, something to indicate the authority they have, to meet an emergency, which does not come up very often, but sometimes is very important.

Gen. PERSHING. Yes.

Senator WADSWORTH. The next topic touched on by the general is Air Service. General, may I ask in connection with the Air Service for your opinion on one of the features of this bill? On page 27, of the bill in section 31, will be found this language [reading]:

Hereafter all appointments of officer in grades below that of brigadier general shall be by commission in the Infantry, Cavalry, Field Artillery, Coast Artillery, Coast Artillery Corps, Corps of Engineers,

and then the Medical Department. The suggestion has been made with a great deal of emphasis that the Air Service should be added to that list. Otherwise, the commissioned personnel of the Air Service will be served solely and entirely by detail. A discussion of this, General, may be unprofitable in view of your suggestion for a single list, which, if adopted, and which I am sure you will enlarge upon, would do away with the character of detail system which we have to-day, and would also do away with permanent commissions in certain branches, such as Infantry, Cavalry, and Field Artillery. But assuming for the moment that the single list is not under discussion, would you say that the Air Service should be added to that list in section 31?

Gen. PERSHING. I am inclined to think it should be added; yes. I had not thought of that particular point before, Senator. I should like to give it a little further consideration. Perhaps before I am through here I might change that, but I think now it should.

Mr. KAHN. As I recollect, you stated this morning that you believed in one head for a united Air Service and placing the Army,

the Navy, and the civil departments of the Government that utilize airplanes under one head. Was that your idea?

Gen. PERSHING. Yes; that is about it, in so far as concerns procurement.

Mr. KAHN. You would create a new or separate branch of aeronautics?

Gen. PERSHING. My idea was that you would retain in the Army a certain personnel and a certain equipment for training flyers and for use in training troops. The same general comment might be made with reference to the Navy. Then, for the Department of Air, which I think ought to be undertaken under some department of our Government, I would have a branch, an organization, small at first, which would be the procurement bureau for all aviation and which would conduct scientific investigations and tests for Air Service in general, certain parts of which might be used in case of necessity in time of war. But it seems to me that the future of air offers such great possibilities that it is quite advisable for the experiment to be made. Just where you would put that is a question that I have not completely determined in my own mind, but I would unite these three branches under one head for appropriations and for procurement of material.

Senator NEW. Mr. Chairman, might I interpose an inquiry there?

First, is there a probability of our being able to conclude with Gen. Pershing to-day?

Senator WADSWORTH. I am inclined to think not.

Senator NEW. I asked that question for a reason, and that reason is this: Yesterday I introduced a bill in the Senate on the subject of the creation of a separate department of aeronautics—Department of Air it is called—which embodies a good many or a number of new suggestions made as the result of inquiries that have thus far been had in the hearings that we have had before the Senate Committee on Military Affairs. I gave Gen. Pershing a copy of that bill at noon. I am sure he has had no opportunity to examine it in the brief time he has had it, and I would like, before the subject is gone into with thoroughness and finality, that the general might have an opportunity to read and consider that bill.

Gen. PERSHING. I should like to have that opportunity, Senator.

Senator NEW. And therefore, if I may be permitted, I suggest that this subject be passed over temporarily until we have completed the other hearings with the general.

Mr. KAHN. Is that bill identical with the bill introduced by Mr. Curry a few days ago?

Senator NEW. No; it is not.

Mr. KAHN. Then I would like to hand the general a copy of the bill introduced by Mr. Curry in the House on the same subject, and ask him to kindly look it over with the view of trying to give us some suggestions in regard to the matter.

Senator WADSWORTH. Perhaps it would be well, then, to postpone the discussion of the department of aeronautics until the general has had a chance to read these bills. Are there any other questions in regard to the air-service policy which the members of the committee would like to ask?

Mr. KAHN. I would like to ask the general this: We have had so much discussion on the floor of the House as to how many American

planes had got over to the other side that I would like to know here from the general, if he cares to state, just what we did in regard to that.

Gen. PERSHING. I think we can give you the exact number. Gen. Conner will read from the statistics.

Gen. CONNER. The total airplanes received, observation type—

Mr. KAHN. American planes received in France?

Gen. CONNER. I give them both, American and European.

Gen. PERSHING. Just give the American first.

Gen. CONNER. The total number of American planes received by January 1, 1919, was 1,443 observation planes. The European planes were, 833 observation planes, 1,153 pursuit planes, 379 bombing planes, 2,816 training planes, or a total of 5,181 received from European sources, to and including the end of 1918.

Senator NEW. Can you tell us how many American planes had been received up to the 11th of November?

Gen. CONNER. I have not that here in detail.

Gen. PERSHING. We can get that for you.

Gen. CONNER. I can give you the service squadrons.

Gen. PERSHING. We will get that to-morrow morning.

Senator NEW. They were all substantially De Haviland 4's, were they not?

Gen. CONNER. Practically all observation planes.

Gen. PERSHING. Practically all of ours.

Senator NEW. If there are any exceptions, and it does not require too much research, I would like to have it.

Gen. PERSHING. Yes.

Mr. KAHN. They were practically all observation planes?

Gen. PERSHING. Yes.

Mr. ANTHONY. General, there has been considerable discussion as to the reason for our failure to furnish you with any of the single-seater combat type of planes. Is it a fact that none of that type reached you from this side during the war?

Gen. PERSHING. I think that is a fact, yes.

Mr. ANTHONY. The other day a committee of the House visited the Curtiss plant at Buffalo. We found there that a contract was entered into with the Curtiss people, I think, in 1917, midsummer, for several thousand Spad machines, which were of the type I have just described, and the type needed for combat purposes, but that the order for the machines was canceled shortly after construction had started. In hearings before our committee the responsibility for the discontinuance of the manufacture of that type of machine, which the Air Service now admits is exactly the type which was needed on the front, was placed upon the American Expeditionary Forces, and telegrams and cablegrams were shown us with your name signed to them, ordering the discontinuance of the manufacture of that type of machine. Now, I wanted to ask you the question: Is it true that the cause for the discontinuance of the manufacture was the result of those cablegrams?

Gen. PERSHING. May I have the opportunity of looking that up and answering to-morrow? I can not recall just the exact circumstances.

Mr. ANTHONY. I want to be fair. It was stated that a cablegram signed by your name, which probably you never saw—let me ask if cablegrams were sent signed by your name that you never saw?

Gen. PERSHING. Of course there were cablegrams necessarily sent that I never saw, but I think this is one that I did see. I have a recollection of the circumstances, but before answering you definitely, I would like to look it up.

Mr. ANTHONY. Whenever you get time.

Mr. JAMES. How many American fighting planes were there in France at the signing of the armistice?

Gen. PERSHING. None. We had the De Haviland 4s.

Mr. KAHN. And you had those bought from England and France?

Gen. PERSHING. Yes; but I understood the question to refer to American fighting planes.

Mr. MILLER. Then, General, if I understand, there were no American-made planes and no American-made artillery on the American front in France at the time of the signing of the armistice?

Gen. PERSHING. We had the observation planes to the number just read.

Mr. MILLER. I mean combat planes.

Gen. PERSHING. No combat planes. The only guns we had at the front that were of American make were some 8-inch Howitzers that were made after the British pattern and sent from America.

Mr. KEARNS. When did you first get these observation planes?

Gen. PERSHING. It must have been about August that they got to the battle line.

Mr. KEARNS. August, 1918?

Mr. KAHN. We were supplying from this country the spruce for the planes that you bought from the British and the French?

Gen. PERSHING. Yes; we were supplying, I think, most of that.

Mr. KAHN. So that they were getting considerable material from us for the manufacture of the planes that you were using?

Gen. PERSHING. Oh, yes.

Senator WADSWORTH. Any more questions?

Mr. KEARNS. I want to ask the general if he knows the reason why there were no more American planes in France than you had? You had a limited number of observation planes, I think you said. How many?

Gen. PERSHING. About 1,400.

Mr. KEARNS. That was on the 7th of August, 1917?

Gen. PERSHING. No; the 1st of January, 1919.

Mr. KEARNS. Do you know the reason why there were no other American-made planes over there?

Gen. PERSHING. I know very little of the construction program in America, nor the reasons why we had no further planes. The only reason that I can give is that there were no planes ready to ship.

Mr. KEARNS. Was it because of some uncertainty as to what kind of engine they would put in those planes?

Gen. PERSHING. I am not at all informed as to these details, except by hearsay.

Senator SUTHERLAND. Did you finally get some 75-millimeter American-made guns?

Gen. PERSHING. There were about 174 received. None of them reached the front. We got something like 170, but none of them

were ever used in battle; they never got to the front. The manufacture of those was begun, after war was declared.

Mr. KAHN. You do not know whether we ever did manufacture a pursuit plane in this country?

Gen. PERSHING. I do not.

Mr. KAHN. I believe we have never manufactured a pursuit plane.

Mr. MILLER. There was quite a sensational account in the public press of the burning of large quantities of airplanes over there, which became quite an interesting piece of news to the people here at home. Have you any comment or observation to make on that matter?

Gen. PERSHING. My information on that is that the material that was burned was of no commercial value whatever.

Mr. MILLER. Nor military value?

Gen. PERSHING. No; no military nor commercial value.

Senator CAPPER. To what extent, General, was there burning of those planes?

Gen. PERSHING. It consisted in the destruction of a lot of odds and ends, broken planes that were brought in, the parts of which had been salvaged and all that was of any use had been taken away. The scraps were thrown on the fire and destroyed, after action of an authority in the matter.

Senator WADSWORTH. The next topic covered by the general was the Tank Corps. Have you any further observations to make about that, General?

Gen. PERSHING. I do not think I have, sir.

Mr. KAHN. Did I understand you to say that you believe that corps should be under the infantry?

Gen. PERSHING. Yes, sir; I think so.

Mr. KAHN. Rather than a separate corps?

Gen. PERSHING. I think so; it seems to me wise that it should be. I think that it is an arm so closely allied with the infantry that its development would be encouraged by the infantry perhaps to a greater extent than it would be if left to itself, and I am in favor of placing it there.

Mr. GREENE. Its tactical use is that of a portable machine gun in a large measure, is it not?

Gen. PERSHING. Yes; except that we use large calibers also.

Mr. GREENE. But it is an accompanying arm to go along with the infantry, for tactical purposes?

Gen. PERSHING. Yes; it possesses something of the character of what we call an accompanying gun.

Senator SUTHERLAND. Do you think, General, that there are possibilities in the line of the further development of tanks as a means of warfare?

Gen. PERSHING. I think the possibilities are very great.

Senator SUTHERLAND. The experience that you had with them was satisfactory?

Gen. PERSHING. Very satisfactory, considering all of the circumstances under which we used tanks. Of course, our tanks came from the French and the British, and we had difficulty in getting them, and they were not in our hands for a long enough time before they were actually put into battle. Our tanks were, therefore, without the necessary training which would give complete cooperation be-

tween them and the infantry, so that the use of our tanks was not as effective as it might have been under more favorable circumstances. But I think that their development should be continued. I think there is a great future for tanks.

Senator WADSWORTH. Are there any other comments on the topics of chaplains and band leaders? If not, I think the next topic of importance which the general touched upon will be found in the language on page 2 of the bill, the language which gives the President the authority to rearrange the organization of the different branches of the service within the limits fixed by the bill, rather than relying upon the Congress to fix those organizations by statute.

Mr. KAHN. About line 6, General, you will find it.

Gen. PERSHING. Line 6, page 2, of the bill 8287?

Senator WADSWORTH. Senate 2715.

Mr. KAHN. It is the same thing, line 6, the end of line 6, and from there on.

Senator WADSWORTH. General, this is a very important part of this bill, and while I do not know how the other members of the committee feel about it, I think myself that it warrants some discussion. It is that provision of the bill which, as I said a moment ago, authorizes the President to regulate the tactical organization of the units within the different branches and within the limits fixed by the Congress. In other words, it will relieve the Congress of the duty of prescribing how many men shall constitute a regiment of Infantry, or a company of Infantry, or how many officers and men of the different grades shall constitute these different units, and leaves that matter entirely to the President, within maximum limits fixed by the Congress in this proposed bill.

Gen. PERSHING. Well, I am in favor of providing for great elasticity in the organization of the Army, and believe that wide discretion should be given the President in that regard. I can see no objection to fixing the number of officers in each grade, and leaving the determination as to where they shall serve to the President, within certain limits as to arms. I think we should only prescribe the approximate size of the different arms of the service and—I will not undertake to go into too many details, but I myself feel that we should be very liberal in granting authority to make these alterations.

Mr. KAHN. Do you mean by that, General, that you would be in favor of a provision in the bill saying that there shall be 6,000 captains, 12,000 first lieutenants, 12,000 second lieutenants, so many majors, so many lieutenant colonels, and so many colonels, and then give the Commander in Chief of the Army the power to designate what branches of the service they shall be assigned to?

Gen. PERSHING. I could see no objection to that at all.

Mr. KAHN. Well, was that your idea? I gathered it was from what you said.

Gen. PERSHING. My first idea was not quite as broad as that, but I can see no objection to that.

Mr. GREENE. Do you have in mind something like this, General, that if the Congress lays the structure of the Army and defines the limits of each part of that structure, that the President may then

move any part of the personnel of the Army anywhere within that limited structure that he wants to?

Gen. PERSHING. I think he ought to be given that power. It seems to me that it would be advantageous to give him that power.

Mr. GREENE. So that he could never disturb the structure that would be laid down and could put in no more men than we have defined, but he could move persons around through the various arms of the service, so long as the structure of the Army itself were never changed?

Gen. PERSHING. Yes; and so it would not be necessary to come here to you gentlemen and get authority to place one more corporal in each company, or to add a second lieutenant to a company of Infantry or whatever it is. Those details should be left in the hands of the Commander in Chief.

Mr. ANTHONY. But would you go so far, General, as to give the President the power to take a medical officer and put him in command of a regiment of the Army?

Gen. PERSHING. Well. I would not hesitate to give him discretionary power to do that, because I would not expect him to do it unless it would be the proper thing to do. I mean, I can see no danger in extending to him that authority, because I would expect him to use just as much discretion in that as he would in any other matter.

Mr. KEARNS. General, would this provision in the bill be advisable? It would give the Executive authority, if he so desired, to destroy any one arm of the service, would it not?

Gen. PERSHING. Well, I should not think, when the great framework of the Army was prescribed by Congress, that it would be possible for him to do that.

Mr. KEARNS. It says he can form any kind of military organization.

Senator WADSWORTH. Within these several branches.

Mr. KEARNS. He could make one very weak and another very strong at the expense of the weak one, if he so desired.

Senator WADSWORTH. The branches are fixed in numbers.

Mr. KAHN. General, as a matter of fact, when we got into this war our units were fixed by the national defense act, and then the Congress immediately had to pass additional legislation to untie those units. We passed the Overman Act, and in the conscription act we provided that special and technical troops might be officered and the number of men fixed by the Executive. Your companies were expanded during the war materially; your regiments were largely increased on account of the provisions of the Overman Act. As I understand you now, you would favor the extension of that law to a peace-time condition.

Gen. PERSHING. Yes; that is my view.

Senator WADSWORTH. As a matter of fact, General, scarcely any officer or group of officers in the Army feels entirely certain what the conditions of 10 years from now will demand in the way of the tactical organization of troops, do they?

Gen. PERSHING. Certainly not, Senator.

Senator WADSWORTH. We will take the Tank Corps, for example. We have only had experience with the Tank Corps for one year, practically, or perhaps 18 months. They have gone pretty far to

reach right down and to legislate just what the Tank Corps can consist of at this time.

Gen. PERSHING. They have.

Senator WADSWORTH. That is rigidly?

Gen. PERSHING. It certainly is, Senator. Within a brief period you might want to expand the Tank Corps several times, or you might find, on the contrary that you would want to abolish the Tank Corps. I mean those are things that we can not foresee, the tactical necessities that result from changes in armament.

Senator WARREN. General, you speak of the President taking charge. Of course, the President is the Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy, but practically, as a matter of fact, you would expect the commanders in the field to recommend to the President such changes as may be called for by the different developments of the Army of the class that you have to meet, and, as a matter of fact, you would expect the President to act nominally on what will go to him from the Army in the field, I suppose?

Gen. PERSHING. Yes; all of those changes would be the result of experience and study on the part of the officers interested, and their reports would go forward with the necessary recommendations which would have to receive the approval of the President to be carried into effect.

Senator WARREN. Is it not a fact that the American Expeditionary Forces were pretty much permitted to make their recommendations, which were very generally approved, as to the contest in France?

Gen. PERSHING. As I remember now, all recommendations as to the organization of new units or the changes in the smaller units of an organization were approved. I do not think of any that were disapproved by the Secretary under the provisions of the Overman Act.

Mr. GREENE. Do you contemplate, then, such changes as might be illustrated by this recollection of an experience of the Army before the war? Several years before the war the service began to try out experimentally the idea of the supply company and headquarters company by making temporary details to headquarters to perform the functions which theretofore had been performed by separate details of troops which were changeable, and I think after that plan had been tried out within the limits of the regiment, so that there had been no disturbance of personnel or authority in any way within the service, then the Army had to come to Congress and get its sanction for the permanent installation of headquarters companies and supply companies, and under your plan, pursuing exactly the same policy, after some experimentation, any service within an arm already fixed by law that was found to be permanent, should be adopted and put into effect without authority from Congress?

Gen. PERSHING. Yes; I think so.

Mr. GREENE. And the limits defined by Congress as to personnel, strength, and so on, would remain fixed.

Gen. PERSHING. Yes; I think it would be perfectly safe to do that.

Senator WADSWORTH. Congress would still be in possession of the purse strings?

Gen. PERSHING. Exactly.

Senator WADSWORTH. The maximum strength of the Army being fixed, and the pay in all the grades being fixed by law, Congress would have charge of the appropriations just the same.

Gen. PERSHING. Assuredly.

Mr. KAHN. In section 3 of the national-defense act there is this language. Section 3, I might say, provides for the composition of brigades, divisions, etc., and then at the end of the section there is this sentence.

Nothing herein contained, however, shall prevent the President from increasing or decreasing the number of organizations prescribed for the particular brigades, divisions, and army corps, or from prescribing new and different organizations and personnel as the efficiency of the service may require.

Your plan practically contemplates just such a provision as that?

Gen. PERSHING. It seems to cover it exactly, so far as it goes.

Mr. KAHN. That is already the existing law.

Mr. GREENE. Of course, General, following the question of Mr. Kahn and your response, my illustration of the supply company and the headquarters company would not be applicable to such a situation, because at that time, under the organization plan, it meant the increase of two companies within a unit already prescribed by law.

Gen. PERSHING. Yes.

Mr. GREENE. Therefore, the situation only emphasizes the necessity not for limiting the strength of that one tactical unit, but if you have put a maximum on the arm itself in which this unit may be, then you cover all the points of economy, purse strings, and so on, and allow this to be a matter simply of interior administration.

Gen. PERSHING. Which is the way I think it should be left.

Mr. SANFORD. I wanted to illustrate to you, General, the difficulty of the language of this law. Mr. Kahn has just read to you a provision of the national-defense act. In that connection, I think one of the most important provisions of this particular bill before you is that it repeals all acts inconsistent herewith. No one would be able to say, for instance, whether the paragraph that Mr. Kahn just read to you is repealed or not. Probably it is repealed by this text. As another illustration, for the purpose of asking you a question, this bill seems to repeal the law that makes the chiefs for the different bureaus. You have been speaking here to-day of the Chief of Coast Artillery. That office is repealed by this bill?

Gen. PERSHING. Yes.

Mr. SANFORD. And there is to be only one chief, and he is to be the Chief of Staff, and he is to define the duties of the chiefs of the different departments, as the Chief of Coast Artillery, for instance, duties which are now defined by law. Do you think the duties of the different chiefs should be defined by law, or should they be defined by the Chief of Staff?

Gen. PERSHING. I think they might very well be defined by regulation.

Mr. SANFORD. You see the last paragraph of section 3 here provides that the Chief of Coast Artillery shall be recommissioned, further illustrating the purpose of this bill.

Senator WADSWORTH. If I may interrupt there, General, in further explanation of what the gentleman from New York said, there is a very profound change brought about by that second paragraph in section 2, which will be found upon page 3. It has this effect: By recommissioning all the general officers of the Army, including all the general officers now in the Staff Corps, in the line of the Army, it abolishes even the Chief of Ordnance, the Surgeon General, the

Chief Signal Officer, the Chief of Engineers, and the Quartermaster General, and with the abolition of the office itself there thus departs the power of the Senate to confirm the nominee to the position of Chief of Ordnance, Chief Signal Officer, and Quartermaster General. Of course, I understood you to say this morning that for reasons sufficient to yourself you did not agree with that paragraph in any event.

Gen. PERSHING. My statement was that these various bureau chiefs should be selected from among the officers of their respective bureaus, but that provision should be made by which an officer could be relieved at the discretion of the President.

Senator WADSWORTH. I do not know whether you would care to discuss that matter of public policy in connection with the confirmation of appointees or nominees as heads of those supply corps or staff corps.

Gen. PERSHING. It is just a little bit puzzling. I have not given it quite enough study to be able to express a positive opinion about it, Senator.

Senator WADSWORTH. But you do object, as I understand, to the possible detail to the head of the Corps of Engineers of an officer who has never had any experience as an engineer?

Gen. PERSHING. Yes; I think it may be as well to prescribe it.

Senator WADSWORTH. That is your objection to that paragraph in that it makes such a thing possible?

Gen. PERSHING. Yes.

Senator WADSWORTH. How would you view the suggestion that the offices be maintained as they are to-day in the statute, and the incumbents be nominated by the President and confirmed by the Senate for a term of four years, but in the event of something arising which would make their removal or transfer advantageous, permit the President to transfer them and nominate some one to succeed them?

Gen. PERSHING. Transfer them with the rank they might have?

Senator WADSWORTH. No; it is a temporary rank.

Gen. PERSHING. You mean let them return to their original rank?

Senator WADSWORTH. Yes; let them return to their original rank, if their services were not satisfactory.

Gen. PERSHING. It seems to me that might be met by a provision in this law which would permit the appointment of his successor upon the recommendation of the President and confirmation by the Senate.

Senator WADSWORTH. Yes; that is it.

Gen. PERSHING. Yes.

Senator WADSWORTH. In that event the tenure would be during good behavior, but not to exceed four years.

Gen. PERSHING. Yes, or whatever the wording is you want to use. I understand that "at the pleasure of the President" has been interpreted to mean permanent tenure of the position, so you would have to change the wording from that.

Senator WADSWORTH. My expression was not at all accurate, but was simply to convey the impression that the President would have power to relieve that officer and appoint his successor.

Gen. PERSHING. Yes, sir.

Senator WADSWORTH. You may proceed now to the General Staff provision, General. There has been a good deal of discussion and some friction, General, as you have probably heard, in connection with the performance of the functions of the General Staff, as contrasted with the performance of the functions of the service bureaus or supply bureaus. I, for one, would be very glad if you would express your opinion as to the proper functions of the General Staff. It comes right under this provision of the bill which prescribed the powers and duties of the Chief of Staff and the General Staff Corps.

Gen. PERSHING. The commanding general of an army, either in time of peace or in time of war, can not himself handle all the various supply bureaus, or issue orders to the various units in combat, or prepare plans for combat, nor carry out all of the details that are necessary in the conduct of war, so that it has become necessary for him to be assisted by officers in his confidence, who are duly qualified for their positions, and qualified to make decisions in his name, to whom he delegates certain authority connected with the conduct of war or the preparation for war in time of peace.

There has thus grown up the General Staff system. The General Staff is not an operative body. I mean to say that it would not undertake to furnish shoes to the troops, it would not undertake to have any of its officers take charge of a motor truck train, nor enter into the details of the duties that are set apart for the various bureaus and supply departments, but it would, and is expected to, prepare plans of campaign, to secure information, to handle plans for the training of troops, and finally, to coordinate the activities of the Staff Corps, the combat units, and the bureaus, if you want to put it in those words. I mean the supply bureaus or administrative bureaus as distinguished from the General Staff.

The General Staff is expected to coordinate their functions, and see that there is no conflict between them. For instance, in France, such a question as this often arose: We were preparing for a campaign, and the question of the location of hospitals and ordnance dumps and repair shops in the rear of the battle front was being considered. Two or three different departments might want to occupy the same place. That was decided by the coordinating section of the General Staff which would assign a place to each one.

Senator WARREN. General, you are speaking of the staff in the field?

Gen. PERSHING. Yes; I am just using that as an illustration of coordination.

Senator WARREN. You are not speaking of the staff at home?

Gen. PERSHING. The same principle is involved. I do not think that the interior administration of supply departments, or the interior operation of supply departments is any function of the General Staff.

Mr. KAHN. You organized a general staff in France with the Expeditionary Forces, and they were known as G-1, G-2, G-3, G-4, and G-5?

Gen. PERSHING. Yes.

Mr. KAHN. Will you kindly state for the information of the committee just how that organization was made and how it functioned?

Gen. PERSHING. Of course, it was built from nothing in France. Officers were selected from wherever they could be spared. I obtained

some officers from home for use on the General Staff. I happen to have a memorandum here that I have been using for my final report showing the duties of the various sections. The administrative section handled ocean tonnage, priority of overseas shipments, replacements, organization and equipment of troops, billeting, prisoners of war, military police, leaves of absence and leave areas, welfare work, and amusements.

Mr. KAHN. How many officers were there in G-1, staff officers?

Gen. PERSHING. It varied from time to time and grew to about 40.

The intelligence section, which was known as G-2, was charged with obtaining information regarding the enemy, including espionage and counter espionage, the production of maps, and the control of censorship.

The third section, known as G-3, or operations, made strategic plans for the employment of combat troops and gave formal directions for operations.

G-4 called the coordination section, was charged with the coordination of supply services, including construction, which was illustrated by the particular incident I just pointed out, transportation of medical department, and the control of regulating stations for supply.

G-5 was known as the training section and had charge of the tactical training, the conduct of schools, preparation of tactical manuals, and the direction of athletics.

This system was applied in its entirety at general headquarters. As you passed down to the lower units, only such parts of the system were made applicable as were necessary. The fourth section was merged with the first when you got down as far as a division, and the fifth was merged with the third, leaving only three sections.

Mr. KAHN. So that in the smaller organizations you had practically the same organization, only modified.

Gen. PERSHING. Yes; practically the same organization, only with a smaller number of personnel, by combining the different functions of perhaps two under one head.

Mr. KAHN. Can you tell us how large a General Staff you had at about the time of the armistice, when you had the greatest number of men in France, practically 2,000,000 men?

Gen. PERSHING. You mean at general headquarters, Mr. Chairman?

Mr. KAHN. Yes.

Gen. PERSHING. Or would you include the number of General Staff officers in the Army as a whole?

Mr. KAHN. No; I mean just at general headquarters.

Gen. PERSHING. On November 9, 1918, there were on duty at general headquarters 258 General Staff officers.

Mr. KAHN. So that if the committee should decide to give you an Army of approximately the number of men you recommended this morning the General Staff could be cut proportionately in fixing the limits of the General Staff in the legislation?

Gen. PERSHING. Perhaps you could not follow the proportion exactly.

Mr. CRAIG. Right along that line, we have always understood that one of the great problems facing you after you got to France and formed a field army was the organization of a staff that would operate with that army. Now, what I would like to know, if it is

possible, is this: If we reduce the number of officers and men to, say, approximately 280,000, with the proper number of surplus or detached officers, will we be following a plan or will we be proceeding along such a line as will make them an unknown factor to us in the future? In other words, are we proceeding along the line of a military organization which will enable the department to have a staff which will function with the field army without having to build it up from nothing, as you did in France?

Gen. PERSHING. That is a very important subject. In order to provide General Staff officers for such an emergency, I think we should develop the school system that we established in the American Expeditionary Forces. We found it necessary there to have a General Staff school. I think that we ought to have provision made for a large increase in the number of General Staff officers and for their education, and I would go further and provide that no officer could be detailed on the General Staff until he had taken that course and passed it successfully. I would also make it necessary for every officer detailed from the line to the administrative or supply services also to take the course at the General Staff school, in order that thereafter all of those men as they came along into the service for detail would understand from both sides—from the bureau on one side and the General Staff on the other—the exact working of this machine. They would also understand the theory, and not only the theory, but the practical operation of the staff departments and the General Staff before they were detailed for staff duty.

Senator WADSWORTH. You said this morning, General, that perhaps some of the criticisms of the General Staff was due to the fact that we had so few officers of General Staff experience that they misconstrued their own functions and perhaps made mistakes unintentionally in their zeal and vigor, and I understand you now to suggest that we write into the statute a provision to the effect that no officer shall be assigned to the General Staff until he has gained a place upon an eligible list, as the result of his education in the Army.

Gen. PERSHING. I strongly recommend it, sir.

Senator WADSWORTH. General, could I offer one amendment to take care of the situation to-day, and which will exist for a few years to come, of adding to that eligible list all those officers, while not having gone through our schools heretofore, have nevertheless displayed their ability in this war in General Staff work by actual service?

Gen. PERSHING. I should have made that exception myself, because there is no school that a staff officer could attend that would better fit him for staff duties than to serve in time of war in an important position on the General Staff.

Senator WADSWORTH. That brings us to this situation. This bill, as I remember it, provides for a General Staff to consist of 231 officers, deemed sufficient for an Army of 509,000 men. Assuming that we reduce the size of the Army, we will say, to 300,000, that probably will result, or undoubtedly will result, in the reduction in the number of officers on the General Staff, although not in the same proportion?

Gen. PERSHING. No; not in the same proportion.

Senator WADSWORTH. However, it will make a reduction. Is it not entirely probable that at the inception of this new idea of eligibility for the General Staff, we will find ourselves in possession

already in the Army of at least 350 officers who have either been through the staff school or have served in this war in General Staff work in such a way as to make them eligible for future service?

Gen. PERSHING. I think you would find at least that many who served on the General Staff abroad. We have just shown that we had 258 at general headquarters at one time.

Senator WADSWORTH. Then there would be no doubt of our having enough officers to start with.

Gen. PERSHING. I think not. There is one point there as to the reduction of the staff officers. It would hardly be possible to reduce them, as I stated, in proportion to the reduction of the strength of the Army that will probably be made from that proposed in this bill, especially if you retain the training cadres for contingents that come in annually for universal training.

Mr. KAHN. Some criticism was made during the progress of the war about the officers trained at the Leavenworth school. It was brought out several times on the floor of the House. You found that those men who had had that training were very efficient staff officers, did you not, General?

Gen. PERSHING. I wish, sir, that every officer who had tactical command might have had that training. That leads me to suggest that the excellent tactical training that is given at the school at Leavenworth, the school of the line, should be very much extended. It would add to the efficiency of our Army very materially if all officers could have the benefit of that instruction. It is a pity that they can not have it.

The only thing that I can propose as a substitute for that is that I hope that we shall be able to establish central schools where graduates of Fort Leavenworth may carry out a course of instruction, paralleling the course that they have completed themselves, in tactical training and in the handling of troops. It is most excellent.

Mr. KAHN. I take it, then, that you strongly favor the service schools in the Army?

Gen. PERSHING. We have not enough of them, sir. I would increase the Fort Leavenworth school to the very limit of our ability to purchase land for a large plant there.

Mr. KAHN. Would you have the graduates at West Point take a year's course at one of the service schools?

Gen. PERSHING. Well, whatever the period of instruction might happen to be. It need not be a year, but I would certainly have the graduates of West Point take this course along with other men.

Mr. KAHN. Before they go in command of troops?

Gen. PERSHING. Not necessarily, because the exercise of the command of troops would be beneficial, and they would find out their own deficiencies perhaps a little bit better than if they would go right from West Point to one of these schools. I would let them serve with troops a while, and then send them to one of the schools. It would be much more beneficial than to send them direct from West Point. Provision should be made, however, to send newly commissioned officers to one or the other of the basic schools.

Mr. GREENE. If I may suggest, I think General Order No. 112, as I remember, passed sometime in September, provided for the very system that you have in mind, and, as the questions have suggested,

that the graduates of West Point shall have a year at some basic school, on the same general theory.

I would like to ask the General to continue his discussion of the functions and authority of the General Staff. Reduced to popular terms, as I understand it, the General Staff acts as a counsellor and advisor of the Secretary of War. In other words, it does not itself have direct administrative authority of its own initiative, but it must counsel what he, as the head of the Army, puts into effect through his own order.

Gen. PERSHING. Yes; and with authority really to carry into execution, or to give directions for execution; in other words, to issue orders in his name.

Mr. GREENE. Yes; but it has got to come through him.

Gen. PERSHING. Yes; the policy must.

Mr. GREENE. In other words the family tree must be so articulated that these people are not in the direct line of authority.

Gen. PERSHING. No staff officer commands anything. Orders are all issued in the name of his chief, and any other attitude is an assumption of authority which does not really exist.

Mr. GREENE. What we have in mind is writing some law, I fancy, that will get that idea quite clearly fixed in the minds of other people, too. Suppose that we consider now the representatives on the General Staff who are attached with troops. I understand they sprinkle down through the various tactical units of the Army, attached to troops.

Gen. PERSHING. Members of the General Staff, you mean?

Mr. GREENE. Members of the General Staff.

Gen. PERSHING. Yes.

Mr. GREENE. In relation to the units to which they are assigned, do they in that capacity have any commanding authority?

Gen. PERSHING. None at all. They perform exactly the same function as they do at headquarters.

Mr. GREENE. They are advisors to the commanding officer in the unit?

Gen. PERSHING. Exactly.

Mr. GREENE. And carry out in that sense the coordination of the policy adopted by the General Staff and promulgated by the Secretary of War?

Gen. PERSHING. Exactly. The operations officer, for a division commander, occupies exactly the same position that an operations officer of my headquarters occupies, and so on with all the other sections.

Mr. GREENE. So that at no time is the military command out of the hands of the lineal line of the commanding officers, superior and subordinate, all the way along down?

Gen. PERSHING. It never should be.

Mr. KAHN. The general staffs of the French Army and the English Army were formed along the lines of the general staff that you created in France?

Gen. PERSHING. Along the same general lines. There was just a little difference between us. Ours followed more nearly the French. There was a considerable difference between ours and the British, except as far as the conduct of combat operations was concerned. There the staffs ran parallel.

Mr. HULL. General, you do not, as I understand it, then, approve of the General Staff's idea of going into the details of the management of the supply divisions, as they are doing at the present time?

Gen. PERSHING. I certainly do not; no, sir.

Senator WARREN. General, I happened to be in Congress at the time the system of the General Staff of the Army was adopted, which was a matter of debate somewhat longer than the league of nations has taken, and at that time, I think the legislation, as we look back to it, will justify what I am going to say. The General Staff was to study the wants of the Army as one of its duties, but largely it was to study the world at large, that is, the harbors, the streams, the forts, the strength of the various armies, and general information. They were to coordinate, as you say, and I remember an illustration that was used of a man in merchandising. We will say, a retailer sends to a big wholesale house his order, which is divided up and sent out to various salesmen, and these salesmen fill their part, and then it comes through the general salesman who deals it out and protects his customer. I understand this coordination was such as hardly to interfere with the bureaus, but if an order came from the field, from an officer somewhere, the Secretary of War turned to the Chief of Staff and expected him to divide up and send to the different departments the requirements and to see that they were accumulated, and to see that the order was carried out. In other words, he is an assistant to the Secretary of War, with no authority whatever except what the Secretary of War gives to him, and issues orders by the Secretary of War, So and So, Chief of Staff.

Gen. PERSHING. Yes; that is the principle.

Senator WARREN. At that time we were not as clear as to the separation of the War College. We now have the War College for these private studies, and so it leaves the staff outside of that, it seems to me, to carry on in a general way the accumulation of information which they are ready to hand to the Secretary of War, and to accept the different policies that are selected by him, and that they are in a way a school for the officers who are detailed there for that service for a short time, and go back to the line. That was the original plan. Now, if anything should be made different from that, I should be glad to hear it.

Gen. PERSHING. That, in general, is the plan. Of course, in the conduct of the operations here at home, there were very large problems that confronted the General Staff and the supply bureaus. Each bureau was called upon to provide enormous quantities of its particular kind of supplies. They naturally went out into the country and sought out sources for the purchase of these supplies. I remember a part of the evidence furnished here the other day by an Ordnance officer where he stated he went out and bought all the leather in the country. Well, there naturally was a tendency and desire on the part of each department to be found not wanting in having on hand the supplies necessary for the large Army that we expected to have in France, but that led to a great deal of confusion. I attribute that to a lack of coordination by a properly constituted General Staff. It emphasizes the necessity of such a staff. It also emphasizes the necessity of having some agency, as I mentioned a while ago in my testimony, which would give direction to the purchasers of the various supply departments and allocate to them the

resources scattered around about through the various parts of the country. I do not know whether I have answered your question, Senator, or not.

Senator WADSWORTH. There is one phase of this that I would like to ask you a question on, to straighten out something in my own mind, and perhaps in the minds of some others. In Washington we have, as I understand it, a General Staff which can properly be divided into two parts, one of the directing and coordinating part of the General Staff, that is the War Department General Staff, divided into divisions under the direction of the Chief of Staff, such as the Division of Operations headed at present by Gen. Jervcy, the Division of Purchase, Storage and Traffic, and the Military Intelligence Division, and then, as contrasted with those, and perhaps in a different category, comes the War Plans Division, whose functions, as I understand, are to prepare plans for the national defense and for the mobilization of the military forces in time of war and to investigate and report upon questions affecting the efficiency of the Army. They do no directing or coordinating. As I understand it, they are in a sense a debating society. They think out problems and the solution of problems in advance. Now, is it your idea that the portion of the General Staff known here for the time being as the War Plans Division should exercise a certain degree of independence in reaching its conclusions, and that the Congress, we will say, and therefore the public, may have ready access to their plans and studies and suggestions, which may result in legislation affecting the proper military policy of the United States? They perform a function other than and quite different from the directing and coordinating.

Gen. PERSHING. Yes.

Senator WADSWORTH. They are a gathering of students?

Gen. PERSHING. Yes, indeed, they are.

Senator WADSWORTH. Who, as I look upon it, should not be controlled and ordered to reach conclusions, but should be permitted to study things out and reach conclusions for themselves and then submit those conclusions to the Secretary of War.

Gen. PERSHING. That is undoubtedly their purpose, Senator.

Senator WADSWORTH. And if thought proper, to the Congress, if they might need to approve?

Gen. PERSHING. Yes.

Senator WADSWORTH. And there was some misunderstanding here as to whether or not the War Plans Division of the General Staff, this debating society, this student branch, is accorded under our present system that degree of independence of thought which it is wise to accord to a group of men who are charged with such a very solemn function?

Gen. PERSHING. I have not gone into the study of the operations of the present War Department Staff. Senator. I think it would be necessary, in order to answer intelligently the questions involving its operation, for me to go over there and make a special study of it, which I have not had occasion to do, but all I know of it and all I have seen in reference to it is the diagram showing their various duties. Well, words do not always convey to different minds the same impression.

Senator WADSWORTH. Indeed they do not. Many of us have this idea in mind. To the average civilian the General Staff is a mysterious and remote piece of machinery which we do not understand. We are trying to understand it on these committees, and if some procedure may be brought about, either by statute or regulation, by which the General Staff, and particularly this planning division, will be brought in close contact with Congress and the people, we will popularize our military policy.

Gen. PERSHING. I can see a very great advantage that would arise from the submission of a great many of the conclusions of the War Plans Division to these respective committees.

Mr. KAHN. You do not think it is necessary to lock up all their studies in some closet so that Members of Congress might not see them?

Gen. PERSHING. I should think that in order to bring about the proper sort of coordination—I understand you object to the word “coordination”?

Senator WADSWORTH. That is a personal objection, team work?

Gen. PERSHING. To secure the sort of team work that should exist between the War Department itself and these two committees, there ought to be an exchange of confidences with reference to all subjects pertaining to the Military Establishment.

Mr. KAHN. I quite agree with you, General, that it would be well if the War Department would take the Committees on Military Affairs into their confidence.

Gen. PERSHING. I am quite sure of it, sir.

Senator WADSWORTH. Are there any further questions on the subject of the General Staff? If not, the committees will consider an hour for their next meeting.

(Whereupon the committees adjourned until to-morrow, Saturday, November 1, 1919, at 11 o'clock a. m.)

COMMITTEES ON MILITARY AFFAIRS,
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES AND
UNITED STATES SENATE,
Saturday, November 1, 1919.

The committee met at 11 o'clock a. m., in the room of the Committee on Appropriations of the United States Senate, Capitol, Hon. James W. Wadsworth, jr., presiding.

Present: Senators Wadsworth, Warren, Sutherland, New, Johnson, Chamberlain, and Fletcher; and Representatives Kahn, Anthony, Greene, Hull, Sanford, James, Kearns, Miller, Dent, Quin, Olney, and Harrison.

STATEMENT OF GEN. JOHN J. PERSHING—Resumed.

Senator WADSWORTH. The committee will be in order.

General, when we adjourned yesterday evening, we had concluded for the time being a discussion of the General Staff and its functions. I understand, sir, that there are one, two, or three matters that you would like to take up this morning, in order to clear up certain

phrases of your discussion of the supply and purchase system, and also of the General Staff and perhaps one or two other matters.

Gen. PERSHING. Yes.

Senator WADSWORTH. We will be very glad if you will do that now.

Gen. PERSHING. The question arose yesterday regarding the operation of the purchasing and finance departments, for want of a better name, and Mr. Anthony will recall that the statement was made that this central agency would purchase articles common to two or three of the supply departments. I should have stated that this central agency would make purchases of articles which heretofore had been purchased in quantity by two or more of the departments. We confused the words "use" and "purchase."

I would not interfere with the purchase of articles now or generally purchased by the Quartermaster Department and supplied to the Army, any more than I would interfere with the purchase of ordnance material that is usually issued to the Army for its use. The only thing is this, and the point I wish to bring out now is, that this purchasing and finance department would, if it seemed expedient, purchase those articles that had been purchased in common, or combine the purchase in some such way as to avoid competition and produce coordination in the purchase. That is the point. There was some confusion yesterday and I desired to clear that up.

Then Mr. Anthony made the point yesterday that through the increase in the number of departments there would result a multiplicity of heads at the smaller posts, which had, as I gathered from him, already produced a certain amount of confusion. Of course, it should be remembered that we are trying to perfect an organization for war and not an organization that would apply especially to the administration of small posts. Furthermore, in the administration of the various staff departments at small posts, we have always been able to unite several different functions under one officer; so that, even in its application to small posts, the question is one of administration which might very properly be handled by the post commander under prescribed regulations, and this is a detail which really does not affect the general organization that would be applicable in war.

The question of the number of General Staff officers was brought up yesterday, and the question was asked as to whether if we reduced the size of the Army from 576,000, or whatever it is, to some smaller number, there would be corresponding reduction in General Staff officers. I stated that there might be a reduction, but not a corresponding reduction, and I wish to emphasize that a little more. The reduction would be probably very small, because you must have a certain number of staff officers to perform those duties, and they do not always correspond to the size of the force.

For instance, in France we had 258 at my headquarters for an army of something over two million. If you reduced correspondingly, that would cut it down to a very small number.

I bring that out just as an illustration.

Senator WARREN. On that point, the members of the staff detail occasionally a man to one of our various posts. You wish to carry

that with the staff, do you not, additional members for any use that may be made of them?

Gen. PERSHING. Oh, yes; I think so. We have provided, of course, a General Staff not only for the headquarters of the Army but for the various corps, divisions, and minor units; and carried the system all the way down, as was brought out yesterday, I think, in the discussion.

Mr. KAHN. In the national defense act there is a provision that not more than half of the General Staff shall be stationed in Washington. Do you believe that that is a limitation that ought to be continued?

Gen. PERSHING. I do not think there should be any legal limitation to it. I mean, it is a matter of administration that should be left to those who are appointed to administer the affairs of the Army. That would be imposing a restriction that would materially interfere with the proper administration of General Staff affairs, and I do not believe it is possible to write into the law a clean-cut line of demarcation between General Staff duties and those concerned with the interior operations of a bureau or staff department.

The rules must necessarily be general, and their application must be left to the intelligence of the officers selected to perform those duties; and I think we must take for granted and concede to them a desire to cooperate and to distinguish between the duties of one set of staff officers and another in such a way as to produce the greatest efficiency, having always in mind the application of the system in time of war.

Mr. KAHN. Would you have enough officers in the General Staff so that if the Government should find it expedient to send a number of those officers into any section of the country to cooperate with a corps or a division of the Army, they would be able to do that without in any way affecting the work of the General Staff here?

Gen. PERSHING. Oh, yes; yes, indeed; without any question.

And, as I said yesterday, Mr. Chairman, the establishment of general staff schools large enough to provide us with a supply of general staff officers, who would be placed on the list of availables for detail whenever extra details might be needed or authorized, is highly desirable.

Mr. DENT. May I suggest, General, right in that connection, if I recall the facts, the General Staff here in Washington never had the full quota authorized under the national defense act, so that the law evidently authorized a sufficient number prior to the war.

Gen. PERSHING. Yes; I am not informed about that.

Mr. KAHN. The law authorized 55 officers of the General Staff, and I think the highest number that they had, after we put in the provision that only half of them should be in Washington, was 27.

Mr. DENT. Twenty-seven?

Mr. KAHN. Yes; that is the highest number they had.

Gen. PERSHING. May I discuss now the promotions?

Senator WADSWORTH. I think that would be very acceptable. You are to discuss now the matter of promotion, and I assume that a related question is the single-list suggestion?

Gen. PERSHING. Yes.

As to the question of promotion, I am a firm believer in promotion by selection. The difficulty of applying such a system is very great.

Many suggestions have been made as to how officers may be selected, but none have appeared entirely satisfactory. I think such a system could be worked out, but we find a very considerable percentage of the Army itself rather opposed to it. However, I believe that it might be met by arranging the officers of the different grades, say, annually or biennially, on three lists—one to contain those officers who are without question suitable and well qualified for promotion at once. They might be arranged on that list according to seniority or according to their merit, seniority, of course, carrying considerable weight in making such arrangement. The second list would be those officers who had not shown themselves especially qualified for immediate promotion, but who should remain in their present grades for a longer period to prove their fitness for eventual promotion.

The third list would be those who are unfitted for promotion, who have shown themselves to lack the necessary ability, energy, and interest in the work, and so on. They should be eliminated without delay.

This brings up the consideration of dead timber in the Army at the present time. The provision for elimination should become operative as soon as authority is granted by Congress, as we shall find in all grades in the service dead timber that should be got rid of. Heretofore the authority to drop men because they were not qualified for duties of an officer, has been difficult of application, because we have had boards who have naturally been loath to recommend that a man be shoved out without any means of support. So, it seems to me that coupled with elimination there should go a provision by which a man should be given credit for the service he has already rendered, and be placed on the retired list with enough to keep him from starving, say, 2 per cent or $2\frac{1}{2}$ per cent of his pay for the number of years that he had been in the service.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. You say $2\frac{1}{2}$ per cent of the amount of pay for the number of years he has been in the service. Just what does this mean?

Gen. PERSHING. If he has served 10 years, he would get 25 per cent of the pay of his grade at the time of his retirement.

Mr. KAHN. Two and one-half per cent a year?

Gen. PERSHING. Two and one-half per cent a year. Ten years would be 25 per cent, and the same proportion for any other period.

Mr. KAHN. But you would fix a limit that he should not in any case receive a greater percentage than 75 per cent, which is the percentage that is given an officer who serves faithfully and well until by operation of law he goes on retirement?

Gen. PERSHING. I should be inclined to fix it lower than that. Seventy-five per cent would indicate 30 years' service, would it not?

Mr. KAHN. Yes.

Gen. PERSHING. Well, I would be inclined to fix the limit at 50 per cent.

Mr. KAHN. Not higher than 50 per cent?

Gen. PERSHING. No. If a man has not rendered valuable service, then he should not be placed in any sense on a parity with officers who have rendered valuable service. And it seems to me it should be below 75 per cent.

Mr. GREENE. In your first classification that was to be made annually, putting officers in three classes, those who were worthy of

promotion at once, as you put it; and, second, those who should stay in their grade until they made good, presumably; and, third, those who should be eliminated.

Let us take the first grade, if you apply that at once, what would be the effect upon a man who comes into the lowest file of grade? Manifestly he would not be regarded, in the ordinary routine, as deserving of promotion anyway under the seniority rule, and he would be new to the duties of the new grade.

Would you have that so arranged that the question of his fitness for promotion simply depended upon his apparent availability in the course of time if he satisfactorily performed his duties up to that time? You see, he really is not a candidate for promotion at once, anyway, under normal conditions. He has not had an opportunity to demonstrate his fitness.

Gen. PERSHING. What I mean by that is they would be available for promotion ahead of the second list. That is what I meant to say.

Mr. GREENE. Obviously there would be a difference between him and a man long established?

Gen. PERSHING. Yes.

Mr. ANTHONY. I presume you would have that process of elimination safeguarded, so that action would only be taken by boards of officers of about the same grade of the officer eliminated.

Gen. PERSHING. I certainly should.

Mr. ANTHONY. I say that because if that responsibility is imposed in high authority, the Army frequently does not have confidence in the judgment of that high authority.

Gen. PERSHING. Yes; and the high authority would necessarily need the advice of officers who came in contact with and would know the qualifications of the officer examined.

Mr. ANTHONY. Because most frequently the high authority only knows a few officers of the Army himself, and there are many he does not come in contact with at all.

Gen. PERSHING. Yes. It seems to me that any action of high authority should be based upon the recommendations of a board appointed for that purpose.

Senator WADSWORTH. General, closely related to this question of promotion is that other suggestion which you mentioned rather briefly yesterday, to the effect that all the officers in the Army might well be commissioned on a single list in the Army of the United States. I think the committee would be very much gratified if you would enlarge upon that suggestion, or, rather, develop that suggestion some, and explain to us just what its benefits would be as contrasted with the present situation of commissions in the lineal list.

Gen. PERSHING. As I stated yesterday, there has been, as a result of the inequalities of promotion, a great deal of jealousy between the line and the staff. Line officers have felt that the staff has, on account of its location here in Washington, been able to secure legislation for its especial branch, for itself, and thus secure undue promotions for service of no greater importance than the services of the line officers. And the same thing applies to the relations between the different arms of the service. One arm would receive an increase of 50 or 75 per cent, and the promotions would go to that arm.

So we have had discrepancies in the relative rank of officers of the different arms in the service, which are very discouraging to older officers, who feel that their merits have not been given due consideration. Not only is that the case, but it has resulted in almost an impossibility of securing united opinion on the part of the Army as a whole as to legislation actually needed for creating an efficient Army. There has been pulling and hauling, and one arm opposed to another, the line opposed to the staff, and so on.

As a matter of fact, nearly every Army officer goes around with a reorganization bill in his vest pocket, but if you will examine that particular bill you will find that he has stressed the particular branch that he belongs to, and it is a scheme to give him promotion against some other fellow who entered the service about the same time or after him.

I might cite my own case. I have originated several Army reorganization schemes. It was when I belonged to the Cavalry; but in looking over them to-day I find that the Cavalry got an excessive amount of promotion as compared with the other arms.

It seems to me that this can be avoided by placing all officers on a single list. Whether they are commissioned as artillerymen or as cavalrymen or infantrymen is a detail. But we could arrive at a jumping-off place from which after promotion had been equalized as far as it could be consistently all officers would start off together arranged relatively according to rank on the same list. In the operation of this law the question would come up as to whether the Cavalry officer, who had arrived at the top of the list, could be promoted to a vacancy existing in the Infantry arm. I say, unhesitatingly, that he could, and we have proved it during the war, that officers transferred from the Cavalry and the Infantry to the Artillery have made excellent records.

So that there would be no question at all as to the propriety of taking a trained officer from whatever branch he comes and making an Artillery officer of him, if he has ordinary ability.

Mr. KAHN. As a matter of fact, during peace times the Coast Artillery officers train their men in Infantry tactics and the Cavalry were taught Infantry tactics as dismounted Cavalry?

Gen. PERSHING. Yes; to a certain extent.

Mr. KAHN. Did that training go far enough to enable the officers to take charge of the Infantry if there happened to be vacancies in that branch?

Gen. PERSHING. In France we assigned officers to the command of Infantry, Cavalry, and Artillery almost without regard to their previous service; and those men performed efficient service in their several positions. Really they were usually up to the average of the men in that particular arm.

There has been some question raised as to the application of promotion by selection to the single list. There should be no difficulty about it at all. You would apply it exactly as if you were applying it to an individual arm. I can see no difficulty about it; and, as to the promotions in the staff, as far as possible the staff should be placed on the same general list. They should be given a position on the list with a "running mate," as spoken by some. Of course, the running mate might fall out for some cause, but the staff officer would be given a place on the list and be carried along in that rela-

tive position and be promoted under the same conditions as a man on the regular list just ahead of him would be promoted.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. General, is there any reason why a man of a lesser grade, who was detailed for duty in the General Staff, or to the head of a Staff Corps, should have a very much higher rank?

Gen. PERSHING. I can see no particular reason for it, Senator.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. You know captains have been taken, and I think possibly those of higher rank than captains, and promoted to the Staff Corps?

Gen. PERSHING. Yes.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. And then given a higher rank—very much higher—than those who have had the same service. Is there any reason for doing that?

Gen. PERSHING. I can see no particular reason for it, sir.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. Do you think a man detailed for the staff, detailed for duty with the staff or with the Staff Corps, should have a higher rank than he had when he was in the line?

Gen. PERSHING. As I stated, I see no reason why the rank in the Staff Corps should be relatively greater than that in the line for equal service.

There might be an exception made in favor of some of those Staff Corps that required their men to undergo certain courses, to go through certain colleges requiring a number of years and considerable expense, but I think those are details which can be worked out, Senator, in the preparation of a bill which I believe would be satisfactory to everybody.

I have recently had before me, with one or two exceptions, the members of the various bureaus of the War Department, heads of bureaus and sections of the General Staff, and we have gone over all of these questions as fully as I have had time since my return. I find almost unanimous opinion on the question of the single list for promotion, and I believe it will meet with almost universal favor, and that the apparent difficulties may be straightened out by a general consultation in the preparation of the bill, by which the officer personnel of those departments that required the services of specially educated men may be given a standing at the start that would make good the delay in entering the service caused by lengthy educational courses.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. General, one other question. You know that we have had at every session of Congress bills that had for their purpose the equalization of rank, but they never seemed to equalize after they were passed.

Gen. PERSHING. That was probably the fault of the application of the law, and the fact that the law was not based on a sound principle such as is the single lineal list idea.

We have a situation in the appointment of the extra officers that have recently been provided for where I think there is an opportunity under the national defense act to equalize promotion right now in the appointment of those officers, so that if this single list should become a law we would practically all start off on the same basis.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. We would dispose of those surplus officers?

Gen. PERSHING. Yes. What I meant was, if you will permit me, that if this adjustment is made now the equalization would be prac-

tically completed. Then, if this new single list should be adopted, the whole Army would start off equal.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. Was this General Staff bill submitted to you before it was finally introduced in Congress?

Gen. PERSHING. No, sir. I never saw it until it had been under discussion for some time.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. Were you corresponded with in reference to what its provisions should be?

Gen. PERSHING. No, sir.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. So you saw it for the first time, and discussed it for the first time after it was introduced?

Gen. PERSHING. Yes, sir.

Mr. KAHN. General, do you believe that officers should be detailed to the Staff Corps rather than be continued permanently in the technical branches of, say, the Ordnance Department or the Quartermaster's Department? Do you think they should all be detailed from a single list; line officers detailed to the technical branches of the Staff Corps?

Gen. PERSHING. I think the detail system, speaking generally, has worked very well, and, as I stated in the discussion yesterday, it was adopted to meet a situation that we found in the bureaus, a situation of stagnation, a situation which involved incompetence on the part of a large number of officers who had held routine positions for years and years and had lost contact with the combat Army. While we had smoothly running bureaus in peace time, these bureaus were not effective as supply or administrative bureaus for an army in time of war.

For this reason, the detail system was found to be necessary, and has served a very good purpose; and I believe in continuing it except, perhaps, for the higher grades in some of the more technical departments. After a man has served, I should say, two details he might then be selected or appointed permanently in that particular corps for whose duties he has shown himself to be particularly qualified, with the understanding that he should return to a period of line duty after, say, each four years' service in his particular bureau.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. Would you let him retain the same grade when he is detailed for that duty, even though he is put into a permanent grade, that he had in the single list?

Gen. PERSHING. Oh, yes; it would all be then under the single list, Senator.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. In other words, he would have a higher rank?

Gen. PERSHING. No.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. Because of the fact that he had been made a permanent detail?

Gen. PERSHING. No.

Senator WADSWORTH. Just on that point, General, assuming that we established the single list, and that at the same time we should decide to create a permanent commissioned personnel in the higher grades, we will say, of the Ordnance Department, where an officer from the single list was finally selected to be assigned permanently to the Ordnance Department. In a sense, it takes him out of the pool or reservoir of officers of the Army; but from that moment should

his promotion go along with his running mates as they were on the single list, step by step?

Gen. PERSHING. Exactly the same relatively that every other staff officer takes. I mean to say he would take a relative position as every other staff officer would.

Senator WADSWORTH. So his promotion in the Ordnance Department would depend upon the general flow of promotion throughout the whole Army?

Gen. PERSHING. Yes.

Senator WADSWORTH. And he would not have special legislation passed for the Ordnance Department?

Gen. PERSHING. No.

Mr. KAHN. That is the point I wanted to make.

Mr. GREENE. May I follow that with the application of the same idea to the line? We start, of course, with the fundamental that it is the business of an officer as he matures in the service to learn the general philosophy of military science, so that he may not specialize in the Army, and that is one of the advantages of the interchange between arms of the service, in order to acquire knowledge of the use of that arm, and its coordination with the other arms in combat. Yet there is some degree of specialization in each of the arms?

Gen. PERSHING. Yes; indeed.

Mr. GREENE. And a certain temperamental inclination on the part of the officer to suit his service to one arm rather than to another. If he goes upon a single list as an infantryman, having excelled as an infantryman and specialized in infantry service, would you make it absolutely arbitrary upon that man's transfer by reason of a vacancy being open in another arm, or could he be held on a detached officers' list?

Gen. PERSHING. I would not make it compulsory at all. I would have no iron-clad rule about that. As you suggest yourself, the extra officers could very well be taken care of on this extra-officers list, and only officers that were especially fitted as a matter of fact for service in that particular arm, if they happened to be promoted to another arm should be assigned to it.

Mr. GREENE. There is, of course, it is needless to suggest, a tremendous value in temperamental inclination, as well as in the book study?

Gen. PERSHING. Quite true.

Mr. GREENE. And a man might be theoretically very well acquainted with all the arms and the coordination of all the arms, and yet best permitted to serve the service under one special branch?

Gen. PERSHING. The point is very well taken; yes, sir.

Mr. KAHN. General, the testimony that was given to the House Committee—and I dare say to the Senate Committee—by the heads of the bureaus of Ordnance and the Quartermaster Corps, and several other corps was to the effect that in the technical branches of their work they desired to have officers who would be permanently detailed to their bureaus. Now, you suggest that that could be done with the higher grades. At what grade do you think a permanent detail should begin for the Staff Corps, captain or major or lieutenant colonel or what?

Gen. PERSHING. Well, I should say, without carefully considering the matter, the grade of field officer—not start below major, generally speaking.

Mr. KAHN. Yes; I think the testimony of the bureau chiefs is practically to the same effect.

Mr. DENT. I thought it was captain. Captain is my recollection.

Senator WADSWORTH. A moment ago Senator Chamberlain spoke of the efforts towards equalizing promotion by legislation, and it reminds me of the situation that existed in the Cavalry branch of the service, about two or three years ago, as a result of the expansion by legislation and the necessary expansion of the Field Artillery, as I remember it, and perhaps of one or two other corps, the cavalry branch was left far behind and its influence was brought to bear upon the Congress, with the result that a bill was passed, or language was inserted in the national defense act, authorizing the arbitrary promotion in the Cavalry, and the result was we had 59 colonels of Cavalry and only 16 regiments of Cavalry. I assume that the single list will make such a situation as that impossible.

Gen. PERSHING. That is a matter that required some readjustment. Naturally they were entitled to sympathy and probably got it. This single list would avoid all further discussion of the question of promotion. It seems to me the question of Army organization and promotion ought to be separated once and for all.

Mr. KAHN. Might I suggest, that one of the difficulties between the War Department and Congress has been due to the fact that almost every bill that has been sent up by the War Department for action had behind it a question of promotion. The members of Congress, who are civilians, always looked for a promotion scheme back of every bill the War Department suggested, and if your plan will prevent that in the future, I am for adopting it.

Senator WADSWORTH. I take it that the Medical Corps would always have to have a permanent commissioned personnel?

Gen. PERSHING. Undoubtedly.

Senator WADSWORTH. There seems to be no dispute about that, so the officers of the Medical Corps would all run with their respective running mates on the single list, and that as advancement proceeded through the Army it would proceed through the Medical Corps in the same way.

Gen. PERSHING. Yes, sir, exactly.

Senator WADSWORTH. I know of a junior lieutenant colonel of the Medical Corps who took 15 years to reach that grade, while a junior lieutenant colonel of Infantry took 24 years. That is an instance of the disparity between promotions in the various arms.

Gen. PERSHING. The lieutenant colonel in the Medical Department knows nothing about the command of troops; he is an administrative officer, while the lieutenant colonel of Cavalry or of Infantry commands men. We are preparing him to take his place in the command of troops in war, and we have heretofore been giving staff officers high rank and neglecting those arms of the service whose officers actually command men, and that is one of the strong reasons for having this list where the staff and line are on a parity, so that we would not have the situation where a lieutenant colonel of Infantry or Cavalry with 24 years' service would probably be ranked

out of quarters by a medical officer of 15 years' service, or where a lieutenant colonel of the Medical Corps would take precedence on military courts or boards over Cavalry or Infantry officers of much longer service. It is a ridiculous situation that has grown up in our service, due to the fact that the various staff departments have come to Congress and obtained these promotions, while the claims of the fighting branches of the service have been generally ignored.

Senator WADSWORTH. I think it is fair to say that the rapid promotion in the Medical Corps was due to the expansion of the Medical Corps in the National Defense Act, where it was provided that there should be seven Medical Corps officers to every 1,000 officers and enlisted men of the Army.

Gen. PERSHING. This will put them all on a just parity.

Senator WADSWORTH. Of course we have attempted before to equalize promotions and tried some strong-arm methods, but the instant it is done the evil begins again and some other branch of the service is expanded by legislation, and necessarily another discrepancy occurs.

Gen. PERSHING. An instance was given in the possibilities of the development of the Tank Corps. Suppose we start the Tank Corps with a certain number of officers to-day; five years from now tanks may be one of the principal arms of the service. Then Tank Corps officers come in for promotion there. That is a somewhat specialized arm, and they would want all of that promotion for themselves, and probably would get it under the present system. The whole thing is absurd.

Mr. SANFORD. Might it not happen, General, under the single list that the senior officer in the Medical Corps or in the Air Service might be the senior officer detailed to that corps, and he might be still, perhaps, a lieutenant colonel, he not having reached an opportunity for further promotion. Would you make him the chief of that corps, if he happened to be the best officer, without increasing his rank?

Gen. PERSHING. There is no reason why he could not serve, because all of the other staff officers would be on the same footing as that officer himself, and I can see no particular reason for making an exception in that case. If we begin to make exceptions then the exceptions become the rule.

Mr. SANFORD. So you might have a lieutenant colonel who might be chief of ordnance, for instance?

Gen. PERSHING. I had not followed it that far.

Mr. SANFORD. But I am thinking of the possibilities of it, if there were a vacancy and he would be the best qualified officer for that purpose.

Gen. PERSHING. Of course the chiefs of departments are already provided for in the present law, which provides that they shall be detailed from their respective corps.

Mr. KAHN. And they occupy the position of major general during that detail, if they are detailed to the head of the corps?

Mr. GREENE. This disparity between the staff corps and the line brings up the point we were discussing yesterday as to whether this really auxiliary service ought to have the regular rank, or be given some assimilated status with all the privileges of the regular rank, but not to confuse these people with the men who have regular

military rank. It seems to me it is a wrong policy to have veterinarians and dentists going around with military rank and title, sitting in on boards, and so forth, when if they were not so styled and constituted they could have an assimilated rank proportionate to their service, and not be confused.

Gen. PERSHING. That is a very strong point.

Mr. HULL. In that case, how would you provide for war-time expansion, when you call in men of great ability? Would you put them in a lower rank?

Gen. PERSHING. They would all have temporary commissions and they might be given any particular grade you decided upon.

Senator WADSWORTH. We are discussing merely the promotions in the Regular service?

Gen. PERSHING. Yes.

Senator WADSWORTH. So the war-time situation, accompanied by the advent of those emergency officers or reserve officers, if we have such a scheme, does not affect the promotion in the Regular service at all, and the same single list would continue in peace and war?

Gen. PERSHING. Quite so.

Mr. KAHN. General, there has been quite a good deal of discussion before our committees in regard to the Chemical Warfare Service. Do you believe that should be a separate corps or that it should be attached to the Engineer Department or some other department of the War Department? It is not mentioned in this bill, but there has been evidence before our committees about the necessity of continuing the work.

Senator WADSWORTH. It is well to add, Mr. Kahn, that it is the announced intention of the War Department to place the Chemical Warfare Service under the Engineer Corps.

Senator JOHNSON. Before you go into that subject, may I ask one question?

Senator WADSWORTH. Certainly.

Senator JOHNSON. There is a class of cases which has enlisted my interest and aroused my sympathy, and that is the class of men who served well in France in advanced rank, like that of brigadier general, who are being demoted because of the exigencies of the present situation to colonels, majors, and so forth. Have you any suggestion to offer as to how what I think is simple justice can be given these men who have served well and who are now demoted, or can you suggest any way by which the situation could be remedied at all?

Gen. PERSHING. You are speaking of officers of the Regular service now, Senator Johnson?

Senator JOHNSON. Yes, sir.

Gen. PERSHING. It seems to me that can find its solution in the adoption of some such method of promotion by selection as has been suggested. Of course, those men must return to their original grades in the Regular service, and they all should be demoted to those grades. There would be and is now in existence a very unfortunate situation in that a great many of the men who served abroad have been demoted, while retained with their high rank are a much larger number of men here in America. So that, in order that all may be placed on a parity, all should be demoted. Then, in the regular course of those promotions in the Regular service I should

be in favor of some system of selection by which those men who have performed their duty efficiently on the battle field may at times be given preference in promotion.

Senator JOHNSON. I have in mind one officer who was a brigadier general, who did his duty, and I think did it well, who was demoted to major, and it struck me as a pretty tough proposition, not only from the material standpoint but from every other standpoint. Many of them are in that category, and I would like personally to afford some relief to them. Is there any way you see that relief could be afforded?

Gen. PERSHING. I think all those men who proved their efficiency during the war in the rank of general officer should be among those first to be selected for promotion to those grades.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. But you could not do that in the single list.

Gen. PERSHING. The single list only applies up to and including the grade of colonel, and a system of selection is not inconsistent with a single list.

Mr. GREENE. Here is a proposition that arises out of that that seems to be a rather serious one: Every soldier is presumed to do his duty, wherever he has been ordered. If he was lucky enough to get into active combat, he has had a stroke of good luck. His running mate may not have been lucky enough to have had that service on the other side, but, under orders, has had to stay at home, where his services, so far as the prosecution of the war was concerned, were perhaps as valuable as those of the men in the field. He did not take the position at home by his own choice, but he had to take it, and he has also lost the further opportunity for promotion by selection and has had hard luck running against him twice.

Gen. PERSHING. If he is a good man you could hardly say he would be deprived of his opportunity for promotion by selection; he would be on the same list, would he not?

Mr. GREENE. When it comes to considering the colorless record, this man shows up rather disadvantageously in the matter of selection?

Gen. PERSHING. I think the promotion boards, those in authority who were selecting officers for promotion, would give the claims of such men due consideration.

Mr. GREENE. Lots of men, as you know, cried their hearts out because they could not go and have an opportunity to make the splendid records they had in them, and if they had to give up their chance and run into a case of hard luck the second time, is not the balance in favor of the men who were in the field?

Gen. PERSHING. In all these promotions to the grade of general officer we are looking for men who are most efficient and best prepared to perform their functions in war. I do not think this grade should be given to officers who have passed their years of usefulness, except for purposes of retirement. That would apply to the staff as well as to the line.

But selection should be made so that when war comes you do not have to sidetrack men here and there by various devious methods and run up and down the list looking for officers who are known to be efficient to put into their places. The efficient men ought to

come to the top by some system we should adopt, and the worthless ones be dropped out.

Mr. GREENE. I have only in mind that stage of the career of every officer in the Army, which puts him as a young first lieutenant getting his first assignment as an instructor of military science. He is a potential Gen. Pershing, but nobody knows it yet, and if he comes up in the matter of promotion beside some other men, all of them the very same age and grade, who had had some service in the Indian wars, very likely our Gen. Pershing would have been overlooked and the Indian war man taken.

Gen. PERSHING. They should give those young officers an opportunity to develop some of their potentialities.

Mr. KAHN. This matter has been running in my mind since Senator Johnson asked his question. We passed a law some few years ago putting all the officers on the Panama Canal in an advanced grade upon retirement, every officer who had served on the Isthmus for three years. Would it be possible to put a provision in the law to the effect that these general officers who served during the war upon retirement could retire at the advanced grade they held in this war? Would that probably meet the situation?

Senator JOHNSON. I am not clear about that. The thing that struck me was this: We all know that when a position of power has once been attained, or a position gained by promotion, that there not only goes with it the material emoluments but also that which every man prizes, and then to be demoted after months or perhaps a couple of years of real service to a lesser rank or to a former rank presents at least a different proposition.

Gen. PERSHING. I should like to see some such proposition as that given every consideration, and if you will permit me I will discuss it at some future meeting before you.

Mr. KAHN. I want to call attention to the condition of a great many field officers who had to remain at the training camps, who were doing excellent work at those camps and who never got any opportunity for promotion.

Gen. PERSHING. I know a great many excellent men in that class.

Mr. KAHN. Of course, to select field officers who were in France for promotion to field officers' positions when vacancies would occur would bring about the very deplorable situation Mr. Greene referred to. So I simply offhand suggest that possibly we could reach that situation by perhaps giving these men the advanced grade upon retirement.

Gen. PERSHING. A great many of them would not retire for a number of years to come, so that would not meet the situation. I would like to make a study of that.

Senator SUTHERLAND. General, what process of comparison was used in the demotion of several major generals and the retention of others on the permanent list? Are those new major generals holding their permanent rank entitled to it by seniority?

Gen. PERSHING. I really am not familiar with the method or policy adopted.

Senator SUTHERLAND. You did not have anything to do with it?

Gen. PERSHING. I had nothing to do with it; I can not answer your question.

Senator SUTHERLAND. I noticed in the list of major generals some names do not appear of men who served, one of them with great distinction, on the other side who are back to their permanent rank of colonel, while others, who apparently served with no greater distinction and possibly less distinction, are now holding the grade of major general.

Gen. PERSHING. Without saying whether it could be avoided or not, the making of those demotions has created an unfortunate condition at present in the Army.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. General, you discussed on yesterday the creation of the rank of lieutenant general for various forms of service. I do not recall what your views were about that. What do you think generally about the proposition of creating the rank of lieutenant general, and if it is created what class of men should be promoted to it?

Gen. PERSHING. I stated yesterday, in general, that ordinarily in times of peace it seemed to me rather inadvisable to confer these higher ranks, that our traditions and practices in the past led us to confer the rank of general or lieutenant general during a war or for war services.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. I think you suggested that probably it would be well to give that power to the President in time of war to so honor men?

Gen. PERSHING. Yes.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. Has it been the practice in our Army to confer that rank in previous wars; do you recall?

Gen. PERSHING. I remember especially that in the Confederate service they had those grades.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. I was referring to the creation of the office of lieutenant general or general.

Gen. PERSHING. For active service?

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. Yes; during the period of the war or after. Do you recall any cases?

Gen. PERSHING. You mean appointing those officers to those positions for actual service, I mean so that they might command a corps or a division, which would correspond to their rank?

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. For any purpose.

Gen. PERSHING. In time of war those ranks naturally go with the command; that is, certain grades.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. We had no such rank in this war as that of lieutenant general?

Gen. PERSHING. Yes.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. What officers filled these places?

Gen. PERSHING. Gen. Liggett and Gen. Bullard.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. That was done by a special act of Congress?

Senator WADSWORTH. They were temporary?

Gen. PERSHING. They were temporary grades.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. The temporary appointments were by virtue of an act of Congress?

Gen. PERSHING. Yes; they were by virtue of an act of Congress.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. There was nothing in the military law prior to this war that authorized the creation of that rank?

Gen. PERSHING. No.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. Several officers were made lieutenant generals during the emergency by a special act of Congress?

Gen. PERSHING. By virtue of a special act of Congress.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. Do you think the rank ought to be created now?

Gen. PERSHING. As I stated, in time of peace it does not seem to me those ranks should be created except for service during war, performed during war.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. In command of troops?

Gen. PERSHING. Not necessarily.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. Any distinguished service?

Gen. PERSHING. Any distinguished service, Senator.

Senator SUTHERLAND. How are they recognized in England and in France, the services rendered by their distinguished officers in charge of large forces of men over there? They are given considerable recognition, aside from rank and pay, are they not?

Gen. PERSHING. In England they are. In England, a number of officers, beginning with Field Marshal Haig and Admiral Beatty have received very large donations. I think those two officers received half a million dollars each.

Senator SUTHERLAND. By legislative enactment?

Gen. PERSHING. Yes.

Mr. KAHN. They were also created peers.

Senator SUTHERLAND. Did not officers in grades lower than those receive recognition?

Gen. PERSHING. Yes; the sum total was quite large. I do not recall the exact number.

Mr. KAHN. Gen. Allenby got \$250,000 and was made a baron, and quite a number of officers were raised in rank and received money donations. I think there were 19 in all.

Senator SUTHERLAND. It would be difficult to recognize our soldiers in that way?

Gen. PERSHING. I think it would be rather difficult. In the French service the highest rank that has been conferred is that of Marshal of France, and that has been conferred on three distinguished French commanders—Marshal Joffre, Marshal Petain, and Marshal Foch.

Senator SUTHERLAND. As permanent rank?

Gen. PERSHING. Yes.

Senator SUTHERLAND. With no money grants?

Gen. PERSHING. I understand not. Outside of that they have no grade in the French Army above that of major general.

Mr. DENT. General, do you think there ought to be any limit to the number of lieutenant generals to be created? There is, of course, such a thing as overdoing the thing.

Gen. PERSHING. You mean a limit on the number of lieutenant generals for what purpose?

Mr. DENT. For service during the war.

Gen. PERSHING. You mean a limit as to conferring that rank for services already rendered?

Mr. DENT. For services that have already been rendered.

Gen. PERSHING. There certainly should be a limit.

Mr. DENT. What limit?

Gen. PERSHING. I have not gone into that. I have not given enough thought to that to suggest the names of the officers who should be given that rank.

Mr. ANTHONY. These foreign officers were all men who had led armies in the field, were they not?

Gen. PERSHING. Oh, yes.

Mr. GREENE. Should we create the grade of lieutenant general and articulate it with the military system permanently so that it would be open to successive promotion when the present incumbent went out, or should we limit it to a matter of honor?

Gen. PERSHING. I should prefer to follow our traditions in that regard.

Mr. GREENE. And have the grade cease with the incumbency of the man so honored?

Gen. PERSHING. And leave the place open for the selection in war of the efficient senior in the next grade, or whatever grade it happens to be, or whatever grade he happens to be selected from.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. In the next war?

Gen. PERSHING. In war; yes.

Mr. GREENE. Of course, if we start—

Gen. PERSHING (interposing). You are speaking of war?

Mr. GREENE. No; I am speaking of permanent legislation, to provide for this grade to be articulated into the military rank and stay there permanently to be successfully filled by men, or whether it should be only created for special instances, and the grade cease with the occupancy of the men so honored?

Gen. PERSHING. I am inclined to think we should create it for special services. With the size Army we have there is no necessity to create the grades of lieutenant general and general during peace time. I would, however, appoint officers to those grades immediately upon the declaration of war and select for those appointments, of course, the ablest men.

Senator SUTHERLAND. Have you thought how your position as General of the Army should be articulated now in time of peace with the Army organization?

Gen. PERSHING. I have given it a little thought, but I have reached no very mature conclusions in the matter, or any very definite conclusions.

Senator FLETCHER. What would be the function of the lieutenant generals you would create; what would be their command or their duties?

Gen. PERSHING. They would naturally be assigned to the higher commands while they held those offices.

Senator SUTHERLAND. Would you care to state your conclusions, so far as made, General?

Gen. PERSHING. I think I would rather reserve that for the present. It is more or less of a personal question, and it seems to me it would be wiser for others to discuss it in public than myself, as it affects me personally.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. If the rank of lieutenant general was created now for services rendered during the war, how would the men named to fill those places be articulated into the general Military Establishment?

Gen. PERSHING. Very easily.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. How would that be done, by regulation?

Gen. PERSHING. Yes; they could be assigned by the Secretary of War to any of the higher commands, without any difficulty at all.

Mr. KEARNS. In all these other cases which you have mentioned, in which the other countries conferred these life honors upon some of their officers, have they selected any officer who was not a commander of troops in the field?

Gen. PERSHING. I think without exception the officers have had command of troops in the field during the war at some period.

Mr. KEARNS. Do you think we ought to confer that honor on any man who did not have command of troops in this war?

Gen. PERSHING. I think that would be a question to be determined by the special case.

Mr. KEARNS. Have you any opinion you care to express about that?

Gen. PERSHING. No such case has been put up to me.

Mr. OLNEY. General, does not the act of Congress providing for 18,000 officers correct to a certain extent the injustice done those officers who have been demoted, say, from brigadier general to major, and have not recommendations been made so that they will be promoted above their original rank? Has not such a recommendation been made?

Gen. PERSHING. I can not answer as to the details of that, but I might make this observation, that the extra list of officers should be utilized to equalize the inequalities of rank that now exist; but as to what has been proposed or even discussed, I am unfamiliar.

Mr. DENT. That law will only be in effect until next July.

Mr. OLNEY. Did that act provide sufficient officers in your opinion; that is, the act providing for 18,000 officers? Does that give you sufficient leeway?

Gen. PERSHING. I suppose the details of that were gone into by the War Department. I am really not in a position to make a reply to that, not having studied the details of it.

Mr. HARRISON. General, there have been a number of applications made to our committee to put the emergency officers, so far as retirement is concerned, on the same footing with the regular officers. There has been a good deal of pressure brought to bear on the members of the committee to give the emergency officers the same right of retirement as the regular officers have. Have you any opinion to express in regard to that?

Gen. PERSHING. I think that would be a rather delicate question, and, offhand, I should think there should be some difference made between the two classes. I can not think that even two years' service would entitle those men to the same consideration in the matter of retirement as officers who have served in the Army faithfully many years.

Mr. HARRISON. Take the cases of men who have been disabled during the war.

Gen. PERSHING. Are you speaking of disability now?

Mr. HARRISON. Yes. There are a number of bills pending before the House Military Committee looking toward giving the emergency officers the same rights of retirement on account of disability that the regular officers have, and the question is, is there any objection to it?

Gen. PERSHING. They ought to be given every consideration. As to whether they would be entitled to the same consideration, I would rather reserve my opinion for further study.

Mr. KAHN. General, I asked you a while ago about the Chemical Warfare Service. In your opinion, should that be retained in the permanent legislation for the Army as a separate corps, or should it be articulated with the Engineers, or some other corps, such as Ordnance?

Gen. PERSHING. It might be made a separate corps, or it might be retained in one of the other departments. I do not think the Engineer Department is the one under which it should be placed. If it were placed under any department, I should recommend that it be placed under the Ordnance Department, as being more closely related to ordnance matters than to anything the Engineers would undertake to do or have ever done.

It is a little bit difficult, because of the possibilities, to decide the question, that is, because of the possibilities of gas warfare. I think it should be developed, and it would be developed better under a separate organization than under any other bureau. There is no doubt about that.

The Chief of Ordnance does not know anything about it, and he does not want it, as far as that is concerned. The Chief of Ordnance, I have no doubt, would give to it every attention. But it is not in his line, and he could not give it the attention that it should be given; he would not draw to his aid the chemists of the country so readily as some man who had been closely associated with the Chemical Warfare Service would do. That is a very important matter, because it would be a department of investigation. I should rather incline to make it a separate department.

Mr. KAHN. You think it is of sufficient importance in preparation of the defense of the country to maintain such an organization?

Gen. PERSHING. It should be maintained, by all means. It is something we can not drop.

Mr. HULL. General, what do you think about the use of poison gas in warfare?

Gen. PERSHING. I think it would be very well if we could avoid it. But we tried it before and it did not work. I do not know whether we could avoid it or not. We might come to an agreement not to use it and the other fellow might spring it on us some dark night.

Senator NEW. We came to that sort of an agreement once.

Gen. PERSHING. There was that kind of agreement, and it was violated.

Senator NEW. There never was an opportunity to violate it until this last war broke out.

Gen. PERSHING. No.

Senator NEW. And then it was violated despite the agreement?

Gen. PERSHING. Yes.

Mr. DENT. This country did not enter into that agreement.

Gen. PERSHING. No.

Mr. MILLER. And it was violated at the first opportunity?

Gen. PERSHING. Yes.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. It came near getting the Allies into very serious trouble, did it not?

Gen. PERSHING. It was a very serious matter with the Allies; the casualties were very great.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. Because of this policy of Germany we not only had to go to work to develop gas, but we had to develop a defense against the use of gas.

Gen. PERSHING. Yes, sir; the Allies were in a very difficult position.

Senator SUTHERLAND. So far as the matter of humaneness is concerned in connection with that method of warfare, is it not about as humane as shooting men to pieces with guns?

Gen. PERSHING. There are not very many humane functions connected with making war, anyway.

Senator SUTHERLAND. Would there be any real distinction from that standpoint?

Gen. PERSHING. We like to think that there is a humane side of war, of course. But our opponent in the next war might undertake to develop a very deadly gas, not a gas that would just put you out of commission for a while, but he might determine that the best thing to do would be to kill everybody he could, noncombatants as well as combatants, and so the humane side might become very inhumane.

Mr. GREENE. Is it not more a question of sportsmanship, inasmuch as the purpose of war is to kill, and the use of gas is hardly sportsmanlike, not giving the other fellow a fair chance?

Gen. PERSHING. I can not see very much difference myself in methods of killing.

Mr. GREENE. But it is not a sportsmanlike method of conducting warfare.

Senator SUTHERLAND. Is not one of its most serious features its effect upon the surrounding civilian population?

Gen. PERSHING. That is a very serious thing. However, the Big Bertha fired into Paris from a long distance for some time.

Senator FLETCHER. Is there any reason for limiting the investigation and development of all means of destruction of property and human life now that this war is over? Ought we to lay aside any of the means we might need in case of another war? Would it be safe, in other words, for us to say that the use of poison gas is inhumane and that it will never be permitted again?

Gen. PERSHING. No; decidedly not; because we can not trust the other fellow.

Senator FLETCHER. Then it follows also that we ought, perhaps, to keep up with the science of the development of all devices, of every possible means for protection in the future?

Gen. PERSHING. I think you are perfectly correct in that.

Senator FLETCHER. Very likely the next war will involve means of destruction never heard of. At the same time, do you think we ought to go on with the development of this Chemical Warfare Service as we did during the war, or merely have a certain limited number of scientific investigators pursuing the matter?

Gen. PERSHING. I think we ought to go on with our investigations in the matter and encourage our chemists and investigators in every way.

Mr. HULL. Your idea is to continue the Chemical Warfare Service as a separate branch?

Gen. PERSHING. I would continue preparation for chemical warfare.

Senator WADSWORTH. Perhaps we can now pass to another subject which you had discussed briefly yesterday in your preliminary statement, and which I think is susceptible of a good deal of development and discussion.

You mentioned the great advisability of maintaining a citizen reserve army, organized and officered, its units established geographically, and that inevitably brings up the discussion as to how that force ought to be constituted. I think you urged that the National Army divisions as they existed in this war and the National Guard divisions that fought in the war should be reconstituted territorially, and that the Army should be recruited by means of universal military training.

Gen. PERSHING. It seems to me, as I stated yesterday, that in those divisions that had service abroad, and also those divisions formed here that were not sent abroad, there exists a very great military asset which could be used and which should be used as a basis for the organization of our reserve. It would seem to me wise that those divisions should be rehabilitated, called together, and their organizations completed as far as their division personnel would permit their completion.

Senator WADSWORTH. You would have it, in the first instance, voluntary; that is, you would invite the veterans of the several divisions to be members of these organizations?

Gen. PERSHING. I think it should be voluntary. I think you would get better results if it were voluntary, and I do not think you would have any difficulty in having those men volunteer en masse, practically, officers and men, because of their association together in war and because of the very close ties that result from a common service of such importance as that was.

These divisions would then become permanent units, into which you would feed your men after they had had six months' training.

Going back just a little bit, I would make an especial point of preserving the numbers of the divisions and regiments and all auxiliary troops and of assigning to those units—and I think this is very important—assigning to those units exactly their original personnel as far as possible. In the case of the replacements that were put into those divisions on the battle front they would naturally go to the part of the country from which they came and would become members of the local divisions there, the local feature of this being important in all discussions of this question.

It might be well to go back a little in the history of the National Guard and of the units that went to the front from that organization. The National Guard performed very excellent service, considering the limited opportunities which they had for training in the past. They had never received, in my opinion, the whole-hearted support of the Regular Army. There was always more or less prejudice against them, and many of our regular officers failed to perform their full duty as competent instructors, and often criticized where they should have instructed. The National Guard people naturally resented this, and very properly so.

The troops have shown themselves in battle to be worthy of our best efforts. I think that in any plan for tying up those units with the national force—I am speaking both of the National Guard divisions and the National Army divisions—there must be a very complete sympathy between them and the Regular Army, and there must be a strong desire on the part of the Regular Army to develop

those divisions into fighting divisions and give them every assistance possible. This can be done by selecting special instructors from the Regular Army and giving them a course of training which would prepare them for their duties with those divisions. It would give them a doctrine, and the War Department would then always know by that means that the instruction of those units was being carried along in a progressive and systematic manner, and that the doctrines and methods were common to all divisions. In other words, the instructors would be able to keep track of instruction and preparation, so that when war came we would only need to give the reserve divisions an order for them to move.

Promotions in those units should be open entirely to the reserve officers occupying positions therein. And I would do that without any particular limit up to the grade of division commander.

It seems to me that in building up a reserve like this the country at large, and especially the Regular Army, in carrying out the policy of the country, should see to it that justice is always done in our treatment of those men who are serving because they love it. By so doing you will develop the whole-hearted effort and unreserved support on their part in the building up of a citizen army.

Mr. KAHN. As I understand you, you would have a volunteer reserve made up of these young men who saw service in this war?

Gen. PERSHING. Start it that way. I do not believe it would be necessary to make it other than voluntary at first.

Mr. KAHN. Then it is your idea that those young men who had six months' training in the training camps should be by law compelled to join these reserve army divisions?

Gen. PERSHING. Yes, for a given length of time.

Mr. KAHN. You would recommend that as a feature of the training system?

Gen. PERSHING. It seems to me that unless those men were allocated by some systematic method you would be in a state of chaos at the beginning of war, as we were at the beginning of the last war. Every man, as soon as he is trained should be assigned to some local unit which he would in a way call his home. He meets his fellows; they come together and have their drills; they talk about how many Germans they captured in the Argonne, and all that sort of thing, and you would build up an esprit de corps through the use of those trained men which you could not build up in any other way. I feel very strongly on this, and I consider it a matter of vital importance that we utilize that splendid material to assist us in creating this reserve army. No one realizes the necessity of such a force better than those men who had to bear the brunt of battle at the front.

Mr. KAHN. Would you classify them into the various branches of the service?

Gen. PERSHING. I would go a little further and assign some of them to staff duties, so that every single officer on the reserve list would know where he belonged, so that a telegram from Washington to a division commander would mobilize that division as quickly as the word could be sent out to the respective units. The division staff would be organized, the cavalry detachment, the artillery contingent, the signal corps, the engineers, and everything you would need would be available as soon as they could be equipped; at least

the personnel could be mobilized at once. Naturally, you would not carry a fully equipped division, as far as material is concerned, but that would have to be provided for. That, to a large extent, should be at local places where the division could get it quickly and mobilize without any material delay.

Mr. HULL. Then at the present time you would recommend that the National Guard units that had service be permitted to reorganize, if they want to?

Gen. PERSHING. There is some little difficulty that enters there. I do not know how far the governors would go. I feel that we ought to utilize those units that fought as part of our Army under the name of the National Guard. I do not know how the governors of the 48 States are going to solve their difficulties in providing themselves with militia to meet local conditions, but it has been proposed, as you of course know, that it be met by allowing the governors of the States to call locally upon such organized reserves to suppress insurrections within the limits of their States, and I can see no objection to that, but I am not prepared to discuss it from a legal standpoint.

Mr. HULL. You would not prohibit the National Guard units from reorganizing? Let me ask you in regard to the minimum strength of a company which wants to reorganize.

Gen. PERSHING. I would not split hairs on that.

Mr. HULL. You would not require them to reorganize with a hundred men?

Gen. PERSHING. I would have no limit to it. If you could get 10 men to a company, I would start the national reserve with that nucleus.

Are you speaking of the militia or of this reserve I am talking about being called into the national service?

Mr. HULL. The National Guard which has seen service in the war, some of them in the Rainbow Division.

Gen. PERSHING. To be called together and then put in this national reserve I am speaking of?

Mr. KAHN. Mr. Hull, as I understand him, wants to get your opinion as to whether these men could come under the National Guard organization and be a part of the National Guard to be federalized immediately upon the event of war?

Gen. PERSHING. I am not sure as to the bearing this will have on the plan I propose, and I shall not enter into that. But, as far as the plan I propose is concerned, as far as it affects the plan by which these units would be taken into the service as national troops and nationalized, with the provision I am speaking of, there could be no possible objection to their coming in with any number of men. I would like to see the unit come in, whether it has 10 men or 50 men.

Mr. MILLER. What would be your plan of perpetuating this institution? In a few years these men who served in the World War will pass off the stage, and in a comparatively few years many of them will be unfit for military duty. What is your idea of perpetuating this institution?

Gen. PERSHING. I have not gone into that fully, Mr. Miller; but if you mean what should become of the older men after serving a time in these divisions, each of these divisions would have its reserve corps

or unit and those men would naturally pass into such a reserve and thereafter be admitted to the local social functions of the active members of the division or unit, and would naturally give the living unit their support, their backing, and their encouragement. These older men might be organized into second reserve units, with some such idea in mind.

Mr. MILLER. I was wondering if you had any idea of putting into those organizations the men who come from the compulsory military training camps?

Gen. PERSHING. I would keep those divisions alive by putting in the men who had taken the six months' training.

Mr. MILLER. That is one way in which you would perpetuate the institution?

Gen. PERSHING. Yes; that would be the best way.

Senator FLETCHER. You would give universal training, and apparently universal service to a certain extent. To what extent do you favor compulsory service?

Gen. PERSHING. I went into that at some length yesterday and took issue with the provision for three months' training provided in the War Department bill. I think we should have six months.

Senator FLETCHER. Of training?

Gen. PERSHING. Of training. I think six months' training is more than twice as good as three months.

Senator FLETCHER. I understand that; but what I am after is this: There is a difference between universal training and universal service.

Gen. PERSHING. As far as the camps are concerned it is universal training. It is not service. They can come in and receive this instruction; part of it is military instruction, to prepare them for their duties in war. A large part of it would be of an educational character, aiming principally at the education of the illiterate and ignorant, and the inculcation of discipline.

Senator FLETCHER. The general development of the manhood of the country; I understand that. What I am getting at is what point does obligatory service begin and to what extent ought we to provide for that?

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. That is, how do you differentiate between universal military training and universal military service, because there are many people who favor universal military training, but who would oppose universal military service.

Gen. PERSHING. If you are having universal service, if we apply the term "universal service" to these men undergoing the six months' training, they could be called out in case of war, in the middle of the summer.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. That would be called for service?

Gen. PERSHING. That would be called for service.

Senator FLETCHER. That is in case of war.

Gen. PERSHING. If they were available for universal service we could have them. I would make a distinction between service and training. If you had universal training only, those men would not be subject to any such order as that except by an act of Congress.

Senator NEW. Is not this the case, that in case of war the young man has to go anyway; he would be drafted or conscripted, as he was in this last war? He must necessarily go.

The experience in this war has, I think, demonstrated to everybody that that would be the method employed in this country hereafter to raise armies of any considerable size.

Now, since he must of necessity go, the object is merely to equip him so that he may go right rather than leave him unequipped, mentally and physically, so that he may be taken out in condition when the time comes when he has to go anyway. There is no purpose in your mind and no purpose in the minds of those who favor universal military training to make this man serve as a soldier in time of peace?

Gen. PERSHING. Not at all.

Senator NEW. And the completion of his term of training satisfies those who favor the equipment of that man to serve as a soldier?

Gen. PERSHING. Assuredly; that is my idea exactly.

Mr. KAHN. That is the difference between the Prussian system and the proposed American system. The Prussian system took the young man at 19 and put him into the army and trained him there and held him in the army. The plan you propose is simply to train him so that if his country should have a war he can then join the army and defend his country's rights?

Gen. PERSHING. That is exactly it, and well stated.

Senator FLETCHER. After he comes out of the training camp you have no further connection with him, or would you require that he be taken into the local units and drilled in certain months of the year?

Gen. PERSHING. I would require him to be registered and assigned to one of these local units, otherwise you would lose the advantage not only of his training, but you would lose the advantage of having an organized unit to call upon when war begins. He himself would lose touch and possibly interest in military affairs, and he would lose the opportunity to learn from the men in the older trained divisions of the conduct of armies in the field, and for many reasons he ought to be assigned to some particular unit.

Senator FLETCHER. Would you require these units to maneuver once a year or once in six months?

Gen. PERSHING. I think provision should be made for those men to assemble once or twice during the period under which they are held available for service.

Senator NEW. The man is held available for service in any case.

Gen. PERSHING. Every man is.

Senator NEW. If he is between the ages of 18 and 45 he is held for service; that is, he is eligible for service and liable to be drafted. It is merely a question of whether during that time he will have some knowledge of what he is to do in case he is called, or whether he will be left liable to the same call without any knowledge of what he has to do. Is not that the case?

Gen. PERSHING. Yes; exactly. I think we can clear this up by saying that there is no purpose to utilize these young men in the military service except upon the declaration of war by Congress, and that their connection with these reserve units would be simply a continuation of their training.

(Thereupon a recess was taken until 2.30 o'clock p. m.)

AFTER RECESS.

The committees reassembled at 2.30 o'clock p. m., pursuant to the taking of recess.

Senator WADSWORTH. The committee will be in order. I think Judge Harrison wanted to ask the general some questions.

Mr. HARRISON. General, when you were speaking of these reserve organizations, you were not speaking of the National Guard, as understood before the war and referred to in the national defense act—the State National Guard?

Gen. PERSHING. No; I had in mind an organization strictly under Federal control, composed of those units that had had service as National Guard units during the war.

Mr. HARRISON. What would be your plan in regard to the State National Guard? As I understand it, under the national defense act, the reserve forces were the National Guard forces. Have you any plans in regard to what should be done along the line of reserving them or organizing them for Federal service?

Gen. PERSHING. You refer to those new organizations that would spring up?

Mr. HARRISON. No; I am referring to the National Guard as it was organized under the national defense act. For instance, I know we had in Virginia what we called the Third Virginia, the Second Virginia, and the First Virginia, all State troops, who were called in prior to the war, for instance, for service on the Mexican border, and then were taken over and carried over to France and served there as a part of the National Army, the National Guard troops.

Gen. PERSHING. I would take all the National Guard troops that we could get that had service during the war and organize them as a Federal reserve.

Mr. HARRISON. Under our reorganization plan, what would be done for the benefit of those State guard troops, those State national guards?

Gen. PERSHING. That had not had service?

Mr. HARRISON. No; just any of them.

Gen. PERSHING. You mean to provide a national guard or militia?

Mr. HARRISON. This State national guard, so as to be utilized as a reserve force in case of war?

Gen. PERSHING. Well, I think that it would be wiser to take all of the troops that had served during the war under the name of National Guard troops, and induct them into this reserve under Federal control.

Mr. HARRISON. I understand that, but what I wanted to find out was if in your plan you contemplate utilizing the State guards, the State militia, as a part of the reserve forces of the United States.

Gen. PERSHING. Only those, sir, that have been utilized during the war for national service.

Mr. HARRISON. You would make no provision for reserving in the States their State national guards?

Gen. PERSHING. Well, that is a question that, of course, is not easy of solution, but it has been proposed that after those troops have been organized as a Federal reserve, distinctly so, that then some provision might be made under which the governor could have the authority vested in him of calling them into service temporarily in

case of insurrection within the limits of the State, for temporary service, without having to go through the formality of making an appeal to the President for the use of the national forces. I only say that that has been suggested.

Mr. HARRISON. I do not know whether I make myself clear. You know that under the national defense act the State national guard, the State troops, the State militia, was a part of the Federal Army, to be called into the service when the occasion required, and there was money appropriated to train them and equip them. Now, under your plan of reorganization of the Army, do you have any plan to fall back on the State national guard?

Gen. PERSHING. No, the State National Guard, as such, would not enter into this scheme, would not be considered as a part of the Federal reserve; because we would have taken all of the National Guard, as it exists to-day, presuming it all was called into service, and Federalized it. Does that answer your question?

Mr. HARRISON. These State troops rendered mighty good service during the war, did they not?

Gen. PERSHING. Excellent service.

Mr. HARRISON. And your plan for a citizen army depends entirely on this plan of having universal military training, because you have no reserves except such as go into these organizations after they have been trained for three or six months?

Gen. PERSHING. Yes, it contemplates that.

Mr. HARRISON. I have always had doubt about the constitutionality of calling anybody into the service. I do not know whether you have considered the legal question of whether you could call anybody into the service except for service in the Army. The Constitution provides that the Federal Government shall have the right to raise armies and support armies. Now, if we do not call these young men in and make them a part of the Army, have you ever considered whether you had the right to call them?

Gen. PERSHING. That is a legal question, I think, that would have to be determined.

Mr. HARRISON. I notice that the Constitution expressly says that the training of these militia should be reserved to the States.

Gen. PERSHING. It would not be militia after it had become Federalized.

Mr. HARRISON. The point that I make is that if you do not make them a part of the Army, by what authority do you get the right to bring them into the service of the United States?

Gen. PERSHING. I think it might be called a part of the training system in preparation for war, subject to service in war, after war is declared by Congress.

Mr. HARRISON. But, as I say, the training of the militia is reserved to the States. The Constitution reserves to the States respectively the appointment of the officers and the authority to train the militia.

Gen. PERSHING. As I understand it, these troops would not be organized under that clause, but under the general clause of the Constitution which empowers Congress to raise armies.

Mr. HARRISON. I understand there is a good deal of distinction between compelling a man to come in for military training and compelling him to come in for military service. The point that I

had in mind was whether you would have to call them for military service in order to have the right to train them. As you say, that is a legal question, but the point that I was trying to get at is what objection is there to the national defense act which had for its basis a small standing army of about the proportions that you designated, and then had in reserve the State National Guard, to be called into service when the occasion required. That was what we had when this war broke out, and I understand the State troops performed excellent service in the war, and if we had a national defense act, with a standing army of some 275,000 or 300,000 men, with the right to the State to organize their State troops, to be supported, trained and in a large part maintained by the Federal Government, I do not see why that would not cover the necessities of our Military Establishment.

Gen. PERSHING. I believe that even under that system the National Guard could be trained to a much higher degree of efficiency than was done before the war. If the sympathy and unreserved assistance of the Regular Army should be invoked, as it could be if those in authority would insist upon it, by a system of training selected officers as instructors in schools especially organized for that purpose, with a course of instruction such that it would be particularly applicable to that class of troops, officers and men, and through which the entire National Guard would receive a systematic and common sort of instruction, I am of the opinion that a great improvement could be made throughout the guard.

We might even go so far as to provide a certain system, by which a part of the trained men, the men who had been trained under the universal training system, should go into the guard under certain conditions. While all that is true, yet you will always have, under the best sort of management, and even the most earnest support of the Regular Army, 48 different units to deal with.

Each State determines the size of its National Guard, determines its appropriations, appoints its officers, details its adjutant general, and all of those 48 units are difficult to deal with, especially when the central Government, which is trying to train them, has so little authority over them. The point we make is that by utilizing this National Guard as it stands to-day under a strictly federalized control, you would have a better system, and you would offer a greater inducement to them to come into the service. It would be a more certain service. They would be encouraged to study harder, to work harder and become efficient, and would be more satisfied with the central control than they would be in trying to maintain an organization extending over the entire country under 48 different heads. Those are the main points that have been urged against continuing or attempting to continue the present system, and have led us to conclude that it would be preferable to adopt the system that I propose.

Mr. HARRISON. Of course, there is an objection to all these systems, but can you not have the regulation citizen army in the National Guard, the State National Guard, without any disturbance of the business conditions of the country, because these National Guards are made up of citizens who voluntarily take it up and are trained, and it is a matter of volition with them, and they could be trained

and called into the service without disturbing in any way the business conditions such as would occur in calling out nearly a million young men every year from productive lines in life. You see, this National Guard system did not have a test before the war broke out. The national-defense act was passed, and then the disturbance on the border and the war called them into the national service before they had ever gotten the practice that was projected by the national-defense act.

Gen. PERSHING. I am inclined to think that the majority of those officers and men who belong to-day to the National Guard, or who have in mind to join the National Guard, would prefer to perform their military service, under any volunteer system, by serving in the federalized reserve.

Mr. HARRISON. If Congress should decide not to adopt compulsory military training, would not that be the best substitute of any of the other plans before Congress?

Gen. PERSHING. I could not say it would be the best. We might have to fall back on that. I would rather regret to see it, however.

Mr. KAHN. General, we were notoriously unprepared at the opening of this war; that is, when we got into the war, and the system that Judge Harrison suggests was in force. There was not any great rush of citizens to join the National Guard. At that time you were on the Mexican border. You did not notice that there was any great increase under the volunteer system of the National Guard organizations for border service?

Gen. PERSHING. There certainly was not; no.

Senator WADSWORTH. May I interrupt to observe there that there was a very good reason for that, General, which should not be overlooked. The War Department suspended recruiting for the National Guard until the Regular regiments could be first recruited up, and hundreds and thousands of men were turned away. I remember the incident perfectly, because those splendid regiments in New York which had in some cases 600 or 700 recruits waiting at the doors, sent word down here asking and begging permission to recruit them, and they were not permitted to do it.

Mr. KAHN. In the National Guard?

Senator WADSWORTH. In the National Guard. Later the gates were opened, and by that time the Regulars were filled.

Mr. HULL. But it is true that before the war had gone very far they stopped volunteering in the National Guard, and they absolutely stopped the National Guard units from performing service. I know myself that in New York they had one well equipped medical unit that everybody admitted they ought to have, and they could not get that unit. They would not accept it, although they were crying on the other side for medical units.

Mr. ANTHONY. Just to keep the record straight, General, it comes to my knowledge that in face of the opposition of the War Department to develop the National Guard at the outbreak of the war, they finally changed their policy and permitted the States to organize full regiments of National Guards in many of the States, and the ranks of the National Guard were promptly filled, and full units furnished the Army. Especially in my State, Kansas, I know that was the case, and for one, I believe that the National Guard is the best second line of defense we can have. And is it not true, General, that it will

cost us less to maintain troops, these State troops, under State control, than it would be to maintain them as a federalized force, because is it not true that every time we take a man into the Federal service we have got to pay him full pay?

Gen. PERSHING. I have not gone into that, because I should not think the difference would be material.

Senator WADSWORTH. General, I did not understand that it was your proposition that in organizing this federalized citizen force, that a man should be paid except for a short period of maneuvers, just as the guard is to-day paid for its periods of maneuver, and is also paid for each drill the men attend. The cost will be no different either way. The Federal Government to-day supplies all the equipment for the guard, and it would supply all the equipment for the federalized force. The Federal Government to-day pays the men for attending drills, and the same thing could be applied, and it would cost no more under the federalized system. There is no difference in either case.

Mr. ANTHONY. If you are going to make the National Guard the backbone and propose to train them, when you take men in for six months' service, and the guard would probably have six months' service, you would certainly have to pay them.

Senator WADSWORTH. I have my own ideas, Congressman. I dislike to seem to put words into the mouth of the general.

Mr. MILLER. General, I wanted to ask you a couple of questions. First, it has been suggested before our committee that in order to stimulate the National Guard and build it up to its full complement in the various States, that the young men enlisting in that National Guard and serving for three years within the National Guard shall be relieved from this compulsory training feature of the bill. What do you think of that idea?

Gen. PERSHING. Well, as a means of producing well-trained soldiers it would fall short, as compared with the other method, undoubtedly.

Mr. MILLER. Now, the second question that I have in mind is this. I am not clear yet, perhaps because I did not hear your statement fully this morning regarding these young men after they shall have performed their period of military training under the compulsory-training law. This bill provides that the selective-draft law shall attach automatically in case of war. After these young men have completed their period of military training under the compulsory-training law, is it your idea that they shall go out then into civil life and be recalled into the service through the medium of the selective-draft law, or shall they, after they have performed their period of military service, be placed in a sort of reserve and be called into the service of the Government under some method different from the selective draft? I am not clear as to the way you express it yourself this morning.

Gen. PERSHING. Without going into too many details, the outline is something like this. After a man has received his six months' training he would return to his locality and be assigned there to the nearest convenient unit or staff department, or whatever it is, to which he would belong, and with which he would turn out for any further training that might be called for in the course of the next year or two years, and with which he would serve when called into

the service by the National Government. His induction into the service would be controlled and conducted through his own division and unit headquarters.

Mr. MILLER. Then you would not have them called into the service or returned into the service through the instrumentality of the selective-draft law?

Gen. PERSHING. It seems to me this would be the better plan.

Mr. MILLER. You would call him in through the organization to which he belonged?

Gen. PERSHING. I should think so.

Mr. GREENE. But, General, continuing the question as to whether you would approve of the maintenance of the National Guard under the foundation laid in the national defense act, you suggested the fact that is apparent, I think, to many who have studied it; that, at best, the maintenance of the National Guard under those conditions depends first upon State initiative and State policy, and 48 different State policies at that, and that while you may have a National Guard, and often do in some of the larger States, not only well organized, and disciplined but well supported by State appropriations, yet another institution bearing exactly the same name and under the law entitled to the same consideration may exist in a neighboring State, having an entirely different state of efficiency and being almost niggardly supported by little pretenses of appropriations, and that all these factors, before they come to you for federalization at all, are dependent upon 48 different State policies, and you get 48 different degrees of carrying out the national policy with regard to it. Your problem begins when they are turned over to you for federalization, and so you propose to start them in the national family together, so there would not be these exceptional instances running through 48 different varying policies, but one national foundation upon which the National Guard would be truly national in name and guard in effect, is not that your idea?

Gen. PERSHING. That is my idea.

Mr. GREENE. You would do away with the duality of authority and control, and the varying degrees of support or lack of support which they get by reason of their distribution now through 48 authorities.

Gen. PERSHING. You see, too, as a matter of fact, the National Government has really no control over the National Guard, the State National Guard, as it exists at the present time. Its only control, as I understand it, is through the allotment of appropriations. We have prescribed a certain standard of efficiency in the National Guard which must be acquired before they shall be entitled, if you please, to a certain appropriation, and through that we have insisted upon conducting inspections and sending officers as instructors, so it is a backdoor or a sort of left-handed control. If you have an out-and-out authority, it gives you the power to issue orders, to require efficiency, or to reorganize units, or to specify authoritatively that they shall follow this or that particular course of training. The present system gives us really no authority except that which the National Guard, through its enthusiasm, has encouraged through national legislation which it has agreed to.

Senator WADSWORTH. That is true.

Mr. GREENE. Is not this true, that because it is difficult to articulate the present great system with the National Guard, in that being local and being dependent upon varying degrees of local support and enlistment of personnel, it is impossible sometimes to form an army with its proper components of the different tactical arms? You get some kind of a thing in one place, and something else in another, according to what the people there on the ground are willing to support. In other words, the Army is not tactically distributed throughout the territory with the proper components to make one tactical army.

Gen. PERSHING. That is a very important point, Mr. Greene, because the War Department has undertaken to organize the National Guard and place its units tentatively by groups in the Federal organization on paper, theoretically, so that in time of war they would have something to start from. But no real organization could be effected, and we were forced to leave the actual control that we should have, the actual power to give necessary instructions to perfect its organization, until after war was declared. I mean to say under such limited control there would be no properly balanced units.

For instance, here is a so-called division composed of the National Guard of three of the small Western States, but lacking the auxiliary units necessary for a division. You could not call it a fighting unit, and you could not depend upon that particular group of Infantry, or whatever it was, ever serving or ever being willing to serve; and you could not, therefore, foresee the requirements in the auxiliary units that would be necessary in time of war, so the whole thing is a mess.

Mr. GREENE. And the men who naturally gravitate to the National Guard system under present conditions of 48 varying controls and local influences are the men who go into it entirely from an enthusiasm for the profession, and in that degree are not the men who need the training so much as the others who are not trained.

Gen. PERSHING. Probably; yes, sir.

Mr. GREENE. In other words, to a certain degree they are already prepared to become, many of them, very excellent soldiers, and yet in the State where the greatest attention and the most enthusiasm and spirit may be applied to the support of the National Guard, a captain is a captain, and not many miles from him, where only a nominal organization exists, is another man pretending to be a captain because he has two bars on his shoulder, and when they come to you you are met with the problem of assimilating those men in the same grade.

Gen. PERSHING. Very difficult problems are presented.

Mr. KAHN. General, as I understand you, the plan you propose under these conditions, is one that under the Constitution would provide for the common defense and promote the general welfare?

Gen. PERSHING. That is the clause under the Constitution.

Mr. KAHN. Well, it is in the preamble, and I think they have always held that any law that will accomplish those purposes was constitutional.

Mr. HULL. General, when the tactical units in a State wanted to tender an entire division, would not that answer your objection that there would not be a fighting organization there?

Gen. PERSHING. Yes, sir; but only two States during the war had them.

Mr. HULL. I understand that during the war everybody said, "We want to organize divisions," and they could not do it.

Now, changing the subject just a moment, you speak of six months of training under the universal training bill. Do you think that is sufficient to make a fairly good soldier, as I understand it, six months' intensive training?

Gen. PERSHING. Six months' intensive training will give you a most excellent foundation to work on.

Mr. HULL. Let me ask you one more question. What do you think of an enlistment for one year in the Regular Army?

Gen. PERSHING. That is a very important question.

Mr. HULL. I might explain to you that some who have advocated that for some time got in the last bill a provision to compel them to take soldiers for one year.

Gen. PERSHING. Yes.

Mr. HULL. And it was amended so that only a third could be taken for one year, and the fact of the matter is to-day that the one-year enlistment has demonstrated that it is one way of getting an army, and we have practically recruited to the limit of the one-year men to-day in the Regular Army, but unless provision is made they will have to stop those enlistments, and, comparatively, at least, the enlistments in the Regular Army would drop off two-thirds, because you are getting 2,000 to-day per week of the one-year enlistments, and 1,000 of the three-year. Now, the question comes up, would you not think it advisable to extend that one-year enlistment so that we would get an army?

Gen. PERSHING. I am inclined to think that the one-year enlistment should be continued. I had a note on this this morning to read. It would give an opportunity for the young men who aspired to enter the Army as either noncommissioned officers, or later as officers, to get the necessary training and experience, or a certain training and experience which would give them a good idea of the service and prepare them for further training and instruction.

Mr. HULL. I think most of us agree with you there. Now, if we did that, and a man enlisted for one year, say, 19 years of age, would that exempt him from the universal training?

Gen. PERSHING. Yes; assuredly.

Mr. KAHN. If he served one year in the Regular Army that would exempt him?

Gen. PERSHING. Most assuredly; yes.

Mr. SANFORD. In conducting this training of the 19-year-old men would it be necessary to use entirely the Regular Army officers, or could you use some of the reserve officers who might be qualified?

Gen. PERSHING. In conducting the six months' training?

Mr. SANFORD. Yes.

Gen. PERSHING. I would make every possible use of the reserve officers. Those men would be very valuable as assistants in this work, and would undoubtedly enter into it enthusiastically, quite to the extent of the Regular Army officer, I should say, because it is the business of the regular, and he gets his fill of it after awhile. But these reserve officers would enter into it enthusiastically, if they undertook it at all, and I think we should encourage them to undertake

it, and perhaps by that method we could decrease the number of regular officers required. We should encourage it in every possible way.

Senator WADSWORTH. May I come back once more, General, to that moot question of the disposition of the National Guard? It seems to me, it resolves itself down to this: Shall we maintain a reserve force, whether it be by voluntary enlistment or by universal training, under the militia clause of the States, or under the Army clause? To-day, whatever reserve force we have is under the militia clause, and it is by voluntary enlistment.

Gen. PERSHING. I should prefer to see it maintained under the Federal clause, under the power to raise and support armies.

Senator WADSWORTH. To raise and support armies?

Gen. PERSHING. To raise and support armies, not under the militia clause, if you refer to it in that way.

Senator WADSWORTH. They are two entirely distinct methods of maintaining a military force. Now, the gentleman from Virginia brings up a very important matter; at least he suggested it, and I am quite sure it is in his mind. The States and the people of the localities entertain a very deep affection for some of the old, famous units of their National Guard. He mentioned his Virginia regiments, and I have no doubt they have long and honorable histories. They are probably as old and as famous as some of the regiments in the Regular Army, and in many other States we have very famous regiments whose war records are longer than any other military units in the country, some of them, and whose battle flag staffs are simply one mass of rings, denoting the battles in which the regiments have taken part. Do you not believe that that local pride and affection can be nurtured in just the same way by taking the three Virginia regiments, or the Seventh New York, from the militia clause and putting them bodily into the Army clause, as it were—the same men, the same officers, the same situs, the same headquarters, only with their status changed?

Gen. PERSHING. The same name?

Senator WADSWORTH. The same name, the same traditions, and the same battle flag.

Gen. PERSHING. The same locality?

Senator WADSWORTH. And the same battle flag and everything. I understand that to be your suggestion?

Gen. PERSHING. I can see no particular obstacle and no reason for opposition to it, as far as the personnel itself is concerned. It would continue them practically as they are and always have been as far as local affiliations are concerned.

Senator WADSWORTH. In New York and several other States they have very elaborate military equipment in the way of armories. Would you see any objection, we will say, to the Seventh New York, that became the One hundred and seventh Infantry in this war, and made a remarkably good record, continuing to occupy its old regimental armory, storing its war material and equipment in that armory, and holding its noncommissioned officers' schools there, just as they do to-day under the National Guard militia clause system? The Federal Government, you do not believe, would undertake to interfere with that? It would be an asset, would it not?

Gen. PERSHING. I think the Federal Government would be very glad to accept the use of all of those armories and all of those facilities which are now made available by the State for the National Guard. It seems to me that, in order to maintain these units, the State itself would encourage this local sentiment by letting them continue to have the use of all those facilities.

Senator WADSWORTH. Now, if we take care of that exceedingly important element; that is, the local pride and affection for these old organizations, there is only about one thing left that is important to take care of, and that is that the governor of the State and the State authorities shall have access, as it were, to those troops in maintaining order within the borders of the State. Can you think of any other important thing in that connection to take care of those two?

Gen. PERSHING. It seems to me that provision would meet all of the requirements of the local State authorities for the maintenance of order, if such a provision could be constitutionally granted, and I see no reason why it should not be constitutional. It seems to me it is a very excellent solution of it.

Senator WADSWORTH. Whether it be under the voluntary system, or the universal military training system, it would work either way?

Gen. PERSHING. Yes.

Senator WADSWORTH. But better under universal military training?

Gen. PERSHING. Yes, certainly.

Senator WADSWORTH. According to your view?

Gen. PERSHING. Yes; better under the universal training system.

Senator WADSWORTH. General, you had some other things, did you not, to discuss in this bill which you had not approached at all yesterday, in the latter part of the bill?

Gen. PERSHING. Under section 27 the question of pay is again introduced. I referred briefly yesterday to the proposed increase in pay of the Army, but wish again to give it strong emphasis. In talking this matter over with officers, such as I have had an opportunity to speak with, I learn that many of them are living a sort of hand to mouth existence. I think, as I stated this morning, that their pay has only about half the purchasing power that it had in 1914; so that as a result of this, many valuable officers are leaving the service for more lucrative positions. I do not think at this time, when we are considering the reorganization of the Army for possible contingencies, that we can afford to dispense with the services of men who have had training in actual war. We need all of that class of men that we can get, Regulars and Reserves, to carry out this program, and I think that some steps should be taken as early as convenient to meet this very aggravated situation in which Regular officers find themselves. As I stated yesterday, I would also increase the pay of the married enlisted men correspondingly.

Senator WADSWORTH. The suggestion has been made, General, in that connection that instead of giving to the noncommissioned officers a flat increase in pay to the extent requested by the Department, that they be granted a comparatively small increase in pay, as such, and, in addition, a ration, or a number of rations, based upon the number of rooms which the officer or noncommissioned officer is given under the commutation of quarters.

Gen. PERSHING. Some such plan as that would meet the requirements, and I can see an advantage in it, because it would operate automatically to reduce the pay a little later on when times get better and the dollar will purchase a dollar's worth of supplies.

Mr. GREENE. If we provide for this as a temporary arrangement, do you not still think that the base pay proper is still out of touch with the general advance, regardless of present conditions?

Gen. PERSHING. I think it could be figured out so that you could parallel whatever increase you think ought to be made. If you intended to increase, we will say, by 30 per cent the flat pay of all officers, according to the standard that exists to-day, then you could figure out the number of rooms that would be necessary for the different grades at \$12 a room or \$15 a room or \$20 a room, or whatever it is, and I think it could be worked out. I worked out two or three grades myself, and it seems to come out about 30 per cent.

Mr. GREENE. I have seen it demonstrated myself. What I was thinking about was that one of the apparent obstacles to the increase which has been suggested is that the present situation is one of inflation, and not one of long continuance, so that some people are afraid of giving any increase in pay at all, because it may be too much.

Now, if you adopt a sliding system such as you propose, by way of increasing the commutation for heat, light and quarters and giving a ration, that, of course, might be easy, and then, from time to time, if the value of the dollar did increase, the commutation might be decreased, but do you not think that apart from that, as compared with the standards of 1908, which might have been normal just before the war, the present base pay of officers is too low?

Gen. PERSHING. Well, neglecting the question of heat, light, and quarters, it is too low, Mr. Greene, yes.

Mr. GREENE. I believe you propose a 30 per cent increase, to be given out on a heat, light, and quarter basis, and a ration, as tiding over the emergency only. I was thinking that even when this emergency has passed, the present statutory rate of pay in 1908 would be too low.

Gen. PERSHING. I get your point. I doubt if we will ever return to a period when the present rate of pay would suffice to support an officer and his family as it would when the scale was adopted originally.

Mr. MILLER. General, we had an officer before us about 10 days ago, whose pay was \$520 a month, a bachelor officer in the service. He testified to us that he could not live on \$520 a month and support himself in decency, and he was therefore resigning from the Army. The question has arisen whether, if a man can not support himself in the Army on \$520 a month, we should reasonably, in the face of public opinion in this country, justly increase the salary of such an officer.

Gen. PERSHING. What was his rank?

Mr. MILLER. Colonel, I believe.

Mr. SANFORD. May I say, in fairness to that officer, that I understood him to say that he could maintain himself, but he did say that he was attracted finally by the offers he received outside, and he was accepting one of them. But he did say, as I understood him, that his allowance was ample for his personal needs.

Mr. MILLER. That is not my understanding of the testimony of the officer. His testimony, as I understood it, was that he could not live decently on \$520 a month in the Army, and he appeared before our committee when we were considering a bill to provide for a 30 per cent increase in the pay of officers and made that statement, which he said was perfectly unbiased because he was leaving the service.

Mr. GREENE. I think while it may be imprudent to mention the name of the officer, I think you will find that he made the statement that he was assigned to a certain character of duties outside of the country under circumstances where he was called upon constantly to meet demands upon his private purse. That is what he had in mind.

Mr. MILLER. Notwithstanding that, he made no mention of it. That is the situation, I think you will find.

Gen. PERSHING. I think we must bear in mind the average case. That would be an exceptional case. An officer of that rank would ordinarily have a family and a number of children to support and educate. I know of one brigadier general who finds himself with three children, two of them in school, and they are limited to about half the number of rooms to which they are entitled, and his wife is doing the work in order to send the boys to school.

Mr. MILLER. Would you differentiate, General, by increasing to a greater percentage the pay of the officers in the lower ranks, say first and second lieutenants, that have the hardest struggle, especially when they are married?

Gen. PERSHING. Well, I always had more money as a second lieutenant, on \$137 a month, than I have ever had since.

Mr. MILLER. You are very fortunate.

Mr. KAHN. You found that as your pay increased, your responsibilities and conditions changed?

Gen. PERSHING. Quite so.

Mr. KAHN. And your money did not go so far?

Gen. PERSHING. Quite so.

Senator WADSWORTH. You had some other matters, General, did you not, that you desired to discuss?

Gen. PERSHING. Just one more point, perhaps, which has been brought out in the discussion. I think I have already mentioned it, although I do not recall exactly what I said, but it was with reference to the elasticity of appropriations. It seems to me that this is a subject to which the committees should give very careful attention. If we adopt the control of expenditures by some agency or organization to be known as supply control, or finance, or whatever it is, we should probably go to the so-called budget system. To my mind, it would work very much as it does to-day. The various departments would put in their estimates, and they would have the money allotted to them, but whatever saving might be made from the expenditures of one department, due to changes in their duties or functions, would be available for use in another department, or be turned back into the Treasury.

Mr. KAHN. You mean in the War Department?

Gen. PERSHING. In the War Department.

Mr. KAHN. That is the budget system of the War Department?

Gen. PERSHING. Yes. /

Mr. KAHN. Well, Congress has practically, in the Quartermaster Department, provided for that very thing. Appropriations for clothing, supplies, and transportation are all made one fund.

Gen. PERSHING. It may very well be extended to the entire department.

Senator WADSWORTH. That is quite an important suggestion, General. You will notice the language on page 32 of the bill, commencing on line 4, "Congress shall appropriate in one item for the support of the Army the total amount of money authorized by them therefor for the ensuing fiscal year." That would seem to indicate that the Congress should not attempt to itemize the expenditures for Ordnance, or the Medical Corps, or any other branch of the service in any way whatsoever.

Gen. PERSHING. I should think that Congress would be rather remiss in its duty and obligation to the country if it did not analyze it.

Senator WADSWORTH. This language certainly contemplates that it shall not.

Gen. PERSHING. But you would have to analyze it, Senator, to arrive at the sum total, it seems to me.

Senator WADSWORTH. I said "itemize," not "analyze."

Gen. PERSHING. I thought you said analyze.

Senator WADSWORTH. This would seem to contemplate that Congress shall not itemize any appropriation, but shall make a lump-sum appropriation.

Gen. PERSHING. But it would be subject to analysis beforehand, and you would certainly be informed as to the expense of each item before the appropriation was made, or the approximate expense, would you not?

Senator WADSWORTH. Yes, in our hearings; but Congress itself would never be able to get that information unless it dug through all the hearings to find those analyses. I am a believer myself in more elasticity in appropriations, and the further approach toward a budget system, but there are instances where the kind of the appropriation has a good deal more significance than the mere number of dollars and cents appropriated. This control used to be very significant as reflecting the wishes of the Congress, or the policies of the Congress, in the establishment of a particular activity in the War Department, and the Congress might want its wishes carried out within certain reasonable limits in that regard.

Gen. PERSHING. I can quite understand that.

Senator WADSWORTH. And the Congress, under this clause, would lose that control entirely. For instance, the Congress might become thoroughly convinced that we need 500 airplanes, and I wish it would be so convinced to-day, but that would not be reflected in the bill at all, but it would merely be left to the War Department to decide whether we should have them or not.

Gen. PERSHING. Well, I should think that Congress, if it desired to indicate or direct any particular line of development through the War Department, would feel perfectly justified in itemizing its appropriation to that extent.

Mr. KAHN. During the war, General, we practically lumped everything into one sum; that is, we made all the appropriations available as one lump sum, but the moment the armistice was signed Congress

went back to provisions that had been inserted in the appropriation bills for quite a number of years. One provision provided that the pay of the Army shall be constituted one fund, and then another provision provided that all moneys designated under the title of "Subsistence of the Army," "Regular supplies, Quartermaster Corps," "Incidental expenses, Quartermaster Corps," "Transportation of the Army and its supplies," "Water and sewers at military posts," "Clothing," and "Camp and garrison equipage" shall be disbursed and accounted for as general appropriations, Quartermaster Corps.

Now, your proposition is to extend that, as I understand you, to all the branches of the Army.

Gen. PERSHING. From my standpoint, I can see no objection, as far as you deem it expedient, to giving the control of the expenditures to the War Department. I think it would be to their advantage in the expenditure of the money, and probably increase the efficiency and the economical use of the money so appropriated. It seems to me that it would.

Mr. ANTHONY. General, in case Congress differed on the matter of policy, for instance, then there would be no way of control by Congress?

Gen. PERSHING. Unless Congress should put it in the bill and say "So much money shall be expended, and it shall end there"—I can see your point, but I am saying that as long as Congress desires to maintain control over the expenditures of any particular branch, you would have to give instructions, through the purse strings.

Mr. KAHN. You know what happened. Congress felt that our boys ought to be brought back from Europe as speedily as possible. The only way that Congress could control it was by cutting the appropriations for pay and limiting the appropriation just to the item of pay. That is the way they proceeded, and that is the way they brought the boys home.

Mr. HULL. May I ask a question there? General, you speak of the budget system. Supposing that Congress should decide that in the next year we were going to spend \$300,000,000 on the Army, do you suppose that the Army could better figure out how to spend that than Congress?

Gen. PERSHING. Well, Mr. Hull, would not the Army come to you with an itemized statement of what this money was to be expended for? And, then, as I said a moment ago, if Congress desired to retain control over \$30,000,000, or \$50,000,000, or whatever it happened to be, or over a certain project, it could limit the appropriation to that project by so many words.

Mr. HULL. But you really think it would be safer, as a whole, would it not, for Congress to decide how it was to be allocated than for the Army itself?

It would be a rather embarrassing thing, would it not, to have the Army take \$300,000,000 and try to figure out a preparedness plan?

Gen. PERSHING. Well, I do not think the Army would have any difficulty figuring out how to spend \$300,000,000.

Mr. HULL. There is no question but what they would spend it.

Mr. GREENE. Perhaps this is what you have in mind, if it does not prolong the discussion unnecessarily. Every soldier knows that the history of the relations of the army to the Parliament has been

gradually to get hold of the purse strings so that the army could run the country. We have passed out of the days of that historical period, but the memories of it linger, just the same. We have found conspicuous examples just in recent years. We decided that there should be a militia bureau to advise and counsel with the officers of the Regular Army, and we enacted into law that there should be one, and that there should be certain details of National Guard officers to it, and fixed their rate of compensation, only to find that, as the years went by, absolutely no attention was paid to it. Now, there is the writing of a positive mandate into the law, only to be disregarded: How much easier would that be if we just wrote a lump sum into the law and let them do just what they wanted with it?

Gen. PERSHING. I know of no easier way of bringing a recalcitrant Army under proper discipline, however, than to itemize the appropriation bill.

Mr. MILLER. General, it has been suggested that Congress still continue to itemize the items, but leave, say, 10 or 15 per cent to be disposed of by the Army, with leeway to be used by them in case of emergency under the exercise of their judgment. That has been suggested to me by a gentleman who was here.

Gen. PERSHING. That is a good thought. It had not occurred to me, and it might possibly meet the situation.

Mr. KAHN. I believe that under the present system the way the money is allocated by the chief of the finance division is to provide originally out of the appropriation that Congress makes for specific items for 15 per cent in a reserve, and if there is a shortage in any branch, in any item of a particular subject, he applies the reserve to paying the bills. That is the system that the chief of finance has put into operation, but of course, that is a matter that rests entirely with himself. I do not think there is any provision of law which authorizes or prevents it. This is simply an expedient that he has found for making the money go as far as possible.

Senator WADSWORTH. Have you another topic that you wanted to take up, General?

Gen. PERSHING. I have nothing further, I think.

Senator WADSWORTH. There is just one thing I want to ask you about. In the tables accompanying the War Department bill it is found that the heavy field artillery, that is those troops equipped with guns exceeding 6 inches in caliber, are assigned to the Coast Artillery Corps. I think they amount to two or three brigades under the tables accompanying this bill providing for an Army of 509,000 enlisted men. The contention has been made before the Senate subcommittee that the heavy field artillery which includes, I believe, the 6-inch gun, the 8-inch howitzer, the 9.2 and the heavier guns, should be assigned to the Field Artillery instead of to the Coast Artillery, on the theory that when war breaks out that heavy artillery goes with the Army into the field and is not coast artillery or defense artillery.

Gen. PERSHING. From a tactical standpoint, the standpoint of organization, it seems to me that all mobile artillery that is used with troops in the field, with the possible exception of railroad artillery that might be used for coast defenses, should be made a part of the field artillery.

Mr. KAHN. General, this matter has been suggested. There are about 3,000 vacancies in the Regular Army officers! We have passed emergency legislation providing for 18,000 officers until June 30, 1920. I understand, and the committee understands, that it is the purpose of the War Department to gradually work into the Regular Army some of these emergency officers who are continued in the service by this special legislation, and the question has arisen whether they shall be filtrated into the Regular Army at their present grade, or whether they should be compelled to come in at the lower grades in the regular service. Have you any suggestion that you desire to make on that subject?

Gen. PERSHING. Of course, you can not require men who have had experience in war in some of the higher grades, such as the field officers' grades, to start at the bottom and work up. That would not be fair, and we should recognize the ability and the services of many of those men; and I think that perhaps there would be a proportion of them whose efficiency would warrant their being taken in perhaps at their present grades, and certainly at a very slight reduction in grade.

Mr. GREENE. It is obvious that all those men, at the best reckoning, had less than two years' service, and many of them in emergency rank, at ranks that were superior to the permanent rank of regular officers, holding at the same time the same rank or perhaps a superior one with a temporary commission, so that when the regular goes back, by demotion, he will go back to, captain or major from brigadier general, or from colonel or lieutenant colonel, and that emergency man who is now knocking at the door and wants to come in, wants to come in with his emergency grade. The question is whether that is fair to the regular service, the men who have given their lives to it.

Gen. PERSHING. It would not be fair to adopt it as a policy; no, sir.

Mr. GREENE. It did not seem so, and yet the text of this bill provides that men may sprinkle right through the lineal line just helter-skelter, according to personal choice. Now, the second phase of the matter is this: We must assume that many young men, and many perhaps somewhat older, enjoying military discipline as a natural characteristic of course, would be willing to come in as second lieutenants. Their age would permit them, and their zeal for the profession of arms would inspire them to do it. There are other men between 35 and 40 years of age who hold captaincies or majorities, who would be loath to come in at that lower grade, and again, then comes, it seems to me, another aspect, which is this.

Notwithstanding the faithful and often distinguished service that they performed in the field, it was largely and essentially that of foremanship rather than the result of their own military study and expansion to that grade. They have no background of military science, most of them, and the question would then come, if we install them in the Army in the grade of captain or major, with no military background and experience, would they be potentially capable of expanding into a lieutenant colonel and colonel, and would it be fair to put them in ahead of other men who had been serving for three, four, or five years, or whatever it may be, and had given up

their lives to the service, for the very purpose of realizing what must be the object of the Army, that every second lieutenant is a potential major general. Now, men at 40 who followed peaceful occupations up to that time and then as a second thought wanted to come into the Army, who have undoubtedly performed distinguished service and performed the functions of executives—are they in a position to take their place alongside of the men of equal grade, who have years of study and experience, and are now ready within a grade or two not to execute, but to plan, and as planners be responsible for execution?

Gen. PERSHING. You ask me the question?

Mr. GREENE. Yes.

Gen. PERSHING. Well, I would answer that by saying that the man who had had military experience to begin with, and had served through all the grades, perhaps in the ranks, and perhaps through the noncommissioned grades oftentimes, would be entitled to the greater consideration. At the same time there is a great benefit to be derived for the Army by a proper and judicious selection of those specially adapted and specially efficient men who served through the war and displayed that efficiency on the battle field, and I do not think we should be too rigid in any enactment of law, because I think they should be given reasonable encouragement to come into the service.

Mr. GREENE. I do not want the record to show that I am opposed to any of them coming in, or that I fail to appreciate their distinguished military service in many individual instances.

Gen. PERSHING. We have had some very striking examples of young men who had gone through the training camps and entered as second lieutenants, and through the exigencies of the service, through the fortunes of the service, had passed through the various grades, some of them up to major, commanding battalions with brilliancy, with magnificent efficiency, and those are the men the Army ought to have. We ought to select those men, if possible, and get them into the service. I would like to see some steps taken in that direction.

Mr. GREENE. Unquestionably. I am not suggesting by my questions that they ought not to come in at all. I am only thinking of the proposition laid down in the bill that they shall come in grade for grade, and there is no sort of limitation apparently on the manner in which they shall come in. The question would be whether a young man in his thirties would come in as first lieutenant.

Gen. PERSHING. Age certainly would have a great deal to do with it.

Mr. GREENE. But when he comes to his first commanding rank, as everybody knows who has followed the atmosphere of the Army at all, he must have seen maturity for many years in the two junior grades before he is fit to come into a captaincy, as a practical matter of business or life occupation.

Gen. PERSHING. I have always thought we spent too much time in preparation for promotion to the grade of captain. I mean the service in the lower grades is rather long and tedious, and if I may make an observation just there, it does not require the average length of time that an officer usually is required to serve as second and first lieutenant to make efficient commanders as captains. If we could

get our commanders a little bit younger it would be very much better for the grades throughout.

Mr. GREENE. That was the effect of seniority and the lineal list, but even agreeing to your idea of a shorter time, the fact remains, however, that a man who has become a captain has some background of military experience through many years of garrison life and through the performance of all the other duties of the service before he is really eligible in any sense for that grade. As against that we have the test of a man who has seen six, eight, or nine months' service in the field, sometimes where he has been executing orders rather than maturing his mind and acquiring the foundation to be prepared by and by to issue orders. Are those two men on the same plane or not?

Gen. PERSHING. I should not think so. Those men were drawn for a specific duty at the time. They would have a great deal to learn as to how the foundations were laid. They would have to go back and pass over a period of service, spend a period of time serving in the Regular Army, in order to get the real foundation that we expect officers to have for the exercise of the superior commands.

Mr. GREENE. Exactly, because you do not want him to stand still at the grade at which he enters the service, but you want to make a major general of him eventually?

Gen. PERSHING. Yes.

Mr. KAHN. How would that apply to men in the supply divisions? A man probably has come in from civil life and is a specialist on some line of work. He has gone into the Army and has gradually worked up to a colonel. He is retained under this law which allows 18,000 officers, and the department is desirous of putting him into the permanent establishment. Under a single list for promotion, eventually he would have to be included in that single list, and would, if it is adopted, come up for promotion regularly as his grade is reached. Do you think there ought to be any distinction made as to his rank when he goes into the regular service?

Gen. PERSHING. Generally speaking, I think the two cases would be practically on a parity, with possibly some preference to the specialist who was a more highly educated man, no doubt, and who had special preparation for the specific duties he was called upon to perform during the war. I would not undertake to give you a general rule upon which you could act without giving it further consideration. There are some very difficult problems in there.

Mr. GREENE. May I suggest right in that general connection that perhaps some confusion may arise in the minds of people who may not have studied it particularly, because we use the word, "grades," that is, from first lieutenant to captain, and from captain to major, and so on, and if the bill is not properly safeguarded men who have gone up through the files and are almost ready for their majority may find that older men of which we are speaking, when made captains, are put in the files with them as captains, and so the word "grade" ought not to be the last word said, because old man "files" comes in there.

Gen. PERSHING. It is a very difficult question, Mr. Greene.

Mr. KAHN. Mr. Hull wants to ask one more question.

Mr. HULL. Yesterday you indicated that a man ought to be 21 years of age before he is taken in at the start of a war. Have you

any idea as to the maximum age that a man can go into an army as an enlisted man and perform proper services?

Gen. PERSHING. The maximum age that a man can perform efficient service?

Mr. HULL. Yes.

Gen. PERSHING. They are carried as available for active service in most armies up to 40 years.

Mr. HULL. About what is the best average age? Have you any idea in regard to that?

Gen. PERSHING. When a man has arrived at full maturity, or well into maturity, I should say he would probably withstand the hardships a little better than a very young man. It would be difficult to fix an age.

Mr. HULL. I would like to ask in regard to the Dental Corps. Dentistry has assumed an importance in recent years, and it is assuming more importance every year, in order to keep men fit for the service.

Gen. PERSHING. It is very important.

Mr. HULL. Do you not think it would be wise to make that an independent corps, or do you?

Gen. PERSHING. Of course, the tendency on the part of a number of the staff corps is to separate from their mother staff, so to speak. We, as you know, would like to have them under one head. I can see no particular advantage that would arise by separating them at this time from the Medical Corps, though I would like to think that over a little more.

Mr. HULL. How about the Veterinary Corps?

Gen. PERSHING. We had the Veterinary Corps in France under the Quartermaster Department. It was under the Medical Department during the war, but it operated as a matter of fact as practically a separate organization under its own head.

Mr. HULL. Then you do not think it would be advisable to organize it as a separate corps, or do you?

Gen. PERSHING. There may be some good reasons for organizing it as a separate corps, Mr. Hull. May I take that into consideration a little bit longer?

Mr. HULL. Certainly.

Gen. PERSHING. I think the question of the construction department has not been brought up, either.

Senator WADSWORTH. Would you care to comment on that?

Gen. PERSHING. No; I think not.

Senator WADSWORTH. Perhaps that could be deferred.

Gen. PERSHING. Yes.

Senator WADSWORTH. Are there any questions this afternoon, gentlemen?

Mr. KAHN. At any rate, you would separate the Air Service from the Signal Corps?

Gen. PERSHING. Oh, yes; the cleavage is so absolute there that there is no question about that at all.

Senator WADSWORTH. Have you any further observations to make this afternoon?

Gen. PERSHING. No, Senator.

Senator WADSWORTH. Then, may Mr. Kahn and I consult with you after this adjournment about another meeting?

Gen. PERSHING. Yes; certainly.

Senator WADSWORTH. We are very much obliged to you for giving us the information you have.

Gen. PERSHING. It has been a great pleasure to me, I am sure. I want you to feel that I am anxious to give you whatever assistance it is possible for me to give.

Senator WADSWORTH. You have made that very evident.

(Thereupon the committee, at 4.05 o'clock p. m., adjourned.)

COMMITTEES ON MILITARY AFFAIRS,
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES AND
UNITED STATES SENATE,
Wednesday, November 5, 1919.

The Committee on Military Affairs of the United States Senate and the Committee on Military Affairs of the House of Representatives met, pursuant to the call of the chairmen, at 10 o'clock a. m., in the Appropriations Committee room of the United States Senate, Capitol.

Present: Senators Wadsworth (chairman), New, Warren, Chamberlain, Fletcher, and Kirby; Representatives Kahn, Anthony, Greene, Hull, Sanford, Fuller, Miller, Dent, Caldwell, Olney, and Harrison.

Senator Wadsworth, chairman of the Senate committee, acted as chairman of the joint committee.

**STATEMENT OF GEN. JOHN J. PERSHING, UNITED STATES ARMY—
Resumed.**

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will be in order.

Gen. Pershing, did you have some matter that you wanted to clear up, as coming over from your former testimony of last Friday and Saturday?

Gen. PERSHING. Yes, Senator.

The CHAIRMAN. We would be very glad if you would do that now, if that is your desire.

Gen. PERSHING. In my discussion the other day of the question of universal training I intended to mention an article that had been written by Prof. Erskine, which I desire to have introduced into my testimony.

Prof. Erskine belongs to the faculty of Columbia University, and was on duty with the American Expeditionary Forces in the capacity of instructor. He was one of the three members of the board that supervised the educational system, assisting Gen. Rees in that regard. He analyzes very carefully the reasons for universal military training, and I should like to submit this and have it become a part of my testimony. Would it be necessary for me to read it?

Mr. KAHN. I do not think so.

The CHAIRMAN. It is not necessary.

Mr. KAHN. What page of the Review of Reviews is that on?

Gen. PERSHING. It is page 416.

Mr. KAHN. Of what month?

Gen. PERSHING. The October number.

Mr. KAHN. That identifies it in the hearing. Is it an article that is copyrighted?

Gen. PERSHING. No; I do not think so. I see nothing to indicate it.

Mr. KAHN. There is nothing to show that it is?

Gen. PERSHING. No; nothing here shows it.

Mr. KAHN. And I do not suppose the author would have any objection to having it inserted into the hearings as a part of your statement, even if it were copyrighted?

Gen. PERSHING. Might I read just two short paragraphs of this, Mr. Chairman?

The mobilization demonstrated also that an appalling number of our young men are not in proper physical condition. It is unlikely that any economic or social pressure will tend to remedy these evils. The illiterate citizen can make a living of a sort more or less satisfactory to himself, and the foreign-born can associate with others of his origin, and both classes can avoid that social criticism which would urge them toward complete citizenship. In fact, economic and social pressure tends actually to segregate in our country the illiterate elements and the various groups of foreign born, and unless some strenuous effort is made to weld all these groups into one, there is no likelihood of change in these unfortunate conditions.

The program of education in the American Expeditionary Forces has demonstrated, on the other hand, that even brief courses of study followed intensively under military discipline are adequate to correct illiteracy and to teach our language. The whole experience of our Army demonstrates further that if brought together in a common purpose the various elements of our population can be speedily made into one nation. We should now find a means to provide these benefits for our country in time of peace.

That is the emphatic part of the article.

(The article referred to is in full as follows:)

UNIVERSAL TRAINING FOR NATIONAL SERVICE.

(By John Erskine.)

No problem now before the United States is more important than the question of national education. Even while we were preparing for war, we had occasion to feel some alarm at certain weakness in our educational system revealed by those preparations. At the same time, so amazed were we at the resourcefulness of our national character in times of stress, that we asked why our great national resources of character and skill should not be mobilized more completely in times of peace for the constant good of the country. Now, that the war is passed we find ourselves facing the special problem of training for national defense. Some kind of Army we must have, large or small, and some kind of training. Shall we give this training solely to a group of professional soldiers? Shall this training look only to the contingencies of war?

Some of us who have been working with our fellow citizens on foreign soil and from that distance have been looking back toward our country, studying it with increased affection, and perhaps also with increased concern, earnestly hope that our people at home will compel training for national defense, and that they will interpret national defense in a larger way than any nation has yet thought of. We have in mind, of course, the total needs of American education—the need of more and better schools, the need of large revisions in college and university curricula, the need of a strong national department of education. For the moment, however, we have in mind particularly the defects of education observed in the United States Army in France, and also what the educational program in the American Expeditionary Forces has done to remedy those defects; and since we are convinced that the time for all progressive nations to organize for peace as well as for war, conceiving of national defense as preparation for peace and war, we would address ourselves for the moment to the specific problem of national training.

The principles according to which we would envisage such national training are five. In the first place, the idea of universal service should be expanded so as to include training for all other duties of citizenship besides military and to

include training of all prospective citizens, even of those physically unfit for military service. In the second place, the present temporary cantonments in the United States, or equivalent cantonments, should be converted at once into permanent training schools for citizenship. In the third place, a permanent educational corps should be added to the Army. This corps should be formed of the most competent experts in school, in vocational, and in the more elementary college subjects. From time to time competent officers in other branches of Army service should be assigned to this corps. In the fourth place, there should be a compulsory training period of 12 months with the colors, from September 1 to September 1, or from June 1 to June 1, or between any other dates which should be found practical, care being taken simply to fit this period into other educational or vocational obligations. This period should be begun between the ages approximately of 18 to 20, perhaps a little earlier or a little later, as experience might prove advisable. Approximately one half of this training should be for military science and for physical development, the other half for training under military discipline in school, in vocational, or in college subjects.

In the first place, the citizen in training should be free to elect the kind of civil education he receives, with the exception that training in elementary subjects should be compulsory for illiterates and for the foreign born.

The mobilization of the American Army demonstrated that an astounding number of native-born citizens are illiterate, and that of our foreign-born citizens a still larger number can not read or write the English language; and in some cases can not understand. The mobilization demonstrated also that an appalling number of our young men are not in proper physical condition. It is unlikely that any economic or social pressure will tend to remedy these evils. The illiterate citizen can make a living of a sort more or less satisfactory to himself, and the foreign born can associate with others of his origin, and both classes can avoid that social criticism which would urge them toward complete citizenship. In fact, economic and social pressure tends actually to segregate in our country the illiterate element and the various groups of foreign born, and unless some strenuous effort is made to weld all these groups into one, there is no likelihood of change in these unfortunate conditions.

The program of education in the American Expeditionary Forces has demonstrated, on the other hand, that even brief courses of study, followed intensively under military discipline, are adequate to correct illiteracy and to teach our language. The whole experience of our Army demonstrates further that if brought together in a common purpose the various elements of our population can be speedily made into one Nation. We should now find a means to provide these benefits for our country in times of peace.

Even those soldiers who are neither illiterate nor unable to command the English language showed to a distressing degree the inefficiency of our popular education. The men waiting to return to the United States were pathetically eager to master some trade or some profession in order to be sure of a worthy place in the society to which they are returning. Far more than one-half of the American Expeditionary Forces are without adequate training for any trade or profession, and perhaps because of the intellectual stimulus of their experiences in the war, the men themselves are uncomfortably aware of their lack. It is disturbing to think that they may miss their proper place in their generation. It is more disturbing to reflect, however, that even had they not come to Europe in the Army, they would still have been without training for professions or trades; in fact, through the Army educational program they are now accidentally receiving such training in preparation for citizenship as is provided nowhere in the United States for any large group of men. It seems folly not to make permanent in our national life for all citizens the advantages which many soldiers now temporarily enjoy.

The mobilization of our Army has shown on the other hand how rich potentially the manhood of our Nation is, and how quickly it responds to the regular life and the scientific care which ever a hurried preparation for war supplied. The soldiers in general enjoyed such health as is the rule in no other community. The total discipline of their life—regular hours, rational diet, and decorum of conduct—have brought out their best physical and moral traits, so that, to look at the average group of American soldiers is a satisfaction; and this condition of health and good living has quickened to the full their intellectual capacities, so that those who have taught them in all subjects from the most elementary to the most advanced have wondered at their eagerness and ability to learn.

Furthermore, the life in the Army has developed in our youth a sense of social cooperation which some of us feared was lacking in the American character. No body of men in our country seems now more eager to study and to deal intelligently with the social problems which confront us than the men of the Army, who have been learning in a kind of a laboratory course what responsibility man owes to his fellow. The fact that in the Army they had met other Americans from all parts of the country has developed a new sense of nationality; and the meeting in the same ranks of rich and poor has developed a new sense of democracy. These advantages of health and morale, of intellectual awakening, of patriotism, and of democratic sympathy we desire to provide for each generation in our country, and as much for those who are never called into battle as for those who in times of the Nation's need answer the call.

It is the logic of our course in this war that our Army, organized to defend the ideals of civilization, is now proving itself to be a vast university of citizenship. It would be the most profitable result of the war for our country and for the world should this university in citizenship become permanent for all our people.

This training should be provided for all men not mentally deficient. Even those who are physically unfit for military service can derive great benefits from such bodily training as is suited to their needs, and quite as much as other men can derive benefit from training in the nonmilitary duties of citizenship. Much of the disrupted thinking in society is done by men physically handicapped, whose point of view toward their fellows is warped or embittered by their own misfortune. In many cases their philosophy of life would be more generous by an improvement in their health, and in all cases society owes it to them to provide even more adequate advantages than for those who start life without handicap. Association with their fellow citizens in a national system of training would probably develop in these men at least a greater sense of unity with the Nation and an increase of pride in what they themselves could contribute to society as a whole. In a very large number of cases the physical defects which now handicap the youth of our country can easily be corrected; but, like illiteracy, they can be corrected only if society insists on bringing the individual under the proper course of training.

The advantage of converting the present training cantonments or equivalent cantonments into permanent training schools is obvious. In our country much sentiment attaches to places of education, and if we are to install in our national life a vast system of training in citizenship, it is in our temper to make of those places where this citizenship is taught shrines, as it were, of affection. If men look back with reverence to their college campus or to the school in which they first had some glimpse of the possibilities of life, there is reason why these large schools should be far more deeply revered in which men from whole sections of the country will be brought together for training in the total defense of their homes—in the defense of their country against possible enemies on sea or land—its defense against disease, ignorance, and incompetence.

In these permanent schools much of the equipment now used for purposes of war could be used constantly for purposes of peace. The materials which in times of war must be gathered hurriedly, instruments for engineering, for chemical research, for hospital and sanitary service, would be maintained at the highest point of excellence in the laboratories of these schools. At the American Expeditionary Forces University at Beaune, the laboratories in chemistry, physics, bacteriology, medicine, biology, engineering, fine arts, and music have been supplied largely out of the resources of the Army. On the return of the Army to the United States it would be in the highest degree desirable if these laboratories could continue to serve educational purposes, and other laboratories also on a much larger scale, which would then be available at short notice for any emergency in national defense.

If it is desirable to maintain for permanent uses the material instruments which our Army temporarily collects for war, it is still more desirable to retain for the advantage of our country in times of peace the educational resources which the Army must also improvise for war. A part of the duty of the modern Army involves scholarship of a high order, knowledge of languages of history, of international politics, and, of course, of the sciences. A nation which trains for all duties of citizenship, civil as well as military, will find it advantageous to develop in peace times the scholarship in the same things.

To conduct such schools as are described above experts would be needed for the teaching of all elementary and secondary school subjects, for the teaching

of trades and vocations, and for the teaching of such subjects of college or university grade as the youth in training would be studying at the time. An addition to the experts who would form the nucleus of this educational corps, teachers should be recruited from officers in other branches of Army service, who from time to time would thus have an opportunity to expand their own scholarship and to make a direct contribution to the intellectual and social life of the country. Hitherto it has been only by accident that armies have been permitted to do constructive social work; after a war with Cuba, for example, the Army surgeon is permitted to clean up a fever district. There is no reason why the training of engineers, or surgeons, or officers in every branch of the service should not at all times be at the disposal of the country.

It will be noted that in the period of training the proportion of nonmilitary education is approximately equivalent to the amount of time required to study yearly in the average high school or college. The time, therefore, spent in national training would not be in addition to the years required for higher education. The period of training is so situated between high school and college that the young men, the comparatively few of our country who enjoy a college education, can during the year of service cover the ground of their freshman work and can also learn habits of application and of study at the moment when they most need to learn them. In fact, it is not impossible that the months spent in the unusually favorable conditions of regular hours and good health will save time for the average student.

No one familiar with college life is blind to the fact that college students ordinarily waste the greater part of their time; this is true even if one admits that an important benefit of college life is the social contact established with other men of one's age. It is not so generally realized that the average college student is extremely careless in his diet and, on the whole, is far below the physical state in which at his age he should be. It has been the hope of college athletics to correct this deplorable condition, but in this hope college athletics has been disappointed. Army life, however, as this war has demonstrated, provides for every soldier a finer system of training than athletes usually submit themselves to in times of peace. The student in perfect health will waste less time in idleness and will make greater progress when he does study than the average college boy as we have known him.

Obviously we must teach the illiterate to read and write, and we must teach the foreign-born to use our language. Aside from this obligation, however, an essential feature of national training should be the complete liberty of the man trained to select his studies. The Nation should undertake during the year of training to advance him as far as possible in any course of study which he desires and is equipped to follow. If he looks forward to business, to agriculture, to industry, then his training should help him toward that career. If he expects to attend college, the training should take the place of his freshman year. If he desires to study art, his training should be in art.

Experience with the educational program in the American Expeditionary Forces demonstrates almost unthought-of potentialities in the American character. Our soldiers apparently had as great native endowments in the arts as the most favored of the Latin races, and a system of national training which should try to develop all of the latent powers of the individual would shortly transform our national life. Perhaps the temptation of any such system as we are here suggesting would be to prescribe for the youth of the Nation what it should study. This temptation must be absolutely avoided. To yield to it would be to overwhelm the whole country in that form of intellectual Prussianism which now fortunately is found only in the conservative catalogues of some of our universities—those which persist in prescribing subjects which are dead, or in teaching vital subjects as though they were dead. Beyond this suggested system of national training, the universities should still pursue their work of teaching and research, functioning according to their special facilities. But the Nation should undertake to make an inventory of its citizenship in each generation and to advance every man as far as possible toward the work to which he feels called.

Such a system of training as is here suggested would be very expensive. The items of expense would be buildings and their upkeep, their equipment, the teachers who would form the framework of the educational corps, and the cost of providing subsistence for the men in training. All these expenses, however, should be charged frankly to national education, and the Nation should realize that in one form or another this outlay is unavoidable. We may refuse to combat illiteracy and disease, we may refuse to assume responsibility

for the making of the foreign elements in the United States into a unified nation; but in that case we shall pay for the support of poorhouses, of hospitals, of jails, and of police, and we shall pay even more heavily in loss of national health and efficiency. If we are to check the ignorance, the disease, and the discontent which in various ways menace our society, we must be ready to pay as much for education as we are now prepared to invest in international canals or in war bills.

It is a tendency of our country to disguise the cost of education. We remit taxes on educational buildings and on lands devoted to educational purposes, and in our bookkeeping we distribute the cost of tuition. Yet, even when the whole account is shown, it does not appear that we give generously to education, though as a nation we have enjoyed the reputation of great generosity in this field. Until we are ready to pay for popular education, we are not likely to achieve even approximately those minimum results which we sometimes try to make ourselves believe we are reaching. In order to give even one year of sound training to every young man in our country, it will be necessary to assume the cost as a national expense. There should, of course, be some financial return to the country in the greater efficiency of our citizens and in the decrease of disease and of irresponsibility. But whether or not such a result does follow, the Nation should be asked now to face the internal peril of illiteracy and of ignorance as frankly and as generously as it faced the menace of an enemy from abroad. A system of training so organized would have obvious advantages.

In a general way each training camp would become an educational center. More specifically, the annual inventory of our educational shortcomings would point out for our school system the task to which it should address itself. Undoubtedly the result would be that year by year the schools would send to training camps generations better prepared; by keeping the election of the courses in the training camps entirely free, we should be able to assist each student to make progress from the point at which his education had left off, and the gradual rise of standards in the courses in this year of training would be the barometer of the intellectual progress of the Nation. The year of training would also show which parts of the country were providing adequate facilities for education, and means could be taken by the National Government to improve the elementary schools in those districts. It is not unlikely that as a result of this national training, and of the statistics which it would make available, the Nation would soon be persuaded, as it should have been persuaded long ago, to establish in the Federal Government a strong department of education, and that department would collaborate with the Army in training for citizenship.

But the most direct advantage would be for the large majority of our young men who at present receive no high-school training at all, nor even much elementary education. To insure for them a reasonable start in life would be worth any cost and any effort. In no other way than by national training, undertaken as a national expense, can this vast body of each generation be sought out in the small town, on the farm, in the overcrowded city, and can be taught the things essential to each individual case. To care for this neglected majority would be really to train our Nation.

Perhaps the byproduct of such a system of training as is here outlined would be the bringing of the Army into a sane relation with society. Through the fear of militarism which possesses the modern world, it has become our custom to support the Army and to admire military science only in moments of extreme need. As a result, the soldier in war time receives an adulation perhaps exaggerated, and in peace times he is neglected, feared, certainly put to no good use. At this moment, when our Army thinks of returning, it is interesting to consider that every man in it hopes to go back to some constructive work for his country, except the professional soldier. He can look forward only to inactivity until the spasmodic need of him arises again. Perhaps society is wise in fearing the Army which has nothing to do; it has been stupid, however, in finding no use for the Army in time of peace. If we could add to the military functions of our Army the constructive kind of national defense, we should be providing a noble and honored career for the man on whom in extreme moments the life of the Nation depends; we should be bringing the soldier into constant relation with the social needs of the country he serves, and we should be teaching every youth within our borders that large conception of citizenship expressed for the Anglo-Saxon race by John Milton, "I call a

complete and general education that which fits a man to perform justly, skillfully, and magnanimously all offices, both private and public, of peace and war."

In completing my remarks regarding universal military training, I should like to invite your special attention to one particularly important advantage of such a system. We are now confronted with serious social problems resulting from the presence of large masses or ignorant foreigners in our midst, who are highly susceptible to the anarchistic or bolshevistic proposals of numerous agitators now at work. The influence of the public schools is insufficient to weld this portion of our population to the body of real American citizens, due to the fact that these foreigners usually collect in such large groups that few truly American children find a place in the public schools in such neighborhoods.

Universal military training is the only means I see available for educating this foreign element in the real meaning of the democracy of our Government and its institutions, and for developing them into good citizens before they fall under the sway of dangerous agitators and become a real menace to the country.

With reference to my discussion the other day of the question of promotion by selection, or to a certain extent by selection, I wish to submit for the consideration of the committee a plan that has been proposed and which seems to have considerable merit. It provides, in general terms, for the selection of officers by their fellows. In other words, it would fit into the proposition that I made the other day of dividing officers of different grades into three classes, and perhaps giving them a standing in each class. This would aid in arranging those selected for promotion according to merit, and would depend upon the opinions of their own fellows.

Without going into any further detail, I should like to submit it for consideration. Would you like to have it discussed any further?

The CHAIRMAN. I would like to ask, General, has it any characteristics of balloting or reports from every officer to every other officer?

Gen. PERSHING. We will take, for instance, the grade of captain. If they were divided into three classes and arranged according to merit, those with the highest rating, the group of three or five of the highest rating, would form a board for the selection and rating of the others, according to their efficiency; and a following board, a board, we will say, of the next five who stood the highest in the grade of captain; would form a board for the selection by general merit. You see, these are different boards. Each rating would count a certain percentage; then you would count a certain percentage for seniority; then you would count a certain percentage, for, we will say, standing in the last examination, making a total of 100 per cent. These would be independent agencies. Then the several ratings are all sent to The Adjutant General, and the man's rating is given and it becomes part of his record. In brief that is the idea. If I might submit this?

The CHAIRMAN. We will be very glad to have it.

Mr. KAHN. Is it something like the board provided in the Navy for agreeing on who should be promoted?

Gen. PERSHING. Yes; it is the new idea of obtaining the views of an officer's fellows as to his qualifications for promotion without going into too many details.

(The matter submitted by Gen. Pershing is as follows:)

A SCHEME FOR MAKING SELECTIONS FOR PROMOTION.

A periodic rating, say annually, in which the following percentages will be given:

1. For seniority, 30 per cent.

(In computing this seniority the time the official has served in the grade in which he then is only will be taken into consideration.)

2. Selection, 30 per cent.

3. Efficiency, 30 per cent.

4. Rating in last previous examination, 10 per cent.

The men who received the highest rating in each grade would be ex officio members of the computing boards; one committee composed of the men holding the highest numbers to be the selecting board; one committee composed of men who hold the next highest numbers to be the efficiency board.

The 30 per cent for selection should be by selection, pure and simple. The selection board could have authority to use all the information at hand or call for such as it might want as to character, fitness, and experience. It would rate all the officers of each grade, giving them their numerical order in accordance with selection. This would be figured only to the convenient decimal point in percentage, which would be passed in for ultimate computation. The efficiency board could have advice from the local officers and inspectors and such data as might be on file, and which should be properly filed with them, as to the manner in which officers had performed the duties which had been assigned them, condition of the companies in the cases of captains, excellence of marksmanship in cases of artillery, etc. The officers, as in selection, would get their numerical order on the total list of officers in that grade, which would again be computed and the percentage passed out to the ultimate computation.

All promotions under this system would be strictly in accordance with the numerical list, the highest man in the next grade receiving the first vacancy. It would be very advisable to have promotion go to the highest officer in the service, regardless of the branch of service, and let him serve for awhile perhaps in some other branch of the service for the sake of his general education, and let him transfer back to his own branch when the proper vacancy came. This would widen his experience and be particularly valuable to him when he came to be in the higher commands, when he would have to command Infantry, Cavalry, and Artillery.

An essential part of this scheme would be the elimination of those men who got the lowest rating in each annual rating, not taking into consideration in this computation the figures for seniority. If officers recently promoted were to go out because their seniority rating was low, a real hardship would be the effect; but the men lowest on the list for selection and efficiency, and on their examinations, should be dropped each year.

This would be the elimination part of the plan. It would have the stimulating effect on the whole service of fear of being the last, and tend to push the whole service ahead. The number to go out could be easily figured, and should be fairly liberal. It would be based on the percentage of the total number in that grade. But a percentage of the lowest men of each grade ought to be dropped each year; and whether 1 man or 50 were to go out would depend on whether there are 50 or 1,000 in the grade.

The question was asked the other day as to what should be done with disabled temporary officers, emergency officers. After making a brief study of this question it seems to me that it is now before Congress in the form of a bill which increases the war risk allotments for certain disability. I believe that those allotments were fixed at the beginning of the war according to a certain rate, but, due to the high cost of living and increase of expenses that these disabled veterans will be subjected to, the Sweet bill, as I understand it, has practically doubled the original allowance. It seems to me

that for the present this would meet the situation, both as to officers and enlisted men, as the allowance is rather liberal, and I should like to recommend that every consideration be given to the provisions of that bill.

The question came up the other day as to the promotions of officers who had held some of the higher grades in the Army in France. I recommended that the grades of lieutenant general and general be reserved for bestowal upon those officers who had specially distinguished themselves during the war.

Of those of whom I have particular knowledge I should like to recommend to your joint committee the consideration of the names of Gen. Liggett, Gen. Bullard, Gen. Dickman, Gen. McAndrew, and Gen. Harbord for promotion to the grade of lieutenant general for distinguished services.

I am of the opinion also that it should be a policy in making future promotions in the service that those officers who, in the position of corps commander, especially distinguished themselves should be selected for the permanent grade of major general in the service, and that those who served with distinction as division commanders, or as the heads of important staff departments, including the General Staff, should be selected for promotion to the grade of brigadier general.

Whether your committees desire to take legislative action on that is a matter for you to decide.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. May I ask you, General, in that connection, if the officers whom you have just named personally were selected for their commands by you, or were they selected by a board, or how were they selected?

Gen. PERSHING. They were selected by me personally.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. And were the division commanders selected by you as well?

Gen. PERSHING. The divisions arrived in France with their division commanders, the selections having been made here. They were frequently changed, however, by myself after they arrived.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. They were changed there, some of them?

Gen. PERSHING. Yes.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. So that those selections for division commanders were made in this country before they went there in the first instance?

Gen. PERSHING. Originally, yes.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. How many divisions were there? How many division commanders were there?

Gen. PERSHING. There were 42 altogether.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. How many changes were made in the division commanders after they got over there? Do you recall—by you?

Gen. PERSHING. No; I could get that; I do not recall just offhand, Senator.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. It is not very material, but I should just like to know what percentage of those who were selected here were retained by you after they reached there with their divisions.

Gen. PERSHING. I can hand that in to you, Senator. I could not just say without looking it up.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. The promotions of division commanders to be corps commanders made vacancies to which others were promoted?

Gen. PERSHING. Yes.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. That would account for some of the changes?

Gen. PERSHING. Yes.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. But did you make any changes for inefficiency in division commanders, or rather, because you thought there were others that would make better division commanders than the ones who came over with divisions?

Gen. PERSHING. I frequently made changes, because I thought there were others who could command the divisions better.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. Yes, sir. But you do not recall just now how many changes you made?

Gen. PERSHING. No, sir.

Senator KIRBY. Gen. Pershing, you had supreme authority in the promotion and designation of officers on the other side, did you not, and your recommendations were invariably followed?

Gen. PERSHING. Well, my recommendations were usually followed. Generally speaking, they were followed. I had no authority myself to make such promotions.

Senator KIRBY. Generally speaking, all the recommendations and suggestions as to selection of officers and promotion in the A. E. F. were left to you, and your recommendations were followed on this side?

Gen. PERSHING. Generally speaking; yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you have something else that you wanted to discuss, General, before we took up the other matter?

Gen. PERSHING. The question of the proper place for the Dental Corps was left for further consideration. I am of the opinion that the Dental Corps should continue as a part of the Medical Department.

There was also a question as to where the Veterinary Corps should be placed. I think that also should be a part of the Medical Department.

There has been some discussion as to the Construction Corps as organized after war began. I believe that it has been recently operating here at home as a separate corps. It seems to me that it might very well be placed for the future, in view of the fact that we shall not have very much construction, comparatively speaking, under the Quartermaster Corps; I believe that is where it belongs.

Senator FLETCHER. General, have you had occasion to confer with Gen. Marshall about the amount of construction work?

General PERSHING. Yes. I discussed this whole subject with Gen. Marshall, and read a very interesting report that he had made on the work that he has done, and I consider that it has been done very efficiently.

But it seems to me that it might be done under the same management, practically as efficiently, even though it be placed under the Quartermaster Corps.

Gen. Marshall, if you will remember, was in charge of the construction department, or, at least, had a prominent position in the construction department under the Quartermaster General; and,

for administrative reasons, or for whatever reasons came up—I suppose on account of the enormity of the work that the department had under its control—it was given an independence during the war, which seemed to be necessary.

But in order to avoid the permanent establishment of so many different bureaus, it seems to me that from now on it should be under the Quartermaster Corps.

Senator FLETCHER. What I had in mind mainly was the testimony before us by Gen. Marshall to the effect that a good many million dollars would have to be spent in the cost of construction in these camps and preparing them for training and a great deal of work is involved in that. I do not know whether you had gone over that with him or not.

Senator NEW. He fixed sixty-six millions as the minimum of the expenditures to be required for making over the cantonments?

Gen. PERSHING. Yes.

Senator NEW. Making them suitable for officers' quarters.

Gen. PERSHING. Yes; I read his report through very carefully.

Senator FLETCHER. It indicates a good deal of construction work ahead of us, if we go on with the plan with regard to universal military training, and that is one item that we have been figuring on very much—\$66,000,000 worth of construction work to put the cantonments in condition where they can be used.

Senator NEW. As I recall, he said that was a minimum figure.

Senator FLETCHER. Yes.

Senator NEW. And the prospects are for the expenditure of several times that.

Mr. KAHN. General, as I understand you, you recommend that the construction corps be continued as a part of the Quartermaster's Department.

Gen. PERSHING. Yes; it should have an organization similar to the one it has now, and I have no doubt that the Quartermaster General would simply embody it as it stands, as a part of his organization. That would be the logical and rational thing for him to do.

Mr. KAHN. It would not disrupt the Construction Corps if we were to transfer it?

Gen. PERSHING. I should think not at all.

Mr. CALDWELL. The thing that it would save would be a duplication of service at the various posts and cantonments, so that instead of having a Quartermaster Corps for one thing and a construction department for another thing, it would all be under one head?

Gen. PERSHING. Yes. There might be a saving there.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you have some other matters that you wanted to take up now?

Gen. PERSHING. I think that ends my list.

Senator KIRBY. With regard to military justice, I have had some suggestions made to me that seemed to me to have some weight, to the effect that there ought to be provided in the regulations or by law a judge advocate general, or a judge advocate, whose especial duty it would be to look after the defense of all soldiers charged with offenses. It seems to me that that ought to be done. If it can be done under Army regulations, then it might be well to leave it to regulation. Otherwise, there ought to be a law providing that

all men charged with offenses in the Army should be defended, or their interests protected by a judge advocate appointed for that purpose. I do not know whether your experience directly with that department would have called the necessity for this matter to your attention or not.

Gen. PERSHING. In the trial of military persons for serious offenses before general courts-martial, they are entitled to have counsel, you know, Senator.

Senator KIRBY. Yes, I know; but the Government ought to supply a man whose duty it is to represent these people without having a man to procure counsel of his own, or to be represented by some officer who is not skilled in such matters. It seems to me that the Government ought to provide a man for the defense of the soldier charged with an offense, just the same as an officer is provided for his prosecution.

Gen. PERSHING. Well, the necessity for that, Senator, had never occurred to me. In fact, while, of course, I have not been thrown in very close contact during the war with courts-martial, I am of the opinion that officers generally when detailed by superior authority to defend military persons before general courts-martial have entered into those duties with a very great interest in their cases, and have to the very best of their ability safeguarded the rights of the accused. I have no reason to think otherwise.

Senator KIRBY. I agree with you that that probably has been the case; but if there was a man charged specially, an officer charged specially, with that duty, then it would be his business to look after it, and all those who were accused might have occasion immediately to consult him or to take up the matter with him, and have their rights protected. It would not necessarily delay matters.

Gen. PERSHING. Would you have this officer a member of the Judge Advocate's Corps?

Senator KIRBY. Yes, sir; just have a man appointed there for the same purpose that you have the other officer. Let him be a lawyer, or a man who was reasonably well informed, to look after those matters. It is just as necessary that a soldier who has been charged with an offense should have a fair trial as it is that a soldier who is guilty should be punished.

Gen. PERSHING. Without any question.

Mr. CALDWELL. Do you understand that there is anything in the law now that prevents—

Senator KIRBY. I do not know that there is anything in the law, but there is nothing in the law to have the Government supply a man he may favor.

Mr. CALDWELL. That is like the people's counsel that has been adopted in some of the States.

Senator KIRBY. Yes. In my State every man has a right to have an attorney. The court appoints him, and he must serve and defend this man without any fee, so far as that is concerned.

Mr. CALDWELL. I understand that in the Army when a military person is called before a court-martial, he has a right to select anybody, commissioned or noncommissioned or enlisted, to defend him that is in the service. He can select any member of the Judge Advocate General's Corps, could he not, General?

Senator KIRBY. I do not think it extends to them at all. This other gives him a right to do that, and I believe that ought to be done.

Mr. CALDWELL. Am I right in saying that, General?

Gen. PERSHING. No. The judge advocates are not subject to such selection.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. As a matter of practice, General, I think some one is designated among the persons present to defend a prisoner. He may be a lieutenant, he may be an enlisted man, he may be a noncommissioned officer; and the person so designated usually appears and defends.

Gen. PERSHING. Yes; and usually the man is allowed to make a selection; and if the officer is available he is usually detailed.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. He is permitted to select if he wants to?

Gen. PERSHING. He is permitted to select an officer; and if the officer is available for that duty, it is the custom to detail him; and, generally speaking, the rights of the accused are very carefully guarded by commanding officers and by courts as well; and, I might add, too, Senator Kirby, that in the selection of these officers to defend accused persons, his knowledge of law and his ability to handle the case is usually taken into consideration. They select good men wherever available.

Senator KIRBY. I understand that. I have had the suggestion from some gentlemen who were judge advocates in the Army, who were lawyers of experience before going into the Army, and also I have had requests from soldiers, asking me to procure clemency and restoration to the service, and the complaint about the defenses that they had had, and that the man selected to defend did not take any interest in it; in fact, that he had done things against the wishes of the accused, and a whole lot of things like that. But an officer who is qualified and whose business it is to look after that, would not only protect the soldier's interests but would facilitate the trial and the promotion of justice, it seems to me, and I believe that that ought to be done; and if it is not properly safeguarded now in the regulations, I believe that a law ought to require it.

I just wanted to have your views, and I am very glad to have them on that subject.

Mr. KAHN. That would require the appointment of such an officer at every camp where there is a judge advocate?

Senator KIRBY. Yes. That ought to be done; there ought to be one for defense as well as for prosecution.

Mr. ANTHONY. In that regard, you would not approve of a suggestion to interfere with the right of the accused to select as his counsel anyone whom he might care to choose, would you?

Gen. PERSHING. No; I should not; because the accused should be left with the impression that he has had—

Mr. ANTHONY (interposing). The kind of trial he wants.

Gen. PERSHING. The kind of trial he wants; that he has gotten full justice and has been given every consideration.

Senator KIRBY. I think he should be allowed to hire counsel if he wants to do so, but there should be some officer there to look after his interests under all conditions, whether he is able to employ counsel or knows whom to select, or anything of that kind.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. This is a subject, General, that is being looked into by a subcommittee, but are you familiar with the British system of court-martial procedure?

Gen. PERSHING. Not in detail, Senator.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. Where there is a judge advocate general present rather as an adviser and not as a member of the court, so as to see that the law is properly administered?

Gen. PERSHING. Yes.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. We have no such system in our country.

The CHAIRMAN. If there are no further questions coming over from the other days, General, we can proceed now to a discussion of Senate bill 3340, which has for its purpose the creation of a department of the air, and which was handed to you last Friday or Saturday.

Gen. PERSHING. Yes.

Senator NEW. Before you take up the bill formally, Mr. Chairman, I would like to ask some general questions, if I may be permitted to do so, if it is agreeable to Gen. Pershing that I should.

Gen. PERSHING. Quite so, Senator. I am quite at your disposal.

Senator NEW. First, General, what importance do you attach to a competent air service in the military operations of the future?

Gen. PERSHING. I think a military air service is a very important auxiliary service, and one that is necessary to success. I would place it on the same footing as any of the principal auxiliary services; as artillery, for instance.

Senator NEW. In his testimony before the committee a short time ago, Assistant Secretary Crowell, who had recently made a trip abroad, spoke of an interview that he had had over there with Marshal Foch, in which he quoted Marshal Foch as saying that the fact was very clearly demonstrated in the present war, that if a nation is to conquer she must have superiority in the air. Do you agree with that?

Gen. PERSHING. Won't you please read that again, Senator.

Senator NEW. That if a nation is to conquer she must have supremacy in the air.

Gen. PERSHING. Yes; I think that is a very clear statement of it.

Senator NEW. He also quoted Gen. Duval, who was the director of military aeronautics in France, as saying that if commercial aviation is not encouraged and stimulated military aviation will die. Do you agree with that?

Gen. PERSHING. Well, I should think that that would depend upon the liberality with which appropriations were made for military aviation.

I would not accept that as it stands, Senator. Military aviation could be kept alive if there were enough money appropriated for the purpose.

Senator NEW. But, General, that opens up the question, of course, of how much money is required for the maintenance of an industry that is big enough to supply the demands in time of emergency, does it not?

Gen. PERSHING. Yes. If we enter into the practical analysis of my reply, the sums required to keep us prepared in military aviation would be rather large.

Senator NEW. Is it not true, General, that England, France, and Italy have established, or have in course of establishment, separate departments of the air?

Gen. PERSHING. England has established a separate department, and the tendency generally is in that direction.

Senator NEW. Don't you think that a compact and efficient air service is to-day an essential feature of the national defense?

Gen. PERSHING. Yes; I do.

Senator NEW. Do you think an air force of this description can be as well provided and maintained if control is divided between the Army, the Navy, the Marine Corps, the Post Office Department, and other agencies, as it would be if concentrated in a single department?

Gen. PERSHING. It seems to me, Senator, that the concentration under some control is necessary to the rational development of aviation.

Senator NEW. Is it not too late to undertake the establishment of such a service when we have entered upon a war?

Gen. PERSHING. The organization should be there, and a knowledge of our resources should be in the hands of the aviation authorities, and we should have, as far as economically expedient, a sufficient plant with which to begin operations when war comes upon us. It would be impossible for us to maintain prior to the outbreak of war, a sufficient quantity of aviation to carry on the war, because production must go on during the war, as it did during the last war.

Senator NEW. That brings up the practical analysis of the answer that you made a short time ago, and, in view of what you said concerning the necessity for a large air force, and what you have further said just now, I will ask you if you think the Army and the Navy, unassisted, would be able in peace time to provide such a service—the kind of service that is required? Would not the cost of it be prohibitive?

Gen. PERSHING. The expenditure required, Senator, would be very large.

Senator NEW. I take it that that is what Gen. Duval had in mind when he said, "If commercial aviation is not stimulated and encouraged, military aviation dies." Is that your inference which you draw from that?

Gen. PERSHING. Probably that is a Frenchman's way of stating it.

Senator NEW. In other words, the types of planes that are requisite for military purposes change rapidly, owing to the present stage of development of the science, and, for that reason as well as regard for the expense involved, the army should not overstock with planes that are likely to become obsolete in a short time?

Gen. PERSHING. It is very essential to guard against that.

Senator NEW. This being true, then is it not necessary for the country to have in it an industry that can be diverted to the production of military machines as types change and as emergency may require it?

Gen. PERSHING. I fully approve of it; yes, sir.

Senator NEW. Do you not know that England, France, Italy, and perhaps other countries are lending the encouragement of their Governments to the building up of such an industry in their own countries?

Gen. PERSHING. I understand that that is the fact.

Senator NEW. It is, of course, taken for granted that we will never have a war with any of these countries, but it is easy to conceive that we might be at war with some nation under circumstances that would prevent their supplying us, and if they could and would they would probably also supply our enemies; besides, their very remoteness would entail an almost prohibitive handicap, wouldn't it?

Gen. PERSHING. It would be a very serious handicap; yes, sir.

Senator NEW. It would therefore appear, would it not, that ordinary military prudence demands that we must rely upon ourselves for this great military necessity?

Gen. PERSHING. The same as we should rely upon ourselves for all military necessities.

Senator NEW. Exactly.

Gen. PERSHING. Yes, sir.

Senator NEW. We know that the English have crossed the Atlantic in single nonstop flights with both lighter than air and heavier than air types of aircraft within the last few months; that we have ourselves put a flying boat across with but one stop. I see by the papers that one day last week Col. Hartz flew in a Martin bomber from San Diego to El Paso, 857 miles, without a stop; and we know that several of our fliers flew across the continent and back recently, one of them making the one-way trip in about 21 hours actual flying time.

Do these accomplishments carry any military lesson; and if so, what is it?

Gen. PERSHING. They show that much greater use is likely to be made of aviation in the future than in the past, as great as the development was during the war; and that if we are to keep abreast of the times, we should encourage the development of aviation.

Senator NEW. Does it not prove to your mind that we must encourage it, that we must be prepared to meet any offensives that may be launched against us in the air by any possible enemy?

Gen. PERSHING. That brings up the question of offensives from across the sea, Senator, if that is what you have in mind.

Senator NEW. Yes; I have in mind, necessarily, an offensive from across the sea, because our neighbors on this continent are few, and there is but one of them, perhaps, with whom our relations have been at all threatening; but, speaking generally on the subject, either by land or sea, don't you think we must be prepared to meet our offensives just exactly as we must be prepared to meet one launched either by a navy or by an army?

Gen. PERSHING. Oh, assuredly, Senator; assuredly, I do.

Senator NEW. I have here, incident to that, a personal letter from "The Flying Parson," Lieut. Maynard, who made the trip across from Mineola to San Francisco and back, in which occurs this one paragraph, which may be of some interest. He says:

With the proper cooperation, we can, within the next 18 months, have planes with which we can traverse the continent within 24 hours, making only one stop.

If that prediction is anywhere near true, does it not also add to the importance of the question of providing a military air force that is commensurate in size with all possible requirements?

Gen. PERSHING. I think we should have, as I have already stated, Senator, a sufficient military air force; but does it not also suggest the development along commercial lines, more especially, perhaps, than military lines?

Senator NEW. I take this view of it, that unless we have the commercial industry, we will have nothing from which we can obtain the planes that are necessary for military uses when the emergency arises.

Gen. PERSHING. Yes.

Senator NEW. It is my personal view, which need not impress itself particularly upon you, or upon anybody else, but it is my personal view that the Army and the Navy can not spend money enough on their needs in peace times to keep afloat an industry that is big enough to supply their needs in case of emergency; that that industry is necessarily dependent upon commercial demand for its prosperity and for its existence in any considerable size.

Senator KIRBY. If the Senator is through I want to ask the General a question.

Senator NEW. No; I am not through.

Gen. PERSHING. I think consideration of that subject by any thoughtful person, Senator, would cause him to agree with you, exactly.

Senator NEW. Now, General, in case we were to be attacked at any point along our coast by a large air force, would there be any certainly successful way of repelling it except by the interposition of a stronger air force of our own?

Gen. PERSHING. That would be the best way to meet it.

Senator NEW. Would it not be the only certain way of meeting it?

Gen. PERSHING. We combine, of course, an offensive use of aviation with a defensive system, you know, Senator.

Senator NEW. Yes.

Gen. PERSHING. In the establishment of anti-aircraft guns and all of that sort of thing; but the main reliance for defense in the air is a successful offensive, the same as it is in fighting on land.

Senator NEW. In that connection, I would like to quote what Gen. Trenchard, of the Royal Air Force, chief of staff of the Royal Air Force, recently said on that subject. Are you acquainted with Gen. Trenchard?

Gen. PERSHING. Very well.

Senator NEW. He is quoted as having said this:

Defense in two dimensions is comparatively simple, but for defense in the third dimension there is no real effective instrument but an air force capable of immediate contact with the enemy in the air and able to defeat it. Consequently, an air force additional to the detachments used for the navy and army should be organized under a ministry independent of the other two services; for if this force is an appendage of either of the other services it will not develop its strategy and tactics along broad enough lines.

Do you agree with Gen. Trenchard in that?

Gen. PERSHING. Gen. Trenchard's tendency was to branch off, or rather follow his own lines. He established a separate air force during the winter of 1918, and prepared to conduct bombing expeditions into Germany, especially along the Rhine; but the failure of Gen. Trenchard's scheme was that he did not have cooperation between himself and even the commander of the British forces,

showing the tendency of some of these air enthusiasts to jump at the conclusion that war can be won by the air service, which is very erroneous. Gen. Trenchard's position was finally adjusted, and he was placed under the control of the commander in chief of the British forces. This, as a matter of fact, came to our especial knowledge because Gen. Trenchard's air force was established by direction from the central Government in England, and he came even into our zone of operations, and occupied landing fields, and all of that sort of thing.

What I mean to say is, there is a tendency—I mean to illustrate that there is a tendency to go a little too fast in this thing, and to jump at conclusions that war can be won by any especial service.

In discussing the question of air, we must not forget that its relation with the other arms must always be well considered, and the size of the forces well balanced, in order to make the best fighting organization, and in this connection I would like to say that the Infantry is the predominant basic arm, and that no offensive can be launched without the Infantry. We are prone to build up branch departments and auxiliary arms, and all of that, to the neglect of the Infantry. Victory can not be assured without an aggressive, well-trained, and intelligent Infantry, whose officers possess in the highest degree the qualities of combined and individual initiative. The new infantry armament, coupled with difficulties of leadership and hardships of prolonged and constant fighting, makes thorough training indispensable, and makes it indispensable to train with Infantry all the other arms. In other words, the problem is to take your battalion, or whatever your fighting unit happens to be, and support it with all that it needs to fight with, and to utilize all of the auxiliary fighting arms in helping it get forward to the objective of its attack, which is the enemy's line, and in that, of course, your aviation plays a very large part, and in that—or perhaps I am anticipating a little bit this bill. Mr. Senator, but if I may just continue along here, will you permit me, please?

Senator NEW. Certainly.

Gen. PERSHING. That requires a very careful and close training and cooperation in time of peace with the Infantry fellow there, with the man who carries the gun and the bayonet, and you have to protect him from attack by the enemy's aviation. You have got to protect him from observation by the enemy's aviation, in order to save him from being the objective of his destructive artillery.

So that the problem is one that hinges absolutely on the accurate and careful training of all these branches, including the aviation, as a support to the Infantry.

Now, I just want to emphasize that particular point in this discussion, so that we may not lose sight of the fact that in preparing for war aviation is not an independent arm and can not be for a long time to come, if ever. War has not changed in thousands of years in that regard. The man who carries the spear or the rifle or the bayonet, whatever arm he happens to carry at the time, is the man that we are trying to support, and he is the fellow that we have got to get forward in order to win the victory.

Senator NEW. I do not say this to dispute what you say, General, but when you speak of thousands of years, that is all true, but it is

only within the last few years that you have had an aeroplane, that it has come into existence. It is an entirely new thing.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. The general concludes that you are an aviation enthusiast.

Gen. PERSHING. No; I am not indulging in any personalities.

Senator NEW. No; not at all. I recognize that.

Mr. GREENE. Senator New, had you finished?

Senator NEW. No; is the equipment of planes and ships now in our possession even measurably sufficient for such a purpose? I mean is the equipment of planes and ships now in the possession of the Army and the Navy, so far as you know it, sufficient for all purposes, either for offense or defense?

Gen. PERSHING. You mean as to numbers, Senator?

Senator NEW. As to numbers or types?

Gen. PERSHING. No; I think not. I think we are quite deficient both as to numbers and types.

Senator NEW. I ask this question for the reason that Congress has within the last week refused an appropriation of \$15,000,000 for the purchase of additional planes. Do you know what the present condition of the aircraft industry in the United States is?

Gen. PERSHING. I have not gone into it very definitely, but I understand that the construction has practically ceased.

Senator NEW. Well, I am able to state definitely that in the three months ending with September 30 there were just 58 airplanes of all types made in the United States, 22 of which were made in September, 22 in August, and 14 in July. I do not know how many have been made since. But, of course, in many countries—well, in England, England alone turned out in the month of July 2,000. I presume that they are continuing production at that rate since, but July is the last month for which I have any figures. It is true, is it not, that the machines we have are rapidly wearing out and that they are practically of obsolescent type now?

Gen. PERSHING. Very true; and you will recall that some of the planes on which we started production early upon our entrance into the war became practically obsolete before we got any over there.

Senator NEW. Yes.

Gen. PERSHING. But they were ready to ship.

Senator NEW. General, you said the other day—reference was made to an order that came from your headquarters stopping the manufacture of the Spad machine here. You said that you would look that up and give the committee the facts about that when you appeared again. Have you had an opportunity to inquire into it since?

Gen. PERSHING. Yes, sir. I have looked it up in its broad outlines. I procured this data from our records and otherwise.

The first negotiations with the French for the rights to manufacture Spad machines were conducted in Washington in June, 1917. No particular reference was made to type, but the latest machine then in use was a Spad 180. No concrete results came from these negotiations. As soon as the Bolling Commission arrived in Europe they undertook, in conjunction with air officers of the A. E. F., to ascertain the best type of pursuit machines. The result of these investigations was a recommendation in favor of the Spad bi-mitrailleuse 200-horsepower Hispano-Suiza. This recommendation

was concurred in by the British, French, and Italians and was cabled to the United States in P. 46.

At the time P. 46 was sent the Spad 150 and Spad 180 were manifestly out of date, and it would have been a waste of time and money to have built these machines in the United States.

But while in July all concerned believed that the Spad 200 was the latest thing in pursuit machines, by September 1 it had been ascertained, as the result of French attacks in the region of Verdun, that the Germans had designed and put into service upon the front pursuit machines—both biplace and single place—which outclassed the Spad 200. The fact that the Germans had produced a machine which outclassed the Spad was brought to the attention of the American authorities by the French, and Col. Bolling (then aviation officer, line of communications) immediately took up the question with the British and found, upon investigation, that all concerned were agreed that the new German machines rendered the Spad 200 (which had not, even from French factories, yet reached the front in quantity) entirely out of date. In the effort to meet the new German machines a number of new pursuit machines had been designed and several of these new machines outclassed the Spad 200. It may be noted also that although the recommendation for manufacture of Spad 200's within the United States was made in July, 1917, it was not until the end of August, 1917, that the French sent the necessary drawings, etc., to initiate manufacture, and that at the same time that these drawings were forwarded it became apparent that the Spad 200 was outclassed. The Spad machines shipped as models to the United States did not reach there until September 18, 1917.

By early October it was seen that pursuit machines manufactured in the United States could not reach the battle front before the latter part of 1918, or at the very best before the summer of 1918. This was inevitable on account of the necessary time required within the United States to begin production on a large scale, the long period necessary for shipments, the assembling and testing of machines in France and their final arrival over the enemy's lines. In early October, therefore, it was foreseen that the continuation of efforts to manufacture the Spad 200 in the United States would be a waste of money, or that if such machines were utilized it would mean sending our men into combat eight months later in a machine which was already far outclassed by the German pursuit planes. Nevertheless pursuit airplanes, whether outclassed or not, were essential, and during October investigation was made as to whether or not pursuit airplanes could be obtained from our allies in the event that the manufacture of Spad 200's in America was stopped. The result of this investigation was summed up in a cablegram sent by Col. Bolling on November 8, from which the following is taken:

Recommend you produce number (single-place pursuit aeros) already actually under contract and started. Believe we can obtain here all this type required future.

Senator NEW. Is that all?

Gen. PERSHING. Yes. That covers it all.

Senator NEW. Another question which you said that you would provide the answer for when you appeared again was how many

American planes had been received at your headquarters on the western front by November 11, 1918.

Gen. PERSHING. Yes; I have got that.

Gen. CONNER. The total number that had been delivered in France on November 11, was 984.

Senator NEW. Delivered in France. Now, how many of them were put into commission on the western front? Can you tell that?

Gen. CONNER. The total number that went to the front and to schools was 984. The total number delivered to squadrons at the front was 417.

Gen. PERSHING. How many were actually on the front?

Gen. CONNER. The number of planes actually on the front, the number of planes on hand in squadrons, November 11, was 213.

Senator NEW. That was the high-water mark, was it not?

Gen. CONNER. These figures would not show whether that was the high-water mark, as to the number in squadrons, or not, because they fluctuated from day to day.

Gen. PERSHING. It probably was about the high-water mark.

Gen. CONNER. Yes; approximately.

Senator NEW. Two hundred and thirteen?

Gen. CONNER. Yes.

Mr. KAHN. Those were planes made in the United States and Europe and France?

Gen. CONNER. They were made in the United States.

Senator FLETCHER. Of what type?

Gen. CONNER. De Haviland 4's.

Senator NEW. You received nothing from the United States except de Haviland 4's?

Gen. CONNER. We received three experimental planes—two Le Peres and one de Haviland 9.

Senator KIRBY. How many planes did you have on the front that the Americans bought or the Americans used?

Gen. PERSHING. About 740.

Senator NEW. That is, at St. Mihiel and in the Argonne?

Gen. PERSHING. Yes, sir.

Senator KIRBY. About 740 that had been purchased from England and France?

Gen. PERSHING. Yes.

Senator NEW. Of French and English manufacture?

Senator KIRBY. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. There may be some confusion in that. Was that 740 including the American-made or merely roughly the foreign-made?

Gen. PERSHING. It includes the American-made.

Gen. CONNER. Those were planes in use, as distinguished from planes in depots. Of course, there were a great many more planes in France, but those were the planes in use.

Senator NEW. Now, Gen. Pershing, if you have any special observations that you would care to make about either of the bills before the two Houses of Congress providing for separate departments of aeronautics and a division and allotment of the work to be done in that line, we would be very glad to hear them. One is Senate bill 3348 and the other is House bill ———.

Senator KIRBY. I want to ask the General a question before he starts. Numerous questions have been asked about the Air Service, of course, and the necessity for it. It has seemed to me that we have poured out our money here liberally. We spent over a billion dollars in the Air Service, and according to the statement there we did not realize much of benefit from it. It has seemed to me that the Air Service is necessarily an auxiliary and not a principal arm in fighting. The Senator here has asked about the invasion of the country by an air force from the sea. That is not possible under existing conditions. Now, the great airplane that came over here, the English plane, the lighter-than-air ship—that could easily be destroyed by gunfire, could it not? And I think that notwithstanding we have a squadron in the air, and I understand that we have had 15,000 to 18,000 of men, we have had about 523 men killed in the Air Service. That is not war. That does not kill anybody, or whip anybody.

Now, it seems to me that that is a very auxiliary, while a very necessary, service, and that the Army is the chief thing, and that the Army ought to have control of all the Air Service, it seems to me. The Army is the principal thing in all wars. It has been so in large wars, and I have not thought that we needed any especial independent control of the air department. It ought all to be under the Army, it seems to me, and it seems probable to me that it has not been developed sufficiently where this Air Service is going to be a great destructive agency if the proper safeguards are taken on the land in the way of antiaircraft guns and things of that kind. We do not need to fear anybody over on this side of the world, it seems to me now, or in the next 20 years, and I can not see why we should spend all the money necessary in keeping up an Air Service, the planes in which would become obsolete in a year or two, when there is no probability of any attack by any great power where we would need to extend ourselves and extend our resources in fighting.

I wanted to call attention to that general impression that prevails largely in some localities and the definite opinion that I have about it when you are discussing the Air Service.

Mr. KAHN. Gen. Pershing, we did spend a billion dollars in the Air Service in the war. Don't you think if we had spent a few hundred millions in times of peace we would have been better prepared to have continued the war than we were in the Air Service? Don't you think it would have been advisable to spend a hundred million or two hundred million rather than throw away a billion, as the Senator suggests, when we got into the war? I would like to have you answer it, if you please.

Senator KIRBY. I just wanted the general to have these things all in his mind.

Gen. PERSHING. The questions seem to answer themselves.

Senator KIRBY. The Senator from Indiana has taken up the case very thoroughly and endeavored to have you commit yourself in favor of the proposition or to commit the general in favor of the proposition.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you care to make any observations, General, in answer to Senator Kirby's questions or Mr. Kahn's questions before any others are asked?

Gen. PERSHING. I think Mr. Kahn's question answered itself. Senator Kirby, did you ask me a question?

Senator KIRBY. I just wanted to put those thoughts in your mind.

Gen. PERSHING. Answering Chairman Kahn's question, the same principle applies to aviation as would apply to any arm of the service, that you can not neglect it in time of peace and expect in time of war to meet the situation, to establish your factories, to adopt your models, and all of that sort of thing without great and excessive expenditures of money, which could be avoided by a proper organization in time of peace and by anticipating, as far as possible, economically the demands that are going to be made upon you in time of war. In other words, without accumulating large quantities of material, to have your factories established and as far as possible your models determined upon, so that we can supply ourselves as soon as war has begun, or soon after the war has begun, keeping always a saving margin of material on hand. It seems to me that principle applies as well to aviation as all the other arms of the service. I am speaking entirely from a military standpoint now.

Mr. CALDWELL. An inquiry was made here a moment ago as to why a billion dollars did not produce more results in the aircraft program. Is it fair to assume that just the number of airplanes produced would be the criterion as to whether the money was properly spent or not, or should not we consider all of the other things that were done at the same time, and necessarily done, in forming our opinion as to what was done; that is, whether it was expensively done or not?

Gen. PERSHING. Of course, I was not in touch at all with the production as carried on here in the States.

Mr. CALDWELL. But, General, this is what I have in mind——

Gen. PERSHING (interposing). If I catch your point.

Mr. CALDWELL. When they started out with the air service in this war, we had practically no air service; that is true, is it not?

Gen. PERSHING. Yes; I think I used up all of the planes we had in the Mexican expedition, which were eight.

Mr. CALDWELL. And we had some 15 or 20 men perhaps who could fly in all America?

Gen. PERSHING. Yes, sir.

Mr. CALDWELL. So that in starting out we had to have these cantonments for them; we had to have factories in which to build the machinery which was to be used; we had to install in those factories all of the necessary delicate machinery used to construct an airplane; and we had to gather all of the necessary materials that we wanted into an airplane, didn't we?

Mr. KAHN. And to build hangars.

Mr. CALDWELL. And we had to build hangars all over the country, and we had to manufacture multiple united hangars and send them over to the other side, so that they could be connected up together. All of those things we had to manufacture in large quantities?

Gen. PERSHING. They must have been so manufactured in order to carry on the production at all.

Mr. CALDWELL. And when we started the war, we had practically nobody who could fly. At the signing of the armistice, weren't there more men in the American Army who could fly than in all the rest of the world put together?

Mr. CALDWELL. I am talking about the American Army both here and abroad, that there were more men in our American Army that

of a thousand years had brought up new problems in military science. I would like to ask you, General, if it is not a fact that the military battles in the olden times—the battles of Caesar there over the same ground—was governed by the strategy of offensive and defensive and that the implements of war were all subsidiary to that consideration?

Gen. PERSHING. Well, the general principles of strategy and tactics have remained about the same. There is very little difference. They require some alterations in organization and readjustment of relation between the different arms, especially as to strength, by the introduction of new methods of fighting, but the general principles remain the same.

Mr. GREENE. And it has been found, has it not, that, strangely enough, maneuvers made by the ancient armies on the same battle fields were duplicated over and again by the maneuvers made during our own war, emphasizing the fundamental that the ground plan of fighting is permanent and these new inventions or discoveries only present a problem for their articulation? Now, if that is so, does not this follow to-day that even if Caesar had tried to support his men, his men with their spears and their swords, who were his ground men, that all of these things must be auxiliary and supplemental to and coordinate with the plan of the Infantry—that is, your foot soldier of to-day and the Air Service falls into that. I am coming to this, that it is proposed to combine the Air Service of all the arms, either of the Navy or the Army or the Marine, and so on. If we were to take that proposition as a basis, would not we also be confronted by this: That ordnance is common to both the Army and the Navy, but that they have peculiar tactical uses within the two services, and that they can not be governed by an outside general direction common to both. Would you set up a separate corps for the management of the Artillery and employ it both in the Army and in the Navy, because the weapons happen to be common to both?

Gen. PERSHING. No; certainly not.

Mr. GREENE. And does not the Air Service fall into the same category, that it needs to articulate with the service with which it is used?

Gen. PERSHING. To a certain extent; yes, sir. The difference is that we want to develop, as I see it, aviation for all purposes——

Mr. GREENE. Exactly.

Gen. PERSHING (continuing). While we do not have to develop Artillery for all purposes. Those things are limited in their use, so that the analogy can not quite be borne out, and the bill, proposed here is, to my mind, in principle correct, the idea, being to develop all sorts of aviation, military, naval, and commercial as well, and to utilize some central control for doing so. Now, just how far we want to apply that central control is the next question we have to determine. For the purposes of procurement, Senator New, and I am addressing myself to you particularly, for the purposes of procurement it seems to me that we can unite all of the requirements of the Army and the Navy and the Post Office Department and the Treasury Department, or whatever department it is that has to use aviation, so that the appropriations that are called for and are needed in aviation under these various heads, could all be grouped under one head and placed under one control for expenditure. Now,

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. In other words, we had a body of young men over there to be trained that could not be trained because we did not have the facilities to train them?

Gen. PERSHING. Yes, sir; that is true.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. And some of them were sent back here to be trained, were they not?

Gen. PERSHING. That is all very true.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. And they were sent back here because we did not have the facilities over there to train them?

Gen. PERSHING. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. And when you boil it all down, General, it means this, does it not, that if you do not prepare in advance you can not hope to patch up after the war commences?

Gen. PERSHING. Yes, sir. As I stated a moment ago, you must make provision during peace so that you can have a reasonable hope of preparing yourself as to material and personnel shortly after the war begins, and keep up the supply, especially in aviation, which is very destructive to material and personnel.

Senator FLETCHER. While we had sent over these young men, and while it may be that we could not train them, it is true, is it not, that we were furnishing them with a very large quantity of material?

Gen. PERSHING. Yes, sir; we did furnish them with a large quantity of material.

Senator NEW. It is true, isn't it, that it requires something more than raw material to make aeroplanes?

Gen. PERSHING. Yes, sir; and it requires, first of all, brains, Senator.

Senator NEW. And the plants in which to utilize the raw material?

Gen. PERSHING. Yes, sir.

Mr. HULL. I have a few questions that I would like to ask. I think it is probable you have answered them in the general discussion, but in that discussion they may have been lost sight of. Does France try to fight her aeroplane service independently of the navy and of the army?

Gen. PERSHING. No, sir.

Mr. HULL. Does Germany?

Gen. PERSHING. No, sir.

Mr. HULL. Does Italy?

Gen. PERSHING. Not that I know of.

Mr. HULL. And you do not believe that that is a practical way of fighting?

Gen. PERSHING. No. As I stated, as I tried to convey in the general statement that I made, the air service can not be regarded as an independent military force.

Mr. HULL. And you believe that we ought to have a unified service for research work and for production and perhaps for training?

Gen. PERSHING. Yes, sir. I think I said that early in my original statement in regard to the Air Service.

Mr. KAHN. Mr. Greene has been waiting to ask some questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Let him proceed.

Mr. GREENE. In your comments I was interested in your statement that the Air Service was necessarily a tactical auxiliary to the Infantry, as all the other arms of the service must essentially be. The statement was made here by some one that the various improvements

of a thousand years had brought up new problems in military science. I would like to ask you, General, if it is not a fact that the military battles in the olden times—the battles of Caesar there over the same ground—was governed by the strategy of offensive and defensive and that the implements of war were all subsidiary to that consideration?

Gen. PERSHING. Well, the general principles of strategy and tactics have remained about the same. There is very little difference. They require some alterations in organization and readjustment of relation between the different arms, especially as to strength, by the introduction of new methods of fighting, but the general principles remain the same.

Mr. GREENE. And it has been found, has it not, that, strangely enough, maneuvers made by the ancient armies on the same battle fields were duplicated over and again by the maneuvers made during our own war, emphasizing the fundamental that the ground plan of fighting is permanent and these new inventions or discoveries only present a problem for their articulation? Now, if that is so, does not this follow to-day that even if Caesar had tried to support his men, his men with their spears and their swords, who were his ground men, that all of these things must be auxiliary and supplemental to and co-ordinate with the plan of the Infantry—that is, your foot soldier of to-day and the Air Service falls into that. I am coming to this, that it is proposed to combine the Air Service of all the arms, either of the Navy or the Army or the Marine, and so on. If we were to take that proposition as a basis, would not we also be confronted by this: That ordnance is common to both the Army and the Navy, but that they have peculiar tactical uses within the two services, and that they can not be governed by an outside general direction common to both. Would you set up a separate corps for the management of the Artillery and employ it both in the Army and in the Navy, because the weapons happen to be common to both?

Gen. PERSHING. No; certainly not.

Mr. GREENE. And does not the Air Service fall into the same category, that it needs to articulate with the service with which it is used?

Gen. PERSHING. To a certain extent; yes, sir. The difference is that we want to develop, as I see it, aviation for all purposes——

Mr. GREENE. Exactly.

Gen. PERSHING (continuing). While we do not have to develop Artillery for all purposes. Those things are limited in their use, so that the analogy can not quite be borne out, and the bill, proposed here is, to my mind, in principle correct, the idea, being to develop all sorts of aviation, military, naval, and commercial as well, and to utilize some central control for doing so. Now, just how far we want to apply that central control is the next question we have to determine. For the purposes of procurement, Senator New, and I am addressing myself to you particularly, for the purposes of procurement it seems to me that we can unite all of the requirements of the Army and the Navy and the Post Office Department and the Treasury Department, or whatever department it is that has to use aviation, so that the appropriations that are called for and are needed in aviation under these various heads, could all be grouped under one head and placed under one control for expenditure. Now,

speaking for the Army alone, from a military standpoint, I think, sir, we must retain control of a certain amount of aviation, which would not under any circumstances be put into the general pool; it seems to me that the military side of it can not be wholly ignored, and that the military aviation could not be administered or trained or prepared for war under a central body, such as you propose, and there should be a very active, a very generous, coordination between the Army and the Navy and whatever use you put aviation to, so that each may have the benefit of the advice from the other, and all to be under a central control or whatever agency you may have to procure your material and manufacture your planes.

Mr. GREENE. That is what I was leading up to.

Senator NEW. I call your attention to section 26 of this bill 3348, and especially to one of the provisos on page 27, as follows:

Provided, however, That nothing herein contained shall be construed to prohibit the maintenance by the War or Navy Departments of an organization adequate for the preparation of general specifications, general plans, and characteristics of the aviation mechanisms, accessories, and equipment required for military or naval purposes. * * *

Gen. PERSHING. But a little further back in that bill you say that the personnel is transferred, and that the aviation fields are transferred, and that everything pertaining to aviation, as it exists in the Army to-day, is really transferred to the central bureau, and then you make this reservation, but you have not left anything to reserve.

Senator NEW. The idea that I have about that, General, is this, and I would like for you to bear with me for a moment. I did not believe that the Army or the Navy were so organized as to permit of their cooperating, for instance, with municipalities, with private organizations, public organizations, for the establishment and the maintenance of the necessary fields, and the establishment of the necessary routes, and of all that goes to make up a perfect aviation system for the country. I do not think that the Army can do that, nor do I think that any one department of the Government can do it. I think that that will be required to be done by a department whose business it is to do it, and I think it is an impossible thing for either the Army or the Navy to bring about the establishment of what we will have to have in this country, and result in an adequate Air Service in the United States.

Mr. CALDWELL. Is not your idea very much the same as the condition in which we found ourselves at the time the Navy Department was taken out of the Army? Now we have the Navy Department, and it has taken over things pertaining to warfare on the sea.

Now we come to a new place in this instance, a division, and why should not we have it? We have an Air Service, and your idea is to have the matter of aviation under control, taken out of the Army and the Navy.

Senator NEW. Why, we fought through one war, and we were 15 years in existence as a Government before we had a Navy Department. Previous to that it was all in the Army, and at that time the situation seemed to require the creation of the Navy Department, and it was created.

Gen. PERSHING. There, again, Senator, it does not seem that the analogy is quite just. As I stated a moment ago, the Air Service, so far as the military side of it is concerned, is really an auxiliary

arm of the Infantry, of the land force, and I do not think that you can divorce the Air Service at the present time. That might be done in years to come, it is possible that such a thing might be done, but so far as we can foresee at the present time, it is going to remain as a part of the organized Army, of which the land forces are the basis; so you can not compare it, in that sense, from the military standpoint, with the Navy. The Navy functions are to fight by sea, and it in addition has its Air Service, which is an auxiliary to it, and I mean that we can not quite jump to an independent Military Air Service—I mean not yet.

Senator NEW. I am somewhat at a loss to distinguish the difference between the military ships, in other words, the man of war, that crosses the ocean on the surface, for the purpose of destruction, and which requires six or seven days to cross the Atlantic, from the ships which cross at an altitude of anywhere from 200 to 300 feet up to even 20,000 or 30,000 feet, and it does it in less than 48 hours, as has been demonstrated—

Gen. PERSHING. Yes.

Senator NEW. I regard one as serious an engine of destruction as the other, and it seems to me that we are pretty nearly up to the day where we shall see the fleets, just as apt to see the fleets of airships as you are seeing fleets at the present day of naval vessels.

Gen. PERSHING. Well, it is not difficult to imagine that. In fact, we had on one occasion—permit me just a moment—in the battle of the Meuse-Argonne, where a German attack was sighted by our observers in the middle of the afternoon, and a bombing fleet of 100 planes was sent to attack them; it did it successfully, so it is very easy to imagine a very great development along that line, but yet we can not foresee, to any great extent, the independent use of aeroplanes of air forces—

Senator NEW (interrupting). Apropos of that, I would like to read two lines from Gen. Duval, or from Mr. Lavergne's testimony. Mr. Lavergne was the French attaché of the Air Department here.

Gen. PERSHING. Yes.

Senator NEW. He says, "I remember the last day of the war, when we flew over the German troops in retreat at an altitude of 1,000 feet. There were 220 of us, carrying 30 bombs of 20 pounds each and three machine guns. It was terrible to see the scene on the ground." He further says, "It is possible to drop down 6,000 bombs in 10 minutes upon a given point."

Gen. PERSHING. Of course, those of us who have been in very close touch with the bombing by aviation always accept the stories that they bring back with several grains of salt. Now, the fact is that our investigations after we advanced to the Rhine failed to develop any very serious or very important effect that was shown to be the result of bombing. Bombing is an uncertain sort of thing. There is no particular method by which you can accurately aim a bomb. You are flying at a rapid rate, of course. They are developing it, and it may come later, that we will be able to do that. I hope so. We are doing very accurate shooting in the Navy with the roll of the waves and the heavy seas, and I think, perhaps, that I have in mind some limitations that other people have not, but I am hopeful of great development in aviation.

Senator NEW. I was going to ask there, isn't it true, until you adopted the modern range finder, that your big-gun attack by naval vessels were not very successful. To-day you can at twelve to fifteen thousand yards—it is nothing for naval vessels to hit the mark every time, but until you developed range finders for them they would not hit an object that far once out of every 25 shots.

Gen. PERSHING. Yes; all that is so.

Senator NEW. And is it not just as reasonable to suppose that the art of aiming from an aeroplane is as susceptible of the same development that it has been on naval vessels?

Gen. PERSHING. Well, I look for a very great development along that line.

Mr. OLNEY. Some one has stated that there were only 523 casualties in the air during the war. Is it not a fact that the most important factor in the Air Service is in the destruction of an aeroplane, which is valuable for observation purposes, and is not the Air Service absolutely indispensable in modern warfare on account of the fact of observation, and not because of the casualties?

Gen. PERSHING. I do not think that the importance of it could be measured by the number of casualties.

Senator FLETCHER. Of the two hundred and odd American planes in squadrons, how much work was it necessary to do on those planes to bring them up to date, after you received them from America?

Gen. PERSHING. Well, there was some work to do on the D. H. 4's, the details of which I have not at my command. The main criticism was that they were roughly put together, and the shop inspection had not been very well carried out.

Mr. FULLER. Was there any structural changes?

Gen. PERSHING. I think there were no important structural changes. Generally speaking, I think I would answer your question in the negative.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you not have some observations of a general character to make in regard to this bill? You have been answering questions all the morning, and you have not been given an opportunity to discuss this bill. Or have the questions brought out about all you wish to say?

Gen. PERSHING. I think that the questions have really brought out practically everything I wanted to cover, Senator.

The CHAIRMAN. I wanted to be sure that they had, otherwise you will have an opportunity to enlarge on what you have said.

Gen. PERSHING. I think I stated everything I had in mind. I do believe there ought to be some coordinating agency that would control the manufacture and procurement of aeroplanes, but the Army should retain its own organization for the purposes of training and all of that.

Mr. ANTHONY. General, in reference to the subject of our failure to supply a type of combat plane in this country during the war, the assertion is frequently made by representatives of the War Department before these committees ascribing our failure to causes or advices received from France. Could you tell us what, in your opinion, was the cause of our failure, whether the cause was on the other side, or whether it was on this side?

Gen. PERSHING. Of course, aviation at the beginning of the war was—the organization of the Aviation Corps was in a very confusing state. Our men were without experience on both sides of the water, and to show you that there were difficulties on the other side, I may mention the number of chiefs of aviation that I had. When I went over I took with me a young officer by the name of Maj. Dodd, since killed in aviation, a very valuable and splendid officer in every regard, who served with me in Mexico. He was unfamiliar with affairs in Europe, and when I arrived there I found Col. Mitchell, now Gen. Mitchell, who had been flying with the French, and who was more or less familiar with aviation on the western front, and I put him at the head of the aviation. That was in July. Then along came Gen. Kenley, who was appointed from this end as the head of aviation and assigned to me. No; Gen. Kenley was my own appointment. He succeeded Gen. Mitchell, and he had had some experience in flying in this country, and seemed to be enthusiastic on the subject. Next came Gen. Foulois. That was in November of 1917.

Senator NEW. You said Gen. Foulois?

Gen. PERSHING. Yes, sir. Now, without thrashing out all the straw, I will say that there was a lot of disagreement as to plans and as to types, and, as you can see, each one of these men brought his own ideas, and each man had ideas that were different from the ideas of his successor or from the ideas of his predecessor, and the handling of aviation was a very difficult problem for me. I was not an expert on it, but I undertook to post myself and to decide a lot of questions which were very difficult, some of them technical, and the General Staff had not gotten so very far in its organization, although it soon came to handle those things itself. I recite this to show the difficulties of aviation on the other side, and it is very probable, in fact, that these changes led to some recommendations from the other side that interfered with recommendations that had previously been made. This state of affairs led me to select an officer of experience as an administrative officer, who really himself had had no experience in aviation, but who was an able man, Gen. Patrick, of the Engineers, and he was placed in charge of the aviation, and until he was placed in charge there was very little cooperation among the personnel of the corps, but after he assumed charge, the matter was straightened out and we had a splendid organization that we were all proud of at the end of the war.

Mr. ANTHONY. In the fall of 1917, I think it was, we started upon the manufacture of the Spad type of machine, which was a pursuit combat machine, as I understand it. Just a few months later the manufacture of the Spad machine was discontinued and there was substituted in its place the two-seated Bristol machine, if I am not mistaken. Every Member of the House will remember the statement that the fighting in the air would henceforth be done by the two-seated machine instead of the single machine. Can you tell where that order came from that superseded the Spad with the two-seater fighter, which afterwards proved to be unsatisfactory?

Gen. PERSHING. Well, I would have to look that up. I do not recall it just now.

Mr. ANTHONY. There has been a mass of conflicting reports, and I asked the question in order that I could get some light on that.

Gen. PERSHING. Well, I have just gone over that question. I think that that would answer your question—were you present when I went over that?

Mr. ANTHONY. I heard what you said about the Spad type, and to follow that up, a number of us were out at Dayton, Ohio, the other day, at the engineer plant of the Air Service, and they had two machines up in the air, which they said were the latest type of these fast pursuit machines, and one of them was of the Spad type.

Gen. PERSHING. What horsepower?

Mr. ANTHONY. I do not exactly remember what the horsepower was. But they said that that was what they had started to manufacture in 1917.

Gen. PERSHING. There are a number of different types, and it depends on the horsepower and some other peculiarities. If you would care to have the actual facts, I would be very glad to insert them in this reply. The facts with reference to biplane pursuit machines are as follows:

Since its field of fire is limited, the single-seater pursuit machine has comparatively little defensive power. Great defensive power is required on certain air missions. To obtain this defensive power efforts were being made at the time we entered the war by all of the countries engaged to develop the biplane pursuit machine.

In the summer of 1917 the best machine developed by these efforts was the Bristol fighter which, in addition to its value as a pursuit machine, appeared to be adapted to observation work.

After agreement with all concerned, I cabled on July 30, 1917, recommending Bristol fighters with 200-horsepower Hispano-Suiza engines. It is believed that in the United States efforts were made to build these planes not with the Hispano-Suiza engines but with the Liberty 12-cylinder engine, and that these efforts were not successful. The July cable did not recommend the supplanting of single-seater pursuit planes by the Bristol fighter, but on the contrary recommended Spad single seaters.

In August, 1917, during the French attack at Verdun, the Germans introduced a biplace fighting machine which clearly outclassed the French monoplace machine. At about the same time—August, 1917—the development of two new engines, the Hispano-Suiza 300 horsepower and the Bugatti 500–525 horsepower, had reached a point which justified great hopes in producing a biplace machine which would completely outclass not only any existing machines but anything which, so far as known, was under development in Germany. After technical investigation and obtaining the consensus of opinion of pursuit commanders, Col. R. C. Bolling, on November 8, 1917, sent his cable number 252, from which the following is extracted:

Following general principles now appear to us: (1) Single-seater fighter will probably become obsolete general use next year, although small numbers will always be used special purposes. Recommend you produce number already under contract and started. Believe we can obtain here all this type required future above number actually under contract here and America. This applies both single-seater fighter airplanes and engines. (2) Two-seater fighter airplanes, with stationary engine, will supersede single seater. Four hundred horsepower probably sufficient next six months. After that 500 horsepower necessary.

It will be noted that this cable specifically stated that a small number of single-seater fighters "will always be used."

The war terminated before the biplace pursuit plane was developed and put into quantity production.

Mr. HULL. General, I have drafted a bill here in regard to the Air Service and I will hand it to you and ask you your opinion of it, along with the other bills, so that the record will be complete. I expect to introduce the bill probably to-day. I would like to ask you a few questions, which you will probably have to look up in order to give the answers, and I should like to have the answers put into the record.

I would like to know the number of National Guard troops, the number of Regulars, the number of Volunteer troops, and the number of drafted troops that were actually engaged in the war on the other side. Can that be obtained?

Gen. PERSHING. I think that we can get it approximately for you.

Mr. HULL. I think it would be very interesting to the people of this country to know that; and then, on top of that, what was the average, approximately, the average time of the training of the drafted troops that were actually engaged?

Gen. PERSHING. Will you let me have a copy of the questions so that I can be sure to get them? Never mind, I will get them from the stenographer.

The CHAIRMAN. I assume, Congressman, that it will be satisfactory to have the answers inserted in the record. I do not anticipate that we would have to have another hearing, but we would just put them in the record.

Mr. HULL. No; it is not necessary to have another hearing. Just put them in the record, is all.

Gen. PERSHING. I have read the bill, H. R. 10380, referred to by Mr. Hull. In that it appears to be designed to foster commercial aviation and to coordinate matters of procurement and the development of industrial resources in aviation, I think the bill embodies a correct principle. I think, however, the bill contains certain defects, the more important of which I might outline as follows:

Sections 1 and 2 appear to establish a department of aeronautics coordinate with the other executive departments, and the head of which would probably be a member of the Cabinet. The desirability of this appears to me largely dependent upon the policy to be adopted by the Congress with reference to expenditures for the development of commercial aviation. If appropriations for this purpose are to amount to several hundred millions of dollars annually and are to be expended over a long period of years, then such a department might be necessary. If, on the other hand, extensive money aid is not to be extended to commercial aviation, it might be better to invest the necessary coordinating power in some sort of a commission. Such a commission might possibly draw its members from the several interested departments.

Section 3 transfers to the department of aeronautics all officers and employees concerned with the development and production of aircraft. I think it is necessary that military aviation retain under control of the War Department a technical section especially charged with research and other work, connected with the development of military aircraft. Military necessities are quite different from commercial necessities, and I think satisfactory progress in military development can best be assured by retaining under the War Depart-

ment a technical aviation personnel. This personnel should, of course, closely cooperate with the technical personnel of the central agency.

Sections 6, 7, 8, and 9 might be construed as taking away from military aviation any responsibility or voice in the design of military aircraft, which would be a mistake. There is also the possibility that exists under section 8, of a conflict between the War Department and the department of aeronautics as to the amount of aviation material to be retained by the War Department.

Replying to Mr. Hull's question as to the classification of troops. Exact figures as to the classification, by voluntary enlistments and by the selective-service draft, of troops actually engaged in battle are not available.

The great mass of actual combatants were, however, in divisions and it is possible to make an approximate estimate of the sources from which such combatants were drawn. The result of such an estimate is as follows:

Classification of personnel of divisions and divisional replacements reaching France.

	Enlisted prior to Apr. 6, 1917.	Voluntary enlisted after Apr. 6, 1917, for period of war.	Selective service draft.	Total.
Regular Army.....	100, 900	95, 594	196, 494
National Guard.....	158, 700	178, 800	337, 500
National Army and replacements.....	10, 340	1 882, 706	893, 046
Totals.....	259, 600	284, 734	882, 706	1, 427, 040

¹ Includes 305,819 replacements furnished combat divisions.

In connection with this table it may be noted that a very large proportion of the voluntary enlistments occurred before the induction into the service of the first men obtained under the selective-service act. It may also be noted that a very considerable number of voluntary enlistments were in certain branches not strictly classed as combat troops.

Replying to Mr. Hull's question as to the average training of drafted combat troops. It is difficult to answer this question exactly, on account of the numerous changes in the personnel of the divisions prior to their departure from the United States. Exact figures are, of course, available as to the time elapsing between the organization of the several divisions and their entry into line in an active sector. These figures show that the average division had eleven and one-half months from its organization until it was called upon to participate in battle in an active sector. Making allowance for changes in personnel and the shorter period of training of replacements, it is reasonable to estimate that the average soldier had about seven months' training before he engaged in battle.

The CHAIRMAN. Are there any other questions which the members would like to ask Gen. Pershing? General, have you any further observations?

Gen. PERSHING. I think not, sir.

Senator NEW. I would like to ask you one point further about this bill in order that there may be no misunderstanding for the purpose of this bill. It is not a bill creating an independent air

force, but a bill creating and consolidating the air forces for the purpose of attending to the general aviation activity, and it is intended to prevent the duplication in the Army and in the Navy, and to provide a force so trained that they will be absolutely under the command of the Army and the Navy, and it is not intended to interfere with the Army or the Navy activities for their special requirements.

Gen. PERSHING. As I stated, Senator, I think the principles in this bill are correct. I think it is a question of their application.

Senator NEW. Of the details?

Gen. PERSHING. Of the details, and it does not seem to me, if you will allow me to go into one or two other details, it does not seem to me that you would meet the situation by creating a military department of the air, and that the development of aviation should be encouraged more along commercial lines under some other control. It may be that I am wrong, but that is the way it looks to me from a commercial standpoint—and I am trying to look at it from all standpoints—and then another criticism or observation would be that it seems to me that we are anticipating a development which we are hardly warranted in anticipating by creating a department of the Government, coordinating with the Navy and the War and Commerce, and the Interior Department, and so on. I am a little bit inclined to think that our development under some other agency ought to proceed a while before we jump to the establishment of a department. I am inclined to think that we would be criticized for it. Let us follow the development a little further under some other coordinating agency, and the question of coordination there is really an administrative one.

You can not enforce coordination by the passage of an act of Congress. It must have its inspiration and its motive force in the power that controls the coordinating agency. For instance, I never have been able to see, for the life of me, why the Secretary of War, the Secretary of the Navy, or any other two or three Cabinet officers, could not get together and say, "We are going to establish an agency under us which will work this thing out," and I am inclined to think that perhaps the thing ought to be developed along those lines a little more fully. It is really none of my business, perhaps, and maybe I am going a little too far, but that is the way it appears to me.

Senator NEW. Not at all. But you say that you can not do this thing by an act of Congress. Well, you can not do anything by fiat, and that apparently is what we tried to do with our aeronautical industry before, and then we undertook to do it by fiat—"Let there be airships," and the first thing we did was to spend \$640,000,000 and we have no air ships. Now, we know that the Secretary of the Navy and the Secretary of War and some of the others have gotten together upon these things, and that the aircraft industry is a thing of the past. I have given you the figures, and they are correct; they are authentic; there were 58 aeroplanes made in the United States since the 1st day of July.

Gen. PERSHING. My remarks there, in which I said you could not enforce coordination by an act of Congress. I meant that there was or is an administrative—there is an administrative responsibility in this thing, Senator, that somebody must assume. It must be under-

stood by those who are interested in coordinating the various industries, and I do not believe that that has been done. Each one goes off on his own responsibility, and the result is nobody gets anywhere, and I am in entire sympathy with the effort that is being made to coordinate this work, and I hope that what I have said so far has not been too much in opposition, for I am not in opposition to the principle. Perhaps I may have occasion to confer with you a little later on, after giving the subject some more study.

Mr. FULLER. This question is somewhat irrelevant to the matter under discussion, but I would like to ask Gen. Pershing if American troops were ordered over the top on the other side on the morning of the day when, under the terms of the armistice, firing was to cease at 10 o'clock. I was told repeatedly by soldiers in various branches of the service in Europe last November that American troops were put over the top, notably at the River Ceille, 20 miles south of Metz—colored troops under Gen. Ballou—were ordered over the top at 9 o'clock, when firing was to cease at 10, and that those troops who were not killed or wounded marched peacefully into Germany at 11 o'clock. Is that true?

Gen. PERSHING. The question has been asked a number of times, and I have made a full report of the matter to the Secretary of War. I do not happen to have the details of the report here, but in brief: When the subject of the armistice was under discussion we did not know what the purpose of it was definitely, whether it was something proposed by the German High Command to gain time, or whether they were sincere in their desire to have an armistice; and the mere discussion of an armistice would not be sufficient ground for any judicious commander to relax his military activities. As to the official movement on the morning of November 11 no one could possibly know when the armistice was to be signed, or what hour would be fixed for the cessation of hostilities, if an hour should be agreed upon, so that the only thing for us to do, and which I did as commander in chief of the American forces, and which Marshal Foch did as commander in chief of the Allied armies, was to continue the military activities. In some cases those activities were carried on until the morning of the 11th of November last, and with great vigor, and wisely so. But the word was received at my headquarters at 6 o'clock in the morning of November 11 for the cessation of hostilities at 11 o'clock. I was in special communication with Marshal Foch's headquarters at the time for the purpose of receiving this word, and I was in special communication with my Army commanders in order to send to them whatever directions I might receive, based upon Marshal Foch's instructions. The instructions were immediately telegraphed out, and we found out later that some of the more advanced detachments did not receive them in time, and continued the fighting after 11 o'clock.

Mr. HULL. You stated the other day that we did not have any American-made guns in actual operation on the front except of the English type. Now, I have received to-day, and I think the members of Congress have received the other day, photographs, two or three photographs of large guns, photographs of American-made guns that were in operation before Metz, one from the Midvale Steel Co.—

Gen. PERSHING. Yes; that escaped my observation the other day. Those were 14-inch naval guns, and they were mounted on railway

mounts, and they did very excellent service before Metz, and while we do not know the details of what they did, they certainly reached the railroad lines, and they pestered them a great deal.

Mr. SANFORD. Now, let me ask you, the law now forbids the enlistment in the Regular Army of illiterates. Would you advise the immediate repeal of that provision, in view of what you have said before the committee? The committee has the matter under consideration.

Gen. PERSHING. Of course, those men are to be called upon at any time, and that part of the Army is supposed to be ready at any time. I prefer to have them literate, from my standpoint, until we establish some sort of system of instruction and provide a method by which they could be educated. I think it should stand.

Mr. SANFORD. There is a provision that permits the Army to educate them. Isn't it a fact that the time to educate the illiterates is in time of peace?

Gen. PERSHING. I thoroughly agree with the purpose of educating them and should like to see some steps taken in that direction.

Mr. SANFORD. The Secretary of War recommended it, and it seems to me—

Gen. PERSHING. I am inclined to agree with the Secretary of War. I think we should establish some system of educating them before we make the application of the law.

Mr. SANFORD. Of course, that would be saying you can educate them the moment you get them, and the number you get probably would be limited.

Gen. PERSHING. The Secretary of War is very much in favor of an educational system in the Army, as I am myself.

The CHAIRMAN. Are there any further questions, gentlemen?

Mr. GREENE. I might suggest with regard to the proposed one-year enlistment there has been some talk as to whether it would be wise to make it a permanent law, so that a man can go into the Army for one year only if he so desires. What do you say about this proposed compromise—we may call it that—that is, to have a preliminary enlistment of one year, and let it be provided that any candidate for enlistment should, upon the expiration of his service, if he desired to remain in the Army, he could then enlist the full term. Do you not think that the certainty that he might have this limited period would induce men to enlist, and then would it not also do away with the homesickness and the consequent desire to desert the Army; in other words, do you not think it would prevent desertion, and a man would have a sufficient try out, so that he would know whether he would want to stay or not, and do you not think that at the expiration of the term of enlistment you would have men who would have more ambition to stay, and it might be a good source for getting the noncoms.

Gen. PERSHING. It strikes me as very favorable, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. If there are no further questions the committee will adjourn, but first let me say that I am sure the committee joins me in saying that we are exceedingly grateful to you for your very informing testimony, and we are glad to have had you with us. We thank you, General.

(Thereupon, at 12.20 p. m., the committee adjourned subject to the call of the chairman.)

REORGANIZATION OF THE ARMY

MR. CHARLES G. DAWES, COL. HENRY C. SMITHER

HEARINGS

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE COMMITTEE ON MILITARY AFFAIRS UNITED STATES SENATE

SIXTY-SIXTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

ON

S. 2691

A BILL TO PROVIDE FOR UNIVERSAL MILITARY, NAVAL, AND VOCATIONAL TRAINING AND FOR MOBILIZATION OF THE MANHOOD OF THE NATION IN A NATIONAL EMERGENCY

S. 2693

A BILL TO CREATE A DEPARTMENT OF AERONAUTICS, DEFINING THE POWERS AND DUTIES OF THE DIRECTOR THEREOF, PROVIDING FOR THE ORGANIZATION, DISPOSITION, AND ADMINISTRATION OF A UNITED STATES AIR FORCE, CREATING THE UNITED STATES AIR RESERVE FORCE, AND PROVIDING FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF CIVIL AND COMMERCIAL AVIATION

S. 2715

A BILL TO REORGANIZE AND INCREASE THE EFFICIENCY OF THE UNITED STATES ARMY, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES

PART 25

Printed for the use of the Committee on Military Affairs

WASHINGTON
GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
1919

C. Smith
June 1919

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REORGANIZATION OF THE ARMY.

TUESDAY, NOVEMBER 4, 1919.

SUBCOMMITTEE ON MILITARY AFFAIRS,
UNITED STATES SENATE,
Washington, D. C.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to the call of the chairman, at 2.15 p. m., in the committee room, Capitol, Senator Howard Sutherland presiding.

Present: Senators Sutherland (presiding), New, Chamberlain, Thomas, and Fletcher.

STATEMENT OF GEN. CHARLES G. DAWES, CHICAGO, ILL.

Senator New. Will you give your name, address, and your military rank and activities to the stenographer, please?

Gen. DAWES. Brigadier general, Engineers, and general purchasing agent A. E. F., and chairman of the general purchasing board of the A. E. F.

Senator New. Gen. Dawes, this committee has before it a number of bills bearing upon the reorganization of the Army and on the military allied topics—Senate bill 2691, introduced by Senator Chamberlain; Senate bill 2693, which deals with the reorganization of the air forces; Senate bill 2715, known as the War Department bill, introduced by Senator Wadsworth, and which is the bill first under consideration. Have you had an opportunity to read those bills at all?

Gen. DAWES. No; I have not read them, Senator. While I have not read the bills themselves, since my return from France I have been interested in the supply problem over here; I have discussed with our own officers and some of my friends who are here from the A. E. F. the general principles of the bills you are considering; and if my views will be of any assistance, I think they can be best developed by an expression of my general ideas as to the relation of the general staff of an army to supply procurement and by an explanation of the device which Gen. Pershing originated and successfully used in a time of great emergency in the matter of supplies for the American Expeditionary Forces.

Senator SUTHERLAND. Go ahead in your own way, General.

Gen. DAWES. Then, if there are any questions, I shall be glad to answer them.

Owing to the lack of shipping facilities from the United States it was possible for the American Expeditionary Forces to secure, during the first seven months of its existence, less than 500,000 ship-tons

of material from the United States, and as emphasizing the emergency under which the Army functioned it was necessary, during that same time, for us to secure from France, which was largely stripped of supplies, and from Europe, over 2,000,000 tons of supplies. During the 19 months, I think it is, from June, 1917, when we first landed, to December 31, 1918, it was possible to ship from the United States to our Army only about 7,600,000 ship-tons of supplies, whereas the Army secured for itself, under emergency over there, 10,000,000 tons of material and supplies during the same period.

Senator SUTHERLAND. In addition?

Gen. DAWES. Yes; in addition, 10,192,000 tons of supplies. In other words, the Army in supply matters was largely "on its own."

There existed and was jealously preserved on the part of the separate services of the Army the right of independent purchase—the right of independent supply—which is only another way of saying the right of self-preservation. Europe was largely stripped of supplies. As our Army stocks were entirely insufficient, our construction programs enormous, and the number of our Army constantly increasing, there was a severe competition between the different services of our own Army in the matter of purchasing goods and with our Allies as well. Prices were being unnecessarily raised, and the domestic business of France still further disturbed by this situation. Gen. Pershing, seeing all this, felt the need of a central control and established it in such a way as to coordinate and centrally control the separate services of the Army without destroying their right of independent action and of self-supply. Now, I will be perfectly frank and say that as a former business man I erroneously entertained the idea, which I find many other business men entertained, that an Army in war is like a great business institution, and that for the Army in actual war as for a great business there should be a central purchase and supply department. The argument made for this in the Army is the same that is made for it in normal business, and that is where the error lies.

The argument is that with a central purchase and supply department it is possible to get a bird's-eye view of the Army situation—that too much of the same material would not be purchased by the different departments in competition—that by bulk purchases better prices could be obtained, and that a system of checks and balances incident to normal business could be better maintained. I do not think there are any Army officers or business men who now entertain views contrary to those which I will express who felt any more strongly than I did, before my experience as chief of Army supply procurement in France, the strength of the principles underlying an absolute control of purchase in any business organization. To tell the truth, I looked upon the Army system of supply procurement as something that had just happened—that it was not a scientific system and that it did not recognize scientific business principles. I had not been in France over three weeks, in the midst of the terrible shortage of all kinds of supplies which confronted the American Expeditionary Forces, before it suddenly dawned upon me that the jealous preservation by legislation in the separate services of the right of independent supply was not the result of a lack of compre-

hension of business principles on the part of Congress but resulted from the unconscious survival of a principle which for 10,000 years and more humanity has come to recognize as necessary to success in actual military action and to an army actually in the field.

Business principles operate in normal times and peace times and in normal business organizations, but there is a difference between an army in the field at war and a normal business organization. A business purchases goods in order to make a profit. An army purchases them in order to use them to prevent its own annihilation. Profit is the motive of the business transaction, self-preservation the motive of the army transaction. Remember, I am talking of an army in the field, and remember also that the first purpose of your military system is to have your army operate successfully in the field. The laws of evolution have been at work longer in connection with war than any other form of collective human activities, for war was the first collective human activity. Experience showed me that the claim of each service to the right of supply procurement for itself is necessary for the success of an army in the field and that the ideal system of central control, while it must be absolute, must exercise its powers by coordinating the activities of the separate services instead of trying to substitute itself for them.

The system which Gen. Pershing originated in the American Expeditionary Forces was a compromise between the central control system incident to normal business and the system of complete decentralization incident to our Army before we entered the war. Gen. Pershing, in devising this plan, could act only under the law providing for purchases and supply procurement by the separate services. He centralized these competing activities and secured the gradual application of the checks and balances of normal business so far as they were consistent with the military aspects of supply procurement by creating a board composed of the chief purchasing agents of each of the separate services of the Army. He then appointed me chairman of the board and general purchasing agent, American Expeditionary Forces, and had these officers report to me as in military charge.

Under his plan no purchasing officer of a service could execute a purchase exceeding in amount 1,000 francs without my approval. Under the law I myself could buy nothing and did buy nothing in France. But nevertheless with power of veto and power of direction arising out of the fact that they reported to me gave me general control of the policy of supply procurement. So large were my powers that it would have been possible for me at that time, if I had been foolish enough to do so, to have attempted the unwise thing of practically substituting for the activities of the separate services a central control where we could have had the business of the Army done on what you might designate scientific business principles. If I had tried to do that thing either I would have been swept out of my position within a month or we would have made a comparative failure of our supply procurement effort.

Congress in one sense is a sort of general staff for the Government. If the Army had the right to make its own appropriations and fix up its own program, and the Navy, the Post Office Depart-

ment, and the Agricultural Department possessed the same power, these powers would be exercised without any reference to the taxable resources of the Nation and only with a view of securing success in the departments of the Government irrespective of the interests of the Government as a whole. Congress, however, coordinates the requests for appropriations as well as for authority on the part of these departments. But Congress does not attempt to substitute itself for the departments. Having a bird's-eye view of the whole situation, including the interests of the Government which it represents, Congress coordinates by means of legislation these independent activities and fields of activity. It would be as wrong in principle for the General Staff to substitute its own activities for the activities of the separate services as it would be for Congress to attempt to administer the different departments of the Government. Let me illustrate why, in the last analysis, an army in the field depends upon its success in supply procurement upon the independent right of the separate services to secure supplies.

Supposing Gen. Pershing had endeavored to set up a central supply procurement agency in the American Expeditionary Forces by which one central organization bought for all the Army. Under this system the man seeking supplies would have been primarily responsible to me, and I would be responsible to the chiefs of the services who were to use them. There would come from the Army in the field and from the services a tremendous continuous and insistent demand for emergency supplies—ether for the Medical Department, because operations were being performed without anesthetics, food supplies where the men were without rations, ammunition where our soldiers were facing an attack without having a sufficient quantity, hospital cots because the wounded were lying on the floors, etc. Now, the tone of voice, since I had an independent jurisdiction, in which I would get my information from the man at the point of necessity would not be the same, nor would it be interpreted by my agents when transmitted by me as the tone of voice from the man at the point of necessity to an agent directly under him and responsible to him for that supply. Nothing on earth can take the place in time of war of the direct steam pressure that comes down from the authority face to face with a crisis to a man directly responsible to him for securing the means to avert it. The other system makes a crook in the steam pipe. The pressure would travel to me and then down from me to my agent and not directly from the point of necessity down upon a man who was directly responsible for its relief. Fortunately, I realized this early, and I told our board when I called it together for the first time that if anything was done to interfere with the current supplying of activities which were going on, insufficient as it was, that we would be swept out of existence in two weeks; that we must impose a system of coordination to prevent competition and to apply business principles so far as possible, but we must do it gradually so that our lines of communication could be made ready and the constantly increasing demands of our Army satisfied.

You can imagine what a tremendous pressure for material and supplies was upon us from what I stated at the beginning, that in the first seven months that our Army was in France we secured

from the United States less than 500,000 ship-tons of supplies and material, and had in that same period to find over 2,000,000 tons in Europe. Somehow we did succeed in finding in Europe the deficiency which submarine warfare prevented us from getting from America. As I said before, during the 19 months to December 31, 1918, we secured 10,000,000 tons of supplies in Europe, of which 7,000,000 tons were from France. We made many mistakes, but we did not make the mistake of ignoring the military aspect of supply procurement. Gradually we imposed upon that system the kind of central supervision which applied the ordinary business system of checks and balances wherever it was possible without interfering with supplies of acute military necessity. We provided for bulk purchases, having one service act as agent for all services. We put in a system to prevent competition between the services and competition of our services as a whole with our Allies. We superimposed upon the Regular Army organization an organization all over Europe to supplement and expedite the activities of the separate services by searching out sources of supply to which the attention of the purchasing officers of the services were directed. Gen. Pershing's plan succeeded in the most acute supply crisis with which a large American Army has ever been confronted, or probably ever will be confronted, and in my judgment its principles will be as effective if practically adopted into your Army organization here.

I have thought much over this matter and I do not see how in principle Gen. Pershing's plan could be improved upon. Now, I have talked with Maj. Gen. Burr and Col. Lehman. I have nothing but words of praise for the splendid organization which they built up to handle the tremendous problem of supply procurement on this side and in which Gen. Goethals had so commanding a part. But I maintain that however successful this more centralized system proved in the United States it could not be adapted to the supply of an Army in the field and in action separated by 3,000 miles of ocean from its main base of supply. And we must remember that the first object of the military system including supply procurement is for the purpose of having its armies win victorious in the field. The General Staff can not successfully substitute itself for the separate services; it could not have attached to it the large number of technical men that are necessary. The General Staff should be a coordinator. But I can not too firmly emphasize the fact that the General Staff must as a coordinator absolutely control the action of the separate services.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. You think the General Staff should have nothing to do, as a central body, with the purchasing agencies?

Gen. DAWES. Yes; I think they should have nothing to do with actual purchases. For instance, the central plan, as our staff officers on this side have talked it over with me, was evolved over here under tremendous emergency and I am wonderfully impressed with its accomplishments, but in my judgment it would not have worked over there. You had more normal conditions here. You had large supplies, your railroads were operating more normally, and it was possible to apply the business principles of concentration and consolidation over here in a way that it was not possible at all over there.

Senator FLETCHER. General, that organization over there was what we know as the Services of Supply, was it not?

Gen. DAWES. No; that organization—I am speaking now of the organization of which I was head—was called the General Purchasing Board, with myself as chairman.

Senator FLETCHER. It had no connection with the Services of Supply?

Gen. DAWES. At first it did not, but when they established the Services of Supply I reported to the commanding general of the Services of Supply. I was chief of the supply bureau, but the commander of the Services of Supply was over me and everybody else in the Services of Supply. I reported to him.

Senator FLETCHER. Did Gen. Kernan organize that?

Gen. DAWES. Gen. Kernan organized it and he is a very able and efficient officer.

Now, I am not suggesting at all a lessening of the power of a central control over the general policy of supply procurement, but am only speaking of the method by which those powers are exercised. I think that the experience of the American Expeditionary Forces proved that the central control should exercise its supreme power of coordination through its command of the supply procurement agents of the separate services, who, while they would be responsible to the orders of the central control for coordination, would be also directly responsible to the chiefs of the services. In other words, I favor the Pershing plan. The central control must be in constant contact with the necessities of the services.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. What did they do? When they reported to you, what did you do and what did your board do?

Gen. DAWES. I simply approved purchases, yes or no, and then when we were confronted with an insufficient supply we would sit down together and determine how much should be bought by one service and how much by another, and at what price, so they would not compete with each other. I had the absolute veto power, but I was forced to consult and come into harmonious relations with the heads of the various services. These officers who were out seeking supplies I could stop or direct; nevertheless they were responsible to chiefs of the separate services. In other words, when I had nothing but the power of disapproval or of approval, I could yet force purchase by category, as I did. I directed a purchase through the Quartermaster Department, under the greatest necessity, of machine tools. We did not get a machine tool from the United States to France for a year after our forces first landed, and we were in a terrible condition for lack of them. Machine tools were needed by the Ordnance, by the Transportation, and by the Aviation Departments, and we had to get them. It would not do to have all these services rushing into the machine-tool market and bidding the price up. That would be foolish. That emergency in machine tools was a critical one.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. Where did you get them finally?

Gen. DAWES. All over Europe. We got 5,000 machine tools, and we scoured Europe for them. We got some from England, got all that were available in France, and it saved our mechanical situation. That purchase of machine tools was made through the Quartermaster Department as agent for all the services.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. Over there?

Gen. DAWES. Over there; a categorical purchase. Instead of having these four or five services go out and bid against each other in an overbought market, with machine tools scarce, we made single purchases by a single agent.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. At that time we could not get them over?

Gen. DAWES. We could not get them over.

Senator FLETCHER. We could not get them finished, I think, in time.

Gen. DAWES. Yes; we were requisitioning them from the United States all the time, but there was not enough shipping. I realized in connection with this whole situation that ships were the crux of the question all the time, and we went on the theory that we had to get everything we possibly could in Europe to save shipping space from America.

The point I make is, if you do not have the General Staff or a central purchase agency endeavoring to exercise the procurement functions of the services, that you can still get for your Army, under central control, the business advantages which come from a centralized system by giving your surveyor general, Gen. Rogers, or whoever is responsible over here for the general bird's-eye view of the situation, supreme coordinating power.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. With a veto power?

Gen. DAWES. With a veto and directive power. You can get the benefit of purchases in bulk for all the Army by doing the way we did in Europe, since every service is represented—having one service by direction of your surveyor general makes the categorical purchases as agent for the other services.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. What did the General Staff have to do with this work over in the A. E. F.?

Gen. DAWES. The General Staff did not have anything to do with actual purchases. The General Staff and the commanding general Services of Supply, of course, had control of the chiefs of the services, and the chiefs of the services would transmit their demands to their chief supply procurement agent, who reported to me, so I did not have anything to do with the formation of service programs. I only knew what the services wanted, and it was my business not to let them compete with each other. My business, also, by the superimposed organization I built up, was to see if I could not continually find new sources of supplies to bring to their attention.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. Then, the General Staff over there confined its operations to the functioning of the Army itself?

Gen. DAWES. To the functioning of the Army itself, and, again, the General Staff had control of the chiefs of the services.

There is one think, and I conclude that you have all seen these things and called attention to them, having kept up somewhat with the Congressional Record and with the progress of debates. At present, with each service having the right to secure its own supplies, you have, in effect, and we had when we went over there into Europe, eight water-tight compartments into which each service bought and took charge of the supplies which it deemed necessary for it to carry out the program imposed upon it by the commander in chief. That is a questionable process even in normal times, but when you have got an insufficient supply of material, it is evident

there is need for somebody who has a bird's-eye view of all the supplies of the Army at the same time; and if the Engineers have more shovels than they actually need and the Ordnance Department have not got any shovels, instead of having the Ordnance either requisition those shovels from the United States—that is only one answer—or buy them in an overbought market, they should be transferred from the Engineers to the Ordnance.

Here you combat human nature. Take a chief of the Engineers, for example, who has been thrifty and forehanded and sure to succeed in his task allotted to him by the commander in chief, if somebody does not rob him; and here is somebody, say in the Ordnance, who has been shiftless and shortsighted. This Engineer chief will fight like a wildcat to keep his service successful from his standpoint and to prevent his supplies from going over to the Ordnance. But to have the Engineer Department succeed as a unit, constant fight all the time between the services. They do not think in terms of one Army, but in terms of eight separate services. The great commanding general of the Services of Supply, Gen. Harbord, used to see that it was done, and over there he thought in terms of emergency all the time.

Now, the law in some way, and you gentlemen know how, should be amended so as not to have those service compartments so watertight that when your Army gets over in the field—and that is the important thing, to have it operate right in time of battle—that there can be a better exchange of supplies between the services, more recognized interdependence, so to speak, and more thinking in terms of a single army instead of in terms of eight separate services.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. Why should not that same principle prevail in times of peace?

Gen. DAWES. I should, sir.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. Because in times of peace we find the bureaux competing with each other in the market for the same goods.

Gen. DAWES. You are exactly right.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. If they had here in connection with these bureaux a man who could go, as you did, and enter a protest and compel obedience in the distribution of these properties, it ought to work in peace as well as in war, ought it not?

Gen. DAWES. Yes, sir. And that function of compelling distribution is a function of the General Staff. That is where the General Staff, the coordinator—where the General Staff comes in.

Senator SUTHERLAND. You think that power should be lodged in the General Staff?

Gen. DAWES. Yes, sir; the power of coordinating.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. Not in attempting to administer the affairs of the bureaux?

Gen. DAWES. Not in attempting to administer their affairs.

Here is a matter which I think very important, and I should like Col. Smither and Gen. Lord to bear me out in this. I am simply a business man. I have no interest in this thing now except as merely an onlooker and well-wisher of the Army, but in talking with these men who are actually interested in it, I do not find very much difference of opinion amongst us in principle.

Take, for instance, the principle of which Senator Chamberlain speaks. There is a wrong and a right way of applying that princi-

ple. If you give your surveyor general or central authority here the power to step in and make categorical or bulk purchase where, in his judgment, it ought to be made for three or four services and concerns one common stock of goods; if you give him the power to step in himself you are going to have trouble right from the first, because human nature is human nature, and there will be a constant effort on the part of this central officer to extend his field of purchases. The influence of his office will be to take more and more away from the services, and there will be a constant conflict between him and the services. Therefore, in my judgment, the power of supply procurement should not be divided between a central agency and the services, but the proper apportioning of supplies among the eight services and the thinking in terms of one army instead of eight separate services—which point Senator Chamberlain has emphasized—can be secured through the authoritative control of the action of the separate services by a supervising coordinator.

Now, there is another thing of which I wish to speak. In creating a plan for a successful organization we must not run counter to the laws of human nature. When I came into association with the Regular officers of the Army in France I found them most reasonable and cooperative men in almost all cases. In my Army and business relations with them reason governed, and for that reason we met on a common plane. Our contact was such that they could learn that any central coordinating order issued by me was for the real interest of their particular service. Whenever good reasons are given concurrently with the exercise of arbitrary authority it is doubly effective. The purchasing board and the chiefs of the services with whom I was in constant contact were kept better informed of the supply needs of the Army as a whole, and therefore carried out orders curtailing the service unit which they controlled with greater alacrity and less misgiving. As far as I could, I endeavored to have these officers consider me as their agent, at least to the extent that they were entitled at any time, irrespective of military authority, to my careful exposition of the needs of any central coordinating order as to purchases.

We need not fear a conflict of authority in supply procurement if Gen. Pershing's plan is adopted into our Army organization, in my judgment. If anybody says that it will not work, the answer is that it has worked in France under conditions of emergency which have never existed before in our Army. The answer is that under it was secured over 10,000,000 ship tons of supplies in Europe during the time we were in war. It succeeded because it did not lose sight either of the military aspect or the business aspect of Army supply procurement, but was so organized that of necessity the military aspect took precedence.

Senator FLETCHER. How does that all bear on the proposition of this bill for a separate finance department?

Gen. DAWES. I am very much in favor of the separate finance department, and that is a different subject. Now, we tried over there to get up a separate finance department.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. Before you pass to that other discussion of the subject let us finish with this, because it is quite essential. Under the General Staff act of 1903 it was the intent of Congress, I

think, that the General Staff should do exactly what you have now described as being done by it in France—that it should confine itself largely to military problems. But the General Staff, from 1903 until the time of the national-defense act which was passed in 1916, gradually assumed jurisdiction over these service bureaus, so that when the national-defense act was passed, in order to prevent the General Staff from functioning as administrative officers themselves, a limitation was put upon the powers of the General Staff prohibiting them from administrative duties. Do you not think that was the proper thing to do?

Gen. DAWES. I do not think the General Staff should have, generally speaking, administrative duties. I mean to say, you should not substitute the General Staff for the administrative-service departments. But that does not mean you should not give the General Staff unlimited power in the matter of coordinating and controlling the independent service.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. That is what it should have. But the General Staff—at least, that is the opinion of some of us—gradually assumed administrative function and did the duties, or attempted to do the duties, that the service bureaus were intended to do.

Gen. DAWES. Yes; I agree with you Senator, as a business proposition.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. The General Staff act here now eliminates that limitation which was put on the General Staff by the national-defense act, and practically gives them the whole control. Do you think that is proper?

Gen. DAWES. If the purpose of it is to substitute the General Staff organization for the service organization, I think it is improper.

Senator SUTHERLAND. Have you anything further to say along that line?

Gen. DAWES. Just one thing more. Generally when we find that an organization is not functioning well or giving results it is because it is operating in some way contrary to the laws of human nature. Since in time of war it is only results which count, we must be more careful than in any other kind of an organization to see that we have the laws of human nature working for the success of our operation. In other words, when men are so placed in an organization that the interests of the organization and of their own ambitions lie in the same direction they will work better. When in any supply organization you want to get the last atom of effort out of a supply procurement agent, you must have the man at the point of necessity possessed of ultimate power over him. You can not get the last atom of effort out of him if the man where the material is needed can not inflict on him discipline or award encouragement in case of success, but he feels responsible to somebody else in control of a central department. Maj. Gen. Black, of the Engineers, in talking with me the other day spoke of some material for the Engineers which had been bought by the central purchasing office of the Army for the Engineers. I have forgotten now just what the material was, but we will say for example shovels.

Gen. Black stated that when he asked for them down on the border, or wherever it was, for use that they were located in several places, in one instance several hundred miles distant. If the

man who had bought the shovels was responsible to Black he would have had a supply of shovels where Black needed them. He would do this particularly because he would get into trouble if he did not do it. But it is impossible for an outside agent to feel the same kind of responsibility to a chief of a service for keeping him supplied when he is working under somebody else. The central coordinating control should have the power to tell this agent what price he should pay for the shovels and where he should get them and how he should buy them if necessary, but that agent's responsibility to the man who is to use the shovels should never be removed. You may be perfectly sure that when this man is responsible to the man who uses the shovels, and if he feels that his head is going to come off if he does not get the shovels where they are needed in the proper time, he is going to strongly present the necessity of the situation to the coordinator and he is going to do it in a way that no agent simply responsible to the coordinator himself will do. Remember, you are building an army for war. Remember, that an army system is not properly organized for war unless it makes it possible to bring out the last atom of effort of which that organization and its members are capable. If you listen to business men who have never been to war when you build up your Army organization and adopt their views you may get a very beautiful business system which will protect you in normal times and in peace but when you transfer this system into time of war and to an army in the field it will break down.

The American Expeditionary Forces succeeded in the great supply crisis which confronted it because the separate services took their well-organized purchasing departments along with them to France. I put all the steam and power that I could behind these supply procurement agents—I supplemented and expedited their activities by building up an organization to search out supplies in Europe. But I say to you that the reason the American Expeditionary Forces succeeded in supply procurement in Europe as it did was because these men had the whip of necessity plied upon their shoulders by the men who themselves had felt it most, to wit—the chiefs of the services to whom they were responsible and who themselves would lose their positions unless they succeeded in the programs imposed by the Commander in Chief. Remember, that I am not making any argument against proper business administration. I maintain that all the checks and safeguards of normal business, all the methods of collective bargaining, all the perspective of central organization can be obtained consistent with the adoption of Gen. Pershing's plan which I am advocating.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. How many members were there on Gen. Pershing's staff, do you remember?

Gen. DAWES. Well, they had the five general sections, G-1, G-2, G-3, G-4, and G-5, that was the General Staff. What was the number, Gen. Lord?

Gen. LORD. Three hundred and fifty.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. Altogether?

Gen. DAWES. Yes; but the General Staff does not include the administrative staff, composed of the chiefs of the services.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. Let me call your attention to this act, because I should like to have the record show. The national defense

act, after defining the duties of the General Staff, had this limitation upon that power:

Provided further, That hereafter members of the General Staff Corps shall be confined strictly to the discharge of the duties of the nature of those specified for them in this section and in the organic act of Congress last hereinbefore cited, and they shall not be permitted to assume or engage in work of an administrative nature that pertains to established bureaus or officers of the War Department, or that, being assumed or engaged in by members of the General Staff Corps, would involve impairment of the responsibility or initiative of such bureaus or offices or would cause injurious or unnecessary duplication of or delay in the work thereof.

That was to prevent them working in an administrative capacity?

Gen. DAWES. Yes.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. That you seem to approve of?

Gen. DAWES. Yes; absolutely.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. Now, the General Staff act, which is now under consideration by this committee, provides as follows:

"The Chief of Staff, under the direction of the President or the Secretary of War, shall have supervision of all agencies and functions of the Military Establishment and shall perform such other military duties,"—

Gen. DAWES. "Supervision;" it would depend on your definition of supervision. If supervision means coordination, and if supervision means the power to veto any particular activity, I would say yes, because there has got to be a supreme control over the programs of the services.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. You would confine it to that?

Gen. DAWES. Yes; control over it. For instance, in the American Expeditionary Forces the Commander in Chief has general control of policy, and the General Staff, as his representative, in matters of policy in their relations with the chiefs of the services. The program which the chief of each service was expected to carry out was given to him by the General Staff. The chiefs of the services then initiated their own method of carrying out their program and proceeded to carry it out, the General Staff, however, having the coordinating power over all of them to keep their plans and programs consistent with each other so as to work out the policy of the Commander in Chief for the Army as a whole. The General Staff did not try to perform the duties of the services themselves, because it could not do so, but controlled the services as I controlled the policy of supply procurement by veto, approval, or power of direction of that which was put up to me.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. I think you have the proper understanding of the functions of the General Staff.

Gen. DAWES. I told you, Senator, if I have it, it does not come because I am a military man; it just comes.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. Because you have come in contact.

Senator THOMAS. It comes because you are not a military man.

Gen. DAWES. But I know it worked over there.

Now, about the subject of a central finance organization. When I was in France as a member of the administrative staff of the commander in chief, in charge of supply procurement, I was in a position where I was likely to be brought into first contact with any new problem of business confronting the Army. For instance, the Treasury Department would desire to know how much money the Army

was going to need in France during the next 90 days. The commander in chief would send this request for information to me, because I was controlling the procurement activities which were spending a good deal of the money. Well, I had to make up forecasts the best I could. I did not have any authority to get it nor was there machinery to get it. The Army had no central finance organization. The business methods of each of the eight separate services differed, but through the spirit of accommodation on the part of the chiefs of the services and without any authority myself I managed in some way to get the rough estimates which the Treasury wanted. All the time we were making an effort to have established a central finance bureau for the Army, which was finally done.

At the beginning I confronted in France what Gen. Lord did here at the beginning of the war—a difference in method of accounting in the different services and separate appropriations for each of them—an entire inability on the part of anyone to give a composite picture of the financial conditions of the Army as a whole, of its outstanding contracts, of its probable financial necessities, so that it could be transmitted to the Treasury Department, thus enabling it to frame proper financial arrangements, including arrangements for exchange for the large amounts which were involved. In some way I managed to give the Treasury some information, though it was poor enough, since I had no organization to collect it, but I was so impressed with the need of a central financial organization that I early made a recommendation for the establishment of one and labored continually to get it to function in time to be of assistance to the Treasury so that it might have an intelligent forecast of what our requirements in money would be.

In trying to have established a central finance department of the A. E. F. we had at first, as always, strenuous opposition of the independent services. I have no doubt you have heard the independent services here express strong opposition to Gen. Lord's plan, because they feel that it interferes with the full success of their independent functioning. One reason the chief of a service is so hard to deal with is because he is usually so efficient. He is an individualist. He has succeeded at the head of his unit by being allowed to do largely as he pleases, and you must exert a very strong central power before you can bend this strong and independent man into proper relation with the common cause, whenever that bending means something derogatory to the interests of the particular program of his unit.

That is the trouble all the time. Unless you have very strong powers in the General Staff to coordinate and to force the general policy of the Army upon the services, the separate services will proceed upon policies of their own irrespective of the policy of the Army as a whole. But if, on the other hand, you attempt to put power in the General Staff to in any degree substitute themselves in the work being done by the services, the separate services will lose their vigor, initiative, and success, and largely dissipate their energies in fighting the General Staff. But we worked out a central finance organization in the A. E. F. just about the time the war closed. What the chiefs of the services are afraid of in connection with the central finance department is that where

the money is to be paid by somebody else than the man who buys the articles there will be delay in the procuring of the supplies.

Gen. Lord tells me that his plan is so drawn as to allow, in cases of emergency, the money to be paid by the man securing the supplies. In other words, the purchasing officer would be named as a disbursing officer representing the central finance organization. It is remarkable, gentlemen, when we come to compare what the A. E. F. did under necessity over there and what we gradually built up in the way of a business organization, how similar it was to what the Army had to create in the United States. I want to pay my tribute to the great accomplishments of these officers in the United States. With us as with them our business organization was an evolution. It was an organization necessarily superimposed upon the old Army organization. Its evolution was gradual. As necessities arose in some way it managed to meet them. As Gen. Lord and I have talked matters over we find that on this side of the water and on that side of the water we realized analogous necessities and adopted largely analogous methods for meeting them.

For instance, during the Battle of the Argonne the pressure upon us for animals to get our artillery into action was acute. We had to get them. That was all there was about it. We had a man go into Spain to buy mules, horses, or anything else on four legs that would pull artillery into action. It was a case where the money had to be paid on the spot before we could get delivery. It did not make any difference what we paid for the mules, or where we got them. We had to get them or you would have held us responsible over here as we would have been held responsible there. If we had put any question of price, any question of scientific methods, or any question of normal business methods between our getting horses to the Artillery it would have been a criminal act under the circumstances. Provided the emergency exists, always the courageous man and courageous organization has been protected in its effort to meet it. During the war the magnificent way in which Congress sunk partisanship and stood behind the American Army was one of the foundation rocks of the morale of that Army. Coming over on the boat, I was reading Trevelyan's American Revolution, and a renewed impression of the tremendous difference in the attitude of our Congress toward this war and the attitude of the Continental Congress toward the Continental Army in the Revolution came to me.

Senator THOMAS. In contrast with the attitude of all past Congresses.

Gen. DAWES. Now, if Gen. Lord provides for emergency payment, there is no argument against the central finance plan. You gentlemen have got to know—somebody should be able to come up here and tell you how much the Army is going to spend the next 60 or 90 days, and talk intelligently to you about coming appropriations. That can not be done intelligently with the different systems of accounts and different methods of estimating. A perfect hodgepodge results when the different services are keeping accounts in different ways and making estimates in different ways. You do not get the bird's-eye view.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. Sometimes for the same property?

Gen. DAWES. Sometimes for the same property, and the central finance agency, as Gen. Lord worked it out, I think is absolutely necessary for the intelligent presentation of the financial situation of the Army.

Senator SUTHERLAND. You are strongly in favor of the central finance agency?

Gen. DAWES. You must have it, in my judgment.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. What did you have to buy there for the support of the Army in Europe?

Gen. DAWES. I have got it here. I should like to put in the record at this point just that data.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. You may do so.

Gen. DAWES. From the middle of June, 1917, when the work of the American Expeditionary Forces in France was inaugurated, to December 31, 1918, is approximately 18 months. The detailed tonnage figures submitted herewith, which have been continuously and carefully estimated, show that during that period approximately 10,000,000 ship tons (40 cubic feet equals 1 ship ton) of material was acquired in Europe for the use and maintenance of the American Army, being approximately 555,000 ship tons of material per month. This material was secured on the Continent and in England through the operations of the General Purchasing Board and the General Purchasing Agent under the supervision and with the cooperation of our allies France and Great Britain. The record of trans-Atlantic shipments from the United States to our Army show that during these 18 months to December 31, 1918, it was only possible to send to the American Expeditionary Forces 7,575,410 ship tons, or 426,000 ship tons per month, based upon Army transport figures showing an average of 56.43 cubic feet per 2,000 pounds received from the United States. Owing to the lack of ships during the first seven months of the existence of the American Expeditionary Forces in France from June to December, 1917, inclusive, a period when it was charged with the necessity of founding a base and line of communications in such a way as not only to provide for current arrivals, but the eventual care of an army of millions, only 484,550 ship tons were directly received from trans-Atlantic shipment.

It is a commentary not only upon the supply emergency under which the American Expeditionary Forces continually labored, but as well upon the splendid effort to alleviate that condition made by the War Department—that during the 80 days preceding the armistice nearly twice as much material was shipped to the American Expeditionary Forces from America as it received from there during the entire first 7 months of its existence. From June, 1917, to May, 1918, inclusive, the first year, the American Expeditionary Forces received from America 2,156,238 ship tons of supplies. From June 1, 1918, to the declaring of the armistice—5 months and 11 days—it received from America 4,059,695 ship tons. It will be noted that the success of shipping program in the United States was such that in the last five months preceding the armistice nearly twice as much tonnage was shipped from America to the American Expeditionary Forces as had been shipped the entire preceding year.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. Was that enough to supply the Army or did you have to continue to buy over there?

Gen. DAWES. By continuing to buy over there we got enough to supply the Army with what we got from the United States.

Senator SUTHERLAND. Were your purchases increasing or decreasing while this was going on?

Gen. DAWES. I have got it right here. I have got the map. There is the thing charted [indicating]. Total purchases in Europe, 10,192,921 ship tons; trans-Atlantic cargo unloaded in France, 7,675,410 ship tons; total, 17,868,331 ship tons.

You will also find indicated on this chart the purchases by months. The shaded parts are ours.

Senator SUTHERLAND. But the purchases were going down the last three months?

Gen. DAWES. Yes; and theirs were going up; you see. In the comparison I gave the benefit, as I should, to the War Department up to December 31, 1918, and in that month of December they shipped from America 880,637 ship tons.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. How much did you buy?

Gen. DAWES. In that month?

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. Yes.

Gen. DAWES. We bought a little less than 700,000 ship tons.

Senator SUTHERLAND. In your largest month you bought how much?

Gen. DAWES. In our largest month we bought 1,600,000 ship tons.

Senator FLETCHER. In the first seven months the ships were occupied taking troops over and could not carry very many supplies, could they?

Gen. DAWES. That was it, and when Gen. Pershing later had his council of war over there in June, 1918, when he considered the question as to the program of men from the United States that he should insist upon, that was the point which concerned him regarding supplies. Gen. Pershing committed us then to the 4,000,000-men program, which meant that every fellow in the supply procurement effort in Europe had to work "on his toes," because if Gen. Pershing was going to get his men from America he could not get all the supplies for them from there.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. What surprises me the most about your statement is the immense amount of supplies you bought over there. I do not see how you found them. My understanding was there was a great scarcity of supplies of all kinds in Europe and not enough, practically, to supply the armies of our allies, and yet from what you have stated here now you purchased there almost as much for our Army, if not as much, as we sent over.

Gen. DAWES. In terms of tonnage we purchased more, but not so much of it was food. I can give you just what the purchases were.

Senator NEW. What was the total tonnage purchased by you in Europe?

Gen. DAWES. 10,192,921 ship tons.

Senator NEW. What was the total we shipped from here?

Gen. DAWES. 7,675,410 ship tons.

Senator NEW. And we bought more of our stuff over there than we shipped from this side?

Gen. DAWES. In tonnage; yes; In figures I can only give you a rough approximation because I did not have any authority or ma-

chinery to compel their compilation, but as a matter of approximation from figures given to me by the chiefs of the services, I estimate that we spent in Europe for our supplies about \$1,024,000,000. We bought a great deal of ammunition. I can give you tonnage figures if you desire them.

Senator NEW. I should like to have this, at least—

Gen. DAWES. Remember, these purchases were made by these separate services. As soon as he got over there Gen. Pershing realized the full extent of current submarine destruction of shipping and what it meant. He instructed me to get everything possible in Europe and with the greatest possible speed.

Senator NEW. Gen. Pershing?

Gen. DAWES. Yes; and he said "go ahead and find all the supplies you can." So I made an organization, partly civilian and partly military, and we combed Europe for material and supplies. I appointed purchasing agents for all the countries, and then they would build up a little organization and go around and look for anything there was, and give us a list of it. We would send our requirements to them so they would know what the Army would have to have—then I would send my purchasing agent to that country and he would show these agents what they could get. Then the purchasing agent through his regular service, you see, as authorized by law, would make the purchase.

Senator NEW. What was the character of your supplies—what was the principle character of them?

Gen. DAWES. Of all kinds; some are itemized in my statements and some are not.

Senator NEW. Were they clothing?

Gen. DAWES. We got clothing and cloth both from Spain and England. Through the Quartermaster Corps the following purchases in Europe were made: Purchases through Chief Purchasing Officer Quartermaster Corps 810,717 tons; coal, 1,438,275 tons; autos and other vehicles purchased for Transport Department, 132,284 tons; horses and mules, 1,401,592 tons; fuel wood, 1,546,038 tons; charcoal, 10,279 tons; and machine tools (through the General Purchasing Agent), 20,000 tons. Purchases through the Chief Purchasing Officer, Ordnance Department, 514,260 tons. This, however, includes 100,000 tons under preliminary arrangements made with the French Government by the Chief of Ordnance in Washington.

Through the Engineer Corps the following purchases were made: Purchases through Chief Purchasing Officer, Engineer Corps, 1,729,172 tons; purchases through Comité Interallie des Bois de Guerre, lumber and ties, 792,469; and manufactured fuel wood, 974,202 tons; and lumber and ties through the Wood Section General Purchasing Board, 213,480 tons. Purchases through the Chief Purchasing Officer, Air Service, 253,503 tons. Purchases through the Chief Purchasing Officer, Medical Corps, 272,055 tons, of which 231,806 tons were general stores and supplies and 40,250 tons hospitals.

Senator SUTHERLAND. You can furnish that table and it can be put into the record.

(The table referred to is printed in full at the conclusion of the witness's statement.)

Senator SUTHERLAND. Will you submit that report for the record?

Gen. DAWES. This report of mine—I did not suppose anybody was ever going to read it. I have never yet been able to get anybody to read it, even my mother, but it is a good thing, gentlemen.

Senator SUTHERLAND. You have mentioned the amount of supplies that we furnished our armies over there. Have you any memorandum showing the amount of supplies that we furnished the Allies during this same period?

Gen. DAWES. No; I have not.

Senator FLETCHER. It is a fact we did send to them a great many supplies, is it not—raw material and that sort of thing?

Gen. DAWES. Yes, of course; in their ships.

Senator SUTHERLAND. Are there any further observations you would like to make in regard to any feature of this bill?

Gen. DAWES. No; I think not.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. Have you thought anything about the question of universal military training or the question of an independent Air Service, or any of those questions?

Gen. DAWES. Oh, Senator, my judgment would not be of value, but I have thought of those things. I am not a military man.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. That is out of your line?

Gen. DAWES. That is out of my line. However, I will say that I am in favor of universal military training.

Senator FLETCHER. It is your view that the same plan you had in operation over there during the war would work all right in peace time, is it?

Gen. DAWES. Yes; and, Senator, right in the midst of my hardest work over there I prepared and sent to Gen. Harbord, who placed it on the War Diary of the American Expeditionary Forces, a carefully prepared memorandum on the Principles of Army Purchase and Supply. It occurred to me during my unique experience to make a careful statement of the principles we followed. This memorandum embodies in a much more carefully prepared way what I have said here in general. It is also in my report to the commanding general Services of Supply.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. Is it in the paper you present here?

Gen. DAWES. I have presented my whole report here. I think I had better leave that whole report with you.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. We will put in the parts you have read and the table.

Gen. DAWES. Then there is an explanation in that of Gen. Pershing's orders and the 17 bureaus built up under my organization and the functions of each.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. Why should not that whole paper go in the record? I think it would be a very valuable document.

Senator SUTHERLAND. Has it been printed elsewhere?

Gen. DAWES. No, sir.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. You have no objection to it going in, have you?

Gen. DAWES. No; I am delighted.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. I think it would be a very valuable acquisition to the work done over there.

Senator SUTHERLAND. I think we might print the whole thing. If there is no objection, it will be ordered that the whole report be printed as part of this hearing.

(The report referred to is printed in full at the close of the witness's statement.)

Senator SUTHERLAND. Are there any further questions? This has been very interesting, Gen. Dawes.

Gen. DAWES. I thank you, gentlemen, for your attention.

Gen. Lord and Col. Smithers (addressing them), do you take exception to anything I have said? Smithers is a quiet, modest fellow. He was Assistant Chief of Staff, G-4 Services of Supply, A. E. F., and he has had a wonderful experience and brilliant success. I believe his views would be valuable, because he is a man of original ideas. Many of us have talked over there in the A. E. F. over supply reorganization, and I think it would be a very interesting thing if sometime before this committee Smithers could be heard.

Senator THOMAS. Why not right now?

Gen. DAWES. I really do think, gentlemen, that this plan of supply procurement originated by Gen. Pershing in the A. E. F., and which stood the test of probably the greatest supply emergency with which a large army was ever confronted in the field, should be transferred to the Army organization here. Its principles are sound and should not be abandoned. Of course, its methods can be adapted and improved, especially when the present laws are somewhat amended. Under it your Army will be supplied under the best conditions when it is in action, and if the Army fails in action everything else fails with it. Let us never lose sight of the military aspect of supply procurement during those periods when the Army may be inactive.

REPORT OF THE GENERAL PURCHASING AGENT AND CHAIRMAN OF THE GENERAL PURCHASING BOARD, AMERICAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCES, TO THE COMMANDING GENERAL, SERVICES OF SUPPLY, AMERICAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCES, FEBRUARY 28, 1919.

FEBRUARY 28, 1918.

From: The general purchasing agent and chairman of the General Purchasing Board, American E. F.

To: Maj. Gen. James G. Harbord, commanding general, Services of Supply, American E. F.

Subject: Report.

In compliance with your instructions, I submit a report of the activities of the general purchasing agent and the General Purchasing Board of the American Expeditionary Forces covering the period from the beginning of operations to the present time. Preceding the report, and as indicating the viewpoint from which it is proper to consider the operations reported, in their relation to the supply situation in Europe and in the United States during the war, the following observations are pertinent:

From the middle of June, 1917, when the work of the A. E. F. in France was inaugurated, until December 31, 1918 (the armistice having been declared November 11, 1918), is approximately eighteen months. The detailed tonnage figures attached hereto, which have been continuously and carefully estimated, show that during that period approximately 10,000,000 ship tons (40 cubic feet equal 1 ship ton) of material was acquired in Europe for the use and maintenance of the American Army, being approximately 555,000 ship tons of material per month. This material was secured on the Continent and in England through the operations of the General Purchasing Board and the general purchasing agent, under the supervision and with the cooperation of our allies, France and Great Britain. The record of trans-Atlantic shipments from the United States to our Army show that during these eighteen months, to December 31, 1918, it was only possible to send to the A. E. F. 7,675,410 ship tons, or 426,000 ship tons per month, based upon Army transport figures showing an average of 56.43 cubic feet per 2,000 pounds received from the United States. Owing to the lack of ships during the first seven months of the existence of the A. E. F. in France, from June to December, 1917, inclusive, a period when it

was charged with the necessity of founding a base and line of communications in such a way as not only to provide for current arrivals but the eventual care of an army of millions, only 484,550 ship tons were directly received from trans-Atlantic shipment. It is a commentary not only upon the supply emergency under which the A. E. F. continually labored but as well upon the splendid effort to alleviate that condition made by the War Department that during the thirty days preceding the armistice nearly twice as much material was shipped to the A. E. F. from America as it received from there during the entire first seven months of its existence. From June, 1917, to May, 1918, inclusive—the first year—the A. E. F. received from America 2,156,238 ship tons of supplies. From June 1, 1918, to the declaring of the armistice—5 months and 11 days—it received from America 4,059,695 ship tons. It will be noted that the success of the shipping program in the United States was such that in the last five months preceding the armistice nearly twice as much tonnage was shipped from America to the A. E. F. as had been shipped the entire preceding year.

In military and industrial efforts in the A. E. F. there were occasional failures, as there were in the United States. Mistakes occurred here and there, as always in a great and complex enterprise, but to the observing officers of the A. E. F., experiencing analogous difficulties in their own work or war preparation, the gathering of the American Army, the industrial devotion to military preparation once the war was declared, and the efforts of the different departments of the Government, all challenged the highest admiration. No matter how great or how successful were the activities in military preparation of the domestic industries and governmental departments of the United States, so long as ships were lacking, the A. E. F. could not be largely supplied from across the ocean. The efforts put forth by the United States in the shipbuilding program, with results just beginning to be greatly felt at the close of the war, coupled with the other great efforts in preparation for a long war, made the United States potentially the most powerful military nation on earth, and so recognized. The greatness of scope in its undertakings and the immensity of the field requiring coordination made inevitable a certain delay before our Nation reached its real military stride. History will probably show, when our home achievements in military preparation are compared with those made by any other nation during the first 20 months of the war, considering our condition of preliminary unpreparedness, that our record has been surpassed by no other nation, and that the armistice date, on which the war ended, should not justly be allowed to obscure the results obtained, because they could not all be in evidence at the front. The knowledge of their existence, however, had a tremendous effect at the front. This preparation and potential power of our Nation was at once the rock upon which a stronger morale of our noble allies was based and upon which the morale of Germany broke. To the A. E. F. in France was given an environment in which its efforts could be more immediately felt along the actual fighting front. More tonnage was not sent from America for the use of the Army because the ships did not exist with which to transport it.

But war once entered upon, conscription having been immediately put into effect, a national program of industrial and financial devotion to the purposes of war adopted, including absolutely essential financial aid to our allies, our Nation succeeded in its greatest supply effort, beside which all other seem small and from which directly resulted allied victory—the supply to France of over 2,000,000 soldiers, than whom no finer or braver body of troops ever existed. The world has not seen in its history such a quick organization and transfer to a field of conflict over such a distance of a force such as was gathered in the United States under the supervision of the War Department during the last two years.

In the emergency situation constantly confronting the supply officers of the A. E. F. it was a source of regret from every standpoint that greater recourse to American products in supplying our Army could not be had, but there were not sufficient ships to make such a course possible. Operations were primarily governed by military exigencies. Charged with the conviction, however, that the first question of importance at all times in order to gain victory was the provisioning, arming, maintaining, and caring for American troops in the fighting line, the supply procurement service of the A. E. F. while subordinating ordinary business considerations to this question of proper supply, endeavored at the same time to apply as safeguards the checks, regulations, and restrictions of normal business organization where these did not involve a diminution in supplies of first military emergency.

The record of the A. E. F. up to the date of the armistice, November 11, shows that it had sufficient supplies to enable it to exist and function. It was not oversupplied. The fact alone that the American Nation was operating under a program proposed by the commander in chief and ratified by the Government, providing for the existence of an army in France by June, 1919, of 4,000,000 men, alone justifies every possible purchase of supplies and material which were secured in Europe for the purpose of saving tonnage from America. The supply requirements of the A. E. F. at all times preceding the armistice, based upon the 4,000,000-man program, were so enormous that the question whether or not these men could have been supplied by the utmost exertion, both in Europe and in the United States, was a matter of such doubt that in resolving it in the affirmative last June, when he determined that so far as he could accomplish it the war should be brought to its climax in the fall, the commander in chief made the most vital, dangerous, important, and successful decision of his entire military career.

The strenuous activity of the supply procurement agencies of the A. E. F. from their very inception in seeking European sources of supply, proved of invaluable assistance when at the crisis of the war military exigency demanded the heavier use of allied shipping to transport men from America at the expense of supply shipments. At the time of the armistice on November 11, 1918, Germany, beaten to her knees, threw up her hands in unconditional surrender. Up to that very time, in view of the 4,000,000-man program, the general purchasing agent and the General Purchasing Board were bending every energy toward supply procurement in Europe so as to make possible its completion. In demanding this program on the part of the United States, none realized so well as the commander in chief the risk which he took in connection with ship shortage in the coming months, considering the enormous increase in the demand for supplies incident to the accession in France of several hundred thousand troops per month. With that foresight and caution which he always combines with energy and courageous decision, he called into conference with him in June, 1918, the heads of the services, including the general purchasing agent, and explained the overwhelming necessity for the most strenuous supply procurement, construction, and transportation efforts in Europe if the American program, which he regarded as absolutely essential to an early victory, be successfully carried out.

From the higher standpoint of history, when truth and justice are not befogged by partisan, personal, or business considerations, the question which will be considered is not, for instance, whether the lack of ships prevented the A. E. F. from properly patronizing American business institutions in securing so much of its necessary supply in Europe, but whether, notwithstanding its great effort to secure supplies from Europe, it had sufficient on hand, and under arrangement at the date of the armistice, to have enabled the American Government, if the war had continued, to carry out the 4,000,000 man program by June, 1919, without having troops in the line improperly fed, clothed, and armed. The commander in chief—the commanding general, Services of Supply, concurring—decided that with his supply organization functioning as it was in the A. E. F., and with the great and successful efforts being made by the War Department to supply an increasing number of ships, there would result the accomplishment of this almost superhuman task. Notwithstanding the inevitable and natural criticism incident to the close of any war, every patriotic and right-thinking American may find great pride in the thought that the American war preparation, of which the A. E. F. was but a part—in spite of mistakes which were inevitable and experiments which often failed, considered as a whole and measured not only by results, but by the methods insuring them—will stand in history both from a military and business aspect as one of the greatest organized efforts ever put forth by any nation.

The general purchasing agent therefore in presenting the following report and with full realization of its public import, submits these observations with it, hoping to induce in its consideration by others that high perspective gained only by keeping in mind the great preponderating and continuing element of military necessity and emergency involved in all procurement matters of the A. E. F. from the smallest to the largest transaction. Whatever success has resulted from the efforts of the general purchasing agent and the General Purchasing Board has come because they have never lost sight of the military aspect of supply procurement while they endeavored to apply as far as consistent with this fact every available device of normal business organization designed to prevent competition, check extravagance, and safeguard honesty.

These supply procurement activities are not properly to be considered from the primary standpoint of the obligations and conventional methods of ordinary commercial transactions. Had the general purchasing agent retarded the supplying of military needs in an endeavor to fully comply with the checks and safeguards of normal business, he and his board would properly have been swept out of existence within a month. At the same time, he feels that the record of his office and this following report will show that every effort was made to apply these safeguards where it could be done without interfering with matters of military exigency.

In the consideration of the question whether or not the A. E. F. should buy articles in Europe or requisition them from the United States, the probable time which would be consumed by securing them from the United States by requisition was a most important element. Probably many articles could have been more cheaply procured in the United States, even taking into consideration the high cost of freight to France if it had been possible to wait the requisite time for ship tonnage to carry them. The question of priorities and relative necessities in the matter of use of the limited tonnage was such that the advisability of purchases in the United States as distinguished from purchases in Europe was controlled by the continuing tonnage emergency.

GENERAL PURCHASING BOARD AND GENERAL PURCHASING AGENT, A. E. F.

The plan for the creation of the office of the general purchasing agent and the General Purchasing Board was conceived by Gen. Pershing, commander in chief, American Expeditionary Forces. In general, it may be stated that the department of the administrative staff under the general purchasing agent was the result of a supply emergency existing at the time of its creation, which has continued throughout America's participation in the war. The plan originated by Gen. Pershing to cope with the chaotic conditions first existing in the matter of supply requirements of our Army in France, resulting from the independent action of the separate services, owed much of its eventual effectiveness to its simplicity. Foreseeing the necessity for the continued extension of central authority in supply procurement, Gen. Pershing did not attempt in the first order constituting the G. P. A. and the G. P. B. to fully define their duties. As is often the case in the unusual environment created by war, the establishment in any army of any new organization which functions satisfactorily results naturally in an increase of authority and jurisdiction extending far beyond the original purposes for which it was created. In this particular case, the G. P. A. was designed at first to be simply a coordinator of purchases. He did not possess, nor has he exercised, the power of direct purchase, but his power of direction and veto over the purchasing activities of the Army and his contact with the chiefs of the purchasing services and our Allies, resulting in the evolution in him of large powers over the general policy of supply procurement.

Coincident with the assumption of the power of coordination, he inaugurated under the direction of the commander in chief, in order to save trans-Atlantic tonnage, a system to supplement the supply procurement activities of the independent services in Europe and superimposed this organization upon the separate services in such a way as to expedite rather than interfere with their functioning.

The fact that the G. P. A. was the only executive officer of the administrative staff, with headquarters for the most part in Paris, resulted in his being used by the C. in C. and the C. G., S. O. S., as their agent in allied interarmy and intergovernmental supply negotiation. Again, from time to time the arising of acute emergencies in connection with the affairs of the Army led to the placing upon him of certain specific tasks by the C. in C. and C. G., S. O. S., because his juxtaposition to the authorities of the French and English Governments facilitated interallied negotiations by him in Paris as compared with the inconvenience of negotiation at Chaumont and Tours. So peculiarly has the work of the office of the G. P. A. and the G. P. B. been the result of emergencies created by the new conditions of interallied military endeavor, that since the signing of the armistice its demobilization has been proceeding rapidly. Its whole system was, in effect, a device superimposed upon the Regular Army organization.

Attached to this report of the G. P. A. are the separate reports made to him by the chief purchasing officers of the services and the chiefs of the bureaus of his office comprising his organization. Instructions by the G. P. A. to the chiefs of the purchasing services and the chiefs of the bureaus in his office were given to confine their reports to the smallest limit consistent with giving

an idea of the general scope and accomplishments of their respective work. Since the prime responsibility for the consummation of purchase transactions is with the independent services, subject only for coordination purposes to the control of the G. P. A., the record of aggregate financial transactions and the details of purchases properly rest in the files of the respective services of the Army. The compilation of these will probably be contained in the report of the chief finance officer of the A. E. F. Such references to costs as are made in the reports filed herewith are only designated to throw light upon the general procurement effect of the A. E. F. The reports attached hereto of the officers assigned to the G. P. A. are manifestly a better source of information for the details of the operation of his office than a recapitulation of them by the G. P. A., who will therefore largely confine himself to general statements. Since the business of the G. P. A. under the emergencies of war was in a constant state of evolution and readjustment, certain organizations were formed and operated for a time by the G. P. A. which were afterwards transferred to other jurisdictions. In such cases a report from the organizations are included among the attached reports and indicate the time of their transfer to other authority. This is the case with the report of the labor organization which was formed by the G. P. A. under General Order 5, S. of R., March 4, 1918, and carried on by him until September 1, 1918, when it was transferred to the Army Service Corps. Likewise upon the organization of the finance section of the A. E. F., the board of contracts and adjustments, established by the G. P. A. February 14, 1918, was transferred to the chief finance officer in December, 1918, as was also the Bureau of Accounts and the financial requisition officer created under the G. P. A. July 12, 1918.

It is the desire of the G. P. A. in this general report to make clearly evident the fact of the importance in the success of supply procurement in Europe of the continued existence of the right of independent purchase by the different services subject to coordination by his central authority. Without the authoritative pressure direct and, without delegation, from those at the point of necessity upon those responsible for the satisfaction of the need, which was secured by a coordinated system of purchase by the different services, the supply results of the A. E. F. could not have been accomplished. While in the results showing tonnage purchased by the independent services as represented on the G. P. B. there are included such supplies as were brought to the attention of the separate services by the superimposed organization of the G. P. A. in neutral and allied European countries, yet the bulk of these supplies would have been secured without the assistance of the organization of the G. P. A., although at higher prices and under greater difficulties. In other words, in the judgment of the G. P. A. the important element in the success of the American Army in France in supplying itself was the pressure put by the independent chiefs of the services upon their own supply agents in their efforts to carry out the military procurement program imposed upon the chiefs by the C. in C. and supplemented by the pressure of the G. P. A. and the C. G., S. O. S. The designation in orders of the chairman of the G. P. B. as the G. P. A. of the A. E. F. makes it all the more important for him in this report as a matter of plain justice to again emphasize the fact that all purchases were consummated by the independent services and not by himself as an individual officer. The results obtained were through the members of the G. P. B. representing the independent services, supplemented, expedited, and coordinated by the superimposed organization of the G. P. A. As a matter of fact, when Gen. Pershing, acting in an environment of acute emergency, conceived and created the G. P. B. and the office of the G. P. A. he established an interdependency and mutuality of interest in an effort for a common result which made close cooperation and complete understanding on the part of both necessary to success on the part of either.

The G. P. A., therefore, names here some of the different chiefs of the independent purchasing services reporting to him as members of the G. P. B. at different times as the ones in his judgment largely responsible for the transatlantic tonnage saved through purchases in Europe.

GENERAL PURCHASING BOARD.

Quartermaster Corps.

First member: Lieutenant colonel-colonel, Brig. Gen. Harry E. Wilkins.

Second member: Colonel, Brig. Gen. C. R. Krauthoff.

Third member: Col. W. R. Grove.

Fourth member: Col. M. J. Henry.

REORGANIZATION OF THE ARMY.

Chief disbursing officer, A. E. F.

Lieutenant colonel, Col. Charles E. Stanton.

Medical Corps.

First member: Major, Lieut. Col. Daniel P. Card.

Second member: Lieutenant colonel, Col. C. C. Whitcomb.

Third member: Lieut. Col. Daniel P. Card.

Engineer Corps.

First member: Major, lieutenant colonel, Col. Thomas H. Jackson.

Second member: Col. J. A. Woodruff.

Third member: Col. C. McD. Townsend.

Fourth member: Col. F. C. Boggs.

Fifth member: Col. Thomas H. Jackson.

Air Service.

First member: Maj. Edgar S. Gorell.

Second member: Lieut. Col. A. P. Spaulding.

Third member: Captain, Maj. Morrill Dunn.

Fourth member: Col. H. Dunwoody.

Signal Corps.

First member, Capt. James B. Taylor.

Second member: Major, Lieut. Col. A. G. Gutenshon.

Third member: Lieut. Col. L. T. Gerow.

Ordnance Department.

First member: First Lieut. Oley Bonar.

Second member: Lieut. Col. E. D. Bricker.

United States Navy.

First member: Capt. George C. Schafer.

Chemical Warfare Service.

First member: Captain, Maj. L. F. Urbain.

Second member: Captain, Maj. R. S. Ward.

Third member: Maj. L. F. Urbain.

Motor Transport Corps.

First member: Captain, Maj. Hugh Tolman.

The following is a classification of the authority and functions of the G. P. A. and the G. P. B.

First. *Coordination of purchases.*—The supply division of the A. E. F. being composed of eight independent services, each possessing its own appropriation from Congress and authority to make purchases for its own department, Gen. Pershing, in order to coordinate the procurement activities in Europe of these independent bodies in General Order 23, G. H. Q., August 20, 1917 (attached hereto as an appendix), established in Paris a General Purchasing Board composed of eight independent officers of the independent services and appointed as chairman of the board the general purchasing agent, to whom these officers reported for duty. As emphasized before, the G. P. A. possessed no authority to make purchases under the law, but exercised the power of control and veto of purchases, and to this effect all orders before being placed by the different purchasing departments of the A. E. F. were required to be submitted to the G. P. A. for approval. The G. P. A. was likewise designated as the representative of the C. in C. in liaison with the various allied Governments and purchasing agencies in matters involving economic and other questions of supply and labor.

Second. *Supplemental organization of G. P. A. to increase procurement of supplies in Europe.*—In addition to the control and approval of purchases, the

G. P. A. was also charged with the work of locating supplies in Europe with a view to saving tonnage from the United States. Upon the first day of his appointment, he commenced the formation of this organization. Under it he maintained representatives in France, Great Britain, Spain, Portugal, Italy, and Switzerland, through whom passed all purchases made by the A. E. F. in those countries, and to whom all purchasing officers of the A. E. F. reported when assigned to those countries for procurement. These representatives worked in close cooperation with the chief purchasing officers of the allied countries and with our diplomatic agents and representatives of the War Trade Board, and in this manner were able to secure supplies which in many cases would otherwise have been unobtainable.

Their duties were also to furnish reports of available supplies.

Copies of the forward requirements of the A. E. F. having been furnished them as rapidly as possible as a basis upon which to figure requirements in advance of the receipt of requisitions. Purchases were made by these representatives only on orders from the chiefs of the various services, forwarded to them with approval through the office of the G. P. A. These representatives of the G. P. A. were designated as general purchasing agents for the respective countries in which they were located, with the exception of France, and an organization partly military and partly civilian in each country built up under them. The agency in Great Britain was established by Gen. William Lassiter a short time prior to the appointment of the G. P. A., and this organization was transferred to the jurisdiction of the G. P. A. In the allied countries the representatives of the G. P. A. dealt with the representatives of the governments, and orders were handled in conformity with the regulations and agreements imposed by the governments, both as regarded requisitions upon the governments and purchases in the open market. In neutral countries purchases of supplies and commodities for which export permits were obtainable were made from individuals and firms.

The G. P. A. sent experts to adjoining countries to investigate the textile industry, the question of raw materials, timber, lumber, horses and mules, tinned food supply, shipping facilities, etc. His representatives in conference with the officials of the Ministère de l'Armement, through the Comité Technique Permanent d'Etudes Franco-Américaines, studied the industrial situation in France in relation to the question of importing raw materials for manufacturing in France with the object of saving tonnage from the United States and utilizing the available local labor. These efforts met with considerable success in connection with the manufacture from tin plate and from other raw material cylindrical and other bulky articles.

As a result of the efforts of the G. P. A. and the G. P. B. under the above two classifications of duties, and with the cooperation of the French and British Governments, there were secured up to the date of the armistice for the American Army in Europe, as before stated, approximately 10,000,000 ship tons of material and supplies.

Third. Bureau of foreign agencies.—Supervision and control of orders sent to foreign countries was effected not only through the purchasing agents for the different countries but through the bureau of foreign agencies in the office of the G. P. A., which was charged with the direction and supervision of European purchasing agencies outside of France. This bureau operated under the general supervision of Lieut. Col. N. D. Jay, assistant G. P. A., and under its chief, Capt. R. H. Cabell, jr.

Fourth. Purchase by category department.—In order to more effectively and intelligently control purchases, to prevent competition between services and to secure the business advantages incident to large transactions, the G. P. A. initiated and secured the promulgation of General Order 41, S. O. S., of September 2, 1918, establishing categories of supplies used by more than one service and authorizing the G. P. A. with the approval of the C. G., S. O. S., to designate specific services to purchase such supplies for all other departments. Under this arrangement only one department of the A. E. F. was authorized to secure any one class of supplies, except in case of extreme emergency, when the purchase was required to be certified by some responsible purchasing officer. The institution of this system was the work chiefly of Lieut. Col. N. D. Jay, assistant G. P. A. of the A. E. F.

Prior to the establishment by order of the machinery for categorical purchases and under the pressure of a great emergency in connection with machine tools, since the lack of ships prevented the shipment of tools from the United States for almost one full year, the G. P. A., in the early period of the existence

of the A. E. F., established a machine-tool section in his office, which, under the authority of the Q. M. C., located, negotiated, and distributed among the supply services of the A. E. F. for the equipment of repair shops, all machine tools obtainable in allied and neutral countries. Prior to September 1, when the machine-tool section was transferred to the Ordnance Department, more than 5,000 machine tools were procured and transferred by that section of his office. This work, initiated in November, 1917, at the suggestion of Lieut. Col. Drake, saved, in the judgment of the G. P. A., the mechanical situation of the A. E. F. It was these machine tools which enabled the A. E. F. to repair the damaged Belgian locomotives secured by the G. P. A. as a cession from the Belgian Government, which not only resulted in a large saving of tonnage but furnished the A. E. F. with absolutely essential locomotive power impossible at the time to be obtained elsewhere. The G. P. A. also endeavored from time to time to secure the interchange of surplus stocks of materials between the different departments, and in other ways to induce the heads of the independent services to think in terms of the Army as a whole instead of in terms of eight separate services. Even when purchases by category were effected the division of stocks into the eight separate custodianships of the different services resulted in a failure to secure the most economical use of existing supply.

When one service, through foresight and in order to carry out its program of accomplishment, was possessed of a surplus of supplies which could be diverted to the satisfaction of the acute necessities of another service, the machinery of transfer was extremely cumbersome and the opposition to its exercise on the part of the heads of the services extremely embarrassing.

Fifth. Statistical bureau.—The rapid development of the need for procuring supplies in Europe in order to save tonnage from the United States necessitated the creation of a bureau for collecting, classifying, and analyzing the requirements of the supply departments of the A. E. F. The statistical bureau was established on December 3, 1917, and was organized under the authority of Maj. J. C. Roop, its first chief, who was largely responsible for the scope of its work and satisfactory functioning. Upon his temporary transfer to my staff as the American member of the military board of allied supply, he was succeeded as chief by Maj. J. W. Krueger. To this bureau was assigned the work of collecting and compiling, on the basis of the forecasts issued by the supply departments, information regarding material procurable in France and adjoining European countries. The bureau likewise maintained a record of all purchase orders which passed through the office of the G. P. A. and, upon the establishment of the metal control bureau, of the metals consumed in filling such orders.

Preparation of supply forecasts of the A. E. F.—As has been before stated, the work of organization of the G. P. A.'s office and the G. P. B. was progressive. While early appreciation was had of the objects which it was desirable to obtain in the way of coordination with the French and the English Governments and of the activities of our own supply services, the Army was handicapped in its early stages by a great lack of personnel accompanied by a constantly expanding program of supply procurement. It was very difficult to secure the preparation of the quarterly forecasts of the requirements of the Army outside of the forecasts relative to food and clothing. The estimate of future requirements for construction purposes was especially difficult, as construction programs were constantly being enlarged or altered. However, by constant co-operation between the services and the G. P. A. the quarterly forecasts became progressively more fixed. The final forecasts by category of the requirements of the A. E. F. for the last quarter of 1918 is given in the appendix of this report. It well indicates the magnitude of our Army transactions and necessities.

In the matter of securing forecasts, the able activities of the assistant G. P. A., Lieut. Col. N. D. Jay, Lieut. Col. Roop, and Maj. Krueger, as in so many other departments of work of the office, were especially noteworthy.

Sixth. Bureau of purchase program and classification.—After the promulgation of General Order 41, S. O. S., the work in connection with forecasts of requirements and purchase classifications rendered advisable withdrawing this work from the statistical bureau and creating a special bureau to handle it.

For carrying out the supervision of the category system of purchasing, provided for in paragraph 3 of General Order No. 41, H. Q., S. O. S., September 2, 1918, the bureau of purchase program and classification was established in the office of the G. P. A., and was further charged with the supervision of the

compilation and classification of consolidated lists of requirements as shown on the quarterly forecasts of the supply services of the A. E. F. The duties of the bureau comprised likewise the recording of data and information obtained from the allied Governments and from purchasing officers in Europe regarding available supplies in Europe and the standardization of descriptions of supplies requisitioned by the A. E. F., for the purpose of compiling a supply catalogue, including the names and types of similar articles used by the French and British Armies.

The bureau of purchase program and classification was headed by Maj. J. W. Krueger, who carried on this work with the high ability which characterized his other extensive activities in the office of the G. P. A.

Seventh. Control bureau.—Through the control bureau, office of the G. P. A., passed for approval all purchase orders and requisitions upon the allied Governments, with the exception of certain small local purchases made by supply officers outside of Paris. An examination of orders was made by this bureau with the object of preventing competition between departments for the limited quantities of merchandise available, and the consequent payment of unduly increased prices. Through this bureau was maintained a liaison with the French mission established in the headquarters of the G. P. A., under which the approval of the French Government was given to all transactions save those involving very small amounts, and in this way gave French governmental protection to the A. E. F. against the payment of exorbitant prices. No requests for purchases by the A. E. F. were authorized by the French Government at prices higher than those actually paid by that Government for similar material, except in very rare cases of special emergency. When the prices asked seemed exorbitant to the French Government it would itself requisition the material at the fair price and turn it over in the form of a concession to the A. E. F. Under this arrangement no purchase exceeding the amount of 5,000 francs could be made by the A. E. F. without the approval of the French Government.

Eighth. Wood section (under control bureau).—The supervision and correlation of all purchases of lumber and lumber products in continental Europe having been delegated to the G. P. A., by General Order No. 8, S. O. S., of April 8, 1918, this bureau was established for the control of wood procurement both in the open market and through, and with the collaboration of, the French and other allied purchasing and distributing agencies. A liaison service was organized between the wood section and the Inspection Generale des Bois (wood service) of the ministry of armament. (See report of Lieut. H. W. Crandall attached.)

Ninth. Metal control bureau (under control bureau).—At the request of the ministry of armament, based upon the fact that the purchasing departments of the A. E. F. had been steadily exceeding, through their purchases in France, the monthly allotment of metals assigned to the use of the A. E. F. by the metallurgical section of the ministry of armament, the metal control bureau was organized on June 28, 1918. The duties of the bureau comprised the examination and approval of all purchases of metal goods and equipment, both with regard to weight of metal and prices, as well as the preparation, for transmission to the United States, of orders for metal for distribution among all departments to meet their manufacturing needs in France. A liaison service was organized between the bureau and the Inspection des Forges, of the French Ministry of Armament.

Tenth. Central printing office (under control bureau).—The difficulty of procuring the large quantities of printed matter and stationery necessary for the various departments of the A. E. F. and the rapidly increasing prices of such work occasioned by constant canvassing of the market by purchasing departments, brought about the establishment on December 1, 1917, under the G. P. A. of a central printing plant. This plant handled a large percentage of the printed matter for the various staff departments. It was transferred, by recommendation of the general purchasing agent, on October 21, 1918, to the chief quartermaster.

Eleventh. Procurement of civilian manual labor for A. E. F.—The responsibility for the procurement, organization, transportation, maintenance, and discipline of civilian manual labor in Europe for the A. E. F. (other than labor procured locally through the French regional authorities), having been delegated by General Order No. 5, Hq. Service of the Rear, March 4, 1918, to the general purchasing agent, the labor bureau was established, and the G. P. A. was designated as the sole agent through whom negotiations with the French authorities in relation to such labor should be conducted. The

bureau was operated as a subdivision of the G. P. A. until it was transferred on September 1, 1918, by General Order No. 38, Hq. S. O. S., to the Army Service Corps.

The recruiting of civilian labor under G. H. Q. was found impracticable since G. H. Q. was removed from first contact with the labor supply, and for the reason that all labor contracts required careful coordination with and supervision by, the French Government. At the time this work was started an acute need for civilian labor existed in the A. E. F. So great was the pressure of the necessity for construction work along the line of communications that combat troops needed at the front were engaged in large numbers in manual labor. The labor organization was under the necessity of furnishing men immediately. At the head of this organization the G. P. A. appointed Maj. J. P. Jackson (now lieutenant colonel), a man of high qualities of natural leadership, who at all stages of this difficult task showed remarkable ability, patience, energy, and organizing talent. The French Government rendered invaluable assistance in the work, and through negotiation with them, as well as by the quick institution of labor recruiting agencies throughout Europe, the labor organization was enabled to furnish men almost as fast as they could be used.

In the very early stages of the labor organization the demand for labor was such that men were furnished in advance of thorough organization into labor units, but the situation was rapidly adjusted, and during the months preceding June, 1918, the labor organization furnished sufficient men to release for the early and important American offensive efforts a number of combat troops equal to a full division. Upward of 1,300 commissioned and noncommissioned officers were detailed to the labor bureau of the G. P. A. in connection with the militarizing and organizing of civilian labor. With the cooperation of the State Department, and as a result of a visit to Italy by Lieut. Col. Cutcheon, of the staff of the G. P. A., 3,500 militarized laborers were received from that country. A women's division of labor bureau was established. After the first heavy pressure for workmen in the first six months had been relieved by the bureau and the civilian labor properly organized, the G. P. A. recommended that the control of the labor organization be transferred more directly to the S. O. S. and incorporated in the Army Service Corps. On September 1, 1918, the G. P. A. transferred to the Army Service Corps the control of the organization, consisting at that time of over 29,000 employees properly officered and organized. Among the nationalities employed were French, Spanish, Portuguese, Italian, Belgian, Greek, North African, Senegalese, Chinese, and Maltese. Great credit should be given to the officers of the labor bureau for their energetic and intelligent work. Many difficult situations arose which were successfully adjusted, and a high degree of organization was effected. From September 1 to November 11, under the jurisdiction of the Army Service Corps, the labor battalions were so increased that at the time of the armistice the total number of laborers, men and women, employed by the labor corps was 42,000. Including replacements, the total number of laborers procured up to this time was over 85,000. In addition to the chief of the bureau, Lieut. Col. Jackson, the G. P. A. desires to especially commend the ability, energy, and good judgment of Maj. F. E. Estes (now lieutenant colonel), chief of organization division; Capt. Jeremiah Smith, chief of contracts and foreign relations; Maj. G. Ijams (now lieutenant colonel), chief of the procurement division; Capt. H. M. Sprague, in charge of labor transportation; and Sergt. Robert C. Wallace, assistant to chief of procurement division. Because of his contact with the French Government the responsibility for the procurement of labor did not pass from the G. P. A. to the Army Service Corps in September, but remained in the G. P. A., and Maj. G. Ijams remained as the representative of the labor bureau attached to the office of the G. P. A. in charge of this work.

The procurement of labor presented the same difficulties as the procurement of supplies. There was a great dearth of man power in Europe, owing to the large armies maintained by the Allies. The character of the labor secured was often poor, and the sources of supply widely scattered, and in many cases difficult of access. Constant questions involving the domestic labor policy of France, local labor laws, and customs were before the G. P. A. and labor organization for adjustment and settlement.

The form of the organization which was devised for handling labor was determined by contact with an actual situation. At the time it was initiated the need of immediate labor relief was so acute that we were ordered not to halt recruiting, pending the detail to us of sufficient officers to promptly handle it and the assignment of central depots for its assortment and intellig-

gent distribution. This, of necessity, involved the bureau in temporary embarrassment in connection with post commanders when it at first sent labor to them improperly organized, but this difficulty soon vanished as officers were furnished us to more completely man the battalions. The fundamental principle underlying the whole system was a central responsibility for recruiting, care, transportation, maintenance, and discipline. One reason for this central responsibility was because the French demanded an organization which they could hold to account for the keeping of the agreements, which in recruiting all labor it was necessary for the A. E. F. to make with the French Government. It was also necessary from many other standpoints. The existence of an independent central control was not only not inconsistent with the military system as organized, but essential to its proper working. The organization was charged with the duty of keeping the labor battalions in the requisite condition to do their work when during the hours of labor they were turned over to the local military authorities. In this organization the G. P. A. had, as always, the loyal support of Col. H. C. Smither, assistant chief of staff, G-4, S. O. S., and Col. J. P. McAdams, deputy chief of staff, S. O. S. The fact that these officers, in connection with the relations of the staff to the labor bureau, realized that a contact of mind was of invaluable assistance in the many difficult questions which constantly arose, led them not to make important decisions having an effect upon the discipline and conduct of this important organization without full knowledge of all the factors involved. The wide latitude and discretion given the G. P. A. and the labor bureau by these officers did not result in any inclination of the former to unduly assume upon authority. And the same confidence given by Col. Smither and Col. McAdams to the G. P. A. characterized the relations of the latter with Col. Jackson, the able chief of the labor bureau.

It may be unusual in a military report of this kind, but in addition to an expression of his high respect for the ability and consideration of Col. Smither, to whom he was more immediately responsible, the G. P. A. desires to here record his deep feeling of gratitude and friendship.

Twelfth. Technical board.—In order to coordinate, develop, and utilize to the fullest extent the electrical power facilities in France, and to control the procurement in Europe of supplies and equipment which are component parts of power plants, the technical board was created as a subdivision of the office of the G. P. A. by General Orders, No. 8, S. O. S., April 8, 1918. To this board were assigned experienced electrical engineer officers, who maintained close contact with the electrical power requirements of the A. E. F., and with the available facilities throughout France, and were able to give comprehensive advice to the construction forces on all matters pertaining to light and power.

The technical board appointed by the G. P. A. consisted of Lieut. Col. F. E. Drake, chairman; Maj. Dugald C. Jackson, chief engineer; Capt. A. B. Cudebec, and Capt. A. T. Kennedy. As epitomizing the extremely important work of the board, the magnitude of which can be only understood by reference to the report of Maj. Jackson attached hereto, I quote the following from the report of Lieut. Col. F. E. Drake to the G. P. A.:

"Officers of thorough experience and of various lines of technical activity were assigned to duty with this board, and the activities were spread to all departments of France where troops or units were stationed. The acquisition of power apparatus was supervised by this board as well as the unification of projects, until, at the signing of the armistice, there were more than 300 different places in France where power or lighting, having a total energy involved of more than 75,000 horsepower, had been effectively supervised and controlled by this board.

"The activities in detail which are extremely interesting will of necessity be of great importance to future military operations requiring similar services, so that the history of the operations of the technical board as being prepared and submitted in formal report by its chief engineer, will become an important document. The presentation of his report in elaborate detail will be made to you by Maj. Dugald C. Jackson.

"In this connection I wish to speak in the highest possible terms of the technical services rendered by Maj. Jackson as chief engineer of the board, whose well-known status in the electrical engineering profession throughout the United States and Europe is known to the scientific world. His personal activities and energy since joining your staff have been of the highest order and his well-deserved promotion could only have been prevented by the signing of the armistice.

"I wish also to especially refer to the devoted services of Capt. A. B. Cudebec, who, until the arrival of Maj. Jackson, served as acting chief engineer of the technical board and actually the officer organizing its first operations under my immediate direction. Capt. Cudebec has shown not only his experience in great power projects in the United States but his technical appreciation and very great ability in negotiating and treating with the various French authorities and private interests with whom we have had to operate. Capt. Cudebec is hereby commended as a most efficient engineer with unusual experience and foresight and his work for the technical board has been most important and satisfactory."

Thirteenth. Board of contracts and adjustments.—The board of contracts and adjustments was established under General Order 29, G. H. Q., February 14, 1918, in the office of the general purchasing agent to prepare contracts and agreements between the different departments of the A. E. F. and corresponding departments of the French or British Governments, to advise officers charged with the handling of contracts and the obligations accruing therefrom, and to aid in the adjustment and settlement of outstanding obligations resulting from agreements of the United States with foreign governments.

The need of the existence of a board of contracts and adjustments became evident to the G. P. A. very early in the administration of his office. It was again the ever-existing emergency confronting the A. E. F. which required the temporary establishment of a legal department concerning itself largely with the inter-army and inter-government business passing through the hands of the G. P. A. Having recommended the establishment of such a board to the C. in C., and having received authority to proceed with its organization, the G. P. A. was concerned with the necessity of securing a man of commanding ability and legal experience to place at its head. He had not then met Lt. Col. Cutcheon but was acquainted with his high standing as a lawyer. At that time Col. Cutcheon was engaged in organization work of the Red Cross in Washington. The C. in C., at the instance of the G. P. A., having offered him a captain's commission he accepted the same and came to Europe in February, 1918. To him upon his appointment the G. P. A. turned over the organization of this most important business, giving him unlimited discretion as to mode of procedure and in the selection of the board and its assistants. To a realization of the large accomplishments of the board of contracts and adjustments under Col. Cutcheon, and under his able successor, Maj. Carl Taylor, it is necessary to read the attached report. So burdensome were the duties, so continuous the work and so limited was the personnel of the board that its success was only achieved at great cost of physical strain and mental effort. No lawyer can read the report of the board of contracts and adjustments without agreeing with the G. P. A. that to Lieut. Col. Cutcheon and to his assistant, who afterwards succeeded him, Maj. Carl Taylor, are due special acknowledgement and appreciation.

Fourteenth. Financial requisition officer.—On July 12, 1918, the office of financial requisition officer was created in the office of the G. P. A. General Order No. 41, Hq., S. O. S., September 2, 1918, changed the system of requisitioning, receipt, and disbursement of funds in the A. E. F., and put into operation a new method, effective as of October 1, which provided that funds "be credited by the Treasurer of the United States to the financial requisition officer, A. E. F., upon approval of his requisitions, based upon estimates submitted by disbursing officers and forecasts received from the various departments." The order directed that fixed credits be established in the name of the financial requisition officer in depositaries designated by the latter, these credits to be maintained by transfers from funds to his credit with the Treasurer of the United States, that individual balances to the credit of disbursing officers in the depositaries be discontinued, and that the latter draw checks against the credits of the financial requisition officer in the depositaries up to the limit of authorizations given them by the latter. The new system was designed to free the large sums of money which had in the past remained for considerable periods unavailable owing to the fact that the moneys received could be used only for disbursement under the particular appropriations under which they were requisitioned, the unused balance of one disbursing officer not being available for use by another.

This office should not be confused with the disbursing officers of the various corps who made the actual payments of money. The financial requisition officer afforded simply a convenient method of securing funds for the disbursing officers and reducing the surplus funds needed to provide for an emergency.

The financial requisition officer of the A. E. F. is Capt. R. Ives, who rendered most creditable and important service to the Army and to the Government.

Fifteenth. Bureau of accounts.—The bureau of accounts was organized under General Order No. 4, headquarters, S. O. S., March 23, 1918, for the purpose of recording, compiling, and furnishing information and statistics with respect to claims, contracts, arrangements for replacements, and other obligations existing between the United States and European countries.

The bureau of accounts was established by the G. P. A. on April 27, 1918, and functioned under him until its transfer to the office of the finance officer of the A. E. F., November 8, 1918. A résumé of its work is contained in the attached report of Capt. Charles R. Stanley, to which attention is asked. This bureau functioned under great difficulty with insufficient personnel, but, notwithstanding, the results obtained were most creditable.

Sixteenth. Bureau of reciprocal supply.—As a result of the demands for replacement of raw materials made by foreign Governments and private firms and corporations arising out of the manufacture of articles of equipment for the A. E. F. in European countries, the bureau of reciprocal supply was established by General Order No. 152, G. H. Q., September 10, 1918, in the office of the G. P. A., for investigating all replacement claims pertaining to articles of military supply and for recommending to the C. G., S. O. S., the means of their adjustment. The bureau was authorized to negotiate with the War Industries Board and the Director of Purchases in Washington the necessary purchases priorities for such materials and to arrange with the C. G., S. O. S., for the allotment of the A. E. F., tonnage needed to transport them to France.

The chief of this bureau was Lieut. Col. Perry Osborne. This bureau was successfully engaged in some very important negotiations but its late formation and the declaration of the armistice made its field of activities limited.

Special activities of the G. P. A.—The activities and negotiations of the G. P. A. which became necessary as a result of the new environment of allied warfare in which each army was placed can not be adequately covered here. A report of daily activities, by order of the C. G., S. O. S., was made by the G. P. A. from March 10, 1918, to December 31, 1918, and is hereto attached as an appendix. As prior to that time no record was kept of his daily activities, save that preserved in official correspondence, no extended reference will be made to them here. These activities like the office of the G. P. A. and G. P. B. had no precedent.

Starting with the details of a few officers the G. P. A. commenced his duties. When in considering that part of the business of the Army which passed through his hands he realized that our foreign environment and relations to our Allies required new departments of activity in the existing Army organization to provide for the proper conduct of its business, he suggested their formation and when authorized they were placed under his jurisdiction. This fact and the fact of his location in Paris is responsible for the creation of so many departments of activities with such widely divergent fields, as, for instance, the labor bureau, the technical board, the board of contracts and adjustments, and the bureau of accounts. The first request for activity in September, 1917, outside of prescribed lines, which was the precursor of many others, was the order of the C. and C. to organize the transport of coal from England in view of an acute crisis existing at that time in the coal supply of the A. E. F. A plan was devised, afterwards passed upon by an Army board and confirmed by the French Government, for the shipment of coal from English to French ports by American transports and the exchange for coal from French mines in the interior in an amount equal to that unloaded from England at the French ports, thus saving domestic transportation in France of the Army supply of coal. The services of Lieut. Col. Frederick Trevor Hill were especially important in this connection and to him should be given chief credit for the plan devised. The G. P. A. placed at the head of this work Lieut. Col. H. B. Moore (then captain), who afterwards became and so continued until the end of the war the director of Army Transport Service of the A. E. F., rendering services of most exceptional usefulness from the beginning to the end. He was the first officer of the A. E. F. to receive promotion from the C. in C. in recognition of efficiency.

After the immediate pressure of the coal situation was over the work and organization passed to the regular channels of the Army. Again where in

the activities of a separate service of the Army there were special occasions and matters in which interallied cooperation was needed, the service of the G. P. A. was invoked either to expedite or to supervise for the time being the special activities of the separate services. The fine understanding which grew up between the G. P. A. and the able and efficient independent heads of the separate services was such that so far from being made to feel unwelcome in such special work of this nature as was imposed upon him by the C. in C. and the C. G., S. O. S., the G. P. A. met on their part a cooperation in the common effort and spirit of team play which facilitated in every way his special efforts. As coming direct from civil life into the Army organization the G. P. A. desires to record here his appreciation of the freedom from smallness and jealousy on the part of the chiefs of the services in connection with what was at times clearly an invasion of individual authority and prerogative none the more welcome because it had behind it the pressure of acute military emergency. In some instances where special duties were imposed upon him, such as recruiting, organizing, transporting, and militarizing civilian labor, the G. A. P. was compelled to use almost entirely the machinery of an independent service which was possible only through the most complete cooperation and understanding with its chief.

An example of this was the use by the G. P. A. of the financial machinery of the engineer department in connection with the recruiting of the civilian labor force of the American Army in France. As among the names of those conspicuous for their spirit of most generous and broad cooperation in the emergency activities of the G. P. A., he desires to mention Maj. Gen. H. L. Rogers, Quartermaster General; Maj. Gen. W. C. Langfitt, Chief Engineer; Maj. Gen. M. M. Patrick, Chief of Air Service; Brig. Gen. Edgar Jadwin, director of construction and forestry; Brig. Gen. C. R. Krauthoff, general sales agent; Brig. Gen. H. E. Wilkins, chief purchasing officer, Q. M. C. (now chief quartermaster, port of New York); Brig. Gen. Wheeler, chief ordnance officer; Brig. Gen. Edward Russell, Chief Signal Officer; Col. C. McD. Townsend, chief purchasing officer, Engineer Corps; Col. E. D. Bricker, chief purchasing officer, Ordnance; and Lieut. Col. H. B. Moore, director Army Transport Service.

It was in such special work which, like his service upon the Military Board of Allied Supply, was not contemplated at the time of his appointment to office that the G. P. A. carried his heaviest burden.

Estimate of trans-Atlantic tonnage saved.—From the very first the office of the G. P. A. thought largely in terms of tonnage to be saved. From the beginning, in constant cooperation with the chiefs of the services, it gave every attention to making estimates of tonnage purchased on this side as accurate as possible. The G. P. A. believes that the estimates of tonnage purchased in Europe as given in the report of Capt. Newman attached hereto are very conservative. In regard to purchases in England, while purchases were consummated by agencies of the British Government for the purpose of securing coordination and protection against excessive prices, the purchasing agents of the independent services, under the supervision of the purchasing agent in England, were very active in searching out supplies which at their instance were secured for the A. E. F. by the British Government. Special acknowledgement is due the British Government for its invaluable service to the A. E. F. in this connection. The figure used in the introduction to this report of approximately 10,000,000 ship tons of material procured in Europe up to November 11, 1918, is fixed at that sum based upon the following report of tonnage saved up to December 31, 1918. In the period between November 11, the date of the armistice, and December 31, 1918, there were practically no orders placed, the principal activities of the services being directed toward the cancellation of previous orders. Allowance in the estimate of tonnage has been made for cancellations since the armistice. In the judgment of the experts of the G. P. A.'s office, headed by Capt. J. J. Newman, the figure of 10,000,000 ship tons up to November 11 fairly represents the net tonnage procured.

Statement of approximate trans-Atlantic ship tonnage saved by American Expeditionary Forces purchases in Europe to December, 1918.

	Total.	French Government.	England, Government and commercial.	Commercial other than in England.
Quartermaster Corps:				
Purchases through chief purchasing officer.....	810, 717	162, 143	211, 750	436, 824
Coal.....	1, 438, 275	1, 438, 275
Autos and other vehicles purchased by transport department, later taken over by M. T. S.	132, 284	98, 866	33, 418
Horses and mules.....	1, 401, 592	1, 085, 776	168, 240	147, 576
Fuel wood.....	1, 546, 038	618, 415	927, 623
Charcoal.....	10, 279	1, 463	8, 816
Machine tools (through general purchasing agent).....	20, 000	20, 000
	5, 359, 185	1, 866, 334	1, 918, 594	1, 574, 257
Ordnance Department:				
Purchases through chief purchasing officer (includes orders executed here, preliminary arrangements for which were made with French Government by Chief of Ordnance at Washington, estimated at 100,000 tons).....	514, 260	275, 361	167, 329	71, 570
Engineer Corps:				
Purchases through chief purchasing officer.....	1, 729, 172	241, 124	396, 000	1, 092, 048
Purchases through Comité Interallié des Bois de Guerre—				
Lumber and ties.....	792, 469	316, 988	475, 481
Manufactured fuel wood.....	974, 202	389, 681	584, 521
Lumber and ties through wood section (General Purchasing Board).....	213, 480	39, 860	173, 620
	3, 709, 323	987, 653	396, 000	2, 325, 670
Air Service.....	253, 508	190, 000	18, 500	45, 003
Medical Corps:				
General stores and supplies.....	231, 806	30, 947	28, 978	171, 880
Hospital trains and mobile hospitals.....	40, 250	8, 750	28, 500	3, 000
	272, 055	39, 697	57, 478	174, 880
Signal Corps.....	80, 765	16, 995	995	12, 775
Chemical Warfare Service.....	13, 050	1, 697	4, 872	6, 481
Motor Transport Corps.....	11, 994	3, 770	844	7, 380
Total ship tonnage on purchases.....	10, 164, 135	3, 381, 507	2, 564, 612	4, 218, 016
Locomotives leased from Belgian States railways.....	28, 796
Grand total ship tonnage.....	10, 192, 921

Statement of approximate monthly trans-Atlantic ship tonnage saved by American Expeditionary Forces purchases in Europe to Dec. 31, 1918.


	Sept., 1917.	Oct., 1917.	Nov., 1917.	Dec., 1917.	Jan., 1918.	Feb., 1918.	Mar., 1918.	Apr., 1918.	May, 1918.	June, 1918.
Quartermaster Corps:										
Purchases through chief purchasing officer.....	13,634	13,862	9,708	6,357	10,509	3,362	10,183	53,420	17,908	23,135
Coal.....	28,337	23,236	53,685	33,027	31,053	32,643	59,483	53,377	91,001	
Autos and other vehicles.....		132,284								
Horses and mules.....	35,560	22,464	23,312	13,168			88,320	56,496	76,480	44,224
Fuel wood.....	16,008	16,040	35,860	21,396	64,188	42,792	8,915	58,839	16,070	41,009
Machine tools, through General Purchasing Board.....		4,633	5,367	1,819	1,637	1,455	1,273	1,091	909	727
Ordnance, through chief purchasing officer.....	797	848	6,277	18,615	20,102	28,854	196,073	5,625	7,666	8,176
Engineer Corps:										
Purchases through chief purchasing officer.....	6,419	63,107	75,471	163,568	855,111	4,536	50,176	47,810	82,037	41,402
Purchases through C. I. B. G.—										
Lumber and ties.....			458	1,500	4,055	9,008	28,596	34,716	50,524	71,060
Manufactured fuel wood.....			377	2,000	3,303	10,631	13,621	25,493	38,353	49,515
Lumber and ties, through General Purchasing Board.....							29,120		90,710	62,126
Air Service.....	197,954	21,788	1,607	1,462	6,335	4,294	579	1,225	701	1,533
Medical Corps:										
General stores.....		7,182	496	6,810	343	510	2,606	1,426	10,322	25,623
Hospitals.....	3,000			4,500	6,260	2,500				15,000
Signal Corps.....	58	3,166	270	79	7,353	313	673	296	747	559
Chemical Warfare Service.....								90	4,325	1,330
Locomotives from Belgium.....					28,786					
Monthly totals.....	273,430	181,427	319,713	294,969	1,041,000	139,338	460,777	346,012	450,129	476,422

	July, 1918.	Aug., 1918.	Sept., 1918.	Oct., 1918.	Nov., 1918.	Dec., 1918.	Total.	
							Items.	Corps.
Quartermaster Corps:								
Purchases through chief purchasing officer.....	38,351	274,708	73,904	159,511	64,159	37,985	810,717
Coal.....	125,792	115,893	149,582	206,032	211,779	223,165	1,428,275
Autos and other vehicles.....							132,284
Horses and mules.....	318,768	390,936	139,024	82,752	65,784	39,304	1,401,562
Fuel wood.....	205,046	256,752	231,790	224,658	176,517	130,159	1,546,038
Charcoal.....			4,068	3,842	2,369		10,279
Machine tools, through General Purchasing Board.....	545	363	181				20,000	5,350,185
Ordnance, through chief purchasing officer.....	29,548	33,755	20,783	111,988	24,865	288	514,260	514,260
Engineer Corps:								
Purchases through chief purchasing officer.....	9,910	230,370	16,223	47,764	30,815	4,454	1,729,172
Purchases through C. I. B. G.—								
Lumber and ties.....	76,503	100,911	116,397	133,972	108,990	57,779	792,469
Manufactured fuel wood.....	71,649	132,469	133,615	133,700	165,882	193,604	974,202
Lumber and ties, through General Purchasing Board.....	16,404	5,850	2,780	4,208	2,280		213,480	3,769,322
Air Service.....	797	6,206	6,756	1,780	482	4	253,503	253,503
Medical Corps:								
General stores.....	88,784	5,112	74,307	8,267	25	2	231,805
Hospitals.....		9,000					40,250	272,055
Signal Corps.....	2,655	7,824	2,849	3,134	733	24	30,765	30,765
Chemical Warfare Service.....	753	4,931	214	1,037	370		13,050	13,050
Motor Transport Corps.....			1,314	6,449	329	3,902	11,994	11,994
Locomotives from Belgium.....							28,786	28,786
Monthly totals.....	985,684	1,575,070	973,787	1,129,094	855,379	660,670	10,192,921	10,192,921

Statement of trans-Atlantic cargo unloaded in France and trans-Atlantic tonnage saved by purchases in Europe to Dec. 31, 1918.

	Trans-Atlantic cargo unloaded in France from first arrival to Dec. 31, 1918.	Trans-Atlantic tonnage saved by A. E. F. purchases in Europe to Dec. 31, 1918.	Grand monthly totals.
	<i>Ship tons.</i>	<i>Ship tons.</i>	<i>Ship tons.</i>
1917.			
June.....	34,578		34,578
July.....	33,529		33,529
August.....	39,980		39,980
September.....	47,732	273,430	321,162
October.....	97,091	181,427	278,518
November.....	129,904	319,713	449,617
December.....	101,737	294,969	396,706
1918.			
January.....	192,184	1,041,020	1,233,204
February.....	189,801	139,338	329,199
March.....	327,020	460,777	787,797
April.....	424,437	346,012	770,449
May.....	538,186	450,129	988,315
June.....	643,139	476,422	1,119,561
July.....	601,604	885,684	1,647,348
August.....	740,660	1,575,070	2,315,730
September.....	794,037	973,787	1,787,824
October.....	897,115	1,129,094	2,026,209
November.....	801,919	855,379	1,757,298
December.....	890,637	690,670	1,671,307
Total.....	7,675,410	10,192,921	17,868,331

STATEMENT OF TRANSATLANTIC CARGO UNLOADED IN FRANCE AND TRANSATLANTIC TONNAGE SAVED BY PURCHASES IN EUROPE TO DECEMBER 31ST 1918 - (SHIP TONS)



French cooperation.—The splendid cooperation of the French Government in the supply procurement effort of the A. E. F. in France and the evolution of the machinery for the coordination of purchases with the French, demands extended comment. The very statement that the system of coordination was an evolution having its origin in emergency and being without precedent, is only another form of a statement that its processes were at first incomplete and that many unsatisfactory conditions were never wholly removed. The importance of this subject and the magnificent cooperation of the French Government in our supply efforts may as well be emphasized here by the statement that approximately one-half of the entire material and supplies used by the A. E. F. from the beginning to the date of the armistice, to wit, about 7,000,000 tons, were secured in France. An examination of the history of the French machinery of coordination attached to this report, prepared by Commandant Varaigne, chairman of the French mission, will indicate, when read, the difficulties with which the French Government and Army had to contend in connection with our requirements, as well as our own difficulties. It will also indicate, when read in connection with this report, that the system of coordination and cooperation which was evolved through mutual negotiation and effort, was one based upon experience and necessity, and not upon theory. From its inception the demands of the A. E. F. for material in France were tremendous and insistent. In the early stages it was necessary for our Army to secure an immense amount of material to form the base of the great pyramid of construction and supply facilities which was afterwards erected upon it. With the French as with ourselves, the evolution of the system was not allowed to interfere with every possible effort to expedite the current satisfaction of our needs both from the French Government and in the open market. Considering the pressure of emergency under which all acted, the system of protection against exorbitant prices and against loose business methods had a very rapid and steady evolution. It reached a high degree of effectiveness as far back as December, 1917, when the machinery, on the French side, was provided by the Office Central des Relations Franco-Américaines. This new office, headed by Mr. Maurice Ganne, and attached to the presidency of the council, had been instituted especially for that purpose, and continued its work until May, 1918. During the first 60 days of the operations of the G. P. A. and the G. P. B. the method of securing a greater measure of coordination between our own purchases and the purchases of all our allies both in France and in other neutral and allied countries were the subject of much consideration by the C. in C. and the G. P. A. in conference. Numerous conferences were had by the G. P. A. also with the French and English authorities. The general method for protection against exorbitant prices in France resulted from an early conference between the C. in C., Gen. Ragueneau, chief of the French mission at G. H. Q., and the G. P. A.

Attached to this report are copies of correspondence outlining the general principles and on very general lines the plan which was agreed upon in this connection. There is attached also an extract from a memorandum of a conference between the C. in C. and the G. P. A. as further indicating the general situation in a letter which the C. in C. forwarded to the chief of all the services of the A. E. F. The plan evolved from these conferences and put into practical effect is best stated in its detail in the attached report of its operations prepared by Commandant Varaigne, of the mission, headed first by Mr. Ganne, director of the office central, till the end of May, 1918, and then by Mr. Andre Tardieu, commissaire general des affaires de guerre Franco-Américaines. The acute supply situation in France which resulted in an overwhelming demand for an insufficient supply made the intervention of French governmental authority absolutely essential to protection from extortion and grossly exorbitant prices. Upon our purchasing officers rested always a powerful and insistent pressure from the heads of their services charged with the execution of most essential military construction and supply. To the chiefs of the independent services burdened with a well-nigh impossible task, having a direct military purpose, the question of prices was properly secondary in their minds. The problem was to prevent the emergency from creating an indifference to price which would result in submission to exorbitant demands unnecessary to accomplish purchases. It is impossible to estimate the enormous saving and protection afforded by the French Government, due to the commission headed successively by Mr. Maurice Ganne and Mr. Andre Tardieu. The bureau of the chef de la mission de commissariat general des affaires de guerre Franco-Américaines, attached in liaison to the headquarters of the G. P. A. was composed of

men selected because of their excellent qualifications both as to character, energy, and ability. Not only did they assist in every way in the protection of the entire purchasing processes of the A. E. F. from exorbitant prices, but they were invaluable in their efforts to expedite the furnishing of supplies from the French Government and to uncover new sources of supply in the open market. The American Army and the American Nation owe a great debt to the men of this organization and those responsible for its formation. Considering the lack of shipping from the United States and the stripped supply conditions of France, it was only by the most unusual effort and the greatest devotion to the cause that they accomplished their task.

The activities of M. Andre Tardieu, commissaire general des affaires de guerre Franco-Americaines, in the furtherance of practical cooperation as well as of good understanding between the French and American Governments, have been so important and varied that they covered many other fields than the one in which he came into relation with the office of the G. P. A.

Immediately upon his return to France from the United States in the spring of 1918, the stimulus of his energetic and able intervention in behalf of the A. E. F. in the supply situation of our Army was evidenced in a most practical way. Outside of the rear of the French Army which was controlled by G. H. Q. in the zone of the advance, the French zone of the rear was controlled by civil authority working along military lines, and was represented by the ministers of the different departments of the Government. It was at first extremely difficult for the G. P. A. to secure immediate decision of vital supply questions where it involved consultation and agreement among several French civilian points of authority. To have a man of the commanding ability of Mr. Tardieu intensely devoted to the common interest of both France and the United States, concerned in the task of coordinating French authority to match the centralized military authority of the G. P. A. was of inestimable advantage in the avoidance of delay and misunderstanding. The thanks of our Nation are due to Andre Tardieu and his earnest advocacy before French civil authority at all times of our supply needs. The G. P. A. can not leave this subject without referring also to the invaluable service to the French and American Governments of Mr. Ganne, delegue general du commissaire general des affaires de guerre Franco-Americaines, a man of indefatigable energy, intense patriotism, and devotion to the common cause. He had upon his shoulders a continual burden of most important tasks. With ceaseless labor and tireless energy he was engaged in the difficult task of assisting the A. E. F. in its supply requirements with a due consideration of the extremely difficult supply situation in which the French Government and Army found itself. Like his noble and able assistant, Commandant Vraigne, he gave immediate response to every call for help from the American Army. It is not too much to say that without the efforts of Andre Tardieu, Mr. Ganne, and Commandant H. Vraigne, the supply procurement of the A. E. F. could not have been accomplished. When the American Army entered France the exigencies of war, accelerating the operation of the rule of the survival of the fittest, had put these men in an influential position in French administration. To them and to their associates, whose names the G. P. A. has not space to mention here, the thanks of the Army and Nation are due. Whether in the early days we were seeking metal and timber for primary construction, or whether in the later days in the St. Mihiel and the Argonne-Meuse battles we were crying for horses to take our artillery into action, for ammunition to fire from our guns, or for camions to transport our troops into action, these men and their associates, with an energy and devotion which knew no limit, found in some way the means to assist us and to enable us to surmount acute crisis. The French mission who secured the governmental approval necessary before we could make any purchases occupied a position of great responsibility not only to the American Army but to the burdened French civilian population and the heroic French Army. Our demands were insistent, overwhelming, and critical.

Much of what was necessary to put our troops effectively into action had to come from France. France itself was largely stripped of military supplies. Almost every cession to the American Army meant a curtailment acutely felt by some portion of the French people and their brave army. The efforts of the French mission remind us that it was not upon the battle field alone that Frenchmen and Americans were as brothers in a common effort.

British cooperation.—Under the provisions of a general order the G. P. A. was named as the sole agent for the negotiation of supply matters of the

A. E. F. with allied Governments. His activities in this connection began as soon as he was appointed to his position and continued throughout the war. Transportation and aircraft negotiations with the allied Governments were conducted by other departments and certain other negotiations were conducted by departments independently of the G. P. A. While not therefore the sole agent in the negotiation of supply arrangements, he has been the chief agent therein, the majority of all such matters having passed through his hands. As representing the A. E. F. with our Allies in these important negotiations, his unique experience fits him to testify to the splendid cooperation of the British Government in the work of the A. E. F., without which its supply efforts might have failed. The G. P. A. therefore desires to express his appreciation of the cooperation of the military and civil authorities of our great sister nation, Great Britain. The closeness of understanding, the immediate response to our needs, the thoughtful, constant, and often unsolicited consideration of our necessities on the part of our British Allies deserve our national gratitude. In this statement the G. P. A. has not in mind that supreme act of self-sacrifice in the common good when the British nation sacrificed its domestic trade in the transport of so large a part of the American Army to France, which made common victory possible. He is referring to what the British Government and the officials of the British Army did in relation to the supply needs of the A. E. F. in France. During the first week of his duties he was called upon by Col. Harry Maud and his assistant, Lieut. Col. G. Davidson, representing Gen. Carter, the director general of forage and supply of the B. E. F. From that interview, which itself resulted in our securing from English sources over 600,000 railroad ties from Portugal, with the saving of tonnage from America incident thereto, to the end of the war, there came such addition to the material supplies of our Army as justifies the statement that without them our task would have been well-nigh impossible of accomplishment. Over two million tons of material absolutely requisite to the success of American effort in France were received by cross-channel shipping, and in the supplying of this our English cousins at the time cut deeply into their own insufficient stocks. During the Argonne-Meuse battle the G. P. A. was suddenly made directly responsible by the C. in C. for our animal supply at the front. Notwithstanding the G. P. A. knew at the time that the British Government was practically at the limit of its resources in artillery horses, it was with no doubt of response that he sounded the "call of the blood" during those critical days. Marshal Haig, Gen. Sir John Cowans, and Gen. Travers-Clarke all immediately acted. The advice, the services, the materials supplied, and the sympathy and generosity with which the British Government and Army endeavored to cooperate with the American Army through the office of the G. P. A. were such that it is impossible to attempt enumeration, but only in a report of this kind to make this wholly inadequate, but heartfelt acknowledgment of them.

Cooperation of War Trade Board.—It early became evident that the possession of raw material by the United States and the dependence thereon of neutral and allied countries for their domestic supply constituted a powerful leverage if properly used by the United States to assist the A. E. F. in securing supplies in Europe. Great difficulty was experienced by the G. P. A. from the first in securing export permits in neutral countries for the shipment of supplies to the American Army in France. An early effort was made to secure information as to what supplies in neutral countries would be of assistance to our Army and to our Allies, the securing of which would be expedited by the cooperation of the State Department in connection with embargo pressure upon the shipment of raw materials to these countries from the United States. It may be stated generally that while every effort was made from the first by the diplomatic service of the United States to cooperate with the Army, the delays incident to action through ordinary diplomatic channels were so great as to be a serious embarrassment. Our diplomatic offices abroad were not organized for the quick transaction of the entirely new business created by the war. The demands of the A. E. F. were imperative, and for a time it seemed as though the Army would lose the great assistance in connection with its supply system inherent in the possible use of an exportable American surplus of raw material and food supplies needed by neutral countries.

The G. P. A. desires to state here, however, that the above remarks do not apply to the very efficient and always active cooperation of Hon. Wm. G. Sharp, American ambassador to France, through whose office, because of his personal juxtaposition to it, the G. P. A. could always secure quick service. A

statement was made by the G. P. A. and transmitted by the C. in C. to the allied Governments looking toward a coordination of effort in the securing of supplies from neutral countries in which it was suggested that the powers of the United States over raw materials were not only valuable when used for the benefit of the American Army, but could be used in expediting the shipment of supplies to the other allied countries and armies. Progress, however, was slow until the visit to France of Mr. Vance McCormick, the able chairman of the War Trade Board, which enabled him to realize the pressing situation and to devise the remedy therefor. Convinced that the demands of the A. E. F. in neutral countries must be met immediately and that the powers of the State Department, if they were to be effective, must be exercised quickly in every instance, in order to effect that result, he sent as the representative of the War Trade Board to France Mr. George McFadden, who arrived in February, 1918.

The work done by the War Trade Board at Washington in conjunction with its representative, Mr. McFadden, in Paris deserves special recognition and remark. The ability, farsightedness, energy, and courage of Mr. McFadden thoroughly supported by the War Trade Board in America, resulted in the creation of a situation by which the State Department could inaugurate immediate economic pressure upon neutral countries where there was a reluctance to permit exportation of supplies to the A. E. F. From the date of Mr. McFadden's arrival the G. P. A. threw open to him the supply requirements of the American Army, and he was in constant touch with his office. Early familiarizing himself in detail with our necessities, he showed an initiative and intelligence in cooperation in our purposes which brought about a surprising change in the attitude of neutral governments toward our requests for export permits. During the progress of the Argonne-Meuse battle, as an instance of the quick action of the State Department through the War Trade Board and Mr. McFadden, arrangements for export permits for animals from Spain needed to take our artillery into action were effected in a few days where formerly weeks would have been consumed. The coordination of the diplomatic service which the War Trade Board and its representative, Mr. McFadden, secured and the practical results of his contact and cooperation with the A. E. F. will, in the judgment of the G. P. A., constitute hereafter one of the brilliant chapters in the history of American business diplomacy. His work in connection with our supply requirements from Switzerland was especially noteworthy. Grateful acknowledgment is made by the G. P. A. of the immense assistance to his office of the War Trade Board at Washington and Mr. McFadden, its representative in France.

Coordination of French, English, and American purchases in neutral countries.—Under the direction of the C. in C. the G. P. A. took the initiative in endeavoring to establish closer coordination of the French, English, and American purchasing officers in neutral countries. While the form of the arrangements for coordination between the three allies which were afterwards made in the neutral countries varied, the general principles outlined in the attached letter of the G. P. A. on this subject, dated October 19, 1917, to which reference is made, was carried out.

PARIS, October 31, 1917.

From: The Commander in Chief.

To: Gen. Ragueneau, chairman of French mission with the American Army.

1. The attached suggestions as to plan and general principles which should govern the Allies in consummating an arrangement for the centralization and coordination of continental purchases for all commodities has been drawn by the general purchasing agent, A. E. F., in conference with me. The plan suggested has my approval as a tentative proposition to be discussed between the representatives of the French and English Governments and of the American Expeditionary Forces.

JOHN J. PERSHING,
General.

PARIS, October 19, 1917.

1. Suggestions as to plan and general principles which should govern the Allies in consummating the arrangement for the centralization of continental purchases for all commodities. This paper represents in general the attitude of the American Expeditionary Forces and is submitted for the purpose of comment by the French and British authorities.

I. It is suggested that in Spain, Italy, and Switzerland all purchases for the allied forces in France, England, and the United States be made by a single board in each country upon which are representatives of the three armies, each speaking for all the branches of his respective service. Pending the procuring of authority, necessary under their system of administration, for one individual each to represent the French and English armies, as has been provided in the case of the American Army, these purchasing boards may consist of a larger number with due regard for equal representation and authority for the three armies. Provision for the Italian representation is to be made as soon as the Italian authorities can be consulted.

II. An interallied board consisting of a representative of the French, English, and American armies at Paris should determine the question of the distribution of purchases made on joint account for the three armies.

III. No agreement need be entered into for the permanent existence of these boards, so that any Government by withdrawing can restore the status quo. The great advantages, however, of coordination and the relief from an intolerable condition of competition afforded by them will result practically in their continuous existence. This consideration should remove any possible hesitation in connection with their immediate formation.

IV. The American Expeditionary Forces recognize that in continental purchases the needs of the French Army and population should have first consideration. The continental countries adjoining France are naturally tributary to the French Army and French population. The undue diversion of supplies from those countries to the British and American Expeditionary Forces might involve France in domestic and civil embarrassments resulting in a serious lessening of military effectiveness and injury to the common cause.

V. The United States by reason of its control of certain sources of supply, notably cotton, is in a position through negotiations as to embargo to increase the available sources of general supply for the Allies from Spain and Switzerland. These boards should be in existence now as a means of aiding with information the American ambassadors to France, Spain, and Switzerland in making representations to the State Department as to the position they deem advisable for the United States to take in connection with embargo concessions. The commanding position of England in connection with ocean tonnage, coal, and other important supplies for the French and American Expeditionary Forces makes specially important to her the common information which will be derived through the operation of such boards and which will be of value as bearing upon questions which are arising and will continue to increasingly arise in connection with the use of interallied tonnage.

CHARLES G. DAWES,

Lieutenant Colonel, Engineers, General Purchasing Agent, A. E. F.

Origin of finance office of the A. E. F.—To enable it to make arrangements for funds in Europe to provide for the payment of the expenses and supplies of the A. E. F., the representatives of the Treasury Department from time to time submitted requests for an estimate of the future financial requirements of our Army. The system of Army accounts by separate services with their inevitable differences in methods, the lack of a central financial organization of the Army with an authority and machinery necessary to make such statements, and the constantly changing situation in the requirements of the Army made it extremely difficult to give the Treasury Department accurate information.

These requests of the Treasury Department upon the Army were referred to the office of the G. P. A., and it endeavored, without machinery and without authority, relying upon the general desire of cooperation upon the part of the chiefs of the different services, to render what assistance in this connection was possible under the circumstances. Lieut. Col. Cutcheon was very active in this work, and he and Lieut. Col. Jay were leaders in devising the methods for bettering the system. It was the lack of such an organization properly organized and with sufficient personnel to handle the situation which led Edward R. Stettinius, special representative of the Secretary of War, who gave invaluable cooperation in this connection, and the G. P. A. to recommend the formation of a financial section of the General Staff which would coordinate and collect the financial requirements of the Army, coordinate and simplify the methods of accounting in the separate services, and provide a central agency for their proper presentation to the Treasury Department. In this connection, and as part of the demobilization of his office as the war ended the G. P. A. recommended the transfer of the board of contracts

and adjustments and the bureau of accounts, both of which had been built up in his office, to the jurisdiction of the chief finance officer provided for by the order establishing the finance section of the Army. The difficulties, however, under any circumstances during our military activities of making an accurate forecast of financial requirements extending over any period of time are self-evident. The large organization of the G. P. A. and G. P. B. was constantly in search of supplies in Europe, on account of insufficient tonnage from America. Sources of supply which could not be foreseen were constantly discovered, which could not have formed the basis for an estimate of future financial necessities. Additions to and curtailments of programs due to the military charges at the front and the general situation in the allied armies, the changing degree of availability for our use of the surplus stocks of other armies and Governments, all combined to make any system of estimate either of forward material or of financial requirements difficult. However, under the system as devised, a considerable advance was made in this connection.

Principles of Army supply and purchase.—The experience of the A. E. F. should here be cited as bearing upon various propositions which have been made for the abolition of the system of Army supply acquirement through separate services. The G. P. A. desires to state that he believes that a central control of the situation through a system providing for purchase by category and interchange of stocks between the services can be made effective so as to secure the benefits of centralization without interfering unduly with that independent and continuous functioning of the separate supply services of the Army absolutely essential in time of war to securing the maximum results. It must be remembered, however, that this is simply a statement of principle. It must not be inferred from it that the present laws governing Army purchase and supply do not need intensive change if proper principles of Army supply are carried out. There should be a removal by legislation to some extent of the barriers between the different services in the matter of common stocks, so that the Army may think in terms of one Army and not in the terms of eight water-tight compartments. The central authority must determine, for instance, whether a dearth of certain material in the Ordnance Department and a surplus of the same material in the Engineer Department makes advisable the transfer of a portion of engineer stock to ordnance stock. Again, the power of purchase by category should be made more definite. Under the present law the independence of the separate services is too rigidly established, and only the great emergency of war and the cooperation of a strong C. in C. and C. G. S. O. S. with the G. P. A. could have produced in the A. E. F. any degree of central coordination and control.

The G. P. A. will not seek to outline the changes of legislation desirable to so modify the present system as to best carry out the proper principles of Army purchase and supply, but because of the great importance of the subject desires to here incorporate a memorandum which he prepared with much care and sent to you when you were Chief of Staff. You placed this upon the war diary of the A. E. F. as being in agreement with your own views:

PRINCIPLES OF ARMY PURCHASE AND SUPPLY AS SUGGESTED BY EXPERIENCE OF AMERICAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCES IN FRANCE.

[Dictated Feb. 23, 1918, and carefully revised Mar. 6, 1918. For insertion in war diary of American Expeditionary Forces.]

War is the oldest occupation of mankind, and the system of organization for war has been the result of evolution for the longest period of any collective human activity. Therefore, what seems to be in military organization an anachronism must always be considered as to whether our regarding it in that light is due to the different functioning of an army organization in times of peace as compared with a time of war. The current criticism of Army organization is based largely upon the assumption that it ignores certain fundamental principles of normal business organization, which should be applied to the business system of an army notwithstanding the ultimate purpose of an army's existence is military as distinguished from business success. The conventional view of the Army purchase and supply system, held by the nonmilitary business man, is that the system of independent departmental purchase is a failure, because, while it is susceptible to an outside coordinating control, this control is not accomplished as in normal business organization by a complete centralization of purchase and supply through one agency acting for the Army

as a whole. The argument of the business man is that if all purchasing and supply activities were centralized in one distinct Army department, created to supply all other branches of the service, there would be obviated competition among the various departments, piecemeal and wasteful purchases, loose methods, insufficient estimation of forward collective needs, and many other objections now incident to some extent to the present system.

It is contended that the needs of an Army and their satisfaction will be better ascertained and accomplished by a central body, having always the bird's-eye view of the situation, and that equally satisfactory results will not be incident to any method of central control reached through a coordination of independent agencies. It was with this belief that I took up my duties as general purchasing agent of the American Expeditionary Forces, under a new system of central control devised personally by Gen. Pershing against the advice of a reporting Army board, to whom the subject had been first referred. This report attached hereto, with the comments of Gen. Pershing thereon, indicates clearly the legal limitations under which he acted, his entire perception of the business and military principles involved, and the final plan he placed in operation as the best solution possible, in his judgment, under existing law, of the problem of reconciling the existing Army and supply system with the fundamental principles of normal business organization without jeopardizing its efficiency from the military standpoint in time of actual war.

I wish I could claim a share in the conception of this plan, but the general had worked it out fully before I arrived at his headquarters and only selected me to put it into effect, and as general purchasing agent, American Expeditionary Forces, and chairman, to assemble the General Purchasing Board and direct its operations. My idea, as that of many other business men, had been that the laws of the United States which so jealously guarded the independent right of purchase and supply in departments of the service, was on our statute books as a result of a lack of business knowledge and foresight on the part of legislators, instead of its being as it is, the logical, legitimate, and necessary evolution of thousands of years of actual military experience. Now, after six months in time of war, in a peculiar position relative to Army purchase and supply activities such as does not exist in the British, French, or other army, so far as I know, I am prepared to say that any change in legislation or War Department regulation designed to bring the organization of Army purchase and supply more nearly into accord with the principles of modern business organization, should provide an agency of supervising coordination, which, while it will permit the application of rigid business principles under normal conditions, will not take away from independent departments the right of purchase and supply, especially during the time of actual military activity, the preservation of such independent powers being absolutely essential at times to military success, which, of course, is the ultimate object of the whole system.

The statement is frequently made that the business organization of an army is the same in its purposes as the business organization of any great corporation. This is misleading. The chief purpose of the organization of successful business is the creation of wealth—the chief purpose of the organization of any army is the destruction of enemy life and wealth. The prime consideration in the establishment in normal business organization of central control of purchase, is the surrounding of purchasing activity with checks and balances compelling due consideration of every purchase from the standpoint of its relation to a prospective profit—in other words, to compel the deliberate application to every transaction of the test as to whether, if consummated, financial profit or something related to it will immediately or ultimately be the result. The first purpose of the army business organization in time of war is the securing of necessary military supplies irrespective of any question of financial profit, yet as cheaply and expeditiously as possible without prejudice to military effectiveness. If the application of all the principles of normal business organization would mean the failure of supply in military emergency, business principles, in the last analysis, must yield wherever necessary to military emergency. The principles, however, of normal business as affecting army business organization can be made to apply through a coordinating system as we have done in the American Expeditionary Forces, where these principles are applied to any army purchase or supply transaction not involving a preponderating military necessity. I can not emphasize too strongly that for the preservation of a requisite system of supply for any army in

action, the feeling of responsibility on the part of a supply-procuring agent must be first to the officers needing the supply. From my experience with the field system of army supply and purchase in this war, the only reason I can imagine why anybody suggests the contrary is because a large portion of the supplies of our army is being collected by the War Department in a country of large resources, which, when collected, are shipped from America to the army in France. Business principles, for obvious reasons, can be given a wider application by the War Department in the United States than it is possible to give to the purchase and supply organization of any army in the field. In the business organization of an army in the field nothing must prevent the immediate application of the greatest possible pressure directly from the point of military and emergency need upon an agent of purchase and supply directly responsible to it. Therefore the central business control of purchase and supply activities of an army in the field, while operating in all normal cases, must not interfere with a perfect device for the operation of a collateral independent system controlled by military necessity. Only in this way can all the needs of an army in time of action be properly met.

Let us assume for purpose of illustration that the American Expeditionary Forces in France, at a time when military operations are under way, had an existing central purchase and supply organization for all departments of the Army without there being in existence machinery for independent collection of supplies. To that central organization would come a series of demands which we might epitomize as follows: From A on the line, 2,000 blankets by night time, which, if not supplied, meant that soldiers would perish by exposure; from B, 1,000 shells for an expected attack the next day; from C, 1,000 cots for wounded soldiers lying on the floors of hospitals; from D, certain medicines and surgical apparatus with available supplies entirely inadequate and wounded still coming in; from E, food for men who had been without it for two days. The central organization, in transmitting to its purchasing and collecting agents these demands, would use an emphatic tone of voice, but that tone of voice would not be the same, not interpreted by the agent in the same way, as the voice of each officer responsible for the situation at each point of necessity speaking to a man directly responsible to him, and located at a point of possible supply. If a demand came for timber to build a bridge necessary to carry 100,000 troops across a stream for reinforcement of a sorely pressed army corps, questions of the price to be paid, or the manner in which it was to be secured, would not, advantageously, be first referred to a central agency for consideration of the business bearings of the transaction. It is no reply, in such a situation, to maintain that an emergency supply and purchase organization can be created for use in times of war which can function when and where it would be impossible for the central organization to do so. A purchase and supply machine to function well must function continuously.

In this war the use of troops in restricted localities, the transportation to masses of stationary troops of large shipments of supplies, the fact that the different units of the Army, as a rule, are not separated by long distances or isolated by lack of railroad or other means of communication, all make more plausible the demand for the abolition of the great Army system of independent departmental supply and purchase. But if any other system is put in its place which does not recognize that the first responsibility of the supply and purchase agent must be directly to the responsible officer nearest the point of necessity, the system in time of military emergency will fail; and the whole object of the military system is not to fail in time of war. In order to give our Army organization in France the benefit as far as possible of all the admirable safeguards and advantages of normal business organization and yet not destroy that which is above all things important, the system, which, irrespective of business considerations, supplies most quickly articles at the point of use during military operations, Gen. Pershing originated the idea of the General Purchasing Board, American Expeditionary Forces, which, while operating under some disadvantages, has applied to the purchase of Army supplies in France the safeguards of normal business. It has insured collective purchasing, prevention of competition, and coordination of effort without interfering with a principle firmly established in legislation and military procedure as a result of thousands of years of evolution.

If nothing is added to the foregoing, it may seem to overemphasize the relative importance of independent agencies of a controlling central system, which must function with it. In the American Expeditionary Forces certain large

conceded and evolved powers of central control, arising out of the exigencies of war and confirmed by the commander in chief, are being exercised by the general purchasing agent, which powers are in effect direct and not negative. It is these direct powers not used to impede but to regulate, expedite, and widen the action of collateral agencies, which are largely responsible for what results have been accomplished through the organization of the General Purchasing Board.

That the lessons in Army supply and purchase taught by this war will find their future legislative interpretation and expression, there is little question. It will be difficult legislation to frame; for, unfortunately, it can not be assumed that in the administration of the system in time of peace it will be characterized by the high degree of cooperation and disposition to subordinate individual interest, which exists among the officers of a military force in active operation, welded together by the powerful pressure of military emergency, by strong leadership, and the sacredness of the cause of their common effort. But even though it may not as yet be possible to frame a law recognizing the principles upheld herein without creating some field for bureaucratic dissensions in time of peace, yet such a law in time of war will afford the competent leadership, which always develops on such an occasion, its proper engine of highest effectiveness.

CHARLES G. DAWES,
Colonel Engineers, N. A.,
Chairman General Purchasing Board,
General Purchasing Agent, A. E. F.

Conclusion.—The activities of the G. P. B. and the G. P. A., not only in the line of coordination but because of the machinery created to supplement the activities of the independent services in searching out and accumulating supplies in Europe, became such an indispensable element in the accomplishments of the American Army that the documents covering Gen. Pershing's original conception, including his comments on the same, are attached hereto as an indispensable part of this report. It will be noted from these documents that the board of officers convened to consider Gen. Pershing's suggestions recommended against their adoption, and that the general then set aside the report of these officers and pointed out their misconception of his idea in the following words:

"PARIS, August 4, 1917.

"Memorandum for The Adjutant General:

"With reference to the proceedings of the board of officers convened to establish a purchasing bureau, the board accepted too literally the wording of the order.

"The idea in mind was to create a central board consisting of an officer representing each staff department which purchases material, and that this board would have a head and be able to coordinate purchases, which would actually be made by an officer of the staff department itself. It was not the intention to create a purchasing board in London or Paris such as we had in New York for the Panama Canal.

"In other words, it may be said that this committee would be simply a coordinating board.

"There are many purchases being made by the Red Cross and the Y. M. C. A. in France, in some instances probably in competition with our staff departments and with each other. They should also be brought under some sort of control. The board in question need not be composed of officers exclusively on that duty, but could meet occasionally for mutual discussion.

"To A. G. for file.

"J. J. P."

The G. O. No. 23, Hq. A. E. F., 1917, establishing the board, was issued by Gen. Pershing on August 20, 1917. On August 29, 1917, I arrived in Paris from St. Nazaire, where I had been stationed with my regiment, and, after a conference, the C. in C. appointed the personnel of the G. P. B. on August 30, making me the chairman and also the G. P. A. of the A. E. F. The G. P. B. and the position of the G. P. A. accordingly have been peculiarly the conception of the C. in C., designed by him to meet what he recognized as an overwhelming necessity in the matter of supply procurement as well as the coordination of purchases.

From that time until the end of the war he gave it unremitting personal attention and support. The relation of tonnage to success was ever upper-

most in his mind. Without the great power constantly exercised by the C. in C. in assisting the G. P. A. in this work of coordinating independent military authority in our Army, as well as in the relation of our Army to the other armies and governments, the accomplishments of the board and the G. P. A. would have been impossible. The C. in C. did not regard it as beyond his dignity to come many times from Chaumont and elsewhere to Paris to assist the G. P. A. in supply negotiations with our allies and the difficult task of coordinating our own separate services. When continuing battle occupied him at the front he still maintained his touch with our activities, and the G. P. A. would meet him there. The quick perception upon his part of the exigencies of the supply situation, the origination of the plan to deal with it and his constant powerful intervention in carrying it out must stand in history as the chief cause of the substantial results obtained. In the beginning of the operations of the G. P. A. and the G. P. B. you (Maj. Gen. James G. Harbord) were the chief of staff and so continued from the beginning in June, 1917, to May, 1918. While this report is made to you as C. G. S. O. S., under whose command from July 29, 1918, the G. P. B. and G. P. A. have functioned the G. P. A. desires to acknowledge the debt which his organization and himself owes to your constant cooperation and far-sightedness not only when acting as C. G. S. O. S. but as the former chief of staff. What is said here of the attitude of the C. in C. toward this organization applies also to yourself not only when chief of staff but when after your brilliant service in command of the Marine brigade at Belleau Wood and the Second Division in the Soissons offensive, you came into your present place of heavy responsibility and therefore directly responsible to the C. in C. for the activities of this organization. No written words are necessary to impress upon your mind the debt of gratitude which the G. P. A. feels toward you but he can not refrain from referring to the firm friendship which has sprung up between us during many trying experiences. When the S. O. S. was organized in March, 1918, and the administrative staff of the C. in C., of which I was a member, was placed under the direction of Maj. Gen. Kernan, the first C. G. S. O. S., he gave to me the same confidence and cooperation which had existed in my relations to the C. in C. and to yourself as chief of staff. Without the unlimited support of higher authority this emergency organization, superimposed upon the Regular Army organization, could not even have existed, much less have succeeded. The chiefs of the services were bending under the load of a terrible task. They were charged in duty and by order with the accomplishment of it.

Their work and the fulfillment of duty at times must be checked and the success of their individual task placed even in jeopardy by the authority of this central agency charged with the duty of compelling subordination of the needs of a unit to the greater necessity of the entire Army of which the unit was a part. Had the attitude of Gen. Kernan been different from that of yourself and the C. in C. in any regard, the wide coordinating power created in the G. P. A. could not have survived. So far from being lessened, these powers, under the same wise and helpful attitude which characterized his successful administration of the entire S. O. S., were, if anything, increased by Gen. Kernan. As my former commanding officer I desire to express the gratitude and admiration which my organization and myself feel toward him. The fact that there existed this continued confidence of higher authority in the G. P. A. and the G. P. B., which higher authority was known by the chiefs of the independent services to be in a position to realize the needs of the common situation, made it easier for them to accept in good spirit the orders for coordination necessitated by a common purpose which were often at the great expense of programs originally authorized and imposed upon them. The almost entire absence of friction experienced by the G. P. A. in his relation with the chiefs of the services is not alone attributable to the patriotism and intelligence of these strong men, but as well because at all times they felt that the G. P. A. was not only expressing in his orders your authority and that of the C. in C., but what was in effect your best judgment in a position where you could determine the relative importance of the execution of the different programs of requirements. It would have been too much to expect that there were not radical differences of opinion at times in connection with the satisfaction of relative needs and as to the necessity for sacrifice by the separate services made necessary by the policy of coordination.

While in the military organization it is not necessary to argue with lesser authority in case speedy action is necessary, it was the policy of the G. P. A., as it has been the policy of yourself and the C. in C., to explain in detail wherever

possible the reason for the exercise of arbitrary authority. As a result a mutual confidence sprang up between the chiefs of the services and the G. P. A. and a spirit of cooperation under the great emergency in which all were placed, which, while it had its beginning in arbitrary authority, had its ending in a condition in which it might almost be said that mutual consent predominated over authority. In proportion to the time officers of the A. E. F. remained in France, the appreciation of the fact increased that the war was essentially an interallied war and not the war of any one army by itself. The immediate perception of the C. in C. of this fact and the inauguration by him of a policy based upon it on the day he entered France, is largely responsible for the success of the A. E. F. in all its supply and military operations.

At the first meeting of the G. P. B., the G. P. A., its chairman, made the statement that it was not, except as he might determine, a deliberative body—that its organization was military, and that it would act as ordered, and not as it might decide. The reasons for this were obvious and were stated. The independent services were overtaxed, handicapped by insufficient personnel, and confronted by continuous and insistent demands for immediate supplies to enable the construction and other work of the American Army to proceed. In the work of coordination, as a rule, only two or three of the eight separate departments of the A. E. F. would be concerned in one transaction. To consume the time of the whole board in the discussion of those questions which affected but two or three departments of it, would have been impracticable. Again, under the military organization, "town meeting" discussions of necessities and plans have not been found practicable or effective. At a later date in purchases under the category and in the settlement of any other question in which each department had an interest, the board was used for deliberative purposes.

In ending the G. P. A. desires to express his appreciation of a number of his coworkers.

It was under the leadership of Lieut. Col. N. D. Jay, Q. M. C., who was for so long the Assistant G. P. A. of the A. E. F., that the system of purchases by category was worked out. To his able hands was also intrusted the general supervision of the purchasing agents of the G. P. A.'s organization in allied and neutral countries. His services were invaluable. His tact and amiability combined with firmness, resulted in his representing the G. P. A. as principal in many important negotiations. As the direct representative of the G. P. A. his constructive and useful authority found expression in a constantly improving state of efficiency on the part of all bureaus and departments of this organization.

Throughout the most difficult periods of the war the G. P. A. found in Lieut. Col. F. E. Drake, Engineers, a constant source of constructive suggestion, untiring energy, and successful administration. Possessed both of imagination and practical business ability, with a wide range of knowledge of business conditions in Europe, his career with the G. P. A. was a most creditable and useful one, for which the G. P. A. desires to make special acknowledgement.

To Lieut. Col. J. C. Roop, Engineers, the present Assistant G. P. A., who was a former comrade of the G. P. A.'s as a first lieutenant in the Seventeenth Engineers (railway), and whose invaluable services and high abilities have won him his successive promotions, the G. P. A. desires to express his appreciation and gratitude. No one in the whole organization has had a better grasp of its principles, or has been more useful in putting them into practical effect. His great competency led the G. P. A. for a time to use him on his staff when the G. P. A. became the member of the M. B. A. S. representing the American Army. From the beginning to the present, Col. Roop had been a main dependence of the G. P. A.

Maj. George S. Ballard, Q. M. C., the adjutant of the office, rendered most valuable service throughout almost the entire period of its existence.

Associated with the office for the first few months as his first assistant, Capt. T. E. Grafton rendered to the G. P. A. invaluable service. The G. P. A. benefited greatly by his constructive suggestions and much of the firm foundation plan of his office was built by Capt. Grafton. His fine abilities and service in this connection demand this special recognition.

The G. P. A. desired to commend the unusual work done by Capt. R. H. Cabell. Capt. Cabell's wide business experience in Europe, his executive capacity and great energy were brought more and more into requisition by the G. P. A. as the business of his office grew. Working in close liaison with Lieut. Col. Jay many very important matters and negotiations were conducted by him.

The work of Capt. C. E. Carpenter, Q. M. C., as head of the Metal Control Bureau, as well as his work in connection with the general affairs of the office, deserves also special notice and commendation. The long business experience of Capt. Carpenter, his acquaintance in France, and his thorough knowledge of the metal situation especially qualified him for his very important work, the success of which depended so largely upon amicable cooperation with the representatives of the French Government.

The chief disbursing officer, American Expeditionary Forces, Col. C. E. Stanton, Q. M. C., came to France with Gen. Pershing and from that time to November 1, 1917, was the only quartermaster disbursing officer to make actual disbursements in France. During that time he paid all troops and all Quartermaster bills, amounting to about \$13,500,000, and negotiated the first official rate of exchange of francs 5.70 per \$1 which remained in effect from January, 1917, to September 1, 1918. The tables of distances upon which mileage is paid for travel in France were also prepared in his office. Col. Stanton, while not a purchasing officer was nevertheless a member of the General Purchasing Board and gave most valuable assistance to the board in determining what could be done in the way of financial arrangements in connection with the procurement of supplies. In many cases where urgent requirements were not specifically covered by appropriations, Col. Stanton made transfers of money on memorandum receipts, on some of which there were many months of negotiation before he could clear such accounts. The service of Col. Stanton on the G. P. B. was from the beginning to the end. Without a man of his courage and sound business judgment in his most important office of chief disbursing officer, A. E. F., it would have been practically impossible for many departments of the Army to have secured the means with which to function.

A man of narrow mind or one fearful of the official consequences of honest error made in the common effort would have created a block upon activities vital to success. The G. P. A. can not overemphasize the importance of the work of Col. Stanton in the matter of courageous and quick decision where emergency payments of money were required. While as a member of the G. P. B. he was not directly concerned with the tonnage-saving effort, nevertheless his presence upon the board gave him full information as to the acute situations constantly confronting the purchasing officers. He thus gained such a conception of the supply emergency resting upon the A. E. F. as enabled him to render a degree of cooperation otherwise impossible. The G. P. A. desires here to state that the functioning of several of his bureaus, notably the Labor Bureau, could not have successfully proceeded had not a man of the high ability and courage of Col. Stanton occupied the position of chief disbursing officer of the A. E. F.

During the first six months of the organization of the G. P. B., Col. James A. Logan, Jr., was assistant chief of staff G-1, general headquarters, which staff section was concerned in the matter of tonnage and shipment priorities from the United States. Being thus in first contact with the shortage of shipping, the mind of Col. Logan turned naturally to efforts to create and expedite all methods by which the A. E. F. could be supplied in France and tonnage saved across the Atlantic. The G. P. A. was frequently in receipt of suggestions from this able and resourceful officer, and in many cases Col. Logan himself originated and followed up plans which resulted in the saving of heavy tonnage. Particularly was this true in connection with the horse supply of the A. E. F. During the time that Col. Logan was assistant chief of staff, G-1, his great ability, his kindliness of spirit, and consideration shown this organization makes this inadequate recognition of them in this report a matter of first duty.

Brig. Gen. Harry E. Wilkins, chief purchasing officer, Q. M. C., was one of the charter members of the G. P. B., with whom the G. P. A. was closely associated in the early and trying days of the formation of the board. His great energy and ability in supply procurement and kindness and consideration in the treatment of his colleagues will ever be remembered.

Brig. Gen. C. R. Krauthoff, Q. M. C., is an officer whose cooperation, constructive suggestions, and sympathy with the efforts of the G. P. A. to establish the general coordinating and business system in the A. E. F. demand acknowledgement. The long, successful, and honorable career of this officer in the Army had given him an experience which made his advice and guidance invaluable.

Col. T. H. Jackson, chief purchasing officer, Engineer Corps, was one of the charter members of the G. P. B. The wonderful energy, ability, and success of Col. Jackson in the procurement of immense amounts of Engineer material at

a period when the construction requirements of the A. E. F. were at their most acute crisis entitle him to the gratitude of every American.

Col. E. D. Bricker, chief purchasing officer, Ordnance, was recommended by the G. P. A. as his probable successor at a time when the duties of the G. P. A. as a member of the military board of allied supply seemed likely to demand his entire time. The business ability, energy, and talent for organization of Col. E. D. Bricker demand special mention.

Col. C. McD. Townsend, chief purchasing officer, Engineer Corps, an officer of great experience and high professional and military standing, succeeded Col. Jackson as a member of the G. P. B. The breadth of view and sound judgment of Col. Townsend in this important place made him an invaluable co-operator with the G. P. A. who conducted the important activities of the Labor Bureau largely through the financial machinery of Col. Townsend's office, with his cooperation.

Among those deserving special mention are the purchasing agents in other allied and neutral countries, as follows:

Purchasing agent for Great Britain.—Capt.-Maj. J. E. Dunning, succeeded by Lieut. Col. H. M. Bylesby, succeeded by Brig. Gen. C. R. Krauthoff, succeeded by Capt. W. D. Crampton.

Purchasing agent for Spain.—Capt. E. L. Sanborn, succeeded by Capt. Aug. de Zavala.

Purchasing agent for Switzerland.—Mr. Harold F. McCormick, succeeded by Capt. D. F. McPherson, succeeded by Capt. J. C. Sims.

Purchasing agent for Italy.—Capt. J. C. Mechem, succeeded by Capt. E. S. Cook.

Purchasing agent for Portugal.—Capt. W. W. Dyar.

Maj. Philip M. Lydig was the American liaison officer between the G. P. A. and the G. P. B. of the A. E. F. and Controleur Peria of the French Treasury. In this connection I quote from a letter from Gen. Alombert of the French Army:

"On this occasion I desire to call your attention to the more and more important rôle taken by the liaison officers of the American Army in their collaboration with our services. I am happy to express to you in particular to what degree I appreciate the useful help of Maj. Philip M. Lydig given for the service Franco-American of the direction du controle."

To anyone coming in contact with his office from its beginning to its end and meeting Lieut. Francis J. Kilkenny, Q. M. C., and Lieut. Dalton H. Mulloney, Engineers, words of appreciation for their energy, tact, kindness, and efficiency would be superfluous. They have served the G. P. A. in many responsible capacities with untiring faithfulness and efficiency, and in this appreciation of them he speaks for his entire organization.

CHARLES G. DAWES,
Brigadier General, Engineers.

Senator SUTHERLAND. General, we have been very glad to hear from you.

STATEMENT OF COL. HENRY C. SMITHER.

Senator SUTHERLAND. General, kindly give your rank and assignments in connection with the A. E. F.?

Col. SMITHER. Colonel, General Staff.

Senator SUTHERLAND. Was that your rank over there?

Col. SMITHER. That was my rank over there; yes, sir. My assignments in the A. E. F. were: From November 12, 1917, date of arrival in France, to December 31, 1917, director of training in the Air Service; on January 1, 1918, I reported to the commander in chief for duty as a member of his General Staff, on which duty I remained until February 16, 1918, when I was appointed Assistant Chief of Staff, Headquarters Services of Supply, and given the task of organizing a logistic section of the General Staff, later called G 4. I organized and direction that section from February 17, 1918, until February 23, 1919, when upon my own request I was relieved and returned to the United States. Since my arrival in the United States I have been on duty with the Purchase, Storage and Traffic Division

of the General Staff, and now hold the position of assistant director of that division.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. You are a Regular Army officer?

Col. SMITHER. Yes, sir.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. A graduate of West Point?

Col. SMITHER. A graduate of West Point, class of 1897.

Senator FLETCHER. What has been your experience in the Army, General?

Col. SMITHER. Following my graduation from West Point, practical experience with troops; one tour of duty here in Washington, General Staff, and more recently in Europe during the war from November of 1917 until March of 1919.

Senator SUTHERLAND. Have you any observations to make in connection with this subject which Gen. Dawes has been discussing, the matter of supply, and the coordination of the Supply Department with the General Staff?

Col. SMITHER. Yes, sir. I should like to preface anything I may say, Senator, with the statement that I am wholly unprepared to testify in any detail before this committee. This is unexpected to me. I have been officially informed that I would not be called upon to appear and therefore have not prepared any notes to guide me in expressing my ideas.

I fully concur in all that Gen. Dawes has so clearly and ably presented to the committee.

Logistics as an element of the art of war has been in the past sadly neglected in our Army. In presenting our needs to Congress we have confined our statements almost entirely to a consideration of the strategic and tactical needs of combat forces, whereas without a sound logistic foundation these needs become merely desirable, without a possibility of realization. This fact has been so impressed upon me as a result of my experience in this war that I have come to regard logistics, which is the business end of war, as the foundation stone upon which all other considerations must rest. Its strategy is infinitely more complex than that of tactical operations; as in strategy and tactics, time and flexibility are its important factors and errors can not be rectified with the same facility as can errors in the handling of troops. This war, above all others, has clearly demonstrated what has always been one fundamental principle of the art of war, namely, that the power of a country to wage war is measured by the mass of its resources in men and munitions and the time in which it can make these effective.

Given the fixed quantity, expressed by man power and its possible training, backed by productive power and its possible development, the one variable is the speed with which we can deploy these resources, and this factor is and always has been the deciding factor in war where the other factors are reasonably equal. This means organization on a basis so flexible that the unexpended can be swiftly met. This brings us to the question of decisions resulting in swift action, and the logistic situation—the business condition—is the limiting factor. In order to stand a chance of being reasonably sound, decisions must be based upon the best possible estimate of the situation which for the moment exists and the supply situation controls all others.

If the sources of supply are to serve their purpose, they must be conserved, and this brings in an economic factor. There must be no

confusion resulting in interior competition, maldistribution or orders upon production, nor random use of transportation resulting in congestion of railway yards. These are but a few of the many elements entering into the logistic problem of an army engaged in war. They are sufficient, however, to indicate the necessity for a coordinating agency empowered to enunciate policies, to direct cooperation, and to render coordinating decisions. These are the functions of the supreme authority in his relationship to his operating services and would be performed by him personally were it not for the fact that many issues clamor for simultaneous statements of policy, for simultaneous issuance of orders, and for simultaneous decisions. The element of speed places beyond the power of a single individual the ability to act simultaneously upon the many issues which arise. The General Staff exists to enable the supreme authority to do these things. His expressed policies become the mission of his General Staff. In order that the General Staff itself may properly act, it must possess as accurate an estimate of the situation as circumstances will permit and must be free from operating responsibilities.

Gen. Dawes spoke of the importance of coordination of supply, and I now wish to add to his admirable statement my own opinion from a General Staff point of view. To me, as Assistant Chief of Staff for logistics, he in his capacity as general purchasing agent was what, for purposes of clearness, may be called a suveyor general of supply, armed with a veto power and a power of approval. To the General Staff and to the logistic section, G 4, over which I presided, he presented an estimate of the situation with respect to the possibilities of procurement. He actually purchased nothing, but he safeguarded the market. This much was in his relationship to the American Expeditionary Forces. He fulfilled a still higher function in his position as the American member of the interallied board of supply. Given by the commander in chief the mission of forming this board, he succeeded in organizing, by force of his personality and business ability, an agency which made possible the planning by Marshal Foch of the series of offensives which succeeded in bringing the war to an early termination. The German was beaten in his supply system—by logistics—which involved his defeat in combat.

This brings me to the definition of logistics, which for years before this war has been accepted in an abbreviated form as covering only the transportation of troops and their supplies. This definition must be amplified: Logistics has to do with the care, maintenance, and movement of troops, and with the care, preservation, and transportation of their supplies, together with all that these things imply. In order that the material matters may be made to yield their utmost, principles of economy must be observed, and to this Gen. Dawes has testified.

You were interested a while ago in the relationship of the General Staff to this whole scheme. As chief of the logistic section of the General Staff Services of Supply I enunciated the policies of Gen. Harbord, my chief, and mine as developed thereunder. I gave to each service its cooperative mission, and rendered in the name of the commanding general decisions which were designed to bring about coordination. Thereafter I kept in close touch with the situation by calling upon each service to present to me its estimate of its own situation, in order that the entire picture might be put

together and a basis laid for the enunciation of new policies or a change in plan. Responsibility was squarely placed upon each chief of service and authority commensurate with that responsibility given. There were some functions which were given to all and of which no one service had a composite view, such as, for example, procurement of supplies, rail transportation, motor transport, finance, construction, labor, storage, fuel in its relation to power, etc. In each of these, where large enough, an agency was created, possessed of the same type of control as was exercised by Gen. Dawes—a veto and an approval power over the actual operating function.

Issues reached the General Staff only when decisions as to priority or urgency of need arose. To my mind—and in this I differ from some others—this agency which lies between the General Staff and the services which carry on is an essential one in war. In the long periods of peace this should be provided for by law in such form that they may be easily and effectively separated in time of war. Some of these, such as transportation, are difficult to defend as a separate activity in time of peace, but in time of war will assume proportions of such tremendous importance that they must be independent of other services.

Such agencies as I have attempted to describe may be regarded as constituting the intelligence service of the logistic section of the General Staff, charged with the mission of presenting the daily and ever-changing logistic situation, upon which the General Staff must rest its decisions. I regard this matter as one of fundamental importance. To charge the head of an operating service with this responsibility and at the same time to add the responsibility for the functioning of his service is, in my judgment, an error of organization. Clear-headed decisions can only be made when responsibility for effective operation is separated from that of estimating the situation as a whole.

The view of the General Staff must not be confined to any particular operation lest it lose that broad picture which it must have if it is to be in a position to give to each service its mission.

Gen. Dawes has stated that to institute a single agency that shall physically procure all supplies for the Army is to put a crook in the steam pipe which will reduce the speed and effectiveness with which supplies may be delivered. In this I fully concur. The Army possesses certain technical services, such as the Signal Corps, the Ordnance Department, the Medical Department, and others, which exist by reason of evolution from necessity. A certain responsibility attaches to each of these services for the effective delivery of its peculiar type of service. This responsibility it can not fulfill unless there be given the authority, coupled with the responsibility, to accept or reject that class of supplies which is its specialty.

I do not believe that there can be instituted within the War Department a single agency which shall procure all classes of supplies consumed or used by the Army without including in its organization such specialized services as the Signal Corps, the Engineer Corps, and the Ordnance Department. Those specialized services already have the purchasing personnel organized in their services, and this furnishing of their experts to a centralized purchase service makes an additional overhead, which, in my opinion, seems unwarranted

There does not exist in the industrial world an institution with which we may draw a comparison in the matter of consolidated procurement. Practically every class of article which the country produces enters into the maintenance and up-keep of the Army. If there existed in the industrial world a combination composed of the railways of the country, of the steel corporations, of the Standard Oil Co., and of all food and clothing producers; there might be some parallel institution from which to draw deductions as to the method of controlling procurement. To my mind, the one logical solution is a surveyor general of supplies, possessed of a veto power, and charged with the duty of surveying the entire situation, so that the fact may be known as to the availability of raw materials, the capacity of production and of transportation, with the decision resting in a logistic section of the General Staff, each subdivision of the administrative services to procure under its own specifications, with a centralization of the purely contractual functions in a single agency. Have I been clear, sir?

Senator SUTHERLAND. Quite clear.

Col. SMITHER. I would like to add this: I have read Col. Palmer's testimony before this committee with the greatest interest, and the only reason that I have added anything at all thereto is that he touched very little upon matters of supply. In everything else he said I would like to go on record as stating that I regard his statement as the ablest presentation before Congress that I know of.

Senator FLETCHER. The S. O. S. was a very essential and important organization, was it not?

Col. SMITHER. Senator, without the proper functioning of the S. O. S. nothing else could have functioned. Its success lay underneath every operation that took place.

Senator SUTHERLAND. Have you any observations to make with reference to any other features of this bill? Have you read the bill?

Col. SMITHER. I have read the bill; yes, sir. I think that all matters that I have had in mind have been touched upon here at various times. Senator, and at anything I might add would be merely cumulative.

There is one matter I might state, that it proposes a three-month period of universal training with, so far as I am able to read in the bill, nothing thereafter. It appears to me that violates a fundamental principle and is a waste of energy.

Senator SUTHERLAND. You think they ought to be assembled in some organization?

Col. SMITHER. There should be some type of organization, otherwise the thing is just dissipated and the money that has been expended wholly wasted—we have nothing.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. The time is not long enough to train a man for anything?

Col. SMITHER. I think not, Senator.

Senator SUTHERLAND. But it is better than nothing?

Col. SMITHER. I think as a matter of establishing a principle upon the statutes of the United States, it might have value.

Senator SUTHERLAND. What do you think about the relative merits of selection by promotion and by seniority?

Col. SMITHER. I am a firm believer in single list, in the matter of promotion, and I believe in the segregation of officers into groups, which will make possible the elimination of dead matter.

Senator SUTHERLAND. Classifying them into three groups?

Col. SMITHER. Well, perhaps into three groups, I should rather say, Senator. But as a flat principle, I think that section, without any means of governing, would be a dangerous proposal. I agree, and I think that everyone else would agree, if there is a task open the best man should be put into it. Personally, I know of no means of arriving at that in peace times.

Senator FLETCHER. Have you any view as to the size of the Army in peace times?

Col. SMITHER. I have had occasion to put a very brief work upon that, taking a letter that Senator Wadsworth wrote to the Secretary of War as a basis of calculation. I have not had time to come to a definite conclusion, but the board of which I am chairman, which has been working upon this matter, is agreed that within the limit of 300,000 or possibly 280,000 the full scheme as outlined by Senator Wadsworth is entirely feasible. With an Army of 250,000 any force which may be immediately available will be so small as to make doubtful whether it could cover mobilization of the citizen forces, that is, give them protection while they are being gotten together and in shape to act. Two hundred and fifty thousand seems dangerously short.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. How much of an Army would we require, Colonel, if we had nothing like universal military training, and just simply relied upon the standing Army in times of peace? About what sized Army would be necessary, or have you not finished your study on that subject?

Col. SMITHER. I can not answer that question, nor do I believe can any other man even hazard a sound reply until such time as Congress by law has laid down the methods whereby the man power and material resources of the country are to be mobilized. Without this knowledge any expressed opinion must be tinged with guesswork. There is one fundamental principle underlying the art of war, and that was enunciated by Napoleon in terms of mass and velocity. It sounds academic, but the mass of a fighting force is made up not alone of its numbers, it is made up of its value in fighting power, the training it has had, the physical capacity of the men that make it up, the character of its organization which permits it to be flexible, and thereafter the readiness with which it can be handled is the determining factor, so a definite answer to your question is impossible. It depends entirely upon the quality of the armed forces to start with, and next the means of mobilizing the entire war strength behind it. This involves providing means whereby the War Department, with its administrative machinery, may expand and continue to work as the demand upon it grows with the size of the forces. If all these things be provided for, a relatively small force would suffice, but if these matters are not taken care of, it will require a very considerable regular force. My own opinion is that the only answer to this question is universal training, the essential thing being that we must be in a position to mobilize every particle of power we possess, man power, productive capacity, and every other resource eventually.

Senator FLETCHER. I have seen some suggestion that if we had an Army of 500,000, as proposed in this bill, it might be feasible to utilize the man in peace times in some kind of duty, some kind of employment, of course paying them correspondingly. Before the war, for instance, the whole fire department of Paris was manned

by soldiers. They were regularly enlisted in the army, and they served as firemen—fire protection for the city of Paris. I presume that was so elsewhere in the French Army. Of course they were paid. I take it, in addition to their regular army pay for this service. Would it be feasible at all for us to adopt any scheme like that so as to utilize these soldiers in some useful employment?

Col. SMITHER. I do not think so, Senator, because to require two functions of a man or of an organization is always to weaken it in either one or the other branch, and the fire department of Paris had not been a very efficient fire department. I think that proposal to use the Army as an educational institution in a vocational way is thoroughly feasible and would give the country an asset of trained men that it would not otherwise have.

I was tremendously impressed during this war with the shortage of mechanics. It was only a period of a few months before they were entirely exhausted. We were unable to procure trained locomotive engineers to man trains in France; we were driven as a last extremity to start schools and build them out of the whole cloth from the ground up. In the case of this great country, part of it, of course, was due to the failure to classify in the beginning, and the thing coming too suddenly. But the suddenness with which that trained personnel can disappear makes it well worth while for the Army to be a source of turning into the country at large results of that sort.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. Not only for war but for industrial purposes?

Col. SMITHER. Yes, sir.

Senator SUTHERLAND. You think that vocational training in the Regular Army is a perfectly feasible matter, do you?

Col. SMITHER. Oh, absolutely. I should say that if the scheme of universal training goes into effect that a rather large percentage of those who come in each year will devote their time to that sort of thing. The several Transport Corps, the Air Service, in the making of their mechanics, require development of the finest sort of mechanics; there are other callings. The clerical expansion, bookkeepers, stenographers, and what not—

Senator FLETCHER. Even quartermasters?

Col. SMITHER. Yes, sir.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. Vocational training in the cantonments would direct the energies of men properly when they never had thought of directing those energies in any useful direction, would it not?

Col. SMITHER. Yes, sir; I think they have a disciplinary effect also Senator.

Senator SUTHERLAND. Those men that pass out of the Army would form a sort of reserve body that could be called upon, would they not?

Col. SMITHER. Yes, sir; they could be called upon, classified, very much in the same way the medical officers are now called upon.

Senator SUTHERLAND. Are there any further observations you wish to make at this time?

Col. SMITHER. I think I have nothing more.

Senator SUTHERLAND. We are very, very much obliged to you.

(Whereupon, at 4.30 p. m., the committee adjourned, subject to the call of the chairman.)

REORGANIZATION OF THE ARMY

HON. BENEDICT CROWELL.

HEARINGS

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE COMMITTEE ON MILITARY AFFAIRS UNITED STATES SENATE

SIXTY-SIXTH CONGRESS.

FIRST SESSION

ON

S. 2691

A BILL TO PROVIDE FOR UNIVERSAL MILITARY, NAVAL, AND VOCATIONAL TRAINING, AND FOR MOBILIZATION OF THE MANHOOD OF THE NATION IN A NATIONAL EMERGENCY

S. 2693

A BILL TO CREATE A DEPARTMENT OF AERONAUTICS, DEFINING THE POWERS AND DUTIES OF THE DIRECTOR THEREOF, PROVIDING FOR THE ORGANIZATION, DISPOSITION, AND ADMINISTRATION OF A UNITED STATES AIR FORCE, CREATING THE UNITED STATES AIR RESERVE FORCE, AND PROVIDING FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF CIVIL AND COMMERCIAL AVIATION

S. 2715

A BILL TO REORGANIZE AND INCREASE THE EFFICIENCY OF THE UNITED STATES ARMY, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES

PART 26

Printed for the use of the Committee on Military Affairs

WASHINGTON
GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
1919

Ben Crowell

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REORGANIZATION OF THE ARMY.

WEDNESDAY, NOVEMBER 5, 1919.

UNITED STATES SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE COMMITTEE ON MILITARY AFFAIRS,
Washington, D. C.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 2.15 p. m., in the committee room, Capitol, Senator James W. Wadsworth, jr., presiding.

Present: Senators Wadsworth (chairman), New, Sutherland, Chamberlain, and Fletcher.

STATEMENT OF HON. BENEDICT CROWELL, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF WAR.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Secretary, we will be glad to hear from you on this matter of the War Department and Army reorganization in any way that you see fit to lay your ideas before us. I assume that you propose discussing some of the features of the supply system of the Army, but we do not want you necessarily to confine yourself to that; anything that has to do with this bill or any topic relating to the military policy we will be very glad to hear you on.

Mr. CROWELL. Mr. Chairman, you will all recall that at the outset of our Government, when President Washington was inaugurated in 1789, the War Department, which consisted of very little outside of the Army itself, had complete charge of the national defense of the country; and the Secretary of War, who was at the head of the War Department, had charge of all functions and operations identified with the national defense. Thus he was the active representative of the constitutional Commander in Chief, namely, the President.

Subsequent theories of organization caused the separation from the office of the Secretary of War of the functions of national defense having to do with navigation, and on April 30, 1798, the Navy Department was set up, having this in charge. From that time the President of the United States was charged with the obligation of centralizing and coordinating the functions of national defense. In our next war, with perhaps a third and distinct branch of the Government devoted to national defense, namely, the Air Service, and the boards similar to the War Industries Board, the Shipping Board, Fuel Administration, the Railroad Administration, and the War Trade Board, which were necessities in the recent war, the President will be overburdened with direct responsibilities. In times of war the defense of the country is one of the many important matters with which the President must deal.

Fundamentally, the question of national defense is of sufficient importance to warrant the care of a special representative of the President. I believe that with the manifold duties of the President in time of war, he should find it only necessary to lay down general policies. It is, therefore, in my opinion, absolutely essential that he be represented in the matter of national defense of the country by a person having official existence, such as a Secretary of National Defense, whose duty and authority it would be to coordinate and direct the War Department, Navy Department, and the Air Department. He should be also chairman of the War Industries Board, of which a skeleton organization should be maintained in time of peace. All other war boards should function under him.

Proceeding now to the War Department organization: Since November, 1916, when I left business and volunteered for war work in Washington the organization of the War Department has been given much study by me.

From April, 1917, to December, 1917, was a period in which little reorganization work was done; the existing organizations, however, were tremendously overloaded and strained, and it was evident that certain organizational changes would have to be made. By December, 1917, the complete reorganization of the War Department, especially as affecting munitions and supplies, had been worked out; indeed, the first steps had been taken. You have in your possession two charts which well illustrate the first changes in organization. These charts were handed to you by Secretary Baker when he testified before your committee about January 10, 1918.

I have brought copies of those charts, if you care to look at them.

The CHAIRMAN. I remember the charts. We hung them up in large form on the Senate wall for the purpose of discussion in the Senate.

Mr. CROWELL. I am advocating the abolishment of the office of Assistant Secretary of War.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. Did you act as minister of munitions in your capacity as Assistant Secretary of War?

Mr. CROWELL. I did; yes.

I would like to present these charts, which I think will illustrate the matter.

The CHAIRMAN. In a sense your suggestion would bring about the creation of an office of equal importance with that of the Chief of Staff as now created?

Mr. CROWELL. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. To be known as the director of munitions?

Mr. CROWELL. Yes.

Senator FLETCHER. Which would take the place of Purchase, Storage and Traffic?

Mr. CROWELL. We would abolish Purchase, Storage and Traffic and take over from the General Staff all supervision over munitions.

Senator NEW. You take away from the General Staff the business operations and put them under the office of the director of munitions?

Mr. CROWELL. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Were you going to develop a discussion of these further in your statement, Mr. Secretary?

Mr. CROWELL. Yes; I am going into it in more detail.

Senator FLETCHER. According to your plan, the General Staff would have nothing to do with the munition bureau, the Inspector General, the Judge Advocate General, or the Insular Bureau?

Mr. CROWELL. They are the same in both cases. I am making no changes in those bureaus. They are shown in the same way in both charts. It is my purpose to make no change in the functions of those. I will proceed to develop this a little further.

The first chart shows the organization of the War Department April, 1917; the second chart shows the new organization, as far as it had been applied, in December, 1917.

I am to-day presenting to you two more charts. The first shows the War Department organization as it exists to-day, and the second shows this organization as it should be when fully completed.

With the large group of men, such as the War Department has called upon to carry a greatly increased load, any change of organization must be accomplished slowly, and this is the reason that the reorganization work was done gradually, and I believe it could not have been otherwise accomplished.

Proceeding now to the permanent organization of the War Department, I believe that in a general way certain broad principles should be followed. First of all, we should profit by the experience of the war we have just gone through and should permanently maintain such departments as were found necessary during that war. In other words, we should organize the War Department so that it will function in time of war. I, therefore, believe that it is necessary to maintain during time of peace such departments as are necessary in time of war, even if their personnel is cut down to a handful of officers. To merge these necessary departments into other departments in time of peace is, in my opinion, an error.

All the functions of the War Department can be divided into two main groups, the military function and the munition and supply function. At the head of the War Department stands the Secretary of War, and he should naturally have two chief advisers. The head of the Military Establishment should advise the Secretary of War on all military matters and the head of the munitions department should advise the Secretary of War on all matters relating to munitions and the supply of the Army.

All orders of the Secretary of War relating to military matters should be handed down from the Secretary of War, through the head of the Military Establishment, to the proper departments. All orders of the Secretary of War relating to munitions should be handed down, through the Chief of Munitions, to the proper departments. The head of the Military Establishment would, therefore, have charge of all military matters, such as the training of troops, the operation of troops, etc. He should have no authority whatever over industrial matters. The Chief of Munitions, on the other hand, should, with his staff, have charge of all matters relating to the munitioning of the Army, but should have no voice in military matters.

When munitions must be provided in the quantities necessary for a major war, the questions of procurement and production become of tremendous importance. It is not too much to say that the industrial stability of the Nation depends upon the ability and skill with which the problems of procurement and production are handled. It

is believed that the ability, experience, and skill for this kind of work can be found only among the industrial leaders who have spent their lifetime in the study and solution of industrial problems. The organization of the War Department should, therefore, be such that the services of men of this type may be immediately availed of.

The actual reorganization of the War Department to meet these general principles is very simple; in fact, requires very little change from the organization which we found when we entered the war. The Director of Munitions should, of course, be a civilian, since it is very rare that an officer of the Army is temperamentally fitted to head a huge supply organization. The military mind and the industrial mind are entirely different. Since he must be a close advisor of the Secretary of War and have large authority he should fill the position of Assistant Secretary of War. The duties of the Assistant Secretary previous to 1918 could profitably be handed over to other officials.

Under the Director of Munitions in this connection would be grouped all problems of purchase and procurement; of storage and transportation. To the corps and bureaus of the War Department as they now exist would fall the duty and function of the problems for which they were severally created. However, in order that bureau competition should be eliminated in the matter of purchases, storage, etc., the Director of Munitions should be vested by law with authority to standardize procurement and distribute and redistribute the function of purchase as applied to specific articles, especially where they are common to the operation of two or more bureaus, as best experience would dictate. With this strong supervisory power in the Director of Munitions I believe will be found the solution of the much criticized condition of purchases in the War Department prior to the operation of the Overman Act.

Directly under the Assistant Secretary, whose title for shortness we will consider to be Director of Munitions, would be a small group of men designed to coordinate the supply functions of the bureaus. In time of peace this would be limited to a very few men. Under this small coordinating body, headed by the Director of Munitions, should be placed the supply bureaus which were in existence before the war, and to them should be added the new departments which have been found necessary during the war. None of these bureaus are wholly devoted to supplies; they all have military functions connected with them, and the legislation should direct that in all supply matters these bureaus and departments should report to and should function under the Director of Munitions, and in all military matters they should function under and report to the head of the military establishment as shown by the chart which I present. This dual function of the supply bureaus has been in operation for some time.

The bureaus I deem necessary for the proper execution of the munitions program of the Army are the Ordnance Department, Medical Corps, Transportation Corps (which should include Motor Transport), the Construction Corps (which should include the real estate department), and the Chemical Warfare Service. and there should also be under the control of the Director of Munitions the finance department. These various corps and bureaus should be charged with the duties the war has developed for them to perform,

and, while it should be the privilege of the Secretary of War to choose the head of each bureau from the Army at large, those bureaus charged with specially technical service, such as the Medical Department, Engineers, Ordnance, Signal Corps, Chemical Warfare, and Construction, should have personnel specially commissioned. Where the bureau or corps does not perform a specially technical service details can be provided for from other branches of the service.

Of course, within these bureaus and corps the question of promotion becomes a very vital one, and my experience leads me to the conclusion that up to the grade of captain promotion should be governed by seniority alone. Between the grades of captain and colonel, inclusive, while seniority should have predominant weight, I feel that if the head of the bureau finds a man specially adapted for a specific work he should, with proper safeguards, be allowed to promote a small proportion of officers by selection. When it comes to the question of general officers, I am satisfied that rank is only warranted by the capacity of the man to perform duties requiring the rank, and I would not promote a man to the rank of general officer who was unfitted by training and temperament to properly perform the functions of the office carrying the rank. Therefore, I believe that the rank of general officers should always be filled by selection.

In conclusion, I desire to record my views on the affirmative side of the question as to whether this country should have universal military training. It is unnecessary to discuss the moral of war. The only excuse for the existence of a War Department is the affording of a means of preparation in time of peace to defend the country in time of war. So also whether we admit or deny the right of a nation to wage war, there can be no two sides to the question of the obligation of a nation to defend itself from war when waged by another nation upon it. I hold it to be the duty of every citizen of this republic to respond in the defense of this country through military service, and if we are to have a citizenry of any effect for the defense of the country we must provide for the training of them in anticipation of the necessity of defending the country.

The CHAIRMAN. Apropos of your discussion of promotion and the matter of detailing to special staff corps, we think it proper to tell you, Mr. Secretary, that the subcommittee something over a week ago decided unanimously to adopt the project for a single list, permitting the assignment of officers to any corps or branch of the service and permitting at the same time of their being retained in these particular branches, with certain provisions to the effect that one year out of every five they shall serve with troops. Does that in any way conflict with your idea of the reorganization of the department as reflected in these charts?

Mr. CROWELL. I can not see where it would. I favor the single list myself.

The CHAIRMAN. You do?

Mr. CROWELL. Yes; I do.

The CHAIRMAN. There is one thing we would like to have you develop. Under this system as proposed by you the General Staff, which includes the War Plans Division, which we regard as really the most important division of the General Staff, particularly in times of peace, in that it has in its charge the making of plans for

national defense, the War Plans Division of the General Staff is separated entirely from the office of the Director of Munitions. Don't you think that plans for the national defense necessarily involve including the supply question and munitions question?

Mr. CROWELL. I think that the recognized duty of the General Staff is to make these plans and to develop what it wants and when it wants it. That becomes, then, the military program; that is, the plans of the General Staff show the number of men required and the time at which they are required. That is then translated into terms of munitions, and that is the Army program. That program, I think, should then be handed to the Director of Munitions, who should be responsible for carrying out the program. But the power of making the program under this plan is in the General Staff, just as it has been in the past, and they are relieved from the responsibility of supplying munitions.

The CHAIRMAN. You would trust to a proper liaison between the Director of Munitions and the General Staff in making up the plans?

Mr. CROWELL. I see no difficulty there whatever. The plan ordinarily would be made up by the General Staff, handed to the Secretary of War, who would then call in the Director of Munitions for advice as to whether it were possible to carry out the plans, because in many cases the General Staff might provide for certain munitions in a time which could not possibly be met. The advice of the Director of Munitions is obviously proper advice for the Secretary of War to follow. In large industrial matters the Secretary of War would probably call together those three—the Chief of Staff, the Director of Munitions, and himself—in which meeting those things are thrashed out, and the result is the Army program.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. Is this your plan, or was this worked out by the General Staff?

Mr. CROWELL. This is my plan.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. I wanted to know that, because it does not seem to be in line with the General Staff bill.

Mr. CROWELL. No; it is not.

The CHAIRMAN. Would you have the Director of Munitions an Army officer?

Mr. CROWELL. No; a civilian.

The CHAIRMAN. You would not even commission him?

Mr. CROWELL. No; I would not.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. Why?

Mr. CROWELL. It is a question for a man with an industrial mind, and I do not think it is possible to find such men in the Army. I think it is important that he should retain his civilian status. His dealings are all industrial dealings with the great industries of the country, and I see no advantage to be obtained by putting him in uniform.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. It would be a disadvantage to have him in uniform, on account of greater etiquette?

Mr. CROWELL. I think so; yes. That is a very important thing. It would be almost impossible to put him in uniform on that very account. Unless you made him a full general he would be at a distinct disadvantage.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. If you selected the best man in America for the job, and he happened to be a captain, he would be delicate about dealing with his superior officer, would he not?

Mr. CROWELL. Yes, sir. On the other hand, there has never been the slightest difficulty about civilians dealing with officers.

The CHAIRMAN. And yet a goodly portion of the Army itself would be under that civilian.

Mr. CROWELL. I see no difficulty in that.

Senator FLETCHER. Just as the Secretary of War is a civilian.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes. Of course, that is provided for by statute. Under the Constitution orders of the Secretary of War, representing the Commander in Chief, the President, are orders of the President. I was wondering how it would work out having a civilian giving orders to an Army officer.

Mr. CROWELL. We have never had any difficulty.

The CHAIRMAN. You abolish the office of the Assistant Secretary of War?

Mr. CROWELL. I do. The office of Assistant Secretary of War is about as important as a man who is picking blossoms from a century plant. There is no need of it.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. I might say, without intending to flatter you, that as Assistant Secretary you have rendered the country very great service during your time.

Mr. CROWELL. I thank you, Senator.

Senator NEW. I think we all feel that.

Mr. CROWELL. If you will look at the duties of the Assistant Secretary of War previous to the year 1918 you will see exactly what I mean.

The CHAIRMAN. You mean they do not amount to anything?

Mr. CROWELL. No, sir.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. This plan differs quite essentially from the plan proposed under the General Staff reorganization bill.

Mr. CROWELL. It is entirely different.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. I see here you have the General Staff functioning as it was intended to function under the act of 1903; that is, making plans, to be submitted through the Secretary of War, to these different bureaus.

Mr. CROWELL. I believe the General Staff to be limited to military matters in its functions.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. You do not propose under this scheme to have them handling service bureaus, except in an advisory capacity through the Secretary of War?

Mr. CROWELL. I should have them supervise and coordinate the bureaus as far as military matters went.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. Yes; but not in performing any of the service functions?

Mr. CROWELL. No, sir.

Senator FLETCHER. What do you mean exactly by military matters in that sense?

Mr. CROWELL. I mean the supply bureaus have two functions. The first is the procurement of supplies and the military function extends into the field of operations. For instance, chemical warfare service not only procures the chemical warfare supplies but it has troops

which handle those supplies in the field, and its duties then become military. The Ordnance Department in the same way procure guns. The upkeep of those guns in the field is also a very important item for which they are responsible. That is their military function. I believe their military functions should be handled by the General Staff, as they are to-day. It involves no separation in any way. We merely provide that the supply bureaus in all military matters shall function under the General Staff; in all supply matters—that is, munitioning matters—they shall function under the director of munitions.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. Has this plan been evolved in your mind as a result of your experience in the last two or three years in the War Department?

Mr. CROWELL. This was the general plan that was evolved about January 1, 1918. The details had not at that time been carried out to the extent that I carried them out here.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. Is it anything like the present organization, the war-time organization?

Mr. CROWELL. It is quite different in its main functions.

The CHAIRMAN. Under such a system would you charge the director of munitions with the approval or disapproval of designs of weapons, we will say?

Mr. CROWELL. No.

The CHAIRMAN. Where would that approval or disapproval lie?

Mr. CROWELL. It would lie exactly where it is to-day. General specifications for new weapons are supplied usually by the arm of the service. That is, the field artillery to-day demands a new weapon; it demands a weapon of longer range. These general specifications are then handed to the Ordnance Department, which is charged with the designing of these new weapons. That design, being completed, is approved by the field artillery, and the Ordnance Department then goes ahead with its procurement. The director of munitions has practically nothing to do with that.

Senator NEW. The different arms have the same latitude or choice and selection of guns, and all that sort of thing, that they have now?

Mr. CROWELL. Exactly.

Senator NEW. After making those selections they are done with it. It then becomes the function of the director of munitions to see to the purchase and production of it. That is correct, is it?

Mr. CROWELL. That is correct. His duty is to supervise and coordinate the bureaus in their producing functions.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Secretary, have you endeavored to prepare a draft of legislation which would bring into effect, if enacted, a scheme such as you have proposed?

Mr. CROWELL. No; I have not. The reason I have not done that is that it would require looking up legal matters for a great many years—the privileges of the bureaus—and it was so large a matter that I have not had time to undertake it.

The CHAIRMAN. I do not think it would require so much time. Legislation of that kind generally carries a saving clause in it at the end, to the effect that all laws or parts of laws in conflict with this act are hereby repealed.

Mr. CROWELL. Under such a provision it would be a simple thing to do.

The CHAIRMAN. That is the usual method of setting up any new agency by legislation; you do not attempt in drawing the legislation to review all the former acts and repeal them or modify them piecemeal, but put in one blanket clause saying that anything in conflict with this new act is hereby repealed.

Mr. CROWELL. That would make it easy.

The CHAIRMAN. You are confident that the military and business functions of the supply bureaus can be separated, so that the first will flow to the General Staff and the second flow to the Director of Munitions?

Mr. CROWELL. There is no doubt whatever in my mind. That has been going on for some time, as a matter of fact, and in one or two of the bureaus it has been going on for a long time, and there would be no difficulty there.

The CHAIRMAN. Have you consulted the chiefs of bureaus in this matter?

Mr. CROWELL. I have consulted the chiefs whose advice I particularly desired. They were the Quartermaster General, the Chief of Ordnance, and the Chief of Chemical Warfare.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you care to say whether or not this plan has been submitted to a sufficient number of officers of authority in the War Department to develop whether there will be opposition to it or a disposition to set up friction and contention? We have had a great deal of that.

Mr. CROWELL. This plan will be favored by every staff department, but it will be opposed by the General Staff.

The CHAIRMAN. Have you had an opportunity of reading Gen. Pershing's testimony?

Mr. CROWELL. No.

The CHAIRMAN. Gen. Pershing testified on these points, and, as I gathered from his testimony, he had something of this sort in mind.

Mr. CROWELL. I would not be at all surprised.

The CHAIRMAN. You would have, as I understand it, your Director of Munitions a civilian?

Mr. CROWELL. I think that is a very important provision; yes.

Senator NEW. Mr. Secretary, is it not absolutely essential under this plan that he should be a civilian?

Mr. CROWELL. I think so; yes.

Senator NEW. If he were a military man, in such relations with the other departments as are provided, his activities would be interfered with?

Mr. CROWELL. I think the question of rank alone would make it impossible that he should be a military man.

The CHAIRMAN. He would give his orders to that portion of the Army serving under him in the name of the Secretary of War, I assume?

Mr. CROWELL. Yes; I should give him those functions by legislation. I think it is quite important that that authority be given to him by legislation rather than by a delegation from the Secretary of War, which is the present method.

Senator NEW. You want his status fixed by law?

Mr. CROWELL. Exactly.

Senator NEW. And not be dependent on the Secretary of War for it?

Mr. CROWELL. Exactly.

The CHAIRMAN. Let me read you the language of the act as prepared in the War Department, having to do with the functions of the Chief of Staff. At page 5, line 20:

The Chief of Staff, under the direction of the President or of the Secretary of War, shall have supervision of all agencies and functions of the Military Establishment—

And so forth. Your plan would take away from him the supervision of the function of procurement?

Mr. CROWELL. Yes; and no Chief of Staff that we have ever had has ever found time to give the necessary attention to procurement, and, in my opinion, there is no chance that any Chief of Staff will ever be temperamentally fitted to give advice on procurement matters.

The CHAIRMAN. Then, again, on the following page, page 6, line 1:

The Chief of Staff shall be the immediate adviser of the Secretary of War in all matters relating to the Military Establishment and shall be charged by the Secretary of War with the planning, development, and execution of the Army program.

Which, of course, includes munitions?

Mr. CROWELL. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Your plan would amend that?

Mr. CROWELL. Would relieve him from responsibility for the procurement of munitions.

The CHAIRMAN. If there were conflict between the General Staff and the Director of Munitions, the General Staff insisting that certain supplies could be obtained as planned and the Director of Munitions insisting they could not be obtained in that quantity or of that particular type, you would have the Secretary of War settle the matter?

Mr. CROWELL. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. As between them?

Mr. CROWELL. Yes. Under the organization existing to-day there might be a conflict between the Chief of Operations of the General Staff and the Chief of Purchase, Storage and Traffic of the General Staff on those same points. Their difficulty would be settled by the Chief of Staff. So that the only difference we have would be that such an argument would be settled by the Secretary of War instead of by the Chief of Staff.

The CHAIRMAN. How much of an office do you think this would amount to for an army of 250,000 men in time of peace?

Mr. CROWELL. I am not sure that it would require anything more than perhaps a few civilian assistants. I should want to study it, however, more carefully than I have been able to before advocating that the force could be limited to that number.

The CHAIRMAN. Have you reached any conclusion in your mind as to the salary to be paid to the director of munitions?

Mr. CROWELL. Yes. I think that a salary should be paid sufficient to attract to the position in time of peace a good man.

The CHAIRMAN. What figure do you think would attract such a man?

Mr. CROWELL. I think, considering salaries paid generally in the War Department, a salary of perhaps \$10,000 would be as much as we could very well pay for that.

The CHAIRMAN. And how would you fix his tenure of office?

Mr. CROWELL. He should, in my opinion, be appointed by the Secretary of War, and be retained as long as he is satisfactory. I think he should be confirmed by the Senate, the same as the Assistant Secretary of War to-day.

The CHAIRMAN. Under existing peace-time law the Chief of Staff is a major general, is he not?

Mr. CROWELL. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. And gets \$8,000 a year?

Mr. CROWELL. Yes. My thought on that would be that he ought to get more if it could be done. I should not stick by any lines on that. I should be willing to see the salary of the director of munitions the same as the Chief of Staff. But you know how difficult it is to get good men to-day, and the dollar to-day is worth only 50 cents.

The CHAIRMAN. Here is another passage from the War Department act, which I think is very little different from the act of 1903, concerning the General Staff. It is true that a new phrase has been inserted in the bill, but I shall not read that. I read this:

The duties of the General Staff Corps, under the direction of the Chief of Staff, shall be to prepare plans for the national defense, and for the mobilization of the military forces in time of war; to investigate and report upon all questions affecting the efficiency of the Army and its state of preparation for military operations; to render professional aid and assistance to the Secretary of War and to general officers and other superior commanders, and to act as their agents in informing and coordinating the action of all the corps, bureaus, and agencies which are subject under the terms of this act to the supervision of the General Staff.

Your suggestion would take from the war-plans division, as it were, the duty of preparing plans for the coordination of all the corps, bureaus, and agencies?

Mr. CROWELL. I am anxious to take from the jurisdiction of the General Staff all matters which are industrial in their nature.

The CHAIRMAN. Take from them?

Mr. CROWELL. Take from them, and put them under the Director of Munitions.

The CHAIRMAN. Have you any questions to ask the Secretary, Senator New? This is a very interesting suggestion. It is the first time we have had it laid before us in graphic form.

Senator NEW. I think it has been made very clear?

The CHAIRMAN. It would require an important piece of legislation to be incorporated in a reorganization bill?

Mr. CROWELL. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. It would have to be drafted with a great deal of care.

Speaking of supply, I thought, Senator New, it might be well to tell the Secretary what the subcommittee has in mind and ask his criticisms. The subcommittee had in mind the establishment, either under the name of the Quartermaster Corps or other appropriate name, of the department of supply which should be charged with the procurement or purchase of all articles whose issue or use is common to two or more branches or corps of the Army, and leaving thereby, by implication, of course, the procurement of technical material to the several staff corps.

We would leave, for instance, to the Ordnance Department the procurement of all weapons and explosives and their appurtenances; and to the Engineer Corps, engineer equipment; and to the Signal Corps, telephone, telegraph, and radio equipment, and all their scientific instruments; and to the Medical Corps, surgical supplies and medicines and drugs; and to the Chemical Warfare—if it is decided to keep that—the production of the gases and the gas defense appliances; but center in the Quartermaster Corps or the Supply Corps the purchase of all tools and implements that are used by any two or more of them; and the purchase of all subsistence and all clothing, all picks and shovels, all motor trucks, wire and nails, and cement and lumber, and all the things that are used by two or more branches of the Army, or are issued to two or more branches of the Army. What have you to say about that, as a matter of principle?

Mr. CROWELL. Would you propose to have all those bureaus function under the Purchase, Storage and Traffic Division?

The CHAIRMAN. I will add to my question: Our purpose being to eliminate competition between the different supply bureaus in the purchase of things in the open market which otherwise are standard things, and which can be bought, as you said a moment ago to me in private conversation, off the shelf, as it were.

Mr. CROWELL. Would this function under a department of purchase, storage, and traffic of the General Staff?

The CHAIRMAN. Lacking any other suggestion or new legislation of that kind it would operate under the General Staff just as all these bureaus are operated to-day; it would be coordinated by the General Staff.

Mr. CROWELL. I do not favor that General Staff coordination of industrial matters. The bureau competition would be eliminated under the plan I have suggested, I think, better than under yours. Your plan is the exact plan that was in operation during the last few months of the war. We have established under purchase, storage, and traffic this same organization, and had enlarged the Quartermaster Department, and made it practically the department which you describe. There was no difficulty in that functioning at that time, and things were going well.

The CHAIRMAN. We understand that it was at least operating such scheme very closely by gradual steps, but there was nothing in the statute to bring it about; in fact, it was wholly a matter of regulation. In fact, the whole department was a matter of regulation, based on the Overman Act, which has expired.

To speak frankly in reference to this, this subcommittee is a little weary of the friction that exists between the bureaus and the staff on the one side, and between the different bureaus themselves; and if we could get it straightened out in the law, prescribing certain general principles, by which the bureaus would govern themselves, and the General Staff govern itself, we would be happy.

Mr. CROWELL. Under the proposed plan I have suggested there would be no friction between the bureaus and the General Staff, because they would nowhere come in contact. The friction between the bureaus themselves I think could be better handled by the method I have outlined, because the Director of Munitions would have more

power than the General Staff in handling these bureaus, and for that reason could handle them with a firmer hand.

The General Staff under all existing legislation has been limited to a rather indeterminate power of supervision and coordination, but they have no administrative power. I think that the bureaus should be handled by coordination if possible, but there have been many times when I think it was necessary to take hold of them with a strong hand and use real administrative power; and, as you know, that has been done more than once during the last few years.

The CHAIRMAN. You think that strong-hand method is not the proper function of the General Staff in matters of production?

Mr. CROWELL. No; I do not think the General Staff ought to meddle in matters of production under any circumstances.

The CHAIRMAN. Assuming, for the moment, that we do create the office of Director of Munitions, does that proposal which I recited a moment ago conflict in principle with your thought?

Mr. CROWELL. Not if you have it operating under a Director of Munitions.

My objections were only in case it operated under the General Staff.

The CHAIRMAN. But you, as I understand it, would leave to the Director of Munitions the task of compelling the proper coordination in production amongst the different bureaus?

Mr. CROWELL. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. And not recite it in the law?

Mr. CROWELL. No; I would recite it in the law.

The CHAIRMAN. I mean, you would not recite the degree of coordination, for instance, among the different bureaus. You would recite that the Director of Munitions would have the power to enforce it, but you would not go into detail?

Mr. CROWELL. Exactly. I would have the law read somewhat as follows, perhaps:

The Director of Munitions is empowered to supervise, coordinate, and, if necessary, direct the bureaus in the carrying out of their functions.

The CHAIRMAN. Coming back to those details again, what would you say to the proposal that under that same department I mentioned—that same bureau—we put all questions of storage?

Mr. CROWELL. I do not think that could be done. Questions of storage are to-day so intimately bound up in the administration of these bureaus that it would be very hard to take them out. The Ordnance Department, for instance, has storage in its arsenals—has storage under its own jurisdiction. The other departments have similar storage.

The CHAIRMAN. We understood they did not—that Purchase and Storage had that now under the Quartermaster General.

Mr. CROWELL. They have all storage; but the Ordnance Department to-day has a large amount of storage that is only handled in a supervisory way by the department of Purchase and Storage. The handling of storage matters, as I see it, is a function of this office of Director of Munitions; all the conflicts regarding storage, all the trouble we have had would be solved if the Director of Munitions had full authority in storage matters. He would then leave the storage that is in the hands of each bureau to be operated by each

bureau and would be able to allocate storage; and I think the existing situation would be better met that way than by trying to centralize storage.

If we were beginning with this thing anew and had no background, storage, I think, could be put into the hands of one department. I think to-day it would be impossible. Now we accomplish the same thing by having this office handle storage. [Indicating on blue print.] As a matter of fact, 80 per cent of the storage is to-day, I think, in the Quartermaster's Department. But there might be a part of storage which was in the hands of the Ordnance Department, which, temporarily, for instance, would be much better used by one of the other departments. Under your plan you would not be able to give that temporary occupancy to one of the other departments. Under the plan I proposed, all storage to be allocated through the Director of Munitions, there would be no difficulty in using storage wherever it was located.

The CHAIRMAN. How about transportation?

Mr. CROWELL. Transportation, you will notice, I have combined; that is, have put the Motor Transport Corps under the Transportation Division. There is a good deal to be said on both sides of that proposition. Motor transport is an operating transportation service; they operate their transportation. The balance of the transportation is not an operating service. But I feel satisfied that we would get better service combined, by having this in one division and have, therefore, made one bureau of transportation, which includes the Motor Transport Corps. I have treated that exactly as the other bureaus have been treated, and believe that is a fairer way of treating the bureaus, as a whole, than to put transportation directly under any one of the bureaus. The minute you do that, the minute you put transportation—make it a part of the Quartermaster's Department, the Quartermaster's Department then has an advantage of other bureaus as regards transportation and, in view of the friction which is inevitable between bureaus, I think you get better results if the Ordnance Department, for instance, has to deal directly with the Transportation Bureau for its transportation, than if the Ordnance Department had to go to the Quartermaster's Department and ask for transportation.

The CHAIRMAN. At what point does transportation cease being a munitions function and commence being a military function?

Mr. CROWELL. In this war the ports of France were the dividing point. It was considered a munitions function until munitions were landed on the wharf in France.

The CHAIRMAN. That would have to be regulated by the Secretary of War in any future war?

Mr. CROWELL. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. A dividing line laid down?

Mr. CROWELL. I think no dividing line could be laid until war time.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes; depending on the place where the war was being fought?

Mr. CROWELL. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, the position of the Finance Division, under your scheme to-day finance has charge of all disbursements, including the pay of the Army?

Mr. CROWELL. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. And a contract and auditing function also?

Mr. CROWELL. I have made no change whatever in the Finance Division; it is shown there as it exists to-day, as an independent bureau.

The CHAIRMAN. And would you have the Finance Division under the direction of the Director of Munitions, make allotments for the appropriations for the whole Army?

Mr. CROWELL. I would have them act just as the other bureaus do. On business matters I would have them function under the Director of Munitions, and on military matters under the General Staff. I think 98 per cent of their business is industrial, however; and they would function mostly under the Director of Munitions.

The CHAIRMAN. And you are in favor of the retention of the Construction Corps?

Mr. CROWELL. I would like to give you a few figures in support of that. I am in favor of it very decidedly.

In the first place, the Construction Division, I believe, was a necessity during this war. The work that they did, beginning with the erection of the cantonments, in the very short time which they were allowed, and in the erection of the many other building projects, running, I think, to a total of over a billion dollars during the 19 months of the war, required a talent which no old department of the Army possessed. The ranks of the Construction Department of the Army were filled from men who had had experience in that very work; and in a future war I believe we will be met by the same difficulties. I am, therefore, in favor of the retention of the Construction Department in time of peace on the theory that we should have our full organization where we can see it in time of peace, and all we need to do in time of war is to enlarge it by adding to it.

As a matter of fact, the functions of the Construction Department are very large in time of peace, and have been large; I think amply large enough to warrant its maintenance. The figures I have here begin with the year 1907, and conclude with the year 1916—the ten-year prewar period—and the lowest amount of money that was spent in any of those years for construction, operation, maintenance, and repair, was \$8,000,000; and the maximum spent was \$19,000,000. The average amount spent per man in the Army was \$142 per year.

Now, applying that figure of \$142 per year, and making no allowance for the fact that we should add to-day 70 per cent to these prewar figures, making no allowance for that 70 per cent, for a total army of 300,000, we will say, the amount to be spent by the Construction Division will be 142 times 300,000, which is approximately \$42,000,000; and if we will allow for that 70 per cent increase we have \$241 per capita, multiplied by 300,000, which would be approximately \$72,000,000 per year.

In other words, if we maintain our Army in the future as we did in the ten years previous to the war, we will have from \$45,000,000 to \$75,000,000 per year to be spent for construction projects.

Senator New. Have you seen the figures that Gen. March will put in in connection with his testimony—the estimates of the work to be done by the Construction Department under the proposed plan for the reorganization of the Army?

Mr. CROWELL. I can not say that I have seen the figures that he used at that time, but I have seen many estimates, and the lowest estimate that I recall for the preparation of our 16 cantonments for occupation by a division of troops in each cantonment is \$100,000,000; and the building of permanent housing for the Army to correspond with that, if I recall it, went \$600,000,000 or \$700,000,000.

Now, I believe there is enough construction work ahead of us which is best handled by this construction division, work which is different from any work which is handled by the Engineers, and it is also different from the work which is handled best by the Quartermaster, on account of the magnitude of the projects—I believe all of that warrants the retention of the construction division.

But I am in favor of putting the real estate division in with it, because construction and real estate matters are very closely tied together, and one can hardly be handled if separated from the other.

The main argument against the retention of the construction division seems to be one of expense. I have never been able to see, however, how the work could be done any cheaper by any other set of men. The plans of the construction division call for construction officers only to be located in the large posts, that is, greater than regimental posts, and only on projects of magnitude. They will soon pay for themselves in those positions. The small repairs to the small posts could still be left to the quartermasters, as they were in the old days.

The CHAIRMAN. We find a good deal of criticism, Mr. Secretary, in the overhead now existing in some of these cantonments and in some of these cantonments it is well to say there are not over 4,000 troops, and we find a construction or utilities officer, we find a motor transport officer, we find a supply officer, we find an Engineer officer, and a disbursing officer representing the Finance Department. There are a good many, all doing the work which was being done by one officer four years ago.

Mr. CROWELL. Is not that due to the fact that it is not economical to maintain 3,000 men in a cantonment that is built to hold 40,000 men? In my judgment, the present situation is transitory, and should not be looked upon as anything else. Where we have stationed 3,000 men, when we get down to a permanent peace basis, of course there will be no necessity for all those officers.

The CHAIRMAN. We have had figures presented to us showing it costs more now to administer the internal affairs of a cantonment with 3,000 men in it than it did to maintain the same cantonment with 40,000 men in it in the autumn of 1917.

Mr. CROWELL. I have not seen all those figures, but if you have all these men I think it is quite likely that it would cost more.

Do you mean by this that you think the maintenance of the construction division would be more expensive than if we handed that work back to the Quartermaster's Department?

The CHAIRMAN. I am not sure. It is hard to say.

But in administration matters of a cantonment or a big Army post like Fort Monroe—

Mr. CROWELL. You see it is the intention to house the Army in large communities in the future; that is, divisions, and where we have a division housed I think there will be plenty of work for an

officer of the construction division, especially if we maintain these temporary wooden camps, where the upkeep is going to be very large every year; but, aside from that, in the regimental and company posts there would be no necessity of keeping an officer of construction.

The CHAIRMAN. Then you would rely upon your Director of Munitions, who supervises and coordinates all these activities, to impose economy in the middle-sized and smaller posts in that regard?

Mr. CROWELL. No; I think that is a military function and would come under the General Staff. If it were under a quartermaster it certainly would be; anything to do with troops I would say would be a military function.

The CHAIRMAN. Then you would have to rely upon the General Staff?

Mr. CROWELL. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, the General Staff to-day has created all these different positions, and they are typical of the job imposed, and it certainly has run up the overhead expenses enormously.

Mr. CROWELL. I am not defending extravagance in any way, but I hardly feel that the present situation is a fair one to judge of the powers of economy that exist in the War Department.

The CHAIRMAN. Under your scheme, the promotion of officers in these bureaus would be regarded as a military matter?

Mr. CROWELL. Fully.

The CHAIRMAN. The Director of Munitions would not come in on it at all?

Mr. CROWELL. No. I think that is wholly to be determined by the chiefs of the bureaus.

The CHAIRMAN. In the first instance?

Mr. CROWELL. Yes.

Senator NEW. You want his to be a business function and not complicated by anything else?

Mr. CROWELL. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Would you charge him with any duty in connection with the recommendation of the appointment for the Chief Signal Officer, for instance?

Mr. CROWELL. I think he should have a great deal to say as to who was appointed Signal Officer, because in the Signal Corps a considerable portion of the duties are purchasing duties. My conception of the appointment of officers in these supply bureaus would be that the Secretary of War would call in the Chief of Staff and the Director of Munitions, wherever there was a vacancy, and would discuss this appointment, and if there were a disagreement between the Chief of Staff and the Director of Munitions, the Secretary of War would be there, of course, to settle it.

The proportion of functions varies, you will notice, in every bureau. For instance, the Ordnance Bureau is almost wholly a bureau of supply, and the Director of Munitions should have 90 per cent of the choice if it came to appointing a Chief of Ordnance. On the other hand the Engineers is, I should say, 90 per cent a military bureau, and the Chief of Staff should have his way in appointing.

Senator SUTHERLAND. In time of peace their work is largely civil, in river and harbor work, is it not?

Mr. CROWELL. There is that work going on. I have rather left it out, as it goes on rather steadily without any particular supervision by the Chief of Staff or anybody else.

Senator SUTHERLAND. Is not that the chief function of the Engineer Corps in time of peace?

Mr. CROWELL. I should say not.

Senator SUTHERLAND. They have to do largely with river and harbor work, do they not?

Mr. CROWELL. I should not call it a large function.

The CHAIRMAN. The work is done by contract?

Mr. CROWELL. Yes. They are merely acting as an architect acts when he builds your house.

Senator SUTHERLAND. Supervises it?

Mr. CROWELL. Yes.

Senator SUTHERLAND. You do not know what proportion of the personnel in the Engineer Corps is used on that class of work, or was used before we went into the war?

Mr. CROWELL. No; I do not.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, none of the troops are?

Mr. CROWELL. No; just a number of officers, and the country is districted, as you know.

The CHAIRMAN. Have you any other observations to make, Mr. Secretary, on your own proposal or any other feature of this bill?

Mr. CROWELL. I think not.

The CHAIRMAN. Have you any idea to express as to the size of the Army in the Regular Establishment?

Mr. CROWELL. I do not feel qualified to pass on that.

Senator SUTHERLAND. I have been called out several times during this hearing, and have not heard all you said, but these departments here are not exactly as they are provided in this bill (referring to the blue print and to the War Department bill).

Mr. CROWELL. No; this proposal has nothing to do with the bill which is pending.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Thomas, have you any questions to ask?

Senator THOMAS. No, Mr. Chairman. I was obliged to come in late, and I am afraid if I had anything to ask it would simply be on matters that have probably been covered by the Secretary's statements.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you believe in the retention of the Chemical Warfare Service as a separate branch?

Mr. CROWELL. Yes; very emphatically.

Senator SUTHERLAND. And the construction as a separate branch?

Mr. CROWELL. Yes. They are both found necessary in time of war. I do not believe in hiding them under any other department in time of peace.

Senator SUTHERLAND. I notice you put motor transportation and motor transport together?

Mr. CROWELL. Yes. There is no reason why the Transportation Department should not include motor transport as one of its branches. In this war there would have been within the three branches rail transportation and water transportation—that is, trans-Atlantic transportation—and motor transport.

The CHAIRMAN. Where would you put animal-drawn transport?

Mr. CROWELL. There is so little of it——

The CHAIRMAN. It is still left to the Quartermaster General, is it not?

Mr. CROWELL. Yes. I think I would leave it there.

The CHAIRMAN. You never can tell where you are going to operate, and you may have to rely on the mule a good deal. I can think of some countries where the motor will not go and the mule will go. You are disposed to leave that where it is, I suppose?

Mr. CROWELL. I think so.

The CHAIRMAN. That is all very interesting, Mr. Secretary. I wish you or some people in your office could prepare a tentative draft of legislation to cover this, so that the committee might have that before it when it sits down to decide this question of the supply system.

Mr. CROWELL. I will be very glad to do so.

The CHAIRMAN. And I hope we can have it fairly soon.

Mr. CROWELL. That is a week or two?

The CHAIRMAN. I would hope within a week.

Mr. CROWELL. I will do the best I can.

The CHAIRMAN. If there are no other questions, we are very much obliged to you, Mr. Secretary.

-(Thereupon, at 4.20 o'clock p. m., the committee adjourned, subject to the call of the chairman.)

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REORGANIZATION OF THE ARMY

HEARINGS

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE COMMITTEE ON MILITARY AFFAIRS UNITED STATES SENATE

SIXTY-SIXTH CONGRESS.

FIRST SESSION

ON

S. 2691

A BILL TO PROVIDE FOR UNIVERSAL MILITARY, NAVAL, AND VOCATIONAL TRAINING AND FOR MOBILIZATION OF THE MANHOOD OF THE NATION IN A NATIONAL EMERGENCY

S. 2693

A BILL TO CREATE A DEPARTMENT OF AERONAUTICS, DEFINING THE POWERS AND DUTIES OF THE DIRECTOR THEREOF, PROVIDING FOR THE ORGANIZATION, DISPOSITION, AND ADMINISTRATION OF A UNITED STATES AIR FORCE, CREATING THE UNITED STATES AIR RESERVE FORCE, AND PROVIDING FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF CIVIL AND COMMERCIAL AVIATION

S. 2715

A BILL TO REORGANIZE AND INCREASE THE EFFICIENCY OF THE UNITED STATES ARMY, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES

PART 27

Printed for the use of the Committee on Military Affairs

STATEMENTS OF

MR. JOHN H. SHERBURNE	COL. RANSOME H. GILLETTE
MAJ. GEN. FRANCIS A. MACON	COL. F. M. MADDOX
MAJ. GEN. JESSE McI. CARTER	MAJ. A. B. CRITCHFIELD
BRIG. GEN. WILLIAM M. MOORE	

WASHINGTON

GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
1919

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REORGANIZATION OF THE ARMY.

FRIDAY, NOVEMBER 7, 1919.

UNITED STATES SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON MILITARY AFFAIRS,
Washington, D. C.

The subcommittee met at 3.30 o'clock p. m., pursuant to the call of the chairman.

Present: Senators Wadsworth (chairman), Sutherland, New, Chamberlain, Fletcher, and Thomas.

STATEMENT OF MR. JOHN H. SHERBURNE, FORMERLY BRIGADIER GENERAL, NATIONAL ARMY.

The CHAIRMAN. Please give your full name and address to the reporter.

Mr. SHERBURNE. John H. Sherburne, Boston, Mass.; formerly brigadier general in the Ninety-second Division and Twenty-sixth Division, Artillery.

The CHAIRMAN. Will you state to the committee about your assignments during the war?

Mr. SHERBURNE. I went over in command of the One hundred and first Field Artillery, from Massachusetts, which was one of the first National Guard regiments to land, and fired the first National Guard shot on the Chemin des Dames; continued with the One hundred and first at Apremont, Seichprey, and then went with the Twenty-sixth Division to the Chateau Thierry sector and took part in the advance there, going forward behind the Twenty-eighth Division and the Forty-second Division after the Twenty-sixth Division had been relieved; and then I was promoted and sent to command the first and only brigade of colored Artillery ever formed—the Ninety-second Division, Artillery. They came back into the line the 19th of October and they were in line and in the last two days' offensive, the 10th and 11th of November. After which I was returned to the Twenty-sixth Division.

The CHAIRMAN. And discharged as a brigadier general?

Mr. SHERBURNE. Yes.

Senator SUTHERLAND. When?

Mr. SHERBURNE. The 29th of April of this year.

The CHAIRMAN. How long had you been in the Massachusetts Guard before the war?

Mr. SHERBURNE. Since 1895.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you hold the rank of colonel at the outbreak of the war?

Mr. SHERBURNE. I held the rank of colonel, yes; and on the border at El Paso.

The CHAIRMAN. We would be glad to have an expression of your views on this situation that confronts us. You know, generally speaking, what confronts us.

Mr. SHERBURNE. Well, Mr. Chairman, of course I do not know how far you have gone in your decision, nor how far it is worth while for me to speak in opposition to the compulsory military service that is being brought forward by these Army bills. In the first place, may I say that I believe, as I think everyone else of sound judgment and thought believes, that there must be a thorough rehabilitation of the military system of this country. I am not in favor of the National Guard as it was, nor of the Regular Army as it was; but I think that any system you build must not be a Swiss system nor a French system, but it must be built on American institutions.

The Army program attempted to bring a centralized military power into being, which, to my, perhaps, conservative, New England brain, is one of the greatest potential dangers that the institutions of the country have to face, because it is upsetting the checks and balances against usurpation of power. Enough for that. You understand my point?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Mr. SHERBURNE. That any system that you install ought to have the double check of being under the State, because when you once take away the military power from the States you take away the sign and symbol of the sovereign power of the States, and in that way upset more than you can possibly foresee now, the constitutional institutions of this country.

Senator SUTHERLAND. The States are all pretty much in favor of letting the Government spend as much money as it will on the various units of guards?

Mr. SHERBURNE. That is true. In my own State I think the State has spent more than the National Government has ever spent, in proportion, and I will say the same for your State, Senator Wadsworth. (New York.) But take such a situation as exists in Boston to-day. It is almost inconceivable to think of the Federal Government policing our streets, and yet the aid to the police power there is of vital importance. Using the State troops for that purpose works well; but if some major general of the Regular Army were there in charge of our Boston situation I do not know just where our civil sovereign power would be.

I am against centralized compulsory service.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. You mean universal military training, or do you mean compulsory service—do you differentiate between service and training?

Mr. SHERBURNE. Yes; I differentiate, because training may be many things; it may mean training in a high school, or it may mean taking the men away and segregating them in some camp, training them a certain length of time and sending them back to their location. The latter, I think, is the same thing as compulsory service. As a matter of fact, the word "training" is used frequently as a camouflage to conceal the idea of compulsory service. The peo-

ple who believe in the full extent of compulsory service feel that, as such, they can not get it through, but as compulsory training they can get it through, and that shortly thereafter it will become compulsory service.

It seems to me that preparedness is insurance. We all agree that we have got to be prepared against any eventuality that may occur; but, like insurance, overpreparedness is like overinsurance, and overinsurance has two fundamental weaknesses; it is an economic waste, and it leads to arson. We do not need any such standing army as universal service would give us. One million one hundred thousand men become of age each year. Taking as the proportion three-quarters—for any less proportion would make the universal feature of it absurd—you would get approximately 800,000 men that you have got to train for three months in the year.

(At this point an informal recess was taken for 15 minutes, at the expiration of which time proceedings were resumed as follows:)

Mr. SHERBURNE (continuing). There was one other point on the question of universal service, a thought that I wanted to leave, and that was a thought suggested by a prominent French general, in speaking of their own system, that it was a serious economic handicap to their country, because no young man could ever begin an apprenticeship or trade before he was through with the compulsory term of service.

Senator SUTHERLAND. How long is that?

Mr. SHERBURNE. Two years. That would be a great deal modified by three months' service, but six months' term would have the same effect upon our young men.

Of course, the necessity of the thing is something that it is hardly necessary to talk. A three months' service for the proportion of the eleven hundred thousand men, which is the last census figures of those who become of age every year, would mean 800,000 men. I assume that any system would cause them to return for some training for the next two or three years, in any event. In other words, you could multiply 750,000 by 3, plus your Regular Army, and you see you would have a standing Army substantially of around 2,300,000 or 2,400,000 men. Personally, I can not see just why this country is in need of any such force.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. I do not think any of these bills contemplate more than one period of training; I do not think any of the bills contemplate that after the first three months' training or the first six months' training that they shall be called back the next year.

Mr. SHERBURNE. Then, sir, I should say that that was the best argument I have heard against any such system, because merely trained men are of no use whatever. Unless you follow your service with a further service in organized reserves and make your organized reserves into a complete, comprehensive, cohesive force, you are far worse off than you were under the old National Guard, which was capable of such moulding. The late Congressman Gardner's dinner to the Reserve Army of the United States, at which 11 men, the whole force, were present, is the best answer to such a plan.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. But, under the old reserve system, when the man was finally discharged into the reserves he lost touch with his unit and the unit, and the Army itself, lost touch with him; he

was gone. You would not claim for a moment that those 11 reservists that you referred to, responding to Congressman Gardner's call, were the only men that were fitted for military duty in the United States?

Mr. SHERBURNE. They were the only ones the Regular Army could get.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. Yes; they were the only ones that had been kept track of.

Mr. SHERBURNE. Any system, economically at least, it seems to me, must be based on an organized reserve, partially at least trained, and the machinery of the command should be fairly well organized. Now, to change the subject, may I speak a word on your compulsory military training?

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. Yes; certainly.

Mr. SHERBURNE. So much has been said that you are going to train them in patriotism and train them in all the other virtues. I say there is a good deal to be said for military discipline in teaching men subordination, and perhaps teaching them promptitude, etc.; but it has been my experience—and I think it will be yours, if you analyze the effect on these men who have come back—that the military discipline rather reacts when they get out of the Army, and the average soldier to-day is a good deal of a Bolshevik, in a pleasant sense, not in a socialist sense. He is very impatient of any harness, of any control whatever, and I think that is the great weakness of the Army discipline, of the Army system. If you perpetuate that in the entire system of universal training, the thing will kill itself in very short order. Now, that is just what I am afraid of—that in creating this system you are creating a system that will automatically die. I have not hesitated to express my feeling against universal service wherever I could, in order to try it out, and I think in no place has my stand failed to meet with an almost instantaneous acceptance and applause, both among the service men and among other citizens in my community.

The CHAIRMAN. Several State conventions of the American Legion have indorsed universal military training.

Mr. SHERBURNE. Undoubtedly; but what do they mean by that?

The CHAIRMAN. They mean universal obligation to be trained.

Mr. SHERBURNE. They may mean universal obligation to be trained, and they may mean universal obligation to have some training in high schools. You do not define it; that is the danger. If it is universal military service they are all against it, and that is the only fair way—to come straight out and say a three months' compulsory service, because that is what it is. Now, turning back to your question of reserves, it seems to me, sir, that what this country needs is a framework more than anything else. It has been my experience, dealing with citizens who have donned the uniform for a greater or less period of time, that it is a very quick piece of business to train them. As an example, I would like to point to the One hundred and sixty-seventh Field Artillery Brigade of colored men who went into the line with less than 60 days of actual artillery training, and were highly spoken of by the French. They did their job in every case. Our men are very quick to learn. This talk that you can not make a soldier in three years is perfect and utter rot, and I

do not hesitate to characterize it as such. You can make a soldier in three weeks with the proper leadership; the whole question hinges on the proper leadership.

The problem to me is to get an adequate number of competent officers bound together in some unified organization, by division preferably, because that is the fighting unit, and with enough men passing through their organization to train them and to train the men, at least partially. Men pass through from the active service into the reserve. There ought to be at least an army of 400,000 to 500,000 citizens, which, with a small Regular Army, and I think it is not a far prophecy that the Regular Army will be very much smaller than even the minimum which officers of the Regular Army have suggested here, within the next 10 years, you are better students of Congress than myself; but I can only quote one Congressman, former Gov. McCall, of Massachusetts, who said that five years after the war the most unpopular man in Congress would be the man who came in with a large military appropriation. I think that is true, with the taxes that are coming and the other problems that are coming, and the fact that we are not a military nation—but if we could have a citizenry soldiery of 400,000 or 500,000 active men to serve, say, a three-year term, with camp work of the proper kind, with proper facilities, and enough ammunition and proper training, those men in turn going into a reserve which will build up the organization to war strength, I do not believe that we will have any fear of any foreign invasion or any hostile attack on our shores; because if with the navies of the world and with the practical sea control we could not move to Germany in the first year any very substantial number of men, I do not believe any foreign power, until at least our Navy is beaten and complete control of the sea is obtained, can move any large or substantial force into this country—and we do not want an army for anything but defense, at least I do not think the American people do. When we want to go out and “wallop” another country we will do it as we did before, and we will raise the army. We ought to change our system so that the raising will be easier, so that the machinery and ammunition and quartermaster's force and officers are there; but so far as keeping such a force all the time, I do not believe the American people will stand for it.

Senator FLETCHER. How would you raise that citizen army to 500,000?

Mr. SHERBURN. I would raise it under the power of the Constitution to raise armies, and I would raise it just as you drafted the men, by States, territorializing, breaking down State boundaries in so far as was necessary for divisions and brigades, and if necessary even regiments; but leaving to the Governor of each State the joint control over the troops of his State for internal police power.

The CHAIRMAN. You would have it by the voluntary system?

Mr. SHERBURN. If it were necessary I should not hesitate to apply a selective draft for that.

The CHAIRMAN. In time of peace?

Mr. SHERBURN. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. By State authority?

Mr. SHERBURN. By Federal authority administered through the State, just as your draft was.

The CHAIRMAN. That would be compulsory service.

Mr. SHERBURNE. Yes; that is right, but you are only getting an army of 400,000 men.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. That is, you would draft them really for State uses?

Mr. SHERBURNE. No; you would draft them for their Federalized use.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. You would not draft them into the Federal Army?

Mr. SHERBURNE. Oh, yes; you would draft them into the—call it the National Guard.

The CHAIRMAN. But Federalize it?

Mr. SHERBURNE. Yes; Federalize it.

The CHAIRMAN. And take it out of the militia clause?

Mr. SHERBURNE. Take it out of the militia clause.

But there is another point I want to make; that anything to be successful on that basis has got to be in part administered by itself, and while I would not say that we ought to have a militia bureau composed entirely of civilian officers, yet I think it would help tremendously if there were a majority of civilian officers in charge of any civilian-army board. Why not call this force the National Guard—we are not afraid of the name—but it would be a unified Federalized force, with a Federal obligation, raised in the States, with a State obligation also, as an aid to the police power. Do you see what I mean?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes; but I was wondering whether that could be done under the Constitution.

Mr. SHERBURNE. I think it could be done under either clause. I think it could be done under the clause for the raising of militia, by providing for the draft, and the Federal obligation just as you have it in the National Defense act, or I think you could provide for it under the other clause, for raising armies, and cede back to the State their powers.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. Let me see if I understand your proposition. Your proposition is this, as I understand it. Say, for purposes of illustration, that we have a citizen army of 450,000 men. Would you leave that open to volunteering first?

Mr. SHERBURNE. Yes.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. And if they failed to raise the total number you would raise the balance by selective draft?

Mr. SHERBURNE. By selective draft.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. And then apportion the number to be drafted in accordance with the population of the State?

Mr. SHERBURNE. Yes. So many per Congressman. I believe that figures out about a thousand per Congressman.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. Now, after they have been raised, would you leave them centralized as they are under your present system, would you leave them in the State to be called the National Guard of the State?

Mr. SHERBURNE. I should call them National Guard for lack of a better name, and yet have them Federalized just as the National Guard was attempting to Federalize itself under the national-defense act.

One thing I think I would do, and one thing that I think has been a great source of all the trouble between the Regular Army and the National Guard, I would abolish the adjutant generals of the several States, and thereby get at once rid of your so-called 48 little regular armies.

The CHAIRMAN. You can not do that here.

Mr. SHERBURNE. But they would have no power in this Federalized scheme.

The CHAIRMAN. They would have no power if this force was to be under the Army clause of the Constitution, they would have the power if they were under the militia clause.

Senator FLETCHER. You propose joint control. Would not that be conflicting sometimes, possibly?

Mr. SHERBURNE. As far as possible, the control ought to be military and not political, and there is the great trouble. The adjutant generals are the spokesmen of the governors in a political way, oftentimes. I mean they are the direct agents of the governors, and they are too often political in their appointments and their viewpoints; and my opinion is that the best thing to do—for example, in Massachusetts we can raise and maintain without any great trouble a complete division on a peace footing. The complete organization would be in the hands of the governor for civil police duty, as an aid to the police power.

Senator FLETCHER. Take, for instance, Florida, where the governor has appointed his son adjutant general.

Mr. SHERBURNE. Well, that is what I say. I do not know anything about this particular case you speak of; he may be the most desirable man—

Senator FLETCHER. I am not commenting on that, but I am illustrating the relation that might exist, as you suggest.

Mr. SHERBURNE. But the great trouble has been that the adjutant generals have had too high rank. The adjutant general has—well, he has felt his oats too much, and he has not been what he was supposed to be, what his Army terminology means, a chief clerk, an adjutant, but he has become the commander in chief of the little army, and the little army has grown away from the inherent cause of it, which is national defense, and become a little army rather than part of the bigger army.

I hope I make myself clear. In so far as possible, if you organize tactical units in each State you avoid any question of the adjutant generals of the States having control, because then the governor calls upon the commander of the troops as his second in command, or chief of staff, or whatever you choose to call it, and the ordinary routine of command is carried through. The military commander is then supreme and responsible to the governor.

That in my opinion is one of the great stumbling blocks that has always existed between a properly Federalized militia and the Regular Army—because there has always been friction in that office, in each State office. We tried in Massachusetts to correct it by reducing the adjutant general to the rank of colonel, when our backs were turned the legislature changed it back again, and he became a brigadier general once more.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. He is usually a good politician.

Mr. SHERBURNE. On the other hand, there is a very excellent example of the scheme I am suggesting here in Pennsylvania, where the governor has called upon former Brig. Gen. Price to command the National Guard, and he is acting as commander in chief of the National Guard, with the adjutant general, properly, under him.

Senator FLETCHER. How many Congressmen have you from Massachusetts?

Mr. SHERBURNE. My recollection is we have 16.

Senator FLETCHER. You would have 16,000 then?

Mr. SHERBURNE. No, we would have 18,000. We have to count our two Senators.

Senator FLETCHER. Eighteen thousand. Then you would expect to volunteer that many. Do you think you could do that?

Mr. SHERBURNE. Yes, I think we could.

The CHAIRMAN. Taking Massachusetts as an example, you have some old regiments there of the National Guard that have valuable traditions, enjoy a good deal of public affection and admiration in their respective localities. Is it your proposal to take those regiments bodily as they stand and merge them into this force that you propose?

Mr. SHERBURNE. They are existing now as State militia.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Mr. SHERBURNE. They have not asked for Federal recognition.

The CHAIRMAN. Since the war?

Mr. SHERBURNE. Since the war.

The CHAIRMAN. But you take those units and lift them bodily into that force?

Mr. SHERBURNE. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. What do you think the State of Massachusetts would do about the armories?

Mr. SHERBURNE. If the State of Massachusetts had joint control of the troops, I think that there would be no question about the armories; I think if the State of Massachusetts had no control there might be a question as to whether or not the Government should not pay for them.

The CHAIRMAN. You mean by "control," for the use of the troops?

Mr. SHERBURNE. As an aid to the police power.

The CHAIRMAN. As an aid to the police power.

Mr. SHERBURNE. And for their parades, and to maintain the sovereignty of the governor in so far as he is a sovereign that needs armed force. It is exactly the conception that they tried to reach in the national defense act, but just fell short of it.

The CHAIRMAN. Because you left them in the militia corps, that was the reason.

Mr. SHERBURNE. Now, take the training of officers under centralized compulsory service. That is going to be one great stumbling block. The officers must be territorialized with the troops; this business of scattering officers and men indiscriminately, as they tried to do over in France, to deliberately break down the territorial feeling, won't work out. They acknowledge it themselves, because at the end of the war they tried, as far as possible, to undo all that they had done, and sent all of us back to our own divisions. Had they kept us with our divisions it would have been very much better all around; there would have been much less hard feeling about

the thing. That is one of the things that I think the men cared most about, to stay with their own officers, to stay with their own commands, to stay with their own regiments.

Whether or not the State ought to have any supervision in the choice of officers is a question. Personally I should not feel that they should as long as the officers are selected territorially. They should be selected within their own regiments; they should be selected within their own brigades, within their own divisions, and not thrust upon them by outside. That is very easy to do. The election problem is not important, that has practically gone, and it would be thrown aside very readily.

When you come to take the training of officers, in the first place I think all of us feel that an officer ought to have been an enlisted man. I served for nine years as an enlisted man and I do not think there is anything that would ever take the place of that experience, from a military point of view, in giving me the knowledge of command, the way the men fought, the extent to which you can push them or to which you can lead them, and where leading and where pushing is necessary. In other words, the art of command is a rather difficult thing to acquire. A man ought to go through the ranks first of all, that is fundamental. Then he ought to have a theoretical and technical training, but do not let these military enthusiasts get you into the idea that military science is any difficult thing. Any intelligent man is quite competent to master the intricacies of military science in his leisure time if he cares to do it.

There is no profound study necessary, nor is it any mystery. There are too many men in the country who know that to-day, the old veil of secrecy about it has been torn away, and frequently the men who have spent most time on it have rather got cranky and gone wrong rather than gone forward in a military sense. I don't know whether you care to have me speak about it, but I voice, I think, a general expression, privately expressed, which perhaps does not get to your committee, that the system at West Point should be overhauled, that it should be based on a college education or the equivalent. In other words, that it should be based on a college education and not a preparatory school education. To-day they take a boy of 18 or 19—and one college professor who has analyzed the thing—I have not done so myself personally—says that at West Point they give him about three-fifths of the average education that another college gives, and they give him discipline and a routine that makes a good many men in some ways, but it breaks a good many men also; I have lived and slept with these men and I know their personal feeling when I express myself; there is a great loyalty to West Point but a great feeling that the future should not be as the past has been. West Point was founded—it was founded by a great uncle of my own, by the way, a Col. Thayer, of Braintree; it was founded when there were not any colleges in the country and the tests were the best they could get, and I think the system has not been changed since. So, if West Point were made a graduate school it would be a great deal better. This is an exact statement of one West Pointer who went from the Middle West to West Point. He said that he thought himself a made man when he went there. He was very proud of himself, but he had not been there two weeks before he

found he had made a horrible mistake, that he was not fitted for the routine and discipline and the other things that he had to go through; but knowing how his community would feel if he dropped out he stuck at it and went into the Army as a career, because he had nothing else open to him.

Senator SUTHERLAND. Would there not be that danger if you took over these boys at a later age, that would naturally go there after completing a college course?—the discipline on those older men would be much more irksome.

Mr. SHERBURNE. I think that is where our Regular Army has gone wrong, they have confused the goose-step with discipline. Now, discipline is subordination, it is the ability to put yourself in the mind of your superior and carry out with your whole heart and whole energy his scheme. In very rare cases have I seen that quality in West Pointers. They will obey orders.

Senator FLETCHER. There has been a suggestion made before the committee that a man ought to be an enlisted man and serve a year or two in the Army before going to West Point.

Mr. SHERBURNE. I agree thoroughly with that. I would make him have the equivalent of—not necessarily a college education, you can not keep it to that, but have what would be called a general education before he goes there; in other words, not confine West Point education to French and German and the other courses that take so much time, but make it a military graduate school, just as is Johns Hopkins Medical School or Harvard Law School, or any of the other professional schools that fit men to be professional men. Then give the man a chance. Your plan to-day does not give a good man any incentive to be better.

Again, without quoting names, I can quote what I have heard frequently among the Army officers. They say, "Well, what the use? All we have to do is to do a certain amount and get by, and we will go on up automatically."

That is not fair to these men. If a man works hard under the system and shows his head he generally gets it hit. Under the old Army system, every time a man puts his head up somebody is ready to hammer it. "This fellow is getting fresh," they say. "He is out of his grade, let's keep him down."

Another thing is that no matter how good an Army officer is there is no recognition adequate for the service he renders, either in pay or honor. He may be sent out to some isolated post in the West and lives amid dust storms or blizzards, and his wife and family are fairly wretched; when he comes to a city his pay is not sufficient to enable him to live on an equality with his equals, to entertain or do anything of that sort, and his career is made about as hard as is possible. The result is that 25 per cent—and unfortunately for the Army of that 25 per cent there are a great many very good men—have gone out of the Army. There is no incentive, in other words, there is no career for these men.

An Army officer who has dedicated his life to the Army ought to be given a chance, if he is not successful, to go back easily into civil life. There are men, I know a great many men, who are citizen soldiers, on the other hand, who ought to be given a chance to go into the Regular Army.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. How would you correct the conditions—by increasing the pay?

Mr. SHERBURNE. I would correct the conditions by establishing schools and by making it more or less of a competitive matter, seniority ought to count to a certain extent, but also competition in promotion. In other words, if a man stood at the head of his class in a school he would gain 10 numbers; automatically, beginning from the bottom, you would sift out the better men, but mind you, the better man is not always the man who can pass the best examination, not by any means.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. No, he is not. That would have eliminated Gen. Grant.

Mr. SHERBURNE. Well, it would eliminate lots of others, and there comes the question, of course, of the supervision in promotion by selection, and, as you honorable Senators know, there would be a terrible temptation to the honorable Senate, for one thing, and if politics once got into promotion it would be far worse than the promotion by strict seniority.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. Well, military politics gets into it now.

Mr. SHERBURNE. Yes, you are quite right.

Senator SUTHERLAND. Inside politics?

Mr. SHERBURNE. Yes; inside politics.

Senator SUTHERLAND. They regard it as a great crime for a Member of Congress to go to them in the interest of the promotion of any officer, but I understand that some brother officer can go to superior officers in the interest of this man or that man, to try to have him promoted.

Mr. SHERBURNE. I guess you are right. Of course, if you keep to straight seniority, if you keep to that rule—you take a mediocre man, just good enough to get by, and he never gets canned, but goes on up, and there is no way of winnowing him out. There ought to be some such way. There have been various methods suggested of doing it.

I was amazed at the French discipline as against our Regular Army discipline; the French discipline is based on real leadership, as a rule. The individual officer, no matter what his grade—I have heard frequently second lieutenants arguing with colonels on technical matters, just as two Senators would argue together.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. Well, there is more democracy in the French Army than there is in our Army, is there not?

Mr. SHERBURNE. Infinitely more than there is in our Regular Army. The French system is very similar to our National Guard.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. Yes; I thought so. I have heard of a commanding officer in the French Army getting off his horse and going in and visiting with a peasant who happened to be a classmate of his.

Mr. SHERBURNE. Was there any harm in that?

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. No, indeed; I mentioned it because I like that sort of thing. You would not find a United States Army officer doing that, though, would you?

Mr. SHERBURNE. You would find a citizen officer doing it, but I do not think you would find your Regular Army officer doing it.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. I do not think so either, as a rule.

Mr. SHERBURNE. And that comes back to the statement I made, that the American Army discipline is goose-step discipline instead of real

discipline; that is, they do not have real subordination, in the sense that you like to find among your inferiors in rank, your subordinates; it is a lip service, an obedience to orders rather than putting themselves in the place of the other man. That is a very marked tendency, it is a very grave tendency.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. Do you not think that this draft Army, the selected Army, that we had in France was a democratic Army in the general acceptance of the term—that is, men of every walk in life were brought together and compelled to associate with each other?

Mr. SHERBURNE. I should not make any differentiation between the draft army and the National Guard, or even the Regular Army, because the Regular Army was composed largely of volunteers. I have heard it said that the First Division was composed of 80 per cent new troops.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. Every section of the country was represented.

Mr. SHERBURNE. I think our Army is essentially democratic and that is why I think the honorable Senate wants to stop, look, and listen and get hold of all the citizen soldiers it can and find out their viewpoint and find out whether the Regular Army represents the American heart.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. I disagree with you about the volunteer army being distinctly a democratic army. As a rule a great many men who owed service to the country did not go in, but every class was compelled to go in under the selective-service act.

Mr. SHERBURNE. It is only a difference of degree. I only know, speaking for my own brigade, that we had enlisted men of every walk of life. I had three members of the Massachusetts Legislature as privates in my regiment.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. They were volunteers.

Mr. SHERBURNE. They were volunteers. I mean I would not make any distinction as between the democracy of any of the lines of service, not even the regular service; that is in the enlisted personnel.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. Yes, you take the National Guard. Do you think that a rich banker would go into the National Guard system as a private generally, in times of peace?

Mr. SHERBURNE. I can recite hundreds of men——

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. It is not generally so in my section of the country.

Mr. SHERBURNE. Hundreds of men; absolutely.

The CHAIRMAN. Indeed, it is not an unfair criticism, is it, that in some units of the National Guard there is too much of that?

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. As privates?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes; gathered into one unit, such as certain units I know of in New York, where there are men who are literally worth many millions of dollars.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. They go into particular companies?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes; supposed to be smart organizations. That, I think, is the least democratic kind of an organization.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. So do I.

The CHAIRMAN. I want to qualify that this way: The spirit of the individual man who enlisted in that way was excellent and most

democratic, but the organization as a body is not democratic, because it feels itself different from the so-called doughboy organization next door.

Mr. SHERBURNE. And the trouble is those very men do not learn what they should learn to make the best officers; if they go into these cut-and-dried organizations they do not have a chance to study men as they should.

The CHAIRMAN. You speak of their value as officers and I think it is well to put into the record—I do not know whether you know the old Seventh New York which became the One hundred and seventh—that it supplied 5,000 officers to the Army.

Mr. SHERBURNE. I believe that is splendid, and yet had those men had a more democratic experience they might have been better officers, they might have understood the men they served with better. They did understand a good deal, because if a man had to walk through mud and dust or ride an artillery team down at Manassas as I did for 22 hours on a stretch he learns a lot about the game right there. If you are lead driver on a leading gun, whether you are in a kid glove outfit or any other, you learn a good deal about the game. But the whole question of Army discipline is to me, sir, a very serious one.

Our General Staff is patterned almost exactly on the prewar German staff methods. Well, perhaps it would be invidious to go very much further on that line, but take for instance, the question of saluting. Undoubtedly you gentlemen have talked to private soldiers. I can speak as a general going around in a Cadillac limousine, and say that my arm has gotten so lame at times from saluting that I have pulled down the curtains of my car so I would not have to salute. I have seen boys along the road who would have to jump up and salute every few minutes, and if they did not they never knew when they were going to get called. I have seen general officers stop their car and get out and go back and call poor doughboys, treat them like dogs, because they were marching along the road, perhaps tired out, and had failed to salute. I have seen it happen time after time, and that was, I think, a pity. It was a little thing in itself, but it was an outward and visible sign of an inward and invisible condition that was nevertheless very apparent.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. Did you see any disposition among the Regular Army officers to discriminate against the Guard officers?

Mr. SHERBURNE. Why, yes; there is no question about that.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. I would like to have you enlarge on that. I have heard a good deal about it. If it existed, how did it manifest itself?

Mr. SHERBURNE. Of course the original step in that was in passing the 119th Article of War, which subordinated all officers not of the Regular Service to all Regulars holding temporary commission in higher grades. In other words, whenever I was, with six or eight general officers I was always the last one to go in the door. I had the experience of raising a brigade of artillery in Massachusetts and having a man who had been a lieutenant in an artillery regiment of the Regular Service come into camp and rank me out of my command.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. Of the same grade as yourself?

Mr. SHERBURNE. He was temporarily a colonel, yes; but his commission post-dated mine. That was a little annoyance, it was a little

thing in itself, but it was one of those things that was again an outward and visible sign of an inward and very apparent condition.

The CHAIRMAN. It was a discrimination as between two classes of officers in the same grade?

Mr. SHERBURNE. When the Presidential proclamation was issued making all officers of the National Army and taking the National Guard off our shoulders, I put up the inquiry whether that also abrogated the one hundred and nineteenth article of war, and the adjutant general at Chaumont decided that the one hundred and nineteenth article of war was still in force. That was just for record.

Now, you ask if there was discrimination. If you choose, I will produce witnesses here who will state that the Regular Army made a determined effort to get me personally after I was made a brigadier general. They did not get me, I was forewarned by telephone. They went so far as to go down to my colonels in line of battle and ask them if the dispositions I had made were right.

The CHAIRMAN. Were those inspectors?

Mr. SHERBURNE. Inspectors.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. They made no charges against you?

Mr. SHERBURNE. No. They sent an inspector down once to see about my violating an order that I had not received, but that did not amount to much. At the start I possibly might have used some political pull from Massachusetts to have become a brigadier general, but I knew I would not live if I did, and so I did not do that, and it was a great question whether I was going to live as a colonel. They finally let me by because I was pretty lucky in one or two things. And then when I was promoted—and the Lord knows why they promoted me—I really know why they promoted me, and it was because you people over here made a kick that the National Guard was being discriminated against and they sent word to give them the name of some National Guard officer fit to be promoted, and I happened to be picked out. And Gen. Debevoise was another.

The CHAIRMAN. If that did happen, Gen. Debevoise graduated No. 1 of the field officers' school, he led the whole class.

Mr. SHERBURNE. Then they took me away from the brigade which I had raised in Massachusetts and they sent me to what was a pure experiment, and they certainly ought to have had the best man they had in their service to carry it through, the negro artillery. I have had it told me by people who were in the headquarters at Chaumont that that was supposed to be my finish.

Senator FLETCHER. What was their object, do you think; did they have some one else of the regular service, do you think, to hold that position, or was it to humiliate the National Guard?

Mr. SHERBURNE. Well, I don't know.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. If they put you in an impossible place they thought you could not make good, probably, and they would then have to can you?

Mr. SHERBURNE. And then I came up to the line and got my colored brigade on the line, which was what I wanted to do, for their own success, because they were remarkable, they were splendid troops—and any man who has served with that artillery brigade will go down the line testifying to their worth.

The CHAIRMAN. You had all white officers?

Mr. SHERBURNE. Yes; we had. I came up to the line and the first day I got there I was informed by one of my officers that the chief of staff had said at the mess of the division three days before, "We'll get that boy scout now."

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. But you got to the line?

Mr. SHERBURNE. I got to the line and I stayed on the line, and they gave me a whole lot more artillery than I brought up.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. Was that word "boy scout" the way the Regular Army officers designated the officers who went up from civil life?

Mr. SHERBURNE. No; I think that was my pet name, because, perhaps, I am youthful in appearance, or something of that sort.

Senator FLETCHER. Did you continue with that command?

Mr. SHERBURNE. I did until I sent them off home at Brest, and then Gen. Pershing in his kindness, out of his sheer good will to me, sent me back to the brigade I had raised and it was—well, those things you can not express exactly as to what it means to you.

Senator FLETCHER. You had raised and trained them?

Mr. SHERBURNE. I had raised two regiments and trained them and had brought the other together and had done most of the organizing of that.

Senator FLETCHER. Where were they stationed?

Mr. SHERBURNE. The Twenty-sixth Division was in the general vicinity of Le Mans.

The CHAIRMAN. That was after the armistice?

Mr. SHERBURNE. Yes.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. Whom did they put in charge of the division you raised when they transferred you to this colored regiment?

Mr. SHERBURNE. A gentleman who had been—I don't know who.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. A Regular Army officer?

Mr. SHERBURNE. Yes; a colonel.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. Did they make him a brigadier general?

Mr. SHERBURNE. No.

The CHAIRMAN. Were you a brigadier general when you were transferred?

Mr. SHERBURNE. I was a brigadier general; yes.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. And they put a colonel in command of the troops you left?

Mr. SHERBURNE. Gen. Aultman was in command, and he was promoted to be the corps Artillery commander. Now, mind you, in these statements do not think I have any grouch against the members of the Regular Army. I think in the Regular Army I have some of the best friends I have on earth, men that I like and trust and have the greatest confidence in. I mean I am not castigating all regular officers.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. I am asking you because the charge has been more than once made and it has been contradicted. I think Gen. Traub testified that there was no discrimination against the National Guard officers. On the other hand, he said he had demoted or transferred as many Regular Army officers as he had National Guard officers.

Mr. SHERBURNE. I served with Gen. Traub and I think that statement is true. I found no discrimination on his part, nor on the part of a great many others. There was, however, a determined propaganda on the part of some, and these men were generally in the position of General Staff officers in the division. It is the small school that commenced at Leavenworth, which set itself up as knowing more than anybody on earth, and which continued its activities at Langres, that is largely responsible for the discrimination, I think. Without going into the names, I know many division commanders and brigade commanders who made no difference, and I never felt that there was the slightest discrimination or question in their minds as between the two classes of officers you have referred to, but on the other hand there were a great many the other way.

Senator FLETCHER. That spirit did not come out of West Point, you think?

Mr. SHERBURNE. To put the thing in its best guise, I think it is part of the same propaganda that you have gotten here, that is going to every newspaper in this country to-day, that is going to appear on the floor of the American Legion in Minneapolis. They sincerely believe that the only solution and salvation is the Regular Army, and they know, and they knew, that as long as the National Guard existed they were going to have this trouble and criticism. I think that the basis of it was a real desire to build up what they believed to be the only right and true system.

The CHAIRMAN. My own experience, especially during the last four or five months, General, is that a large number of Regular Army officers have completely revised their ideas about the citizen soldiery, and particularly about the National Guard. They realize that for many years they did not give the Guard that encouragement which it ought to have had. I have had many of them express that to me, and their expressions were very different from what they were some years ago; in fact, it is in the record that Gen. Pershing stated the other day that the Regular Army had not shown proper encouragement and sympathy to the National Guard.

Mr. SHERBURNE. I think that it true of Gen. Pershing. In my dealings with him, I found him in a very different attitude of mind. Now, you tell me when to stop.

The CHAIRMAN. We have been very glad to hear you and are very much interested in what you say.

Mr. SHERBURNE. But if you want discrimination, if you want to go into that question, I can bring you so much evidence of it that it will swamp you.

(Informal discussion followed, at the conclusion of which the committee adjourned, to meet again at the call of the chairman.)

REORGANIZATION OF THE ARMY.

SATURDAY, NOVEMBER 15, 1919.

UNITED STATES SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON MILITARY AFFAIRS,
Washington, D. C.

The committee met, pursuant to the call of the chairman, at 10:15 o'clock a. m., in the committee room, Capitol, Senator James W. Wadsworth, jr., presiding.

Present: Senators Wadsworth (chairman), Thomas, New, Sutherland, Frelinghuysen, Fletcher, and Chamberlain.

Present also: Senator Smith of South Carolina.

The CHAIRMAN. Will you state your name and rank to the reporter?

Gen. MACON. Maj. Gen. Francis A. Macon, National Guard, retired, North Carolina. My present position is Paymaster General.

The CHAIRMAN. For the State?

Gen. MACON. Yes.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. Did you serve overseas?

Gen. MACON. I did not; no.

The CHAIRMAN. Gen. Macon, whatever you want to discuss before the committee the committee will be glad to hear.

STATEMENT OF MAJ. GEN. FRANCIS A. MACON, NATIONAL GUARD, RETIRED, OF NORTH CAROLINA.

Gen. MACON. Mr. Chairman and gentlemen: Universal training is universal service with limitations, either of which may be compulsory. Compulsory military service or training should be governed by necessities only. The necessity of the Nation and the necessity of the service.

In peace times the principles of democracy should apply with the same degree of fitness that militarism is exacted in time of war, and war conditions in time of peace are as unsound in principle as unpreparedness would be unsafe in practice in time of war.

In time of peace a professional army so large that it can not be maintained by voluntary enlistment is too large for a democracy, and in my judgment this is the measure by which the size of the professional army should be arrived at, for in this way, and in this way alone, can the people give a determinate and free expression as to the size of the army they would have Congress create and maintain.

The size of the militia is fixed by the Constitution, and its employment, both in war and in peace, is limited to necessities only.

It is indeed the most adjustable institution of our Government and can be made to do what the people would have, and this by their representatives in Congress.

Neither to raise nor maintain the organization of the Militia through or by compulsory training or compulsory service is required, but to meet the reasonable requirements of military preparedness, I am convinced that the adequate training of the young manhood of America is essential to the perfect safety of the Nation. The trained militiamen should constitute the war reserve.

In my opinion the National Guard legislation should prescribe compulsory universal training, and therefore I do not approve of the action taken by the National Guard Association in eliminating this feature from their proposed National Guard bill.

To function as a national force the National Guard itself should participate at least in its overhead administration, and this, I think, is the just means for securing its proper relationship of accountability through responsibility. The freedom of latitude accorded by the latter should be the measure of exactness imposed by the former. The admittedly successful manner in which the National Guard discharged its every responsibility in the recent past would seem to justify for the future a greater confidence for its performance than has heretofore obtained.

For this reason I favor most heartily a National Guard council. Then, too, since it is not possible to convert either the militia or the National Guard into an exclusively Federal force without a very serious encroachment upon the sovereignty of our States, under what condition should the States, as such, be deprived of their control by federation of the same States whose individual governments are not inimical to the interest of all concerned? I fail to see the cause for conflict, but I do see the door opened by this council to opportunities for coordination and cooperation upon new lines which will result in a get-together military policy for the United States.

A substantial objection to organization of the National Guard under the militia clauses has been that as militia there is reserved to the States the authority for the appointment of officers and of training the militia according to the system of discipline prescribed by Congress.

These limitations present no obstacle to an efficient organization of the guard and are, in fact, advantageous, because it keeps the organization closer to the people and preserves to the governors of the States the prerogative and authority of appointment of officers which, if it were not exercised in connection with the National Guard, would be likely to apply to other forces of purely State origin, to the confusion of the whole military policy.

Furthermore, under the authority of the Federal Government to prescribe the system of discipline, which includes training, it is possible so to regulate the qualifications of officers, the standard of efficiency, and the method of control to make of the National Guard a unified coordinate force beyond any criticism which may heretofore have existed of disunity by reason of separate State organization.

Another objection to the organization of the National Guard under the militia clauses of the Constitution is that, as militia, the Federal Government is limited in its use, and may call it out on the

four objects which have been declared, and are generally accepted, as intraterritorial. That is to say, the National Guard, as militia, can not be used beyond the territorial limits of the United States.

It was to meet that limitation upon the use of the guard that there was inserted in the national defense act, approved June 3, 1916, the provision that in case of war the members of the National Guard would be subject to draft by the President, and that upon exercise of such draft the members thereof should stand discharged from the militia.

It is proposed to meet the objection by inserting in the proposed bill a similar provision; at the same time, it is believed that with the power to provide for the draft it is possible and constitutional to provide also that the release from militia limitations shall be effective only during the period of emergency, to provide by the act that, upon the termination of the emergency and the release from Federal service, the National Guard should return to its former status and complete the term of enlistment contract, and with such allowances as may be provided for the term of Federal service, as was done in the Mexican border campaign.

The right of States to use the National Guard in case of civil disorder is beyond question. While it is believed by some that the authority to use other troops for such purposes might be delegated in certain instances to State authority, we contend that this is open to constitutional interpretations.

Unless the National Guard is organized as proposed in this bill, there would be little if any inducement to the States to continue liberal appropriations which they have customarily provided in the recent years; and it would be necessary at this time and in this connection, with this proposed legislation, to provide for materially larger appropriations to meet the requirements of the National Guard, which should not militate against this proposition, for one of the strongest arguments against other proposals which have been submitted is that the method or system devised for the National Guard provides a more adequate system of defense, and at the same time is much more economical.

In destroying the National Guard, you wipe out the traditions of nearly a century of troops that have been organized, and you destroy all the sentiment that exists and the support that these troops have had from their communities. It would lay to waste millions of dollars of valuable property which has been donated by the States in support of their militia under their constitutional rights, and it would leave open at any time, unprotected by any constitutional provision, the power of Congress to withdraw from the States their every privilege by act of Congress.

Since arriving in Washington I am advised that those of us who are here by invitation to explain the National Guard bill are suspected of hostility and animosity toward the Regular Army. As a National Guardsman of 30 years' service, I challenge any man to point out one instance in my military career when I have shown but the friendliest feelings and highest respect for the Regular Establishment. Perhaps I have had as much direct dealing with the Army as any National Guardsman in the country, and the record of my association and dealing with the Regular service will support my assertion of friendship and respect. These records are in the

files of the War Department and cover intimate and continuous service from 1900 to 1914. It was through affiliation with the Regular service that I chose to send my boy to West Point, and I am proud of being the father of that noble son, who is to-day a capable officer of the Regular Army.

There are many instances where officers of the National Guard have sons who are officers of the Regular Army, a number of them West Point men. There is no difference in our attitude and feeling for the Army.

The CHAIRMAN. What is the situation in your State, General?

Gen. MACON. The sentiment in my State is decidedly in favor of the National Guard.

The CHAIRMAN. What does your Guard consist of now?

Gen. MACON. Practically nothing. We have been disorganized, and have not had the opportunity to reorganize.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. Is any effort being made to reorganize and revivify the National Guard?

Gen. MACON. Yes.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. With any degree of success?

Gen. MACON. Yes. The interest, however, is held in abeyance awaiting the action of Congress on this bill.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. From the statement made by you, I should judge you are not entirely in accord with this bill, S. 3424.

Gen. MACON. I believe in universal compulsory training. I believe it is not necessary, though helpful, in raising and maintaining the National Guard to the requisite strength, but it is necessary in the constitution of a national reserve. The bill does not go this far.

The CHAIRMAN. Would you link up universal military training and the National Guard so that in time of emergency the two would be merged, and even for training purposes, in time of peace, the two systems might be merged?

Gen. MACON. Yes; I would form an organized reserve composed of men who have been trained in the National Guard and the schools, and I would train in the National Guard the boys who were not otherwise provided for.

The CHAIRMAN. And then you would use the National Guard as an important piece of machinery for training, if you had your way?

Gen. MACON. It would be a school. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. And have it compulsory upon all young men of certain age?

Gen. MACON. Either in other schools or in the National Guard at home. The proposed bill provides for the training of pupils and students only. I favor the training of all young men.

The CHAIRMAN. What would be your idea as to the period of training under such a scheme and the character of the obligation?

Gen. MACON. I should begin to train the boy at 16 and, if a school attendant, give him as much training as it is possible for him to take without interference with his other school work. Now, in arriving at that, of course the school authorities would have to be consulted. If not a schoolboy, he should be trained in the National Guard.

The CHAIRMAN. But the Federal Government has not jurisdiction over the schools.

Gen. MACON. It has jurisdiction over the boys.

The CHAIRMAN. Not until they are 18.

Gen. MACON. I do not mean to disagree with you, but I understand the Constitution says that all able-bodied men, and I understand that the ages of 18 to 45 were fixed subsequently by legislation.

Senator FRELINGHUYSEN. Would that not conflict with the State laws on the compulsory education?

Gen. MACON. I think it would fit in with them, sir. It would in our State if under State control, as it must be.

Senator FRELINGHUYSEN. You could hardly expect the average parent to consent to military training and academic training at the same time unless you establish the military training in the public schools. It would be a good deal to put on a boy.

Senator SUTHERLAND. Your view is to have the training go on during the summer vacation; is that your idea?

Gen. MACON. Yes, sir. The field service and training would be in vacation time, and the everyday physical development would be in the school life.

Senator SUTHERLAND. That would be more along the line of universal physical training rather than universal military training, would it not?

Gen. MACON. Yes. Accurately speaking, and under this bill, it would be both.

Senator FLETCHER. You would not have the boys in uniform; you would not require the high schools to put them in uniform?

Gen. MACON. I think not. Uniforms would be desirable for the summer outdoor exercises, and if supplied, their use could be made optional during the school period for special occasions, such as parades, commencements, etc. Cadet uniforms for dress occasions.

Senator FRELINGHUYSEN. General, is it your idea that this compulsory military training shall be in the summer time?

Gen. MACON. The outdoor exercises in the summer, and in the school, of course, during the school hours.

Senator FRELINGHUYSEN. There is a great deal of merit in that if it can be applied.

Gen. MACON. I thank you, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. It seems to me it is largely a question of whether or not the Federal Government has sufficient hold over the individuals to compel the States to install the instructions in the schools. The Federal Government has not power, as I see it, to install instructions in the schools because it has no jurisdiction over the schools. It can not command the superintendent of the school to do anything unless the law of the States compels him to do that same thing.

Gen. MACON. The Federal Government can provide for these things, and the State can direct through conforming legislation agreeable to the school authorities.

Senator SUTHERLAND. A great many parents will object to taking boys of a tender age away from home instruction and putting them in camps.

Gen. MACON. We do not propose to do that. We propose to have this summer training—this vacation training—along the lines of the Boy Scouts, with appropriate development.

Senator SUTHERLAND. You mean, in their home communities?

Gen. MACON. Yes.

Senator SUTHERLAND. Where they will live in their homes?

Gen. MACON. Yes. We do not take them away from the influence of the home; that should not be done. When a boy is in the early adolescent state he should be most carefully handled. I can say that because I am the father of boys. For the high-school boys the bill provides that the camps of instruction shall be held for 15 days annually within the State, when and where the governor may direct.

The CHAIRMAN. There is a provision in this National Guard bill covering this proposed training in schools?

Gen. MACON. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. I notice on page 39, section 44, at the bottom of the page, and section 45, at the bottom of page 40.

Gen. MACON. I should like to call attention to the fact that an analysis of the bill will come later by those who are more thoroughly familiar with it than myself; but I should like to say that in section 29 just a few words were left out, through inadvertance, I know.

On line 22, page 26, section 29, it is stated:

"The chief of such a bureau shall be appointed by the President."

Right there should be inserted, "and confirmed by the Senate."

Senator FLETCHER. That might read, "by and with the advice of the Senate."

Gen. MACON. Yes. That was written in one of the redrafts but was evidently left out in the final summing up of the bill. These other gentlemen here are more familiar with the details of the bill than I am.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. I have not read this bill at all, but does it provide for universal training at all?

Gen. MACON. I believe it does; but it is not compulsory. It is voluntary except with the school boys.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. Entirely voluntary?

Gen. MACON. Yes. This is the only objection I have to the bill. It should be compulsory, in my opinion, for all.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. According to your views, would the training be had under Federal authority?

Gen. MACON. Both Federal and State authority.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. Cooperating together?

Gen. MACON. Yes. These full-time National Guard officers that this bill provides for, and such other officers as may be needed will conduct the work.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. But, with reference to the law which compels the training; ought that be under the Federal statute, operating practically under Federal authority?

Gen. MACON. I think it would be best, sir; but under State control.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. Making it, therefore, really a Federal force?

Gen. MACON. If you want to have it uniform, I believe it should be. It ought to be outlined from one head.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. One of the great difficulties with the National Guard has always been—I served as a member of it for a long time—to get cooperation and uniformity of action between the different States. The effort of the Federal Government has been to try to bring about unity of action between the different States, but with very little success.

Gen. MACON. I think you will find that this bill thoroughly covers the sentiment of the different States. They were pretty generally represented in the conferences.

Senator FLETCHER. Suppose the National Guard is not reorganized as rapidly and as thoroughly as you would like, how would you manage it? For instance, suppose the National Guard people did not take the interest that they used to take in it, but that they fell down?

Gen. MACON. They would not fall down. The National Guard has been thrown down and is now torn down, but has never fallen down, and, as I say, the interest is more intense now than ever before. It is in abeyance, however, awaiting a change of policy. In other words, the National Guardsmen feel, and I understand are going to try to show to you gentlemen, that they have been handicapped.

The CHAIRMAN. I notice in section 44 this language: "That all male citizens of the United States between the age of 16 and 18 years," etc., "shall receive physical and mental training," etc.

Incidentally, I think the following language is very well expressed, but as I understand it, the only power to put that system into effect is the indirect power of withholding appropriations for the support of the Guard.

Gen. MACON. Well, if you have reference to enforcement, that is true.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Gen. MACON. But you will never find that necessary under this bill.

Further answering the suggestion of the chairman that the only power to put the school-training system into effect "is the indirect power of withholding appropriations for the support of the National Guard," I point to the fact that this has been true of every Federal provision for organizing and administering its militia or National Guard. It is the one feature whose history has been uniformly satisfactory and effective. It must continue to be so, for the reasons:

1. No State under modern conditions can afford to be deprived of the use of the Guard for times of emergency.


2. Every State is ambitious to have its sons share in the honor and emoluments of military service and unwilling to appear laggard in patriotic response to the Nation's need.

3. Parents in general will wish their sons to have the physical and disciplinary benefits of military training, particularly under circumstances which will not materially interfere with their home employments or their business engagements. Any other system of universal training must take the youth of our country away from home for a considerable time, unnecessarily interrupts the family life, defer the preparation for an entering upon permanent employment by these young men and to a corresponding degree defer the age of marriage and rearing of families, with a probably tendency to lower the birth rate and finally effect the growth of population.

My views are entirely in harmony with those expressed by President Wilson in his address to Congress, December, 1914:

Let us remind ourselves, therefore, of the only thing we can or will do, we must depend in every time of national peril, in the future as in the past, not upon a standing army, nor yet upon a reserved army, but upon a citizenry trained and accustomed to arms.

(Whereupon, at 12.23 the committee adjourned subject to the call of the chairman.)



REORGANIZATION OF THE ARMY.

WEDNESDAY, DECEMBER 3, 1919.

UNITED STATES SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE
COMMITTEE ON MILITARY AFFAIRS,
Washington, D. C.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call of the chairman, at 2.15 o'clock p. m., in the committee room, Capitol, Senator James W. Wadsworth, jr., presiding.

Present: Senators Wadsworth (chairman), New, Sutherland, Fletcher, and Chamberlain.

STATEMENT OF MAJ. GEN. J. McI. CARTER, CHIEF OF MILITIA BUREAU.

The CHAIRMAN. General, will you kindly state your assignments?

Gen. CARTER. I have been chief of the Militia Bureau for two years, with the exception of about six and one-half months spent in command of the Eleventh Division, during which time I was absent from the bureau.

The CHAIRMAN. As you know, General, we have several legislative proposals before us looking toward the reorganization of the military branch. I think you have not testified on the so-called War Department bill?

Gen. CARTER. No.

The CHAIRMAN. That has been pretty thoroughly gone over, but more recently there has been introduced a bill by Senator Frelinhuysen, prepared by an appropriate committee of the National Guard Association, which has not been discussed at all so far, and the committee thought we would like to have you lead off in a discussion of it, in view of the fact that you are the head of the Militia Bureau, and in close contact with the National Guard problem, unless you have some observations you want to make on the other bills, which we would like to hear if you wish to make them. It might be well to insert the National Guard bill in the hearings at this point.

(The bill is as follows:)

A BILL To establish a national reserve force and to provide for the military and physical training, and for the reorganization of the National Guard, and for other purposes.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That the Vice President of the United States, the officers, judicial and executive, of the Government of the United States and of the several States and Territories; persons in the military or naval service of the United States; customhouse clerks, persons employed by the United States in the transmission of the mail; artificers and

workmen employed in the armories, arsenals, and navy yards of the United States, pilots, mariners actually employed in the sea service of any citizen or merchant within the United States, persons holding a full and honorable discharge from the armed forces of the United States or from the Organized Militia or National Guard of any State, Territory, or the District of Columbia, shall be exempt from military duty under this Act without regard to age.

SEC. 2. COMPOSITION OF THE NATIONAL GUARD.—The National Guard shall consist of the regularly enlisted militia between the ages of 18 and 45 years, organized, armed, and equipped as hereinafter provided, and of commissioned officers between the ages of 18 and 64 years.

SEC. 3. ORGANIZATION OF NATIONAL GUARD UNITS.—The organization of the National Guard, including the composition of all units thereof, shall be as authorized by the Secretary of War, on recommendation of the National Guard Council, and shall conform, so far as practicable, to the organization of the Regular Army: *Provided, however,* That the Secretary of War, on recommendation of the National Guard Council, shall be empowered to vary, modify, or change the organization of the units composing the National Guard for the purpose of increasing or contributing to the proper organization the training or efficiency thereof.

SEC. 4. NUMBER OF THE NATIONAL GUARD.—The number of enlisted men of the National Guard to be organized under this act within one year from its passage shall be for each State in the proportion of not less than 200 such men for each Member of Congress in the House of Representatives from each State, and a number to be determined by the President for the Territories and the District of Columbia, and shall be increased each year thereafter in the proportion of 50 per centum until a total strength of 800 enlisted men for each Member of Congress in the House of Representatives shall have been reached: *Provided,* That in the States which have but one Representative in Congress such increases shall be at the discretion of the National Guard Council, with the approval of the Secretary of War: *Provided further,* That this shall not be construed to prevent any State, Territory, or the District of Columbia from organizing the full number of troops required under this section in less time than is specified in this section, or from maintaining existing organizations if they shall conform to such rules and regulations regarding organization, strength, and armament as the National Guard Council, with the approval of the Secretary of War, may prescribe: *And provided further,* That nothing in this act shall be construed to prevent any State, Territory, or the District of Columbia from immediately, or in the future, organizing and maintaining, under the provisions of this act, a National Guard equal in strength to the National Guard from that State, Territory, or District of Columbia which was drafted into Federal service in the year 1917: *Provided further,* That nothing in this act shall be construed to prevent any State with but one Representative in Congress from organizing one or more regiments of troops, with such auxiliary troops as the National Guard Council, with the approval of the Secretary of War, may prescribe; such organizations and members of such organizations to receive all the benefits accruing under this act, under the conditions set forth herein: *And provided further,* That the word Territory as used in this act and in all laws relating to the land militia and National Guard shall include and apply to Hawaii, Alaska, Porto Rico, the Philippines, and the Canal Zone, and the militia of the Canal Zone may be organized under such rules and regulations, not in conflict with the provisions of this act, as the President may prescribe: *And provided further,* That after the initial strength of 200 enlisted men for each Member of Congress in the House of Representatives has been reached as herein required, the strength of the National Reserve as hereinafter provided for, which shall be duly enlisted and subject to service in any State, Territory, or the District of Columbia as hereinafter provided for in this act, shall be counted as a part of the strength of the National Guard of such State, Territory, or District of Columbia, and all subsequent increases thereafter required by the terms of this section of this act: *And provided further,* That in case any State shall fail to organize and maintain the number of troops required by this section of this act, the National Guard Council shall have power, with the approval of the Secretary of War, to allot the unorganized quota of such State to other States or Territories or the District of Columbia desiring to organize troops in excess of their quota.

SEC. 5. ASSIGNMENT OF NATIONAL GUARD TO CORPS, DIVISIONS, AND BRIGADES.—For the purpose of maintaining appropriate organization and to assist in

instruction and training, the Secretary of War shall, upon recommendation of the National Guard Council, assign the National Guard of the several States, Territories, and District of Columbia to corps, divisions, or other tactical units and may detail officers from the National Guard composing such tactical units to command the same, and the Secretary of War, upon recommendation of the National Guard Council, may prescribe the particular unit or units as to the branch or arm of service to be maintained in each State, Territory, or the District of Columbia in order to secure a force which, when combined, shall form complete higher tactical units: *Provided*, That complete units shall be organized as far as practicable in each State, Territory, or District of Columbia: *Provided further*, That where complete tactical units are organized in any State the commanding officer thereof shall be selected in the manner provided by the laws of such State, and no such commanding officer shall be displaced under the provisions of this section: *And provided further*, That in case of a Territory or the District of Columbia the commanding officer of the National Guard organized therein shall be appointed by the President: *And provided further*, That where the National Guard troops of one or more States are combined to form a tactical unit the commanding officer thereof shall be selected from some one of the National Guard units so combined by the Secretary of War upon recommendation of the National Guard Council, and such commanding officer shall be commissioned by the governor of the State wherein the unit from which he is selected is located, after proper examination as to his ability and fitness. Such examination to be under such regulations as may be provided by the Secretary of War.

SEC. 6. LOCATION OF UNITS.—The States and Territories and the District of Columbia shall have the right to determine and fix the location of the units and headquarters of the National Guard within their respective borders: *Provided*, That no organization of the National Guard, members of which shall be entitled to and shall have received compensation under the provisions of this act, shall be disbanded without the consent of the National Guard Council, with the approval of the Secretary of War, nor without such consent shall the commissioned or enlisted strength of any such organization be reduced below the minimum that shall be prescribed therefor by the National Guard Council, with the approval of the Secretary of War: *Provided further*, That nothing contained in this act shall be construed as limiting the rights of the States and Territories in the use of the National Guard within their respective borders in time of peace: *And provided further*, That nothing contained in this act shall prevent the organization and maintenance of State police or constabulary.

SEC. 7. VOLUNTARY ENLISTMENTS IN THE NATIONAL GUARD.—Hereafter the period of voluntary enlistment in the National Guard shall be for three years, subject to exceptions hereinafter provided, and the qualifications for enlistment shall be the same as those prescribed for admission to the Regular Army; reenlistments shall be for a period of one year: *Provided*, That all persons who have served in the armed forces of the United States or the Organized Militia of the several States subsequent to April 6, 1917, and have been honorably discharged from such service, may within six months after such discharge, or within six months after the passage of this act, enlist in the National Guard for the period of one year and may reenlist for like periods.

SEC. 8. FEDERAL ENLISTMENT CONTRACT.—Enlisted men in the Organized Militia of the several States, Territories, and the District of Columbia now serving under enlistment contracts which contain an obligation to defend the Constitution of the United States and to obey the orders of the President of the United States shall be recognized as members of the National Guard under the provisions of this act for the unexpired portion of their present enlistment contracts. When any such enlistment contract does not contain such obligation the enlisted man shall not be recognized as a member of the National Guard until he shall have signed an enlistment contract and taken and subscribed to the following oath of enlistment, up on signing which credit shall be given for the period already served under the old enlistment contract: "I do hereby acknowledge to have voluntarily enlisted this — day of — 191—, as a soldier in the National Guard of the United States and of the State of —, for the period of — years, under the conditions prescribed by law, unless sooner discharged by proper authority. And I do solemnly swear that I will bear true faith and allegiance to the United States of America and to the State of —, and that I will serve them honestly and faithfully against all their enemies whomsoever, and that I will obey the

orders of the President of the United States and of the governor of the State of —, and of the officers appointed over me according to law and the rules and Articles of War. So help me God."

SEC. 9. ENLISTMENT IN THE NATIONAL GUARD.—Hereafter all men enlisting for service in the National Guard or National Reserve shall sign an enlistment contract and take and subscribe to the oath prescribed in the preceding section of this act.

SEC. 10. DISCHARGE OF ENLISTED MEN FROM THE NATIONAL GUARD.—An enlisted man discharged from service in the National Guard shall receive a discharge in writing in such form and with such classification as is or may be prescribed for the Regular Army. In time of peace or when not in the actual active service of the United States enlisted men may be discharged prior to the expiration of the period of their enlistment pursuant to such regulations and for such causes as the National Guard Council, with the approval of the Secretary of War, may promulgate or prescribe: *Provided*, That an enlisted man in the National Guard may be transferred to the National Reserve as herein provided for instead of receiving a discharge for any reason other than the expiration of the period of his enlistment contract or physical or moral disability or disqualification.

SEC. 11. FEDERAL OATH FOR NATIONAL GUARD OFFICERS.—Commissioned officers of the National Guard or the Organized Militia of the several States, Territories, and District of Columbia now serving under commissions regularly issued, shall continue in office with their present date of rank as officers of the National Guard without the issuance of new commissions: *Provided*, That said officers have taken, or shall take and subscribe to the following oath of office: "I, —, do solemnly swear that I will support and defend the Constitution of the United States and the Constitution of the State of — against all enemies, foreign and domestic; that I will bear true faith and allegiance to the same; that I will obey the orders of the President of the United States and of the governor of the State of —; that I make this obligation freely, without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion, and that I will well and faithfully discharge the duties of the office of —, in the National Guard of the United States and of the State of —, upon which I am about to enter. So help me God."

SEC. 12. QUALIFICATIONS FOR NATIONAL GUARD OFFICERS.—Persons hereafter commissioned as officers of the National Guard shall not be recognized as such under any of the provisions of this act unless they have been selected from the following classes and shall have taken and subscribed to the oath of office prescribed in the preceding section of this act: Officers or enlisted men of the National Guard; officers on the reserve or unassigned list of the National Guard; active, retired, and former officers of the United States Army, Navy, Marine Corps, National Guard, National Army, and Reserve Corps; former enlisted men who have served in the armed forces of the United States subsequent to April 6, 1917, and prior to November 11, 1918, and have received an honorable discharge therefrom; officers who have served in the organized militia of the several States during the war with Germany; graduates of the United States Military or Naval Academies and graduates of schools, colleges, and universities where military science is taught under the supervision of an officer of the National Guard or Regular Army, and, for the technical branches and staff corps or departments, such other civilians as may be especially qualified for duty therein: *Provided*, That no person hereafter appointed an officer of the National Guard shall be commissioned unless he shall have successfully passed such tests as to his physical, moral, and professional fitness as the National Guard Council shall prescribe. The examination to determine such qualifications for commissions shall be conducted by a board of three commissioned officers appointed in accordance with the laws of the State in which the officer is to be commissioned from the officers of the National Guard of said State: *Provided further*, That any officer or former officer of the National Guard, National Army, or Reserve Corps who served in the Army of the United States subsequent to April 6, 1917, and who received an honorable discharge therefrom, shall, upon his request, be recommissioned without examination, except physical examination, and be given his rank under said commission, to date from the date of his original commission in that grade, providing such commission shall be awarded or issued within six months from the date of his discharge from the Army of the United States or six months after the passage of this act.

SEC. 13. ELIMINATION AND DISPOSITION OF OFFICERS.—The moral character, capacity, and general fitness for the service of any National Guard officer

may at any time be determined by an efficiency board of three commissioned officers of the National Guard, appointed in time of peace by the governor of the State in which the National Guard officer in question has been commissioned, or in time of war by the Secretary of War. The board shall consist of officers senior in rank to the officer whose fitness for service shall be under investigation; and if the findings of such board be unfavorable to such officer and be approved by the official authorized to appoint such an officer, he shall be discharged. Where the rank of such officer is such that a board can not be appointed pursuant to the provisions of this section from the officers of the State in which he is commissioned, such board may be composed in whole or in part of National Guard officers from other States, who shall be appointed by the Chief of the National Guard Bureau upon request of the governor of such State. Commissions of officers of the National Guard may be vacated upon resignation, absence without leave for three months, upon the recommendation of an efficiency board, or pursuant to sentence of a court-martial. Officers of the National Guard rendered surplus by the abandonment or reorganization of their organizations shall be placed in the National Reserve. Officers may, upon their own application, be placed in said reserve.

SEC. 14. FILLING OF VACANCIES, APPOINTMENT OF COMMISSIONED OFFICERS.—Brigade commanders and officers of the staff of each tactical division shall be appointed on the nomination of the general commanding the division. Officers to serve on the staff of the brigade commander and colonels of regiments shall be appointed on nomination of the brigade commander, approved by the division commander, commissioned officers of regiments, below the grade of colonel, shall be appointed on the nomination of the regimental commander approved by the brigade commander and the division commander. All officers whose nominations are not otherwise above provided for shall be nominated by the division commander. In times of peace all appointments of commissioned officers shall be made by the governor of their respective States and Territories upon nomination as above set forth where complete divisions, brigades, or regimental units have been previously organized: *Provided*, That if the constitution or laws of any State now provide another method of nomination or appointment such State constitution and laws shall be followed: *Provided further*, That all officers, howsoever appointed, shall not receive a commission in the National Guard except after an examination to determine their eligibility and fitness as herein provided for.

SEC. 15. SYSTEM OF COURTS-MARTIAL FOR NATIONAL GUARD.—Except in organizations in the service of the United States, courts-martial in the National Guard shall be of three kinds, namely, general courts-martial, special courts-martial, and summary courts-martial. They shall be constituted like and have cognizance of the same subjects and possess like powers, except as to punishments, as similar courts provided for by the laws and regulations governing the Army of the United States, and the proceedings of the courts-martial of the National Guard shall follow the forms and modes of procedure prescribed for said similar courts.

SEC. 16. GENERAL COURTS-MARTIAL FOR THE NATIONAL GUARD.—General courts-martial of the National Guard not in the service of the United States may be convened by orders of the President, or of the governors of the respective States and Territories, or by the commanding general of the National Guard of the District of Columbia, and such courts shall have the power to impose fines not exceeding \$200; to sentence to forfeiture of pay and allowances; to a reprimand; to dismissal or dishonorable discharge from the service; to reduction of noncommissioned officers to the ranks; or any two or more of such punishments may be combined in the sentences imposed by such courts.

SEC. 17. SPECIAL COURTS-MARTIAL FOR THE NATIONAL GUARD.—In the National Guard not in the service of the United States the commanding officer of each garrison, fort, post, camp, or other place, brigade, regiment, detached battalion or other detached command may appoint special courts-martial for his command, but such special courts-martial may in any case be appointed by superior authority when by the latter deemed desirable. Special courts-martial shall have power to try any person subject to military law, except a commissioned officer, for any crime or offense made punishable by the military laws of the United States; and such special courts-martial shall have the same powers of punishment as do general courts-martial, except that fines imposed by such courts shall not exceed \$100.

SEC. 18. SUMMARY COURT FOR THE NATIONAL GUARD.—In the National Guard not in the service of the United States the commanding officer of each garrison,

fort, post, or other place, regiment or corps, detached battalion, company, or other detachment of the National Guard may appoint for such place or command a summary court to consist of one officer, who shall have power to administer oaths and to try the enlisted men of such place or command for breaches of discipline and violations of laws governing such organizations; and said court, when satisfied of the guilt of such soldier, may impose fines not exceeding \$25 for any single offense, may sentence noncommissioned officers to reduction to the ranks, may sentence to forfeiture of pay and allowances. The proceedings of such court shall be informal and the minutes thereof shall be the same as prescribed for summary courts of the Army of the United States.

SEC. 19. IMPRISONMENT IN LIEU OF FINES.—All courts-martial of the National Guard, not in the service of the United States, including summary courts, shall have power to sentence to confinement in lieu of fines authorized to be imposed: *Provided*, That such sentences of confinement shall not exceed one day for each dollar of fine authorized.

SEC. 20. EXECUTION OF SENTENCES TO BE APPROVED BY GOVERNORS OF STATES.—No sentence of dismissal from the service or dishonorable discharge, imposed by a National Guard court-martial not in the service of the United States shall be executed until approved by the governor of the State or Territory concerned, or by the commanding general of the National Guard of the District of Columbia.

SEC. 21. RETURN AND REPORTS OF ADJUTANTS GENERAL.—The adjutants general of the States, Territories, and the District of Columbia and other officers of the National Guard shall make such returns and reports to the Secretary of War, or to such officers as he may designate, at such times and in such form as the Secretary of War may from time to time prescribe: *Provided*, That the adjutants general of the Territories and of the District of Columbia shall be appointed by the President with such rank and qualifications as he may prescribe, and the adjutant general for a Territory shall be a citizen of the Territory for which he is appointed.

SEC. 22. PROPERTY AND DISBURSING OFFICER.—The governor of each State and Territory and the commanding general of the National Guard of the District of Columbia shall appoint, designate, or detail, subject to the approval of the Secretary of War, an officer of the National Guard of the State, Territory, or District of Columbia who shall be regarded as property and disbursing officer of the United States for such State or Territory. He shall receipt and account for all funds and property belonging to the United States issued to the National Guard of his State, Territory, or District, and shall make such returns and reports concerning the same as may be required by the Secretary of War. The Secretary of War is authorized on the requisition of the governor of the State or Territory or the commanding general of the District of Columbia to pay to the property and disbursing officer thereof so much of its allotment out of the annual appropriation for the support of the National Guard or any other funds appropriated for any of the purposes of this act, as shall be necessary for the purposes enumerated herein. He shall render, through the War Department, such accounts of Federal funds intrusted to him for disbursement as may be required by the Treasury Department. Before entering upon the performance of his duty as property and disbursing officer he shall give a good and sufficient bond to the United States, the amount thereof to be determined by the Secretary of War, for the faithful performance of his duties and for the safekeeping and proper disposition of the Federal funds and property intrusted to his care. He shall receive the same pay and allowances as an officer of the Regular Army of like grade and prior service, and such compensation shall be charged against the allotment of the State, Territory, or the District of Columbia. Such property and disbursing officer, when traveling in the performance of his official duties, shall be reimbursed for his actual necessary traveling expenses and such expense shall be charged against the allotment of the State, Territory, or District of Columbia. The Secretary of War shall designate at least once a year an inspector who shall examine the accounts and records of the property and disbursing officer.

SEC. 23. ISSUE OF FEDERAL PROPERTY TO THE NATIONAL GUARD.—The Secretary of War is hereby directed to issue from time to time to the National Guard upon the request of the governors of the several States, Territories, and the commanding general of the National Guard of the District of Columbia such number and type of arms with all accessories, Infantry equipment, Field Artillery material and equipment, Coast Artillery material and equipment, Signal Corps material and equipment, Aviation Service material and equipment, tank and motor truck material and equipment, sanitary troop material and equipment,

accouterments, uniforms, clothing, equipment, equipage, camp equipage, transportation, motor trucks and cars, horses, mules, forage, military publications, and all other kinds and classes of arms, uniforms, equipment, military stores and supplies now or hereafter issued to the Regular Army of the United States as shall be necessary to arm, uniform, and equip the National Guard of the several States, Territories, and the District of Columbia for field service; and to provide in the several States and Territories for the use of the National Guard thereof target ranges, camp and maneuver grounds, and to properly equip the same, and a sum of money shall be appropriated annually to be paid out of any money in the Treasury not otherwise appropriated for the purpose of securing by purchase or manufacture and delivery all such stores and supplies, and for the acquisition, construction, and equipment of such target ranges, camp and maneuver grounds. Such appropriation shall be in addition to and to supplement the appropriation made in that section of the Army appropriation act approved July 11, 1919, reading as follows: "The Secretary of War is hereby authorized to issue from stores now on hand and purchased for the United States Army such articles of clothing and equipment material as may be needed by the National Guard organized by the act entitled 'An act for making further and more effectual provision for the national defense, and for other purposes,' approved June 3, 1916. This issue shall be made without charge against militia appropriations and shall be reimbursed in kind for all Federal property brought into service by State troops." The annual appropriation made under this section and all provision for arming and equipping the National Guard and for target ranges, camp and maneuver grounds made under this section shall be in addition to the annual appropriation made for the support of the National Guard provided for under section 25 of this act, and any other appropriation authorized or provided under any other section of this act.

SEC. 24. ISSUE OF NEW TYPE OF EQUIPMENT.—Whenever a new type of arms, fieldpiece, transportation, or equipment shall have been issued to the National Guard of the several States, Territories, and the District of Columbia the same, including all accessories, shall be furnished without charging the cost or value thereof or any expense connected therewith against any annual appropriation provided for the support of the National Guard or the equipment of the same. Each State, Territory, and the District of Columbia shall, on the receipt of new property issued to replace obsolete or condemned prior issues, turn in to the War Department or otherwise dispose of as directed by the Secretary of War all property so replaced or condemned and shall not receive money credit therefor. Whenever any such property issued to the National Guard of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia shall have been lost, damaged, or destroyed, or become unserviceable or unsuitable by use in service or from any other cause, it shall be examined by a disinterested surveying officer of the Army or the National Guard detailed by the Secretary of War, and the report of such officer shall be forwarded to the Secretary of War or to such officer as he shall designate to receive such report; and if it shall appear to the Secretary of War from the record of survey that the property was lost, damaged, or destroyed through unavoidable causes he shall be authorized to relieve the State or Territory or the District of Columbia from further accountability therefor. If it shall appear that the loss, damage, or destruction of property was due to carelessness or neglect, or that the loss, damage, or destruction could have been avoided by the exercise of reasonable care, the money value of such property shall be charged to the accountable State or Territory or District of Columbia, to be paid for by such State, Territory, or District from funds other than Federal. If the articles so surveyed are found to be unserviceable or unsuitable, the Secretary of War shall direct what disposition, by sale or otherwise, shall be made of them: *Provided*, That if any State, Territory, or the District of Columbia shall neglect or refuse to pay or cause to be paid the money equivalent of any loss, damage, or destruction of property charged against it the Secretary of War is hereby authorized to debar such State, Territory, or the District of Columbia from further participation in any or all appropriations for the National Guard until such payment shall have been made.

SEC. 25. APPROPRIATIONS FOR TARGET PRACTICE, ETC.—That a sum of money shall be appropriated annually to be paid out of any money in the Treasury not otherwise appropriated for the support of the National Guard, including the

expense of encampments, maneuvers, indoor and outdoor target practice, and other field instruction; for the hire of animals for the use of National Guard units, together with forage for the same; for the hire of competent help to care for material and equipment purchased or issued under the provisions of this act; for the hire of hostlers to care for public animals issued under the provisions of this act, and for forage and veterinary service and supplies for the same; for the maintenance, equipment, and rental of target ranges, camp and maneuver grounds, including the hire of caretakers and other expense of maintenance of the same; for indoor shooting ranges; for the pay and expenses of the State property and disbursing officer, and for such other purposes necessary for the support, training, and maintenance of the National Guard of the several States as the Secretary of War, upon the recommendation of the National Guard Council, shall deem necessary. The appropriation provided for in this section shall be apportioned among the several States, Territories, and the District of Columbia in direct ratio to the number of enlisted men in the active service in the National Guard of such State, Territory, or District of Columbia on the 30th day of June each year: *Provided*, That as a condition precedent to the issue of any property whatsoever pursuant to any provision of this act, the State, Territory, or District of Columbia to whom it is proposed to make such issue shall first make adequate provision, to the satisfaction of the Secretary of War, for the care and protection of such property so issued.

SEC. 26. STATES TO PURCHASE FEDERAL PROPERTY FOR CASH.—That any State, Territory, or the District of Columbia may, with the approval of the Secretary of War, purchase for cash from the War Department for the use of the National Guard, including the officers thereof, any stores, supplies, material of war, and military publications furnished to the Army, in addition to those issued under the provisions of this act, at the price at which they shall be listed to the Army, with cost of transportation added. The funds received from such sale shall be credited to the appropriation to which they shall belong, shall not be covered into the Treasury, and shall be available until expended to replace therewith, the supplies sold to the States in the manner herein authorized: *Provided*, That stores, supplies, and material of war so purchased by a State, Territory, or the District of Columbia may, in time of actual or threatened war, be requisitioned by the United States and delivered, credit for the ultimate return of such property in kind shall be allowed to such State, Territory, or the District of Columbia.

SEC. 27. NATIONAL GUARD COUNCIL.—There shall be a National Guard Council composed of the chief of the National Guard Bureau, hereinafter provided for, who shall be the president of the council, and one National Guard officer from each of the several States, Territories, and District of Columbia, who shall be appointed by the governor of such State, or by the President for a Territory or the District of Columbia. In the first instance, one-fourth of the members of the council shall serve for one year, one-fourth for two years, one-fourth for three years, and the balance for four years. The officers first appointed to the council shall decide by drawing lots, which of said officers shall serve for the terms stated in this section. Any member of said council, having served as much as four years on said council, shall not be eligible for reappointment until the expiration of two years, except that officers serving under an appointment for a short term as provided for in this section may be reappointed for a full term at the expiration of the original appointment: *Provided*, That this provision shall not apply to the chief of the National Guard Bureau.

SEC. 28. DUTIES OF THE NATIONAL GUARD COUNCIL.—The National Guard Council shall be advisory in its functions and perform such other duties as may be devolved upon it by this or any other act. The council shall hold stated sessions in Washington, District of Columbia, in June and December of each year, and shall hold such extra sessions as may be called by the chief of the National Guard Bureau, with the approval of the Secretary of War. Members of the National Guard council shall be entitled to pay, mileage, and allowances of their respective grades for not to exceed 60 days in any one year while in attendance at such sessions. The National Guard Council shall make all necessary rules and regulations to carry out the provisions of this act and for the thorough organization, discipline, and government of the National Guard, and shall cause to be prepared and submitted to the Secretary of War estimates of the amounts necessary to be apportioned annually to carry out the provisions of this act.

SEC. 29. NATIONAL GUARD BUREAU.—The Militia Bureau of the War Department created by section 81 of the act entitled "An act for making further and

more effectual provision for the national defense and other purposes," approved June 3, 1916, shall, from the date of the approval of this act, be abolished. There is hereby created a National Guard Bureau, which bureau shall be under the direct supervision of the Secretary of War and shall not form a part of any other bureau, office, or other organization. The chief of said bureau shall be appointed by the President, upon the recommendation of the National Guard council, from the officers in the National Guard having a rank not lower than that of colonel, for a period of four years, and during the time such officer shall act as chief of the National Guard Bureau he shall have the temporary rank of a major general with the pay and allowance of that of a major general of the Regular Army having the same length of service; and in computing the pay and allowance of such officer he shall have credit for previous service in the National Guard, National Army, Regular Army, or Reserve Corps. The chief of the National Guard Bureau shall be relieved, for cause, by the President upon the recommendation of two-thirds of the entire membership of the National Guard Council. The President, upon the recommendation of the National Guard Council, approved by the Secretary of War, shall detail to the National Guard Bureau such officers of appropriate rank not above the grade of colonel, and such enlisted men as may be required to properly administer the affairs of said bureau. Such officers and enlisted men shall be selected from the National Guard, the National Reserve, or the Officers' Reserve Corps upon the recommendation of the National Guard council, and shall receive the pay and allowance of officers of the Regular Army having the same rank and length of service. Enlisted men detailed to duty with the said bureau shall receive such compensation as the council, with the approval of the Secretary of War, may fix. Such bureau shall be provided with such clerks and stenographers as the National Guard Council, with the approval of the Secretary of War, may deem necessary, and shall be entitled to have its official communications, orders, circulars, and publications transmitted at public expense without the payment of postage thereon. For the purpose of coordinating the instruction of the National Guard and the Regular Army, the Secretary of War shall, on the request of the chief of the National Guard Bureau, detail an officer not above the grade of colonel from the Infantry, Artillery, Cavalry, or other arm or department of the Regular Army, for duty in such bureau. Officers so detailed shall be relieved from such duty on like request.

SEC. 30. DUTIES OF THE CHIEF OF THE NATIONAL GUARD BUREAU.—The Chief of the National Guard Bureau, under the direction of the Secretary of War, shall have supervision of all National Guard troops throughout the United States, and of the different departments, corps, and organizations in connection therewith or attached thereto, and he shall perform such other military duties, including the administration of the affairs of said bureau, not inconsistent with his duties as Chief of the National Guard Bureau, as may be assigned to him by the Secretary of War. He shall provide for and establish within the said bureau all necessary departments, corps (including a chaplain's corps), and subdivisions as may be necessary to properly carry out his duties under this or any other act. All legal questions affecting the National Guard or the application or effect of any provision of this act shall be referred to the Attorney General of the United States.

SEC. 31. TRAINING OF THE NATIONAL GUARD.—The National Guard divisions, brigades, regiments, and other units shall assemble for drill and instruction, including indoor target practice, at such times as may be prescribed by regulations by the National Guard Council, subject to the approval of the Secretary of War. In addition thereto such units shall participate in encampments, maneuvers, and other outdoor exercises, including outdoor target practice, at least 15 days in each year unless excused from participation in such training by the Secretary of War upon recommendation of the Chief of the National Guard Bureau. Upon the request of the governor of the State or Territory, approved by the Secretary of War, funds allotted such State or Territory under the provisions of this act shall be placed to the credit of the State property and disbursing officer for the purpose of meeting the expense of camps of instruction, maneuvers, target practice, and other field service, and the officers and men participating therein shall be entitled to the same pay and allowance, transportation, subsistence, and supplies from the date of leaving their home station until return thereto as troops, officers, and men of the Regular Army may now or hereafter be entitled to. Tactical units consisting of troops of more than one State may hold brigade, division, or corps camps

and maneuvers at such place as may be designated by the Secretary of War on the recommendation of the National Guard Council.

SEC. 32. DETAIL OF INSTRUCTORS FROM THE REGULAR ARMY.—For the purpose of increasing the efficiency of the military forces of the United States and of coordinating the several elements, departments, corps, and branches of the service, the Secretary of War may, upon the request of the governor of any State or Territory, detail officers and enlisted men of the Regular Army for duty with the National Guard of the same, and may detail officers and enlisted men of the National Guard and the National Reserve for duty with units of the Regular Army at encampments, maneuvers, or other field service, and such officers and men shall be relieved from such duty upon like request.

SEC. 33. DETAIL OF NATIONAL GUARD OFFICERS AND ENLISTED MEN TO SERVICE SCHOOLS, AND SO FORTH.—Under such regulations as the President may prescribe the Secretary of War may, upon the recommendation of the Chief of the National Guard Bureau, authorize selected officers and enlisted men of the National Guard or National Reserve to attend and pursue a regular course of study at any military service school of the United States, except the United States Military Academy, details to which shall only be made from the National Guard pursuant to the laws, acts, and regulations now or hereafter prescribed for appointment thereto. Officers and enlisted men of the National Guard may in like manner be attached to an organization of the same arm, corps, or department to which such officer or enlisted man shall belong for practical instruction at or near an Army post during a period of field training or other outdoor exercise, and such officer or enlisted man shall receive, out of any appropriation made for the National Guard and available for such purposes, the same travel allowances and quarters or commutation of quarters and the same pay and allowances and subsistence to which an officer or enlisted man of the Regular Army would be entitled for attending such school, college, or other course of instruction.

SEC. 34. INSPECTION OF THE NATIONAL GUARD.—The Secretary of War shall cause an inspection to be made at least once each year by inspectors detailed by him to determine whether the National Guard is properly armed, uniformed, equipped, organized, trained, and disciplined in accordance with the provisions of this act, whether or not the property issued the several organizations is properly cared for and preserved, and to enable him to determine the condition and efficiency of the National Guard of the several States, Territories, and the District of Columbia.

SEC. 35. PAY FOR NATIONAL GUARD OFFICERS.—Commissioned officers of the National Guard of each State, Territory, and the District of Columbia participating in the apportionment of the annual appropriation for the support of the National Guard shall receive compensation for their services, except during periods of service for which they may become lawfully entitled to the same pay as officers of corresponding grades of the Regular Army, as follows: Officers of the grade of second lieutenant, \$200 per year; of the grade of first lieutenant, \$240 per year; above the grade of first lieutenant, \$500 per year: *Provided*, That all staff officers, aides-de-camp, and chaplains shall receive not to exceed one-half of the pay of a captain, except that regimental adjutants and majors and captains in command of machine-gun companies, ambulance companies, field hospital companies, or sanitary troops shall receive the pay hereinbefore authorized for a captain.

SEC. 36. PAY FOR NATIONAL GUARD ENLISTED MEN.—Each enlisted man of the National Guard of a State, Territory, or the District of Columbia participating in the apportionment of the annual appropriation for the support of the National Guard, shall receive compensation for his services, except during periods of service for which he may become lawfully entitled to the same pay as an enlisted man of corresponding grade in the Regular Army, at a rate, for each regular drill not exceeding five in any calendar month, at which he shall have been present, 7 per cent of the initial monthly pay now or hereafter provided by law for enlisted men of corresponding grades of the Regular Army: *Provided*, That the rate of compensation for any enlisted man shall not be less than \$1 for each such regular drill within such limitations: *Provided further*, That periods of any actual military duty equivalent to the drills prescribed in this and the last preceding section (except those periods of service for which members of the National Guard may become lawfully entitled to the same pay as officers and enlisted men of the corresponding grades in the Regular Army) may be accepted as service in lieu of such drills when so provided by the Secretary of War: *And provided further*, That if any enlisted man shall fail to attend at

least 60 per cent of the ordered drills or perform a like proportion of equivalent duty in any calendar month or for the part of such month that he is in the service, he will not be entitled to any compensation for any of the drills attended or duty performed during that month.

SEC. 37. PAY ROLLS AND PAYMENT OF OFFICERS AND ENLISTED MEN OF THE NATIONAL GUARD.—All amounts appropriated for the purposes of the two preceding sections shall be disbursed and accounted for by the officers and agents of the Quartermaster Corps of the Army, or by the State property and disbursing officer, as the Secretary of War may direct, and such payments shall be made immediately following the close of the month in which compensation was earned, and not later than 15 days after the end of the same, upon pay rolls prepared and authenticated in the manner prescribed by the Secretary of War. The Secretary of War may, in his discretion, deposit such sum as may be necessary to pay the troops of the State, Territory, or District under this section with the State property and disbursing officer, who shall disburse and account for the same under regulations to be prescribed by the Secretary of War. Stoppages may be made against the compensation payable to any officer or enlisted man hereunder to cover the cost of public property lost, damaged, or destroyed by and chargeable to such officer or enlisted man.

SEC. 38. COMPOSITION OF THE NATIONAL GUARD IN FEDERAL SERVICE.—When it shall be necessary to increase the strength of any National Guard unit called into the service of the United States as such, or drafted into Federal service as provided in this act, recruits for the same shall be enlisted or assigned thereto from the State or Territory from which such troops are called or drafted and from the locality in such State or Territory from which such troops came. The right to recruit such National Guard units so called or drafted by voluntary enlistments therein shall not be denied, nor shall the right of any citizen of a State or Territory drafted into Federal service to be assigned to a National Guard unit of his State or Territory be denied, provided the National Guard of such State is below the required maximum war strength at the time.

SEC. 39. GOVERNMENT AND DISCIPLINE OF THE NATIONAL GUARD IN FEDERAL SERVICE.—The National Guard when called as such into the service of the United States shall, from the time they are required by the terms of the call to respond thereto, be subject to the laws and regulations governing the Regular Army, so far as such laws and regulations are applicable to officers and enlisted men whose permanent retention in the military service, either on the active list or on the retired list, is not contemplated by existing law.

SEC. 40. SERVICE OF THE NATIONAL GUARD OUTSIDE THE TERRITORIAL LIMITS OF THE UNITED STATES.—When Congress shall have authorized the use of the armed land forces of the United States for any purpose requiring the use of troops within or without the territory of the United States in excess of those of the Regular Army, the President may draft into the military service of the United States to serve therein for the period of the emergency, unless sooner discharged, any and all units of the National Guard and the National Guard Reserve, including the officers and enlisted men of the same. All National Guard organizations or troops so drafted shall from the date of their draft be subject to such laws and regulations for the government of the Army of the United States as may be applicable and shall during the period of such service have the status of Federal soldier and be subject only to the orders of the President. The officers of such drafted National Guard shall be commissioned by the President with the same rank they held at the time of draft into Federal service. Vacancies existing at the time of such draft among commissioned officers of the National Guard, or occurring thereafter, shall be filled by the President from the members of the same, and where complete units are taken from a State or Territory such vacancies shall be filled by appointments from the members of the same: *Provided, however,* That nothing contained herein shall have the effect of finally discharging any commissioned officer or enlisted man from the service of the State in which he was appointed or enlisted, and upon his release from Federal service such officer or enlisted man shall resume his status as a soldier of the State from which he was drafted: *Provided further,* That National Guard organizations so drafted into the service of the United States shall retain their tactical unity and organization, subject to such necessary exceptions as may be recommended by the National Guard Council.

SEC. 41. THE NATIONAL RESERVE AND THE OFFICERS THEREOF.—There shall be in each State a National Reserve, to consist of such officers and enlisted men as

may be assigned to, enlisted, or commissioned therein. Any person physically qualified who served as a commissioned officer or was recommended for a commission in the armed forces of the United States subsequent to April 6, 1917, and who was honorably discharged therefrom, shall be eligible to appointment as a commissioned officer in the National Reserve with a rank not greater than that he held in such Federal force or for which he was recommended. Officers in the National Reserve may be placed on active duty at any time by either State or Federal authority, and while so serving shall have the same status and receive the same pay, transportation, and allowances as officers of like grade on the active list. The oath to be taken and subscribed to by officers appointed in the National Reserve shall be as follows: I, ———, do solemnly swear that I will support and defend the Constitution of the United States and the constitution of the State of ——— against all enemies, foreign and domestic; that I will bear true faith and allegiance to the same; that I will obey the orders of the President of the United States and of the governor of the State of ———; that I make this obligation freely, without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion, and that I will well and faithfully discharge my duties as an officer in the National Reserve of the United States and of the State of ———, according to law. So help me God.

SEC. 42. ENLISTED MEN OF THE NATIONAL RESERVE.—Any physically qualified person under the age of forty-five years who served in the armed forces of the United States subsequent to April 6, 1917, and who was honorably discharged therefrom or who has served for three years in the National Guard shall be eligible for enlistment in the National Reserve. Enlistments shall be for a period of three years, either in the reserve generally or as a reservist in any unit in the National Guard of the State. Except as otherwise provided in this act, enlisted men in the reserve shall not be required to perform any military duty while the National Guard is not in actual active Federal service, other than to report for muster at the annual inspection of the unit to which assigned as a reservist: *Provided*, however, That such reservist may voluntarily, under such regulations as may be prescribed by the National Guard Council, participate in any drill, service, encampment, or other military exercise, including target practice, of the unit to which attached as a reservist, and shall while so participating be entitled to the same pay, allowances, transportation, and subsistence, and subject to the same discipline as active members of the National Guard. When the National Guard is called into the active service of the United States or drafted into Federal service under the provisions of this act, the President may call or draft such reservists with and as part of the unit or units so called or drafted.

SEC. 43. ENLISTMENT CONTRACT IN THE NATIONAL RESERVE.—Persons enlisting in the National Reserve shall be required to take the following oath: I do hereby acknowledge to have voluntarily enlisted this ——— day of ———, 19—, in the National Reserve of the United States and the State of ——— for the period of three years under the conditions prescribed by law, unless sooner discharged by proper authority, and I do solemnly swear that as a member of such National Reserve I will bear true faith and allegiance to the United States of America and to the State of ——— and that I will serve them honestly and faithfully against all their enemies whomsoever, and that I will obey the orders of the President of the United States and of the governor of the State of ——— and of the officers appointed over me according to law and the rules and articles of war as applied to said reserve. So help me God.

SEC. 44. PHYSICAL TRAINING IN SCHOOLS.—All male citizens of the United States between the ages of 16 and 18 years attending any common, grade, private, parochial, or other school shall receive physical and mental training to develop physical posture and bearing, mental and physical alertness, self-control, discipline, initiative, sense of duty, and spirit of cooperation under leadership. Such preliminary training shall be given as part of the school curriculum of the common and grade schools in the several States and Territories, and District of Columbia, and of private and parochial schools, colleges, and similar institutions throughout the United States. The program for such training shall be prescribed by the National Guard Council, approved by the Secretary of War. The Secretary of War is authorized to issue under appropriate regulations such equipment for said training as may be authorized by Congress, and to disburse through the Federal disbursing officers of the several States, Territories, and District of Columbia such sums of money as Congress may appropriate to carry into effect all the provisions of this act relating to physical and military training before such State shall be

entitled to share in any appropriation made by Congress to carry out the provisions of this act, or to the use of any property authorized to be issued under this act to the schools and colleges.

SEC. 45. TRAINING IN THE HIGH SCHOOLS.—There shall be established in each high school in the United States a department of military training. The course of training shall be prescribed by the National Guard Council, with the approval of the Secretary of War, and shall cover the period of enrollment of the male students of such high schools. The Chief of the National Guard Bureau shall detail National Guard officers or properly qualified persons who have served in the National Guard, National Army, or Reserve Corps in the World War, residing in the localities where such schools are located, as instructors shall receive such pay and allowances as may be fixed by the National Guard Council, with the approval of the Secretary of War, under such regulations as the Secretary of War may prescribe. Arms, uniforms, and equipment, including ammunition for target practice, shall be furnished by the Federal Government to carry out the provisions of this section. The members of such high school cadet corps shall receive field training in camps of instruction to be held at such point or points within the State, as the governor of the same may designate, for the period of 15 days each year. The course of instruction at such camps shall be prescribed by the National Guard Council, with the approval of the Secretary of War. Officers of the National Guard and National Reserve and others on duty as instructors in the various schools, colleges, and universities within the State may be detailed as instructors at such camps.

SEC. 46. CERTIFICATE OF COMPLETION OF COURSE IN MILITARY TRAINING.—A certificate of completion of the course in military training in the high schools herein provided for shall be issued by the Chief of the National Guard Bureau to such students as shall complete such course and who shall be adjudged entitled to receive the same, under regulations to be prescribed by the National Guard Council, which certificate shall entitle such student to attend the course prescribed in the Officers' Training Corps in colleges, as hereinafter provided.

SEC. 47. PAY AND ALLOWANCES FOR STUDENTS.—Students of high schools, colleges, or other institutions of learning attending summer camps for intensive training herein provided for shall receive, while in attendance at such training camp, the base pay of a private of the Regular Army, together with subsistence while attending such camp, and transportation to and from their home stations, provided such students shall complete the course of instruction at such camp, such fact to be evidenced by a certificate signed by the officer in charge of said camp: *Provided*, That deductions may be made from the pay of such students for any loss or damage to public property caused by such student, and for fines imposed by a military court as punishment for military offenses committed by such student while attending such camp.

SEC. 48. OFFICERS' TRAINING CORPS IN COLLEGES.—There shall be established an Officers' Training Corps in all civil educational institutions, requiring four years of collegiate study for a degree, including State universities and such State institutions as are required to provide instruction in military tactics under the provisions of the act approved July 2, 1862. Such Officers' Training Corps may also be established at military schools which do not confer an academic degree, but which shall be found to be especially qualified by the Secretary of War to impart the required instruction in military science.

The course of instruction at the Officers' Training Corps so established shall be prescribed by the Secretary of War, and shall consist of a minimum of two years' military training for the physically fit male students attending such institution, who shall possess a certificate showing such student has completed the course in military training hereinbefore provided for in high schools, and three years' military training for other students. Which course of military training, when entered upon by any student, shall, as regards such student, be a prerequisite for graduation at such institution of learning.

No Officers' Training Corps shall be established at any institution of learning until and unless such institution shall furnish and maintain for such military instruction at least 100 physically fit male students.

Each student in the Officers' Training Corps hereinbefore provided for shall receive annually 15 days of intensive training, to be received in training camps established throughout the United States at such places as the Secretary of War may designate, upon the recommendation and suggestion of the National Guard Council.

SEC. 49. INSTRUCTORS FOR OFFICERS' TRAINING CORPS.—The Secretary of War shall detail as instructors to such institutions of learning as shall establish Officers' Training Corps under the provisions of this act and as instructors in the training camps herein provided for such number of Regular Army officers and National Guard and National Reserve officers as may be necessary, which said officers shall receive the pay and allowances of their grade while acting as such instructors.

SEC. 50. CERTIFICATE OF COMPLETION OF TRAINING FOR OFFICERS.—Any student completing the course of instruction herein provided for, including the intensive training in the camps of instruction herein and by the last preceding section provided for, shall receive a certificate to that effect from the War Department of the United States and shall be eligible to be commissioned in the National Guard of any State upon passing the examination prescribed for commissions in the National Guard for that State.

SEC. 51. ISSUE OF FEDERAL PROPERTY TO COLLEGES.—That the Secretary of War, under such regulation as he may prescribe, is hereby authorized to issue to institutions maintaining Officers' Training Corps such public animals, arms, uniforms, equipment, and means of transportation as may be necessary, and to forage public animals so issued at the expense of the United States. He shall require from each institution to which United States property is issued a bond in the value of the property issued for the care and safekeeping thereof and for its return when required.

SEC. 52. APPROPRIATION, APPORTIONMENT, AND DISBURSEMENT OF FUNDS UNDER THIS ACT.—A sum of money shall hereafter be appropriated annually to be paid out of any money in the Treasury not otherwise appropriated for the support of the National Guard and for carrying into effect the military training in the schools, high schools, and colleges herein and by this act provided for, including the expense of providing arms, ordnance, quartermaster, and commissary stores and camp equipage and all the military supplies for issue to the National Guard and to the schools, colleges, and other institutions of learning which shall become entitled thereto under the provisions of this act and such other expenses pertaining to the purposes of this act as are now or may hereafter be authorized by law. The appropriation provided for in this section shall be apportioned among the several States and Territories under just and equitable procedure to be prescribed by the Secretary of War on recommendation of the National Guard Council and shall be in direct ratio to the number of enlisted men in active service in the National Guard existing in such States and Territories and District of Columbia at the date of apportionment of said appropriation, and in direct ratio to the number of students whether in schools, high schools, colleges, or other institutions of learning in the several States, Territories, or District of Columbia who are receiving instruction in the military training department of such schools, colleges, or other institutions of learning herein and by this act provided for at the date of apportionment of said appropriation: *Provided*, That the sum so apportioned among the several States, Territories, and District of Columbia shall be available under such rules as may be prescribed by the Secretary of War on recommendation of the National Guard Council for the necessary expenses incurred by officers and enlisted men of the Regular Army or the National Guard when traveling on duty in connection with the National Guard; or in connection with the military training department of schools and colleges; for the transportation of supplies furnished to the National Guard or schools and colleges for the permanent equipment thereof; for office rent and necessary office expenses of officers of the Regular Army or National Guard on duty with the National Guard or with the military training department in the schools or colleges receiving any of the appropriation herein provided for; for the expenses of the National Guard Bureau, including clerical services; for the expenses of enlisted men of the Regular Army or National Guard on duty with the National Guard or at any school or college, including quarters, fuel, light, medicines, and medical attendance; and such expenses shall constitute a charge against the whole sum annually appropriated under the provision of this act, and shall be paid therefrom and not from allotment duly apportioned to any particular State, Territory, or District of Columbia; and for such other incidental expense in connection with lawfully authorized encampments, maneuvers, and field instruction as the National Guard Council may deem necessary and for such other expenses pertaining to the National Guard, the National Reserve, or the military training department in schools and colleges as are now or may hereafter be authorized by law.

SEC. 53. LEAVES OF ABSENCE FOR CERTAIN GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES.—All officers and employees of the United States and of the District of Columbia who shall be members of the National Guard shall be entitled to leave of absence from their respective duties, without loss of pay, time, or efficiency rating on all days during which they shall be engaged in field or coast-defense training ordered or authorized under the provisions of this act.

SEC. 54. RIGHTS TO PENSIONS.—When any officer or enlisted man of the National Guard drafted into the service of the United States in time of war is disabled by reason of wounds or disability received or incurred while in the active service of the United States in time of war, he shall be entitled to all the benefits of the pension laws existing at the time of his service, and in case such officer or enlisted man dies in the active service of the United States in time of war or in returning to his place of residence after being mustered out of such service, or at any other time in consequence of wounds or disabilities received in such active service, his widow and children, if any, shall be entitled to all the benefits of such pension laws.

SEC. 55. NONCOMPLIANCE WITH FEDERAL ACT.—Whenever any State shall, within a limit of time to be fixed by the President, have failed or refused to comply with or enforce any requirement of this act, or any regulation promulgated thereunder and in aid thereof by the President or the Secretary of War, the National Guard of such State shall be debarred, wholly or in part, as the President may direct, from receiving from the United States any pecuniary or other aid, benefit, or privilege authorized or provided by this act or any other law.

SEC. 56. APPLICABLE TO LAND FORCES ONLY.—The provisions of this act in respect to the militia shall be applicable only to militia organized as a land force and not to the Naval Militia, which shall consist of such part of the militia as may be prescribed by the President for each State, Territory, or District: *Provided*, That each State, Territory, or District maintaining a Naval Militia as herein prescribed may be credited to the extent of the number thereof in the quota that would otherwise be required by section 4 of this act.

SEC. 57. ANNUAL ESTIMATES REQUIRED.—The Secretary of War shall cause a separate estimate to be made annually by the Chief of the National Guard Bureau of the amount necessary for carrying out the provisions of so much of this act as relates to the militia, and no money shall be expended under said provisions except as shall from time to time be appropriated for carrying them out.

SEC. 58. REPEALING CLAUSE.—That section 37 to section 119, inclusive, of the act entitled "An act for making further and more effectual provision for the national defense, and for other purposes," approved June 3, 1916, and known as the national defense act, as well as all laws and parts of laws in so far as they are inconsistent with this act, are hereby repealed.

Gen. CARTER. I have confined my study entirely to the National Guard, or the law as it related to the National Guard, since that was my particular duty, and I should like to talk about that.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well.

Gen. CARTER. The Militia Bureau has taken the view that the militia, being part of the fabric of the Government by reason of the provisions of the Constitution, should be utilized so far as practicable for Federal purposes, and it believes the Act of June 3, 1916, was an effort to make it possible to use the National Guard for national purposes, and to make the Guard suitable for that use. It has exercised its utmost efforts to organize a National Guard that would be capable of Federal use, to justify the expenditure of the Federal funds appropriated for its maintenance.

We have kept in mind the fact that the National Guard was available for use by the State Governments, and that it should be suitable for that use, but where there was a conflict as between the interests of the State and the Federal Government, the Militia Bureau has endeavored to see that the Federal Government's interest in the Guard has been protected.

The organization of the National Guard, under the Act of June 3, 1916, began from what was the organized militia. We have never had full opportunity to test that law of June 3, 1916, because within 12 or 15 days of its passage the National Guard was called into Federal service, sent down on to the Mexican border, and was kept there; part of it, indeed, was never mustered out until the Guard was drafted for service in this World War. With that part of the Guard that did not serve on the border, we put into effect certain regulations that were authorized by law; we observed very carefully what their effect was, with a view to changing them if necessary, and we have at last arrived at what we think to be a system that will work well, both for the interest of the State and of the Federal Government.

The main difficulty in the organization of the Guard lies in the fact that there is no method of compelling State authorities to take action, and it is entirely optional with the State whether it will organize any National Guard units or not. If units are to be organized the law requires that they shall be so allotted to the States as to be capable of being formed into higher tactical units. The allotment of units with that end in view has sometimes caused some friction, but usually we can adjust the matter so that the State authorities are satisfied and the Federal Government's interest will be protected.

With respect to the utilization of the National Guard under this proposed new system, I would like to say a few words, if I may,

The CHAIRMAN. We shall be glad to have you.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. You mean under the Frelinghuysen bill?

Gen. CARTER. No; under the universal-training scheme.

Senator NEW. May I interpose a question there, to clear up a matter in my own mind, before you take up this other branch of the subject?

Gen. CARTER. Yes, sir.

Senator NEW. You speak of the difficulties that have arisen in the different States, that the chief difficulty has been because of the size of the companies?

Gen. CARTER. Just at present that is so. I should like to go into that just one moment, if you will let me.

Senator NEW. Yes; that is just what I wanted to bring out.

Gen. CARTER. When I came to the Militia Bureau in the fall of 1916, they had gone along a certain distance on the road to the organization of the National Guard, and I find that when they took over the Organized Militia and tried to convert it into a National Guard, they found Infantry companies varying in strength from some 28 to 74, or perhaps 100 in some instances. In order to get uniformity, homogeneity, and an effective force they provided that no company should be given Federal recognition unless it had 65 men. The same circular that published that regulation prescribed, that after June 30, 1917, no Infantry company would be recognized that had less than 83 men in it, and that after June 30, 1918, none would be recognized that had less than 100 men.

The average strength of the lettered Infantry companies that were brought into the Federal service in 1917 was 97 men. We figured that it would not be at all difficult if they exercised energy and diligence to organize companies of 100 men hereafter, and it was prescribed that companies should be organized at that strength, of 100.

Then the law prescribes the organization for the National Guard shall be the same as that prescribed for the Regular Army. The minimum Infantry company prescribed by the tables of organization issued under the act of June 3, 1916, which is the continuing law, not that which is now temporarily in force, prescribes 100 men as the minimum for an Infantry company.

When Congress adjourned on March 4, without passing an appropriation bill, a number of the governors had requested authority to authorize National Guard units. They represented that they were unable to have State constabulary or police because of the failure of their legislatures to appropriate money for that purpose, and the only military force they could get would be National Guard units. I asked the authority of the Secretary to organize in those States some National Guard units with a strength of 65 men for the lettered companies, because they could be quickly raised, and because the appropriation that I had on hand, the remaining appropriation, was not sufficient to equip a greater number of men than that. He gave me that authority, and I authorized those regiments in certain specified States. There were originally authorized to be raised at that strength 183 companies; of those we had, up until about a month ago, actually received 65.

The impression gained ground that we had gone back to the 65-man company, and then all the States began to clamor to have their companies reduced to 65, because it is easier to recruit a company of 65 men than one of 100. But there are very excellent military reasons why a company should be kept at a peace strength greater than 65. A platoon organization is practically impossible with a company of 65 men; it is really one big platoon, and the strength for war of an Infantry company is something over 200 men, so that the inflation in new men that would occur in time of war would render a company of 65 men practically worthless; there would be three new men for every old man in a company, whereas if you had the company in time of peace at 100 men, when you brought it up to war strength, there would be about one-half the men well trained and experienced soldiers, and the other half could be more easily trained. We have found we can absorb that number of men and get rapid training, but when you try to take in too many green men it spoils the whole organization, so we have insisted that the companies be brought to 100 men, but we are taking in those regiments that were organized prior to July 11, the date the last appropriation bill was approved, with the understanding that they would be brought to 100 by June 30, 1920.

Senator NEW. Then I understand you to say now that you are accepting this minimum of 65 with the understanding that by July 1, 1920, they are to be brought up to 100?

Gen. CARTER. Yes; but only in those limited cases where we had authorized such organizations.

Senator NEW. You said that that had been extended to a number of the States?

Gen. CARTER. Yes.

Senator NEW. Are there any States to which that privilege has not been extended?

Gen. CARTER. Those that had not made application prior to March 4 for new units, were not extended that privilege, because it was not thought at that time that they desired to organize in that way.

Senator NEW. I understand. That is all right.

Gen. CARTER. All of the National Guard organized during the war, all of the Infantry organized during the war, was recognized with the minimum strength of 100 men per company.

Senator NEW. I can very well see the military reason, and it is a very excellent one as you have explained it, why the company of 100 men is almost essential for the purposes of a war organization, the platoon idea, and so forth, but it has been represented to me by the adjutants general of more than one of the States that it was impossible for them to recruit companies to the 100 standard in a number of towns and counties where a company of 65 was easily obtainable, an excellent company, and of course after you pass 65 it is manifestly true that every additional man is just that much more difficult to get.

Gen. CARTER. We have made provision for that, Senator, by authorizing the formation, in States where the community is sparsely settled, of platoons in towns, so that they will have one platoon in one town and one in another.

Senator NEW. The two platoons forming one company?

Gen. CARTER. The two platoons forming one company, and some States having taken advantage of that, Ohio, which is just beginning to organize the National Guard, is going to adopt that very largely for towns that will not support companies of 100 men.

Senator FLETCHER. What is the limit in platoons?

Gen. CARTER. The limit is 50 men, a minimum of 50 men for each platoon in the infantry company. Of course, the strength of cavalry troops is 65, a battery of artillery is 126; the strength varies in various arms, but this 100-man provision is all in regard to the infantry company.

The advantage of having the platoons in separate towns is that in modern warfare the efficiency of an army depends primarily upon the efficiency of the platoon leader. He is in direct contact with the men; he knows them individually; he knows their ability and their limitations, and he has to command those men in action, and upon his success in getting his platoon forward depends the success of the whole Army. That man, then, if he is put on his own in time of peace, in training his men, will develop initiative and strength of character and control of his men in a greater degree than if he kept on depending on his superior officer to do everything. So we think we get really a more efficient force if they have platoons formed in the small towns than if we had small companies with the captain commanding and the lieutenant doing nothing but assisting.

Senator FLETCHER. Perhaps I used the wrong word when I used the word "limit." That means minimum.

Gen. CARTER. Fifty would be the minimum strength of platoons, and by reason of the fact, Senator, that we have authorized the largest number of National Guard that can be organized with the appropriations and equipment available, it would also be about the maximum. We can not take full strength companies without restricting the organizations, and we do not wish to do that.

Now, in respect to the National Guard in its relation to universal training, I should like to say a word. One of the greatest difficulties in organizing the National Guard is in recruiting it, especially at this time, when the men are rather surfeited with military service. If you gentlemen authorize universal training for the United States and specify that the men shall be kept on the roll for, say a period of five years after he has gone through the training—if you will simply provide that if he voluntarily enlists in the National Guard and serves in that organization for three years, and obtains an honorable discharge, that he shall be excused for the remaining two years of liability for service, you will enable us to get the cream of the young men of the country in the National Guard. I have figured that with the arrangements now in the States, in the way of armories and storehouses, we can accommodate a National Guard of 425,000 men, that will be ready for instant service. They will have their arms and equipment; they will be organized; the men will be acquainted with their officers, and the officers with their men; you will continue the men's training in just a sufficient degree to keep them thoroughly on edge all the time, and you will be able to mobilize that force within two weeks from the time war is declared on any frontier, whereas if you make this an organization of men who have gone through the camp and are scattered throughout the country, it will require some two or three months.

You will have to reach each of those individuals by mail, for instance, and have them go to some place to get his equipment, and perhaps he would need some slight additional training before he went. But I believe the greatest good you can do the National Guard, if you adopt universal training, or go into universal training, is to make provision that men who go through these training camps, if they enlist in the National Guard, shall receive some consideration in the way of reduction of the liability for service in return for that service in the National Guard.

Contrary to the general belief, as a means of training soldiers, the National Guard is an expensive and not entirely an efficient method. It is expensive because you have to spend so much money and so much time to get a little period of training. It is not entirely efficient, because the men, not being all the time for a considerable period under military restraint, never form the habit of discipline, and discipline is a habit. If he could be put through the training camp until he has acquired that habit and then be allowed to go into the National Guard, the role of the National Guard officer has grown considerably more important; he has a more inspiring function. Instead of trying to teach men all the time the details of facing and saluting and marching and manual of arms, he will begin at once their training as soldiers, and he could have a much more efficient organization. I think it would be the greatest step forward possible in the development of the National Guard.

Senator FLETCHER. What do you base your estimate of that number on?

Gen. CARTER. It is on the number of armories, the number of organizations that have existed in the past, and that we have been able to take care of.

We figure we would have about that number if we developed the National Guard under the present law to the strength of 800 men

per Senator and Congressman, as is authorized as the minimum. We believe we could get that many men to enlist without difficulty. Of course, the man who lives some distance from the center of population could not enlist in the National Guard; he could be enrolled in the Federal reserve and held available for service, but the man who went in the National Guard would attend weekly drills, going through maneuvers in summer and spring, and he would be kept in a thorough state of training and preparedness.

The CHAIRMAN. Have you any recommendation to make in the direction of further federalization of the Guard?

Gen. CARTER. No, sir. I think we have gone about as far along that road as we can and keep within the Constitution, the constitutional provisions.

There is just one suggestion I have to make with regard to that. It seems to me that since you have already, by law, limited the class from which officers of the National Guard can be appointed by the governors, that you might possibly go further and require that the governor restrict his appointment of officers in this new National Guard to men who had qualified for the Federal reserve.

Now, every National Guard officer we have got at the present time can do that without difficulty, because it only requires that they have served in some military organization or have some military training; we require that they pass an examination; we scrutinize very carefully their record, their standing in the community, and if you could, by further provision of law, assure the National Guard of getting officers with military experience, some military training, so that they would get to be leaders of their men and not be blindly groping along and trying to learn at the same time their men learn, it might add to the efficiency of the Guard. I think it would.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you happen to read Gen. O'Ryan's testimony?

Gen. CARTER. I read a great deal of it; I did not get the full report of it.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you notice his suggestion that the National Guard be transferred bodily, as it were, from the militia clause of the Constitution to the Army clause?

Gen. CARTER. Yes, sir. But one of the reasons for the National Guard is that it furnishes the governors, in time of peace, with an organized and trained force to control disorder. If you take it out of the hands of the governors, then it is necessary to form some other kind of force in the States to do that same thing. You are therefore paying out State funds for a force that will be largely military in its nature, and is going to be of no use as an organized Federal force, and you are not getting any use of that force for the Federal Government. It seems to me a waste of the people's money to do that.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you notice Gen. O'Ryan, in considering that very point, suggests that the law provide the governor should have the right to call upon the Federal Government for the use of those troops stationed in his State, for the suppression of disorders, thereby protecting the State?

Gen. CARTER. If you do that, then you have at once divided control. They are not State troops; they are not subject to the governor's orders; he asks that they be sent there, but the rôle they play, what they shall do, depends on the Federal Government, whereas the

National Guard is entirely under the control of the governor. It seems to me to be a more effective way to do it.

The CHAIRMAN. The Regular Army has really reached that same point to-day, has it not?

Gen. CARTER. A great many troops are used in the suppression of disorder, but some of the States, I should like to say, are taking this matter into their own hands and controlling disorder with State troops, and the War Department has urged if they can do that to do it and not call on the Federal Government for troops in domestic disturbances, unless they have utilized to the full all the available forces in the State.

The CHAIRMAN. What I have in mind is that the Secretary of War not long ago sent to at least one department commander of the Regular Army, if not to more than one, instructing him to respond to the call of any governor in that department.

Gen. CARTER. Senator, the instructions that went out were for the purpose of preventing delay in getting troops; but the telegrams said that the department commander would act when troops were called for under the section of the Constitution, which says that the Federal forces may be used to insure domestic tranquility in the State, at the request of the legislature, if it is in session, and of the governor, if the legislature is not in session—of course it has always been understood that that request would only be made when the State had exhausted its resources and when the case was very urgent—it was intended that that information to the governors should guide them when they had to make an application for troops, that they would not telegraph here to Washington, for instance, and so be delayed in getting the troops.

The CHAIRMAN. What is the essential difference between that very thing and Gen. O'Ryan's suggestion?

Gen. CARTER. Of course, the regulars that we have now are provided for by law, and they are not—

The CHAIRMAN. They are raised and trained under the Army clause. Gen. O'Ryan suggests that the National Guard be raised and trained under the Army clause and be Federal troops.

Gen. CARTER. Well, if you do that, I do not see any reason for maintaining the term, "National Guard."

The CHAIRMAN. That would really not be an important problem.

Gen. CARTER. It would be a Federal force.

Senator SUTHERLAND. "National" implies the idea of the whole country rather than of the State?

Gen. CARTER. Yes, sir. There is another thing, Senator, that, if you will permit me, I should like to talk about a bit.

In the administration of the act of June 3, 1916, we have found that there are a few things that ought to be changed in the interest of efficiency and harmony and better satisfaction of the States.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. Is that the national-defense act you refer to?

Gen. CARTER. Yes, sir. In the provision with regard to pay, that is unsatisfactory. Under two sections of that bill, a man's pay depends not only on his being present and drilling, but on there being present a certain percentage of the officers and men of the company. The man is not responsible at all that his companions are not there, so we have asked that if he attends the drill which has been ordered,

and is there undergoing instruction, that he shall be paid, but that the pay of his captain shall depend on the number of men that he gets present. We have made numerous other recommendations as to minor changes, which would very much facilitate work and tend to harmonious cooperation between the State and Federal Government, and that was all submitted in the letter of September 30 to you.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. You have in mind the utilization of the national-defense act of 1916 in the discussion that you are now indulging in?

Gen. CARTER. This change that we have asked is in the law that was incorporated there with respect to the National Guard; yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. General, how much of an embarrassment or handicap, if there is any, would result from what is known as the dual control over the force that you are connected with. That is so often brought out or claimed that I should like to have your views on it.

Gen. CARTER. It is always difficult when there are conflicting interests to get any line of agreement if the men on both sides are determined and obstinate, but we have done all we could to be conciliatory, and have gone just as far along the road to meet the needs of the State authorities and their view of the matter as we could without, as I said before, sacrificing the Federal Government's interests. The main trouble with this law is that the party in the State charged with its operation is a State officer and not in any way under Federal control. Usually we have his cooperation and we have no difficulty, but when we have not we can not make any progress.

Now, the one means of securing proper cooperation that we have is the withholding of appropriations or of equipment. We say to the State that unless you will come up to a certain standard, unless the units you produce will meet that standard, we will not equip them, we will not extend Federal recognition; you can not be given arms and pay; and, in order to get all those advantages, arrived at by the Federal appropriations, they usually try to meet our standard.

Senator SUTHERLAND. Have they or not been very rigid with reference to the physical standards?

Gen. CARTER. They were quite so. The standard has been lowered a little. We are now working on the standard set during the war, which was not quite as high as that set before; yet we can not always apply that standard very rigidly. Sometimes in making the examination they let in men that do not pass the rigid scrutiny that they have when they are drafted in the Federal service, but in the last draft—I have not got the exact figures—there were not as many thrown out as when we called the National Guard into service on the Mexican border.

Senator FLETCHER. This Frelinghuysen bill provides in Section 4:

SEC. 4. Number of the National Guard.—The number of enlisted men of the National Guard to be organized under this act within one year from its passage shall be for each State in the proportion of not less than 200 such men for each Member of Congress in the House of Representatives from each State.

Gen. CARTER. The act of June 30, 1916, had that provision and said until a minimum of 800 per Senator and Congressman shall be reached. I think this provides 1,000?

Senator FLETCHER. Eight hundred is the maximum.

Gen. CARTER. That was in one of those bills.

Senator FLETCHER (continuing):

And shall be increased each year thereafter in the proportion of 50 per cent until a total strength of 800 enlisted men for each Member of Congress in the House of Representatives shall have been reached.

Gen. CARTER. That is the same provision as is in the act of June 3, 1916.

SENATOR FLETCHER. You could start off then with 200?

Gen. CARTER. We have done that this year, but we found, after we had made the allocation of units to the States, that some of the States—New York, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin; several others—desired to organize a larger number of troops this year. As we had not at the beginning of the year the full number for which you have provided armory and drill pay, etc., we figured we could accommodate, could take care of, a larger number than we at first allotted, and I obtained permission from the Chief of Staff to utilize enough of the Regular Army equipment. You understand we are now issuing the equipment from Regular Army supplies without charge against the National Guard appropriations—that I could issue enough of that equipment to equip a larger number of troops, so that we have now granted to New York, Pennsylvania, Wisconsin, and Maryland, and perhaps one or two other States, authority to raise additional troops—that is, troops in addition to those in the first allotment—and we will have more than 200 per Senator and Congressmen even this year if all the States fill their allotment.

SENATOR FLETCHER. Speaking of that dual control, General, would there be danger of a condition arising when the Governor would feel like he ought to have the National Guard, and the Government would feel that it needed the National Guard, and you might not be able to command that force in those circumstances?

Gen. CARTER. I think you could, sir. You can under the law of June 3, 1916. That provides that it can be called into Federal service and used as militia, in which case it remains State troops, but in Federal service. It can be drafted when every one of the men and officers is discharged from State service and it becomes a Federal force, as during the war of 1917.

The CHAIRMAN. That is in the event of war only?

Gen. CARTER. In the event of war only; yes, sir. For any ordinary purposes, such as strikes and disturbances throughout the country, a call of these troops will place them under Federal control and under Federal pay, then when their duty is over they will revert to the State control again.

Senator FLETCHER. And the Federal authorities would have the absolute right to call them whenever they saw fit?

Gen. CARTER. Yes; and utilize them anywhere within the boundaries of the United States, that is—

Senator FLETCHER (interposing). They could not send them outside of the United States?

Gen. CARTER. They can not send them outside of the country. I think that has been held by the Attorney General.

Senator FLETCHER. How about the officers of this National Guard? They retain the officers they had in the States, do they not?

Gen. CARTER. Yes, sir; when called they make no change. When drafted the law provides the President shall appoint the officers from the same locality, evidently meaning they shall be practically the same officers, and that is what we did during this present war.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you care to discuss this bill now, General? We shall be glad to have your observations on it.

Gen. CARTER. Senator, I have not made a thoroughly complete study of this bill. I studied one which I think was introduced by Representative CALDWELL, and there is one feature I should like to mention, and that is in regard to section 27, the National Guard Council. I am now going to give you my personal views about this matter. I have not discussed it with any of the officials of the War Department, but it seems to me that if you desire to organize a force which shall be available for Federal use and valuable for Federal use whenever an emergency arises, that you would want that force trained and organized under the jurisdiction of officers that owed allegiance solely to the Federal Government and that were looking to it solely from the Federal Government's point of view. There are many National Guard officers that are very efficient, and there are some that, of course, not having spent much time at it, are not quite so efficient. Unfortunately, it has been my experience that you can not keep out of the National Guard the political interests of the States and that the officers appointed to it sometimes represent political influences rather than military efficiency. If you get men like that in a military force, you are bound to come to a point soon where you no longer have efficiency in the force. If their interests laid entirely with the Federal Government, then, of course, you would get the best results for Federal purposes, but if you take men who come directly from the States and put them in charge of a part of the national defense, they are going to look at it largely, it seems to me—they are bound by human nature to do so—from a point of view of the State interests, and you are going to have the National Guard organized largely for police purposes rather than for the war purposes of the Federal Government.

I believe it would be better to leave whatever bureau or office you put in charge of the affairs of the National Guard as a Federal bureau rather than have it made a committee, as this is.

Senator FLETCHER. That National Guard Council is given very considerable power here, it seems to me, throughout this bill.

Gen. CARTER. Very considerable powers. There are some other things there that struck me as being rather inconsistent. For instance, some of the bills that I read—I do not remember this particular one—provided the adjutant general of the State should be appointed by the President. Of course, the adjutant general is a State official and the President can not appoint him. It provided some 400 or 600 officers that were to be inspectors and instructors, that should be appointed to the National Guard by the President. Well, the officers of the National Guard, the officers of all State forces, are, by Constitution, appointed by the governor. The President can not appoint them. You would have to create some kind of military force aside from the Regular Army within the Federal Government to contain this group of officers, if you are going to have the President appoint them and keep them out of the Regular Army.

Senator FLETCHER. This bill provides the organization of the National Guard, including the composition of the units, shall be as authorized by the Secretary of War, on the recommendation of the National Guard Council; and, then, as to the increase, it provides in States which have but one Representative in Congress, such increase shall be at the discretion of the National Guard Council, and all through the bill the National Guard Council plays a very important part, it seems to me. It is really a material question whether that National Guard Council ought to be organized as provided here, or, if so organized, whether it should be given all this power of recommendation and pretty nearly control.

Gen. CARTER. Frankly, I believe that provision was put in there in order to insure to the officers of the National Guard a greater voice in the Federal control of the National Guard. I believe that would be better met by providing, as I think Gen. Wood recommended to this committee, that officers of the National Guard be detailed for service on the General Staff of the Army, because, after all, that is where the policy of the Army is formulated, not in the Militia Bureau, not in this little body that controls the operations of the National Guard. We are authorized now under the law to have two National Guard officers in the Militia Bureau. We have really one—one colonel that I had expected to get will be brought as soon as he can be given Federal recognition, and we will take full advantage of the law in that respect, but while we can discuss with them many features of the bureau's work in formulating policies with respect to the military affairs of the country, the Militia Bureau has not much voice. It merely controls the relations between the Federal Government and the National Guard, and so I think if provision were made for the National Guard officers to serve with the General Staff, it would have a better effect on the cooperation, the coordination of the work of the two services than to put one separate bureau in here to control the National Guard. I think you would cause a wider split than you have now if you did that.

Senator FLETCHER. What would be your recommendation with regard to that National Guard council, if you think it should not be constituted as the bill provides? Suppose you constitute such a council, how would it be composed—very much as the militia bureau is?

Gen. CARTER. It would be a great deal better to have one man responsible to the Secretary of War, but if he does not cooperate with the officials in charge of the Regular Army, when we come to use that force in time of war, we will find that the two will not harmonize, that we can not use them together; they will be differently trained; they will be organized, perhaps, somewhat differently, and equipped in a different way, and you will have two armies instead of one.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. It always seemed to me, General, that under that provision of the Constitution which leaves the National Guard as a State force, that requires that they shall be trained and disciplined under regulations by the War Department, by the Federal Government, that you could always maintain the National Guard up to the Federal status.

Gen. CARTER. That looks easy, Senator, until you try it.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. Oh, you could not do it yourself without help, but suppose the Congress of the United States just declined

to appropriate moneys for the maintenance of the National Guard unless that National Guard maintained the status of the Federal troops?

Gen. CARTER. It seems to me that is exactly what you have done under the act of June 3, 1916.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. We tried to do it; that was our hope, but have we done it?

Gen. CARTER. I have assumed you have, and have acted on that theory. Of course, you can not be unyielding and too rigid in the application of the law, and, as I told you, we tried to meet the needs of the States, and we have told them that unless they get units that are really efficient for Federal service, we will not extend Federal recognition nor give them Federal aid.

When they began to need a military unit in a State for police purposes and organized a company, we will say, too low in numbers, or not properly constituted in some way, and present it for recognition, and we refuse to recognize it, they became very indignant, because they think their needs ought to be considered. This causes a little friction.

Senator FLETCHER. How do you find the spirit now, General? Are they reorganizing the National Guard?

Gen. CARTER. They are in many States, and that disposition to reorganize is growing daily. We are getting new units much more rapidly than we did a while ago. We expect to have the New York division completed in a very short time. The Pennsylvania division is well along toward completion. Minnesota and Texas have something over 100 per cent of their quota.

I have here a graphic chart that represents the development up to the last of November.

Senator SUTHERLAND. Have you any information that leads you to a conclusion as to what percentage of the returned soldiers are joining the National Guard?

Gen. CARTER. That is different in different States, and it is governed by a variety of considerations. In some States during the war they raised the Home Guard organizations, which did excellent service, but they were composed largely of men who could not go into the war for one reason or other, because of dependency, or they were engaged in essential industries, and the tendency in States was to retain those organizations and have them recognized as National Guard, but when these men who had formed the National Guard before came back from the other side, after having had a year or more of war, and found their places taken, they seemed to resent it, and they do not want to go back into those units. Now, the difficulty is to get the two opposing factions harmonized and getting the men who have had service, and whose further service would be valuable, to go back into these organizations. They are doing that in some of the States. I understand they are meeting with a great deal of success in getting the old men to agree to go back.

Senator SUTHERLAND. To go back into the guard?

Gen. CARTER. Yes, sir.

Senator SUTHERLAND. I anticipated some difficulty in that direction at first, but I thought it would get better as time wore on. I believe that will be found to be the case, too; that after these fellows have been back a little while they will feel more like going into the

Guard organization than they do after having been discharged from the Federal service.

Gen. CARTER. Oh, undoubtedly

The CHAIRMAN. As I gather it, the provisions in the bill which you are just discussing, which provide for the Federal Guard Council and the Chief of the National Guard Bureau, are really the most important provisions in this bill.

Gen. CARTER. I think so; yes, sir.

Some of these details and changes in the bill of 1916 that are provided here were set forth in this letter of September 30. We had made these recommendations prior to the meeting of the National Guard Association, which occurred last May, and, finding they had adopted many of these, I asked the Secretary if he would not request that you make these changes in any modification of the law that you made, because they would greatly enhance it.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. Do those changes that you suggest meet the approval of the National Guard, generally?

Gen. CARTER. They were recommended, all of them, with perhaps one or two minor exceptions, by the National Guard Association. When you speak of the National Guard it is pretty hard to say exactly what they would like, because we have the National Guard adjutants general of the States, who usually look at the National Guard from one point of view, the man who serves in the ranks and the man who is an officer, and they do not always agree on what they would like to have done for it.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. It does not always follow that the adjutant general is a trained military man?

Gen. CARTER. No, sir; but they are going to be so, much more. It seems to be the desire of governors now to get an adjutant general who has had military training.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. I hope they may reach that end finally.

Senator SHERMAN. General, do you think that your suggestion that Guard officers be detailed to the General Staff will actually do away with this friction and bring a better understanding between the two forces?

Gen. CARTER. I think it would gradually bring that about, Senator. I do not think you could do it at once. We have a condition of unrest and of dissatisfaction that is very difficult for me to understand. I have talked with every National Guard officer with whom I could get in contact, with nearly all of the adjutant generals, and I have sought the cause of the discontent, and hardly any two of them have told me the same cause. I believe that there is a general distrust on the part of the National Guard officers of the Regular Army officer. They think he does not endeavor to understand their motives or their difficulties, and that he is not rendering the loyal assistance that he should. I do not believe that that feeling exists generally in the Regular Army, and I have assured them all that our bureau was doing the very best it could to meet their views, and to eliminate any cause of complaint, and I have had very loyal assistance from many of them in spreading that doctrine about; but there are some of them that are so disgruntled and dissatisfied that I do not believe any steps you could take would entirely satisfy them.

I think that ultimately, if they were allowed a voice in the formulation of policies, that they would come to see that in forming any

Federal force the interests of the Federal Government must be considered, and that you can not look at the thing merely from a local point of view, from the view of the States' interests.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. Would you give them representation on the General Staff?

Gen. CARTER. I think so, yes, sir.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. And on the Militia Bureau?

Gen. CARTER. Yes. We have that now. In the Militia Bureau we have to have a good many specialties, because so many questions are coming up that a man must know all about Field Artillery, for instance, all about the Infantry arm, all about the Cavalry, or the Signal Corps or the Engineers. Those men we would like to get from the Regular service, because of their opportunity for wider training and more extended knowledge of the subject, but when it comes to considering matters of policy, and the effect it will have on the National Guard, we find these officers we get from the National Guard are a very great help.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. How many of these guardsmen ought to be on the General Staff?

Gen. CARTER. I do not know as to that. I should think it ought not to be too great a proportion, but enough to have the point of view thoroughly explained.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. It seems to me that that would be a wise thing to do. Then the National Guard generally in the several States would feel they had a representative at court who could submit their common viewpoint.

Gen. CARTER. Yes. I believe it would lead to a better understanding between the Regular Army and the National Guard.

The CHAIRMAN. You remember, General, in 1916, when Senator Chamberlain's bill or the National Defense Act was passed, the Senate adopted an amendment to that act, specifically providing that the National Guard officers should be detailed in the General Staff, and the War Department and the Regular Army fought it to a standstill, and beat it out in conference.

Gen. CARTER. I did not remember that. I was not in this country at that time, and I could not keep up with events.

The CHAIRMAN. I think I offered the amendment, if I remember it correctly. At any rate, it was soundly beaten as soon as the War Department got into it.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. It passed the Senate.

The CHAIRMAN. I passed the Senate, and the War Department took the attitude it did not want any National Guard officers on the General Staff; that they would be in the way.

Senator FLETCHER. You could have on from each State.

Gen. CARTER. No; I think that would be too great a representation; rather an unwieldy body.

The CHAIRMAN. I thoroughly believe in it, did then and now, as regards this so-called National Guard bill. I have not studied the bill very carefully. I forget whether it makes such provision, but whether we have the council or not, I believe it should be in the law.

Senator FLETCHER. It lays emphasis on the council, rather.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. I wonder if it would not be a good idea to print this graphic chart submitted by Gen. Carter in the record.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes; that may go in the record.

(The paper referred to is here printed in full, as follows:)

PROGRESS OF THE NATIONAL GUARD OF THE UNITED STATES ON DECEMBER 1, 1919.

During the month of November Federal recognition was extended to units as follows:

New York: Five companies of Infantry, one company of Coast Artillery Corps, and 1 battery of Field Artillery.

Ohio: Two companies of Infantry.

Alabama: One company of Infantry.

Wyoming: One troop of Cavalry.

The 12 States listed have not yet expressed their intention of proceeding with the organization of all the units which were allotted to them by the Militia Bureau last July: Delaware, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Vermont, Arkansas, Louisiana, New Mexico, Texas, Illinois, West Virginia, Idaho, and Wyoming. The State of Nevada has declined to organize any National Guard. Twenty-two States and Porto Rico have presented no units for Federal recognition and are not listed below.

States.	Enlisted strength.		Standing, in per cent of organized strength.
	Author- ized for fiscal year 1920.	Present from latest returns.	
1. Minnesota	3,688	4,079	111
2. Texas	11,427	12,005	105
3. Oklahoma	3,339	2,731	82
4. Maine	1,361	1,095	80
5. Kansas	2,267	1,635	72
6. Colorado	1,859	995	54
7. Washington	2,107	1,147	54
8. Tennessee	2,294	1,137	50
9. Hawaii	540	250	46
10. Arkansas	1,758	790	45
11. Oregon	2,152	792	37
12. District of Col..	801	238	30
13. Missouri	4,429	1,288	29
14. Iowa	4,580	1,104	24
15. Vermont	853	205	24
16. Utah	713	161	23
17. New Jersey	4,030	909	23
18. Rhode Island	1,086	214	20
19. South Carolina ..	1,727	339	20
20. Virginia	2,365	460	19
21. Alabama	2,432	454	19
22. Ohio	4,830	873	18
23. California	3,584	508	14
24. Wyoming	658	92	14
25. New York	20,497	1,990	10
26. Florida	1,563	146	9
27. Mississippi	1,879	100	5
28. Georgia	2,877	90	3
Other States	61,589		
Total	153,285	35,827	23

The decrease from 29 per cent for November to 23 per cent for December is due mostly to the increase of allotments to several States and partly to the falling off in the strength of units already recognized.

Gen. CARTER. There have been changes in them since that was issued. Recognition has been extended to several additional units. We are going on much faster.

The CHAIRMAN. Is there any other matter in this bill you would like to call attention to?

Gen. CARTER. I think not, sir. I should like to be given a chance to study this particular bill. I had, as I tell you, given more attention

to the Caldwell bill, and to submit to you, Senator, what especially occurs to me, if I may, in my letter.

The CHAIRMAN. We shall be very glad to have you do it.

Senator FLETCHER. What have you to say, General, on the broad question of universal training,

Gen. CARTER. Well, I thoroughly believe in it, not only as a military proposition, but as a benefit to the Nation and to the individual. I believe it would make him more effective in his work in afterlife, make him a better citizen. I believe that it will eradicate much of the misunderstanding between what we term the classes in the United States.

I know that service in the divisions in this war brought about a better understanding between the poor man and the rich man, and the man that toiled with his hands, and the man that works in the office. They have, I think, a better feeling for each other, and a better appreciation of their country's many advantages.

Senator FLETCHER. To what extent would you have universal service go?

Gen. CARTER. I do not think universal service should apply, except in time of war, but I believe universal training, with the exception, perhaps, of the young man who has the responsibility of the sole support of a widowed mother or something of that kind, would be a good thing for the individual and the Nation.

Senator FLETCHER. Would there be universal service required during the training?

Gen. CARTER. To the extent merely of the training.

Senator FLETCHER. And what amount of training would you recommend?

Gen. CARTER. I believe, in order to make troops that would be reliable when called, without further training, you ought to have at least six months, but that if you can give them further training, that a three months' course would probably be sufficient to start them right.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. It practically doubles the expense, though, to have only three months' training?

Gen. CARTER. Yes.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. It would double the expense of transportation, surely?

Gen. CARTER. Yes; but if you could give them six months' training, and permit those who desired to enlist in the National Guard, giving them, as I said, this advantage of reducing the period of liability to service, then you will have produced a force large enough for all ordinary needs, that would be available for almost instant use.

Senator SUTHERLAND. What do you mean by reducing their period of availability for service?

Gen. CARTER. I assume, when these men get through this training, that they will be put on a list of men available, in case Congress should authorize a draft for war, and that they will be kept on that list, say for a period of five years. If when a man goes into the National Guard he serves three years and obtains an honorable discharge, you strike him off that list, he will have reduced his liability for two years. The average American hates to have an unfulfilled obligation hanging over him, and young men who want to get mar-

ried or who want to engage in business, would be the men who would enlist in the National Guard, the forward looking, enterprising man, and he would make the best soldier in time of war.

The CHAIRMAN. You might turn to page 39 of this bill.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. Before you pass that—what age do you think they should be for the universal training?

Gen. CARTER. I believe, sir, that 19 years is the best age, about that time, because then the young man has not assumed any obligations, and he can, after that period, if necessary, complete his college education. He is sufficiently developed, so if the training is strenuous it will not injure him physically, and he is old enough to appreciate the advantage he derives from it.

The CHAIRMAN. In all human probability, if universal military training were adopted as a policy in the United States, it would mean the training of a certain number of men each year?

Gen. CARTER. Yes, sir.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. Do you not think the colleges would therefore adapt their curricula, adapt their school periods, to meet this six months' reduction?

Gen. CARTER. Undoubtedly.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. They could do that?

Gen. CARTER. Yes.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. So it would not interfere with a man's education?

The CHAIRMAN. I said a moment ago, General, that perhaps the National Guard Council feature was the most important feature of the National Guard bill, but another one of equal importance you will find, I think, if you will turn to the bottom of page 39, section 44, and the following section, which provides for physical training in the schools of the country:

"All male citizens of the United States between the ages of 16 and 18 years, attending any common, grade, private, parochial, or other school shall receive physical and mental training to develop physical posture and breathing," etc.; and that the National Guard Council shall lay out the program for the training.

Gen. CARTER. It seems to me that there the Federal Government would be interfering in a purely State matter. The control of schools and their maintenance, anything in regard to them, is a State affair, and to require them to introduce into their curriculum something entirely in the interest of the Federal Government, and without in some way reimbursing them and making it possible for them to do it, I do not believe would be practicable.

The CHAIRMAN. They use the same weapon you now use.

Gen. CARTER. Yes; withdrawing support.

The CHAIRMAN. In attempting to get them to do it, in other words, they would withdraw the support of the Federal Government in the way of appropriation if the schools of the States do not install these courses.

Gen. CARTER. Then it makes it very uncertain. We have one State that has already indicated it will not form any National Guard, and others seem to be in no particular haste about doing it. You can not compel those States to form a National Guard. You can not get any units there unless they are voluntarily organized.

Senator FLETCHER. Would not that be very expensive, to pay these students base pay of a private of the Regular Army, together with

the subsistence, etc., while attending such camp? If you require the students in all the schools in the country you would go to an enormous expense, it seems to me.

Section 47 provides for that.

Senator SUTHERLAND. Yes; that strikes me as being prohibitive.

The CHAIRMAN. The idea itself is a most excellent one. I wish we had it in all schools.

Gen. CARTER. It is provided in New York State.

The CHAIRMAN. New York has compulsory military training, also draft for its Guard. It has gone the limit.

Gen. CARTER. Perhaps you do not know that three other States have the draft law.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. What States are those?

Gen. CARTER. Connecticut, Maine, and I do not recall the other, but I think Vermont. I know we have the laws over in the bureau.

The CHAIRMAN. The governor of New York to-day can fill up the New York Guard to full war strength by issuance of a draft?

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. He has never had to resort to it?

Gen. CARTER. No.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. I see some of the States here have more than the required quota for 1920?

Gen. CARTER. Yes; that results from the fact that they were organizing Guards during the war, and we did not limit them to 200 men, but took as many as we could sustain with the appropriation we had.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. General, you had a little to do with the National Guard until you were put at the head of the Militia Bureau, did you?

Gen. CARTER. My experience was limited to mustering out a number of volunteer regiments that had been National Guard in 1899 to 1900 and inspection of the National Guard while on the Mexican border. I had never served with it in the State service.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. As the result of your experience here for two years, do you not find the National Guard a very much more efficient body of men than you thought they were when you first went in?

Gen. CARTER. I always regarded the National Guard as composed of the very best class of citizens, but prior to this I thought that many of them did not take their military obligations very seriously. Judging from what I have seen of them, as chief of the Militia Bureau, I believe they do; and that where they have an opportunity they learn rapidly. I had striven in every way I could to provide them the means of learning, to give them the advantages of our Regular Army schools, and to provide them with the best inspectors and instructors possible, and I think there is great possibility in the National Guard, but we have got to work assiduously and keep at it.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. I think the attempted Federal control of them, Federal cooperation with them, has done a great deal of good and can do more.

Gen. CARTER. Yes, sir.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. If the spirit you now evince existed all along the line, to try to help them.

The CHAIRMAN. We thank you very much, General.

We have been glad to have your views.

REORGANIZATION OF THE ARMY.

WEDNESDAY, DECEMBER 3, 1919.

UNITED STATES SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON MILITARY AFFAIRS,
Washington, D. C.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to the call of the chairman, at 2.15 p. m., in the committee room, Capitol, Senator James W. Wadsworth, jr., presiding.

Present: Senators Wadsworth, jr. (chairman), Sutherland, New, Chamberlain, and Fletcher.

STATEMENT OF COL. RANSOME H. GILLETTE, NATIONAL GUARD, STATE OF NEW YORK.

The CHAIRMAN. What has been your military experience, Colonel, and especially during the late war?

Col. GILLETTE. I have served approximately 20 years in the National Guard of the State of New York, principally in the Second Regiment, which I now command. I enlisted as a private in the Twenty-seventh Division in December of 1917, took the course of training in the Second Officers' Training Camp at Camp Wadsworth, at Spartanburg, S. C., was commissioned a major and assigned to duty with the First Battalion of the One hundred and sixty Infantry, and served with the division in France up to the time I was wounded at the Hindenberg show. I rejoined that division in January of 1919 and served with it until mustered out at Camp Upton in April, still as a major with the same regiment. Thereafter I was appointed colonel of the Second New York Infantry, which is a State Guard unit, which is now practically ready to be federalized and taken back into the Federalized National Guard forces of the United States as they existed prior to the war.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. In other words, if your regiment were treated as a Federal unit, it is prepared to be drafted into the service at any time?

Col. GILLETTE. Yes, sir. I was elected president of the National Guard Association of the State of New York at its last meeting, and was appointed one of a committee of five by the executive committee of the National Guard Association of the United States to prepare and submit a piece of legislation designed to embody the wishes, opinions, and experiences of National Guard officers who are members of the United States National Guard Association.

I might add that I am a lawyer by profession. Associated with me in the work were four National Guard officers: Col. Carlin, of New York; Col. Berkhead, of Texas; Col. Colston, of Kentucky, and myself; we prepared this bill.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. The one known as the Frelinghuysen bill?
Col. GILLETTE. Yes, sir.

All of these officers, with the exception of Col. Carlin, saw service overseas with different divisions in the American Expeditionary Forces, and Col. Carlin was one of the officers who served in the State force, keeping the State Guard together, keeping the military organizations of the State in a more or less condition of efficiency and preparedness.

At St. Louis, in May of this year, 1919, what I will call the Federal National Guard Association had a meeting, which was attended by representatives from every State of the Union, I think, excepting five, which particular States I do not now recall. Certain resolutions were formulated by proper committees appointed for that purpose and turned over to this subcommittee, of which I am one, for the purpose of expressing those resolutions in legislative language, and the bill, No. 3424, the Frelinghuysen bill, is an attempt on the part of this subcommittee of four to put into legislative form the resolutions adopted at that convention at St. Louis.

There have been six drafts made before the one submitted and introduced. The bill in its present form has been passed upon by different conferences of National Guard officers at different times, including Gen. O'Ryan, of New York; Gen. Price, of Pennsylvania; Gen. Sherburne, of Massachusetts; some general officer from the West—I have forgotten his name—Gen. Hulin, of Texas; a high-ranking officer of the National Guard from California whose name I do not recall, besides being submitted to a meeting of the adjutant generals of the United States, which was held in St. Louis within the past two months, where 22 States were represented and several more by proxy.

The different drafts—and I will say in this connection that the drafting committee have not put into this bill their personal ideas; we regarded ourselves merely as a means of transmuting the ideas of others in the phraseology that now appears before you—different suggestions were made at these different meetings and at these different conferences; and the drafts would be drawn and submitted again and again, until, finally, this proposed legislation has resulted. But the whole thing is based on the resolutions that were adopted by this convention of the National Guard Association of the United States at St. Louis in May of this year. I have a copy of those resolutions here, Senator.

The CHAIRMAN. We had better have them in the record.

(The resolutions referred to are here printed in full, as follows:)

RESOLUTIONS ADOPTED BY THE TWENTIETH ANNUAL CONVENTION OF THE NATIONAL GUARD ASSOCIATION OF THE UNITED STATES AT ST. LOUIS, MO., MAY 5, 1919.

Whereas, the record made by the National Guard troops in the Great War, who bore the brunt of the fighting as shock troops, and the efficiency of the officers and men, entitle the National Guard of the United States to the fullest measure of support and the widest opportunity for the development of a military force which the public sentiment of this country demands shall be the backbone of its military strength—the great body of citizen soldiery who answered the call never flinched in the face of the severest fire, and whose record of achievement stands as a guarantee of the ability of this organization to handle its own affairs, and any situation that may confront it; Therefore be it

Resolved, That the Congress of the United States be requested to proceed at once to take such necessary steps as will permit the establishment in the

United States of a National Guard Corps of the Army of the United States, under the administration of National Guard officers, administered through a bureau known as the National Guard Bureau of the War Department.

Realizing that the organization of the National Guard Corps proposed in these resolutions could not be effective for some time, be it

Resolved, That Congress be requested to immediately enact such legislation as may be necessary for the War Department to authorize the immediate reorganization of the National Guard under the National Defense Act of June 3, 1916.

Resolved, That universal military training is a necessary step toward adequate national preparedness, and for the proper development of the citizen soldiery of the Nation; and we affirm that it can best be developed in conjunction with the National Guard.

Resolved, That it is the sense of this convention that every State in the Union shall immediately organize a National Guard Association of such State; and that such State association, when formed, shall immediately adopt every resolution passed by the National Convention.

Resolved, That a communication be addressed to the governor of each State, requesting him to issue an invitation to all Members of both Houses of Congress, and to every member of the legislature of his respective State, within a stated, definite period, after the adjournment of the national convention, to which conference the resolutions of the national convention will be submitted, and before which conference a committee shall appear to explain, in detail, the wishes of the convention, and the reasons for the passage of definite, adequate, constructive legislation.

Resolved, That a memorial be addressed to each State legislature by the national convention, calling upon the State to apportion definite stated sums as their share for the maintenance of the national and State associations, to the end that every State may secure uniform legislation looking to a proper distribution of this expense among the States.

Resolved, That all orders, circulars, and memorandums heretofore published by the War Department and now in effect and applying to the National Guard, should be compiled, indexed, and issued to all officers of the National Guard; and that all orders, circulars, and memorandums hereafter published relative to the National Guard should be published independently of all other matters.

Resolved, That we place before the world our appreciation of the services rendered by men representing every organization and every character of service, overseas, underseas, on the seas, in the air, and also by those in service at home; and we enunciate it as a national and State policy, that the greater the service, and the greater the sacrifice, the greater opportunity shall be afforded for further service in the State forces; that this shall apply equally to all, with preference as to grade for those who have seen combat service, when other qualifications are equal.

Resolved, That the Congress be requested to exact such legislation as will authorize the issue from surplus stores now on hand and purchased for the United States Army, such animals, articles of clothing, and equipment material as may be needed by the National Guard organized under the provisions of the act entitled "An Act for making further and more effectual provision for the national defense, and for other purposes," approved June 3, 1916, which law is still in force and applicable to State forces. This issue to be made without charge against militia appropriations, and to be reimbursed in kind for all Federal property brought into service by State troops. Issue to be made as soon as the provisions of said Act of June 3, 1916, shall have been fulfilled: *Provided*, That the provisions of section 62 of said act of June 3, 1916, will be considered fulfilled if the first strength mentioned therein be attained within one year after the approval of this act and the other increments provided therein be attained by successive years thereafter: *Provided further*, That this will not prevent any State from compliance with the provisions of section 62 of said act as now amended: *Provided further*, That the appropriations and provisions of this act, referring to the National Guard, shall become applicable and immediately available upon the approval of this act.

Resolved, That section 62 of the national-defense act be amended to read:

"Sec. 62. *Number of the National Guard.*—The number of enlisted men of the National Guard to be organized under this act within one year from its passage shall be for each State in the proportion of not less than 200 such men for each Senator and Representative in Congress from such State, and a number to be determined by the President for each Territory and the District of

Columbia: *Provided*, That in States which have but one Representative in Congress, the number of enlisted men shall be at the discretion of the President: *Provided, further*, That this shall not be construed to prevent any State, Territory, or the District of Columbia from organizing such additional number of troops as the President may prescribe: *And provided further*, That nothing in this act shall be construed to prevent any State with but one Representative in Congress from organizing one or more regiments of troops, with such auxiliary troops as the President may prescribe; such organizations and members of such organizations to receive all the benefits accruing under this act under the conditions set forth herein: *Provided further*, That the word 'Territory,' as used in this act and in all laws relating to the land militia and National Guard shall include and apply to Hawaii, Alaska, Porto Rico, and the Canal Zone, and the militia of the Canal Zone shall be organized under such rules and regulations, not in conflict with the provisions of this act, as the President may prescribe."

Resolved, That section 69 of the national-defense act be, and is hereby, amended to read as follows:

"SEC. 69. *Enlistments in the National Guard*.—Hereafter the period of enlistment in the National Guard shall be for a term of three years; and upon the completion of such term of enlistment, reenlistment may be for a period of one year: *Provided*, That all who have served as enlisted men in the Army of the United States and in the forces of the several States, subsequent to April 6, 1917, and who have been honorably discharged from such service, may, within six months after such discharge or within six months after the passage of this act, enlist in the National Guard for a period of one year, and at the end of such period may reenlist for such term and under such rules and regulations as the President may prescribe."

Resolved, That section 74 of the national-defense act be amended to read as follows:

"SEC. 74. *Qualifications for National Guard Officers*.—Persons hereafter commissioned as officers of the National Guard shall not be recognized as such under any of the provisions of this act unless they have been selected from the following classes and shall have taken and subscribed to the oath of office prescribed in the preceding section of this act: Officers or enlisted men of the National Guard; officers on the reserve or unassigned list of the National Guard; officers, active or retired, and former officers of the Army of the United States, Navy, or Marine Corps; former enlisted men who have served in the Army, Navy, or Marine Corps subsequent to April 6, 1917, and have received an honorable discharge therefrom; officers who have served in the State forces during the war with the Central Empires of Europe; graduates of the United States Military and Naval Academies, and graduates of schools, colleges, and universities where they have received military instructions under the supervision of an officer of the Regular Army, and, for the technical branches and staff corps or departments, such other civilians as may be specially qualified for duty therein."

Resolved, That section 75 of the national-defense act be amended by adding at the end thereof the following:

"Former officers of the Army of the United States who have not been discharged for incompetency and who have received an honorable discharge from the Army of the United States may be appointed to the same or lower grades in the branch in which they served in the Army of the United States, without examination as to their professional fitness if they are appointed within six months from the passage of this act or from the date of their discharge from the Army of the United States."

Resolved, That section 109 of the national-defense act be amended to read as follows:

"SEC. 109. *Pay for National Guard officers*.—Certain commissioned officers on the active list belonging to organizations of the National Guard of each State, Territory, and the District of Columbia, participating in the apportionment of the annual appropriation for the support of the National Guard, shall receive compensation for their service, except during periods of service for which they may become lawfully entitled to the same pay as officers of the corresponding grades of the Regular Army, for each regular drill, not exceeding five in any calendar month, at which he shall have been officially present, as follows: Officers of the grade of second lieutenant, \$4; of the grade of first lieutenant, \$5; above the grade of first lieutenant, \$9: *Provided*, That 50 per cent of the commissioned strength and 60 per cent of the enlisted strength

attend the drill for not less than one and one-half hours: *Provided further*, That all staff officers, aid de camps, and chaplains shall receive not to exceed one-half of the pay of a captain for each drill of not less than one and one-half hours' duration at which 50 per cent of the commissioned strength and 60 per cent of the enlisted strength shall be present, or for performing such military duties prescribed by the Secretary of War to be accepted as service in lieu of such drills. Regimental adjutants and officers above the grade of captain, and captains in command of machine-gun companies, ambulance companies, field hospital companies, sanitary troops, or other organization authorized for the Regular Army, shall receive the pay hereinbefore authorized for a captain and subject to the conditions prescribed hereinbefore for staff officers, aid de camps, and chaplains."

Resolved, That the minimum of 65 recently fixed by the militia bureau as the number for a company of Infantry or Coast Artillery, is, in the opinion of the association, the proper minimum number for future organizations or such companies, and it is recommended that this requirement be made the permanent minimum number.

Resolved, That the first paragraph of section 110 of the national-defense act, be amended to read as follows:

"SEC. 110. *Pay for National Guard enlisted men.*—Each enlisted man on the active list belonging to an organization of the National Guard of a State, Territory, or the District of Columbia, participating in the apportionment of the annual appropriation for the support of the National Guard, shall receive compensation for his services, except during period of service for which he may become lawfully entitled to the same pay as an enlisted man of corresponding grade in the Regular Army, at a rate for each regular drill, where he is officially present, not exceeding five in any calendar month, of one-twentieth of the initial monthly pay now or hereafter provided by law for enlisted men of corresponding grades of the Regular Army: *Provided*, That the rate of compensation for an enlisted man shall not be less than \$1 for each such regular drill within such limitations: *Provided further*, That periods of any actual military duty equivalent to the drills prescribed in section 109 may be accepted as service in lieu of such drills when prescribed by the Secretary of War: *And provided further*, That if any officers or enlisted men shall fail to attend in any calendar month, or for such proportion thereof as he may be on the active list in the National Guard, at least 60 per cent of the ordered drills, or shall fail to perform the like proportion of military duty prescribed by the Secretary of War to be accepted as service in lieu of such drills or as the equivalent thereof, he will not be entitled to any of the compensation provided in this or the last preceding section for any of the drills attended or equivalent service performed by him during the calendar month or portion thereof: *And provided further*, That the provisions of section 109, which requires that 50 per cent of the commissioned strength and 60 per cent of the enlisted strength attend a drill for not less than one and one-half hours to entitle a commissioned officer to compensation for a drill shall apply in the case of enlisted men: *And provided further*, That stoppages may be made against the compensation payable to any officer or enlisted man hereunder to cover the cost of public property lost or destroyed by and chargeable to such officers or enlisted men, and for disciplinary fines, as may be imposed under regulations prescribed by the Secretary of War."

Resolved, That this convention go on record as recommending that Congress enact such legislation as may be necessary to authorize the War Department to issue commissions to all officers or enlisted men who were recommended for such commissions prior to November 11, 1918.

Be it

Resolved, That this convention go on record as favoring legislation by the Congress of the United States which will place upon an equal basis, as to retirement for disability incurred in active service during the war with the Central Powers, all officers and enlisted men of the Army, Navy, Naval Reserve Force, and Marine Corps of the United States; whether Regular Army, National Army, National Guard, Reserve Corps, or Naval Reserve Force.

Col. GILLETTE. I will say, briefly, that the resolutions are to the effect that the dependence of the United States for its Army forces, for defense, for the insurance of our future security must rest primarily upon the citizenship and not upon a professional-paid army. From that as a premise, the convention went on record as

favoring that there be established in the War Department the National Guard Corps of the Army of the United States, under the control of National Guard officers, and to be administered through a bureau known as the National Guard Bureau of the War Department. In transmuting that thought into legislative language the drafters of the bill drew up sections 27, 28, 29, and 30, found on pages 24 to 29. The National Guard Council therein provided for was designed to meet that thought of the National Guard Corps, but having in mind the military principle that there can never be but one boss in an army, and some of the constitutional and statutory and legal questions involved, we thought that that idea could only be carried out by making this National Guard Council advisory in its functions, not executive and not administrative, but advisory truly, functioning and reporting directly to the Secretary of War.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. And not through the General Staff.

Col. GILLETTE. Not through the General Staff, the idea being that eventually—this legislation is not designed to cure any immediate pressing need or ill that exists, it is designed for future conditions—to create in the United States a broad military policy rather than a narrow, constricted Army program for national security. What we want to do is to enable and compel every citizen of the United States hereafter—it may take 10 years, it may take 25 years; but at the end of that time we hope there will be written into the statutes of the Federal and State Governments the doctrine that every citizen of the United States owes it to the country to train himself to bear arms in the case of emergency, just as he owes it to his country to serve on juries, and any other civil function he may have to perform.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. Does it provide for any method of coordination between the General Staff and the National Guard Council, except through the Secretary of War?

Col. GILLETTE. Yes, sir.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. What is that?

Col. GILLETTE. Between the National Guard and the General Staff?

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. Yes.

Col. GILLETTE. No, sir; not the General Staff of the Regular Army; no, sir.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. Here is what I am getting at. The only avenue of coordination of this council, representing the National Guard, the National Corps, as you call it, and the Regular Army, would be the Secretary of War?

Col. GILLETTE. Yes, sir.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. So that unless he did coordinate in fact the National Guard system as a Regular Army system, there would be some lack?

Col. GILLETTE. Somewhat. Senator, let me say this National Guard Council functions through a National Guard Bureau. That National Guard Bureau would be the means whereby the Regular Army training, which Gen. Carter spoke of and which is very necessary, would be coordinated with the training of the National Guard, but this National Guard Council was to function exclusive of the General Staff, and somewhat of the same general character of the General Staff.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. The fear I had as to that was the old fear we had here—that is, constant antagonism between Regular Guard officers and National Guard officers. I feel there ought to be some means provided that the two forces could be cordinated and function together somewhat.

Col. GILLETTE. Yes; that can best be done, in the views of the National Guard perhaps, by subordinating the Regular Army to the National Guard. Now, I do not like the words "National Guard." I think it has too restricted a meaning in the popular mind. When I say "National Guard" what I really mean is a big National Army where the Reserve Corps and all the different classes and subdivisions that exist now in our Military Establishment are merged into this big National Army, something like the Swiss Army.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. But what I still fear is that the creation of a separate bureau here, functioning independently of the Regular Army, would, in the very nature of things, lead to strife between the two forces. There ought to be some system somewhere, or some agency somewhere, that could take both arms by their neck and shake them up together, if necessary to do it.

Col. GILLETTE. That would be the Secretary of War.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. Well, you might get it done through the Secretary of War, some Secretaries.

Col. GILLETTE. As I say, the legislation is not designed to meet immediate, pressing conditions, because we strove to deal here not with the symptoms but with the disease.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. We can not shut our eyes to this fact, Colonel, because it comes up all the time, that the National Guard feels that it has not been treated properly by the Federal force.

Col. GILLETTE. That is a very strong sentiment in the National Guard.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. Now, if you build up a bureau here, functioning as a National Guard bureau, not connected except through the Secretary of War, with the Federal forces, would you not intensify that feeling, would there not be a struggle here between the National Guard Bureau and the Federal forces?

Col. GILLETTE. Very likely for the time there will be, yes, sir; but unless something of that kind is done, Senator, I am convinced of this, that five years from now there will not be any National Guard, which, as I say, might not be a very blessed thing for the United States for that to happen, but I say that that is a fact. I have been in the National Guard as a private within the last two years, and I think I know how they feel in the division in which I served.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. I am heartily in sympathy with you in your attempt to develop the National Guard, but in that attempt I would not want to create greater conflict than now exists, and I was wondering if you would not have that conflict intensified if you had the separate corps or council here working separately of the General Staff?

Col. GILLETTE. The suggestion that the National Guard be given representation on the General Staff is in line with this basic idea.

Now the National Guard feels, and I think there is a reason, though I personally have no quarrel with the Regular Army, the

National Guard feels they are much more capable of dealing with the problems and condition that confront them than any officer trained in the Regular Army could possibly be, unless that officer had come in from the National Guard. That applies to the question of recruiting, the question of supply, and the question of training.

I will cite an instance. The National Defense Act required that the National Guard units shall hold 48 drills per year, which is perfectly proper. But it has been construed that those drills must be held in each separate week. That means a man, when I go out to recruit one of my companies, this man says, "What kind of an obligation am I going to assume here?" "Why, you are coming into the National Guard and going to get the benefits of armories, and all." "But what have I to do?" "You have to report every week for 48 weeks a year." He says: "I can not do it; it is utterly impossible, because I go away in the summer for my vacation, or my business is such that I want to take a certain length of time for myself," and so on. That is only one instance.

And now that condition, I say, and conditions similar to it, can best be dealt with by National Guard officers who are familiar with the conditions and not the theoretical proposition only. We are confronted with conditions. Nobody knows better than I do that the training and the regulations promulgated for the government of the Regular Army of the United States could not be improved upon when you are talking about professional soldiers, but we are not professional soldiers, we do not pretend to be, all we can hope to do is to keep ourselves in a comparative state of readiness so that we can turn in and learn the technique of soldiering in a short time, and I submit that our record overseas proves that we can do just that.

I will say this, that there is a feeling in the National Guard that that condition was brought about in spite of the Regular Army and not with its help. For that reason this association, or this meeting in St. Louis, resolved that, in their opinion, the best interests of the citizen soldiery would be subserved by taking it out from the control of the Regular Army and establishing it as a separate force. We must always have the Regular Army. There can not be any question about it.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. That is, except in time of war?

Col. GILLETTE. In time of war I think, sir; that the functions of the Regular Army are very well defined.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. But how about the National Guard, would you still have it continue as a separate force?

Col. GILLETTE. In time of war?

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. Yes.

Col. GILLETTE. In time of war, sir, there would be an Army of the United States. I think, myself, it is rather an anomalous condition to have, as we had at one time, the Regular Army, the National Guard, and the National Army all at the one time, and that, of course, could not last any more than this condition can last. We can not have two forces in the United States growing up side by side.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. You approved of that consolidation?

Col. GILLETTE. There is no question there can be only one boss of the Army; there is no question about that. What this is going to do,

Senator. is gradually to build up in this country, we hope, a citizens' army, which will be one great big force; the men who wish to make a profession of arms will bear the same relation to that army that, we will say, the expert chemists of the Steel Corporation now bear to the big mass of stockholders in that corporation. Their advice is sought, their directions are followed up to a certain point, but they do not wag the dog. When the thing is all over and done it is the stockholders that decide the policy to be followed and not the skilled experts, whom we must have; we have got to have.

This is rather crude, rather rough, but it is what the National Guard Association feels must be the first step in bringing about the result that we tried to outline; the National Guard Council functions as an advisory body; it is made up of one member from each State, so that the Secretary of War—make it the Chief of Staff, if you like, it makes no difference so long as its deliberations will have consideration—I would say will be binding on the Chief of Staff—and let them function under the Chief of Staff, but let their assistance amount to something; let their recommendations amount to something and get them into the law.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. You will understand I am not opposing the plan you have in mind, nor am I advocating it. I am simply trying to find out a method of coordination between the two forces in case a council is established for the National Guard.

Col. GILLETTE. They must be coordinated in the last instance by the Commander in Chief. There is no question about that.

Senator FLETCHER. Do you not think you can accomplish what you want by having the National Guard properly represented on the General Staff?

Col. GILLETTE. Yes; if the committee feel that way. I have no pride of opinion about it whatever.

The CHAIRMAN. Your bill does not provide for representation on the General Staff?

Col. GILLETTE. No; because that is just what the convention and the further meetings we had would not do. Our original draft had that feature in it, but that has been eliminated after this conference of the adjutants general and with the National Guard officers from all over the United States.

Senator FLETCHER. Why do they not want representation on the General Staff?

Col. GILLETTE. Because they feel they would not be given sufficient consideration or sufficient attention paid to their recommendations, and they base that feeling on the course of treatment they have had from the Militia Bureau and from the General Staff itself.

The National Guard Bureau is carrying out of the idea by abolishing the Militia Bureau, instituting instead a National Guard Bureau, to be administered by a National Guard officer who shall be selected by this National Guard council, thereby giving each of the States a say in the selection of this man. That man shall be appointed by the President for four years, shall function under the Secretary of War, and we hope thereby to bring about the very necessary cooperation between the Regular Army and the National Guard while this idea is growing.

Senator FLETCHER. Has this bill been referred to the department?

The CHAIRMAN. No; I think it would be an idle thing to do.

Col. GILLETTE. There is no question, Senator.

Senator FLETCHER. I hoped they might be a little enlightened.

Col. GILLETTE. This bill has another distinction that attaches to it. It seems to be the only piece of military legislation that careful study shows to have been submitted by other than Regular Army people. All the military legislation of the United States, if you will read back, you will find has emanated from the Regular Army, and very properly so, perhaps.

But this is the first time that any organized body has ever attempted or has ever laid before any committee of the Congress—I may be wrong in this, but this is the result of my investigation—a complete piece of legislation. We do not pretend it is perfect, but we do say it conveys and contains the ideas of the National Guard as outlined from these various meetings and conferences that I have detailed, so that we feel that, in the first instance, we must be allowed to work out our own salvation and to put into effect our own ideas of what is best for us and what is best for the country along those lines; not thereby impugning either the intelligence or the efficiency or the patriotism of the Regular Army, but we feel that we are entitled to the opportunity to try this line out. The other line certainly has not resulted favorably. Up until this war the very best that you could do would be to get less than 100,000 men to voluntarily enlist in the Regular Army of the United States. We did not have an Army, and you could not get one by voluntary enlistments. So far as the National Guard is concerned, practically the same situation existed there, except we had a matter of 300,000 men, perhaps, perhaps not as many, but in any event, under that system we did not get results. Now, under this system we hope that we will.

The convention also went on record as follows:

That universal military training is a necessary step toward adequate national preparedness and for the proper development of the citizen soldiery of the Nation; and we affirm that it can best be developed in conjunction with the National Guard.

That portion of the program we tried to write into this law in sections 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, and 50 by providing that there shall be established a military training department in the schools of the United States, and I am very frank to say that this portion of this bill in that respect is modeled after the New York State law, with which the drafters of the bill were more familiar than with any other, and a copy of which I have here, if the committee cares to see it.

That training is to be under the direction and control of this National Guard Council, for this reason, that it is the only practical way whereby it will be possible to introduce military training into the States. I think I am right in saying that it will be almost hopeless to try to get legislation on the books giving compulsory military training, but this scheme is figured to induce the States, by appropriations from the Federal Treasury, which will not be excessive, or not be in large amounts, to put in this military department of military training in their schools, where the instructors will be men in their own community, national guardsmen that live right there in their own towns, men in whom the citizens of that particular town

have confidence and who know their children are not going to be subject to any of the evils that seem to exist in the public mind whenever you say the words "Army training," or something of that kind.

The course of instruction is left to the National Guard Council, because that is a representative body and a democratic body. The course of instruction would have to be adjusted all over the United States, hence the necessity for a conference of representatives from each State to lay out this course. What would be a good thing for Alabama would not be a good thing for Maine; what would be a good thing for New York would not work in Nebraska—something of that kind—but by a general conference of representatives from each of the different States, some scheme is bound to be worked out that will be workable, and will insure universal, uniform training.

This does not mean military training as it is popularly understood. All you can do in the first instance is to give these boys the ordinary footwork, the setting-up exercises; perhaps you can teach them the marchings; you can teach them how to walk together; you can teach them cooperation and teamwork. When they finish with the grade schools and go into the high schools, almost every high school now has a corps of cadets, we simply enable the high schools to enlarge their cadet corps and have it equipped by the Federal Government, providing they will train a certain number of young men during that time.

There is also the feature of the intensive training in the summer, where these high-school corps are taken out to camp from these different States, or in the different States, and in that connection that would be of some expense, but I do not think it would be out of proportion to the benefits received.

Now, as soon as a young man gets out of high school and goes into college, any college that can furnish 100 men to take the higher course of training, he finishes his military education in his college, and all the way through this military education is a prerequisite to a certificate of graduation or a diploma. If a young man takes it up he must finish it, just as he finishes a course of Latin or mathematics. There is no compulsion about taking it up, but if he does go into it, if he elects it, he must finish.

The instruction in high school and in grade schools is, as I say, done by the National Guard or National Army officers who live in the locality in which those schools are located. That gives it, we think, the local touch of character that will interest the localities in it. My town of New Lebanon is not particularly interested in what Federal legislation goes on down here, but if in my town, and in the high school in that town, they hear they can put in a course of military training, those people will simply be delighted to do it. That is in New York State.

Take it in Nebraska, where the feeling against compulsory, or any other kind of Army training, is perhaps as strong as in any State in the Union, they would immediately, the educators and the sensible people out there, would immediately see the benefit of this thing and would take it up, and we would have a start toward the preliminary military training that is so essential to prepare this Nation for defense in time of war.

Senator FLETCHER. You do not hold the Federal Government can compel the States to adopt a course of training?

Col. GILLETTE. No; any more than the Federal Government can compel them to keep up a National Guard force.

Senator FLETCHER. You simply offer it as an inducement, that the Federal Government will help them?

Col. GILLETTE. Yes; and leave it to their good sense and patriotism.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. That is one view of military training.

Col. GILLETTE. Yes. When this young man gets into college, there he is taken hold of by experts. His higher education is finished by officers from the Regular Army, or from the National Army, qualified for that purpose, and who are assigned to this college work as they are now. That is our idea in dealing with the military education feature.

The CHAIRMAN. In drafting this provision for this school training and college training and high-school training, did you get any figures showing the percentage of the male population that ordinarily goes to high school?

Col. GILLETTE. Yes; I did, Senator, and I regret to say I do not have them with me. I have them in New York State. I will send them down to you. They are very interesting and they are very illuminating.

The high-school course in New York State, for instance, I think 70 per cent of the high schools in New York State have cadet corps that are purely voluntary, and that are supported by the students themselves, who buy their own things.

The CHAIRMAN. I do not mean quite that. I probably expressed myself badly. I want to know if you have found any figures showing the percentage of boys in the United States who go to high school?

Col. GILLETTE. No; but I think I could get them from our own State, from New York State, and possibly from Ohio and some other States.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. I think the gentleman who testified here from the War Department had charge of this education gave those figures.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes; my recollection is he said only 6 per cent of all the boys in the United States went to high school, but that may be inaccurate.

Senator FLETCHER. I thought it was 8 per cent, but only a small percentage of those that go through the graded schools, even.

Col. GILLETTE. Yes; the ideal way to fix it, if it could be done, would be to start this training in the preliminary schools and the common schools, and those young men that do not go to high schools, you could compel them, put them into the National Army for a term, the men that do not go to college agree that they shall do the same thing, and let the colleges be a sort of Sandhurst, such as they have in England. Make them as many West Points throughout the United States as you care to support. That would be the ideal solution of it. But that is an attempt to meet that feeling, unquestionably broadcast over the land, that we ought to have some form of military training, and we ought to have it compulsory so that it will gradually grow into something worth while.

We think that those sections of the bill would be worth while to try and see what would happen. It might not amount to anything, but it might do some good, and there is no other possible way, except by passing a law compelling military training, and that very question was brought up in the meeting of the adjutants general when there were 20 States represented and voting. We had written into this bill a compulsory military-training feature; that is, jumping from the militia clause back to the Army clause we had attempted to put that compulsory feature in there, too. It was put to vote in that meeting, and, as I say, there were 16 States voting. It was 9 against and 7 for, 9 to 7, and we had to strike that feature out of the bill.

The CHAIRMAN. That was pretty close.

Col. GILLETTE. Pretty close; yes.

The CHAIRMAN. You came within an ace of doing an awfully good thing there.

Col. GILLETTE. Yes, sir; we did. Personally I should like to see compulsory military training and compulsory military service, but the feeling throughout the United States, so far as I sense it in the meetings I have had with these different National Guard officers, is that such a measure would not only not be popular, but would be very antagonistic to the general sentiment.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. Not one in 100 differentiate between universal training and service; do they?

Col. GILLETTE. No, sir.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. When you speak of one they thing of the other?

Col. GILLETTE. Yes, sir. It was our idea to get the thing started and educate the big mass of our people up to what military training means.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. To show them the effect of it?

Col. GILLETTE. To show them the effect of it. I know in New York State, this military training they have there now, they had very hard work last winter to get an appropriation for it, because the people who did not want it were very active and the people who did want it were apathetic, which is always the way in those cases, but finally the thing went over. There is a little town called Round Lake, just above Mechanicsville, which in winter is about as accessible as Nome, or any other Alaskan city up there, and the Round Lake superintendent of schools went to Mechanicsville and saw this military training unit drilling there in the town hall, and he said "I should like to get one of those things up in my school." He had a high school up there. Col. McGaffin said, "You can not get it up there." He said, "I have 32 boys there, if you will send an instructor up." The colonel said, "I will come up and see how many boys you can get." As a matter of fact, at the first meeting there were 32 there, and after that 48, and those boys drove in there from 6 to 8 miles around, and their parents came with them to make them come.

I believe if we can write into the law something of this kind that will enable the States that do want to do it to get aboard and get started, we will gradually get in the path where we can get universal military training, and everybody will be perfectly satisfied with it. I agree with you, Senator, that opposition to it comes from ignorance more than anything else.

The CHAIRMAN. You said a moment ago, Colonel, you thought it hopeless to get upon the statute books at this time a provision for compulsory military training.

Col. GILLETTE. That perhaps was rather a wide statement.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, however, I gather from that it was at least the opinion of your meetings.

Col. GILLETTE. It was the opinion of our meetings, yes.

The CHAIRMAN. That this was your alternative?

Col. GILLETTE. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Had you known of another scheme of an alternative, and that is that the Federal Government, by using the cantonments which it now has, which will house many, many thousands, would open up a course of military training to every young man of 19 who wanted to take advantage of it, make it voluntary?

Col. GILLETTE. Yes; but the difficulty there, Senator, is that if you can not by voluntary enlistments get your National Guard companies up to what they ought to be, how can you recruit, by voluntary enlistment, a training proposition?

Now, the Plattsburg idea was fine business, and Plattsburg reached a lot of young men in the summer who are willing to spend their vacation period in that way, but the Plattsburg idea can not apply to the young man of 18 or 20, who has to go to work because he has not got the time to devote to it—that is, in any quantity.

The CHAIRMAN. You mean the Plattsburg idea only gathered in the sons of the well to do?

Col. GILLETTE. I would not say that. I would say the Plattsburg idea only brings in the young men of the country who really do not need it. We will put it that way. The chaps that really need the training are the fellows who have neither time, money, nor opportunity to get it—those who think they have not.

Now, if you can get them interested in something near home, if you can get them interested in something in their own town, where they can get something of the advantage of a Plattsburg camp, with a minimum interruption to their earning capacity, and actual time they wish to devote to other things, that is the ideal way to catch them, and we hope we can catch them through this National Guard proposition of establishing a reserve. We have put in here a National Reserve, any man who has been discharged from the National Guard, who has served in the armed forces of the United States can enlist in this Reserve and be attached to the local unit of the community in which he lives. He does not have to attend the armory exercises. He knows all he needs to know about squads east and west and sighting rifles and that sort of thing, but he would like to go out once or twice a year and shoot a rifle, and go out once or twice a year and do a tour of duty in camp. I know many of them would like that.

We provide that in the National Reserve, but we make it local in character and local in application. It may not work out any better than the present features of the national defense act, where I think the Reserve Army consisted at one time of 12 or 15 men.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. Gardner's dinner?

Col. GILLETTE. Yes.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. That did not prove anything, though.

Col. GILLETTE. No; it did not.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. I heard Gen. Miles here. He was a very distinguished officer; he testified before this committee one day that we did not need any army, because he said there were so many men who had gone through military training at one place or another that would organize an army whenever it was needed in this country. I know the pacifists used that statement in their propaganda.

Col. GILLETTE. Yes. That is utterly out of the question.

In the other features of this bill, we have followed, so far as we can, the language of the national defense act; putting into this bill in that language the ideas that we want to see incorporated in the statute, because the national defense act is familiar to all military men the language has been construed from time to time, and there can not be any question about the grammatical construction or the definitions of words as used. As I say, we followed as closely as we could the national defense act. The question of the appointment of the National Guard Corps and the organization of the National Guard units, and the commissioning of officers, I am convinced, as a lawyer, that it would be impossible to commission officers in the National Guard, except by the various States, because the Federal Constitution reserves to the States the commissioning of the officers and the training of the militia; and if this is going to be a military force it has got to be handled as a State proposition, and we have got to devise some way of coordinating the 48 little armies that we have heard about under one head. We hope we have done that through the National Guard bill. If the Army is going to be raised under the Army clause of the Constitution, and be a purely Federal force, we feel that it is impossible to do that, because it has been tried; unless compulsory service is put into effect. If it is, it settles all that.

The CHAIRMAN. In what way has that been tried?

Col. GILLETTE. I say it never has been tried. The draft was an illustration.

The CHAIRMAN. I understood you to say it has been tried.

Col. GILLETTE. No; it never has been tried in time of peace.

The CHAIRMAN. You probably heard me ask Gen. Carter about his opinion of Gen. O'Ryan's suggestion?

Col. GILLETTE. Yes; that is the Calder bill. The Calder bill was an effort to put the National Guard under the Army feature of the Federal Constitution. That was what was the intention and the purpose to do.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. By whom was that bill prepared, Mr. Chairman?

The CHAIRMAN. I think by the adjutant general of New York.

Col. GILLETTE. It was by Gens. Barry and O'Ryan.

The CHAIRMAN. I think that is not quite accurate.

Col. GILLETTE. Not quite. I sat in on the conference.

The CHAIRMAN. As I remember Gen. O'Ryan's testimony, he lays particular emphasis on the absolute necessity, even under the Army clause, of maintaining the local character of the troops, of units, and their traditions, their numerals, their designations.

Col. GILLETTE. Yes; that is all very true.

The CHAIRMAN. So your second regiment would still be the second regiment, but would be under a different category in its relations to the general scheme.

Col. GILLETTE. But I think Gen. Carter would agree with me there that you are destroying the whole efficiency of the Army. You are going to tie down the administration of a force by restrictions as to locality of troops, location of troops, and matters of that kind; you destroy its efficiency as a mobile force. It is not an army then; it is a fixed constabulary, you might say. That is, they are asking the United States to support the New York State Guard, practically.

The CHAIRMAN. It does it now, pretty nearly.

Col. GILLETTE. Still, we own our own armories; we are a little better off than some of them.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. You spoke a while ago, and some others mentioned, the fact that the National Guard hardly received a fair deal in this late war.

Would you mind telling us in what particulars they were not treated as they ought to have been treated by the Regular Army?

Col. GILLETTE. Personally, I have had no disagreeable experiences with Regular Army officers, but I know of any number of cases where there was rank injustice perpetrated on individuals.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. Officers?

Col. GILLETTE. Officers and men both, where National Guard officers were treated with—I will not say with scant courtesy, with no courtesy at all, in the training camps they attended. I think there was an institution in Texas that was known as Patsy Dugan's "Mad House," and some of the officers that appeared before you are graduates from that school. I hope that Col. Burkhead and Col. Colson and two or three more will come here, and I am sure they can tell you from personal experience what that was. That was an unfortunate situation, and it has raised really what is a false issue.

There is nothing wrong with the officers in the Regular Army, not a thing. I think the system is rotten, because the able men in the Army never get a chance; they are never heard from. They have managed to suppress progressive officers—call them the younger element—by a system of regulations, precedents, etc. Anyone will tell you that, civilian or soldier. So far as injustices to the men are concerned, I have known of rank injustices perpetrated on the enlisted personnel. Go up into my country right now and ask any man who served in a replacement division. I know of one case where a man was drafted from New York State, and he was sent into a division, and that division was made a replacement division, and when a combat division was reduced in numbers, the division commander requisitioned for so many men, so many lieutenants, so many corporals, so many sergeants, just as he requisitioned for so many mules or horses, and they were sent to him, irrespective of any question of morale or esprit, or anything of that kind. They treated the men as they treated animals, the same system, and it is not right; you can not run an army that way. Men have got some feeling, even though they are soldiers—they have got some human feelings left in them. For instance, at Dollon, France, they sent me 64 men from California, utter strangers to my people, yet they must have had, and did have in the replacement divisions, any number of men from New York State and from the locality my men came from.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. They paid no attention to that?

Col. GILLETTE. No, sir; they issued them just as they issued clothing, mules, or anything else.

I had an instance of a lieutenant who went over as a sergeant, his name was Wolfenden. He lived in Utica. He was wounded in the Argonne. He went from us down south to some of the American divisions, and while he was in hospital at Savigny, I think, he went into St. Lazarre one night and, it was charged, he got drunk. It was a very reprehensible thing to do, if he did do it, as a great many others did. He was arrested by the military police, who, by the way, were Regular Army troops, because the distinction continued even after the order canceling the different armies went into effect. He was tried before a general court-martial composed of Regular Army officers, for being drunk. They found him guilty. They sentenced him to imprisonment for some weeks. Now, this man was a second lieutenant, an officer who held a commission in the United States Army, and they fined him a year's pay. He came back from the hospital, was confined pending the time his pay as a second lieutenant would pay up his fine for that infraction of the regulations in France. Now that man does not feel very kindly toward the Regular Army, because they gave probably the necessary, what they thought was the necessary discipline; the iron hand was closed down on him without regard as to his rank, or anything else, and I interested myself as a lawyer in his case, and, finally, after he had served 10 months and had been deprived of his pay for 10 months, was finally discharged from the Army.

There are any number of instances like that that they lay to the Regular Army. Whether the Regular Army is responsible for it or not in every instance I do not know, but that is the feeling that exists, and it is going to take a long time to cure it, Senator.

At this convention which formulated these resolutions I have been talking about here, when we from New York went out there, I thought we were pretty radical. Our idea was that the Regular Army ought to be made to see that they did not know all there was to know about National Guard affairs, and about the National Guard men. We have had some very fine inspectors and instructors in New York State, and I have known them all, and they are splendid gentlemen, good soldiers, no better. They were victims of this system. There is no better friend of the National Guard now than Gen. Carter, yet Gen. Carter can not put his ideas into effect, because he would have to work up through the General Staff, and when it gets to the top of the General Staff it is pitched over.

When we got out there to St. Louis and this convention really got under way, I do not believe there were—there were perhaps between 250 and 350 National Guard officers, some who had been in the service and some who had not, and I do not suppose the Regular Army had ten friends in that whole outfit, and those men had served in the A. E. F. from Belgium to the Swiss border, and had been connected at one time or another with every organization of the A. E. F. and with a great many organizations here in the States, yet the whole consensus of the opinion was just what I am telling you now.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. If I recall its position, I think the General Staff's bill continues to discriminate against the National Guard.

Col. GILLETTE. Oh, yes; indeed. For instance, here is a distinction that I think is very unfair.

We had a colonel, as a matter of fact, Col. Taylor; he was the colonel of our regiment—the 106th Infantry. He went overseas

with us, and he carried the thing along and he brought that regiment clear through to the end. He went out to Fort Sill as a colonel, I think, to a school out there of some kind, and Col. Taylor was certainly as well educated in a military sense as many of the Regular Army officers who were there for that particular course of instruction, you see, yet he was there as a captain, on a captain's pay, on a captain's allowance, and the man next to him, who happened to be from the Regular Army, a major, was drawing the pay of his grade, which was more or less of a humiliation to the man, I should say. I would not attend a service school on a bet.

The CHAIRMAN. I think that is due to a provision in the national defense act.

Col. GILLETTE. Of course it is. Here is another thing in here.

The CHAIRMAN. That was another thing that the War Department insisted on, that any National Guard officer, in time of peace, attending an Army school, should not under any circumstances be paid higher than the pay of a captain.

Col. GILLETTE. Yes; and should not get any allowances or anything else. That feature should be provided for and a very liberal detail of officers be given from the National Guard troops. We want this added to any such provision of the act as that—I think it comes in under section 32, page 30 of the act:

DETAIL OF INSTRUCTORS FROM THE REGULAR ARMY.—For the purpose of increasing the efficiency of the military forces of the United States and of coordinating the several elements, departments, corps, and branches of the service, the Secretary of War may, upon the request of the governor of any State or Territory, detail officers and enlisted men of the Regular Army for duty with the National Guard of the same, and may detail officers and enlisted men of the National Guard and the National Guard Reserve for duty with units of the Regular Army at encampments, maneuvers, or other field of service, and such officers and men shall be relieved from such duty upon like request.

Now, the situation is, under the national defense act—it seldom happens, but it has happened—that where an inspector-instructor is detailed to a State, and he does not get along very well with the people whom he has to inspect and instruct, then, in that case, that State is out of luck. This man will stay there until the officer detailing him makes up his mind to take him away. That is very unfortunate. It wastes the money. There is no power in the governor or anybody else to be relieved from an unwelcome detail. Those are only a few of the many instances that go to make up that unfortunate feeling which I have spoken of.

The CHAIRMAN. Does your bill correct the very evident injustice done in article 119?

Col. GILLETTE. What was that?

The CHAIRMAN. The Articles of War.

Col. GILLETTE. I do not recall just what it was.

The CHAIRMAN. It gives the Regular Army officer precedence in the grade over every other officer.

Col. GILLETTE. No; we do not attempt to deal with anything affecting the Regular Army in this bill.

The CHAIRMAN. But that affects the National Guard also.

Col. GILLETTE. It affects the National Guard in a certain way, yes; but if we are allowed to run our own affairs, we can stand it to have the other fellow go into dinner ahead of us.

The CHAIRMAN. But it does not stop there?

Col. GILLETTE. No; it does not stop there. If two officers happen to be in the same cantonment or the same camp, the Regular Army officer takes precedence, but I do not understand that a lieutenant would take precedence ahead of a National Guard colonel.

Now, Gen. Carter mentioned some things here that I think I have covered to some extent. Of course, the big objection, the objection I am prepared to argue to the limit, is that these 48 men on this National Guard Council should not be rejected simply on the ground that it may result in political favoritism or political control or anything of that kind. That is just as true with the General Staff. They must be National Guard officers and must have had some experience in military affairs and must be familiar with the game, and if the governor of any State is so lost to all sense of patriotism and wisdom that he is going to pay a political debt with an office of this kind, I do not see how by legislation you can stop it, or how you can hedge or surround the appointment with any safeguard that the governor of a State could not override if he wanted to. Then you could give him a rank of a certain kind; you can write into this bill what was written in the national defense act in regard to the Philippine Islands, that he must be a man of certain service and experience, etc.

We do not pretend to do anything but lay down general forms that must be further amplified by regulation.

Gen. Carter spoke of the necessity of having the training of the National Guard coordinated with that of the Regular Army. Of course we must not start on the assumption that the National Guard is going to start a new army, because it would not be reasonable or patriotic. We must not be charged with things of that kind unless there is some proof brought to the effect that we are threatening to do it. The National Guard Council and the National Guard Bureau would naturally coordinate with the Regular Army up to this point, as has been demonstrated time and again. But when a National Guard idea is better than a Regular Army idea, then the Regular Army should conform to it.

The CHAIRMAN. And who would be the determining factor in a case of that kind? The Secretary of War?

Col. GILLETTE. The Secretary of War; yes, sir. We had an instance of that during the war. We had in the service Col. Atterbury, who went abroad to take charge of the railroads, and in a great many of his actions, backed by his experience as a railroad man, they ran counter to the opinions of the military superiors, who did not know anything about the railroads, and on each occasion necessity compelled that the precedents and the ideas of the superior officers should give way to the practical necessities of the case. Now, that is just what we hope will happen here. If the National Guard can demonstrate that a company of 65 men is more efficient than a company of 100, then the Regular Army must conform to that idea.

Now, the General spoke about the separate platoon system. I do not think it would work. I know it would not work in New York State. I have got a regiment located in eight different towns, and I have tried that platoon system in the regiment, and I have been waited upon by the chambers of commerce, all societies down

to the Ladies' Aid Society, with petitions demanding that the letter of designation be not taken away from that town, and my answer has been to them "produce a company." But they can not produce a company of 100 men. They can produce a company of 65 or 70 men, but they can not do anything further. Now, that is an experience that Gen. Carter never had, and he does not know anything about that.

Now, this situation would not have arisen if the judge advocate of the Army had not ruled that when the Army was demobilized the troops were thereby discharged and return to civil life. That was a legal opinion, and nothing else. I differed with him. I do not believe that the Federal Government can release me from my obligation to the State because, when I enlisted, I entered into what might be called a dual contract, one contract with the State and one contract with the Nation. Now, the Federal Government can release me from my contract with the Federal Government, but can not release me from my contract with the State. But the judge advocate has not taken that view. In my second regiment, in every town I could have put back better than 90 men——

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. They are there to-day?

Col. GILLETTE. They are there to-day, but I can not get them back. Now, that suggestion that the overseas men are enlisting in any quantity in my instance is not the case. I know it is not. I have been——

The CHAIRMAN. What do you think the reason for that is?

Col. GILLETTE. Well, Mr. Chairman, they are fed up. They are through. It is this way: Some of them have one reason and some have another, but it is generally because they have had enough. I am not going to try to tell you that any different or other legislation that could be put on the statute books would bring them back, because I do not think it would. I do not blame them. They all want to be generals, is one thing——

The CHAIRMAN. They like the looks of those stars?

Col. GILLETTE. They are through.

The CHAIRMAN. Are there any other things you want to call attention to in this bill, or have you any general suggestions to make on the general situation.

Col. GILLETTE. Why, I do not think so, sir. As I say, there will be other officers here behind me. All I wanted to do is to give you an idea of the mechanics of the thing and how it was done. We have divided it into three big features, putting it on a separate basis, getting a National Guard organization simply, then recognizing in some features the location of the units, and the number, and so on. the change in the number of the National Guard. We have omitted the Senatorial proportion. It is difficult enough to raise a quota, but take a State like, say, Oklahoma, we can raise enough to make that uniform with our Representatives; but we have got two Senators, just like New York. Then the military training feature, and some minor changes in the court-martial feature. We want to get our own court-martial.

The CHAIRMAN. Col. Maddox is here, a National Guard officer in Gen. Carter's bureau. He came here to be heard this afternoon, and we will hear from him now. We are very much obliged to you, Col. Gillette, for the information that you have given us.

Col. GILLETTE. I should like to submit for the record communication from Gen. Nash, of date November 19, 1919, as Gen. Nash will not be able to attend these hearings.

The CHAIRMAN. That may be included in the hearing.

(The letter referred to is here printed in full, as follows:)

MILITARY DEPARTMENT, STATE OF GEORGIA,
Atlanta, November 19, 1919.

Senator JAMES W. WADSWORTH, Jr.,

*Chairman, Committee on Military Affairs, Senate Chamber,
Washington, D. C.*

MY DEAR SENATOR: Upon receipt of your telegram dated the 14th instant, I wired you by day letter, which I now confirm, as follows:

"Your telegram 14th received; just out of hospital; convalescent from operation; not in physical condition to make trip unless absolutely necessary; if so, wire me.

"My testimony follows: We are being strangled with technicalities by War Department. They are imposing war-time organization and conditions upon us in times of peace, and demanding a degree of perfection in organization, strength, and efficiency not possible or attempted in the Regular Army. The professional soldier has no understanding or conception of the conditions confronting the citizen soldier, who can not be treated on the basis of a regular, his service is an avocation, not a profession, and he will not make the sacrifice necessary to enlist unless the service is made attractive, interesting and beneficial.

"A widespread and general spirit of resentment exists among discharged officers and soldiers alike, on account of the discrimination shown them and the treatment received from the Regular Army officers during the period of their service. Breaking up and scattering the personnel and changing old organizations from one branch of the service to another during the war was a crime which can not be forgiven, and officers and men will not join again under existing laws and risk a recurrence of similar action by those in authority, while laws which permitted such actions exist or remain in force.

"A National Guard corps, under the control of National Guard officers, functioning directly with the Secretary of War analogous to the marine corps, separate and distinct, and out from control of Regular Army officers, is the only solution. The country does not need a large standing army of greater strength than that necessary to garrison our possessions. The several States under their constitutional rights can and will cooperate and maintain a citizen army for the country's use in time of emergency. This was demonstrated during the World War by the National Guard, who, despite the obstacles thrown in their way; the alleged rotten system and lack of cooperation between the 48 different States; the threadbare argument of the Regular Army officer that the system was rotten, and that it was impossible to obtain results commensurate with the labor, money, and time expended, gave a pretty good account of themselves and both officers and men proved the equal, if not the superior, to many of the professionals.

"The conclusions reached here, owing to the many ambiguous letters received from the militia bureau; the constantly changing attitude and rulings upon all subjects; the continual delay and haggling over trivial details, and the apparent conflicting statements by different officials, we are constrained, though regretfully, to the conclusion that there either exists inefficiency and lack of cooperation between the bureaus of the War Department, or there is a direct and intentional effort to deceive and confuse the general public and our Representatives in Congress concerning the real issues. The citizens of this State desire most earnestly to see enacted a common sense practical law to govern us in time of peace, versus the technical application, in time of peace, of theoretical laws, framed to govern in time of some future war in which we may or may not be involved."

Receipt of your wire, dated the 16th instant, is acknowledged, in which you notify me regarding the postponement of the hearings on the army reorganization bill, and I trust that when resumed I will be able to be present.

Respectfully,

JAMES OTT NASH,
The Adjutant General.

**STATEMENT OF LIEUT. COL. F. M. MADDOX, LIEUTENANT COLONEL
FOURTH ALABAMA, DETAILED IN THE MILITIA BUREAU.**

The CHAIRMAN. Give your name and your position.

Col. MADDOX. I am lieutenant colonel Fourth Alabama, detailed in the Militia Bureau.

The CHAIRMAN. And what has been your experience in the war, Colonel?

Col. MADDOX. I was first in command of the First Alabama Infantry, which was afterward designated One hundred and twenty-third Infantry and Thirty-first Division, was used as replacement Thirty-first Division with 9 other divisions—10 in all—the Le Mans. After that I was assigned as commanding officer of the Eight hundred and sixth, brought it back to Camp Upton, where some were mustered out, and assigned to duty at Governors Island, and was mustered out at Camp Gordon October 13, and mustered in November 10, 1919, State of Alabama.

The CHAIRMAN. What observations have you to make upon this bill, or on the general situation, which you think would be of interest to this committee?

Col. MADDOX. Really, I have not had an opportunity to go over this bill, Mr. Chairman—this bill 3424—but I do believe that a representative from each State should be detailed or assigned to represent that State and be gotten together to formulate the policy for the National Guard. I think that, if I understand it, is about the only change that has been made in the bill we now have, or one of the main changes, because the States have not, as I understand it, had any say in the laws that pertain to their citizen soldiers; and take it in any business, they would act as directors. Directors of a concern usually make the plans that run the business, and I think that these men—the men detailed from the States—would be interested and would know exactly the needs of that State. By bringing them together plans could be formulated and suggestions made to the Secretary of War through the Militia Bureau, or whatever the head of the guard was called; assigning those with the officers that they would have here would cause a general working out of plans that would get results.

The CHAIRMAN. You approve of the National Guard Council, do you?

Col. MADDOX. I believe that the National Guard Council could be of service. Each State would feel that it had had a say in making recommendations as to the laws necessary to carry on the guard. I believe we would get better results than what we have now.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you believe it should report only to the Secretary of War?

Col. MADDOX. Only to the Secretary of War, unless the guard is represented on the General Staff.

I think that that is proper. We should have one big army, that is the one thing, but as we find it, and as has been stated here by the National Guard officer, that is hard to have. While a great many of the officers in the service were very considerate and seemed to understand the National Guard, a great many of them condemned us before we started. As it is, we stand condemned before we start. At least, I found that as a general rule.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. You think there was an assumption that the National Guard officer, that the National Guard enlisted men, did not know as much as the Regular Army officers and the Regular Army enlisted men?

Col. MADDOX. Yes; they said so. A great many of them said so. Now, there are a great many officers in the Army who have worked hard for the guard, who have been of great help to us. On the other hand, there are some few that have actually, I think, tried to do everything they could to break it up.

The CHAIRMAN. You were saying a moment ago that the best thing would be to have one big army. Have you thought of the suggestion of the two officers of organizing it under the Army clause?

Col. MADDOX. I have. I agree with Gen. Carter in the universal training, and along the lines as have been talked over here, but on the other hand we must have, the National Guard must have, representation, if it is going to be run on the plan that is now in force. It is hard for any young Regular Army officer to see a National Guard officer with the rank of a field officer on the General Staff, because when we went into service, I mean the field officers, we went in as colonels; our jobs were just a little bit too large, and a great many captains in the Regular Army wanted them. It is just like when the Democrats are in power; they get the good jobs, and when the Republicans come there is always a change.

The CHAIRMAN. And you think some others would like them?

Col. MADDOX. It is not so in peace times, but when we are called into service.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. The West Pointer, for instance, who is a captain in the Regular Army, resented the men coming in from civil life and having higher positions—

Col. MADDOX. No; I will not say it is the West Pointer altogether. I found that the officers of above 38 years of age are generally fair-minded officers as a general rule. The youngster is the one that seems to resent the idea, he having spent 10 or 12 years in the Army, and to have a National Guardsman, who perhaps spent 20, coming in and outranking him.

The CHAIRMAN. How is the guard in Alabama getting along now?

Col. MADDOX. We have eight companies organized.

The CHAIRMAN. Of Infantry?

Col. MADDOX. Of Infantry.

The CHAIRMAN. And on the 65 or the 100 basis?

Col. MADDOX. Sixty-five. It is going to be hard to organize the companies into sets of 100, because in the South the armories, the rooms were built to accommodate 65 men, as a general rule, and so far as the platoons are concerned, as the colonel preceding me has explained, my regiment being scattered over south Alabama, I found that it did not work. You can not get them down for inspection; you have got to go to them, and just as the former colonel said, they want the captaincy; when they get a few more men than the other platoon they think that they should have the captaincy and the name changed to the town with the largest platoon and it causes a division of responsibility of property, and after every formation in which the company is assembled, as a whole, property responsibility

always arises. I have tried it out. We have hard work in getting up the companies we started.

The CHAIRMAN. And it didn't work?

Col. MADDOX. It did not work there. Perhaps it might work in other places.

The CHAIRMAN. What are your duties in the Militia Bureau?

Col. MADDOX. Well, I am assigned as an advisor in the Infantry to Gen. Carter.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you keep in touch with the Infantry, the condition of the Infantry of the guard all over the United States?

Col. MADDOX. I have just been there a few days, but I expect to do that. I will say that Gen. Carter and all of the other officers there are doing everything in their power to reorganize the Guard, and they are going as far as they can go.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you object to having the General Staff enjoy any jurisdiction over the guard?

Col. MADDOX. I would not mind—it is all right for the General Staff, but I believe we should have representation on the General Staff.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you think you could be adequately protected by such representation?

Col. MADDOX. I do, if we are not too few in number.

The CHAIRMAN. You men the War Department General Staff?

Col. MADDOX. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Assuming that we had a War Department General Staff to be composed of a maximum of 100 officers of the Regular Army, how many guard officers would you say should be added to that guard detail?

Col. MADDOX. Well, I would say 20, or one for each department, and with enough rank to be the right hand man of the Chief of Staff.

The CHAIRMAN. Would you have them assigned in all the subdivisions of the General Staff or would you put them mostly in the War Plans Division?

Col. MADDOX. I think there should be some in all branches, so as to be in touch with the whole situation.

The CHAIRMAN. And you would have them in operations P. S. & P. and War Plans?

Col. MADDOX. I think so.

The CHAIRMAN. What would be your idea in the event that the Militia Bureau was continued of having adequate National Guard representation on that?

Col. MADDOX. I think that the Militia Bureau is doing all that they can consistently do. They are trying, but it seems to me that it is controlled, of course, by the General Staff. If the Militia Bureau could report direct to the Secretary of War it would be all right, but I know in a great many cases that the ideas of the Militia Bureau do not exactly agree with the ideas of the General Staff.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. About what percentage of the ideas emanating from the Militia Bureau are approved by the General Staff?

Col. MADDOX. I believe there should be one or two officers representing the Infantry and the Artillery and the different branches in each department.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. No; I do not think you understand the question. Your bureau, through Gen. Carter, makes recommendations very frequently with reference to the National Guard?

Col. MADDOX. Yes, sir.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. Now, those recommendations go to the Secretary of War through the Chief of Staff?

Col. MADDOX. As I understand it.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. And suppose the Chief of Staff disapproves of a recommendation, it would not get to the Secretary of War?

Col. MADDOX. I have not been there long enough to say positively about that, but I do not think it would.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. Do you know what proportion of the recommendations are approved?

Col. MADDOX. No; I could not say.

The CHAIRMAN. I want to ask some more questions along the line of liberalizing the system. Do you think that a considerable number of the National Guard officers and reserves would take advantage of post-graduate schools of the Army if the doors of those schools were opened wide enough, say at Riley and Leavenworth and Bragg and so on?

Col. MADDOX. I believe that we could get a number to attend those schools. I believe that a number would be glad to attend those schools.

The CHAIRMAN. The time was when they were not permitted to attend except by special order, which was rather difficult to get.

Col. MADDOX. I think that a number would be glad to attend, because I have found that the majority of young officers in the guard are always trying to better their conditions. They love the game. They are not in it for the money that is in it. Take, for instance, the school that we had in Alabama. Maj. Guthrie was detailed in Alabama as an Engineer officer in charge of the rivers and harbors, and he offered his services as an instructor for our schools, and we had our schools and they were supposed to be open for two hours, and we would find them open until 12 o'clock quite frequently. They would often ask for an additional night in the same week to carry on a subject that was under discussion.

The CHAIRMAN. That is, a night school?

Col. MADDOX. Yes, sir; a night school. Of course it was only one night a week.

The CHAIRMAN. And those were guard officers from that locality?

Col. MADDOX. From that locality, in Mobile and near-by.

The CHAIRMAN. And that was purely a voluntary school?

Col. MADDOX. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. That Maj. Guthrie started there?

Col. MADDOX. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. He was stationed there at that time, was he?

Col. MADDOX. He was, as Engineer officer.

The CHAIRMAN. That showed a very good spirit on his part.

Col. MADDOX. Maj. Guthrie was very much interested, and told us a real war would show the guard to be a better prepared machine than most of the people had any idea of, but he stated that he believed it would be better to go in as a reserve officer, as he believed

they would see service before the guard as a whole, and it did a lot of good for the regiment.

The CHAIRMAN. Are there any additional observations that you want to make about this bill?

Col. MADDOX. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. The thing that strikes your eye first is the National Guard Council, I assume?

Col. MADDOX. Yes; I believe in the National Guard Council. At least it could not do any harm to have a man from each State called in once a year to talk over the affairs that pertain to the military, to the States and to the United States as a whole. I do not agree with Gen. Carter in the six months' training, because I believe that would be a little too long and they would be fed up with it. Three months would be long enough, and I think could be utilized between school sessions, but six months would overlap.

(Thereupon, at 4.55 p. m., the committee adjourned until the call of the chair.)

REORGANIZATION OF THE ARMY.

THURSDAY, DECEMBER 4, 1919.

UNITED STATES SENATE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON MILITARY AFFAIRS,
Washington, D. C.

The subcommittee met pursuant to call at 2.15 p. m., in the committee room, Capitol, Senator James W. Wadsworth, jr., presiding.

Present: Senators Wadsworth (chairman), Sutherland, Chamberlain, Fletcher, and Thomas.

STATEMENT OF MAJ. A. B. CRITCHFIELD, UNITED STATES ARMY.

The CHAIRMAN. Just give your full name to the reporter, please.

Maj. CRITCHFIELD. Major A. B. Critchfield.

The CHAIRMAN. And, Major, in addition to having been adjutant general of the State of Ohio, what, in a general way, has been your military experience?

Maj. CRITCHFIELD. Well, Senator, I have been pretty nearly everything. I was captain in the Spanish War, and major for eight or nine years, and lieutenant colonel, and adjutant general of the division, and adjutant general of the State, and I was in The Adjutant General's office for nine years. Have been a member of the National Guard for 36 years.

The CHAIRMAN. This is in the Ohio National Guard that you are speaking of?

Maj. CRITCHFIELD. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, in this war.

Maj. CRITCHFIELD. Well, I have been in this war twice. This is my third term in the Army. I was drafted and mustered in at Chicago on the 2d day of May and was discharged without reason or cause on the 11th, paid \$1.15 for the telegram notifying me of my discharge, and was reappointed and commissioned and got my discharge, appointment, and commission in the same mail. Now, I do not know anything about it further than that.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. You make one statement that I know you do not intend to make or do not intend for it to appear the way you said it. You said that you were drafted.

Maj. CRITCHFIELD. Yes.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. You were not drafted. You were requested to serve.

Maj. CRITCHFIELD. I was ordered to Chicago to muster in, and I was a member of the National Guard, and I was ordered to Chicago and reported there.

Senator SUTHERLAND. That was an order issued by the governor of your State?

Maj. CRITCHFIELD. No; by The Adjutant General of the Army.

The CHAIRMAN. Under the act of 1916?

Maj. CRITCHFIELD. Yes. I have been before your committee a time or two, and somebody did not like something I said, I guess; I did not get the particulars.

Senator SUTHERLAND. Did you subsequently go into the service?

Maj. CRITCHFIELD. Oh, yes; I got my discharge and my appointment and commission in the same mail. I beat Flanagan—off again, on again, gone again.

Senator SUTHERLAND. So you ended up by being in the service?

Maj. CRITCHFIELD. Oh, yes; I am still in the service. Yes, sir; I am still working.

The CHAIRMAN. What has been the character of your services, Major, during this war?

Maj. CRITCHFIELD. I am in the Infantry School of Arms.

The CHAIRMAN. At Camp Benning?

Maj. CRITCHFIELD. At Camp Benning.

The CHAIRMAN. As an instructor?

Maj. CRITCHFIELD. Yes; and I have been more than that. I have done nearly all of the temporary construction of the rifle range and things of that kind and also instructor in small arms.

Senator SUTHERLAND. He ought to be able to give us some information about Camp Benning.

Maj. CRITCHFIELD. Yes, sir; I can do so. That is the best camp in the United States by long odds. I agree entirely with Gen. Bullard.

Senator SUTHERLAND. You think it ought to be kept?

Maj. CRITCHFIELD. Yes, sir; there is not any doubt about it. It is just as Gen. Malone outlined to your committee. I am speaking of the National Guard. The natural conditions there are simply wonderful. The cost of construction can be reduced to a minimum there. The whole country is supplied with good water, and there is every kind of terrain you could imagine. We can have an Artillery field and an aviation field, and everything imaginable. God did his part right in that camp, and my judgment is it would be a tremendous mistake to salvage that property. It ought to be retained in preference to anything else that I have ever seen that the Government has charge of or owns; and I believe every Army officer who has ever seen it will agree to that proposition; and I believe your committee, if you could go down and see it, would agree to it in a minute. The House committee, I know, did.

Senator FLETCHER. If you are going to give up anything, give up something else?

Maj. CRITCHFIELD. Yes, sir.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. It is a nice climate, too; isn't it?

Maj. CRITCHFIELD. Yes, sir; they have mild winters down there.

The CHAIRMAN. You have made rather a specialty, haven't you, in training young men to shoot?

Maj. CRITCHFIELD. Yes, sir; I have always been a crank on that subject and have spent a lot of time on it.

Senator SUTHERLAND. Is the school in operation there now?

Maj. CRITCHFIELD. Yes, sir; the last graduating class from West Point is there now, and there are probably four or five hundred students there at present. It is not in good shape. For instance, the sewer is not entirely complete; it is about 98 per cent complete, and it ought to be connected up. The waterworks are in the same condition; and there is no provision in any appropriation bill for setting up the stoves; and there ought to be fire in those buildings.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. I should have thought they would have transferred some of these conveniences from camps they intended to abandon and put them in Camp Benning.

Maj. CRITCHFIELD. I think there is material there on the ground, but there is no money to install it.

Senator SUTHERLAND. They find out ways to do everything that they really want to do. I do not know why they have not done those things.

Maj. CRITCHFIELD. There is something in that, too.

Senator SUTHERLAND. There is danger of some of those boys getting pneumonia down there, isn't there?

Maj. CRITCHFIELD. Yes, sir. If it happens to set in wet. They have had very favorable weather so far.

Senator FLETCHER. It will get to be pretty chilly from now on.

Maj. CRITCHFIELD. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. The completion of that camp was dependent, of course, on the action of Congress.

Senator FLETCHER. Do you think it would be a good idea for the subcommittee to go down there and look it over?

Maj. CRITCHFIELD. Yes, sir. Then you would know what we are talking about when we come before you. The House committee was in the same shape. They went down, and when Mr. Anthony came back and he told me personally "That beats anything I have ever seen." He said, "I was against it, but I will have to be for it," and he will present the bill to retain it in the House. It is already reported out with a unanimous report for Benning. That was after he was down there and saw for himself. That is all that is necessary. Anybody that will go there and see it will have no trouble in comparing it to other camps. It is superior, and especially for the purpose of this school, because you have every kind of terrain there, a splendid water supply. Right back of Gen. Farnsworth's house, within 100 yards from his house, there is a spring that will run a 6 or 8 inch pipe. It is a tremendous spring, and every condition is there present.

The CHAIRMAN. We would like to have your comments on this military problem, and especially that part of it with which you are most familiar; that is, the connection of the National Guard with the general system.

Major CRITCHFIELD. Well, sir, I have read this bill under consideration.

The CHAIRMAN. Which one?

Maj. CRITCHFIELD. The Frelinghuysen bill. There is not anything especially new in this bill. They are all things that have been

presented here before in other measures except sections 27 and 28, pertaining to the council, and that is new. We have been trying to get control of the Militia Bureau for the last 10 or 12 years, and we will keep on as long as we have anything to do with the National Guard, trying to do that very thing, because we are never going to get anywhere until we do. That is an absolute essential.

Section 3 of this bill is an important provision. It ought not to be changed. We have been having a good deal of trouble that would be eliminated under section 2 of this bill. There are a couple of suggestions that I want to make before I forget it, in other sections.

In section 14, in the second line, after the word "appointed"—"brigade commanders and officers of the staff of each tactical division shall be appointed"—after the word "appointed" insert, in line 11, section 14, page 13, "from the organization," just three words.

The CHAIRMAN. Brigade commanders and officers of the staff of each tactical division shall be appointed from the organization?

Maj. CRITCHFIELD. From the organization.

The CHAIRMAN. You mean the divisional organization?

Maj. CRITCHFIELD. Yes, of course. That is what they are talking about, of filling vacancies by appointment of commissioned officers. It is from the division.

Senator FLETCHER. That is singular, not plural?

Maj. CRITCHFIELD. Well, I think it ought to be singular. "Each tactical division," it says, "shall be appointed from the organization." I think that is only fair, and I think that is right. I think it will prevent a lot of trouble, too.

Now, in section 29, in line 23, page 26, after the words "National Guard," insert "with the advice and consent of the Senate." And after the word "years" in line 25, "not less than 15 years' service."

The effect of that, gentlemen, is this: The committee will agree that that is the way this should have been, that it was intended that way in the beginning. We want an opportunity, when the General Staff or the Chief of Staff appoints a man that we know is not the man for the job, and he does it probably over our protest, we want somebody that we can go to and make our complaint to, and there is only one place in the world, and that is right here. We want a chance to be heard. That is the reason we want this man confirmed by the Senate. It is perfectly proper that he should be, and in the balance of the sentence "not lower than that of colonel, for a period of four years," that gentleman might have been on some governor's staff for four years, and he would not know anything about the National Guard, and for that reason we want to put in there "not less than 15 years' service."

We want him to have had real service in the National Guard and not some honorary position. We used to have those kind of men in our State. The governor appointed 15 or 20 colonels and brigadier generals, that we had to hold on to their horses, and we do not want that kind of a soldier for this job.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. What jurisdiction would the Senate have over a purely State institution?

Maj. CRITCHFIELD. This is the Militia Bureau.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. Oh, I see.

Maj. CRITCHFIELD. This is the National Guard Bureau, and he ought to be confirmed by the Senate, because you are creating a very important office there, and this section 29 is the whole thing in this bill. It is the most important feature about it. Without that it does not make any difference what you do with the rest of the law, because without that provision there won't be any National Guard and you won't need a bureau.

I was in a convention last Sunday of 350 officers in our State, men that have served 40 years in the guard, from there on down. We have been working and spending money to reorganize the guard, and this is the first time in our history that we have ever asked the State for an appropriation for recruiting purposes. We have asked them for \$50,000. We can not get anywhere with it until we get this provision. We have been played with long enough, and we want to run our business ourselves, and we want to be put in the same relation to the War Department as the Marine Corps is to the Navy Department. If the Marine Corps can make a success without anybody else running them, we can. We want to bear the same relations. There is no question about being a different organization and not functioning, because there is no trouble of function in the National Guard the minute they get together, just like the Marine Corps and the Army.

Senator SUTHERLAND. Should not that provision of "not less than 15 years' service come after the word "colonel"?"

Maj. CRITCHFIELD. Well, sir, I just put it in there because I wanted to get the language before the committee.

Senator SUTHERLAND. Having a rank not lower than that of colonel and having not less than 15 years' service, nominated for a period of four years.

Senator FLETCHER. Your idea is, and that is the purpose of the friends of the measure, that this National Guard Council will name the chief of that bureau?

Maj. CRITCHFIELD. They can recommend.

Senator FLETCHER. They recommend, and the President is to appoint the man they recommend; isn't that your idea?

Maj. CRITCHFIELD. Yes.

Senator FLETCHER. If he refuses to appoint the first recommendation, for instance, then he may call for another, and you can make another; but he is obliged to appoint the man whom this National Guard Council recommends?

Maj. CRITCHFIELD. Senator, you know we have had some experience. Section 111 of the present law is just as plain as this one, and it was violated in every detail during this war and caused very hard feelings—more hard feelings than anything I have ever known to happen in the Army or connected with it. I have not found a case where section 111 was carried out except the first half of it. The one that ruined the Guard was enforced to the letter. The one that would have done good was ignored to the letter, and this is section 111 of the present law. If you will examine it you will find that there are two very important provisions in that section. The one when we were called into the national service, discharging us from the National Guard, was enforced. The provision that required officers to fill vacancies to be appointed from the organization was

always violated in my State. Officers would be discharged for lack of inertia, whatever that is, or temperamentally unfitted to command. Gen. Speaks was discharged because he was temperamentally unfitted to command. The charge was made and entered by a man who had been in command of a Coast Artillery post, had never seen a regiment, had never seen a brigade. Gen. Speaks had been in command of a brigade for 19 years. He lacked 5 days of having been in command of some kind of troops for 40 years. He was the only man in his division that had ever commanded troops under fire that I ever heard of, and he was discharged because he was temperamentally unfitted to command. His successor was not appointed from the division. Had the law been observed he would not have been discharged, no doubt.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. Was he temperamentally unfitted for a soldier?

Maj. CRITCHFIELD. Well, sir, I do not think so. He was not worn out. He is one of the most active men I know of to-day. I hope he will come before your committee and you can see for yourself.

Senator FLETCHER. He must be getting pretty old.

Maj. CRITCHFIELD. Not a very old man. He has been at it since he was a kid. He commanded a company in the Cincinnati riots in 1883.

Senator SUTHERLAND. How old is he?

Maj. CRITCHFIELD. He is about 58 or 59; something like that. About 58, I judge.

Senator FLETCHER. Then he is a young man.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. Did he go to France in command of a brigade?

Maj. CRITCHFIELD. No. They took him away from it. He did go to Porto Rico in 1898.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. What became of him finally while the war was on?

Maj. CRITCHFIELD. Discharged and sent home.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. By a board?

Maj. CRITCHFIELD. By a board; yes, sir.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. What was the finding? What was the finding of that board?

Maj. CRITCHFIELD. They recommended—they approved the charges, and it went to the Department of the Southeast, and the general sent it back and said there wasn't anything against the man. So they made some kind of an amendment and sent it to the War Department and ignored the Department of the Southeast, and it was approved by the War Department. I saw a letter from Gen. Duvall that he would have disapproved the second report, as there was nothing in it. It was simply to make a place for the man who preferred the charges, and who got it, and he had been in command of a Coast Artillery company.

That is only one instance. I could write a book on this subject, gentlemen, but I do not want to take up your time.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee would like to have your views as to just how this thing would work, a National Guard Bureau presided over in a sense by a National Guard Council. What do you think would be its special functions?

Maj. CRITCHFIELD. Well, sir, it is not so much my notion as to what they might do as to what they would not do. I have orders right here, issued by the bureau, that will ruin the National Guard, and I am going to take my own home town as an example, to show you how it will work out. This order here provides for two or three things. First, that they fix the age of the officers, which is not in the law, and none of their affair. The Militia Bureau should not meddle with that. It does not come within their power, I do not think. They fix the number of men at 100.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. In a company?

Maj. CRITCHFIELD. In a company. I live in a town of 1,200 population. We have a National Guard company there, and have had since 1884. They served in the Spanish War. They served in this war. There were two men, as I recollect it, drafted in my town. Everybody belonged to that company. There has never been but one boy graduating from the high school in that town that did not belong to this company. At the end of the war we had 27 officers in the Army from this town. Under this regulation, that company has got to go out of business, although within two weeks after the time they came back we reorganized the company with 82 men. They have been called out twice by the governor since they have been reorganized as a National Guard company for duty in the State.

Senator SUTHERLAND. Since the armistice was signed?

Maj. CRITCHFIELD. Yes; and in the last 90 days. They have just been on duty within the last three or four weeks at Canton, Ohio, at the steel mills there.

Senator SUTHERLAND. Would you favor fixing a limit, and what figure would you fix?

Maj. CRITCHFIELD. Senator, the law was made for the Army. The law provides that we shall conform to that. Now, we have to conform when the Army can not, nor does not try. If it does not work in the Army, why try it on the dog? The Army can not comply with it. Here is the proposition: A captain in the National Guard under this law and under the present law would receive \$500 a year. For that he must furnish a company of 100 men. He must give bond for their equipment. He has got to do everything that a captain in the Army does, besides furnishing his own company and earning his own living. But a captain in the Army on full pay does not have to furnish a man; he has no responsibility for the property, only its general supervision. He goes on the retired list after a while and is finally buried in Arlington. Compare the two. Why exact 100 per cent from the man getting 20 per cent pay and nothing from the fellow who is on full pay? It is unfair. It puts us in a position where we can not do it. It puts the companies out of every small town in the country. Now, in cities like New York or Philadelphia, Cleveland, Ohio, possibly, you can get enough men in the immediate vicinity to have a full company or a battalion or a regiment. That is possible, but when you go out in the country towns—and they are about the best companies there are—you can not do it. There is not enough available material, without going too far.

The suggestion comes that we have platoon organizations. My God, we can not find armories for one, let alone two organizations. We have tried that and could not do it. You must remember, when

you look into this thing from the standpoint of what actually takes place on the ground, it is different from some theory that you might get up in Washington. It does not work out.

Senator SUTHERLAND. Would you fix a limit, and where would you fix it?

Maj. CRITCHFIELD. It has never been possible and we never could get equipment for more than 65 men. Now, they had an idea that we must have a very great big organization, following the French. We followed the French in everything. Of course Great Britain did not. When they got to France, they were the 146th Regiment, whereas before they left Ohio they were the 8th Ohio Regiment. That destroyed all of our home associations. I can not see any use of it. Canada did not change theirs, or Australia, or New Zealand, or anybody else, but we followed France. Home meant more to us than empire. That regiment had served in the Civil War and in the Spanish-American War, and it has had a record for years and years and this just spoiled it.

Senator SUTHERLAND. You think, then, that the law should be left as it is, fixing the limit at 65?

Maj. CRITCHFIELD. Well, it ought not to be more than that, at least as a minimum. There is no objection to having more where you can get them.

Senator SUTHERLAND. I am talking about the minimum.

Mr. CRITCHFIELD. When we went into the Spanish War in 1898 they wanted us to have 84 men. We were first ordered into the National Guard camps with 84 men, and they only mustered us in with 62, and then we had to go back and fill up to 100. We got all the men I took in, with the exception of 6 or 8. But you can not fix a rule that you must have 100 men in a company. I want to tell you that in cities of 10,000 in my State you can not maintain that number. It destroys them, and what is the excuse for it? If you can go to Mexico with 14 men in a company, why can't we stay at home with 65?

Senator SUTHERLAND. I suppose every one of these officers were members in your Guard?

Maj. CRITCHFIELD. Yes, sir; and they served on every front, from Dalmatia to Archangel, Russia.

Senator SUTHERLAND. That shows the advantage of maintaining a small company in a small town?

Maj. CRITCHFIELD. Yes, sir. Our armories were built for small companies. Must we go to work and remodel all of these armories because somebody has an idea that he has put in force and upsets the whole system that has been in vogue for 40 years? If there was any reason for it or if it was possible, it would be different, but it is not needed.

Senator SUTHERLAND. The platoon suggestion would be feasible if there were some other small town not far from you. There could be a platoon there and one in your town?

Maj. CRITCHFIELD. No, sir; that will not work. It has been tried out in many places. A National Guard officer gives a bond of \$4,000 for the property. The Government issues it to the State, and the State does not give any bond. The State issues it to the National Guard officer and requires a bond, so if it is lost the captain loses it

and not the State, nor the Government either, and he is working for 20 cents on the dollar.

Senator FLETCHER. Does the State require the bond or the War Department?

Maj. CRITCHFIELD. The State. It has, always.

Senator FLETCHER. Then the War Department is not responsible for that.

Senator SUTHERLAND. The Government fixes the regulations as between the State and the Government.

Maj. CRITCHFIELD. Yes, sir.

Senator SUTHERLAND. And the State then is responsible to the General Government?

Maj. CRITCHFIELD. Yes, sir; and they require a bond from the responsible officer, who is the captain of the company, and in our State the bond has been \$4,000. I have given many a one.

Gen. MOORE (adjutant general of South Carolina). I think you are mistaken in your statement that the States are not responsible to the Government, aren't you?

Maj. CRITCHFIELD. Of course, they are responsible, but I never knew them to make an appropriation to pay for anything.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. The State receipts to the Federal Government for the property, and the local commanding officer gives the bond to the State.

Maj. CRITCHFIELD. He gives the bond to the State, and he takes the responsibility, and then he issues it to 65 men without any chance of being protected, not even a pay roll to check up the property against. That is what happens. Outside of that, you know he has got to go out and earn a meal ticket. He does not live off the Government; he lives in the Government.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. You would favor, then, a minimum of 65 for a company instead of 100?

Maj. CRITCHFIELD. Yes; it ought not to be more than that, and then, Senator, here is another thing that happens, as every fellow in the National Guard service will be able to verify: Conditions change in a community; they fluctuate; the number of men you have got in your company fluctuates up and down. Sometimes it will run down very low. I have seen splendid companies go down to 40 men. I did not muster them out as adjutant general. Maybe it would go up and then we would have 75 men in that company. You can not fix a hard-and-fast rule in this kind of a service. If you do you are going to destroy the very thing you are trying to build up. It has got to be encouraged rather than handicapped. That is one reason why we insist that this bureau should be run by officers of the National Guard. There is nobody that knows so much about it as the fellows that have been brought up in it. No man in the Army knows as much about the National Guard as I know. I do not pretend to know as much about the Army as an old Army officer, but whether he pretends to or not, I know he does not know as much about the National Guard as I know, because I have put my whole life into it.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. I think that is true, Major, but I am anxious to know this: Suppose there was a council established here. It would be composed of one officer from each State, as I recall the bill?

Maj. CRITCHFIELD. Yes, sir.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. They function absolutely independent of the General Staff?

Maj. CRITCHFIELD. Yes; and should.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. What would be the result? You have your council here, taking charge of and having jurisdiction over the National Guard, with the Chief of Staff commanding, or, rather, at the head of the Regular Army proper. Won't there be conflict and confusion between the two?

Maj. CRITCHFIELD. Not if he does not have anything to do with our business. We do not want to have anything to do with his, and we do not want him to have anything to do with ours.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. I am somewhat in sympathy with your views, but I do not know how in the world you will prevent conflict and confusion.

Maj. CRITCHFIELD. How do you keep down conflict between the Marine Corps and the Army? Simply because they have nothing whatever to do with the management of each other's affairs.

The CHAIRMAN. You mean the Marine Corps and the Navy?

Maj. CRITCHFIELD. No; the Army.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. That is hardly a parallel case, because the Marine Corps is under the jurisdiction of the Navy except in time of war, when it may be assigned for duty to the Army, but here you bring up a different proposition. The Marine Corps has no separate council in the Navy Department. It is all under the Navy proper.

Maj. CRITCHFIELD. Yes.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. But here you are creating a council that comes up here acting independently of the Regulars.

Maj. CRITCHFIELD. And, Senator, it should be, for various reasons, and the first one is this: The National Guard proposition is purely a democratic organization. You have got to deal with the public. We have these organizations in our homes. The people in them are our neighbors, the people that we associate with daily. The rules and system that you might try to enforce in the Army you can not enforce in the National Guard. It has got to be handled from a different standpoint entirely. It is an entirely different proposition. When we come together with our own staff, which that council would probably be, we all understand it alike. Those men have the same conditions in every State, and they can work together and harmoniously. It gives us somebody to consult with. It would be a great help for a chief of this bureau to have men come in there to consult with and find out about the conditions in their State, find out what they want and what is necessary, and what will help, and two heads are better than one in council, and that is a good proposition, but it ought not to be connected with the General Staff, and I do not want the General Staff to have anything to do with it. If I had my way about it, they would not have.

The CHAIRMAN. You would have them in charge of all training?

Maj. CRITCHFIELD. Well, the training is prescribed by the War Department. We have the same training, and the Marine Corps has the same training, and the Army has the same training. We would all have the same training. We would follow their system of train-

ing, but it is done by the States under the Constitution. The system of training is already prescribed by the War Department. When we come together we can function in a minute, because there is no difference in our training.

The CHAIRMAN. I am a little confused there. In what way would the training of the National Guard be prescribed by the War Department?

Maj. CRITCHFIELD. It is already prescribed by the War Department.

The CHAIRMAN. Under what authority?

Maj. CRITCHFIELD. The national defense act of 1916. We are to conform in our training and system and everything to the Army.

The CHAIRMAN. You are to conform in your tactical organization with the Army?

Maj. CRITCHFIELD. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. But you do not have to conform in the method of training the men.

Maj. CRITCHFIELD. You do not always find two captains that train the company just the same, but they do the same thing and get to the same place when they are brought together. We use the same textbook in every arm and branch of the service.

Senator SUTHERLAND. They use the same manual of arms.

Maj. CRITCHFIELD. Everything is prescribed. We follow the regulations that are issued. We follow the regulations, of course, in all branches of the service.

The CHAIRMAN. My recollection of the militia is that the training is in charge of the State.

Maj. CRITCHFIELD. It is better to illustrate that by saying when we go back to universal service we would do that. That particularly applied to the old militia law, and when we had universal service—our Constitution provides for universal military service, and I think pretty nearly every State constitution in the United States does. I know Ohio is very emphatic that "every able-bodied man between the ages of 18 and 45 shall be enrolled and shall perform military duty."

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. Is that provision enforced? Are they enrolled?

Maj. CRITCHFIELD. No, sir. It says "shall" and not "may." We had about 8,000 men in the National Guard, and they did the duty for about a million, the rest—the 992,000—did nothing or made complaint.

Senator FLETCHER. This bill probably covers the point that Senator Wadsworth mentioned, and it would be left to the Secretary of War to see that the regulations are such as would bring about similarity of training. It says in section 31 that "the National Guard divisions, brigades, regiments, and other units shall assemble for drill and instruction, including indoor target practice, at such times as may be prescribed by regulations by the National Guard Council, subject to the approval of the Secretary of War."

Maj. CRITCHFIELD. Why, certainly.

The CHAIRMAN. That is as to time.

Senator FLETCHER. Yes.

Maj. CRITCHFIELD. But you know, Senator, there would be no other way to train these men except as the Army is trained. That

is the pattern. We follow the Army absolutely. There is no question about that. We train our men in every particular just the same as the Army, and so far as learning to shoot is concerned, better than the Army does. We had 54 instructors in the Small Arms School, and everyone of them were officers of the National Guard.

The CHAIRMAN. Where, at Camp Benning?

Maj. CRITCHFIELD. At Benning and Perry both.

Senator FLETCHER. That is a very important thing.

Maj. CRITCHFIELD. Yes. Fifty-four of our instructors were officers from the National Guard. I have seen many a lieutenant of the guard going out with majors and captains from West Point to show them how to shoot. It is a very good thing, and you will see it right now at Camp Benning if you will go down there, because these officers are experts in their line. We have had several of them from New York, like Lieut. Dietz, Capts. Luchener and Wallace.

The CHAIRMAN. Is Lieut. Dietz the man who lectures on pistol practice?

Maj. CRITCHFIELD. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. What other comments have you to make on this bill, Major?

Maj. CRITCHFIELD. I do not know that this would hardly apply to the National Guard proposition, but I wanted to suggest a proposition in regard to the court-martial section. I would provide a court under the office of the Judge Advocate General's Department, who would try all cases coming up for general court-martial. The court would be a permanent court, and the officers permanently under the Judge Advocate General's Department, and not transferable to any other branch of the service or arm of the service. This court would act the same as the circuit court of appeals of our State or the circuit court of the United States, and would try cases wherever and whenever necessary. They would become efficient, would have no other duties, would be free from prejudice and not under the influence of the commanding officer or other officers who might be very much prejudiced.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. That is, for a court to revise the decisions in the lower court, is it not?

Maj. CRITCHFIELD. No, sir. Any case that comes up will come for trial; any case that would be tried before what we term a general court-martial this court would try it. I would not detail a court just promiscuously from the camp and allow the commanding officer, who probably makes the charges of complaint or who might, on the other hand, be trying to defend the man, I would not allow him to appoint the court.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. Here is the difficulty about that: There were over 300,000 trials during this war, and probably 25,000 general court-martial cases.

Maj. CRITCHFIELD. And probably 20,000 of them too many.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. I think so, too. It would be impossible for the Judge Advocate General's Office here to attend to those trials.

Maj. CRITCHFIELD. That would be in time of war, but you know that about 95 per cent of the time we are not in war.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. I think, as a peace-time tribunal, you are right; but if you would give the Judge Advocate General's Office or

some tribunal here the power to revise or revert the trials that are had in camp don't you think that would be an improvement over the present system?

Maj. CRITCHFIELD. Yes; most anything would be an improvement over the present system, but the greatest improvement would be some way to eliminate the number. I commanded a company for nine years and I never tried a man in my company for anything in my life, or in my regiment, and it is not necessary. Last year I worked a battalion of 1,800 alien enemies. They spoke every language but English, and I never had any complaint. I never even had to call a man to task, and I can not understand why other fellows have to. I have always noticed that where we have an organization that has got a police court every morning the organization is not going to last long.

The CHAIRMAN. What do you think of this school-training suggestion in this bill?

Maj. CRITCHFIELD. Well, that is all right. I am in favor of universal military training, but under no plan that I have seen yet published, exactly. I would give the man an opportunity to take his training in the National Guard, or in the Army, or in the Navy, or in the Marine Corps, or in a school where they had a military course of training, like the Virginia Military Institute or Culver or any school of that kind, where they had military training, and I would give him credit for it there. I do not think it will interfere with any man's business or education to take six months' military training, except some boy who might have dependents, in which case it would be necessary for the Government to make some provision.

I know cases where boys are supporting mothers, for instance, and probably smaller children, and it would be a great hardship to take them away; but, outside of a case of that kind, having been in the service all of my life, I never knew of a time, I can hardly remember when I was not taking it, and it has never bothered me any, and I do not know how it would any other fellow for six months. But it is not necessary that they should all have to take it one way. If we had a compulsory service of six months, sometime between 18 and 20 years—he must take it before he is 20 years old—now, you can enlist in the National Guard, or you can take it in the Army or go in the Navy or the Marine Corps, or you can go to Culver or to Virginia Military Institute, or some school of that kind where they have it, and get a certificate which would relieve you from the service outside. But all the rest of them I would have go to these cantonments and take a six months' training.

The CHAIRMAN. Under Federal supervision?

Maj. CRITCHFIELD. Yes, sir; under Federal supervision; but you would have to probably get National Guard officers to help. Of course, there would be hundreds of them available. There would be no trouble to get instructors.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you think many citizen officers, such as guard officers or reserve officers, can spare the time from their business?

Maj. CRITCHFIELD. If I had my way I would require every officer in the National Guard and the Army both to take the course of training at Camp Benning in this school when it is established, and I would pay him for his time the same as an officer in the Army. I

would not limit it to a captain's pay. I would not humiliate a colonel to send him down there and take that training on a captain's pay. I do not think that is fair, and I do not think there was any reason for it in the beginning, only to discourage him, if that was the purpose of it; but it would be a good thing for the man, it would be a good thing for the school, it would be a good thing for the country, if they should do that. I have seen the benefit of it. We have had officers come in there—National Guard officers and all kinds of officers—and take the course, and I know they were all well pleased when they got through, and I think that would be a great help.

The CHAIRMAN. How long is the course?

Maj. CRITCHFIELD. Well, I do not know how long Gen. Malone contemplates—probably six to nine months. I think to-day it is about four months.

The CHAIRMAN. What I meant to ask was, Do you think there would be many reserve and guard officers to train young men in quantities?

Maj. CRITCHFIELD. Yes; if you would order them on duty. They do not raise any question about it. I have done such things many times, and kept fellows on duty all summer, but I paid them. That is the main thing. There are always a lot of officers available. There are a great many officers in the guard in our State that are school-teachers. In the summer time school is out the 1st of June, and they have not anything to do until September or October. In July and August you can have these things, and they would be very glad to get the jobs—and very competent fellows.

The CHAIRMAN. Have you got some other matters you wished to take up, Major?

Maj. CRITCHFIELD. Yesterday the question came up about members of the National Guard being members of the General Staff. That passed in 1916 and was stricken out in conference. I believe you made that remark.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Maj. CRITCHFIELD. That was bitterly opposed by the War Department. We did not insist on it. In fact, I think it was done at the instance of Mr. Hay, who was chairman of the House committee at the time, but I think it would be a whole lot better, gentlemen, if we should not interfere with the General Staff. We will work out a lot of things that they will be very glad to pattern after us. I organized a medical department—I did not know anything about it—away back in 1902 or 1903. And so on. We have furnished them a lot of things. We could work better among ourselves.

The CHAIRMAN. Irrespective of your suggestion for a National Guard council, it seems to me that the detailing of officers from the National Guard to the General Staff would be a good thing, not only for the National Guard, but would be a good thing for the Army.

Maj. CRITCHFIELD. I am satisfied that that is true.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, why not do it?

Maj. CRITCHFIELD. But I do not know. Our experience has been that it is pretty hard to get a hearing.

The CHAIRMAN. If they are members of the General Staff, they would get a hearing at least.

Maj. CRITCHFIELD. That would help some. It is awfully hard to get consideration of things.

The CHAIRMAN. I want to ask you again about this school training. Do you think it practicable?

Maj. CRITCHFIELD. I would like personally to see it compulsory.

The CHAIRMAN. No; I mean the grade school, the high schools, in this bill.

Maj. CRITCHFIELD. If the Government can fix some way to bring it about. I do not see how the Government is going to dictate to the States what they shall teach in the schools.

The CHAIRMAN. They can only coax them to do it by giving them money or withholding it.

Maj. CRITCHFIELD. You might offer a bonus of some sort. I do not see how it can be done.

The CHAIRMAN. That is an indirect method of achieving the result.

Maj. CRITCHFIELD. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Is that one of the troubles of the National Guard system?

Maj. CRITCHFIELD. What?

The CHAIRMAN. That some of the States won't do it, even though the Government offers them the money?

Maj. CRITCHFIELD. Not any State that amounts to much. The National Guard system, Senator, is the best military system that the world has even seen. The German military system that we heard so much about being the model and the ideal, that was the claim made in 1916 before your committee and the House committee, is the National Guard system of the United States, because they stole it. And in their constitution, which they adopted in 1848 they got exactly our National Guard system, and they added to it compulsory service, and with this exception, over there the princes of States had a lot more powers than our governors of States, and the Kaiser had a whole lot less power than the President of the United States, because the princes of States appointed all the officers up to general officers, and the Kaiser could only appoint officers commanding forts and posts of large proportions, the high commands, as they call it. All the other officers were appointed by the princes of States.

Senator FLETCHER. You provide in section 40, under the head of "Service of the National Guard outside the territorial limits of the United States" how they can be summoned in and generalized, as it were, and then in line 23 you say:

Provided further, That National Guard organizations so drafted into the service of the United States shall retain their tactical unity and organization, subject to such necessary exceptions as may be recommended by the National Guard council.

Maj. CRITCHFIELD. Yes.

Senator FLETCHER. You do not give the War Department any authority or power there to change the organizations or the officers?

Maj. CRITCHFIELD. Well, that would not be necessary, to make changes through the War Department, because these are changes that would be made immediately. We would have it—this is my interpretation of that—I can not see why they should be changed. For instance, why should the First Florida Regiment be changed to

the One hundred and eighty-fifth Regiment, or anything else? Is there any necessity for that?

The CHAIRMAN. I should say in 99 cases out of 100 that there would not be any necessity for it, but does not that provision take away from the President of the United States his right to be the Commander in Chief?

Maj. CRITCHFIELD. There might be cases, there might be some place where that should not be, I do not know.

The CHAIRMAN. You see, this is in time of war.

Maj. CRITCHFIELD. What page is that?

The CHAIRMAN. At the bottom of page 36.

Senator FLETCHER. It seems to me that you might get a conflict there, and that you are going rather far to leave that to the National Guard council, and the President would have no authority, or the War Department acting for him, to modify anything that the National Guard council might want.

Maj. CRITCHFIELD. That certainly must be wrong, for this reason. This is after they are drafted into the service, and the National Guard council would have nothing to do with it.

Senator FLETCHER. Yes.

Maj. CRITCHFIELD. That is certainly a misprint there. It must be a mistake.

Gen. MOORE. It was intended to prevent the breaking up of organizations and destroying their unity, just at the whim of somebody else, for the purpose of substituting somebody else—just like has been done in this recent war.

Maj. CRITCHFIELD. But, General, you know it is except on recommendation of the National Guard Council. There would not be any National Guard Council there. It probably ought to be left to the President of the United States.

Gen. MOORE. The National Guard Council would still be in existence, even though the forces were drawn into conflict.

The CHAIRMAN. You can not deprive the President of the United States of the prerogatives of the Commander in Chief.

Gen. MOORE. I do not think it does that.

The CHAIRMAN. He could have stopped the practice you speak of at any moment.

Gen. MOORE. They were made without his knowledge or consent. It would necessitate, at least, taking it to him for his approval.

Maj. CRITCHFIELD. There is one thing that has been eliminated in this bill that I want to call attention to, and I hope it will be eliminated. In the act of 1916 nearly every section provided, "under such regulations as the Secretary of War may prescribe," or "under such regulations as the President may prescribe," and the War Department has a legislative body for the National Guard, and, of course, that is the reason we are having all of these orders and troubles. We want it under such regulations as Congress may provide. We want to know what is trump, and we want the cards on the table, and then we are ready. We do not want to have a man legislating for us and providing changes in the rules and regulations, etc., that does not know what he is doing. That is where this council comes in. You put it before the National Guard officers representing the States of the Union, and you are not going to go

wrong, because there will be always a majority of these fellows that will be right.

Senator FLETCHER. You do not think you can accomplish that by having the National Guard represented in the Infantry Bureau and on the General Staff, both?

Maj. CRITCHFIELD. Senator, I doubt it, unless we are in the majority. I have not much hopes for a minority in that outfit representing the National Guard. That would work all right if I were Secretary of War for just 15 minutes, which I hope to be some day for 24 hours, and God knows there will be more business done than you ever heard of.

The CHAIRMAN. There were some other things you had in mind, Major? You were here yesterday and probably heard the discussion in connection with the proposal that the Army clause of the Constitution be used rather than the Militia clause, for the organization of any citizen-reserve force, localized. Do you think that Army clause offers any solution which would be satisfactory as compared with the Militia clause?

Maj. CRITCHFIELD. Well, if we do, we would have to go back and do what was in vogue many years ago. We called it a Standing Army, and then we would have to have the United States Army besides. This National Guard proposition is one that appeals to the public. It is the organization that kept alive what military spirit there was in the country for the last 50 years.

The CHAIRMAN. That is perfectly true.

Maj. CRITCHFIELD. That is the reason why we do not want to destroy it. It should be encouraged, and that is the reason we come to you now and ask you to permit us to run our own affairs. Let us manage this for a while. If we fail, take it away. If we do not do better than has been done, if we can not improve it, take it away, but give us a chance. Let us run this thing for a little while and see what happens.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. What would be the effect if we were practically to abolish the Regular Army and substitute the National Guard for it, with such a council as you propose?

Maj. CRITCHFIELD. Under present conditions, you are coming to that very rapidly.

The CHAIRMAN. Other things being equal and conceding that it is possible to create a system which could be really democratic, so far as any military organization can be democratic, the best military policy is to have it one Army, is it not?

Maj. CRITCHFIELD. That is all we have got.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, I mean one Army, with one control.

Maj. CRITCHFIELD. Well, there is only one control. When they are brought together, there is only one control. The Marine Corps got in and the National Guard got in, and the National Army got in, and there was only one Army.

The CHAIRMAN. I mean, in time of peace.

Maj. CRITCHFIELD. In time of peace you can not do it that way. The Army could not run the National Guard and keep it alive 30 days.

The CHAIRMAN. I am trying to paint a picture of the National Guard just as it is and merge it with the Regular Army just as it is.

Maj. CRITCHFIELD. They can not be run by one man, because they are two entirely different propositions.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you think it would be possible to organize an Army of the United States under the Army clause in such a way as to take care of the local interests and affections and concerns of the units established locally and territorially, and have it under one control and preserve the traditions and the spirit, the esprit, in the National Guard units as now existing, with their own names and designations, and still have a satisfactory system which would be democratic in its interest and in which the localities would have a voice in all conferences and committees?

Maj. CRITCHFIELD. I do not.

The CHAIRMAN. Why not?

Maj. CRITCHFIELD. Because that would mean that it would be under Army control. The Army, so far as my experience has been, and I have had a little, they do not understand the American people. They do not know how to get along with the American people, and they would be upsetting the boat every day. This must be handled by the fellow at home. A stranger can not go into your town, Senator, and run a National Guard troop.

The CHAIRMAN. That is perfectly true, but you are assuming that only the Regular Army would run it.

Maj. CRITCHFIELD. Certainly I am.

The CHAIRMAN. But I am not. I would fix it so that it would not be only the Regular Army that would run it.

Maj. CRITCHFIELD. If you will fix it so that they won't run our business, we can do it. We can not get the old officers, the fellows that will go and reorganize and rehabilitate the National Guard and build it up to its previous status or the requirements of this bill—you have got to get those fellows back in. We do not look at their teeth when we get them in. We do when we buy a mule. We have to get the man in the locality that can get these men to enlist. They have got to be brought back, and it is more than an ordinary proposition to get them back.

The CHAIRMAN. I understand that.

Maj. CRITCHFIELD. We can only do that when these men see that their work is not going to go for naught, they are not building this organization up for some other fellow to come along and take away from them and play with them at the last minute. That will never happen again.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. I think that was one of the mistakes of the war, although it was almost inevitable to break up the National Guard units as we replaced troops.

Maj. CRITCHFIELD. Those that were not broken up they fired the officers to make room for men who had nothing to recommend them, and displaced men who had spent years and years in the National Guard.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. But they deny that.

Maj. CRITCHFIELD. I know men that would deny there was a Jesus Christ.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. I think practically every Army officer who has testified here claims that there was no discrimination against the National Guard.

Maj. CRITCHFIELD. Gen. Pershing said over in the House that there was a good deal of complaint, and justly so.

Senator SUTHERLAND. They claim further that they "canned" about as many Regular officers as National Guard officers.

Maj. CRITCHFIELD. There was probably a good reason for that, but they did not follow the law. That is what made the complaint. The law says that the vacancies must be filled from the organization, and they did not do that. That is what made the trouble. Do you suppose Gen. Speaks would ever have been discharged from his brigade if the vacancy had to be filled from the brigade? No; it was done to make a place for a pure outsider.

Senator SUTHERLAND. Some of the States asked that Regular Army officers be assigned, on the theory that those who had given their entire lives to the business of war would be the better officers, and would have superior qualifications.

Maj. CRITCHFIELD. But we did not in our State. That is one thing that we will not admit, regardless of how often the charge is made.

Senator SUTHERLAND. Some of the States that had the very best National Guards in the country; take Massachusetts and other States, and they asked that Regular Army officers be assigned to them.

Maj. CRITCHFIELD. Yes, sir; that is true; but I also notice that when they removed Col. Lincoln and they discharged Gen. Cole, that Massachusetts got mighty busy, and they had to take them back. That is different, you know, when they did not fill the vacancies from the organization.

Senator FLETCHER. I think there were instances of National Guard organizations where the men got right up to a question of going into battle, and they had some question about the leadership of their own men, and they asked that Regular Army officers take charge.

Maj. CRITCHFIELD. Then somebody ought to take charge, if you have a man of that kind, he ought to get out of the way absolutely. But there are so many cases, I could cite you case after case that is entirely contrary to that.

Senator SUTHERLAND. A great deal of this displacement was done on this side before they ever had a chance to go over.

Maj. CRITCHFIELD. Yes; I can give an instance in my own State, the Three hundred and thirty-second Regiment was from Ohio. That is the regiment that went to Italy. All the troops we had over there.

Senator SUTHERLAND. There were some West Virginians in there.

Maj. CRITCHFIELD. Yes; I expect there was. This regiment was made up of people from along the Ohio River. Anyway, they broke up old established organizations, regiments like the First Regiment and the Second Regiment and the Seventh Regiment, and scattered them, and most of this new outfit, the Three hundred and thirty-second Regiment, were strangers, and I do not know of any of them—how much experience they had—but I do know that when I read the inspection report in the Congressional Record over in the House, that the colonel was inefficient and the quartermaster was inefficient, and the commissary officer was inefficient, and so it goes on all down the line, and no wonder they had the trouble they had, because they were men without experience. These other fellows were scattered all over Christendom, they were not in there. Why

did they not make replacements with that sort of men, instead of breaking up an organization that had been in existence for 40 years? I can not see the advantage of destroying an old organization to build a new one.

The CHAIRMAN. Have you any further observations to make, Major?

Maj. CRITCHFIELD. I think I have covered all the notes that I had, Senator. I have had so many things that I did not give this the attention I would like to have, but I gave it all I could.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, we are very much obliged to you and are glad you came.

**STATEMENT OF BRIG. GEN. WILLIAM W. MOORE, ADJUTANT
GENERAL OF THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA.**

The CHAIRMAN. Give your name and rank and assignment just now, please.

Gen. MOORE. William W. Moore, brigadier general, adjutant general of South Carolina.

The CHAIRMAN. You were adjutant general during the war?

Gen. MOORE. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Had you been in the National Guard before?

Gen. MOORE. I have been in the National Guard for 30 years.

The CHAIRMAN. Prior to your assignment as adjutant general, you have been with troops?

Gen. MOORE. I was not assigned. I was elected. South Carolina is the only State in the Union that elects its adjutant general by popular vote. Florida, previous to the last four years did, but they changed it. South Carolina is the only State that elects its adjutant general by popular vote, and I am serving now my fifth term.

The CHAIRMAN. For how long are you elected?

Gen. MOORE. Two years.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. You are elected by the general electoral vote in South Carolina?

Gen. MOORE. At the primary election.

Senator SUTHERLAND. Not an election by the Guard, but by the people?

Gen. MOORE. By the people.

The CHAIRMAN. I would be very glad to have you proceed in your own way, General.

Gen. MOORE. Mr. Chairman, the question that naturally presents itself now for your solution, and which must be determined, is what shall be the future military policy of this country. Do the majority of the people of this country desire a large standing Army, at a tremendous cost to its taxpayers, and which of necessity must be a conscriptive draft, not only to provide for its military training, but also for military service, which only can be secured by compulsory laws, which the country is decidedly opposed to.

Or do they want an efficient National Guard, which can be procured by the several States through voluntary enlistment, and which can be maintained at a cost not to exceed one-third of that required for the maintenance of a large Regular Army.

A dual military force can be procured and maintained by the latter method, and financial support can be secured through the

several States to aid in its proper support. And the burden of keeping up a sufficient military establishment for both purposes can best be organized, trained, and kept in existence, with much more satisfactory results than the former, and I most heartily recommend for your careful consideration the National Guard bill which has been prepared by the organization committee through its legal subcommittee.

If this bill is administered as provided for under the control and supervision of the National Guard Council, which will be representative of each State, and who will suggest the military policy of this country, to be carried out through the administration of the National Guard Bureau, who will function directly under the Secretary of War.

The Chief of this Military Bureau will be appointed by the President from officers of the National Guard who have had long and active military education and experience, and who will, by virtue of their training and association with the guard, be able to administer its affairs in such manner and sympathetic interest as will bring about the highest state of efficiency and greatest development that is desired by all concerned.

On the contrary, should a large Regular Army be decided upon, the cost of maintenance will approximately reach a billion dollars, and still no military protection will be provided for the use of the several States, and they, of necessity, must look to the creation and support of its own forces; and such action will in many instances impose an unusual hardship from a financial standpoint.

So, to my mind, the National Guard, or Citizens' Army, under a dual contract and properly administered by officers who are acquainted with and sympathetic of its conditions and necessities, will produce the greatest good to all concerned.

The most important feature in the bill proposed, in my opinion, is the administration of its affairs by the National Guard Bureau, in conjunction with the National Guard Council. This bureau will be under the direct supervision of the Secretary of War and entirely divorced from the control of other military heads, as is not now the case. And I am frank to admit that only by such separation can the best results be obtained, and this opinion is based entirely upon the records of the past. The great trouble being founded upon the fact that the National Guard in the past has not been fully understood or appreciated by those who have had control over it, and evidently has not been in sympathy with its development.

This is a new idea, it is true, to many who have not given it the careful thought and investigation as those of us who have been in direct contact with the situation, but the facts as outlined can not successfully be contradicted, for the reason that to procure the greatest degree of efficiency there must necessarily be a spirit of genuine cooperation and interest displayed by all parties concerned, and only through such efforts can the best success be obtained.

I feel that the National Guard is entitled to every consideration in working out its future destiny, in view of its splendid record made in the recent war between this country and the Central Powers. In this great ordeal they have proven, beyond any question of doubt, that they possess all of the natural qualifications that go to make up officers and soldiers that we all feel so justly proud of, and which

entitles them to every consideration in formulating a future military policy for this country at your hands.

The future military policy of this country should be such as will meet the expectations and requirements of the greatest number of its people, especially in view of the fact that this recent war was fought upon the principles of democracy as against autocracy. Hence, if the majority of the people are in favor of a National Guard, in conjunction with a small Regular Army, as against the elimination of the guard in favor of a large Regular Army, I feel that they should be, and are, entitled to a voice in this matter, and I am confident that after a careful investigation and consideration of the merits of this bill that you will reach the conclusion that it will furnish for this country a future military policy that will meet the demands of the greatest number of its citizens.

The many details which are intended to carry out the enforcement of this bill are of minor importance in comparison to the administration of its affairs, as has been shown by the different constructions of the act of June 3, 1916, which in many instances were carried into effect through regulations issued, which in my opinion were never intended by the framers of this bill. Hence without the creation of a proper control and administration of the National Guard in the future, it can never attain any great degree of efficiency and success.

Under Section 44 and subsequent sections, which provided for a military training in the schools and colleges, there will be inculcated in the youth of this country not only an interest in physical and military requirements, but a good, wholesome obedience and respect for the laws of the land. This feature of the bill, to my mind, is a very important one, and should have your careful consideration.

I have not gone into the details of that, because that was expected to be handled by the framers of the bill.

There is another important thought for your consideration, in view of the immediate and urgent necessity for the procurement of a military force of sufficient size to handle all questions that may arise, either local or general, which no one who has given the matter any thought can for a moment doubt the importance of—immediate action in this line of preparedness.

This was prepared some little time ago, and you see the condition that confronts us to-day. We are wasting a lot of time, but we can not formulate a military policy in this country too soon and get it into operation. It is going to take time to do it. I do not care what policy you decide upon, it is going to take time to do it, and we are confronted now with the necessity of one very soon, it looks from the present situation.

Especially is this necessary in so far as the several States are concerned, in securing a military force with which it is necessary to protect the life and property of its citizens, as well as to uphold the dignity of the law and enforce its mandates.

There is also an equal demand for a Federal force with which to meet any emergency that may at any time arise, and this can be reached in a practical way, without unnecessary delay, by the passage of the National Guard bill, as presented for your consideration and action thereon.

The National Guard of the several States, under former organization, were so well distributed that it was an easy matter to mobilize

and dispatch such organizations to the points where they were needed, with a minimum cost of transportation, as well as prompt action in preventing troubles and disorders and enforcing the laws where they were being violated.

Under the present conditions that confront us—with practically no National Guard in many of the States, and scarcely any of them who have a sufficient number of units with which properly to protect and enforce the laws—hence it is required in many instances at the present time to use Federal troops in cases where there is likely to be incidents of disorder. The use of these troops is, as a whole, more repugnant to that class of citizens than would be the use of the National Guard, besides the unusual delay in procuring permission by the several States for the use of Federal troops in cases of urgent necessity, to say nothing of the additional cost of transportation, etc. The loss of property, and often lives, occasioned by such delays must be taken into consideration.

That is very true. I know that it happened in our State some time ago that we felt that the conditions were getting critical and the Governor and myself called on Maj. Gen. Reed, with a view to ascertaining whether we could secure Federal troops, and the general very promptly decided that they could only be used in cases where the governor had reached the conclusion that the situation had gotten beyond his control and if he would make that statement then the Federal forces would be available. The governor was very reluctant to make a statement of that kind and determined to use his own forces until the situation got entirely beyond his control. We only had a few companies of reserve militia, which in many instances have been depleted in number, due to the fact that they only enlisted for the period of one year or for the emergency, and the war practically had ceased, and they did not reenlist, because they felt that the purpose for which they had volunteered was over, and they did not see the necessity for a reenlistment.

I only cite that as an instance where the lack of military preparedness brings about a condition such as I have stated, and if Federal troops are available, which they are after considerable delay, the trouble in many instances will be over, that fighting and rioting will have passed, and the purpose for calling out the Federal troops will have passed, and the trouble, whatever it is, and the loss of life and property will have been carried out without any military protection.

A Regular Army of sufficient size necessary to provide proper and adequate protection to the country at large, and to the States in general, would entail a cost of maintenance of more than twice the amount already estimated for an army of a half million men. This, coupled with the unusual amount of "red tape" which would be necessary in each particular case to be gone through with before these forces could be available for use by the authorities of the respective States under the present existing laws, would make it almost impractical to put into execution. Hence, the great importance for the establishment of a military policy which will provide necessary and ample military protection to every part of the country, and to every State, the minimum number that is required, which if only from moral suasion did nothing more than prevent

the lawless element from performance of such acts or deeds which would unquestionably exist and do exist in States where an inadequate military force is maintained.

As a last and final analysis of this important question, the National Guard of this country ask and demand the same privilege and right to administer the details of its affairs as the Regular Army is accorded, and I desire to impress you with the fact that unless they are given this privilege, there will be no National Guard of a sufficient force to amount to anything, for the reason that they who have had experience in the past know and understand exactly the demeanor and treatment that will be accorded their officers and enlisted personnel, judging the future by the past. They do not desire a repetition of the management of National Guard affairs as it was prior to and during the war with the Central Powers, and I can assure you that a sufficient number can not be procured to build up the Guard to the size that is necessary for its practical uses, and neither do I feel that a Regular Army of even the size as outlined by Gen. Pershing and others can be maintained by a voluntary enlistment.

That is just as much a physical impossibility as it would be to maintain a National Guard without the proper control and assistance being given.

The plan proposed for a National Guard Council, whose administration of affairs will be controlled by the National Guard Bureau, is, in my opinion, the only logical plan upon which a National Guard of sufficient size and efficient force can be organized and maintained, through a voluntary enlistment plan, and why should they not be accorded this privilege? This is the plan under which the Marine Corps, an organization than which there is no superior from a military efficiency standpoint, operates, and, while it is under the direct control of the Secretary of the Navy, the details of administration of its affairs, I am informed, are directly controlled by its own head and administrative forces.

It is exactly a parallel case with ours. They are functioning directly under the Secretary of the Navy. At the same time, so far as the training and organization of the Marine Corps is concerned, it is directly under the head of the Marine Corps, with its major general commandant and through its officers under him, the training and discipline and organization of the Marine Corps is carried out. While ostensibly the Secretary of the Navy has direct control as the superior officer over all, and I do not think there is an instance on record where he ever goes into the details; I have never heard of it if he has.

Now, is there any good reason why the National Guard should be controlled and dominated by the Regular Army, whose interest in them and knowledge of their requirements and necessities is very little understood, to say nothing, at times, of their antagonistic attitude, which was evidenced by the desire to disintegrate their forces after the recent war with the Central Powers.

That policy was established prior to the war, or just after war was declared; that is, that after being drafted into the Federal service they should be discharged from the National Guard service, and we attempted—I say “we”; I refer to the executive commit-

tee of the National Guard Association—to get in this proviso that they should be discharged for the period of the war. That would simply have reverted them back to their original position, allowed them to fill out their contracts with the States, which were made in good faith, and which should never have been abrogated, except that it was intended to destroy the National Guard eternally and forever. That was the view which most of the National Guard officers took of it. Whether it was the intent or not, that was the impression it made upon our minds, and it was effective in so far as the organization that we sent out at that time—and we did send out an organization which made a record for itself and a credit to the States from which they came, and also the Federal Government; they made a record which I think will stand up as a parallelogram with any organization in the service, and for that reason they must have been efficient.

I also recall some public criticism made of the guard by some of the high ranking officers in the Regular Service, which was unjust and unwarranted; for instance, in 1916, Gen. Wood made the public statement that the National Guard could never be made a dependable fighting force.

Now, I want to say right here that this is not said because of any personal feeling toward Gen. Wood. Gen. Wood and myself are on the best of terms, and I have a very high regard for him, but I simply bring that out to show you the adverse opinions that they had at the time, and how incorrect it was, which actual results have proven, but I want to press this particular point, that if they start out on the hypothesis that nothing can be done and that it can never be made a dependable fighting force, then if that is the opinion of those who have controlled it, then how can anybody expect anything of them? And I want to especially stress this point, that the general impression has gotten out that the National Guard is fighting the Regular Army. It is not fighting the Regular Army. It is not with that intention, although that remark was made by Col. Bennett Clark in the meeting, but he never intended to convey that idea. He meant this, that they were fighting for their own existence and their own rights and prerogatives in this matter. They had a right to do that. We have no fight with the Regular Army. We want the Regular Army to maintain their organization, but we want the right to maintain our organization, to manage our affairs. We want them to manage their affairs and let the National Guard manage theirs, and the two combined, whenever a war occurs and the forces are brought in jointly, then they will be under the control of the officers in charge. It is simply the training and efficiency and organization of the guard up until the time that they are called into the Federal service. After they are called into the Federal service, then the National Guard Council will have no further control over them, excepting in offering suggestions.

I replied to that criticism of Gen. Wood in my annual report in this language:

I can not speak for the condition of the National Guard in other States, but in so far as South Carolina's National Guard is concerned, these criticisms can not be sustained, because of the record which they have made and the complimentary reports furnished by officers of the Regular Service, under and with whom they served during this period.

That is where I got the information, from the officers of the Regular Army, with whom and under whom they served, and it was exceedingly complimentary, and I would say right here that the report made by the Militia Bureau of the National Guard forces, not only of South Carolina but of the United States, Gen. Heevy, in his report last year, was exceedingly complimentary, and I took the occasion to write him a personal letter and thank him, and I said that I did not in any way concede the fact that they were not entitled to it, but "I recognize the difference in the attitude of the head of your department with regard to the National Guard and the appreciation of their services, as compared with the past," and he came back and wrote me a personal letter in which he said that he thought he had not done them justice, that in his opinion they had made 100 per cent good.

And the record made by the National Guard of the several States without, to my knowledge, a single exception, is one covered with splendor and glory, and which should unquestionably entitle them to the greatest consideration in the formulation of a future military policy for this country, provided it is desired to enlist their interest and service in the future development of the military forces of this country.

I thank you for the opportunity to present for your consideration, in my feeble way, what, in my opinion, are the rights and prerogatives of the National Guard of this country, and I feel sure that due and careful consideration will be given this subject by the members of your committee and Congress as a whole.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. Let me ask you—you spoke of the Marine Corps being under a commandant major general. That is true—Gen. Barnett. The Marine Corps functions under the Secretary of the Navy through Gen. Barnett.

Gen. MOORE. That is what I stated.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. Why could there not be appointed from the National Guard here at Washington, under the Secretary of War, a major general, or whatever his rank might be, to be at the head of the National Guard of the Union, just as the commandant of the Marine Corps is at the head of the Marine Corps? Why would not that do just as well as the council?

Gen. MOORE. That is practically what we have asked for in sections 29 and 30.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. Your bill provides for what the Marine Corps has not got. The Marine Corps has no such organization such as you propose here. You would have a council.

Gen. MOORE. No; because it is a part of the regular establishment. That is the difference between the two. Ours come from the volunteer forces of the several States. Hence we feel that every State should have a voice in the military policy to be carried out. They are simply advisory. They absolutely do not control the situation, except in an advisory way.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. Would 1 man take the place of the 48 which you now propose?

Gen. MOORE. There is one head—the one man at the head of it—who is selected and recommended by the representatives of the several States to the President for appointment.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. Then you practically——

Gen. MOORE (interposing). It amounts to one man after all. The council is simply an advisory body.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. Your council which is proposed under this bill, though, not designated as such, would really be a general staff of the National Guard, with a man at the head of it.

Gen. MOORE. It may be like the General Staff, but it would not have the absolute power to control that the General Staff has. It would be more of an advisory body. The General Staff now has absolute control and dictates practically the military policy.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. It has gone further than it was intended.

Gen. MOORE. Yes, I know it has.

Senator FLETCHER. This bill provides a good many things to be done on the recommendation of the National Guard Council.

Gen. MOORE. Yes.

Senator FLETCHER. So they are something more than advisory. They make recommendations, and their recommendations must be followed, apparently.

Gen. MOORE. In a way, yes; but after all it is an advisory board. It is representative, and coordinates the several States upon one line of thought and ideas, because a majority will work out the policy. Some may differ with the majority, but the majority rule will follow, just like the preparation of that bill. That bill has been the outcome of the different ideas from the different States, written down by the organization committee, whose duty it was to prepare it. But they did it after they had heard the representatives from the several States and their views and ideas. They did not take every one of them, but they took the best. They took what the majority considered was for the best interest of all concerned.

The CHAIRMAN. I want to pursue that inquiry a little further. The chief of the council, the chief of the bureau, or some body of men must do the general staff work for the guard.

Gen. MOORE. That is provided for by detail.

Senator SUTHERLAND. You mean the guard as a whole?

The CHAIRMAN. The guard as a whole.

Gen. MOORE. The appointment of staff officers, you mean?

The CHAIRMAN. No. I mean there must be a central general staff for the guard as a whole.

Gen. MOORE. That will be practically the chief of the National Guard Bureau.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes. Then it is his function to work out, for instance, the plans for mobilizing the National Guard.

Gen. MOORE. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Suppose those plans should seriously conflict with the plans of the General Staff of the Army for mobilizing the Regular Army?

Gen. MOORE. But he is going to be in consultation. There will be officers of the Regular Army detailed on that board, as I understand it. I think it provides for that.

Senator SUTHERLAND. He would be right here in Washington.

Gen. MOORE. There can not be any conflict, unless they want to make conflict. If they start out on the hypothesis that they are not going to agree to anything, why of course the Secretary of War can step in. He is the head of the whole force.

Senator SUTHERLAND. Or the President?

Gen. MOORE. Yes; the President is the head, but I mean primarily the active head is the Secretary of War. The President is the head of the whole Military Establishment.

The CHAIRMAN. I am not arguing one way or another. I want to find out what you think are the functions of the chief of the bureau and the council.

Gen. MOORE. It is laid down there.

The CHAIRMAN. No legislation ever details everything.

Gen. MOORE. No; but I will answer that by saying that the same policy will be pursued with regard to the carrying out of the details by the head upon the recommendation of a majority of the council. That is the intention. That will be the policy.

The CHAIRMAN. Then, in a sense, the council is the general staff?

Gen. MOORE. Yes; figuratively speaking, it is simply in an advisory way.

The CHAIRMAN. For example, there is the War Plans Division in the General Staff.

Gen. MOORE. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Whose duty it is not to direct or command or to exercise any executive function?

Gen. MOORE. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. This is exceedingly important, because on the work of the War Plans Division there depends the whole question of national defense.

Gen. MOORE. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. The War Plans Division is charged with the duty of mobilization upon any frontier or for the preparation of plans for sending an expeditionary force into some other country. Now, as I understand it, you would have to have some such instrumentality like that to make plans for the National Guard.

Gen. MOORE. That is all provided for until they are taken into the Federal service; then it comes under the General Staff.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes; after they are taken into the Federal service; but how are those plans made prior? It is all very well to make plans after the trouble arises. That has been our trouble for a hundred years.

Gen. MOORE. Those details were to be explained by Col. Gillette, who was one of the drafters of the bill, from a legal standpoint; and those things I have not given any thought or consideration as to the details, because the details are naturally to be worked out by regulations.

The CHAIRMAN. He testified yesterday and described the general purposes of the bill. Commencing on line 10 on page 27, it says:

The President, upon the recommendation of the National Guard council, approved by the Secretary of War, shall detail to the National Guard Bureau such officers of appropriate rank, not above the grade of colonel, and such enlisted men as may be required to properly administer the affairs of said bureau. Such officers and enlisted men shall be selected from the National Guard, the National Reserve, or the Officers' Reserve Corps upon the recommendation of the National Guard Council, and shall receive the pay and allowance of officers of the Regular Army having the same rank and length of service.

Now, I assume that it will be the function of these officers to assist the bureau chief in preparing plans for the utilization of the National Guard in time of war.

Gen. MOORE. As well as its organization, training, equipment, and all, whatever is necessary. That provision should be made for the completion of the organization.

The CHAIRMAN. I have tremendous sympathy in your desire for a reasonable degree of what might be termed military home rule, and it has been highly obnoxious to me the way the guard in many instances has been treated, but when it comes to planning for the national defense, where both the Regulars and the guard must be called upon to defend the country, how can you ever get away from the proposition that there must be but one planning board?

Gen. MOORE. Haven't you often heard it said that two heads are better than one, if one is a goat head?

The CHAIRMAN. It is a group of officers that do the planning, and they have got to sit down in one room and do it.

Gen. MOORE. Don't you think, Senator, that the component parts—that is, the individual members of the National Guard—have shown up creditably?

The CHAIRMAN. Certainly.

Gen. MOORE. Haven't they the ability?

The CHAIRMAN. Splendid.

Gen. MOORE. Why should not they be able to work out these details? They have the ability and they have intelligence.

The CHAIRMAN. But this plan does not permit them to join in the plans for the national defense.

Gen. MOORE. You are the one to write into it such changes as you may wish. When we present this plan, it is our idea. We do not expect to ram it down the throats of Senators and Congressmen. We present it as our views and our ideas, after careful study, as the thoughts and ideas expressed by the different representatives from the different States—a majority of them.

The CHAIRMAN. Just a moment, General. That has been our trouble for a hundred years, that the control is not complete until after the war commences. Then it takes us three or four months to get ready to fight.

Gen. MOORE. It took you longer than that, didn't it?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes; it took 13 months and 3 weeks to put a division into action? Why was it? Because we had no unified military policy and no preparation, and there are a whole lot of people to blame for it. I imagine the people of the United States are to blame, for they control their own Government, but it seems to me that if we assume that a country can never be safe to meet an emergency unless the methods by which the emergency is to be met are worked out in advance, that all the elements that are going to be called upon of a military character to meet the emergency should sit together to make the plans prior to the arrival of the emergency.

Gen. MOORE. That is what I suggested.

The CHAIRMAN. But this does not do that.

Gen. MOORE. But you can change it to meet your views and your ideas.

Maj. CRITCHFIELD. We can not legislate for the Army.

The CHAIRMAN. We want to legislate for both.

Gen. MOORE. You asked Maj. Critchfield here why could not the National Guard be given representation on the staff. They have that now, under the law.

The CHAIRMAN. It is not mandatory.

Gen. MOORE. I think it is.

The CHAIRMAN. Oh, no.

Maj. CRITCHFIELD. We have no representatives at all.

Gen. MOORE. It is on the Militia Bureau.

The CHAIRMAN. But the Militia Bureau has nothing to do with the General Staff. That is the trouble.

Gen. MOORE. They have representation on the Militia Bureau, but they have not any say so in the administration of affairs in the Militia Bureau. What does one or two men mean when you have the majority against you? That is the point.

The CHAIRMAN. I hope the day will come when we won't have minorities and majorities in questions of National defense. You can give the National Guard full control over the Militia Bureau as it is to-day. The trouble is that the Militia Bureau has nothing to do with making the plans for the war.

Gen. MOORE. I know. They are dominated by the General Staff. I do not know it, but I have understood that is the case.

The CHAIRMAN. It is bound to be the case. It is only an executive agency, and that is why I have repeatedly asked if it would not be a most excellent thing to put a provision in the law that whatever citizen forces you have—call it National Guard or anything else—it must be represented adequately in the planning board of the military forces of the country.

Gen. MOORE. It should be. Just as a matter for argument, how would you suggest that that be allotted in the way of representation from the guard and from the Army?

The CHAIRMAN. A certain percentage.

Gen. MOORE. How many members on the General Staff from the Regular Army and how many members on the General Staff from the National Guard?

The CHAIRMAN. A certain percentage.

Gen. MOORE. In what ratio, now—in the ratio of the enlisted personnel or in the ratio of the number of officers?

The CHAIRMAN. I could hardly defend under the number of enlisted personnel, because the number of enlisted personnel does not measure the entire responsibility. But I would fix it so that there would be an adequate representation; that is, so that there would be a hearing in every division of the General Staff. I would make it mandatory.

Gen. MOORE. Would a hearing give the desired results?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes; decidedly.

Gen. MOORE. Suppose, for the sake of argument, that the General Staff and their views and ideas were at variance with the National Guard representatives, which policy would be carried out?

The CHAIRMAN. Somebody would have to make the decision finally, and it would be the President of the United States.

Gen. MOORE. No; the decision would be made in the General Staff if they had the majority of the representatives of the staff. We could make a minority report and appeal it to the Secretary of War and

from the Secretary of War to the President. It might be done that way.

The CHAIRMAN. It is done that way.

Gen. MOORE. That might be a little check on the proposition.

The CHAIRMAN. The Planning Division of the General Staff does not decide things. It merely plans the things and submits the plans to the Secretary of War and the Chief of Staff, and they decide if it is good or bad and modify it according to their judgment, and then we are going to propose in this legislation that these plans shall be sent to the Congress.

Gen. MOORE. If it came down to an appeal to the Secretary of War, did not the Secretary of War make a statement to the committee here that called on him with reference to reducing the number of requirements of the Army from the table of organization of 1907 from 100 to 65, and he said this, if I can quote it correctly, that "You have come to a man that knows as little about it as any man connected with it, but I am largely governed by my military advisers."

The CHAIRMAN. Yes; and I want some of the Guard officers as his military advisers.

Gen. MOORE. The governors called on him, too, a committee and told him it was impracticable and absolutely impossible to maintain organizations at a 100 minimum; that is, at least, to start with, but they would not allow us to start under that.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes; we have heard all of that.

Gen. MOORE. And the governors appealed to them, and finally the Judge Advocate General was requested to formulate a decision, and his decision was that we were technically at war, and that the Secretary of War could not, under the conditions, change the table of organization; that is, he had no authority to do it. But he had done it or it had been done, and the explanation of that was that it was an emergency. I said, "Great God, if there was ever any greater emergency than there is now, I can not understand why you could allow the two battalions in my State to have 65 and the third battalion you must have a hundred." It is inconsistent, and if you can do it in one case you can do it in another. It is absolutely the same. It is absolutely impossible to get 100 men up. I do not say that you can not eventually reach the 100. Under the old system we could organize with 40 or 45, and while the requirements were 65, we would give them a reasonable time to bring the company up. I asked a major of the Regular Army who came back on leave the other day, "How many men have you got in your battalion?" He said 35. Yet they require 65 to organize a battalion in the National Guard. The thing is very plain to my mind. They do not want any National Guard.

Senator FLETCHER. What minimum would you suggest?

Gen. MOORE. Sixty-five.

The CHAIRMAN. Of course the comparisons are hardly fair to-day. The whole Army is in chaos.

Gen. MOORE. The National Guard conditions are even worse than the Army, because the men who come into the Regular Army come into it for a permanent livelihood. The men in the National Guard are giving their time free gratis for the purpose of making up a military organization.

The CHAIRMAN. Just a moment. The comparison is hardly fair at this stage of our history. I agree with you that it is exceedingly dif-

difficult to start with 100 men in an Infantry company, and the fact that that difficulty was gotten into by the department is due to the fact that they did not have anybody advising them who knew from the localities themselves.

Gen. MOORE. We appealed to them.

The CHAIRMAN. But you only came one day.

Gen. MOORE. Two different committees.

The CHAIRMAN. What does that mean, in comparison with the opinions of officers who were there all day every day?

Gen. MOORE. It has had no effect, because they absolutely disregarded the appeals.

The CHAIRMAN. That is what I say, and I want to have that advice have effect.

Gen. MOORE. It is extremely difficult to organize at a minimum of 65. If they would allow us to organize at 45 and increase within a reasonable time to 65, I could get up my organizations right away, but I have numbers and numbers of units with 50 and 58 men, and it is hard to get the others. They have combed the country, all those that are available for enlistment. Now, formerly they took married men, and now you can only take unmarried men. The first thing a recruiting officer asks a man is "Have you any dependents?" If he is married, if he has a wife and two or three children, we had a case of that kind, yet that thing was explained to him carefully and accurately by the local organizer of the company, the recruiting officer, and he had told the inspector-instructor that he had made it plain, yet he kept on, "You know that you have dependents; why could you make a statement like that?" And he finally made that fellow get out.

The spirit of the thing impressed me very strongly, that they did not want any National Guard. They want it, but they do not want it.

Senator FLETCHER. The General Staff does not make final decisions now, and if you had people sitting in with them all the time, their conclusions would have to be presented to the Secretary of War or to the President for final action.

The CHAIRMAN. Let me describe a hypothetical case, showing the difficulties of not having one staff make the plans at the same time. For instance, plans will have to be made to move 200,000 men to the border, or 300,000 men to the border. That involves intricate train schedules, consultation with railway officials from all over the United States, moving not only the Regulars, stationed at Fort Sheridan, Ill., but the guardsmen stationed in Wisconsin, next door, and in connection with that you have got to have your whole supply system.

Gen. MOORE. You would after they were called into the service.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes; but they have to be planned in advance.

Gen. MOORE. They will know the size of the unit, they will know the location of it, and they will know every detail of it that they know now, because they get all that information from the National Guard Bureau Chief.

The CHAIRMAN. They would not get it unless they wanted to under this bill. I want to make them get it.

Gen. MOORE. You can fix it so they could.

The CHAIRMAN. You can not fix it so they could under this bill unless you put guard officers or citizen officers in the General Staff.

You have got to have the supplies meet those troops at the various points of concentration, and carry them on and have the supplies meet them at the right point near the border, and there is only one body of planners that can carry that out.

Gen. MOORE. I see what you mean, but my experience in the past is, if we have representation, as we did in the Militia Bureau, it amounted to absolutely nothing.


The CHAIRMAN. Because the Militia Bureau plans nothing. It is the General Staff that does the planning.

Did you have any other observations to make? I did not mean to take all of your time with my lectures.

Gen. MOORE. Nothing except what I have brought out. So far as the details of this bill are concerned, I did not give it any thought or consideration.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee is very much obliged to you, General.

Whereupon, at 4.30 o'clock p. m., the subcommittee adjourned, to meet at the call of the chairman.



REORGANIZATION OF THE ARMY

HEARINGS

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE COMMITTEE ON MILITARY AFFAIRS UNITED STATES SENATE

SIXTY-SIXTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

ON

S. 2691

A BILL TO PROVIDE FOR UNIVERSAL MILITARY, NAVAL, AND VOCATIONAL TRAINING AND FOR MOBILIZATION OF THE MANHOOD OF THE NATION IN A NATIONAL EMERGENCY

S. 2693

A BILL TO CREATE A DEPARTMENT OF AERONAUTICS, DEFINING THE POWERS AND DUTIES OF THE DIRECTOR THEREOF, PROVIDING FOR THE ORGANIZATION, DISPOSITION, AND ADMINISTRATION OF A UNITED STATES AIR FORCE, CREATING THE UNITED STATES AIR RESERVE FORCE, AND PROVIDING FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF CIVIL AND COMMERCIAL AVIATION

S. 2715

A BILL TO REORGANIZE AND INCREASE THE EFFICIENCY OF THE UNITED STATES ARMY, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES

PART 28

Printed for the use of the Committee on Military Affairs

STATEMENTS OF

COL. WILLIAM H. JOHNSTON
COL. MILTON A. RECKORD
MAJ. GEN. WILLIAM G. PRICE

ADJT. GEN. ORLAND HOLWAY
ADJT. GEN. HARRY B. SMITH
AMERICAN LEGION



WASHINGTON
GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
1920

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REORGANIZATION OF THE ARMY.

FRIDAY, DECEMBER 5, 1919.

UNITED STATES SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON MILITARY AFFAIRS,
Washington, D. C.

The subcommittee met at 2.15 p. m., pursuant to the call of the chairman.

Present: Senators Wadsworth (chairman), Sutherland, New, Fletcher, and Thomas.

STATEMENT OF COL. WILLIAM H. JOHNSTON, UNITED STATES INFANTRY.

The CHAIRMAN. Would you please state, for the information of the committee, what assignments you had during the war?

Col. JOHNSTON. When the war opened I was a member of the War College Division, General Staff Corps, in Washington, and had been since November, 1914.

I was appointed brigadier general of the National Army August 5, 1917; organized the One hundred and eightieth Infantry Brigade at Camp Travis, Tex.; commanded the Ninetieth Division at Camp Travis, Tex., during the winter, December 17 to March 1, while Maj. Gen. Allen was in France; I commanded the Ninetieth Division from about May 31, during its transfer to the American Expeditionary Forces, by way of England, reaching its billeting area July 8, 1918; I commanded the One hundred and eightieth Infantry Brigade in the defensive sector north of Toul; I was appointed major general, United States Army, for the emergency only, August 8, 1917, and assigned to the Ninety-first Division; I was with the Ninety-first Division, and commanding it, through the St. Mihiel, Meuse-Argonne, and Ypres-Lys offensives, and returned with the division in April, 1919; I commanded Camp Lewis, Wash., from May 1, 1919, until I was discharged as major general, July 31.

I am now on duty at the General Staff College.

The CHAIRMAN. General, we will be glad to have your observations on anything that is connected with this great question of military policy. You are familiar—at least, in a general way, I assume—with some of the bills that are pending before the committee, the so-called War Department bill, reorganizing the Army, and what might be called the National Guard bill, recently introduced. We will be glad to hear you on any subject.

Col. JOHNSTON. I have not seen the National Guard bill, although I have heard that it was presented or published. I have read over carefully the bills S. 2715, S. 2691, and a bill some time ago proposed for a separate Air Service.

The CHAIRMAN. For your information, I may say that the bill for the separate department of aeronautics was reported this morning.

Col. JOHNSTON. A different bill?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes; a later bill; or, rather, a corrected and improved copy of it.

Col. JOHNSTON. I have not seen that. I have seen the first one.

The first point that appeals to me as an improvement over the national-defense act is expressed in the so-called War Department bill, which calls our future force the United States Army. The national-defense act, which I helped to write as a member of the General Staff, divided the Army of the United States into various forces. The result was friction—jealousy between the various parts of that Army.

One of the best things I find in this bill was issued as an order while I was in France. In other words, we had officers whose previous commissions read "National Guard of the United States." Some read "National Army." Some read "Officers' Reserve Corps." And others read "U. S. Army"—both temporary commissions and regular commissions. They had different collar insignia. I noticed in the Texas brigade and in the Ninety-first Division I had officers from all those sources. When the orders came, I think in August, 1918, that they were all to be called officers of the United States Army, you could not tell the difference between those officers. I think any bill that is passed should take care of all the armed forces of the United States; that it should not state that the Army of the United States shall consist of the Regular Army, and then something else. While I have been a Regular for 36 years—and I was in the National Guard four years before that—I do not think the word "Regular" need any longer appear in legislation.

The CHAIRMAN. What guard were you in?

Col. JOHNSTON. I enlisted in a regiment called the Police Reserves of St. Louis. Afterwards, it was the First Infantry, National Guards of Missouri. At the time of the riots in the seventies, I served three years in the ranks and was discharged as a sergeant. Later, I raised Company B, First Arizona Territorial Militia, at Prescott, Ariz., during the Cibicu Indian affair in the fall of 1881.

The CHAIRMAN. Your proposal that there shall be but one Army of the United States involves, of course, the use of the Army clause of the Constitution as the authority for raising and maintaining the Army?

Col. JOHNSTON. Yes; it does. There may be an inactive part of the Army as well as an active part; but I would not start out with a different law governing one part of our fighting force from that which governs another part. That is a fatal defect. There is no difference; they are composed of the same young men. In the divisions in which I served you could not tell the young regular officer from an officer of the National Guard or Officers' Reserve Corps. They were all treated alike. Why they should be designated differently in peace I can not see. There may be objections to placing

the National Guard, or those who were in the National Guard, and who want to come back into the Army, directly under the sole control of the President. Personally, my experience has been that most National Guard officers of the line would rather be under the War Department than directly under the States. I have heard many of them state that they would like to avoid the necessity of being called upon for riot duty, before any other troops are called. If they are to be called upon for riot duty, it is harder to secure enlistments.

I have inspected the National Guard of several States, and I know many captains are badly handicapped in trying to get recruits because the labor element in the States will sometimes discourage a young man from joining the National Guard. If the labor element, or their sentiment, predominates, you can not expect a National Guard captain to be able to keep the company up to its quota. If he is working at a trade, a man must join the labor unions. Labor unions do not want their members in the National Guard of the States.

Senator THOMAS. Do not a number of them expressly forbid that by the by-laws?

Col. JOHNSTON. I am not informed about that, but I am giving my experience from inspecting the National Guard and serving with them; having been in the ranks of the National Guard, I know they do not get a fair show in getting their recruits.

The ideal situation would be, in equity to those officers of the National Guard who were brought into the Army, either on the Mexican border, or because of the World War, to permit those officers to reorganize their divisions under power of Congress to raise armies, have each State maintain its constabulary for riot duty, and free such divisions as the Twenty-seventh of New York and the Twenty-eighth of Pennsylvania, and good National Army divisions, from the trouble they may have in being liable to be called out for small labor troubles if organized under the national defense act as State forces. We are now using the Regular Army, so-called, for riot duty. The distinction that has hitherto prevailed, that you must first exhaust the powers of the State and not turn out the Army until the State has shown its inability to put down a riot, is what made the service of the National Guard unpopular.

Senator THOMAS. It is not now the rule because of the fact that we are still in a technical state of war; but upon the return of peace conditions, I presume the constitutional limitations upon the use of the military will again assert themselves, and it will become the duty of the guard to do what the National Army is doing now.

Col. JOHNSTON. I see no reason why some reserve force to absorb the young men that are given compulsory training can not be organized out of the personnel which has returned from France, and which was formerly called the National Guard. You can call that the reserve army or the inactive army, or anything you like, but it should be locally identified. The minute you begin to put them under the control of the States, the line officers themselves tell you they object, because then, in certain States, they are not given the same prestige as in a Federal force. Possibly they are not treated in the same manner throughout the country, but they feel that they are discriminated against. I think most officers of the Army have

the kindest personal feeling toward all officers of the National Guard. I had many in my division—although I had not command of a National Guard division, so-called. Many officers transferred to me who had gone over to France in the so-called National Guard divisions, and I could not tell them apart from Regular and Officers' Reserve Corps. When an officer behaved badly—I had to relieve a few from duty—I did not know until after action had been taken what his origin was. That was because I took command of the Ninety-first Division only two days before it was ordered to the front, and I had not had time to become personally acquainted with the origin of many of the officers; that is, down below the grade of colonel and lieutenant colonel. I did not have in the Ninety-first Division, commanding troops of the line, officers who were Regular Army officers, below the grade of colonel and lieutenant colonel. So-called "temporary" officers commanded battalions and companies, and they made good. I think those men deserve some place in the permanent United States Army.

I notice in the bill S. 2715 there is a provision that original vacancies shall be filled, at least partially, by these officers who served and who establish their physical and professional qualification in the new army. I like that. It does not state how many. I would like to call attention to the fact that those officers that are to be given positions in this new army under permanent commissions need not necessarily be selected exclusively from the officers who have been held over by the War Department. I noticed the other day in glancing over the sheets that a very large majority of what we call "temporary" officers held over are staff officers. Captains and majors who served in the Meuse-Argonne sector and in Belgium, and won the distinguished-service cross, were promptly discharged as soon as they landed in the United States. The men who anchored themselves to good positions in the United States and never went to France; or, if they went over, came home early enough to get a good place in some staff corps, especially as personnel or property officers—those officers are generally the ones that are held over for demobilization.

Senator THOMAS. What would be the status of the men who have been retained and the officers who have been discharged under the new organization, in the absence of any regulation whatever, from what now obtains?

Col. JOHNSTON. You refer to the purely temporary officer or to the regular officer with temporary rank?

Senator THOMAS. This is what I mean. Do not take this down. * * *

Col. JOHNSTON. If any reorganization bill authorizes officers to be recommissioned in the new army in the grades and with dates of rank now held by them, the result would be that any officer subsequently appointed, who had been demoted for various reasons, would be forever junior to those officers who had been retained in their temporary commissions; in fact, they would be junior to men who were formerly clerks in the War Department or elsewhere.

Senator THOMAS. Would not that be unfair and unjust?

Col. JOHNSTON. I think that would be upsetting the customs of the service. That is, we generally believe that, outside of certain

meritorious cases, the opportunity for advancement ought to be somewhat in line with a man's length of service.

Senator THOMAS. I think so, too.

Col. JOHNSTON. The new legislation gives the officers who have been retained in their temporary grades an opportunity to be recommissioned. Speaking now solely of the temporary officers, many of the worthiest of the temporary officers have been discharged after they stated they would like to stay in the Army, because legislation had not made it possible to give them commissions. Now, those worthy line officers that commanded companies in my division and other divisions, and some who commanded battalions, and were under fire for weeks, are the men that are entitled to the greatest consideration in giving out commissions in the new permanent force. They should be given some preference; they should be examined physically and professionally. But if legislation simply continues the present condition by which certain temporary officers are held up to July 1, for purposes of demobilization, and then continued under present commissions, they will be senior to men who are now majors and were brigadier generals under fire in France. That would be a mistake. I think, in fact, every officer and ex-officer should have an equal opportunity, and that his temporary commission ought not to govern what he is going to hold in any permanent establishment. His permanent commission should govern. I think that covers that matter.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, indeed.

Col. JOHNSTON. I would like to add that I do not believe the War Department committee intended any other course. I can not believe they did. In section 31, lines 20 to 25, it states that all officers will continue or be recommissioned in their present grades and dates. They probably meant in their present permanent grades. That is what I think. I do not believe there was any intention on the part of the committee that framed this bill to cause any injustice at all. I think it was just verbiage that was not observed carefully.

I notice in the bill—without knowing much about the ideas of the War Department, but generally speaking—that they have left out a chief of infantry and chief of cavalry. In my opinion, the chief of infantry could take care of instruction in the various arms we are supposed to fight with. I see no reason why a tank corps with a special chief should be a part of the army. Tanks are infantry weapons.

Some purchasing agency, similar to the Division of Purchase and Storage at present, can buy anything; but the infantry does not need a special corps to buy anything, nor to teach it how to use it. The tanks should be assigned to a division, at each of these camps, for training, and the character of training should be prescribed as the result of experiments and drills held at the Infantry School. You thereby save having all the overhead of a lot of officers and enlisted men of a special corps.

The same recommendation applies to the Motor Transport Corps. You do not need a general and a lot of colonels to take care of a few thousand motor vehicles. I had 300 trucks in my division. One motor transport officer, who had no commission as such cared for them. Officers and men of the division were able to take care of the

supply train of the division and the ammunition train and handle the trucks as well as repair them.

I would like to add here, in defense of the War Department bill—if it requires any defense at all—that when I was a member of the General Staff in 1916, an order came down to the War College from the Secretary of War to report what action, what legislation, required attention, as the result of the appropriation bill passed August 29, 1916. That was the usual way of handling appropriation bills, to see if there was some legislation for which we should draft regulations. I noticed that five corps had obtained permission by the act to buy motor transport. Originally only the Quartermaster Corps bought them; then other corps commenced to put that in the items of appropriation bills, until finally five corps had it. I wrote a memorandum, which was forwarded to the Chief of Staff, stating the fact that in case of war (this was nine months before the war), five bureaus would be out in the market trying to buy motor vehicles.

The War College Division recommended that the Quartermaster General buy for all the other four corps, and be reimbursed from their appropriations, as he had standing bids for a year. No action was taken upon that. I know I read later, after I went to France, that considerable confusion resulted from the fact that five bureaus were in the market trying to buy the same things. In the case of motor transport it led to considerable confusion.

Senator FLETCHER. What would you say about doing away with the Quartermaster Corps?

Col. JOHNSTON. I was not in the United States at the time you say it was done away with.

Senator FLETCHER. No; I say what about doing away with it now, in the future?

Col. JOHNSTON. Oh, I do not believe I am qualified to discuss the organization of the War Department General Staff or the bureaus as they are working now. Since I have been here I have been at the General Staff College, Washington Barracks. We never have time to go up to the War Department. I believe that one great virtue established was the concentration in one bureau of the right of purchase of all articles that are not technical, articles that are used by everybody in the Army. I think that is recognized as a step in advance.

Senator FLETCHER. Would it be wise to get rid of the name "Quartermaster Corps" entirely and call it "Supply Corps," in view of all of our past history and tradition?

Col. JOHNSTON. Well, about that I do not know, sir. I have never had any duty in the Quartermaster Corps. I vaguely remember the name "Supply Corps" was adopted at the time of the consolidation, and the next year you changed the law and called it Quartermaster Corps. When you combined the Pay Department, the Quartermaster Department, and the Subsistence Department, I think the first bill did call those together the Supply Corps.

Senator NEW. I think, however, that bill was never passed.

Col. JOHNSTON. Maybe so. Then they adopted the words "Quartermaster Corps." In the regiments we have supply companies and supply sergeants. So, whatever the supply department is, it would be appropriate to call it the "Supply Corps." It may be the

officers of that corps have a sentimental interest in preserving the word quartermaster. I do not think I am qualified to give much advice on that point.

Senator FLETCHER. Have you thought about that provision establishing a separate finance department?

Col. JOHNSTON. My experience has been in France, and since I came back, that the establishment of a finance department or finance corps is justified. I have heard people say that it delays the payment. I never heard of delay in France. I think the concentration of it in one corps is not a bad idea—concentration of the payment of all bills. I have not had experience in the War Department, but I believe in 1912 we loaded upon the Quartermaster Corps too many different things to do. By combining three departments too much work was loaded on them. It was hard to find officers with proper qualifications that could be switched from one to the other. I have heard some officers state that the payment of contracts has been delayed. I do not know that. I commanded Camp Lewis for three months, and there was no trouble about having the finance corps make the payments. My supply officer was the camp supply officer, who was under the zone supply officer at San Francisco. He made purchases and certified the bills.

In France and Belgium my finance officer paid the officers and men. We did not settle bills there. They were forwarded to the G. H. Q. or headquarters S. O. S. for payment. As far as the line officer looks at it from outside the window, the present separation of the payment from the purchase seems to work; but when you get into the War Department, the munitions building, and study its ramifications, there may be a just ground for saying they should be consolidated. I do not know much about that.

I do think this: We made a mistake in drafting the national defense act by studying and very carefully asking for the precise number of officers and noncommissioned officers and men in a regiment or company. Before the Tables of Organization had been printed, we drifted into the war. French officers came to the War College Division, and we devised an entirely different organization, as experience had taught us that we had to add enough machine-gun companies to support each battalion. Now, in order to send over the First Division it was necessary to combine a whole lot of men. We did not have the machine-gun companies, and yet the law said we could not have more than one per regiment. It caused us a great deal of inconvenience to adapt those provisional organizations. When the national selective-service law was passed, at the last minute, we had to send to you gentlemen and ask for the necessary machine-gun battalions to the brigade. I think the request reached here just about in time to be put into the conference report, to enable us to send over the proper number of machine guns to give fire power to the infantry. It is an illustration of the disadvantage of putting too many details into a bill for the organization of the Army.

The War Department bill apparently leaves it to the War Department or the President, after he is given a certain number of officers and men, to organize them as he pleases. I think the intention is that, in case we enter another war, our fighting will be different from

the trench warfare, and we may want to change from two regiments in a brigade to three regiments in a brigade. If we have it specifically fixed by law that we must have just so many everything will be provisional; that is, they will not belong to the regular organization; you can attach men; you can do anything you please, and call it a provisional organization; but it is not a clean way to keep the books. That is one of the points in this bill which is very good. I mean, the Senate bill 2715.

Looking at it from the point of view of the commander of the division, I can see a reason for a great many provisions here, where it is apparently left to regulation to fix the strength or something else, rather than have it specified precisely by law.

Senator FLETCHER. What about the size of the Army in peace?

Col. JOHNSTON. Well, sir; I think that until we have a national policy, I do not know enough to say what the size of the Army should be; I do not think any Army officer can say that 500,000 is too much or too little for the active Army. Six months from now we may be very much interested in the strength of our Army.

Now, if we knew the national policy we could criticize the size of the Army. As Army officers and naval officers, all of our plans are now being harmonized; but those plans may be simply idle type-written sheets if Congress does not happen to care for that kind of a national policy.

I believe there should be closer association between the General Staff and the Military Affairs Committees of the Senate and House, as Congress should know—and does know—what the national policy is going to be. The Secretary of War says 500,000. He is a member of the Cabinet, and I can not dispute his estimate. I do not know the national policy, and he only proposes that estimate tentatively. I do not think there is an Army officer to-day who predicts that we need only 300,000 or 100,000 that may not be very sorry within six months that he ever opened his mouth, because he might say, "I am sorry I said anything about it; I didn't know anything about it"; and he does not. I had that experience with the national-defense act. I was working on it six months, and I can see now mistakes I made all through; and it was passed about a year before we entered the war.

If we do not enlist the 500,000 that this bill recommends, we do not have to pay for them. But if a sudden emergency arises before the National Guard has been able to get on its feet and get its 400,000 men, and we want to mobilize troops along the border, we need an army. If we have not any authority for the 500,000, we can't enlist the men offering to enlist. Any money we expend beyond a certain amount is contrary to law. I believe your committee—the Senate committee and the House committee—know what our national policy is going to be.

The CHAIRMAN. That is assuming a good deal.

Senator NEW. I should say so.

Col. JOHNSTON. You fix it. The Secretary of War has said 500,000. I certainly, as an ex-division commander, would hate to dispute that and then six months from now find myself down on the border, and be told when asking for replacements, "You can't have any more men now because we have exceeded the limit of the law."

I have heard many officers say, and I used to believe, that there was a limit to the number of men you can get by voluntary enlistment, but I have changed my mind. If the country generally knew the advantages of vocational training, we could fill the ranks of the permanent Army, whatever you call it, and to a great deal more than its present size.

I commenced advertising vocational training at Camp Lewis. I sent around several recruiting parties and I got some airplanes there and sent them out to towns to make demonstrations. I wrote personally 4,000 letters—that is, I signed 4,000 letters—to ex-officers and men of the Ninety-first Division, asking them to send me recruits: not asking them to enlist themselves again, but to send me recruits. An ignorant enlisted man, whose writing I could hardly read, from Montana, sent me a message that he had five recruits there, and I had similar word from others. If I could have enlisted men for one year, I could have gotten more; but under the regulations as announced by The Adjutant General, if a man had not served before he had to enlist for three years. That made it harder to get recruits. This bill says the enlistments shall be for three years.

If you want to fill a large volunteer force, and you will add:

Provided, That any soldier who has undergone successfully vocational or educational training and has become a dependable soldier may be discharged at the end of one year in time of peace.

The man knows that if he studies hard—and about half his time is devoted to vocational training and half to military training—if he knows that half his training is preparation of college, and that he can get out of the service in one year, he will be glad to enlist. I was told up in the Northwest that that would bring me enough recruits to fill Camp Lewis. Various boards of trade in the State of Washington, and the women in Washington, agreed to go around and canvass the mothers and get their sons to enlist for one year. Most mothers will not willingly let their sons enlist for three years in the Army.

When I was 18 years old, if I could have enlisted, with all the privileges a soldier has to-day, with liberal pay, and opportunity for advancement, I would have enlisted, because I was trying hard to get into West Point and did not have enough influence. But then the pay was so much less and no privileges. To-day most people do not appreciate the advantages a soldier has.

Senator New. May I ask you a question that what you have just said suggested to my mind?

This bill provides for universal military training. Suppose we are not able to get a measure of that kind enacted into law, for one reason or another, and suppose, as an alternative to that, we were to propose a system of voluntary universal military training, calling for a period of six months' training, and combine with that the vocational training, with what sort of a response do you think that would meet, how many young men would that attract?

Col. JOHNSTON. I do not think you would effect the proper result of universal military training. You would get some young men. This bill says you would pay them \$5 a month. I believe you would get very many that would volunteer to go out for six months at \$5 a month. But you could fill a Regular Army—that is, a permanent

establishment—much better than we have ever done before, if we would put the strong pedal on the possibility of getting out at the end of one year, provided the boy has taken the vocational or educational training, and has become a reliable, dependable soldier. I think universal military training is the only way to Americanize, and you might say unionize, the youth of this country; that even if we have 500,000 authorized for our permanent force, I still believe that the only way this country can prepare for national defense is to have universal military training.

Senator FLETCHER. What kind of vocational training did you have at Camp Lewis? You spoke of vocational training. What was the character of that vocational training?

Col. JOHNSTON. Mine was simply a start. I only used the existing facilities. I advertised it by putting up booths at the Northwest Peace Jubilee. One of them was an illustration by the Signal Corps of the instruction in wireless; another, of wire telegraphy. Then we had a pigeon coop there and communication was maintained by pigeons between the fair grounds at Tacoma and my headquarters at Camp Lewis, about 18 miles away. We had in front of each booth a list, expressed so that the layman could understand it, of the various trades that could be taught with our existing facilities and without any expense to those who would take the courses.

For instance, I moved a bake oven down there and baked all the bread for Camp Lewis in the fair ground and had a mess there in which we had men representing the school for bakers and cooks. On the outside we advertised qualifying men to become steward of steamship, the chef of a hotel, various trades which we could demonstrate. We had about 10 of those. At the remount depot booth we had a school of horseshoeing and veterinary science. The Medical Department put up a hospital. We had in front of each booth the names of the various trades we could teach—just vocational trades. All expense was paid by the jubilee committee.

After I had sent photographs of those booths to the War Department my plan was circulated by mimeograph all over the recruiting service as a way to advertise.

We secured quite a large number of men that were willing to undertake vocational or educational training; and we then organized classes. When I left the post we had classes organized in which we were teaching men algebra and any preparatory study for college. I called for volunteers. I was not given a cent to begin with and I started without any money. There were plenty of vacant barracks. That was a small start. I presume my successor has continued it; and I know now all over the Army there are certain posts where that vocational training is being emphasized. But I think that need not be included in universal military training. That is the way to stimulate interest and to fill the ranks of the permanent Army and to educate the young men of the country.

I do not think the people appreciate quite yet how many good American citizens were made by service in the ranks during this war, and I do not think you will ever realize how many clashes between labor and capital will have been avoided because the men representing those classes served in the same ranks.

Nothing will replace universal military training for the Americanization of your young men.

Senator FLETCHER. What time do you think should be spent on that? The Army bill provides for three months, and Senator Chamberlain's bill provides for six months.

Col. JOHNSTON. Of course any soldier will tell you he prefers six months. I presume the department puts it three months because it is a new idea, and four classes can be graduated in one year. I have forgotten whether it is three or four, but, anyhow, with the same overhead you can turn out more men if you make the course three months.

I have not talked with anybody in the War Department who prepared that bill, but I assume that it is a starter. My solution would be, if you can not get six months, you probably will be able to get a three months' period. Surely, this country, after what was seen in the operation of the selective draft law, will be willing to have young men trained for three months. Now, after that, take those same young men, when they have had three months' intensive training, and put them into this reserve force I was speaking of a little while ago, officered by officers of the National Guard and the National Army and the Reserve Corps, who have left the Army and are now in civil life. Keep them in an organization, have them out every summer, just as the National Guard has been out, for two weeks, or whatever period you care to pay them—in other words, supplement the three months' training with three or four years of summer training. If legislation does not provide a reserve force to receive men that have received three months' training, better than dropping such men is to induce them to go into the ranks of the National Guard; in other words, call the National Guard your inactive army if you can not get any other force.

Let these young men be told, if they will enlist for three years in the National Guard—it will involve the three summer encampments and keeping a record of them—they will be excused from further training. If they do not do that, I would make them come back every summer for the next three years and take two weeks' training. I suppose you are all familiar with the Australian law. Even those three months are better than they had in Australia.

Senator FLETCHER. In three months you could not have vocational training; you would have to confine that to intensive military training, would you not?

Col. JOHNSTON. Yes; that is very true.

Senator SUTHERLAND. What does the Australian law provide, General?

Col. JOHNSTON. I would have to look at my notes to answer that. Excuse me a moment. [After referring to note.] The Australian law was only for home defense. They were not required to serve outside of Australia.

Senator FLETCHER. When was that passed?

Col. JOHNSTON. About 1909, and when the war broke out it had been in operation only about 5 years. Their junior cadets, as they called them, from 12 to 14 years of age, received very little training. Their senior cadets, from 15 to 18 years of age, inclusive, received possibly less than young men do now in our high schools and our private military schools under Army officers. They were then considered a citizen force, as recruits, for two years, and then citizen soldiers for six years. The liability ceased with their twenty-sixth

year. But the custom was, although it was not enforced, that they should join rifle clubs.

Senator SUTHERLAND. Did they have any training between 19 and 20?

Col. JOHNSTON. The training imposed was between the ages of 18 and 26; that training covered those eight years. They were called recruits two years, and then they graduated into citizen soldiers; but the training between 18 and 26 years was 16 days, or the equivalent, annually. Eight of these 16 days in camp of continuous training. There was no obligation to serve outside of Australia. When the war broke out the so-called militia consisted of 50,000. About 90,000 were undergoing this compulsory training, and 90,000 were registered in rifle clubs. During the war they showed the remarkable record of 750,000 volunteers, of whom 417,000 were accepted. Their population was about 4,800,000. So that nearly 10 per cent of the whole population, including the women, were accepted for service—9 per cent and a fraction of the whole population.

The Australian system, you see, started just as I suppose the War Department General Staff proposes to start this, with an opening. Everybody would like to have it for six months. But when I left Camp Travis in the spring of 1918 to go to France, I think in the ranks of the Ninetieth Division there were four to five thousand men who had had less than three months' service. Nobody in the division, excepting the officers and a few noncommissioned officers, had had more than six or seven months' service. That was because our divisions were broken up by transferring men from one division to help out somebody else's division; and then we had to take recruits recently drawn to fill our vacancies.

So when the Ninetieth Division left Texas, out of 27,000 men, I venture to say 20 per cent, at least, had less than three months' training.

Senator SUTHERLAND. Are you familiar with the Swiss system?

Col. JOHNSTON. I have not studied it lately. I did study it some time ago. I could not recall now the exact amount of training required there.

There is one other way in which you can help fill the permanent Army. At present the papers announce there are hundreds of vacancies at West Point. There would not be a vacancy at West Point if the entire class for admission each year were selected from the ranks of the Army. By competitive examinations held in these various camps candidates could be selected, and if they were selected in that way, as I say, there would not be a vacancy. To-day I think we have a right to send 90 men from the ranks. I may be mistaken, but there is a law by which some particular number of men can go. A great many men overlook that; do not realize that that is the law. But you have generously opened it so that some men can go. I have been told by several friends that when they give a competitive examination the man who is the best student perhaps wins the place, but one Member of the House of Representatives told me the other day the man who won his last examination was an absolute coward and he had not the slightest attribute of a soldier. He gave him the appointment because he had made the best showing in the examination.

Now, if you had those appointments given in the ranks, the men who had been under observation for one year, and had been selected by boards of Army officers to go to West Point, you would get the effect of military aptitude, which you do not get at all in your present competitive examinations. Military aptitude is worth just as much as ability to pass an arithmetic examination.

One of our officers told me when he went to West Point he had never heard of the place. He did not want to go there, but his father said he had to go because the Congressman from the district had offered him the place, and the father could not afford to put him in college or elsewhere, where his course would have to be paid for. That man said he had not the slightest desire to have any career in the Army; still, he made good. But he had never heard of West Point, as I say, when he went there.

I am not a West Point graduate, but I have the highest respect for graduates of West Point. It was not my fault that I was not allowed to enter the academy. You will remove the prejudice that the papers talk about of the "aristocracy of West Point" if all the boys who go there have carried a rifle in the ranks and, not only that, but you will induce to go into the Army a hundred times as many men as go to West Point. You will get the finest class of young men in the Army who will enlist with that hope.

Give those places to men who have carried guns in the ranks, and when they come out of West Point nobody will point his finger at them and say, "They are aristocrats." Of course, I do not say that graduates of West Point are aristocrats, because the graduates of West Point have made the Army; but there is that attitude of the newspapers that they are aristocrats.

So I say that I believe it would be a good thing to give those appointments to men after they have served one year in the ranks. Of course, that is perhaps not a popular suggestion to you gentlemen who have the appointments—

Senator THOMAS. I welcome it. It would relieve me of a good deal of embarrassment, and I would welcome it.

Senator SUTHERLAND. Your father was a graduate of West Point, was he not?

Col. JOHNSTON. No; he served in the Civil War.

I do not find in the bill here any provision for the organization of an Army corps. I think any Army legislation ought to describe in general terms an army, a corps, a division, but not in detail the number of men, or the number of regiments. Some authority for the organization of them, however, ought to be in the bill, and I do not see that in the War Department bill. I have seen the quotation, however, from the Chief of Staff, that he believes in a certain number of corps, composed of a certain number of divisions. So evidently that is contemplated under the bill.

Another thing in the bill: It would apparently use the permanent force to conduct the compulsory training. I think you ought to have a training cadre separate entirely from the forces of the Army for that. You can not take young men at \$5 a month and give them compulsory training for three months and put them in the ranks of some company where the soldiers are drawing \$30 a month, and expect to have any morale; and yet this bill apparently contemplates attaching them to the organizations of the permanent force.

You should provide that the young men that are taken up for compulsory training are taken care of in separate barracks under a permanent training cadre, whether those officers belong to the Officers Reserve Corps or the permanent establishment. Whether officers belong to the one or the other is not important, but in case of any sudden mobilization of troops, you do not want to interfere with the continuous performance of training young men when you detach a division from its cantonment and send it off on some errand.

Those are only details, but section 50 of the bill contemplates they may be attached to organizations of the Army for training.

The CHAIRMAN. That is true.

Col. JOHNSTON. I think you will find that you ought to have a force in charge—I should think not to exceed 1 officer for 58 men, and 2 noncommissioned officers for 58 men. That kind of a training cadre in three months, one lieutenant and two noncommissioned officers, ought to be able to teach 50 men all that they will need to do to make them good private soldiers.

Senator FLETCHER. It seems to me some of the experts who have testified before us have stated that one trained man to four new men would be needed; that that was the proportion.

Col. JOHNSTON. I think I read that, but I think they were misunderstood. I think they meant that if you have lost casualties and you are going to get replacements, you can put 25 per cent of untrained men in with your 75 per cent trained men and absorb them. That was my experience in the Meuse-Argonne. I lost 25 per cent of my enlisted men. I was given less than that; I was given 4,000 to replace 5,000, and they were put on the train and sent to the French Army in Belgium, and absorbed by two Infantry brigades, Ninety-first Division. Probably three men could easily absorb and take care of one. But I do not believe that anybody would claim you need one trained soldier to teach four men for three months. Whoever is reported to have said that must have been misunderstood.

Senator THOMAS. My recollection is that that was Gen. Bundy's view.

The CHAIRMAN. Gen. Bullard's.

Senator THOMAS. No; Gen. Bundy.

The CHAIRMAN. Gen. Bundy has not testified.

Senator THOMAS. Oh, yes; Gen. Bundy testified. He was one of the first.

Senator FLETCHER. That was one reason for asking for 500,000 men, that so many were needed to train these men.

Col. JOHNSTON. I think very likely that what they meant was that they could absorb 25 per cent of their strength to replace casualties. That was my experience in fighting in the Meuse-Argonne. In my case less than 25 per cent were replaced; but we went up to the front and joined the French Army and everything worked smoothly. These new men given to me had had rather limited service, but we were able to absorb them, and marching up to join the French we had drills. They no longer practiced secrecy there; and we went out in the day time and drilled after marching, and the result was that in our attacks on the Germans in Belgium we did not really realize the presence of so many inexperienced troops that we had absorbed.

Another advantage of the three months' training might be said to be that it will bring into intimate association with the Army young men who have never seen the Army. If they are compulsorily brought in, they become acquainted with the Army and with people from other districts. Now, having had three months, we will probably do, to fill the permanent establishment, just what we did when the troops came back from the A. E. F. at every demobilization camp. Those men were talked to, explanation was made of the great advantage they would have if they would reenlist for one year more instead of going back and looking for a position that was not ready for them.

At Camp Lewis I gave orders that no man should be sent up to be discharged until he had been there all night, had had a bath, and a good meal and time to think it over and recruiting officers had had the opportunity of talking to him and telling him the advantages of reenlisting. Well, we got a great many of them. And then we followed them up with postal cards. We took the men's addresses and 10 days after they had been discharged we wrote them cards and asked them if they had secured positions, and, if not, that we would like them to come back; and, if so, if they would come, transportation would be sent, or we would tell a man what recruiting depot to go to. So in that way we got quite a number of men. Men would go home and see their families and then finding nothing that satisfied them in the way of positions a good many were inclined to come back into the service and enlist for one year. That is one of the ways in which the War Department has stimulated recruiting in the last year.

But I regard the idea of the universal military training and calling young men in, even for a short period, as an educational measure.

It ought not to be considered that we need an Army of 300,000 or 500,000 as a war measure solely. That depends, as I say, upon the national situation, upon the policy you are going to adopt. As an educational measure, as a measure to bring up to one point men of various degrees of Americanism and mold them into one good class of American citizens you must have interassociation. On the Pacific coast, where I was serving for three months, there was considerable of this alleged or so-called I. W. W. business. In my division every man—as I presume in every other division—was naturalized before he went to France, and we had a varied degree of people. I had Scandinavians, Italian-Americans from lower California, Indies, Hawaiians, Alaskans, nearly every European race, Chinese and Japanese. A Chinese sergeant won the D. S. C. Those men before they were discharged, or before they went to France, were good American citizens, and it will be worth the price to the country to bring into the Army this 650,000 provided for in this bill—perhaps more than that in the other—if it is not doing anything more than to make them better American citizens.

I believe the age limit in section 30, of 40 years, was probably inserted just for comment, I don't know. It seems to me that if a man had served 10 years in the ranks of the Regular Army or the National Guard and had gone over to France and had become a commissioned officer, distinguished himself in action, that the fact that he is 41 years old by the time you adopt such legislation ought not to keep him out of the Army.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you think 50 would be a better age for that class of individuals?

Col. JOHNSTON. Many of them would make good staff officers even if they are above the age of 40. That is the age that first appears in the statute as the maximum age for appointment as chaplain. When I saw this provision in the bill I rather thought that somebody had that in mind. At 40 years you would get 24 years more of service out of your men; that is a point to be considered, but no limit need be fixed by law.

There is one change you ought to make in the interest of economy. We ought not to put young officers on the retired list at 75 per cent of their pay after they have only served one or two years. If you do that you will probably have a very expensive retired list. Take a young man out of West Point and after two years service put him on the retired list and you will be supporting him then, perhaps, for the next 40 years. I would like to see some retired list left when my time comes. I would like to feel that there was some room for me, and not have the danger of having the retired list wiped out on account of it being so big.

I think any provision for the forced retirement of an officer, or even the retirement for disability, ought to give the officer a certain percentage of his pay, but certainly not 75 per cent.

The CHAIRMAN. If it were a disability involving being maimed by reason of a wound, do you think it would be fair to deny him 75 per cent?

Col. JOHNSTON. Yes; I think if he was in the service when the war risk insurance act was passed and if he was patriotic enough to comply with the wishes of Congress and the administration and take out \$10,000 war risk insurance, he would be taken care of under that. I know that at Camp Lewis officers were going through the discharge plant there, and I was astonished at the liberality of the legislation which authorized them to be retained in the service and taught a new vocation.

Senator NEW. You speak of the provision made for the officers under the war risk insurance. The maximum that he could get under that is \$57.50 a month.

Col. JOHNSTON. For disability?

Senator NEW. Yes.

Col. JOHNSTON. You mean his widow might get that?

Senator NEW. Yes.

Col. JOHNSTON. Then the question of retired pay would not be involved. But I think I have heard of cases, sir, where a man who has been disabled by the loss of one or two limbs or an eye has received a great deal more. I am not very familiar with that. I think the compensation given under the war risk insurance is considerably greater.

Senator FLETCHER. Yes; I think so.

Senator NEW. That is true.

Col. JOHNSTON. In fact, it was passed while I was in France, and I was astonished to learn when I took command of Camp Lewis how generously Congress had taken care of these soldiers and officers who had come home with some slight wound that did not render them physically unfit. I saw men that claimed that they were perfectly

well and did not want any examination, but the medical officers insisted that there was something the matter with them. I know there was one man who had been a farmer, and the doctors said that his heart was not quite right, and they would send him to school for two years and make him a public-school teacher, and that struck me as being very generous.

Senator FLETCHER. How about the method of promotion?

Col. JOHNSTON. Well, personally, I believe in the theory of promotion by selection.

I believe that under some conditions prescribed by law you could protect it so that promotion by selection would be satisfactory. It may be difficult, but it is the ideal way. I make this statement though I personally have been the victim of promotion by selection; that is, I have never received any favor. I have had more commissioned service than a majority of the officers holding permanent commissions as general officers in the Regular Army; but there is not any of them that I know of who does not deserve his place. For years general officers have been selected. Why not promote others by selection?

Theoretically—and I think it could be made practical—selection for all grades above that of captain would be the proper method. I do not think a young lieutenant has had time to establish his record. If any selection is had, it should commence above the grade of captain.

The CHAIRMAN. What do you think of the proposal for the single list?

Col. JOHNSTON. If it is confined to the line, I believe it will be satisfactory to the officers of the Army; but I do not believe you can take a single list of officers, including members of the staff, what we call the permanent staff, and make a satisfactory solution of the "single list." Most officers do not care what rank a staff officer has. The only thing I am in the Army for, is the right some day to command, and the presence of a colonel in the Medical Department who has been a colonel longer than I have does not worry me, because he can not take command. The presence of a colonel in the Signal Corps does not worry me, for the same reason. I think when you try to apply the single list to some of the staff bureaus you will find it impossible to produce an equitable result. I do believe that in the line of the Army, officers of the Infantry, Cavalry, Field Artillery, and Coast Artillery, the general sentiment to-day is that they would be willing to see a one list based upon length of commissioned service. After you have that one list, I would prescribe that all officers reaching a certain grade shall take rank in that grade according to length of commissioned service. For instance, we did that when this mobilization occurred for the World War. I was a member of the General Staff when we recommended that every brigadier general be appointed a major general for the emergency; that, all being appointed the same date they should be rearranged in that list according to their length of service. It was eminently fair, and the man who signed that memorandum, Gen. Kuhn, lost several files by approving that memorandum. In other words, he was younger than some below him, and he went down below them as major general.

When a man becomes a colonel in the Infantry later than his contemporaries or classmates in the Field Artillery, all your law needs to state is that in each grade officers will take rank according to the length of commissioned service, and then you have equity. A single list starting now would not correct the existing inequality among higher grades. You can readily understand that there may be now in one corps or two corps certain officers who are perhaps six years ahead of their classmates in another corps. When their classmates in any future organization become colonels, they should take rank according to their total commissioned service. In other words, it would not then depend upon a man's hazard or chance as to when he was appointed or his right to command troops.

Senator FLETCHER. General, did you have any experience with the Air Service over there.

Col. JOHNSTON. The only time any of the Air Service was placed under my direct control was when I was with the French Army of Belgium. I had a French squadron directly under me as division commander, and the service rendered was very good. I could send out, while marching through Belgium—a French officer was at my side all the time, and whenever I wanted to learn where the Germans were or my men were, perhaps 2 or 3 kilometers ahead of me, he would telephone back to the hangar to send a plane out; the plane went out, and dropped a message at my headquarters on its return. He said he could do that in 40 minutes, and several times he demonstrated it very successfully.

In the American Army an air squadron (less 1 flight) was attached to the Ninety-first Division one day, but taken away later and put under the corps or Army commander—I did not have any further control—but the allied planes, American, French, British, flew over us during the Meuse-Argonne; they went over us almost every hour.

Senator FLETCHER. How were they commanded?

Col. JOHNSTON. I have heard various reports, sir. I do not know officially. I have heard that the corps sent air squadrons when the line-up was made, a certain member of the Air Service was ordered to report to the commanding general. When he wanted an airplane he would have to telephone back or telegraph back, wireless, perhaps 10 miles, because it takes a while for a plane to rise, to get some planes to assist the division commander. Whenever I wanted air support, I had to send a pigeon message or a wireless message to my corps headquarters, and he had to relay it to some airdrome, and before the planes could get to where I was, the German planes were indicating our troops as targets to their artillery. But I do not criticize the Air Service. I think it was efficient, and I do not think we can expect them to be continuously over us. I think the Air Service was credited with having brought down more planes than we lost, and that they went over and dropped bombs on the enemy's railroad centers. Of that, of course, I do not know officially. I saw some of our own airplanes bring down German planes within my divisional area, and I saw three planes brought down by antiaircraft artillery in my divisional area. But the planes would be over us, a squadron of allied planes; we could not tell, of course, always whether they were American or French, and I forbade the men to look to see.

After the allied planes left us one evening, October 2, 28 German planes appeared within 15 minutes. Now, the allied planes that had just left me going west over toward the Argonne Forest were apparently being watch by these German planes; when they saw that the patrol had gone by me, they came stealing down from the north and dropped the first bomb at my door, at a little cottage I was in at Epinonville and soon killed 35 and wounded 115 members of my division headquarters, or the artillery, which was just under the hill, and some engineers. I do not think that that reflects upon our Air Service. You might as well ask the Ordnance Department to give us suits of mail and expect to protect all of our men from machine guns.

Senator FLETCHER. Did the German planes do very much damage? Of course, this incident you have mentioned was very serious, but, generally speaking, did they do very much damage?

Col. JOHNSTON. I did not see it. I did not know. I was in Toul and various other sectors night after night when the German planes regularly raided our lines. The French were very firm in their orders to keep out automobile and other lamps going over the roads. The planes would come about 7 or 8 o'clock in the evening and go back at 2 or 3 o'clock in the morning; next morning there would be the report of about six women killed in Toul and one or two soldiers killed; there were lots of artillery plants and aidromes around there, but I did not hear of their hitting the targets; I have driven my machine many a time with a dim light rather than have a collision. Gen. Pershing authorized lights. I never saw a shell hole from a bomb that landed in the road. That is, they could hit all around the road. If you were driving your machine and if a dart hit within 50 feet of the road, you might get one of these projectiles through your machine; but the Americans did not consider them dangerous.

Senator FLETCHER. Did they locate your lines? They probably helped that way?

Col. JOHNSTON. As observation planes, yes. You could not put a battalion out in the field outside of the woods. You could not have a battalion, or even a company, formed without having a German plane over it in 5 or 10 minutes, and the German artillery within 5 minutes after they arrived. They just simply wired to the batteries the particular square on their battle map on which was the target, and we had to move forward out of that open space into the woods to save ourselves.

So the German Air Service, so far as it helped their artillery, was splendid, and I have no doubt that our Air Service rendered equal service for our Artillery.

Senator FLETCHER. In actual battle, the command of the planes ought to be under the officer commanding the troops, ought it not?

Col. JOHNSTON. I think to a certain extent, yes. I think that every group of artillery should have at least one squadron of air planes. In other words, I had three regiments of artillery of my own, and had two regiments of another division's artillery. I took two brigades of artillery, and one of them was short one regiment. I would have liked to have an air squadron that I could control, without sending the message back to corps headquarters. But, of course, they would not remain permanently with the division, not

an integral part of that division, simply a part of any division that happened to need it during an attack. Naturally, they would go back to their own training ground for proper training and perhaps for other operations, after an offensive ceased.

The CHAIRMAN. Had you any further observations to make, General?

Col. JOHNSTON. I think I have covered all of this bill. There was one other point. I saw in the paper the other day a recommendation by Gen. Pershing. I think if you would authorize these reserve divisions to receive the partially trained personnel through compulsory training, to hold the colors and the name and number and so on of the units under which they fought, you would stimulate an interest in these troops in their localities.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, no doubt.

Col. JOHNSTON. And there are a great many of the men, even though you do not say that you compel them to go back, whether it is a National Guard or a National Army division, if you perpetuate by law the authority to use those names, a great many of those men will go back to those divisions. They will come out from civil life and fill up these divisions, and help fill up the Regular Army.

The CHAIRMAN. That is a very powerful appeal, I have no doubt. We are very much obliged to you, General.

STATEMENT OF COL. MILTON A. RECKORD.

The CHAIRMAN. Will you give your name to the reporter, please?

Col. RECKORD. Col. Milton A. Reckord, Bel Air, Md.

The CHAIRMAN. Colonel, you have been an officer of the National Guard in Maryland?

Col. RECKORD. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. What, briefly, has been your service in the guard and in this war?

Col. RECKORD. I enlisted in the guard as a private, went through the several grades to the grade of major. When the war broke out I was promoted to the grade of lieutenant colonel, and then colonel, and commanded the 115th Infantry in the war in France.

The CHAIRMAN. Was that in the Twenty-ninth Division?

Col. RECKORD. The Twenty-ninth Division.

The CHAIRMAN. And what was the 115th Infantry made up of?

Col. RECKORD. It was composed practically of all the officers and men who had formerly made up the three regiments of Maryland infantry, the Maryland National Guard, the First, Fourth, and Fifth Maryland. Well, while it did not include all of those officers and men, it took the great majority.

The CHAIRMAN. And you were mustered out when the Twenty-ninth Division came home?

Col. RECKORD. I was; yes, sir.

Senator FLETCHER. Did you participate in the fighting over there?

Col. RECKORD. Yes, sir; I did.

Senator FLETCHER. Where?

Col. RECKORD. I was in the Alsace sector for about 60 days, and in the Meuse-Argonne offensive beginning on September 26, and the Twenty-ninth Division had been relieved and was out in the Barle-

Duc area prepared and in fact under orders to go into another fight when the armistice was signed.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, Colonel, we will be very glad to have your views on this question of national defense, and especially what you think should properly be done in the organization and maintenance of a reserve force of citizens, a citizens' reserve.

Col. RECKORD. I am personally absolutely in favor of universal training. I have been a National Guard officer so long that I naturally lean toward the National Guard as a reserve force, but unless the National Guard can be worked into a general plan of real military preparedness, I am in favor of the elimination of the guard. In other words, I think that now, whatever we do, it should be a real military policy, and that the Regular Army and the National Guard and the National Army should all be secondary to that policy. I feel that we do not need a large Regular Army, and that universal training is what we do need, and I think we should all work toward that end.

Senator FLETCHER. Do you separate universal service from universal training?

Col. RECKORD. Well, if you will allow me to correct that, I meant universal training. I am not in favor of universal service.

Senator FLETCHER. You meant training?

Col. RECKORD. Training; yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. As I understand it, then, you would have but one Army of the United States?

Col. RECKORD. Absolutely, Senator.

The CHAIRMAN. An active Army is an inactive Army?

Col. RECKORD. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Somewhat as Gen. Johnston suggested?

Col. RECKORD. Yes, sir; only in listening to Gen. Johnston, I thought he was inclined to the large Army plan, and I am not.

The CHAIRMAN. Of course, that is a matter of detail?

Col. RECKORD. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. What you desire is to have the proper military policy first established and then build on it?

Col. RECKORD. Absolutely.

The CHAIRMAN. Have you ever given any consideration to the comparative advantages of organizing for the national defense under the militia clause of the Constitution as contrasted with the Army clause?

Col. RECKORD. I can not say that I have given much, but I think the latter would be much the better.

The CHAIRMAN. How would you provide for policy protection of the States?

Col. RECKORD. I believe, sir, that that could be taken care of practically the same way that we are now taking care of it, where the Regular Army is being used. I think the President could be given authority to allow a Governor to use such troops if it become necessary. I do not believe in many instances a separate and distinct smaller body of constabulary would work out. It will in a State like Pennsylvania and New York, probably, but I do not believe it would in my own State. Maryland is a small State, and I am afraid it would not work out.

Senator THOMAS. Why not, Colonel?

Col. RECKORD. Well, I do not know, sir, that I can answer just why not, but I doubt very much if the officers and men would care to serve in that capacity. I think the reason most men go in the National Guard, or have gone into it heretofore—

Senator THOMAS (interposing). But I misunderstood you. You mean the use of the National Guard as a State constabulary?

Col. RECKORD. No; what I meant, sir, was that most men go into the National Guard because they believe, or did believe, that at some time they would be needed in the defense of the Government of the country, not because they wanted to act as State constabulary.

Senator THOMAS. Well, Pennsylvania has a State constabulary, which is entirely distinct from the National Guard.

Col. RECKORD. Yes.

Senator THOMAS. And what I understood you to say was that while that sort of a system would work in Pennsylvania, you did not think it would in Maryland.

Col. RECKORD. That is what I did say; yes, sir.

Senator THOMAS. Well, the Texas Ranger system, upon which the Pennsylvania constabulary was to some degree modeled, you know, has been a successful body for a great many years.

Col. RECKORD. Yes.

Senator THOMAS. Of course there are differences between Texas and Pennsylvania so very marked, and it had occurred to me that it might be a solution of the plan by which law and order might be preserved during the times of industrial trouble particularly.

Col. RECKORD. That may be so.

Senator THOMAS. That is the reason for my question, as to why it would not work in Maryland.

Col. RECKORD. It is my opinion that it would not work in Maryland, but I may be wrong on that, sir.

Senator FLETCHER. You would not have any State in the militia as such under the control of the governor, subject to be called into the Federal service?

Col. RECKORD. My opinion, sir, if we are going to get the best we can get, I would make that secondary. I would have a real army and a real military policy, and I think it would be much better if it were all under Government control.

The CHAIRMAN. You would leave the matter of maintaining the State militia to the discretion of the States?

Col. RECKORD. Absolutely.

The CHAIRMAN. If they wanted to, they could?

Col. RECKORD. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. But that would not be a part of the Federal Army?

Col. RECKORD. No, sir; and therefore I do not think it would amount to much.

The CHAIRMAN. Have you examined the provisions of the National Guard bill introduced by Senator Frelinghuysen?

Col. RECKORD. Only since I reached Washington. It has been very little; I have had very little time.

The CHAIRMAN. How do the provisions of that bill appeal to you?

Col. RECKORD. I think, sir, if we are going to have the National Guard continued, then we should by all means have some represen-

tation in administering that National Guard force. 'I do not think the National Guard officers as a whole feel that heretofore they have been fairly and justly treated by the officers of the Regular Army who constitute the War Department. I think they feel that they should have some say, and I am frank to admit that I think they should have some representation on whatever governing body there may be.

The CHAIRMAN. Don't you think that would be essential also, even under your scheme that you mentioned, that the Reserve Army, that is, the inactive force, should have the privilege at least of representation—

Col. RECKORD. I think they should.

The CHAIRMAN (continuing)—on the General Staff, in order to keep the active or Regular Army in closer contact with the citizen soldiers?

Col. RECKORD. Yes, sir; I think they should.

The CHAIRMAN. You have got some units in Maryland that have got long traditions, and must stand pretty well in the affections of the people there?

Col. RECKORD. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. I remember some of the fourth and fifth famous regiments, and probably the first was, too.

Col. RECKORD. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. How would you suggest that those traditions may be maintained under unified control, under the Army clause proposal?

Col. RECKORD. I think, sir, in the organization, if it was possible to give the organization one of the old numbers with the State designation, it would undoubtedly help a great deal. That was all done away with in the reorganization for the war in France, and in my judgment, when the division to which I belonged was organized, I think we were set back considerably by virtue of that very fact, but I think whatever we do should be done by districts; otherwise, the mobilization would be much harder and much more extensive. I think those traditions would probably in many cases have to fall by the wayside. But if you allowed officers who are interested in those particular units to make those decisions I think you could get around that.

The CHAIRMAN. Have them take apart in the making of the decision, at least?

Col. RECKORD. I think so; yes, sir. Some would have to give way, others would not, but I think they should by all means have some part in selecting the designations for the new organizations.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, in many cases they would be the old organizations simply put in a new category.

Col. RECKORD. Absolutely so. They would be exactly the same men.

Senator FLETCHER. And you think the National Guard ought to be separate and under distinct control and authority, separated from the General Staff, and separated from everything, as proposed in this Frelinhuisen bill?

Col. RECKORD. That phase struck me in reading it over just a little while ago. It comes to me so suddenly that I doubt whether I am in position to intelligently answer your question, but I do think that they should have some representation.

Senator FLETCHER. Well, they have now.

Col. RECKORD. Probably on the General Staff.

Senator FLETCHER. They have representation on the Militia Bureau now and also on the General Staff.

The CHAIRMAN. No, not on the General Staff.

Col. RECKORD. But it amounts to practically nothing.

The CHAIRMAN. They have none on the General Staff.

Col. RECKORD. They have not?

The CHAIRMAN. No, sir.

Col. RECKORD. That is what I thought, but I do think that they should have a good representation on the governing body, and I really believe that that would be better than having a separate and distinct organization.

Senator SUTHERLAND. Are they represented in the Militia Bureau except by the designation of a Regular Army officer?

The CHAIRMAN. There are two National Guard officers assigned to the Militia Bureau, but the Militia Bureau does not do any planning or directing. It is simply a drafting office, and obey what the General Staff and the Chief of Staff tell them to do. It is in the General Staff that the plans are made, and the Chief of Staff makes the decision as to the plans.

Col. RECKORD. There is no doubt that at the present time the National Guard is administered solely by the Regular Army, and the National Guard officers feel that they have not received their just due and consideration at the hands of these Regular Army officers. Therefore, the results to be obtained are not what you gentlemen would wish or what we would wish.

Senator SUTHERLAND. Were many of your National Guard officers in Maryland relieved from duty at the beginning of the war or during the war?

Col. RECKORD. There are some few, but not very many.

Senator SUTHERLAND. Is it in connection with the relieving of them from duty at that time that you think they were not treated justly, or just generally, in respect to some complaints in regard to the National Guard?

Col. RECKORD. My remark is general.

The CHAIRMAN. In the event that the National Guard is maintained on practically the same basis as it has been maintained for the last 10 or 15 years—at least since the passage of the Dick law—what would be your opinion on this proposal for a National Guard Council, and a chief of the National Guard Bureau reporting directly to the Secretary of War, and being entirely separated from the General Staff of the Army. Do you think that is the proper way to get representation?

Col. RECKORD. No, sir; I do not.

The CHAIRMAN. You think it is too radical?

Col. RECKORD. I do; yes, sir. I think we ought to have one army. I think if the National Guard is to be continued, then it should be a reserve force of what we now know as the Regular Army, and not a separate and distinct force, and I think as such a reserve force they should have such representation on the General Staff and work conjointly with the Regular Army.

The CHAIRMAN. How do you regard the proposal in the so-called National Guard bill for physical and military training in the graded and high schools? Have you had a chance to examine that?

Col. RECKORD. No, sir; I have not.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you think that would work?

Col. RECKORD. I do not see how it will. It seems to me to be carrying the matter so far afield that we have no way to control it. I do not see how that would work.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you think some States might install the courses and some probably would not?

Col. RECKORD. Yes, sir; and some probably would not.

Senator FLETCHER. How about the requirement as to the size of the companies?

Col. RECKORD. I think the requirement of a company of 100 men in small towns is too high.

Senator NEW. Do you think, Colonel, that that is cured or materially helped by the introduction of a platoon system; that is, a platoon located in one town and one in another?

Col. RECKORD. Yes, sir; that would help.

Senator NEW. Constituting a company?

Col. RECKORD. That would help it somewhat.

But I really believe if the limit was placed at 65 you would get the final results just the same. You have the framework there of a war-strength company. When the call comes, and the new men flocked in to fill that company up to war strength, the 65 men that you had up until that time would give the necessary framework and more. Small country communities can not maintain 100-man companies.

The CHAIRMAN. It is particularly hard to start with 100 men?

Col. RECKORD. Indeed it is, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. You may fill up to 100 later on?

Col. RECKORD. Yes, sir; I have lived in a small country town, and I know, because I was captain of the local company several years ago, and it was an awful hard problem to keep up to 65, and yet, upon the call to go to the Mexican border we left town with 106 men. The others simply came in because something was going on.

Senator THOMAS. You thought something was going on?

Col. RECKORD. Yes, sir; I stand corrected.

Senator FLETCHER. How are you now organized? What is the status of your National Guard now?

Col. RECKORD. Under the provisions of the present law, having been drafted into the service and coming home and mustered out, we are private citizens again.

Senator FLETCHER. I know, but have you any companies organized at all?

Col. RECKORD. No, sir; we have not. I have been called upon by the adjutant general of the State of Maryland and asked to accept a commission as colonel of the First Maryland Infantry and to go ahead and reorganize that regiment. Nothing has been done so far.

Senator FLETCHER. Do you think the prospect at all encouraging that the men will go back into the National Guard?

Col. RECKORD. He has put it up to me in such a way that I fell as a duty I can hardly turn it down, but I think it will be one of the hardest jobs I ever undertook.

The CHAIRMAN. What is the reason you say that?

Col. RECKORD. Those of us who have been over there and have been through it for the time being, at least, Senator, see nothing in it. That is about the answer.

Senator FLETCHER. It seems rather tame to you now?

Col. RECKORD. Absolutely. I commanded a regiment of practically 3,800 men and in battle, and now to come home and command a regiment of 12 companies of 65 men would seem rather tame, and that goes on down all the way. But I think a great many officers and men will realize the necessity of some sort of an organization, and unless universal military training is decided upon, some of us have got to go to work and reorganize the guard.

The CHAIRMAN. How do you think the public sentiment is on this question of universal military training?

Col. RECKORD. I believe Senator, that the people of Maryland will be in favor of it. I think the public will see the light, so to speak, and be very glad indeed to get behind the bill. I may be somewhat prejudiced in favor of it, because I am absolutely in favor of universal training.

Senator FLETCHER. Do you think three months is enough?

Col. RECKORD. I doubt that, Senator, but I think six would be ample; from four to six months, I think, would be necessary.

Senator THOMAS. Every year?

Col. RECKORD. No, sir; only one year, and have them go into the reserve and probably go out for a maneuver for two or three years succeeding that.

Senator THOMAS. One year for those who are subject to that year under the law?

Col. RECKORD. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. You can get rid of a great deal of illiteracy, too, even in that short period of training?

Col. RECKORD. Undoubtedly; yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Teaching men to read and write, at least, in that period?

Col. RECKORD. Yes, sir. We taught them after the armistice in France, with a number of illiterates in all the organizations.

Senator SUTHERLAND. Don't you think, Colonel, that a military policy could be formulated along the lines of these bills which would build up the National Guard and make it a very essential part of the effective military forces of the country?

Col. RECKORD. Yes, sir; I think that.

Senator SUTHERLAND. Taking advantage of the State pride and State theory?

Col. RECKORD. I feel that it has already been just what you term it, but before we went to the Mexican border the National Guard was not considered by those in authority in Washington as being worth while.

Senator SUTHERLAND. Don't you think that they have a much more liberal idea now with reference to the National Guard and its effectiveness than they did prior to this war?

Col. RECKORD. Yes; they certainly have.

Senator SUTHERLAND. A great many have testified so here.

Col. RECKORD. There is no doubt of that, sir.

Senator SUTHERLAND. That they have a very different idea of the citizen soldiery than they have heretofore held.

Col. RECKORD. I think that was all brought about on account of the service the guard rendered during the war.

Senator SUTHERLAND. Yes. Your idea is, then, as I understand it, that unless the National Guard is to be built up and made a strong and an integral part of the Nation's effective military strength that we had better abolish it?

Col. RECKORD. That is my idea; yes, sir.

Senator FLETCHER. Is it not true that, even where you give the six months' training, in case of a war and you had to mobilize your army, etc., you would have to have a further training, wouldn't you?

Col. RECKORD. Yes, sir; you have to train continuously. Every moment that we were not fighting in France we were training, every day, and even after the armistice was signed we went on with our training, really more strenuously than we had before, just as though we expected the next day to be called to go into battle again, and I think it is the only way to keep the Army in a healthy condition.

Senator FLETCHER. Yes; but before you could put these men who had had this training that you speak of into service, you would have to put them into training camps, as we did the National Guard, before putting them into battle?

Col. RECKORD. Yes, Senator, I think you would; but I think if we had universal training, as outlined in one of these proposed bills, and have those men who desired to become noncommissioned officers and officers study, so that they would prepare themselves for higher positions, and then have terrain exercises and maneuvers, which would bring about the end that you would desire.

The CHAIRMAN. At least, if we had a reserve Army made up of men who had had from four to five months of compulsory military training in a Federal cantonment, all of them assigned in time of peace to units in their respective localities, such an army when called out by a declaration of war by Congress would be in a fit condition in about one-tenth the time that it took us to take recruits and raw officers and get them together and train them and organize them.

Col. RECKORD. It certainly would.

The CHAIRMAN. Instead of consuming 13 months and 3 weeks to get a division into action, as was done in this last war, it would probably be nearer three or four weeks?

Col. RECKORD. Yes, sir. We would be able, I think, to mobilize in three or four weeks to go into battle.

The CHAIRMAN. Are there any further remarks you wish to make?

Col. RECKORD. I want to say that it is my belief, if you will permit me to make one suggestion—

The CHAIRMAN (interposing). We do not want to cut you off at all.

Col. RECKORD. It is my belief that after this committee gets the views of all the officers and gentlemen they care to get before them, if a bill would be written tentatively, and the officers of the Regular Army and the officers of the National Guard and the officers of the National Army got together, and they should sit down at a table and go over that bill, we could very readily get a bill that would suit everybody, in my humble judgment.

The CHAIRMAN. You would start in on that matter of coordination of the whole Army into one before we would create the Army?

Col. RECKORD. Yes, sir.

Senator SUTHERLAND. That is not a bad suggestion. I do not know how it would work out, but it is worth trying.

The CHAIRMAN. It is going to be tried.

Col. RECKORD. That is fine. I believe it would come out all right if you try it.

Senator THOMAS. I hope so.

Col. RECKORD. I know from my observation that all of the Regular Army officers are not opposed to the National Guard, but I also know that all of them are not as liberal toward the National Guard, or are not in the same frame of mind toward the National Guard as some are, and therefore I believe that if you would get representatives from each of those bodies and let them sit down like men and discuss it they would soon reach a common ground.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, there are just two categories, the professional soldier and the citizen soldier.

Col. RECKORD. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. And you believe, as I think most of us believe, that they can sit down and come to an agreement on what is best for the United States?

Col. RECKORD. Absolutely.

The CHAIRMAN. We are very much obliged to you, Colonel.

STATEMENT OF COL. WILLIAM H. JOHNSTON—Resumed.

Col. JOHNSTON. Mr. Chairman, there was one point I neglected to speak about. May I just add it to my remark?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, indeed.

Col. JOHNSTON. It won't take more than two minutes now.

I forgot to state that in forming the permanent part of this Army we can fill up the ranks of considerable of the units serving overseas by a more generous authority to enlist native troops. I commanded the first battalion of Philippine Scouts which was ever organized—one year at the World's Fair in St. Louis and two years in the Pulajan insurrection, Samar, P. I. That was a trial battalion. From that there developed later a large number, several more battalions, and during this war they have organized a complete division of Filipinos. To-day in the Philippine Islands the number of American troops is very small. Some troops that were there before were sent up to Tientsin in 1911 and to Vladivostok in 1918.

I believe that almost the entire garrison, outside of a few coast artillerymen in the Philippines, can be composed of Filipinos, with American officers who gained their experience in this war. They will be very glad to go over there and accept commissions in the native forces, and the same thing can be done in Porto Rico and to a certain extent in Panama. The Philippine troops can be sent to Hawaii. There is already a large Philippine population in Hawaii. If such legislation will authorize a more generous enlistment of natives of the Philippines, we can not only create most of the garrison of the Philippine Islands from the 9,000,000 people that are

there, but we can use their troops at other places at much less expense, where we might not find it profitable to send Americans.

The CHAIRMAN. That suggestion has been made by several officers here, including the ranking officers of the War Department, and yet the tables of organization which made up this bill provide for a complete white division in the Philippines. I could never see why it was necessary to have at least the Infantry in that division white.

Col. JOHNSTON. You perhaps do not know that they have had Philippine Engineers for at least eight years over there; one battalion of scouts—that is all the law authorizes—was converted into an Engineer battalion, I think, as long ago as 1912 or 1911. I have had letters from ex-Scout officers since I have been in Washington advocating the raising of a division of Filipinos in the Philippines. To-day they have a division, so-called, of the National Guard of the Philippines. The Filipino can be taught a great deal under American officers, but he is not particularly satisfied under a native officer. We have an abundance now of Reserve Corps officers, and those Reserve Corps officers, under the existing national defense act, can be called to active duty for an indefinite period, with their consent. In other words, they can be required to serve 15 days for training, but, as a matter of fact, you can call them into the service with their consent for any period.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Col. JOHNSTON. We have plenty of reserve officers to-day, and we could send over some Regular and reserve officers to build up the entire garrison.

Senator FLETCHER. Do those engineers prove efficient?

Col. JOHNSTON. They do, from the reports I have.

And in Artillery, the theory has long been exploded that you need a complete battery of technically trained men. Several Artillery officers told me that they discovered in France that about 20 per cent of the light battery in technical instruction was all that was necessary. The rest of the men are taking care of the horses or driving the motors. The Filipino can be trained in the Artillery.

Senator SUTHERLAND. You mean in the technical part of it.

Col. JOHNSTON. In the technical part of it. We have had Filipino graduates at West Point; and it won't take long to teach a Filipino to learn how to sight a gun, such a gun as they use. The Coast Artillery require a partial force of highly trained men; but the men who simply carry ammunition and pass it along, as fire buckets are passed, they can be Filipinos. Part of our reserve forces at Panama can be formed from Filipinos.

The CHAIRMAN. I myself have been wondering for some time if the War Department could not make more use of the Filipino troops, and thereby save us the use of white troops over there and save the Treasury a lot of money.

Senator THOMAS. It ought to be done.

Col. JOHNSTON. Under a white officer, they are perfectly reliable, but they themselves do not like a Filipino officer over them or a colored man over them.

Senator SUTHERLAND. Did they not have to become acclimated?

Col. JOHNSTON. My health reports were very good. I just lost 2 out of 450 men in one year in the winter.

Senator NEW. That was in the United States?

Col. JOHNSTON. That was in the United States; yes, sir; when the weather was very cold, and they were in camp. They spent the winter in St. Louis in camp, when the thermometer was below zero seven times, and they lived in camp.

The CHAIRMAN. We thank you very much, Colonel.

Col. JOHNSTON. I thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. That is all to-day, and we will have nothing to-morrow.

(Whereupon, at 4.40 o'clock p. m., the subcommittee adjourned, to meet at the call of the chairman.)

REORGANIZATION OF THE ARMY.

MONDAY, DECEMBER 8, 1919.

UNITED STATES SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON MILITARY AFFAIRS,
Washington, D. C.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to adjournment, at 2.15 o'clock p. m., in the committee room, Capitol, Senator James W. Wadsworth, jr., presiding.

Present: Senators Wadsworth (chairman), New, Sutherland, Chamberlain, and Thomas.

**STATEMENT OF MAJ. GEN. WILLIAM G. PRICE, JR., COMMANDING
PENNSYLVANIA NATIONAL GUARD, TWENTY-EIGHTH DIVI-
SION, CHESTER, PA.**

The CHAIRMAN. General, will you be good enough to tell the committee about your assignments during the war?

Gen. PRICE. I was in command of the Forty-third Field Artillery Brigade in this country during its training and throughout its service during the war.

The CHAIRMAN. That brigade was the Artillery Brigade of the Twenty-eighth Division, was it not?

Gen. PRICE. In support of the Twenty-eighth Division, until after the Argonne fight, the Argonne battle, then we supported the Ninety-first Division in Belgium. We were there until after the armistice.

The CHAIRMAN. And the Twenty-eighth Division was the National Guard Division from Pennsylvania?

Gen. PRICE. The National Guard Division from Pennsylvania.

The CHAIRMAN. When did you get back and when were you mustered out?

Gen. PRICE. I came back on the 9th of May and was discharged on the 15th of May, this year.

The CHAIRMAN. And are now reorganizing?

Gen. PRICE. I am now on duty as a major general with the National Guard of Pennsylvania, reorganizing that division.

Senator SUTHERLAND. Who commanded the Ninety-first Division?

Gen. PRICE. Gen. William H. Johnston.

Senator SUTHERLAND. He commented very strongly to me on the unusual way in which the Artillery supported that division in Belgium.

Gen. PRICE. That is very nice, sir; I am glad to hear that.

The CHAIRMAN. General, we have several legislative proposals here, looking toward a reorganization of the military forces, not only of the so-called Regular Army, but of the National Guard, involving also the question of the military training of the youth of the country. We would be glad to have you make any observations you may care to make on this general subject, and, perhaps, after you have discussed it with us a while, we can ask you some specific questions.

By the way, how long have you been in the guard service?

Gen. PRICE. I have been in the National Guard since 1886 continually. I served first in the ranks of the Infantry for five years. I went through all the commissioned grades; I was lieutenant colonel during the Spanish-American War of the Third Pennsylvania Volunteers, and in 1901 I was promoted to the command of the regiment and continued as a colonel until 1910, when I was promoted to brigadier general and commanded an infantry brigade until after the Mexican border trouble, when I was detached and assigned to organize an artillery brigade, which I did, and commanded it until it was mustered out of the service.

The CHAIRMAN. We shall be glad to have your ideas in any way you see fit to present them, just in your own way.

Gen. PRICE. Senator, I have not studied any of these bills; I have read most of them, but I have not thought so very much about it, because I felt that without a military policy it would be rather difficult to determine on any definite bill—I mean to say if you are to have universal service that would call for one kind of a bill, and perhaps a different-sized Army. If it is to be universal training, that will probably lead to another sort of a measure, and so I have only read these bills as I would read any matter of news and have not formed any definite opinion.

Personally I do not think this country can afford—I do not know whether it is right for me to say this or not—but I do not think this country can afford a large Regular Army. I do not believe that an American Army should be that sort of an army—i. e., a large Regular Army. I think that the National Guard, in connection with the Regular Army, can be made to work successfully.

I have been very much disappointed that we have not had an opportunity to try just how the National Guard will work under the national defense act of June, 1916. While that has been in effect for several years, yet we have not operated under it, because we almost immediately went to the border after that was signed, and then almost at once after that we were sent to mobilization camps for the Great War.

I know that a great deal of time and intelligent effort was spent in the preparation of that bill, both by the Army and by those who were long familiar with the National Guard service, and I feel that these other bills that I have read have not had the joint consideration that the national defense bill had in their preparation.

In view of the late war, perhaps your committee may conclude that it is better that some other law might be enacted under which we should continue our military policy, but to me it seems, until some definite military policy is adopted in the country, that the

present law might serve very well until things were quieter and until we were on a more level basis, if I may put it that way.

The CHAIRMAN. You spoke a moment ago of the necessity of knowing what the military policy was going to be. That is what we would like to know, too, and whatever it is going to be we are going to try to express it in legislation now. Of course, it takes a great many minds to make up a thing like that. What is your idea of the wisest and most effective and best from the American standpoint of military policy for this country?

Gen. PRICE. I think that before the military policy is decided upon the question of the possible use of an Army outside the limits of the United States, or in this country, should be carefully considered. If you fear an attack from a foreign country, we should possibly have a differently organized force than we had before; but it seems to me that the greatest danger we had—that is, any danger we might have had from a country known as a military country; Germany, for instance—has been removed, and the necessity for a larger Army does not seem to me as great as before. As far as Japan is concerned, it never seemed to me, from what knowledge I had of it, there should be anything that we need be overly worried about. I do not think Japan is big enough or strong enough to attack us, and I do not think that she has any idea of doing it. Japan may increase the size of her armies if we increase ours.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. That would be largely a naval proposition anyway, would it not?

Gen. PRICE. I should think so, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. It can be said, too, General, can it not, that about six or seven years ago you would have had great difficulty in finding a single American that would have dared to dream that we would ever be in war with Germany on the soil of France?

Gen. PRICE. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. So you never can tell?

Gen. PRICE. Never.

Senator SUTHERLAND. What has happened may happen again?

Gen. PRICE. That is true. It is about to happen? I mean to say, it is as apt to happen now, after we have had this great war, as it was six or seven years ago, because I think we all thought, in some sort of way, they were preparing for war in Europe, and it broke; but are they able to continue it?

The CHAIRMAN. I think you will find hardly anyone advocating compulsory military service, but there has been, of course, a very steady movement on foot for universal military training not only for its military sake but for the improvement it will bring about in the physical condition of the young men and in the matter of illiteracy and in Americanization. What do you think about the proposal for military training?

Gen. PRICE. First, Senator, as far as universal service is concerned in time of peace, I am very much opposed to it. As far as military training is concerned, the more I inquire the more I find the general feeling throughout the country, from those I meet, is in favor of a military training of some sort, though, personally, I have not been so strongly for it, because I felt that it would be such a great

expense to the country that we could not afford it without causing a great deal of discontent.

The CHAIRMAN. I might inject this observation, that the estimates of the War Department indicate there are about 650,000 young men of 19 years of age in the country to-day physically fit to take training, and more than that as a total, but physically fit; that these could be trained, including transportation to and from the cantonments or camps for three months, at a total cost of \$94,000,000, which is much less than we can ever hope to support a Regular Army of only 100,000 men, so by comparison it is the cheapest way to prepare.

Gen. PRICE. If that is all it would cost, and it would be cheaper than maintaining a regular army, undoubtedly that would be a very excellent way to raise forces, but how are you to keep up the Regular Army? From these men that are trained here?

The CHAIRMAN. No; the Regular Army, I think everybody agrees, has got to be voluntarily recruited, because they have to serve a period of three years in the ranks, a period of enlistment, and, in time of peace, you would have, of course, to depend upon volunteer enlistments of the Regulars, and we shall always have to have a Regular Army.

Gen. PRICE. Unquestionably.

The CHAIRMAN. But the better the training of the young men the smaller the Regular Army you will need to maintain.

Gen. PRICE. I would think so.

The CHAIRMAN. What is your observation of the effect of training as you have seen it in your 28th Division on the men themselves?

Gen. PRICE. Do you refer to the training they had before we went abroad?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes; the military training.

Gen. PRICE. Very excellent. The training we had at Hancock certainly made wonderful changes in the men—I mean to say physically, and one might say mentally, because they were more alert and it left little to be desired in way of training.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you think it would be a pretty good thing if every young man had a little of that?

Gen. PRICE. I think athletic training for any man at that time of life is good. And I believe, in a measure, that military training is good. And I consider these things both from the point of view of a military officer and a business man. I know from experience that business men, as a rule, have been very apathetic regarding our armed forces—that is, before the war—I do not know how it will be now; they have been largely not at all sympathetic toward the National Guard or an Army. We had a great deal of trouble securing enlistments, getting men, and they were not encouraged to enlist. I believe probably because they did not want to lose the services of their men in summer time when we took them to camp in a great many cases. Probably if service was compulsory, if everybody had to allow their men to leave for military training, such objections might be largely removed.

The CHAIRMAN. Have you examined the National Guard bill, General?

Gen. PRICE. I have gone over it, but not very carefully. I read it over once or twice.

The CHAIRMAN. What do you think of its salient features, speaking of training? How about that proposal of training in the schools, the grade schools, the high schools, and the colleges?

Gen. PRICE. Personally I am very much opposed to it. I do not think it is the province of the National Guard officers to attempt to supervise the training in schools and colleges of students. I believe if that should be done, it should be done by professional soldiers, for the reason that a National Guard officer has not time to do it and attend to his business or his profession, and if he has neither and wants to become a soldier, he might better become a professional soldier. Personally it seems to me that that is a thing that should be done by the boards of education throughout the different States. I doubt very much if Congress ought to say that every school, of no matter what sect or what denomination, shall have military training.

The CHAIRMAN. Congress, of course, has not the power to enforce it. It would simply have to coax them with an appropriation or encourage them with an appropriation and withdraw it if they did not conform to the standards.

Gen. PRICE. I do not think it overly popular. The University of Pennsylvania, with 11,000 enrolled students this year, at the beginning of the term, had considerable trouble in getting 100 men to take the training.

The CHAIRMAN. In the R. O. T. C.?

Gen. PRICE. Yes. I do not know how many have enrolled now, but Dr. McKenzie told me one day—just after the school had opened—that they had trouble in getting 100 men out of 11,000. Some of those 11,000 were women, but most of them men.

Senator SUTHERLAND. Many of them had been in the Army, too, had they not?

Gen. PRICE. I do not think many of those who have been in the Army are taking the training. A great many of University of Pennsylvania students had been in the Army and are now back.

Senator SUTHERLAND. They had enough of it?

Gen. PRICE. I think so.

The CHAIRMAN. What do you think of the proposal for a National Guard council and a National Guard bureau as contrasted with the present Militia Bureau, which is in part under the control of the General Staff?

Gen. PRICE. I am a little afraid that the National Guard council will not work as a practical proposition.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. Do you not think it would, in the nature of things, bring about a clash between the council and the representatives of the National Guard and the General Staff as representing the Regular Army?

Gen. PRICE. Yes; I do, Senator, but I think that clause, perhaps, was prepared because of the feeling that the National Guard had toward the General Staff. I think a great many of the National Guard officers during the war were not treated fairly and they resented it.

Senator NEW. General, please particularize a little, if you can, will you? You say you do not think they were treated fairly. In what respect and what particular did that unfair treatment consist?

Gen. PRICE. Well, men or officers were discharged for physical disability at the training camps at times and after they had returned home their own physicians examined them and said that they were all right. In my own knowledge officers who were good soldiers and capable and had had long service were thus discharged, and further it was announced as a policy of the War Department that promotions should be made in divisions. That was not done, even when divisions had capable and efficient officers.

The CHAIRMAN. It was in the law, was it not?

Gen. PRICE. Yes, sir. I know of some cases where recommendations were made by the division commander for promotions in the division that were not heeded, but other men from the Regular Army were put in these positions.

Senator NEW. The men who were given the positions vacated were taken from the Regular Army?

Gen. PRICE. Yes, sir. I have in mind one case where an officer, a general officer in the Regular Army, was relieved during the progress of battle by the division commander. Yet the colonels in that particular brigade served throughout the war with the division, were not promoted, although recommended by their division commander, who was a Regular Army officer—or I will change that—were recommended by their superior officers, who were Regular Army officers.

I am speaking now only of a division with which I served. I have heard of many other cases, but that is hearsay, yet I have heard some of the officers who prepared this bill tell of specific cases, and I know that was the feeling throughout the National Guard. Fortunately, that was not general. I do not say this as a criticism of the Regular Army as a whole, because I have no closer friends than Regular Army officers, nor do I know any men that I have more respect for than a great many Regular Army officers, but it is the system that is wrong. Now, then, I am afraid that if this council prevailed, just as Senator Chamberlain said, it would possibly make friction, and I believe that an army, and all branches of it, should be headed from one headquarters—or should be directed from one headquarters.

The CHAIRMAN. The problem, General, is it not, is to get the citizen soldier and the citizen officer more thoroughly understood by the professional soldier, and to have the professional soldier more thoroughly understood by the citizen soldier?

Gen. PRICE. I think if that could be accomplished, that practically all the friction that has ever existed would be eliminated. I have found that Regular officers, who have been assigned to the National Guard, after they had come to know the National Guard, the difficulties under which they labor, after they have learned of the sacrifices that were made by national guardsmen, in order to keep their organizations in existence, those men invariably became sympathetic and appreciative of the hard work we had, and became friends of the National Guard.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes; I have observed that myself.

Gen. PRICE. Another part of that bill, Senator, that relates to the National Guard council, is the question of a National Guard officer as Chief of the Militia Bureau. I think the thought in that was perhaps that through him the National Guard would get directly to the Secretary of War with strictly National Guard matters rather than through a General Staff which was not sympa-

thetic. It is a well-known fact that many officers in the Army, and on the General Staff, do not believe in the National Guard, and therefore have nothing in common with them, and are very unsympathetic. And it is generally felt in the National Guard that some of the problems that are put up to the Chief of Division of Militia Affairs and, by him, submitted to the Secretary of War, are stopped in the General Staff before they reach the Secretary of War, or a possible recommendation is influenced by their unsympathetic judgment or handling of the question before it gets to the Secretary of War.

One case in point, in the reorganization of the division, is the question of the minimum number of men in a National Guard company. Now, as a matter of fact, in some of the outlying districts of Pennsylvania it is going to be impossible to maintain 100 men in a company of infantry, simply because the community is not large enough to support that number of men or to provide that number of men. I am told that in the sparsely settled South and in the Southwest, it will be even more difficult. The Army's answer to that is that, unless you can have 100 men to train when you expend to war strength you have too many recruits. But we are up against the situation, the men are not there to have. When we explain that to them, they say "Get one-half a company from this community and one-half a company from that."

Senator SUTHERLAND. The platoon system?

Gen. PRICE. Yes. Now, the adjutant general of the State of Pennsylvania and the commander of the brigade of the Pennsylvania Reserve Militia, organized while we were away, tried that scheme and they both tell me it never worked. Theoretically it ought to be fine, but practically it will not work. Take the case, for example, where a first lieutenant happens to be in command of the platoon and the captain in another—perhaps the lieutenant is the better officer of the two, which is often the case. When they go to camp for eight days they do not seem to get together to do the best work until about the eighth day, and when it has been tried in Pennsylvania it did not work.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you believe in having a National Guard officer at the head of the Militia Bureau?

Gen. PRICE. If the right kind of a man could be put there, and if you knew the right kind of a man to put there, I think it might work. I should like to inject here that I have no criticism of the present head or any of the heads of divisions on Militia Affairs, as far as I have known them and come in contact with them, and I have observed the longer they have been connected with the National Guard the greater their sympathy with and understanding of the National Guard; and I do not know that I should say it, but my impression of Gen. Mills's attitude toward the National Guard when he first went in as Chief of the Division of Militia Affairs was not overly enthusiastic, but before he died he became, apparently, very much attached to it and saw great possibilities in it. I believe the advantage of having a National Guardsman there would be that at the outset he would be very familiar with all the requirements and the difficulties that are before the average National Guard organization. Then, I believe that the framers of this bill feel that a Na-

tional Guard officer would go directly to the Secretary of War with their problems, as the law prescribes—as I understand it does in the national-defense act—and the National Guard officer, not being a member of the General Staff, would probably be able to more satisfactorily represent the National Guard—at least, many believe so—than under the present method.

The CHAIRMAN. I imagine that you will find that the Chief of the Bureau of Militia Affairs has very little power in shaping the policy of the War Department with respect to the guard. You will find it is done in the General Staff and through the officers of the Chief of Staff, and the Chief of the Bureau of Militia Affairs is instructed what to do. He may obtain modifications of those orders, but he takes orders from the Regular mechanism of the Army. I had not thought that would cure the evil that is so generally complained—I mean the evil complained of is that you do not get a hearing; that you are not represented. I had thought the way of getting the forces together and making them understand each other, even if you have to lock them up in the same room for a while, is to give the guard, or whatever system of force you maintain, representation on the General Staff itself.

Gen. PRICE. I was going to say it seems to me that is the only way in which that can be done. Even if the Chief of Militia Affairs was to be a National Guard officer. I think there should be officers from the National Guard on the General Staff, for the simple reason I do not think the General Staff understand the National Guard or its problems.

The CHAIRMAN. They have no way of understanding it.

Gen. PRICE. They have not trained with it; they do not know the difficulties; and I am almost constrained to say that the officers of the General Staff or Army, as a rule, do not know America or do not know Americans as the National Guard officer does.

The CHAIRMAN. They do not know the psychology of the civilian public?

Gen. PRICE. Yes.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. As a matter of fact, wherever a Regular Army officer has been assigned to duty with the National Guard, he always comes away with a better opinion of it than before?

Gen. PRICE. Yes, sir.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. I think that is universally true.

Gen. PRICE. I so stated a few minutes ago. Now, the answer they make—many officers of the Army—when you speak to them about the National Guard, is to compare one State with another, but I can not understand why all of the National Guard can not be made as efficient as the best of the National Guard. There must be some answer to the reason why it is not. If it is a question of personal equation, it seems to me that might be corrected.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. One reason the National Guard in one State is better than the National Guard in another is because some States have taken a deep interest in the welfare of the National Guard, have provided splendid armories for them, and other States have not done anything in the way of preparing armories. In the West, in my State, for instance, the largest city in the State has as fine an armory as can be found anywhere in the country. It occu-

pies a whole block. Many of the larger towns in various counties have constructed armories, but in many States they have not any armories.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes; under the present system there is no way of assuring uniformity of efficiency. You can encourage it by offering the Federal appropriation. You can not insure it.

Gen. PRICE. I was going to say, excepting through the appropriations.

The CHAIRMAN. It is an indirect method.

Gen. PRICE. Sometimes it is very direct, when they have little or no money except that which they get from the Government.

The CHAIRMAN. The effect is felt directly. Had you an opportunity at all to read Gen. O'Ryan's testimony?

Gen. PRICE. No.

The CHAIRMAN. Are you familiar with the views he expressed here?

Gen. PRICE. No.

The CHAIRMAN. To put it briefly, he came out very strongly in favor of organizing the guard, for the citizen reserve, or whatever it may be called under the Army clause of the Constitution, rather than under the militia clause, doing away thereby with what is known as dual control between State and Federal Government, but localizing the unit itself as localized to-day and retaining their names and traditions, and protecting the States in the event they needed police protection, by authorizing the governor of the State to call on those troops in the event of disorder within his borders, and then giving the guard, or the citizens' force, representation at Washington adequate to its importance.

Gen. PRICE. Under that system it is proposed still to have the governors control the National Guard?

The CHAIRMAN. Not at all. They would not appoint the officers, and the States would not govern the training as is now necessary under the militia clause, and under which the guard is organized, but the units would stay just where they are to-day and perhaps others would be added, but would be supported entirely by the Federal Government.

Gen. PRICE. Theoretically, I think that would be fine. I do not know how it would work when it came up to the 48 governors. That is, I do not know whether they would agree to give up as the commanders in chief of the forces of their respective Commonwealths.

The CHAIRMAN. There would be nothing in such a scheme to prevent the State from organizing and maintaining its own State militia, but, of course, it is fair to say that if you had the Federal reserve forces located in the State, it would be very difficult for a State to maintain another in competition with it.

Gen. PRICE. Senator, under that system would it be possible for the President and Commander in Chief to withdraw from the States their forces other than in time of war?

The CHAIRMAN. Under Gen. Ryan's suggestion, only for training a limited period, two weeks in the year. The training grounds might be outside the border of that State for some of the units in a given State, but his suggestion does not involve clothing the President with

the power to order those men around in time of peace, except for a limited period of maneuvers.

Gen. PRICE. Take such a situation as occurred in 1860, for instance; those troops could not be gathered together from all parts of the United States at any one point by the President?

The CHAIRMAN. Only in time of war.

Gen. PRICE. Only in time of war.

The CHAIRMAN. Declared by Congress.

Gen. PRICE. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. I am simply repeating Gen. Ryan's suggestion, which is indorsed and supplemented by Gen. Wood and Gen. Pershing. I think it is fair to say that Gen. Ryan was the first one who suggested this to this committee, and it is one of the important suggestions we have had.

Gen. PRICE. I should think that might be a very good solution of the situation. I only have in mind the hesitancy which the governors of the States might hold in having that power which they now hold taken from them.

The CHAIRMAN. By an act of Congress?

Gen. PRICE. Yes.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. You are perfectly familiar with the National Guard provisions of the national-defense act of 1915, are you not?

Gen. PRICE. Yes, sir; fairly so.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. Do you think that those provisions could now be reenacted, modifying them only to the extent of placing officers of the National Guard in the General Staff as representatives of the National Guard, so as to make it effective as the National Guard act?

Gen. PRICE. I think it is very unfortunate that they can not continue the national defense act for some time to come, with such modifications as you suggest, and perhaps a few others. It seems to me that the national defense act covers very well the dual control, and I believe that the National Guard could function very successfully under the national defense act, particularly since it provides for paying soldiers for drill. I believe that it would induce men to volunteer.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. As you said a while ago, it did not have a fair trial, or in fact had no trial.

Gen. PRICE. Practically no trial.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. Functioning under it now, if it were reenacted, it would give a splendid opportunity to work out a better bill, would it not?

Gen. PRICE. I think so, sir; and time to consider it. There are several changes, Senator, that should be made. One is the unfairness toward a man who attends every drill; if a certain percentage of his company does not attend that drill, he is not paid. In other words, his pay is predicated upon the action of others.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. Yes.

Gen. PRICE. The answer of the Army to that is rather fair. They say that unless 50 or 60 per cent of the men attend a drill that it is of no use. In other words, the company officers and 10 men may gather together at drill, and that obviously is not enough to carry on a course of training, and therefore at least 60 per cent. I think they say,

should turn out, otherwise nobody should be paid. It is very difficult to explain that to the enlisted man who comes every night to drill.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. In other words, it penalizes the regular attendant for the nonattendance of the others?

Gen. PRICE. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. There is another provision of law which operated very unjustly, it seemed to me, that is article 119 of the Articles of War.

Gen. PRICE. It was very unfair to put that into effect, and in credit to the majority of the officers of the Army, I do not believe they knew it was there.

The CHAIRMAN. It was drawn in the War Department, however, General.

Gen. PRICE. I know. It did not come from the National Guard, Senator.

The CHAIRMAN. Under that I suppose you came out lower than a brigadier general?

Gen. PRICE. I did sir. I kept going down on the list of B. G.'s as I increased my service and additional brigadiers were made. But I rather gloried in it.

The CHAIRMAN. I think you will find the disposition of this subcommittee, in whatever legislation it finally presents, will be to protect the citizen soldier and officer in that regard in all those cases, in all kinds of cases of that sort. I think this is essential, that he must feel that he has got a fair show.

Gen. PRICE. I think, Senator, that the National Guard officer, almost without exception, felt that he was discriminated against all through this war, and it was a poor reward for his patriotism and for the efforts he had put in for so long. I believe that many officers in the Army, quite a majority of them, disapproved of any discrimination, as well as all of the National Guard, and if some system can be worked out where that can not occur again. I feel sure the Army would have no more loyal supporters than the National Guard.

The CHAIRMAN. I have never regarded it as a difficult problem to solve myself.

Gen. PRICE. Nor I.

The CHAIRMAN. It is exceedingly easy to put in the law, no matter under what clause of the Constitution you organize the citizen forces, a provision to give citizen officers and soldiers adequate representation in every division of the General Staff, then draft regulations and provisions protecting him in the grade in which he is commissioned.

Gen. PRICE. I would think that a fair representation on the General Staff, as you suggested some time ago, would probably prevent a good deal of criticism coming from the National Guard regarding their treatment.

The CHAIRMAN. How would you have National Guard officers selected for service on the General Staff? Of course, it must be with their consent, I assume. Now, how would you select them, You would want to get men, of course, who were competent to do General Staff duty.

Gen. PRICE. Absolutely. I would think now, having given it no consideration other than while I am speaking of it, that that might

well be done, from the reports of the inspector instructors. I do not agree with all my National Guard friends regarding the inspector-instructor proposition, for I have felt as a rule that their reports were fair, in fact, in all the experience I had with them I found them so. Now, they have efficiency reports of the officers with whom they come in contact, and they might select from a list of 125. I repeat I am giving this without serious consideration, but we will say 125, and send that list to the governor of the State or to the adjutant general of the State, and while it would be found that many of those National Guard officers would not be available, yet from such as were could be selected the ones to be sent there, or the adjutant general of the State could recommend certain officers, and the War Department, having the efficiency record of those recommended at Washington, could say whether those recommended were qualified to enter the General Staff. I would not want to send anybody from Pennsylvania who I would not believe would creditably represent Pennsylvania. By that I mean I would not send every one that might apply, because some otherwise capable officers would not be qualified for that work. They might be very excellent soldiers in the field or in the armory, but they might not be prepared to do General Staff work.

The CHAIRMAN. What percentage do you think should be added to the General Staff of the War Department in the way of National Guard officers by detail?

Gen. PRICE. How many of the General Staff at present are in any way connected with the Division of Militia Affairs?

The CHAIRMAN. None. The Division of Militia Affairs has nothing to do with the General Staff.

Gen. PRICE. But I mean by that, is any recommendation made by the Chief of Division of Militia Affairs regarding the training of the National Guard that is acted upon by the General Staff?

The CHAIRMAN. It is.

Gen. PRICE. By the whole General Staff?

The CHAIRMAN. By the appropriate subdivision of the General Staff.

Gen. PRICE. Answering your question, I should think that half of those officers might be National Guard officers that would have to do with the consideration of questions of the Division of Militia Affairs. I think it would come mostly under the training section. I do not think it would necessarily come under making plans of defenses for war.

The CHAIRMAN. I am not sure of that, General.

Gen. PRICE. If you are going to bring in civilians, I say yes; but I am speaking now of the National Guard officers of the line.

The CHAIRMAN. That is what I mean, too. Of course, the War Plans Division, as I remember it, has charge of the making of the plans, amongst other things, for training. But there are several other things with which the guard must be connected up with the General Staff. For instance, the Division of Purchase, Storage, and Traffic. That reorganizes the railroad schedules in case of mobilization, and it certainly would be a tremendous benefit to that division to have, for example, a well-trained, paid guard officer to point

out to them how best to move the troops from the 40 or 50 different communities in Pennsylvania in which they are located.

Gen. PRICE. Do you not think, Senator, in answer to that, while admitting that should be done, do you not think it would be a very excellent thing to have officers of the General Staff detailed for certain periods to assist those in charge of railroads and of the larger corporations?

The CHAIRMAN. That suggestion has been made in even a better form before this committee on two or three occasions, that Regular Army officers generally be detailed from time to time to spend six months or a year with the large industries of the country and the transportation concerns. But what I have in mind is that if you have representation in the General Staff, should you not have representation on its divisions, so as to permeate the whole system with the contact of the professional and the citizen?

Gen. PRICE. I always have in mind, when I think of such details, the question of availability of men or officers from the National Guard for those details. For instance, at present an officer from the National Guard may attend the Staff College or the War College, and it states in the act that while he is there he has the same privileges, pay, and allowance, as an officer of like rank in the Regular Army, provided it does not exceed a captain's pay.

The CHAIRMAN. Of course, that is indefensible. Everybody knows that.

Gen. PRICE. I had in mind a lieutenant colonel in my division, who graduated in the Staff College abroad, and since on return to civil life, there was an opportunity to send him here to the Staff College. He was very anxious to attend, but he could not live on the pay of a captain in Washington, and I had to pass it up, because I had no other officer available in the new guard at the time.

The CHAIRMAN. Those things can be cured. It is very simple.

Gen. PRICE. I should think so. But I think Senator Chamberlain's suggestion of retaining the national defense act, with such modifications as might be considered necessary until we have had time to look around, before we pass a new defense act, or until such time as the military policy has been determined upon definitely by Congress, is the safe thing to do.

The CHAIRMAN. Of course that involved, General, the military policy, of a kind.

Gen. PRICE. It does. But, Senator, do you not think we first ought to know how big an Army we are going to require, whether we are to adopt definitely universal service or universal training? Do you not think the whole system is predicated upon that?

The CHAIRMAN. I think those things ought to be decided as soon as possible, if you ask me.

Gen. PRICE. Then, until that is done, I should think the present vehicle we have, with slight modifications, can be made suitable to carry the Army along until such time. I refer to the national defense act of June, 1916.

The CHAIRMAN. There is no doubt that is true. There is no doubt of it. This Congress will have to decide on the strength of the Regular Army, for instance.

Gen. PRICE. I think so.

The CHAIRMAN. It is in a state of flux to-day. We have only a temporary Regular Army. It only lasts until June 30, 1920. Prior to that date we have got to legislate for a permanent Army. When we legislate for that permanent Army we have got at the same time to fit it into the guard, connect it up.

Gen. PRICE. I am sure those officers I know in the Regular Army would very much rather the present plan would continue a while, if Congress would rearrange their salaries, which are very, very much too low for what they do, and considering the cost of living.

The CHAIRMAN. That seems to be conceded. In fact, this committee reported a bill Friday, it is reported today in the Senate, raising the pay of the Army and the Navy both.

Gen. PRICE. That is fine.

The CHAIRMAN. What is your idea of the strength of the Regular Army, what ought it to have?

Gen. PRICE. I do not know what the plans of the General Staff are, of course. However, I do not know what they are going to do with over 200,000 troops, unless they are going to maintain armies abroad. Now the national defense act provides for 225,000, does it not?

The CHAIRMAN. The maximum; yes.

Gen. PRICE. The maximum of 225,000. I have that in mind when I say I think that bill would suffice, with changes, until the military policy would be finally determined.

The CHAIRMAN. Of course, the War Department asks for 576,000 maximum.

Gen. PRICE. That seems to me silly. Perhaps that is an unfortunate word to use.

The CHAIRMAN. I am not inclined to think it is.

Gen. PRICE. If we are to be a military Nation and we hope to take the place of Germany, which has been recently defeated, then I would say make it 500,000, or a million if you want; and if we do not get war from outside we will probably have revolution within.

The CHAIRMAN. As a matter of fact, you do not believe they could recruit that number by voluntary recruiting, do you?

Gen. PRICE. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. How are you getting on with the Pennsylvania guard?

Gen. PRICE. We have appointed all the general officers, all the field officers, practically all the line officers, and will start to enlist this month.

The CHAIRMAN. What are the prospects for enlistments?

Gen. PRICE. I have had very favorable reports, but inasmuch as we have not enlisted any at all yet, I can only hope that the enlistments will be as favorable as promised.

The CHAIRMAN. Is it the policy of the State to ask federalization of those troops as they reach the prescribed minimum?

Gen. PRICE. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you expect to organize a division in all its parts?

Gen. PRICE. One complete division. We have been authorized to do so by the War Department.

The CHAIRMAN. What maximum strength can you get?

Gen. PRICE. We will have something less than 15,000.

The CHAIRMAN. For the rest of this fiscal year?

Gen. PRICE. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. You have not drawn any of your Federal appropriations for this year?

Gen. PRICE. None at all, because we have not had any troops which have yet been accepted.

The CHAIRMAN. Is there any disposition in your State to abandon the State constabulary?

Gen. PRICE. We increased it during the last session of the legislature.

The CHAIRMAN. How many men have you got in the constabulary now?

Gen. PRICE. I think 460.

The CHAIRMAN. You calculate that relieves your National Guard units from a good amount of police duty, do you not?

Gen. PRICE. Yes; we have been practically relieved from police duty since that organization was formed. The division has not been out since 1902, as a division. Some small part of it was out a few years ago in the western part of the State, but we have always felt that it was unfortunate that the National Guard had to be called upon during industrial disturbances, because so many of our men were men that were at times affected, yet they were never called but that they responded.

The CHAIRMAN. Oh, yes; that is perfectly true. Then you are a believer in the constabulary system?

Gen. PRICE. Oh, very much so. I think it is the only system for a State that is apt to have industrial disturbances.

The CHAIRMAN. What other States have that besides Pennsylvania, New York, and Texas?

Gen. PRICE. I do not know of any others.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you happen to remember how much money you spent on your constabulary annually?

Gen. PRICE. No; I do not know. That is a different department from the guard.

The CHAIRMAN. How much has Pennsylvania spent on its guard?

Gen. PRICE. The appropriation for the last two years was, I think, \$750,000, but usually they appropriate \$1,000,000.

The CHAIRMAN. Largely for the maintenance of the armories?

Gen. PRICE. Largely for the maintenance of the armories and rifle ranges, although from the Government appropriation we can get money for the rifle practice; the excess pay for troops at camp, over the pay from the Government, and then Pennsylvania allows its officers an allowance each year for uniforms.

The CHAIRMAN. How much? According to grade?

Gen. PRICE. Forty-five dollars for a mounted officer, and I think \$30 or \$35 for a dismounted officer.

The CHAIRMAN. That would only cover a very small portion of the actual expenses?

Gen. PRICE. Yes; but it covers a period of five years, which is the time for which an officer is commissioned.

The CHAIRMAN. It is annual?

Gen. PRICE. Yes; and covering the period of five years helps him quite considerably in outfitting.

The CHAIRMAN. Have you any other observations you care to make on this general question?

Gen. PRICE. I do not think, Senator, there is anything else.

The CHAIRMAN. Have you any ideas about the system of promotion?

Gen. PRICE. In the Army?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Gen. PRICE. No; I have not, for the reason that whenever I have discussed that question with the Regular Army officers they have always said they were afraid of politics, that they would rather it would remain as it was. My discussion has been limited, but every time I have spoken of it that has been the answer.

The CHAIRMAN. You mean they are afraid of promotion by selection?

Gen. PRICE. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. I did not know but you had observed the effects of the present system of promotion as reflected in the war.

Gen. PRICE. I have. In some cases it has been very fortunate and in others, I think, unfortunate.

The CHAIRMAN. In what respect have they been unfortunate?

Gen. PRICE. They had in some cases selected the wrong men for the higher positions.

The CHAIRMAN. You mean under the seniority rule?

Gen. PRICE. I do not know what rule applied.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, they have seniority up to colonel.

Gen. PRICE. I am referring now to the service abroad.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes; and from colonel up it is by selection.

Gen. PRICE. Did they follow that out?

The CHAIRMAN. Oh, not during the war; no. It was selection complete.

Gen. PRICE. That is what I was referring to, during the war.

The CHAIRMAN. I imagine that no system is absolutely perfect.

Gen. PRICE. No. The human element enters into those things, and I suppose the only way it could be determined whether a man is efficient or not is to give him a trial, and each man craves that trial, and some of the National Guard officers felt badly that they did not get it.

The CHAIRMAN. We are very much obliged to you.

Gen. PRICE. Senator, I am very glad to have been here.

STATEMENT OF ADJT. GEN. ORLANDO HOLWAY, STATE OF WISCONSIN.

The CHAIRMAN. Will you state your present rank?

Gen. HOLWAY. Adjutant general, State of Wisconsin?

The CHAIRMAN. How long have you been adjutant general?

Gen. HOLWAY. Six years.

The CHAIRMAN. You have seen the guard troops leave Wisconsin on at least two occasions?

Gen. HOLWAY. Yes; and I went with them the time before. I have been in the guard service 37 years.

The CHAIRMAN. You are familiar with the guard bill, I assume, and perhaps some of the other proposals that have been made here from time to time affecting the military policy of the country. What observations have you got to make on the question?

Gen. HOLWAY. If I may, I should like to present a short statement to the committee.

The CHAIRMAN. We shall be very glad to have you do so.

It is my understanding that a detailed analysis of the bill now under consideration will be later made before you by Col. Gillette, of the law committee of the National Guard Association; but I find it expedient to give briefly the general scope of the law to give application to the comment I wish to make.

The bill which is before your committee is one which embodies the suggestions and recommendations of the National Guard Association revised in consultation with the State adjutants general called in conference for that purpose.

The Organized Militia or National Guard has always been an advocate for military preparedness. It has, further, been the one body that has taken practical steps to communicate and spread military training among the young men of this country.

In this procedure the representatives of the guard have, on the whole, been constantly and intimately in touch with the people of nearly all communities in nearly all of the States.

It is their unanimous judgment that compulsory military service in time of peace is impracticable of enforcement, and, with few dissenting, that only a limited measure of compulsory military training could be made effective, so closely is military training linked in the public mind with enforced peace-time military service.

The bill now before you is based and drawn on these conclusions. It endeavors to use to the best possible advantage, and to improve, the chief instrument which is at hand and which has been shown capable to impart military training to men in large numbers.

It is proposed to enroll with all possible speed, to organize, and to train a minimum force of approximately 375,000 national guardsmen; to add to this active training force within a reasonable period approximately 750,000 trained reservists subject to call for national emergencies by the terms of their enlistment oaths.

The question at once arises whether this program can be accomplished, and, if accomplished, whether the soldiers thus procured will be efficient for war.

Practically without the aid of any of the benefits conferred by the act of June 3, 1916, approximately 140,000 national guardsmen, on or about the 30th of that month, responded to the call of the President for Mexican border service.

At the close of that emergency the strength of guard organizations through ordinary, natural causes was somewhat reduced, but very shortly thereafter with the threat and outbreak of war against Germany the strength of the guard was rapidly increased to a total of approximately 382,000 men, approaching its maximum, the increase coming in large part from men who had had previous guard service and affiliations.

The record of their performance in the war is open for all to read. But no record can show more graphically where they were and what they did than the following statement:

The Army of the United States numbered something over 3,800,000, the National Guard 382,000, one-tenth of this Army.

The casualties of the American Expeditionary Forces—the casualties of battle and campaign aggregate about 300,000, approximately 40 per cent of which, 120,000, fell upon the 382,000 national guardsmen.

No man may certainly prophesy the future event, but it is upon the facts just stated that the National Guard Association and the adjutants general of the several States base their expectations and make their estimates of results if the bill proposed by them is enacted into law.

In the main, the provisions by which this result may be accomplished are the mere reenactment, with minor changes, of the provisions of law already in force by virtue of the act of June 3, 1916.

The one radical change proposed affects the administration, under the Secretary of War, of the affairs of the National Guard Bureau (Militia Bureau).

It is proposed to intrust this administration to a National Guard council, composed of one representative from each State, which council shall select and recommend for appointment by the President the chief and other executive officers of the National Guard Bureau, both council and bureau officers to be National Guard status.

Precedent for a bureau so controlled exists in the administration of the Marine Corps.

None realizes more thoroughly than do the representatives of the National Guard and of State adjutants general, now appearing before you, the advantages of centralized Army control.

But the change of administration which is proposed by this bill has been made necessary and vital by the attitude of the controlling element of the Regular Army itself.

Chiefs of Staff and many other officers of high rank in the Regular Establishment have publicly announced that the National Guard system is a worthless system and that it is impracticable by means of it to efficiently train soldiers.

They have permitted this statement to be spread by the public press and otherwise without denial.

Undoubtedly this expresses their honest opinion and that of the majority of Army officers, and evidence accumulates that their opinion is unchanged.

In consequence, they have no incentive or wish to preserve or build up the National Guard.

Individual officers of the Army have given the guard invaluable help and instruction, but Army policy in general has been such as to repress and restrict the guard's growth and development, and it is felt that this policy will continue to govern if an Army officer is to remain Chief of National Guard Bureau, functioning directly or indirectly under and through the Chief of Staff.

It is not usual to trust the advancement of an enterprise to those who openly claim that it is worth nothing.

Whether or not the Army attitude is truly as stated, that it is such is the belief and conclusion of the great majority of the thousands of men who have recently served in the Army upon whose enlistment is dependent the rapid reorganization of the National Guard.

It is to meet this situation and to gratify these men in their desire for a new deal that the present bill proposes to put under the direc-

tion of a National Guard council, subject to approval by the Secretary of War and within the provisions of the law as enacted by Congress, all those administrative matters which have to do with the organizing and building up of the National Guard.

It will be noted that provision is made for the detail of officers of the Regular Establishment for service with the National Guard Bureau for the purpose of coordinating the military instruction given with that prescribed for the Regular Army; and that, by section 34 of the bill, it is provided that the Secretary of War alone, without voice of the council or Chief of National Guard Bureau, shall determine by whom the inspections shall be made to ascertain whether the units of the National Guard have complied in all respects with the requirements of the law.

Passing on to those provisions of the bill which deal with military or correlated training of other than duly enlisted men, it is proposed to promote and foster the physical training of all youths 16 to 18 years of age in every school within the United States as an initial step toward possible universal training, this training to be especially that which will best promote bodily health and vigor.

It is hoped that the benefit of such training will be so pronounced and immediate as both to enable and to warrant the extension of the law to cover all school children of both sexes, providing for proper physical examination and with modification of exercises to fit age and infirmity. Sound bodies, physical strength, and endurance are as great national assets in peace as for war.

The establishment of departments of military training in all high schools continues this system of physical training and adds distinctively military training and organization.

The residence in nearly every locality of capable officers or non-commissioned officers of Army service in the World War, affords the opportunity to secure competent instructors for reasonable compensation.

The appointment of a National Guard council member who continues to reside in the State which he represents affords an officer who is directly interested in the quick general adoption and continued maintenance of the system of physical training above outlined in all schools of the State.

Finally, units of the Reserve Officers' Training Corps remain as provided by the act of June 3, 1916, and graduates are made eligible for commission in the National Guard, inclusive of the National Guard Reserve.

Now, Mr. Chairman, I believe I have given you a summary of the bill and some of the reasons why the National Guard proposes this bill at the present time.

The CHAIRMAN. The question has been asked here two or three times, and I think on two or three occasions by Senator Chamberlain, of Oregon, who is not here just at this moment, as to whether or not the creation of a National Guard council in the War Department, reporting direct to the Secretary of War, would increase the friction and the separation between the two branches of the service?

Gen. HOLWAY. It ought not to.

The CHAIRMAN. You have heard, perhaps, some of the discussion, particularly relating to the advisability of having the National Guard

represented on the General Staff. What do you think of that proposition?

Gen. HOLWAY. I doubt the advisability of it. It ought not to create any more friction at the present time. It is a reversion to the old Militia Board, with a little bit more general application, so as to include the men who know the circumstances in all of the States. We then had a council of five officers who served as an advisory board for the Chief of the Militia Bureau, and this is an application of that, and the thought occurred to all of us, that if we attempted to start with physical training and some part of military training in our schools, we would then have some directing officer within the State who would be directly interested in the promotion and the prospering of it.

The CHAIRMAN. From your own experience, General, what are the greatest difficulties that you desire to overcome?

Gen. HOLWAY. In what way, Mr. Chairman? In what ways do you mean? There are a whole lot of difficulties.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, do you mean the difficulties of nonrepresentation or lack of appreciation by the Regular service?

Gen. HOLWAY. I would be well content to leave the administration of the Militia Bureau as it was, if it was not for the attitude which you know as well as I, and the fact that, on account of that attitude, we can not have an opportunity to grow and increase as we would like to see ourselves grow and increase.

The attitude of the National Guard is that it should be the instrument to communicate basic military training to the men of the country. It has grown up for that purpose, and has extended itself to reach quite large proportions without the aid of the Government in any way whatsoever. We never had any benefit of the act of June 3, 1916.

The CHAIRMAN. But you have had a Federal appropriation before that?

Gen. HOLWAY. We had a Federal appropriation of \$85,000 to maintain 4,000 troops.

The CHAIRMAN. And do you have the equipment besides that appropriation?

Gen. HOLWAY. No. The original equipment probably came from Federal sources, going back to the days of the Spinach War and before that time, but from that time on, all the renewing equipment, keeping it up to date, and so on, came out of the annual appropriation.

Senator SUTHERLAND. Was that a State appropriation?

Gen. HOLWAY. We had an original State appropriation of \$150,000. Between 3,500 and 4,000 troops were maintained at an expense to the State and to the Government of approximately \$75 per year per man. That is too little. It calls upon the men in the ranks to give too much.

Senator SUTHERLAND. How much of an encampment do you have?

Gen. HOLWAY. We have an encampment of one week each year.

Senator SUTHERLAND. Only one week each year?

Gen. HOLWAY. Seven days a year. There is where a large part of the State appropriation had been used, in the pay of the officers and enlisted men.

The CHAIRMAN. You had the regular armory drills?

Gen. HOLWAY. We had the regular armory drills, which would average better than one per week. Outside of that we had our target practice.

Senator SUTHERLAND. Could you do anything worth while in the one week's encampment?

Gen. HOLWAY. Yes, but we could do a great deal more in two weeks.

The CHAIRMAN. You could do more than twice as much in two weeks as you can in one week?

Gen. HOLWAY. Yes, we could do more than twice as much; we could do three times as much.

The CHAIRMAN. The first couple of days of the encampment are occupied in shaking down and the last couple of days in packing up?

Gen. HOLWAY. Yes, the last couple of days in packing up.

Senator SUTHERLAND. How much Federal aid have you had?

Gen. HOLWAY. We have had \$85,000 in one year.

Senator SUTHERLAND. That is Federal aid?

Gen. HOLWAY. That is Federal aid.

Senator SUTHERLAND. And that is supplementary to the State aid?

Gen. HOLWAY. Yes, in the last three years we have had a State appropriation of \$300,000—

Senator SUTHERLAND. That is for the three years?

Gen. HOLWAY. That is for each year.

My Federal appropriation varied from \$75,000 to \$80,000 and the State appropriation was \$300,000 a year. That also took care of the office expenses—

The CHAIRMAN. What have you to say about representation on the General Staff? What have you to say about that?

Gen. HOLWAY. Well, I doubt the advisability of it. It is not our desire to be on the General Staff. We would not desire to dictate the general military policy. The purpose of the National Guard is to get together and train the young men of this country—

The CHAIRMAN. Is it not necessary for some one to plan for the use of the National Guard in the event of war?

Gen. HOLWAY. Yes, sir; it is, when the President calls for them or drafts them.

The CHAIRMAN. Which is the signing of an order, and that does not do the work. The National Guard has to be transported, and it has to be fed, and it has to be housed and handled, and only a general staff of some kind, somewhere, can make those plans in time of peace, so as to properly use them in time of emergency or in time of war.

Gen. HOLWAY. But we have our medium of communication with the Chief of the General Staff, that is through the chief of the bureau.

The CHAIRMAN. But the policies are made in the general staff and the plans are made there, and I am surprised that the National Guard does not ask to share in the making of the policies and the plans. The council can not do that, but it only functions, so far as the training is concerned, in time of peace.

Gen. HOLWAY. What would be gained by representation? What would be the idea of having a National Guard section of the General Staff?

The CHAIRMAN. I would not have it as a National Guard section of the General Staff. I would have National Guard officers assigned to each of the sections of the General Staff. Under the law, the General Staff is charged with the duty of preparing plans for the national defense, which include the plans for the use of the National Guard in war time, and preparing it for that use in peace time, and it is for the very reason that there is no one of the National Guard officers represented on the General Staff when the plans come out and the regulations come out and the orders come out, that the National Guard finds that it does not fit in with their peculiar difficulties. The Secretary of War can not make those plans. He is too busy for that.

Under your scheme the National Guard Bureau and council will report direct to the Secretary of War. I imagine that you have gotten many an order from Washington which bore every evidence of having been drawn without a knowledge of the peculiar conditions pertaining to Wisconsin.

Gen. HOLWAY. But would there be any difference if we had officers on the General Staff? If we had them report to the General Staff, through the National Guard Bureau, would not they be as fully advised as they would be if there were National Guard officers on the General Staff?

The CHAIRMAN. The National Guard officers on the General Staff would help to draw those orders.

Gen. HOLWAY. But their recommendations to the Chief of Staff would merely amount to recommendations, would not they?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes; in the same degree that the recommendations of the other officers of the General Staff amount to recommendations.

Senator SUTHERLAND. And it would give you first-hand information.

The CHAIRMAN. And they would of necessity see the plans being evolved and would be advised, at least—

Gen. HOLWAY (interrupting). Very possible.

It is, as I say, something that I have not given thought, not being incorporated in the bill as now presented by the National Guard Association.

The CHAIRMAN. How are you getting on in Wisconsin in the matter of reconstituting your National Guard?

Gen. HOLWAY. Well, we now have about 5,000 men pledged for enlistment.

The CHAIRMAN. But you have not them actually enlisted?

Gen. HOLWAY. I think probably that we have about 2,000 at the present time. Originally I had a circular from the War Department urging the reenlistment of the National Guard, and expressing a great desire to have us reenlist as many as possible of the Army or service men. I immediately replied to the effect that all of the units were localized units, under the National Guard Regulations, and, in order to reconstitute the guard, I would immediately proceed to reorganize every unit that was drafted for the war. I was then told that I could not organize more than 2,600 men. The State of Wisconsin sent 17,400 men into the service from the National Guard. My full allotment was obtained during the Mexican service. It

consisted of six regiments of Infantry, one of Cavalry, one of Artillery, a battalion of Engineers, and one Signal Corps battalion. Immediately—I did not wait—immediately that I got that letter from the War Department, I immediately announced that we would reconstitute all the old regiments and the companies that were in the German War, especially since the War Department had informed me that the reorganization would be made under the tables of May 3, 1917.

After considerable correspondence I was told I would be within the law to organize the full quota of 10,400, but I would be obliged to accept another allotment of units.

The great difficulty of organizing the National Guard—and it is one that possibly the War Department does not appreciate, although it has been told many times—is that quite all men of 19 years or over, capable of Army service and not exempt, volunteered or were drafted into the service. Almost universally, when you approach one of these young men for enlistment, he says, "Not for me; find somebody else." Consequently we are limited to men of 18 years. In any locality there are a certain number of these men who are greatly influenced by the adverse attitude of the men who have seen service, and the only way to reconstitute companies was to reorganize my old units and simply say to the men, "Come back and take a place for a year and put your old company on its feet." They will do this, but it is seldom possible to induce them to enlist for a new and strange organization.

The CHAIRMAN. How about the officers in Wisconsin?

Gen. HOLWAY. Some have been appointed. I have taken advantage of the Military Bureau regulations, which are favorable in the matter of National Guard reserves, and issued commissions in the National Guard reserve to every officer who had seen overseas service and who applied for commission.

The CHAIRMAN. And how many applied, General?

Gen. HOLWAY. About 300; and they are coming in right along.

The CHAIRMAN. Would many of them be willing to take active service in the guard?

Gen. HOLWAY. Some of them will, but the great majority of them will not. I can not use the latter in active capacity. I have asked them all to take reserve commissions, even those who later will be put into active service because of the ruling of the War Department that I may not get an officer of active status recognized until the unit he is to command is fully organized. The only way that I have to lawfully enlist men is to get recognition of the reserve officers who are qualified, beating the devil around the bush in that way.

It may seem an easy thing to get 65 or 70 men and hold them together for three or four months without binding enlistment, but I will tell you that it is not.

What we want is the authority to enlist these men. If I had it in the first place and could use the active officers for the purpose, I would organize a company in this or that town. If I could have gotten such officers commissioned and recognized, I would have a nucleus with which to work. Instead of that, I have nothing. It has all to be done out of my office, and my State is a pretty broad one.

The CHAIRMAN. I appreciate the difficulty. I have seen it worked out.

Gen. HOLWAY. Yes, Mr. Chairman; you have seen it worked out, but the situation hampers us all around. I have been thoroughly about my State now and I have three or four men working with me out of Madison, and we feel very confident, we confidently expect, that if organization on a basis of 65 for Infantry companies may be permitted that between this and May we will put into the United States service, under the National Guard rule, the full State quota of 10,400 men. More than that, there can be enlisted from the men who have been in the service nearly as many more, in reserve, provided there is the option of one, two, or three years' service in the reserve.

The CHAIRMAN. And you have not that option now?

Gen. HOLWAY. No. I was informed at the War Department that when the repeal of reserve provisions was made affecting the Army that it carried with it the repeal of the same provisions relative to the National Guard, which is unfortunate at the present time.

The CHAIRMAN. What do you think of universal military training, General?

Gen. HOLWAY. Well, it is what the National Guard has been working for for a good many years, and I think it the only way that it will be brought about.

The CHAIRMAN. Don't you think that we are out for it now?

Gen. HOLWAY. The employer in general, the man who appears prominently in public, is, but the employed man is not, and the farmer and the employed men are not, and they are in the majority. These other National Guard officers will confirm this. They have been working toward universal military training for 30 years, and in their opinion conditions are not ripe for this measure.

Senator SUTHERLAND. Do you mean the laboring men and the farmer?

Gen. HOLWAY. Yes, sir.

Senator SUTHERLAND. That they are not ready for universal training?

Gen. HOLWAY. They are not ready for universal training; no, sir.

Senator SUTHERLAND. What do they say about it?

Gen. HOLWAY. Well, the great objection that I have heard expressed is that compulsory military training is compulsory service in time of peace. We will tell the men that it is not, and they will say that the one is nothing less than a door for the other, a shutter that can be opened at any time. That is their idea.

The CHAIRMAN. They do not distinguish between the two?

Gen. HOLWAY. No, sir; they do not distinguish between the two. You gentlemen know, and all of us know, that there have been certain public slogans that have been spread broadcast, which have had their effect on these men. In the first place, was the slogan, "We were kept out of the war," and after that was the slogan that "This was a war in order that all wars may cease." They now say, "Why, in that case, this great increase in preparation for war?"

The CHAIRMAN. I wonder if the second prophecy will be as exact as the first?

Gen. HOLWAY. I am only speaking of the temper of the people in general and of this as one of the reasons with others I have given why they are in this temper. There is no set of men that

ever got together that are more ardent to see the spread of military preparedness than these same national guardsmen we have named.

The CHAIRMAN. And they are the only elements in the country that exert any continuous efforts?

Gen. HOLWAY. We believe that only a very moderate amount of compulsory training is possible at the present time. That is why we are so insistent in our efforts to build up and continue the National Guard, which does give training, not perfect, but is trying perfect itself right along.

Senator SUTHERLAND. You think that we are going in the schools as far as it is practicable for us to go at the present time?

Gen. HOLWAY. Yes, sir; that is my idea.

The CHAIRMAN. How generally do you think that the provisions of this bill would be accepted and taken advantage of by the States?

Gen. HOLWAY. Very generally.

The CHAIRMAN. Have you heard any estimate of the approximate cost to the Government of this plan?

Gen. HOLWAY. I can give you one that I have penciled out myself, but I won't say how nearly correct it would be. These figures are merely estimates; but you take young men of 15, 16, and 17—I have put it; or say 16 to 18—it would include many young men 15, 16, and 17 years, or boys of that age, and there will be attending school in the United States approximately two million of them. That is just an estimate, as I thought the matter over.

In the draft registration it was shown that there were about 1,000,000 men each year who came of a certain age. There would be a certain proportion of these 15, 16, and 17 years of age in attendance at the high schools, but you would have a total of 3,000,000 of the three ages; a certain proportion will not be in school attendance, and another proportion will be cared for through high schools. So I have 2,000,000—I have estimated that figure—as the number of the young men of the specified ages in attendance in those schools; that is, all of the schools, public schools, parochial schools, and so on. That subdivides itself into classes; that is, in regard to numbers. If there is a school with only 10 such pupils in attendance, I would not put in training, but from 10 to 50, it would cost probably \$200 a year. From 50 to 100, it would cost \$300 a year. Over 100, \$450 a year; and there will be very few schools with over 100. I figured on that basis, approximately, \$6,000,000 would cover the cost to be appropriated. Now, in the high schools, I have tried to arrive at the number in the high schools as best I could. I did not have access to books of statistics, but I have taken the towns that I know of 30,000 to 40,000 population. In a town of 45,000 population, say the City of Madison, there are 1,200 students. Not over half of them are boys. In another town of 30,000 inhabitants, there are approximately 1,000 high-school students; so I figured for the whole United States 1,500,000 in the high schools—1,500,000 boys.

The CHAIRMAN. One million five hundred thousand?

Gen. HOLWAY. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. I am afraid that is higher than the actual number.

Gen. HOLWAY. I think myself it is, but in making these figures, I wanted to be sure that I was getting enough to cover actual attend-

ance. I think that 1,500,000 is too much of an estimate, and I did not have accessible the books of statistics.

There are very few high schools—that is, in the smaller towns—where you can not muster 30 boys of that age. From 30 to 100, the cost would be about \$300.

The CHAIRMAN. Three hundred dollars for the entire class?

Gen. HOLWAY. Three hundred dollars for the entire class, and one instructor is sufficient. This involves probably an hour a day, or we will say two periods of a half hour each. At the present time the thing has been made possible, because we have in every locality men who are thoroughly trained, at least from the physical standpoint, and we have officers who are thoroughly trained. I have formed officers' councils in every town, large and small, and in every town there are men who are eligible to give physical training, men who were former officers of the guard, and there are also officers who have seen Army service. These councils vary in numbers; from 4 to 5 officers in some of the very small towns, up to 50 and 80 and 100 in the larger towns. There is where I got my idea that they are available, and they will work for a small compensation.

The CHAIRMAN. There is no question about the availability of the officers at this time. But let me read you the testimony of Dr. Winthrop Talbot, who discussed the benefits of training to the young men of the country, and in the matter of education and illiteracy, in his discussion, recited some rather startling facts relative to the public-school system. I assume that his figures are accurate. He says:

But we must realize, however, the facts as they are.

He is speaking about illiteracy.

Out of 27,000,000 children between the ages of 5 and 18, 5,000,000 are not enrolled in the schools at all, and 7,000,000 more are not in regular daily attendance. Nearly 2,500,000 do not go to school in their lives. Five out of 10 of those who do go to school leave for good at the age of 14 or 15. Only 2 out of 10 of those who are in regular attendance get so far as the second year in high school; only 4 per cent of all males are graduates from any university, college, technical, or professional school. Nineteen States do not require the full year. Eight States require less than 100 days. One State still fails to make schooling obligatory.

So there, you see, if he is correct in his statement that only 2 out of 10 are in regular attendance and go so far as the second year in the high school—

Gen. HOLWAY (interrupting). I have no doubt that he is correct.

The CHAIRMAN. Go so far as the second year in high school. You would reach only a small percentage of the boys—

Gen. HOLWAY. I have no doubt of the substantial accuracy of his figures, but our proposition is a step toward universal training. I do not expect to get everything, but I do expect to get physical training of 2,000,000 of our children, and also, in the high schools, physical training and military instruction will be given to 1,000,000 more, and is not that a pretty big step in advance?

The CHAIRMAN. Every step in that direction is a good step. That, in turn, is based on the assumption that every State will take up this proposition.

Gen. HOLWAY. Yes; and every State may, or it may not.

The CHAIRMAN. Yet you see how backward some of them have been in the elementary proposition that every child shall be educated. They are not all like Wisconsin.

Gen. HOLWAY. No; and they are not all like New York, which goes ahead of Wisconsin in that respect.

The CHAIRMAN. It is a very interesting problem, I think.

Gen. HOLWAY. The most expensive feature in connection with this bill here is your two weeks in camp.

The CHAIRMAN. In the school training?

Gen. HOLWAY. In the school training. There is a provision made in the bill for the pay. Of course we would not get that full attendance, but taking my estimate of 1,500,000, and pay the necessary officers and the small amount of transportation, annual camps will cost \$40,000,000.

The CHAIRMAN. You would not expect the Government to pay the students of high schools and colleges and boys of 16 or 18 the base pay of a private in the Regular Army?

Gen. HOLWAY. That is the proposition.

The CHAIRMAN. Is not that a good deal?

Gen. HOLWAY. I don't think so.

The CHAIRMAN. Would you pay a 16-year-old boy the pay that the Government pays a full-fledged soldier?

Gen. HOLWAY. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Why inject the element of pay in the bill?

Gen. HOLWAY. I think the reason that moved the committee was this, in order to obtain the participation. You take the ordinary young boy of that age and a great many of them will get work after school; they will have a summer job somewhere. The parents will say to them, "You take the job in the store down here." I think he should have the pay in order to get him to participate.

(Thereupon, at 5 o'clock p. m., the committee adjourned, subject to the call of the chairman.)

REORGANIZATION OF THE ARMY.

TUESDAY, DECEMBER 9, 1919.

UNITED STATES SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON MILITARY AFFAIRS.
Washington, D. C.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to adjournment, at 2.15 o'clock p. m., in the committee room, Capitol, Senator James W. Wadsworth, jr., presiding.

President: Senators Wadsworth (chairman), New, Sutherland, Chamberlain, and Thomas.

STATEMENT OF ADJT. GEN. HARRY B. SMITH, INDIANA NATIONAL GUARD.

The CHAIRMAN. General, will you please give your name and rank?

Gen. SMITH. Adjutant general, State of Indiana.

The CHAIRMAN. How long have you been adjutant general there?

Gen. SMITH. Since January, 1917.

The CHAIRMAN. You had been in the guard before that, had you?

Gen. SMITH. Since September, 1877, continuously, with the exception of about two years.

The CHAIRMAN. General, you know what we have under consideration—this whole matter of military policy and of course involved in it is one very important element, and that is the National Guard. I should like to have your views on the subject in any way you see fit to lay them before us.

Gen. SMITH. It goes almost without saying that I am a very warm supporter of the National Guard organizations. I have seen their work for many, many years. I saw their work during the Spanish-American War, when it was my fortune to command the Second Brigade of the Second Division of the First Army Corps, and I saw the perfection that was attained by the guard organizations after they were called into the service; I saw the perfection and the imperfections of the guard organizations that went into service, showing the difference between the method of training that had been followed by different States, and by certain organizations in the same State.

The average national guardsman has always gone into the game because of his love for that work. As to the efficiency that can be attained in the National Guard at this time I think a greater degree of efficiency can be attained than ever before, because I think the

morale and the personnel of the organization, as it is proposed to make it now, will be higher than heretofore.

There has been for a number of years friction between the National Guard organizations and the Regular Establishment. I am not saying that as between the National Guard and the Regular Army officers, because in the majority of cases I have found the Regular Army officer to be a great big, manly gentleman; he has my entire respect and esteem, and what success I have had as a national guardsman is due, to a certain extent, to the training which I have received from the inspector-instructors and inspectors of the Regular Army—officers with whom I have associated and with whom I have had joint maneuvers at various times.

I am a firm believer in the National Guard organization so far as possible to control its own affairs. I believe better results can be obtained that way than in any other way. I have given considerable study to the proposition that was advanced some months ago by Adjt. Gen. Nash, of the State of Georgia, relative to the National Guard being controlled by the National Guard council or bureau, comprised of National Guard officers, reporting directly to the Secretary of War.

The first communications, I think, that I received regarding that matter came from Gen. Nash of Georgia. I gave it considerable study; but in the last two months I have had not much opportunity of doing anything but being a military policeman. I believe that results, and good results, could be obtained.

Senator New. You make that last remark, as I understand it, because you have been in continuous service in the strike district of northwestern Indiana?

Gen. SMITH. Absolutely. When I have not been out with the troops, I have been at certain places in the district there that required constant attention relative to the disturbances that were going on, and the condition of unrest in the industrial district and territory.

I received a copy of a National Guard bill, or a bill that was framed by the National Guard organization, some two months ago. I have not given it the careful study that I should have liked to have done if I had more time, but, in a general way, it combines the ideas that I have of National Guard legislation.

I believe in the universal training. I think it should come to the schools, the high schools and the colleges, and then into the National Guard for intensive training, for camps of instruction, particularly for rifle practice and range work, because I think if you can teach a man to march and teach a man to shoot you have made a pretty good soldier out of him. I believe thoroughly in the officers' training camps and training and fitting men for officers. I think you can take the average American soldier, that receives his training in the schools, and in the National Guard, and with the proper officers that have been properly trained, over him, soon whip a bunch of rookies into a splendid army.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you happen to recollect what percentage of the male population of Indiana goes through high school?

Gen. SMITH. No, sir; I do not. I asked for that information at one time. I am not sure whether I received it or not.

Senator NEW. You speak generally of the training coming through the schools. You have said that you favored training through the medium of the schools. That, necessarily, could not be universal training, because not all our youth go through the schools. Does that mean that you oppose universal military training?

Gen. SMITH. Not at all. I am heartily in favor of universal military training, and, in order to accomplish that, I believe, wherever it is possible, it should be started in the schools, in the high schools and in the colleges, and also in the National Guard. I am making the National Guard proposition one of the three units in which this training should be obtained. I think you should require the training not only in the schools, but also the training in the National Guard, up until they have reached a certain degree of efficiency, by which they can be transferred into a National Guard Reserve, if you please.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. Your answer to that question suggests this thought in my mind for the first time:

Suppose the universal military training should be left to the different States, through the National Guard system, and the Government were to appropriate so much money, provided each State would conform to a certain system of training, what do you think would be the effect of that effort?

Gen. SMITH. I think if there was one general rule, followed out, and certain requirements laid down by the general Government that would have to prevail in all States, that you would get splendid results from it. I would not leave it optional with the States.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. There would not be that fear of inducing militarism if it were done directly by the States, but suppose the Congress should make an appropriation of so much money for the training of the young men of the different States, when done under the legislative power of the different States, but to conform to a code of training prepared by the Regular Army; do you think that could be accomplished?

Senator NEW. A considerable part of the expense of which is to be defrayed by the National Government and apportioned between the States?

Gen. SMITH. I can not see but that a system of rules or plans could be outlined by which that could be followed and good results obtained from it.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. It would have to be uniform?

Gen. SMITH. Absolutely. I am in favor of universal military training, but I am also in favor of a universal system of that training.

The great opposition to militarism, which was brought to my mind by the words you used, is very largely the home influence. That is, the mother does not want to give the boy up; the boy does not want to go away from his own neighborhood, from his own family, from his own college, from his own State, we will say. If you are able to take that boy and give him that military training, and still have his home training and his home environment. I take it that it is a better proposition than if you take that boy away from all his home influences and put him into a Regular Army, say, for a period of years, to get this training.

My judgment of the matter is, you are going to find an opposition from the citizens, particularly from the mothers, to taking that boy away at any time. In other words, I do not believe that conscription will ever give you an army.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. That is what I had in mind.

Senator NEW. A conscription for training?

Gen. SMITH. For training or for the Regular Army. I do not believe you can get it.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. In order to keep that home influence at work, suppose Congress would appropriate \$14,000,000, we will say in round numbers, for universal military training, to be put in force by the legislatures of the several States, the States which are willing to go to the universal military training by legislative enactment to receive a certain proportion of the \$48,000,000, and, unless they do it, no part of the appropriation shall be given to that State.

Now, would not every State in the Union be glad to accept a part of that appropriation and to train the young men under a system of universal training along a code prepared by the War Department?

Gen. SMITH. My judgment of the matter is they would.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. It seems to me you would then have universal military training directly under the control of the States and under home environment.

Gen. SMITH. Yes; I think you would. The system, however, should be outlined by the Federal authorities?

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. Absolutely.

Gen. SMITH. So that it will be a universal system in all of the States?

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Then you would have it in the schools?

Gen. SMITH. I would certainly have it in the schools; I would start it in the schools, and I would give them a certain number of credits for it. In other words, I would make a plan, which would have to be very comprehensive, and one that would have to have a great deal of study. I would make the plan, however, that the boy would receive credit for the number of months, we will say, that he had had this military training in his school. If he got it in his graded school, all well and good; then pass on to the high school and get his additional credits there; and then, we will say, he would pass under the control of the National Guard in his immediate home, and he would come up with his credits there, and when he had secured a required number of credits, then he could be transferred in the National Guard Reserve.

The CHAIRMAN. Would you have that apply to the boys who do not go to schools?

Gen. SMITH. Yes, sir; if the boys do not go to school and do not have the advantage of a college or high-school education, I would begin with a certain age, say 18, and I would put them in the National Guard, and let them get their training there.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you think that the same legislatures would pass acts involving compulsory military training within the States?

Gen. SMITH. I do not know that I am prepared to answer that question, Senator, whether they would or not, but my judgment is they would.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. I think so.

The CHAIRMAN. If all the States would do it, it would follow, logically that the Congress would.

Gen. SMITH. The condition is different to-day than what it was some years ago.

There has been a National Guard unit in almost every State in the Union, dating back to the earliest days, until a comparatively few years ago, and the National Guard was supported entirely by the the members of the National Guard individually; later, by certain appropriations made by the States, by the different States for their particular guard, and, by an appropriation from Congress, in which the various States participated in proportion to the number of national guardsmen they had, or State militia. So the spirit has existed for a great many years, even when the men had to go down into their own pockets and pay all their expenses, as you, Senator New, will recall. Later you had small appropriations made from the States, and eventually from the General Government, which aided materially in the development of the military spirit of the National Guard.

I do not believe you can ever get an army by voluntary enlistment of 500,000 men, nor, I will say, one-half of that by voluntary enlistments. You have only two ways to get it then. You can go out into the open market and make the pay of your soldier such as will compete with industry at this time, probably three times what your soldier is drawing now, and, coupled with that, would be his subsistence and his clothing; or you can get it by conscription.

Now, I do not believe that the people of the United States, the mothers in the United States particularly, are going to stand for the conscription proposition.

The CHAIRMAN. Not in time of peace.

Gen. SMITH. If you can not get it that way, how are you going to get it? If you are in favor of universal military training, and I believe a majority of the people are in favor of universal military training—I think it makes a better man physically, morally; I think it makes a better citizen; I think it takes the young man at the time in life when he needs control and discipline, and it makes him better in every way to have this military training. Now, if you take your young man, your boy, and give him that training in the school, in the college, or through your National Guard, you will build up an Army in a few years of from a million to two million men, who have received this military training, and who, if it should become necessary to call your Army into the field, will have had all the preliminary training in military tactics and science, and that was my idea of which I spoke before where your officers come into the game.

I would in addition have an intensive officers' training system. If you can train the officers, and I believe there are certainly enough young men in the United States that have the military fever, and the military ability and willingness to train, who would attend these training camps, you will have the nucleus of a splendid citizens' army. But if you can not get it under this plan, I do not know how you will get it.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. You differentiate between compulsory military training and universal military service?

Gen. SMITH. Yes, sir; I do; I differentiate between the two, between the word "training" and the word "service."

Senator NEW. You have had long experience with the guard and in the training of the young men. What has been your observation, General, as to the result of the training upon the individual? I mean the result physically and the result, too, as it affects his citizenship?

Gen. SMITH. I think that it is decidedly to the advantage of every young man to take the military training. It gives him a better physique; it gives him a better idea of military discipline, and makes him more obedient to the laws at home and the national laws, and it makes him a better citizen in every way.

The CHAIRMAN. Of course it is utterly out of the question that we should propose conscription to fill a Regular Army, or fill any other kind of force in this country in time of peace. That would not occur, I suppose, to one member of this committee.

Gen. SMITH. You understand, gentlemen, I am simply giving my views in this matter, maybe in a kind of haphazard way, but it is as the result of years of experience I have had.

The CHAIRMAN. We are glad to have them.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. You rather favor the plan proposed by the National Guard Association, do you not, with a council up here at Washington functioning independently of the General Staff and independently of the Regular Army, except in so far as the Secretary of War is a liaison officer between the two? Do we not then have that great trouble of dual control just the same?

Gen. SMITH. You will have the same system exactly as exists at this time with the Marine Corps. They function direct.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. I am wondering whether there would not be trouble brewing all the time between the National Guard council, so called, and the representatives of the Regular Army?

Gen. SMITH. It may be. I can see how that condition may arise; but even at that, I believe that friction would be decidedly less with the National Guard council than under the present system.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. What officer is there in the Army that corresponds to the commandant of the Marine Corps is the Navy?

Gen. SMITH. I do not believe that there is any.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. They have no chief of staff in the Navy?

The CHAIRMAN. They have a Chief of Operations, but they have not a general staff. That is one side of it which makes it rather difficult to compare the Marine Corps status with that of the National Guard, in the Navy and the Army, respectively. The marines, officers and men, are all what might be termed Regulars. They are not citizen soldiers. Their obligation is just the same as that of the seamen and the naval officers proper, so there is not a great diversity in their problems. Your difficulty has been that the Regular officer does not understand the citizen soldier. There is a much bigger spread between the status of the Regular soldier and the citizen soldier, like a national guardsman, than between a sailor in the Navy and the marine in the Navy.

Gen. SMITH. Yes; I see that. If it becomes a question of friction, the question is where the least friction would occur. In my judgment,

the National Guard council, appointed as provided for in that bill, reporting directly and operating and functioning to and with the Secretary of War, would give you much less friction than under the present system.

The CHAIRMAN. We have discussed all phases of that on two or three occasions lately—yesterday and the day before.

I can not help expressing my own personal opinion that you do not cure your trouble by it, because, after all, it is the General Staff that is going to lay down the policies, and your National Guard council will not have anything to say about fixing the policies of the armed force of the United States. Unless you have representation on the General Staff you do not have your day in court where the plans are made for mobilization, demobilization, supply and equipment, and all things that are necessary to be planned before war breaks out; they must be assured in times of peace and standardized in times of peace.

Gen. SMITH. It might be planned through your General Staff, but there, so far as operation of it is concerned, that would come through your National Guard council.

The CHAIRMAN. You must not have two plans of the military forces of the United States. You must have one which will operate for all of them, all elements, in the event of an emergency. I have expressed surprise to several other witnesses that the National Guard bill did not provide for adequate representation of the National Guard on the General Staff itself, where the plans are made. One of your troubles to-day is that the Militia Bureau has no authority to make plans for the National Guard; it gets its order from the Chief of Staff and the Secretary of War and from your National Guard council. Your chief of the National Guard Bureau, whom you provide for in this bill, would get his orders from the same group that are giving them to-day.

Gen. SMITH. Under that bill, I thought it provided that they would get orders and function under the Secretary of War.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes; but the plans in detail are made out in the General Staff, and are handed up to the Secretary of War. If they meet his approval, that is the order.

Gen. SMITH. Then the power behind the throne would be the General Staff?

The CHAIRMAN. It always is and must be.

Gen. SMITH. Why not let Congress make those laws?

The CHAIRMAN. It is not a matter of laws; it is a matter of plans—mobilization and supply.

Gen. SMITH. In other words, rules and regulations?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Gen. SMITH. If the General Staff is going to have the making of the rules and regulations under which you operate, you might as well wipe out your National Guard council entirely.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. That is what I think.

The CHAIRMAN. My suggestion is that you take part in making the rules and regulations, as members of the General Staff.

Gen. SMITH. That is a plan I had not thought of.

The CHAIRMAN. That is the military way of doing it.

Gen. SMITH. On what basis of representation, Senator?

The CHAIRMAN. What would seem necessary to give a force of the importance of the National Guard adequate representation?

Gen. SMITH. Would you say 50?

The CHAIRMAN. No; I think that is too much.

Gen. SMITH. Yet the National Guard is going to furnish the majority of the Army?

The CHAIRMAN. The General Staff does not operate by majority; it does not vote like a caucus. It is a debating society. Nearly all decisions of the committee of the General Staff are reached finally by a unanimous vote. Upon a few occasions, a couple of officers upon the committee of the General Staff have disagreed with their fellows, and there may be two or three minorities, and, under the regulations, they are entitled to pass their opinions up with the opinions of the rest of their fellows on the committee to the Secretary of War, and he settles the differences as to what the plans and policies shall be.

Now, if there were trained officers on there, or citizen-soldier officers, I do not care whether you call them "guard" or not.

Gen. SMITH. I am willing to accept "citizen soldier" in place of "guard" all the way through. That is what I am getting at. When you get your million and a half or two million reserves, you are getting your citizen soldiers—call them "guards," but they are citizen soldiers as a matter of fact.

The CHAIRMAN. If they secure a representation on the General Staff, on all its divisions and committees which make plans for the national defense, which must include the use of the guard—no plan of the national defense would be complete without plans for the use of the National Guard, their opinions would go up to the Secretary of War, along with the opinions of the Regulars, and I venture the assertion, if you had that system in practice for one year most of the decisions would be unanimous.

Gen. SMITH. It is barely possible that is true.

The CHAIRMAN. Each element would teach the other a whole lot.

Gen. SMITH. I see it would be a give and take proposition, a series of compromises; but before the final vote you are entitled to arrive at a compromise between the Regular and the citizen soldier?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes. That has been the difficulty. I have seen it going on for a long time. I have been pretty close to the guard in New York. They feel they have not had representation in Washington, where the decisions are made. Now, the decisions in their preliminary stages are made in the General Staff, and they must be made there. They may be approved or disapproved, in whole or in part, by the Secretary of War, of course.

Gen. SMITH. Yes. I think your citizen soldier will, in case of a call, in fact must, furnish your army.

The CHAIRMAN. Always.

Gen. SMITH. That is where you must get it.

The CHAIRMAN. Always. It has been proved beyond all question that this country never could support a Regular Army in time of peace competent to defend it in time of a big war.

Gen. SMITH. Absolutely.

The CHAIRMAN. It can not be done. It would break the Treasury.

Gen. SMITH. Frankly, I am not a believer in a great big Regular Army. When I spoke a while ago of 250,000 men, it was not my idea to make that as a basis for the Regular Army. I simply used that in illustrating the point I made in regard to using a Regular Army. I am a great believer in a big Navy, as big as you can get, because I think there is your safeguard for your country, for your insular possessions, and everything else, because if you have not a Navy that can absolutely guarantee security, it does not make any difference whether you have 5,000 or 50,000 men in the Philippines. If the other people could land there it would only be more disastrous if we had twenty or thirty thousand there rather than five thousand; so I am a firm believer in the great big Navy proposition.

The CHAIRMAN. The more men you sent there under the circumstances, the greater hostage you put to stake?

Gen. SMITH. Absolutely. That is what makes me strongly in favor of the best Navy you can have, with our immense coast line,

The CHAIRMAN. How have you been affected in Indiana by the recent regulations of the Militia Bureau, or the recent regulations of the General Staff?

Gen. SMITH. We have not had any National Guard since 1917. I am very much opposed to the system by which the National Guard, under the present national defense act, was discharged and came back citizens. I am heartily in favor of a system by which they were mustered out from the Mexican service and became again national guardsmen. There are regiments in Indiana, not as old as some in New York State and the other Eastern States, where those regiments have existed for years and years, where their traditions are very sacred to all those men, of their old regimental organizations. But the regiments have been done away with; they are a thing of the past. I do not believe that policy is right. I am absolutely opposed to it.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. That drafting of the National Guard into the Federal service and then mustering them out into private life I do not think was the intention of the national defense act. I think that was a decision of the Judge Advocate General.

Gen. SMITH. I think you will find that in the national defense act, if I remember rightly.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. It may be.

Gen. SMITH. You see, they made a distinction between the words "muster" and "draft." When taken to the Mexican border service, they were mustered into service and mustered out, and again became national guardsmen. When taken in the last time, it was under proclamation of the President, and they were automatically discharged as national guardsmen from the various States. That proposition I am opposed to. I think when they returned, they should have gone back in the same status they were when they were taken in as national guardsmen of the State.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. And leave the State authorities to muster them out?

Gen. SMITH. Absolutely. Let their term of enlistment go right on; and when it expired they could be placed on the State retired list, or discharged from the service, just as they chose.

The CHAIRMAN. I never could understand that the Congress intended any such thing, nor can I understand how it can be held that

an act of Congress can nullify an obligation which an individual takes to his State.

Gen. SMITH. I do not understand it either. I do not understand, either, why the national defense act of June 3, 1916, can say—it has one proposition in it—can say that in time of peace no State shall maintain a State militia or any State troops, excepting State constabulary or State police. That right is absolutely guaranteed under the Constitution, and I do not see how an act of Congress can take away that. I do not believe it can. I believe that provision is absolutely unconstitutional. I do not believe it would ever stand if ever taken to the Supreme Court. I do not know that the question has ever been taken there in years gone by, but I do not believe that proposition would ever stand, because it takes away from the State the absolute right that is given in the Constitution for the State to organize its State militia and control it, and appoint the officers for it, adopt its system of training, etc.

The CHAIRMAN. What was the strength of the Indiana Guard at the outbreak of the German war?

Gen. SMITH. Ten thousand four hundred and nineteen officers and men.

The CHAIRMAN. Your Artillery was sent into the Forty-second Division?

Gen. SMITH. The First Indiana Field Artillery became part of the Rainbow Division. The Third and Fourth Indiana Infantry became the One hundred and thirty-seventh and One hundred and thirty-ninth Field Artillery of the Thirty-eighth Division. The First and Second Indiana Infantry became the One hundred and fifty-first and One hundred and fifty-second Regiments of Infantry of the Thirtieth Division, Seventy-sixth Brigade.

We had three regiments of Artillery in service, one only actively in line; that the One hundred and fiftieth, of the Rainbow, and the One hundred and thirty-seventh and the One hundred and thirty-ninth in the Thirty-eighth Division.

The CHAIRMAN. And they were broken up for replacements?

Gen. SMITH. No; those two regiments were returned intact. A great many troops were taken away from them during the months of June, July, and August of 1918, but the regiments eventually were sent across and were returned with the same personnel, practically, that they went across with, but the Infantry regiments were all broken up and used for replacements, and all other troops, with the exception of the One hundred and thirteenth Engineers.

The CHAIRMAN. What are your plans for reestablishing?

Gen. SMITH. Of the National Guard reorganization?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Gen. SMITH. We are working along the lines outlined by the Militia Bureau.

The CHAIRMAN. Can you make the 100 minimum for a company good?

Gen. SMITH. We can, but it is going to be an awfully hard job to maintain it and maintain efficiency. There are a number of towns of medium size and population that can give us an organization of 65 to 70, where it is almost an impossibility to get the organization with 100, the strength required for the Infantry companies and bat-

teries at the present time. It would be hard to maintain them. I do not believe in the platoon system. I do not believe you can have efficiency in the organization by having one-half of it in one town and one-half in another town. I am opposed to that proposition and have never tried it out and do not intend to. I am taking the experience of the adjutants general of different States that have tried it. I am heartily in favor of the smaller unit, say, 65, 70, or even 75; but when you get it up to 100 you are barring out a good many towns where the military spirit is all right, but where it is a physical impossibility to secure that number of men, of the class of personnel you want to maintain in an organization that ought to be of a high character—a high-standard organization—because I believe if the United States pays the bill for these organizations that the United States ought to superintend the training of these organizations, and they ought to be efficient.

In Indiana we are looking for efficiency in our National Guard. We shall probably be slower than some of the other States in its organization and in the establishment of the new National Guard, because we are going to take time, and we have in mind one thing, and that is efficiency above everything else.

We hope, if possible, to get at least 70 per cent of service men in our organization. You can not get them now. A man comes back from service, and the first thing he says, "Never again for me. I have done my bit. Somebody else can take the job." And within 30 or 40 days he comes around and says, "I wonder if it would be possible for us to secure the old armory hall to have a supper with the boys out of the organization?" Within 30 days longer he says, "What are you doing on the reorganization of the National Guard?" And within 30 days more, "Our old bunch is going to get together, is going to come back." That feeling was very strong in old Battery A, which was the senior organization in the One hundred and fiftieth Artillery of the Forty-second Division. When they came back from the Mexican border they said, "Never again," and in three months they had a stronger organization than they ever had before.

Senator THOMAS. It is like swearing off in the good old days!

Gen. SMITH. That is it. If you once get the bug you always have it. So we hope to get at least 70 per cent of our officers and our men from the service, men who saw service either in the war here or across overseas.

We are going to eliminate very largely the old-timers. When I say that I am including myself. We are going to try to put the burden of the work to carry on this efficiency, and to make this efficient guard on the shoulders of the younger men, who have been in the game. It is going to rest there very shortly anyway, so they might as well take the burden now, assume the responsibilities, and buckle down to hard pan, for that is what it takes.

Theoretically, a man goes through a short training and gets a commission; he is a well-educated young man; he understands the technical part of the game; but when he gets against the command of troops and the handling of men he falls down. It is exactly like a football squad. You can find one or two or three competent men in your football squad to make a captain of your team, but you can not find very many more than that, but you can find a great many more

fellows who will make a crackerjack team. I always thought there was a very great similarity between football and a military company; I always thought they were about in the same line.

Just as I believe in football and baseball and athletics of all kinds making a better student, a better man physically, morally, religiously, socially, and every other way, so I believe the military game does the same thing.

The CHAIRMAN. We gathered the impression from Col. Gillett and others who were active in the preparation of the guard bill, who had been in the conferences that were held, that they believed the time was not yet ripe for universal military training.

Gen. SMITH. I was only able to be present at the first bill, when the organization committee was first announced. Unfortunately, I was out in service at all the subsequent meetings of the organization, so I have not been in touch with them except through correspondence, and I had the pleasure of meeting Col. Rose one day last week, but, of course, a great many things have come up, and a great many decisions and conclusions that the organization committee came to, and the legislative committee come to that I am not conversant with. The fact is I have not given this bill the careful study it ought to have, but it has not been because I did not want to, but because I have not had the opportunity.

The CHAIRMAN. But from what you know about Indiana, do you think there is a good deal of sentiment in favor of universal military training?

Gen. SMITH. I think there is among the better class of people. When I say "the better class of people" I mean the thinking people. I think they are in favor of universal military training. I make the distinction I made a while ago, however, as against universal military service.

The CHAIRMAN. There comes in a knotty little problem, General. If you are going to have universal military training, say, in Indiana and in all the States, under the proposal you make a man who does not go to school, to high school and college, is compelled by the State or Federal law to serve in the National Guard, and the National Guard is subject to call by the governor to suppress disorders, and, under the National Guard act, is also subject to the orders of the President to suppress insurrection, under the militia clause of the Constitution; then have you not gotten universal military service in time of peace?

Gen. SMITH. Yes; you have to a certain extent, but not to the extent you can take that man out and put him in the Regular Establishment and require him to serve there for two or three years.

The CHAIRMAN. Oh, no; it would be for specific purposes.

Gen. SMITH. For specific purposes.

The CHAIRMAN. But potentially he is under compulsory service?

Gen. SMITH. Yes, sir. The great thing in this training would be, to my mind, to Americanize, with the biggest A that you can put in front of the word; and that, I think, would be loyalty, and to me the word "loyalty" embraces everything else you have—patriotism and everything else. My experience in the last few months has made me think there is just simply one thing to go by, and that is loyalty and Americanism.

The CHAIRMAN. There is not the slightest doubt what it would do for the young men in the country in that regard.

Gen. SMITH. I think the benefit in that respect would be almost inestimable.

Senator THOMAS. Do you not find a very considerable absence of that spirit, and an unfortunate absence?

Gen. SMITH. I have in the past few months, sir.

Senator THOMAS. That was in your recent service?

Gen. SMITH. Where I have been located; yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. You are speaking of the steel industrial district in northern Indiana?

Gen. SMITH. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Have you any other observations you would like to make? Your remarks have been very interesting.

Gen. SMITH. I do not know that I have, Senator. They would all lead back to practically the same two things—universal military training and the betterment of the American citizenship by that military training—and the question as to how that is best to be brought about is one that you gentlemen will have to settle. I have my own ideas. Perhaps I am prejudiced toward the National Guard side of the proposition, because I have always been in the National Guard; yet, as I said at the very start, I want to give the Regular Army man credit for being a splendid man, a gentleman, and, in a general way, I have found nearly all of them very courteous, willing at all times to do anything they could for the betterment and training of the National Guard. I think the system is wrong, or else the rules and regulations are wrong; there is something wrong at headquarters somewhere; it is not with the officer we are thrown with. That is my experience. I was not fortunate enough to get into this war. I thought I ought to have been. Some of the authorities down here had the idea I had one foot in the grave and the other on a banana peel and that I was slipping very rapidly, but I think I had two or three punches in the old man yet, and I was away under the retiring age. It was the disappointment of my life that I did not get in after all these years of training. I think I should have gotten it.

The CHAIRMAN. What have you to say as to the value of the local pride and spirit in the organization as a military asset?

Gen. SMITH. That brings it right back to the proposition I spoke of a while ago. These old organizations have existed for years. Take your organizations in the State of Massachusetts and in the Northeastern States and the Eastern Atlantic States, they, of course, have had these organizations for a hundred years or more; they have a pride, there is an esprit de corps in their organization; they feel that organization ought to live forever. My old Indianapolis Light Infantry that Corpl. New trained me in, while that organization drifted eventually into Company A, and eventually Company D of the old Second Indiana Infantry, now the Second Infantry, I think those organizations should exist for all time, and that the esprit de corps and pride in the organization is one of the things that will help your military training proposition.

The CHAIRMAN. We are very much obliged to you, General.

Gen. SMITH. I certainly thank you gentlemen for your thoroughly courteous treatment.

The CHAIRMAN. There is submitted for the record a statement prepared by Gen. Louis G. Lasher, adjutant general of Iowa, who is unable to be present at this hearing.

There is also submitted some correspondence between the adjutant general of Georgia and the governor of Georgia, expressing the opinion of the adjutant general of that State.

(The papers referred to are here printed in full, as follows:)

STATEMENT OF GEN. LOUIS G. LASHER, ADJUTANT GENERAL OF IOWA, TO THE SENATE COMMITTEE ON MILITARY AFFAIRS, NOVEMBER, 1918.

Preliminary to my statement as prepared, I desire to ask the indulgence of the committee on this point. My statement is necessarily based on conditions as I find them in my own State, and I apply the provisions of the bill presented by the National Guard Association for your consideration to these conditions, with, however, the firm conviction that in so doing I also express the sentiment of practically all the States which have given any thought or study to the question of adequate preparedness and a definite and acceptable military policy to be followed. Why do I speak for other States? Because it has been my pleasure within the past three months to meet and confer with representatives from the various, in fact I can truthfully say from the majority of the States, on this subject, and feel sure I am not mistaken as to their attitude in reference to this bill.

I also wish to assure you we are not fighting the Regular Army or anyone else. It is true we may have a bone to pick with them. Who has not? But there is nothing incorporated within this bill which can be construed as dictating what the policy relative to the Regular Army should be. We assume they are perfectly able to manage their own affairs, and, incidentally, we request from them the same privilege, as will be indicated.

The first and extremely important question to be taken into consideration is, Does the country demand a large Regular Army or a large efficient National Guard? Without any reservation whatever I say to you, the country is opposed to a large standing Army. Therefore we must provide some organized, trained mobile force to furnish the country with its necessary military strength, and which will be the backbone of its national defense. What greater organization can be suggested than the National Guard? It requires no words of mine to convince you of the efficiency of the National Guard; notwithstanding certain insinuations. Their deeds in 1898 and in the war with the Central Powers just ended, is evidence enough, and you are without doubt better informed and better able to judge of that than I. The bill as drawn provides for a National Guard council, composed of a representative from the National Guard of each State. To properly and efficiently function this council has an executive body known as the National Guard Bureau, also composed exclusively of National Guard officers with appropriate rank. Both of these bodies, it is provided, shall function directly under the Secretary of War.

The necessity for the composition of these executive bodies being confined exclusively to national guardsmen is apparent to anyone who is at all familiar with the problems continually facing the National Guard, and it takes no expert to soon realize that the professional soldier, who through training and life does not appreciate the necessity for the democracy of the National Guard as contrasted with (if I may use the ugly term) autocracy of the Regular Army. Consequently, the administrative bodies which promulgate regulations and orders must be familiar and in absolute sympathy with the existing conditions.

One might use the same argument in reference to these bodies functioning directly under the Secretary of War without being responsible to the General Staff of the Army. It takes no stretch of the imagination to realize what would happen were an exclusively National Guard department obliged to function through the General Staff. Nor does it require any great consideration to realize how much more efficiently the wheels of the National Guard department would run by being in direct contact with the supreme authority. In the first instance it would be only natural that the Secretary of War would be governed, in his decisions on any questions, by the recommendation of the department last passing on it. It could not be expected that the manifold duties of the Secretary of War would permit of anything else hence the conclusion as indicated.

It is proposed that the National Guard officers composing the National Guard Bureau will be on full-time duty with pay travel and allowances of grade. The officers composing the National Guard council are part-time officers and the limit of their actual duty is 60 days per year, unless especially called by direct authority of the Secretary of War.

Without discussion as to the merits of the case the fact remains that the citizen soldier, under the present law governing the National Guard, will not enlist in sufficient numbers to build up the guard to its required strength of 800 men per Senators and Congressmen, unless they are assured of a new deal. In my own State this is being demonstrated fully. My office has been very active in its endeavor to reorganize the National Guard so as to comply with the requirements of the Militia Bureau, but it has met with very little success.

Both officers and men say they do not want to reenter the guard, and again run the risk of undergoing the same treatment and the same lack of consideration of their training and service; such as was shown in the past two years. But if they can be assured of proper legislation, such as is proposed, I can vouch for it that Iowa will bring into the ranks of the National Guard the very flower of its manhood, and can and will answer any call of the Federal Government, with troops in any number consistent with its population, trained and officered by men all of whom have but one controlling thought—America—first, last, supreme. America above all organizations that exist in this country to-day.

To bring the Regular Army up to the strength required, were we to have no National Guard, by voluntary enlistment would be impossible. I am free to say that now, nor in the future, would it be possible to recruit the Regular Army to 500,000 men by voluntary enlistment. Hence, to accomplish the organization of such a force, we would be obliged to resort to conscription, and I know from personal study and observation that conscription in time of peace is abhorrent to the country, and the mere suggestion of such in any proposed legislation spells its defeat.

Gen. March's estimate of \$900,000,000 is based upon conscription, but if it were based upon voluntary enlistment it would be necessary to figure a cost considerably more; to be conservative, half as much again, for the very evident reason that to encourage enlistment it would necessarily have to be made attractive, and to obtain the type of men who should make up any Army this country would furnish we would be obliged to establish a minimum pay of \$60 per month and subsistence, etc., to compete with opportunities offered to industrial wage earners. On the other hand, the entire cost of the National Guard system, due to the fact that the men and officers are only receiving compensation when on actual duty, which includes training, will cost less than 40 per cent of any other plan proposed.

The provisions of the National Guard bill, which deals with military training, is distinctive from military service, and it is this phase of the bill which has created no little criticism of the bill, due to lack of understanding on the part of those responsible. The impression has gone forth that the National Guard Association is against universal military training. This is not true, as the association is for that form of training for the youth of the country, and they went on record at the annual convention held in St. Louis on May 8 last to that effect, but the association is in accord with the entire country as being against any form of universal military service. The disadvantages of the latter appeal to all thoughtful men and women as that form of training and service which receives the boy at the formative period of his life and takes him from the influence of mother, church, and home life. It places him in large concentration camps, under the rigid discipline and the influence of men who do not know where he came from, what his home life had been, and who naturally could not be in sympathy with the personal element which plays such a great part in molding the character of the boy.

The advantage of the former is that the boy is trained by local officers, men who have perhaps known him all their lives and in whom the mother has confidence, and a feeling of security that her boy will be under the personal observation of one she knows and respects, and at the same time the boy will have all the advantages and influences of home and church.

The bill provides for a National Guard of high standard of efficiency, and instead of an organization of 48 little armies, such as existed previous to 1916, we will have a comprehensive coordinated force.

(a) Because they are coordinated through the National Guard council.

(b) Because the Government in supplying funds and equipment shall have the right to appoint inspectors and demand an inspection satisfactory to the Secretary of War.

The more rigid these inspections the better satisfied the National Guard will be.

On the question of training, it is the opinion of all that training in the school system is not repugnant to the ideas of Americans. It does not savor of militarism if it is carried on through our educational system. The plan of beginning this training in the lower grade school by teaching the boy care of his physical being, both as to sanitation and physical development and at the same time instilling into his mind love of country and respect for law and order, which has been demonstrated quite recently, is lacking in the youth of our country. The training the boy would receive in high school and college would be specialized, with the latter the reservoir for officers under Regular Army technical instructors.

For the great percentage of boys who finish school without entering high school or college, their military training should be worked out along the lines similar to those used in New York State, with a campaign among business men and manufacturers of the country, such as is being conducted in St. Louis at the present time, which is to provide that all employers agree to urge their employees to join the National Guard with the assurance and promise on the part of the employer that the employee may attend drills and camp duty without loss of pay or vacation period. This is the price business must pay for its own protection.

The bill provides for the preservation of all the rights of the States, and the protection of property within the States, and yet in an emergency plans the authority for call by the President of the United States into Federal service, with the express provision that when the emergency ceases to exist those units of the National Guard which were called will be returned to their home stations and revert to their former status.

This provision not only makes it possible that the National Guard will receive credit for deeds it may have performed, but it will also prevent a repetition of the chaotic conditions which exist in the country to-day.

The bill provides for an organized national reserve, obtained by graduation of a definite proportion annually from the National Guard. This reserve makes immediately available a large number of trained men and officers for any emergency. Then we have the unorganized reserve, which consists of a definite proportion graduated annually from the organized reserve, thus adding another source from which trained men can be obtained.

Another and entirely new departure is a provision for the organization of a chaplain's corps. It may appear as not being germane to our national-defense problems to make a provision such as this, but allow me to call your attention to a few facts.

Before the war this country was divided into armed religious camps, each endeavoring to accomplish the same end in its own way. Experiences of the war broke down these walls and created an era of good feeling and a spirit of cooperation that must be preserved. We do not claim the chaplain corps is necessary for the Regular Army, for the reason we are not qualified to pass on that subject, but a National Guard made up of citizen soldiers should have a chaplain corps to coordinate all religious and welfare activities, making possible in time of war the accomplishment of welfare work without any duplication and at a minimum of expense, and what is more important, it would be under the direction of men trained in the work with a broad vision made possible by contact with fellow members of the corps, representing beliefs or creeds different from their own. I have copies of letters from many prominent clergymen and former chaplains, but I only want to read two of them, and then I am at your service in any way you may desire.

NOVEMBER 25, 1919.

From: The adjutant general, State of Georgia.

To: His excellency, Hugh M. Dorsey, governor of Georgia, Atlanta, Ga.

Subject: Organization of National Guard.

1. Receipt of your letter of the 20th instant is acknowledged, in which you inclose a letter from the Secretary of War dated November 7, 1919. This letter I return to you as requested, with the following analysis, together with a state-

ment as to the status of conditions in Georgia at the present time as directed.

First. The conditions in Georgia at the present time are as follows: There has been organized at Dublin, Ga., one Infantry company of 100 men, and this organization has received Federal recognition as National Guard and is now receiving uniforms, arms, and equipment from the Government.

In Macon there is in process of organization three companies of Infantry. These companies have not yet recruited up to the minimum of 100 men required for Federal recognition under the regulations of the War Department imposed by the terms of the national defense act of June 3, 1916.

There is now in process of organization one company of Infantry in each of the following towns, none of which have as yet been able to recruit up to the minimum of 100 men required: Atlanta, 2 companies; Americus, 1 company; Columbus, 1 company; Albany, 1 company; Sparta, 1 company; Brunswick, 1 company; Griffin, 1 company.

All of the above could easily qualify in a very short time if the War Department would reduce the Federal regulation to its former status of 65 men minimum.

We have existing now the following home guard organizations, under the command of Gen. Peter W. Meldrim: Savannah, two battalions of four companies each, and one company at each of the following stations: Atlanta, Athens, Quitman, Columbus (two companies), Decatur, Clio, Newington, Augusta, Pearson, Rochelle, and Tifton.

An active campaign has been carried on to overcome the obstacles encountered, and every effort humanly possible has been exerted to induce the returning officers and men to reorganize the National Guard units, and the unsatisfactory results to date are directly attributable to the following facts:

We are being strangled with technicalities by the War Department. They are imposing war-time organization and conditions upon us in times of peace, and demanding a degree of perfection in organization, strength, and efficiency not possible or attempted in the Regular Army. The professional soldier has no understanding or conception of the conditions confronting the citizen soldier, who can not be treated on the basis of a Regular, his service is an avocation, not a profession, and he will not make the sacrifice necessary to enlist unless the service is made attractive, interesting, and beneficial.

A widespread and general spirit of resentment exists among discharged officers and soldiers alike, on account of the discrimination shown them and the treatment received from the Regular Army officers during the period of their service. Breaking up and scattering the personnel and changing old organizations from one branch of the service to another during the war was a crime which can not be forgiven, and officers and men will not join again under existing laws and risk a recurrence of similar action by those in authority, while laws which permitted such actions exist or remain in force.

The Militia Bureau is constantly changing its attitude and rulings upon all subjects, and owing to the many ambiguous letters received from them, the continual haggling over trivial details, and the apparently conflicting statements of different officials of the War Department, we are constrained to the conclusion, though regretfully, that there either exists inefficiency and lack of cooperation between the bureaus of the War Department or there is an intentional, though veiled, effort to deceive and confuse the general public and our Representatives in Congress concerning the real situation and issues.

The citizen soldier desires most earnestly to see enacted a common-sense, practical law to govern in times of peace versus the technical application, in time of peace, of a theoretical law framed to govern in time of some future war in which we may or may not be involved.

An analysis of the Secretary of War's letter will reveal the following:

It is passing strange that the Secretary of War should be so greatly exercised now over the failure of the War Department to reorganize the National Guard under existing laws, when he knows that no provision was made for the National Guard in the War Department's Army reorganization bill, drafted by the General Staff, and approved by him and submitted to Congress with his indorsement and recommendations that it be passed.

Taking the letter at its face value, it is an apparent appeal for the organization of a State force under Federal control to supplement the Regular Army. The National Guard of the several States was recognized as a first reserve to the Regular Army and has been so used in the past on the Mexican border and during the World War. In the first and second paragraphs of his letter, the Secretary of War merely recites facts which are of common knowledge.

In the third and fourth paragraphs he acknowledges the failure of the War Department to reorganize the National Guard, and, by implication, places the blame upon the States, when the facts are that the antagonism of the War Department against the National Guard before, during and since the war and their lack of cooperation with the State authorities, is the direct cause of their failure. The following excerpts from official correspondence with this State will show very plainly what little encouragement we have received from the War Department and will reveal the ambiguous rulings:

A letter was written by this department under date of January 29, 1919, as follows:

"By direction of the governor, permission is hereby requested to reorganize the Georgia National Guard."

The reply received to the above letter from the Militia Bureau, under date of February 1, 1919, by first indorsement, reads as follows:

"1. Under date of January 15 the following instructions were received from the Secretary of War:

"The future military policy of the War Department has not been announced. This policy will involve questions affecting the National Guard organization.

"In order not to handicap or interfere with the formulations of a proper future military policy, it is deemed unwise at this time to proceed with a reorganization of the National Guard. Action upon the equipment of such as have been organized will be deferred for the same reason."

"2. 'Reorganization' as used above is understood to include the organization of new units and their inspection and recognition.

"3. This bureau is charged with the duty of carrying out the instructions of the Secretary of War in relation to the National Guard; therefore no further action can be taken by it in relation to authorization of new organizations, or further inspection and recognition thereof, or in supplying further arms, clothing, and equipment to existing organizations until such action is authorized by the Secretary of War.

"By direction of the Secretary of War."

Again on March 7, 1919, another request to reorganize was made, to which the following reply was received in letter dated March 13, 1919:

"Under instructions from the Secretary of War the Militia Bureau is not extending authorization for new National Guard units at the present time, for which, as has been pointed out above, there are only a limited amount of funds available for arms and equipment."

The above ruling brought forth a strong protest from the several States and caused the Militia Bureau to reverse their former decision and a letter under date of April 15, 1919, was written, excerpts from which are quoted as follows:

"In order to provide a limited number of units of National Guard available for the maintenance of law and order within the several States, the Militia Bureau will consider the authorization of units of the National Guard as far as limited funds permit, provided, however, that the necessity is shown for National Guard for this particular purpose by the State authorities and cogent reasons are advanced for the completion of their organization prior to June 30, 1919.

"When specifically authorized by the War Department, units, except Coast Artillery, will be organized under Tables of Organization approved May 3, 1917, and Coast Artillery units under Circular 29, Militia Bureau, 1916. For the present the lettered companies (including Calvary troops) and Coast Artillery companies will be presented for recognition and maintained as National Guard at the enlisted strength of 65. The Headquarters, Machine-Gun, and Supply Companies will be maintained at the minimum strength authorized by Tables of Organization, May 3, 1917."

It will be noted above that the States were only given from April 15, 1919, to June 30, 1919, in which to complete their organization. Some States had troops organized and awaiting acceptance, others had none and it was a physical impossibility to organize them in every detail within the time allowed. However, they distinctly authorized in paragraph 5 a minimum strength of 65 men per company, and bear in mind that this authority was given in time of war.

One month later, they again reverse themselves in letter dated July 16, 1919, in which they allot a certain number of troops to each State by the following statement:

"Units will be organized for the time being under Tables of Organization, United States Army, approved May 3, 1917, except Coast Artillery units, which will be organized under the provisions of Circular 29, Militia Bureau, December 6, 1916. Two copies of these tables are inclosed with this letter.

"The strength required for Federal recognition will be the minimum strength specified in the tables referred to above, and 100 enlisted men for Coast Artillery companies."

From the above you will see that they have arbitrarily raised the minimum from 65 men per company to 100 men per company. This action caused a strong protest to be made by this State, which resulted in the Militia Bureau issuing letter dated July 28, 1919, containing the following statements:

"1. Referring to your letter of July 21, on the above subject, I am directed by the Secretary of War to advise you as follows:

"(a) The strength necessary for Federal recognition is the minimum strength specified in Tables of Organization, United States Army, approved May 3, 1917, as stated in paragraph 4 of my letter of July 16, 1917 (100 men for each lettered Infantry company).

"(b) The strength of 65 men authorized for Federal recognition, to which you refer in paragraph 3 of your letter, was distinctly limited to a few National Guard units, authorized by this bureau to meet an emergency, and the organization of which was required to be completed on or before June 30, 1919, in order to be equipped from appropriations which lapsed on that date. The State of Georgia was not authorized to organize National Guard under this ruling.

"All National Guard organizations are now required to maintain the minimum strength specified in paragraph (a) above, which is the strength now required for Federal recognition."

The above was followed by Circular Letter No. 39, dated July 30, 1919, in which the following statements were made:

"The minimum enlisted strength prescribed by the President for all organizations of the National Guard recognized by the Federal Government as such, shall be the minimum strength given in approved tables of organization for the Regular Army. The latest approved tables for the Regular Army (exclusive of Coast Artillery) are those approved May 3, 1917. For Coast Artillery companies a minimum strength of 100 enlisted men is prescribed, as given in column 4 of table in paragraph 3, Circular No. 29, Militia Bureau, December 6, 1916. This strength is required for Federal recognition, and no organization shall be reduced below this minimum without the specific consent of the President in each case, as provided in section 68 of the act of Congress approved June 3, 1916.

"All previous authorization for the organization and recognition of any National Guard units at less than the above strength (such as authority contained in Militia Bureau letters of April 11, 1919, to certain States, permitting lettered companies of Infantry to be presented for recognition and maintained as National Guard at a strength of 65 are hereby revoked, effective from July 16, 1919, notice of such action having been given the various States on that date.

"No units will be recognized in the future at a strength below that prescribed in paragraph 1, above, and units already recognized will be given a period of five months from August 1, 1919, to recruit to the strength prescribed in paragraph 1, above, and if not up to that strength by December 31, 1919, will be subject to the withdrawal of Federal recognition."

Following this the Secretary of War wrote personally to the governor of Georgia under date of September 6, 1919, as follows:

"I beg to acknowledge receipt of your telegram dated September 3, relative to the minimum strength required for National Guard companies, and desire to state that reply thereto has been delayed pending a complete investigation of this subject.

"An opinion has just been received from the Judge Advocate General of the Army as to the authority of the Secretary of War under existing law with reference to the reduction in strength of National Guard companies. The result of this investigation, together with this opinion will be communicated in a few days by the Militia Bureau to the governors and adjutants general of all States, and to members of the Senate and House Military Committees."

The above letter was referred by the governor to the adjutant general who had also received a similar letter dated September 6, 1919, from the Secre-

tary of War personally inclosing a long argument from the Judge Advocate General setting forth his opinion relative to the minimum strength of National Guard companies, declaring that any reduction below 100 men would be illegal and that the Secretary of War at this time is without authority to grant such a reduction in time of war.

Subsequent to the above ruling, and in the face of it and the positive statements made by the Secretary of War, the War Department has authorized certain States to proceed with their organization on a 65-men minimum basis, proven by the following quotation from letter dated October 23, 1919:

"Several of the States organized units with a strength of 65. When the appropriation act finally did pass Congress, July 11, 1919, those States which had organized National Guard units with a strength of 65 were notified that we had now sufficient funds for equipment and that the strength of the organizations should be brought up to 100 men per organization by the 31st day of December, 1919. Whereupon several of the States concerned besought the bureau to allow them to complete the regiment which they had started to organize at the strength of 65 per lettered company, although they were not able to complete them previous to June 30, 1919. This permission was granted to the particular States affected, but applied only to those regiments originally authorized previous to June 30 and to no other troops. It was further insisted upon that any organization recognized after June 30 with a strength of 65 must reach a strength of 100 per organization by June 30, 1920. This communication was not furnished the State of Georgia, because the State was not interested in the authorizations extended previous to June 30, 1919."

To summarize, the War Department has thrown every obstacle possible in the way to prevent the reorganization of the national guard. If it was legal in April to authorize a minimum of 65 per company, how can it be illegal in September of the same year under the same conditions? If some States organized on the 65 basis and others tried and failed, by what authority has their time been extended to June 30, 1920, and why is Georgia denied this right or the same privilege, and how can the War Department legally grant this extension to June 30, 1920, to some of the States and refuse others the same privilege in the face of the ruling of the Judge Advocate General?

The facts are, they are now allowing some States to organize on the 65 men basis and receive Federal recognition, while they require other States to organize on a 100 men basis. Some States were given until December 31, 1919, to complete their organization, while others have been given until June 30, 1920. I can not see the equity, reasons, or justice in such a policy.

Further analyzing the Secretary of War's letter concerning the State guard or home guards, please note the different statements in the following letters:

"In those States where the requirements of the national defense act can not be fulfilled, the State authorities certainly can comply with the provisions of the act of June 14, 1917, and secure proper equipment for properly constituted State forces to preserve law and order within the borders of the States." (Quotation from letter from Secretary of War date Nov. 7, 1919.)

"There is no authority of law for issuing machine guns or any other military equipment to States for National Guard purposes, unless such States have National Guard organizations recognized as such under the provisions of the act of June 3, 1916. The State of Georgia has at present no recognized National Guard.

"There is no authority of law for the issue or sale of machine guns to State military organizations unless they be National Guard. An act of Congress dated June 14, 1917, provided for the issue of certain specified military equipment to home guard or other State troops or militia. But such equipment was itemized in the law and limited to rifles, ammunition, cartridge belts, haversacks, and canteens." (Quotation from letter from Chief, Militia Bureau, dated Mar. 15, 1919.)

"Returned, with the information that there is no authority of law for the issue of any Federal property to States for use by constabulary or military organizations (other than National Guard authorized and recognized under the provisions of the act of June 3, 1916) except as provided by an act of June 14, 1917, which authorized the issue of rifles, ammunitions, cartridge belts, haversacks, and canteens, when available to Home Guard and similar organizations. Issues of these specified articles must necessarily be returned to the Federal Government upon the declaration of peace, when Home Guards will by law cease to exist." (Quotation from letter from Chief, Militia Bureau, dated Mar. 25, 1919.)

The above statements were made in official letters from the Chief of the Militia Bureau in reply to efforts of this department to secure equipment for State guard companies. No further explanation is necessary, except to say that the Secretary of War should be aware of the fact that the present emergency ceases to exist when Congress ratifies the peace treaty, and this may or may not occur shortly, when the arms and equipment issued to State guards under the act of June 14, 1917, will be withdrawn from those States who have not been able to reorganize the National Guard, and if the purposes of the War Department are carried out in this respect such States will be left without arms and equipment and thus stripped of the only means now available to meet any uprising or unlawful acts against the enforcement of law and order.

I hope that you will make such use of the above information with our Senators in Congress as to cause some action to be taken to relieve the situation, and such relief is contained in the National Guard bill, S. 8424, now before Congress which I trust you will call to the attention of our Senators and Congressmen requesting that they support the measure.

J. VAN HOLT NASH.

The Adjutant General.

(Whereupon, at 4 o'clock p. m., the subcommittee adjourned until Wednesday, December 10, 1919, at 2.15 o'clock p. m.)

REORGANIZATION OF THE ARMY.

WEDNESDAY, DECEMBER 10, 1919.

UNITED STATES SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON MILITARY AFFAIRS,
Washington, D. C.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to adjournment, at 2.15 o'clock p. m., in the committee room, Capitol, Senator James W. Wadsworth, jr., presiding.

Present: Senators Wadsworth (presiding), Sutherland, New, Frelinghuysen, Chamberlain, and Thomas.

Also present: Mr. Allan Tukey, Omaha, Nebr., chairman of the special committee on military policy of the American Legion.

Mr. Milton J. Foreman, Chicago, Ill., formerly of the Thirty-third Division.

Mr. F. W. Galbraith, Cincinnati, Ohio.

Mr. Henry L. Stimson, New York City.

Mr. Franklin D'Olier, Philadelphia, Pa., national commander of the American Legion.

Mr. Thomas W. Miller, of Delaware, chairman of the national legislative committee of the American Legion.

STATEMENT OF MR. ALLAN TUKEY, OMAHA, NEBR.

The CHAIRMAN. I understand, Mr. Tukey, you are chairman of the legislative committee of the American Legion?

Mr. TUKEY. Not of the legislative committee, of the military-policy committee.

The CHAIRMAN. Would you kindly state for the information of this committee how and where your committee was appointed?

Mr. TUKEY. Our committee was appointed under authority of our convention at Minneapolis, which provided for a committee of seven on military policy. I will read you the paragraph if you wish it.

The CHAIRMAN. If you want to have it in the record, yes.

Mr. TUKEY [reading]:

That a committee of seven be appointed by the executive committee of the American Legion to consult with and advise the Military and Naval Committees of both Houses of Congress as to the working out of the details of organization and training of the future Army and Navy of the United States, using as its basis the resolutions accepted and adopted by this convention.

The CHAIRMAN. And your convention, as I understand it, adopted a set of resolutions, did it not?

Mr. TUKEY. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. I think it would be well to read those resolutions into the record.

Mr. TUKEY [reading]

RESOLUTIONS ADOPTED AT THE MINNEAPOLIS CONVENTION OF THE AMERICAN LEGION ON THE FUTURE MILITARY POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES.

1. That a large standing Army is uneconomic and un-American; national safety with freedom from militarism is best assured by a national citizen army and navy based on the democratic and American principles of the equality of obligation and opportunity for all.

2. We favor a policy of universal military training, and that the administration of such policy shall be removed from the complete control of any exclusively military organization or caste.

3. We are strongly opposed to compulsory military service in time of peace.

4. We have had a bitter experience in the cost of unpreparedness for national defense and the lack of proper training on the part of officers and men, and we realize the necessity of an immediate revision of our military and naval system and a thorough house cleaning of the inefficient officers and methods of our entire Military Establishment.

We favor a national military and naval system based on universal military obligation, to include a relatively small Regular Army and Navy, and a citizen army and navy capable of rapid expansion sufficient to meet any national emergency, on a plan which will provide competitive and progressive training for all officers, both of the Regular Army and Navy and of the citizen forces.

We believe that such military system should be subject to civil authority. Any legislation tending toward an enlarged and stronger military and naval caste we unqualifiedly condemn.

5. The national citizen army, which should and must be the chief reliance of this country in time of war, should be officered by men from its own ranks and administered by a general staff on which citizen-soldier officers and Regular Army officers shall serve in equal number.

We recommend that military training in high schools and colleges be encouraged.

6. We favor the continuance of training camps for the training and education of officers to serve in case of national requirement.

We recommend that Congress pass such legislation as will make the United States Air Service a separate and distinct department of our system of national defenses, under control of a member of the President's Cabinet, appointed for that purpose alone.

7. The national citizen army and navy should be organized into corps, divisions, and smaller units, composed in each case of officers and men who come from the same State or locality and preserving local organizations as far as practicable.

8. The national citizen army and navy should be trained, equipped, officered, and assigned to definite units before rather than after the commencement of hostilities.

9. The selection and training of men for the national citizen army and navy should be under the local control and administration of its own officers, subject to general national regulations.

10. That a committee of seven be appointed by the executive committee of the American Legion to consult with and advise the Military and Naval Committees of both Houses of Congress as to the working out of the details of organization and training of the future Army and Navy of the United States, using as its basis the resolutions accepted and adopted by this convention.

The CHAIRMAN. Was that resolution adopted by the convention by a substantial majority, Mr. Tukey?

Mr. TUKEY. I am not certain of it, but I believe it was adopted by a unanimous vote, or practically unanimous.

The CHAIRMAN. In other words, there was no considerable opposition manifested?

Mr. TUKEY. There was no opposition from the floor whatever.

The CHAIRMAN. Have you any observations to make on this situation as you know it and view it at this time? I ask you that because I understand the committee arrived here but yesterday and has hardly had a chance to examine the bills pending before this subcommittee of the Military Affairs Committee.

Mr. TUKEY. If you will allow us, I should like to have Mr. Galbraith speak for the committee as to what we arrived at.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well. It has been our custom, gentlemen, for the purposes of the record, to inquire of each of the witnesses who appear before us what his assignments have been during the war, so before you leave the stand we shall be glad to hear what your assignments were.

Mr. TUKEY. I was commissioned in the first officers' training camp at Fort Snelling, Minn., as second lieutenant. I was sent abroad immediately, unassigned, attended a British school for some five or six weeks, and spent a little time in the line with the British. I was then assigned to the First Division, Twenty-sixth Infantry, Company D. Company D was later transferred to the Third Machine Gun Battalion, which was also in the First Division. That was my only assignment. I was wounded in July and invalided home in October.

The CHAIRMAN. And discharged?

Mr. TUKEY. And discharged in March from the hospital.

STATEMENT OF MR. F. W. GALBRAITH, CINCINNATI, OHIO.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Galbraith, we shall be glad to hear from you. Will you state at the beginning your assignments during the late war?

Mr. GALBRAITH. I was colonel of the First Ohio Infantry, then assigned to the One hundred and forty-seventh Infantry of the Thirty-seventh Division, and I commanded the regiment until the 18th of April, 1919, when I was discharged from the service.

The CHAIRMAN. We shall be glad to have you proceed in your own way, Mr. Galbraith.

Mr. GALBRAITH. The committee this morning in its deliberations authorized the preparation of a brief statement, which I would be glad to read. It is as follows:

The members of the American Legion are deeply impressed with the folly of national unpreparedness for war, from the results of which they suffered while in France. They believe that this country should adopt a policy of universal military training for its young men as the only fair, democratic, and adequate system of defense. They realize the individual benefits in Americanism and good citizenship which would result from such training. Having been through it themselves, they think it only fair and proper that the generations which come after them should share such duties and benefits also. They know that these benefits far outweigh the cost and time spent in the training.

They believe that in this way the country can maintain for its defense a citizens' army which will be adequate for any national emergency. They are strongly opposed to militarism or the fostering of any military caste. They believe that the Regular Army should be reduced to the lowest numbers necessary for our foreign garrisons and other necessary professional duty; that our General Staff should be liberalized by an admixture of competent citizen officers, and that all officers should be subjected to severe tests of fitness which would eliminate all dead wood.

They believe that this citizens' army should be trained so far as possible by citizen officers, and its units localized in the territory from which they

come, but that it must be trained solely as a National Army under the authority of the National Government for use only in time of war; and that the men must not be used to fill up the Regular Army.

The CHAIRMAN. Are you familiar at all, Mr. Galbraith, with the so-called War Department bill, which was introduced by me, Senate No. 2715?

Mr. GALBRAITH. To some extent.

The CHAIRMAN. I want to call your attention to one phase of it, because that statement and the resolutions in part related to that same phase. Under the War Department bill each boy of 19 is to receive three months' training in a Federal training camp, and thereupon is to be sent back to civil life unassigned to any unit, reserve or otherwise, and unorganized? Those men will be unorganized and left unorganized. Do you believe that is a sound military practice?

Mr. GALBRAITH. I do not.

The CHAIRMAN. For what reason, in a general way?

Mr. GALBRAITH. Because it permits a man to get a small amount of training, assigns him to nothing, keeps no touch with him—in other words, trains him without any definite responsibility for the future.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you think it would be wise then to assign a man thus trained to a unit of his own town?

Mr. GALBRAITH. If he is not assigned to some unit where he can be within reach and keep in touch with his organization he is not available.

The CHAIRMAN. It takes two or three months to organize them after war breaks out, does it not?

Mr. GALBRAITH. It certainly does.

The CHAIRMAN. Have you any observations of a general character to make on the situation other than the statement you have just read.

Mr. GALBRAITH. In reference to what, Mr. Senator?

The CHAIRMAN. Anything having to do with the military policy, or any of the legislation that has been pending before us. I do not want to press you too much on that, because, as I said to Mr. Tukey, I understand you have not had a chance to study the legislation that has been pending here, and at a later date you will be better prepared, but I wondered whether to-day you cared to make any general observations beyond those contained in that paper?

Mr. GALBRAITH. One observation, which is referred to indirectly, is thus: That any military organization, any army, should be an army, one army, the United States Army. It may be composed, and would have to be composed, of professional soldiers and citizen soldiers, but that should be the only distinction.

The CHAIRMAN. I assume from that that you would assume such an army being raised and maintained under the so-called Army clause of the Constitution?

Mr. GALBRAITH. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. As contrasted with the militia clause?

Mr. GALBRAITH. We have two situations to deal with, Mr. Senator. Any organization plan which does not bring all classes into one war is not going to be an efficient Army organization. In other words, the American Legion believes in a small Regular Army and

citizen army. Now, as to the details of the organization and how it should be worked out at this hearing, this committee is not prepared to say. We have a meeting on Monday with representatives from all of the States.

The CHAIRMAN. Here in Washington?

Mr. GALBRAITH. Here in Washington, and after that meeting we would be better prepared to make specific recommendations and answer in detail many questions which to-day we would not care to commit ourselves on or commit the legion.

The CHAIRMAN. Merely as a matter of detail, but you are settled in your minds on two fundamental principles?

Mr. GALBRAITH. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Those are universal military training and a single army?

Mr. GALBRAITH. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. What observations have you to make as a former officer, Mr. Galbraith, on the benefit of military training to the young men?

Mr. GALBRAITH. Why, Mr. Senator, there is not any man who served who has had an opportunity to observe carefully the effect upon the man while in the service and since he has come out—he was not accustomed to discipline when he went into the Army; when he came out he was accustomed to discipline; he knew the value of authority, properly administered, and my observation and my firm conviction is that he is a very much better citizen, better able to take a speaking and an acting part. In other words, assume the full obligations of a citizen to a very much higher degree than when he went into the Army.

The CHAIRMAN. I suppose you had in your regiment from time to time men of many different national origins?

Mr. GALBRAITH. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you observe that it helped to weld them together?

Mr. GALBRAITH. Very much.

The CHAIRMAN. Did it make them understand each other better?

Mr. GALBRAITH. Very much, and to give all nationalities a sort of universal standing.

The CHAIRMAN. Americanization, in other words?

Mr. GALBRAITH. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. You had not come to any conclusion as a committee as to what would be the proper size of the Regular Army, so-called, in figures, had you?

Mr. GALBRAITH. No, sir; because we are not advised as to what our outlying garrisons will take and what will be available for use within the territorial limits of the United States. The resolution is perfectly clear—a relatively small Regular Army and Navy. In other words, an adequate Army, without any additions.

The CHAIRMAN. Is it the purpose of your committee to make any specific recommendations with respect to the Navy?

Mr. GALBRAITH. We had a naval member, but he has not appeared, and we have not discussed the Navy question. The American Legion is composed of men who were discharged from the Army, Navy, and Marine Corps, and all branches of the service.

The CHAIRMAN. This committee would have no jurisdiction over naval reorganization and naval legislation, so we would want to hear from you only on the Army matters.

Mr. Tukey, did you have anyone else of your committee who wishes to say a word to-day?

Mr. TUKEY. I do not think so, Mr. Senator, unless there are some other particular questions you would like to ask.

Senator FRELINGHUYSEN. I should like to ask Mr. Galbraith a question or two.

How many men are enrolled in the American Legion at the present time, Mr. Galbraith?

Mr. GALBRAITH. As near as we can tell, somewhat in excess of a million in numbers.

Senator FRELINGHUYSEN. Are they a unit in support of military training?

Mr. GALBRAITH. I can best answer that by stating that when this resolution was read, of the military policy committee, after they had carefully considered the matter for two and one-half days, day and night, it was, as I remember it, unanimously accepted.

Senator FRELINGHUYSEN. Did they report back to their chapters, and did the chapters approve the action?

Mr. GALBRAITH. That is being done. The resolutions have been distributed, and what is proposed—I speak only for the State of Ohio—is as soon as something is definitely before us that that will be presented to every local post for its action in the United States—that is, so far as Ohio is concerned.

Senator FRELINGHUYSEN. Did you have any experience with the attitude on this question of foreign born who served? There was a large number in the Army. Will they support this policy, do you believe?

Mr. GALBRAITH. I could not answer that, except from personal experience with a number of men whom I have talked with, a very few, I think only three, who believe in the policy of universal training as a part of their American citizenship. In other words, they have become thorough Americans.

Senator FRELINGHUYSEN. Of course, I believe thoroughly in military training. I want to see it put across, and I want to see every bit of punch back of Congress that can be enlisted to induce Congress to pass a military training bill. But what are you doing to educate the people and inform the public, through the American Legion, of the advantages of the military training?

Mr. GALBRAITH. We are trying to show to the public by our works and by our deeds that the result of the military training that these men who came back from overseas has made them better citizens, of greater force and value to the community than they ever were before in the world.

Senator FRELINGHUYSEN. If this Congress should fail to pass a universal military training bill, would you consider that a bill providing for military training by the Government of the citizen army, training each year volunteers in a class, would be a good beginning. say 150,000 to 200,000 should volunteer each year and we should train those out of the 19-year-old class?

Mr. GALBRAITH. If I had to compromise from what is really in the end the wise thing to do, I would accept any compromise which would permit of training of any force, or any forces—of course it would have to be voluntary, because then you would show conclusively, even by a small number, that it was a good thing; you would have banded together patriotic Americans who believed in the obligations of citizenship, who were preparing themselves for a condition which may again confront us.

Senator FRELINGHUYSEN. I think it is largely a matter of education, do you not?

Mr. GALBRAITH. Yes, sir.

Senator FRELINGHUYSEN. Of the people as a whole? Now, is the American Legion going to take that up, other than among their own members, I mean?

Mr. GALBRAITH. Yes.

Senator FRELINGHUYSEN. And make the necessary effort to induce the people at home to get their Representatives in Congress to enact this system into law? That seems to me the only way we can win.

Mr. GALBRAITH. Mr. Senator, when there is something definite presented to the members of the American Legion in the form of pending legislation, which has come out of the committee, and which is acceptable, and they believe that the points are well taken and covered, and it is a proper and suitable bill, then is the time that the American Legion must consider the bill as a whole, and if it is a wise bill, I think you will find the American Legion not wanting.

Senator FRELINGHUYSEN. Of course, I do not think the verbiage of the bill amounts to much. It is a question whether we are going to have universal training or not, and I think we have got to get support throughout the country for that system of military preparedness, and while your organization may be able to help us put it across, if you enlist all of them, nevertheless you have got to convince men in Congress who are opposed to this system that it is of benefit to the country to enact it into law.

Mr. GALBRAITH. Yes, sir.

Senator FRELINGHUYSEN. There is a proposition here which you can take and advise us, that is, in this bill, the War Department bill, that is one proposition. The other proposition is a suggestion that we have voluntary military training here. Of course that means that all the shirkers and slackers and stay-at-homes will not volunteer, and all the fellows who have got a little red blood in their veins will go and take the training. But whether that will permeate back home and eventually result in military training I do not know. I think it will go a large way, as did the Plattsburg Camp, toward inspiring the young men of the country to come forward and offer themselves for service. But this thing is an extremely practical one. We can figure and talk about the ethics of it, but you have got to get the votes back home to put it through.

Mr. GALBRAITH. I agree with you, sir.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. How did you find the sentiment among the members of the legion from the South with regard to universal military training?

Mr. GALBRAITH. The selection and training of men for the national citizen army and navy should be under the local control and administration of its own officers, subject to general national regulations.

I am expressing a personal opinion. There are certain geographical areas in the United States where there is a large percentage of foreign born and illiterates who perhaps are not competent to do all classes of service, and it seems reasonable to suppose that where that condition exists that men should be trained for the service, after proper examination and tests, whatever the tests may be. We have had many of them in the Army (I expect they were all good), so that those men may be determined, by suitable experts, that they would be qualified. We have to have many troops in the line of communication, comparatively, perhaps, and equally perhaps a greater number as combat troops. A man may be a good infantryman, but he would make a mighty poor flyer, and so as to various sections of the country these men will be found, either qualified or not qualified for the various and sundry branches of the service. Take agriculture. I think this committee, speaking for the committee, is convinced that vocational training is particularly desirable for a great many men. It makes them more valuable as citizens, as the heads of families. They can earn more money for themselves after they have come out of their training, yet it is of great value to the Government, because those men are badly needed to produce or to handle in the lines for which they are fitted. It is not every one that can be a flyer or an artilleryman or a doughboy in the front line.

Senator FRELINGHUYSEN. In that connection, not discussing vocational education, but the elementary education, take a man who can not read or write, and you had many of them in the Army, had you not?

Mr. GALBRAITH. Yes, sir.

Senator FRELINGHUYSEN. Suppose this universal system of training provided that if it was found a man could not read or write that three months should be spent teaching him to read and write, and then he should be carried on further in a system of military training; would that be practical?

Mr. GALBRAITH. It goes, Mr. Senator, just like we had it in the Army anyway. The man was relieved of comparatively little duty. His military education was not neglected; it was reduced in some measure in order that he might be taught to read and write, and then to know something of the principles on which this country is founded—something of the Constitution.

Senator FRELINGHUYSEN. What you were trying to get at was this: That if we have universal training in the South and train the Negro, and it was found he could not do service in the combat lines, that he could utilize it in other directions. Was that not what you meant?

Mr. GALBRAITH. Not alone the Negro, but every other man, whatever his color.

Senator FRELINGHUYSEN. Color or race?

Mr. GALBRAITH. Or race—there is use for them all. Their color and race should not prevent their being useful to their Government.

Senator FRELINGHUYSEN. But the advantage of military training would extend to the South just the same as in the North?

Mr. GALBRAITH. Yes.

Senator FRELINGHUYSEN. That is all I have to ask, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Have you any other statement to make, Mr. Tukey?

**SUPPLEMENTAL STATEMENT OF MR. ALLAN TUKEY, OMAHA,
NEBR.**

Mr. TUKEY. I thought, at the time you were speaking as to how far the legion was behind these resolutions, it might clear it up a little to say that before this convention there were certain questions which each State and each individual knew was coming up at the convention. These questions were in most cases brought up at the State conventions, and I believe I am right when I say that the majority of the State delegations were sent to the convention instructed as to what stand they were going to take on these particular questions, of which this question of military training was one, and probably the most important, and they voted on that basis and practically unanimously supported these resolutions. I know of several individual State conventions which took it up and the action was the same there. It was practically unanimous in the two or three State conventions that I know of.

The CHAIRMAN. Let me say there I happen to know the New York State convention was unanimous.

Mr. D'OLIER. Pennsylvania also.

STATEMENT OF MR. MILTON J. FOREMAN, CHICAGO, ILL.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Foreman, will you tell the committee of your assignments during the war?

Mr. FOREMAN. I commanded the One hundred and twenty-second Field Artillery.

The CHAIRMAN. Prior to that time you had the First Illinois Cavalry?

Mr. FOREMAN. The First Illinois Cavalry, transferred to the Artillery over night, became the One hundred and twenty-second Field Artillery and served in combat through all the American operations.

I am strongly impressed with the belief that a large bulk of the American people are academically for universal military training; the only thing they differ on is the application of it. How far the desire for that has permeated the family, the church, the small community, is a question that is at least debatable. We are so near the sacrifices of the war that people are apt to set their faces against the things which are necessary for the future. But it occurs to me that nothing will promote the principle of real training like the local military enthusiasm—the heart-to-heart, hand-to-hand training.

I am State commander in Illinois. We propose to cover the State with literature upon the advantages of the training, the desirability of the training, and get it on to the large bulk of men of families of foreign birth, who are not by any means convinced of the desirability for the training at this time. Chicago has a very large population, and it is in that field and in the large colliery regions that this education is necessary, not only by literature, in my judgment, but also by the promoting of military enthusiasm; the actual military thing in the neighborhood will produce more desire for military training than mere literature will. Hence the provisions here in the resolutions of the American Legion, which would maintain organizations in some form in the localities, preserving the

traditions and associations and making them centers of dissemination of military enthusiasm and military knowledge and patriotic knowledge, and a willingness to make patriotic sacrifices, will go further than all the resolutions on earth.

I do not think all the laws that can be passed will help the matter unless right at home we develop the sentiment so it becomes a part of the method of life, the principle of life, the practices of the entire community.

The CHAIRMAN. In other words, you believe any legislation framed for universal military training should take that very important thing into consideration?

Mr. FOREMAN. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. And should they localize the units that are to be formed with these trained men, so that each unit will be known to belong to one certain community, and that community will take a pride in its development, and entertain an affection for its members?

Mr. FOREMAN. Yes. The greatest support my regiment has, and I have been in the regiment 25 years and I have commanded it for 15 or 16 years, has been the support of the folks back home, the mothers and the sisters and the fathers; they brought their neighbors in, and I think we have produced as many elements who believe in actual, concrete, applied military training as any organization in the United States, because we have kept them together, and my old regiment meets just as much as it did before the war, and I think it generally is true, with a very few exceptions, that the men are teaching the principles to every man that has been compelled to go through the training they went through.

The CHAIRMAN. Some parts of the Army, during the war, learned a bitter lesson on that question, did they not?

Mr. FOREMAN. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. The breaking up of old units and the scattering of men was a distressing thing?

Mr. FOREMAN. It is a bitter neighborhood feeling, too. The regiments in Illinois had to be broken up to fill up other regiments, where they reduced the number of regiments and divisions, has met an unfortunate and antagonistic feeling in the communities, where in many cases the father was a member of the company, and the son and the uncle, that they represented in many cases the big community interest, the big social interest, outside the church, in the small community.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. It impaired the military spirit?

Mr. FOREMAN. Very much, sir.

Senator FRELINGHUYSEN. How can you get that local esprit until the principle of military training is established? What I am trying to get at is this: I am thoroughly in favor of it; I will vote for it every time it comes up, but you have got to get the sentiment in the locality for it; you have got to get the sentiment for it. Now, I should like to know whether in the West there is really a sentiment for universal military training, and will your Members in Congress vote for it and support it?

Mr. FOREMAN. I can not answer how the Members of Congress will vote.

Senator FRELINGHUYSEN. That is the question, do you want it enacted?

Mr. FOREMAN. There is undoubtedly a very strong public sentiment in Chicago for universal military training. It is expressed at public meetings. Now, I do not pretend to know how far that extends beyond the public impression.

The point that I wanted to make was that the American Legion, at least the Illinois department, would devote itself to assisting to educate the people into an understanding of it, and if that could be assisted by the maintenance of the integrity and the traditions of the regiments that served in the war, and thus that purpose served, who would be the examples. These local regiments furnish club facilities; they are meeting places, and they bring their neighbors and their friends in. I have one troop of Cavalry that came almost entirely out of the University of Chicago. I have one troop that came entirely out of the University of Illinois. That troop that came out of the University of Illinois became Battery B of the One hundred and twenty-fourth Field Artillery, and when we started at it they were loath to be interested in anything of a military nature that took any of their time.

I merely make these suggestions, sir, in order to show some of the methods by which this spirit could be developed, and the only way by which I think it can be developed.

The CHAIRMAN. In the matter of legislation governing this matter, and the assignment of units to their designations and their localities, do you not think it would be a wise thing to decentralize that matter as far as possible from Washington?

Mr. FOREMAN. Yes, sir; by all means, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. And call upon the best minds and thoughts of the communities to help establish the system on, well, what I think I am entitled to say, a democratic and American basis.

Mr. FOREMAN. I strongly believe so, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. And that would not involve any real injury to the strictly military side; in fact, it would add another aid?

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. If I were making a guess about the sentiment of Congress, I would say that a universal military training bill would be defeated by Congress.

The CHAIRMAN. The Senator from Oregon may be right, but I would rather be for it, just the same.

Senator FRELINGHUYSEN. We all of us want it to pass.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes; very much so.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. The American Legion may do as much as any factor in cultivating a sentiment for it.

Senator NEW. It can do more.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. Because the average Congressman, all of us, keep our ears pretty close to the ground to learn the sentiment back home, and that influences all of them more or less.

Senator NEW. The American Legion can do more than any other single influence in this country to-day toward creating a sentiment for universal military training, in the very nature of the thing. The statement has been made so often that the returned soldier is against military training; that he is sick and tired of everything that partakes of a military character. Well, that may be true, as it always is,

that at the close of a period of military enlistment the men, in their desire to get back home and all that, probably do feel they have had enough soldiering for a time, but I do not believe it is true that the men who went through this war are permanently opposed to the establishment of a system that is going to make this country's defense an efficient one, its defensive force an efficient one, and if the American Legion were to take this up and speak of the benefits of it from all the various standpoints, I think no other agency in the country to-day would have the ear of the country as the returned soldier.

Mr. FOREMAN. I agree with you, sir. The great organizing period of the American Legion is starting now. The Minneapolis convention was held on the 12th of November; that was the first time they got a permanent organization. The States have just got permanent organizations, and the propaganda ought to be pretty vigorously promoted from now on. I know it will be in Illinois. We will drench the State.

The CHAIRMAN. Would any other member of your committee like to say a few words, Mr. Tukey?

Mr. TUKEY. I think Mr. Stimson would.

STATEMENT OF HON. HENRY L. STIMSON, NEW YORK CITY.

The CHAIRMAN. We shall be glad to hear from you, Mr. Stimson.

Mr. STIMSON. I have already been before your committee, Mr. Chairman, and I did not intend to weary you again, but it occurred to me, while these gentlemen were speaking, that as a member of a National Army division we had an opportunity to notice the effect of training upon men who had been wholly without it up to that point in a way, which was perhaps not quite so true of the guard divisions which had previously had military training, and I only wanted to add my word to the effect, as to the striking benefits which we observed in the Seventy-seventh Division. The Seventy-seventh Division contained about as homogenous a lot of men and material, different races, different languages, all of them wholly untrained, as existed in the entire Army; probably the most homogenous of all. They had none of the previous experience of such regiments as Col. Galbraith's regiment or Col. Foreman's regiment, which had been together for a great many years. Nevertheless, in the course of the training period it was really wonderful to watch the development in the qualities of manhood, responsibility, the general developments that go to make good citizenship which came out under the effect of that training. It, I think, offers in that way perhaps the example of those divisions a little more accurate gauge of the result than one can expect of the introduction of the system into the country at large and the length of time which it would take to produce those results. They confirm, in general, the positions which have been taken, I think, by witness before your committee and by the advocates of the system, and in that way we have had a demonstration, in part, of the effect of the system.

It is noticeable that it continues. We have none of the advantages of meeting places, such as a guard regiment going back to the guard has in armories, and yet there has been a very marked desire on the part of the men who formed the regiment that I was connected with

to keep together and to form an element of good citizenship. We established a legion post in the regiment, and it was very largely and enthusiastically attended, and the interest of the men in keeping together and in continuing to keep in touch and to carry on the things that they learned in the Army is not only noticeable and decided, but it is getting more and more so the further they get from the war, the more they value the association. That is about all I have to say.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. Colonel, I believe that if an effort were made to bring the country to universal military training by urging the necessity of organizing an army, that we would fail in our efforts, because the great mass of people believe that this war has ended. But if it were brought to the attention of the people that to train these men makes them fitter for civic duties, develop them physically, and makes better citizens of them, teaches the rules of hygiene, and all of those things, I believe you could reach the people through that method of instruction better than any other.

Mr. STIMSON. I agree with you, Senator Chamberlain. I think that the system appeals to the people of this country as a system which is particularly valuable in time of peace, even if we did not have any more war, and I have found in my talking about it that that was the argument that we are very apt to lay more stress upon.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. Those who oppose military training, as a rule, base their opposition on the fact that it is making a soldier of a man first, that you are creating the militaristic spirit. Now, that is really not the purpose of it. The purpose of it, as I understand universal military training, is to develop the manhood of the individual.

Mr. STIMSON. It was because I thought in the case of the National Army we had such a good opportunity to see that that I injected these few words.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. Yes; I am glad you did so.

SUPPLEMENTAL STATEMENT OF MR. ALLAN TUKEY.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Tukey, before we adjourn, will you tell us something about the make-up of that convention at Minneapolis? I understand from conversation with members of the legion that you make no distinction whatsoever between former officers and former enlisted men?

Mr. TUKEY. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Were there many former enlisted men delegates to that convention?

Mr. TUKEY. Yes, sir; there were a great many of them there. I believe there were more than one-half enlisted men at the convention.

The CHAIRMAN. You dropped all titles?

Mr. TUKEY. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. And the former enlisted men, delegates, took part in the preparation of the work of the committees, did they?

Mr. TUKEY. They were on all committees; they took part in all the work.

The CHAIRMAN. In other words, the former officers are not the whole thing in the legion?

Mr. TUKEY. The question of officers and enlisted men never arose in the convention. The men were selected for committees with regard to their fitness for each committee, and it developed on every committee that there was a very strong representation of enlisted men.

I can tell you the story of the situation at Omaha in a very few words.

The CHAIRMAN. We shall be very glad to hear it.

Mr. TUKEY. I do not know what bearing it has in the matter.

The CHAIRMAN. It may have this bearing, to show the value of the sense of responsibility and patriotism and devotion to American institutions.

Mr. TUKEY. One thing I can show you by it, is to what extent rank has interfered in the legion. That was your question just now. We had a riot in Omaha, so, of course, we got quite a little publicity, and it developed the evening of the riot that we were not going to have a sufficient force for the next day, and possibly for the next two or three days, on hand to take charge of the situation. They asked me, as head of the American Legion there, what we could do. I told them that as an organization I did not feel that we would do anything; in other words, that the American Legion did not propose to underwrite any one's citizenship, neither did it propose to act as special policemen when the city saw fit. I told them that because of our peculiar fitness, on account of training, I felt that returned soldiers might be helpful, and I offered to attempt to raise a force of citizens, of a size they thought necessary, composed chiefly of returned soldiers. They said they wanted 500. They told me that in the morning. We called in as many members of the American Legion as possible to get within the time we had, asked them if they wished to volunteer. There was no call whatever. I also stated clearly to the citizens that they were eligible just as much as the returned soldiers. As a result, we had a force of 500 men out at 4 o'clock in the afternoon. Of that 500 men a large majority were members of the legion. There were a few members of the home guard of citizens who had turned out.

Illustrating the effect of rank, as you spoke of it, we turned out in uniform. I was formerly a second lieutenant. I had as my second in command of my force of 500 a colonel. I had 10 platoons and a couple of divisions of supply, and one thing and another—in charge of these various units I had everything from a lieutenant colonel to a private. A private soldier was in command of one of the platoons. I do not remember the individuals in the others. Officers were serving in the ranks all the way from second lieutenants up, and the question of rank never once arose; we were citizens again, and serving as citizens; we were members of the American Legion, but even when we were out in uniform the question of rank never arose, and no criticism ever reached me, nor did any talk whatever of the rank.

We held ourselves at Gen. Wood's call for a week. The first two evenings of that week we were on duty; after that we merely held ourselves at his call, but the members of the legion were very ready to turn out.

As the result of this action, when they all understood it, understood we had not made it compulsory, that it was not a legion proposi-

tion, that it was a proposition of citizenship, two men resigned from the legion, and we got approximately 400 new members.

I believe personally that that illustrates pretty well the attitude of the returned soldier toward his civic responsibilities.

The CHAIRMAN. That is a very interesting illustration.

STATEMENT OF MR. FRANKLIN D'OLIER, PHILADELPHIA, PA.

Mr. TUKEY. Mr. D'Olier, I think, you can tell the make-up of our convention as regards officers and enlisted men. Mr. D'Olier is the commander of the legion.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. D'Olier, we shall be glad to hear you, and wish you would state your assignments during the late war.

Mr. D'OLIER. I was commissioned captain in the Quartermaster Corps in April, 1917, called into active duty at the Schuylkill Arsenal, Philadelphia, went to Boston depot, was sent abroad August, 1917, and spent 20 months there, and returned a lieutenant colonel in the General Staff.

In the early part of this year, in France, a movement was started to form a veterans' organization. March 15, 16, and 17 over 1,000 delegates attended, both officers and enlisted men, a meeting in Paris, and at this convention the American Legion was born, the name was chosen, a tentative constitution drawn up, and it was decided to organize in the States by States rather than in France by divisions.

In May of this year a convention was held in St. Louis, at which delegates from every State in the Union were present; the temporary organization was started, and the American Legion was organized on a temporary basis in every State in the Union. This temporary organization merely got together ex-service men as rapidly as they could, posts were formed so that by the end of September there were approximately 5,000 posts throughout the country. State conventions were held, in the latter part of September and the early part of October, and each post in a State sent delegates to the State convention which, in turn, chose delegates to the national convention.

The national convention was held in Minneapolis, November 10 and 11. The delegates there were as truly representative of the ex-service men as it was possible to get them; every ex-service man in the country was given an opportunity to join; about 1,000,000 availed themselves of that privilege.

In this connection I should like to call attention to the fact that the total number of officers in the entire Army was approximately 200,000. It is not reasonable to suppose that one-half of them had joined the American Legion, so that at the time of the Minneapolis convention the officers in the American Legion were outnumbered at least 9 to 1.

The distinction between officer and enlisted man has been dropped to such an extent that in one State convention, where the subject came up, the whole matter was referred to all of the enlisted delegates at the convention. They came back with the statement that there was no rank in the American Legion and that they, as enlisted men, were perfectly willing to take their chance with any man who was formerly an officer, and, as a result, we do not ask,

and we very seldom know, whether a man was an officer or an enlisted man. The American Legion makes no distinction between the man who served in this country or the man who went abroad.

The operation of the convention was as follows: Shortly after the convention was called to order there were some 20 different committees chosen, in order to handle the enormous amount of business which was presented. Each committee consisted of one delegate from each State, chosen by the State delegations as they deemed fit. Each committee, after having been selected, chose its own chairman and its own secretary. Each committee considered the problems presented to it and presented their conclusions to the convention, which accepted, rejected, or modified, as they saw fit, the voting being done by each State in accordance with her actual paid-up membership. So that we feel in this matter that every conclusion reached by the Minneapolis convention was reached in as truly a representative and democratic way as it was possible to arrive at it, and on this basis the military policy report of the American Legion was discussed fully and freely and when reported to the convention appealed to the convention as being such an admirable compromise that it was accepted practically unanimously.

The CHAIRMAN. Have any of your members any other observations to make?

Mr. TUKEY. I do not believe we have, Senator.

The CHAIRMAN. I understand, Mr. Tukey, that by next Wednesday the members of the committee, after consultation with representatives from each State, which are to meet here for that purpose, will be ready to come before us with some definite suggestions for carrying out the general policies that you recommend in your resolutions?

Mr. TUKEY. Yes, sir; we should have quite a few more definite suggestions by Wednesday than we have now. For one reason, we are going to be able to get the idea of the representatives of all parts of the country on the specific things we put up to them.

The CHAIRMAN. If there are no other questions, we will adjourn for to-day.

(Whereupon, at 4.30 o'clock p. m., the subcommittee adjourned until Friday, December 12, 1919, at 2.15 o'clock p. m.)

REORGANIZATION OF THE ARMY

HEARINGS

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE COMMITTEE ON MILITARY AFFAIRS UNITED STATES SENATE

SIXTY-SIXTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

ON

S. 2691

A BILL TO PROVIDE FOR UNIVERSAL MILITARY, NAVAL, AND VOCATIONAL TRAINING AND FOR MOBILIZATION OF THE MANHOOD OF THE NATION IN A NATIONAL EMERGENCY

S. 2693

A BILL TO CREATE A DEPARTMENT OF AERONAUTICS, DEFINING THE POWERS AND DUTIES OF THE DIRECTOR THEREOF, PROVIDING FOR THE ORGANIZATION, DISPOSITION, AND ADMINISTRATION OF A UNITED STATES AIR FORCE, CREATING THE UNITED STATES AIR RESERVE FORCE, AND PROVIDING FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF CIVIL AND COMMERCIAL AVIATION

S. 2715

A BILL TO REORGANIZE AND INCREASE THE EFFICIENCY OF THE UNITED STATES ARMY, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES

PART 29

Printed for the use of the Committee on Military Affairs

STATEMENTS OF

BISHOP WILLIAM S. McDOWELL
BISHOP CHARLES HENRY BRENT
REV. FRANCIS P. DUFFY

CHAPLAIN JOHN T. AXTON
REV. GAYLORD S. WHITE
COL. JOHN J. FRAINE

AMERICAN LEGION REPRESENTATIVES



WASHINGTON
GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
1920

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REORGANIZATION OF THE ARMY.

FRIDAY, DECEMBER 12, 1919.

UNITED STATES SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON MILITARY AFFAIRS,
Washington, D. C.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 2.15 o'clock p. m., in the committee room, Capitol, Senator James W. Wadsworth, jr., presiding.

Present: Senators Wadsworth (chairman), New, Fletcher, Thomas, and Chamberlain.

Also present: Senator Capper.

The CHAIRMAN. Bishop, the committee understands that the gentlemen here to-day want to discuss with the committee the status of the chaplains in the Army and their proper organization.

Bishop McDOWELL. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. We will be very glad to have you express your opinions in your own way.

STATEMENT OF BISHOP WILLIAM S. McDOWELL.

Bishop McDOWELL. Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, we wish, first of all, to thank you for the privilege of this hearing. We have been working upon the problem of the relations of the chaplains to the Army, all through the war and now, particularly, with reference to the chaplains in the reorganized Army, we are greatly concerned.

The men that we are here representing have practically, perhaps, an actual unanimity of sentiment as between the war-time commission of the Protestant churches and Father O'Hern, of the Roman Catholic Church.

Father O'HERN. Yes.

Bishop McDOWELL. And those bodies that have to do with the furnishing of chaplains during the war, and will have to do with furnishing them and backing the religious life of the Army in the days of peace.

Senator Capper has introduced the bill, with which you are familiar. It creates a corps in the Army of the United States, to be known as the corps of chaplains. Our first desire, I think, with reference to the chaplains, and in this we are unanimous, is that there shall be an organization of the chaplains which shall correspond in principle to the organization of other bodies in the Army, so that the chaplain corps shall be an organized branch of the service.

The Capper bill, I think, proposes that this shall be done by a corps of three chaplains which would be a little bit irregular. I un-

derstand that an amendment, made in behalf of the department itself, or to harmonize with other features of your legislation, has been introduced, making a senior chaplain for the head of the corps, to have associated with him two other senior chaplains, but that meets exactly our wishes as to the organization.

We do not contend for the exact form of our original proposition; all we ask is that there may be an organization.

The second point upon which we are agreed is with reference to the classification and grades for chaplains, their rank, and the proportion of men holding certain rank. I will ask, if I may, that others more familiar with that may speak of it, Mr. Chairman.

The third point upon which we desire your favor relates to the number of chaplains. You will remember, originally there was one chaplain for every 1,200 men; then, in the reorganization, to correspond with the practice abroad, when the regiment was made to consist of 3,600 men, we had to have an amendment here to get the proportion back. We are thoroughly persuaded, Mr. Chairman, that one chaplain for every 1,200 men, especially under the new plans for the moral welfare of the Army, is the minimum number; that there ought not to be less than one for every 1,200 men; and, indeed, it is our observation and judgment that there are groups of men in military service smaller than 1,200 men in number, who are in need of a chaplain's services quite as much as these larger groups—men detached from larger bodies and alone, and exposed to the moral perils that we all seek to avoid.

The fourth point that we desire to have considered relates to the age of the chaplains, and upon these points we ask that, if you wish, you may hear from Maj. Axton, or anyone representing the body of chaplains who have been working with the War Department, especially the new department that has been created, on these details. I desire to say, Mr. Chairman, further, that we are prepared to read to you or to leave with you—I think that Father O'Hern will read to you a letter from his grace, Archbishop Hayes, but we are prepared to read to you or have read to you, letters and indorsements from his emmience, Cardinal Gibbons, Gen. Pershing, Lieut. Gen. Liggett, and from the general committee on Army and Navy chaplains, to Secretary Baker, this communication being signed by Dr. Robertson E. Speer, who was chairman during the way; by Bishop Lawrence, by Bishop McDowell, Bishop Harding, by Dr. Mott, of the Y. M. C. A.; by Dr. Wallace Radcliffe, and Dr. Lawson, chairman of the administrative committee of the Federal Council; by Dr. Charles F. Macfarland, secretary of the Federal Council; Dr. E. O. Watson, Dr. White, and myself, as chairman of Army and Navy chaplains during the war; and also indorsed by a long list of ecclesiastical bodies.

I think, Mr. Chairman, we are particularly anxious to have the committee hear from Bishop Brent, out of his experience overseas, and his knowledge of the actual work of the chaplains during the war on the other side.

We also hope you will hear from Chaplain Duffy, who likewise, had distinguished experience and rendered distinguished service, and who is here with Father O'Hern, representing his grace, the

Archbishop of New York. It would be our pleasure to have Chaplain Axton speak with reference to the work from the point of view of men who have been long in the Army, and especially any questions you may wish to have answered.

We thank you very much, sir, for the privilege.

(Statement of Bishop Charles Henry Brent follows:)

STATEMENT OF BISHOP CHARLES HENRY BRENT.

The CHAIRMAN. Bishop, the committee will be glad to hear from you.

Before commencing, would you mind telling the committee what your assignments were during the war?

Bishop BRENT. I was senior headquarters chaplain from April, 1918, to May, 1919.

The CHAIRMAN. In France?

Bishop BRENT. In France. For a short time I was with the Y. M. C. A., doing work not specifically with or for the chaplains, but I was then in contact a good deal with the chaplains, both in the British and in the American Expeditionary Forces.

My relationship with the chaplains in the Army in an intimate way dates back to 1902, so that my conclusions relative to the organization of chaplains and how they could best be enabled to fulfill their duties are reached from matured experience. At quite an early date I felt that until, or unless, a corps of chaplains was formed we could not expect that sustained effort on the part of the chaplains which is very largely induced and maintained by a sense of close association.

The difficulties that naturally suggest themselves in connection with a corps of those who are of varied religious convictions are that there is not a sufficiently close relationship in matters of belief to enable the corps to work smoothly. Our experience in France convinces most of us—I think all of us, I might say—who had experience there that there is a sense of common purpose and a relationship that is very deep and real; but that does not loosen men's fundamental convictions; that makes a corps most possible and workable and adds tremendously to efficiency. So, on the basis of the possibility of a corps, I would say that I think the American Expeditionary Forces proved that such a thing was both possible and desirable.

With relation to the idea of a corps in order to put the chaplains in what would seem to me to be an organized relationship to the Army, put them into the Army life in a full way, I would say that at the present time a chaplain holds an anomalous position, which makes it difficult both for him and for the Army at large to recognize his possibilities and his duties. He has been given a sort of half recognition, and it has been argued somewhere that, inasmuch as his office is a spiritual office, that he ought not to depend on the externals to the same extent that other officers in the Army do.

Practical experience, I think, has proved that it is not a possible position. The same reasons that argue for the Medical Corps argue for a corps of chaplains.

In the matter of rank, two positions have been put forward, and I have gone over them both carefully from every viewpoint. One is

that there should not be rank in the same sense that other officers have it, but that there should be grades; and the other is, of course, that they should be in the same plane, exactly, as men in the Medical Corps or other noncombatant arms in the service.

My feeling is that the Chaplains' Corps should be just as complete a part of the Army, in order to make it more effective, as the men of the Medical Corps. In other words, that rank should be given.

Senator FLETCHER. Would it trouble you if I should interrupt you for an inquiry?

Bishop BRENT. Not at all. I shall be very glad.

Senator FLETCHER. About what is the present grade and what is the present arrangement? They have ranked some as high as captain?

Bishop BRENT. As high as major, and the chaplain enters as a first lieutenant. He has to serve 7 years before he can be made a captain; and then after 10 more years, 17 years in all, he can be one of 15 majors. They are restricted to 15.

Senator NEW. As I understand this, you do not propose to have them designated as first lieutenants?

Bishop BRENT. No.

Senator NEW. Or as captains and majors?

Bishop BRENT. No.

Senator NEW. Their rank is to be determined by their pay and not by the title, is that it?

Bishop BRENT. As the matter stands now a chaplain is to be addressed by that title, and as far as my own opinion is concerned, I can not conceive of any higher title a man would desire than chaplain.

Senator NEW. I agree with you.

Senator FLETCHER. Section 4 provides for the rank.

Bishop BRENT. It provides for the rank.

Senator FLETCHER. Five per cent of colonels, and so on down.

Bishop BRENT. But that is provided for now, if my memory is correct. It is directed that the address of the chaplain should be "chaplain."

Senator NEW. He is to be known as "chaplain" in all grades?

Bishop BRENT. Yes.

Senator FLETCHER. His insignia now is a cross?

Bishop BRENT. Yes.

Senator FLETCHER. Would that be changed by rank?

Bishop BRENT. As I understand it, that has not usually been a matter of legislation; it is a matter of regulation by the War Department. That would not enter into legislation at all.

Senator FLETCHER. I did not know what the idea was of the friends of the bill, whether there would be any other insignia adopted?

Bishop BRENT. There is one matter that, perhaps, would be worth while to just touch on, that chaplains are to-day, so to speak, a remnant of a past age of the Army in their present status. They have a purely regimental relationship, and while, according to the present system in the Army, other officers move with promotion from one organization to another, the chaplain is always, so to speak, attached to his colonel, and his is an anomalous position as an Army officer. The corps and the development of the corps along the Army lines would put him in a position where, I think, he would be far

more effective in the performance of his work, because it would be known he was part of the recognized system, and his status would be determined thereby. It would not in any way militate against his spiritual office.

Senator FLETCHER. If we have an Army of 300,000 men you would have only 250 chaplains in the corps?

Bishop BRENT. That might be. At the same time I feel that the benefits that would accrue would give you an efficient group of chaplains. Where you leave them as isolated units, having to sink or swim by themselves, you take the spirit out of the men. I have seen chaplains come into the Army full of enthusiasm and hope and expectations and I have watched in some instances the spirit of those men die down, not through their own fault, but in large measure because they were so entirely left alone, without an appeal beyond the colonel of the regiment, for instance, without anybody representing them of their own order at the center.

In other instances you have in Washington, in the War Department, the medical men, or whatever the particular group may be; but there are men of their own profession, of their own group, to represent them. With the chaplains it has not been so.

So far as the central group committee of three is concerned, in the A. E. F., we found it a serviceable mode of administration. It would be absolutely necessary that one of the three should be designated as an organizing head, whatever you might call him.

If I might just briefly give our experience in France. We found that we could not do otherwise than have some sort of a central body, and some sort of an organization, and our organization grew out of the immediate necessity. I was asked to act as the chief of the three who were first appointed, as the headquarters office, at general headquarters in France, and I had associated with me a Congregationalist and a Roman Catholic—an old Army chaplain. That office was increased later to five, when a Salvation Army chaplain and another Roman Catholic were added to the office, and in the year that our office fulfilled its responsibilities we never had a shadow of trouble. I can always look back on that experience as one of the most unclouded in a long administrative experience.

We made two simple rules, and those rules were lived up to: That there were no office seekers. That all correspondence was to be the property of the entire office, both what came in and what went out; that no chaplain was to be responsible merely for the men who belonged to his own particular church, but that each chaplain had the responsibility of all the chaplains on his shoulders, and we carried that out, I think, with a reasonable degree of efficiency, and with great loyalty. So that, from the practical standpoint, such an office is a possibility and proved to be, in the judgment of those who saw it work, probably the best solution of the problem that had been offered in our own Army.

Just one other thing in relation to the number of chaplains, the number of men under one chaplain, one to 1,200 was the law that we worked under in France, and it seemed to be satisfactory. I can not see any reason why, in times of peace, there should be any decrease. One to 1,200 is a fair number, comparing it with other armies.

The English, for instance, I think it is about 1 to 1,000. I was in touch with the British a great deal and discussed this whole matter with them. Their system is somewhat different from ours. The Canadian Army had an office almost exactly like ours, and, according to the reports that were given me, it was entirely successful. In fact, I think the Canadian corps and the Canadian administration was the finest of any chaplains' organization that I have ever had to do with.

The CHAIRMAN. As a matter of fact, Bishop, according to the plans of the War Department for taking over all the welfare work inside of the camps and military reservations, the work of the chaplain from now on, who is a part of the military organization, will logically greatly increase, will it not, at least in responsibilities?

Bishop BRENT. Very much more so than it has ever been in the past. The chaplain in the past has been an odd-job man and his spirit has suffered accordingly. Anything that nobody else wanted or that was unloaded on him by somebody in authority he had to take, and many, many letters have come to me from men who felt that their office as chaplain was being cut into by that very fact. Now, with this new distribution of responsibilities, the chaplain will be put in the proper relationship to the command, in that he has the spiritual and moral welfare of the men to care for, and will be in direct touch with the other departments, like the educational, the moral, and so on.

Bishop McDOWELL. It has seemed to us that just now, when we are proposing this new and very much better arrangement, as it seems to us, that the status of the chaplain shall be clearly defined, rather than being left as it has been in a somewhat vague, uncertain, and unsatisfactory way.

The CHAIRMAN. Our understanding is that the Y. M. C. A., the K. of C., and the Jewish Welfare activities have been withdrawn?

Bishop BRENT. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Of course, that leaves it to the military personnel, including the chaplains—especially chaplains—the work that has thus been done in an unofficial way before?

Bishop BRENT. Yes; exactly.

Senator FLETCHER. I take it this staff of three will have the rank and pay of colonels. According to your program, you only have 12 chaplains with the rank and pay of colonels. That staff of 3 would leave you 9 with that rank and pay only?

Bishop BRENT. I have just come from a meeting of the Army and Navy commission of the Episcopal Church, where I have given this bill careful consideration, and they asked me if I would state that the bill represented the general principles for which they would stand.

Senator FLETCHER. It seems to me it would be a very excellent bill.

Bishop McDOWELL. The bill has been indorsed by the Federal Council of the Churches of Christ in America; by the general convention of the Protestant Episcopal Church; by the national council of the Congregational Churches; by the national Lutheran commission, November 4; by the Northern Baptist convention; by the general assembly of Presbyterian Churches; by the Bible and evangelistic conference of the Methodist Episcopal Church, South; and by a good many other bodies.

Bishop BRENT. I think that really covers the ground.

The CHAIRMAN. Are you prepared, Bishop, to comment upon the matter of promotion inside that corps?

Bishop BRENT. As to how promotion shall come?

The CHAIRMAN. As to how promotion shall be obtained. What system of promotion is suggested here? I see there is nothing in the bill referring to it.

Bishop BRENT. I do not believe that I am prepared to discuss that. I really have not any very strong convictions about it. It is a matter of method. As long as the principle is accepted, I would leave the matter of method to those who have studied the military aspects, because that enters into the question.

The CHAIRMAN. Of course, there have been conflicting proposals as to which is the best method of promotion in the commissioned personnel of the Army, and perhaps some of the other witnesses will discuss that.

Bishop BRENT. One feature of the bill has not been touched on here yet. The desirability of two years of provisional service would be, I think, a very desirable thing, before they are actually appointed as chaplains. That would apply to all who had not had service in the recent war.

The CHAIRMAN. Where is that recited in the bill, Bishop? That is in existing law?

Bishop BRENT. In section 5: "All commissions shall be provisional"—line 15.

The CHAIRMAN. I see. That is just as it is in the line of the Army?

Bishop BRENT. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Appointed from civil life?

Bishop BRENT. Yes.

Senator CAPPER. May I ask a question, Mr. Chairman?

The CHAIRMAN. Certainly.

Senator CAPPER. I should like to ask if you ever discussed this with the men in the service, as to how they feel about a move of this kind?

Bishop BRENT. The chaplains are line officers?

Senator CAPPER. The line officers and enlisted men.

Bishop BRENT. Not with the enlisted men so much as the line officers. There is a difference of opinion among those that I have discussed the matter with. In the main, the men agree with me pretty strongly, I think. I think the majority would agree with such a provision.

Senator CAPPER. That has been my understanding. I did not know how you had found it.

Bishop BRENT. I have talked with a great many.

The CHAIRMAN. We will be glad to hear from Father Duffy.

STATEMENT OF REV. FRANCIS P. DUFFY.

The CHAIRMAN. Will you state for the information of the committee your military experience?

Father DUFFY. I was hospital chaplain in the Spanish War; National Guard, 1914. Federal service. Mexican border; and from August 15, 1917, to May, 1919, chaplain, One hundred and sixty-fifth Infantry, and senior chaplain, Forty-second Division.

The CHAIRMAN. And prior to the war with the Sixty-ninth New York?

Father DUFFY. With the Sixty-ninth New York.

The CHAIRMAN. Which became the One hundred and sixty-fifth Infantry?

Father DUFFY. Which became the One hundred and sixty-fifth Infantry?

The CHAIRMAN. We shall be glad to have your ideas on this, Father.

Father DUFFY. My observations can be made briefly and to the point. I have agreed always with Bishop Brent's idea that it would be a good thing to have a chaplains' corps. The chaplains enter into the Army as first lieutenants; they rank with veterinary surgeons, and they are sort of in the also-ran class. There is not any person particularly they can appeal to. They were attached in the last war to the medicos, and it would be an advantage to the chaplains and to their service if they had, as we actually had abroad—we had practically a chaplains' corps—some person to whom we could appeal or ask for advice, or who would handle our transfers and promotions and recommendations, through the Adjutant General of the A. E. F.; but they practically had that power.

As for the method of handling it on the top side, whether to have one head or three, if you can get three people gaited like Bishop Brent and his associates, that is an ideal system, although the Army, perhaps, will prefer to have some one person directly responsible. I think that is fully in accordance with Army methods, as a rule. A triumvirate works out very well with men of this sort, but it might not work out so well in the ordinary administration of an army. That is a matter I can not give any definite opinion on, except it is an ideal system, I think, in the A. E. F.

As for matters of rank and insignia and promotion, I have not any observations to make. I defer in matters of this kind to the chaplains of the Regular Army. I move into the Federal service and out again according to what the National Guard does, and in a special position with officers that I know, perhaps see them come into the Guard, and with men that I enlist myself, and the position is different; it is a family. A Regular Army chaplain, who is transferred from one place to another, feels he needs the protection or the assurance, the prestige of insignia of rank and matters of that kind; he is the person to speak of it. My experience does not entitle me to speak. I would side with him.

With regard to the age and questions arising from that I think that the provisions of this act, to make 35 years a maximum for chaplains in the Regular Army, is a proper one. Granted, I suppose, there would be some provision made for the emergency of war, and the increase in the number of chaplains that probably would come when war is declared, if it ever is, I think the feeling of all the men in the service who are in at the present is rather a generous one, rather overgenerous—I am not in position to state, because I do not know what is involved to the Government, but the point I have particularly in mind with regard to this is that while a maximum age is stated, practically there is going to be a minimum age, if you want to have seasoned clergymen in the service.

For 14 years I was engaged in the work of preparing men for the church in a theological seminary. We ordained them at 23 to 26 years of age—I do not think most of those men were fit to go in as Regular Army chaplains until they had about three years' service in the ordinary work of the ministry. They need associations with riper men of their own church. They should not be taken right from the theological seminary and put in the Army, where their associates are good fellows, but are of the secular people. The young clergyman ought to be associated with older men of his own religion, get advice from them and have practice under them in the ordinary work of the ministry before he separates himself from all these helps and goes into a regiment, so that I think the minimum age practicable, if I were recommending men, even men I have known for years, to enter the service, my minimum would be about 27, and if he did not enter until about 30 I would not be sorry. He would be ripe, able to stand on his own feet.

Senator FLETCHER. This bill does not give any minimum?

Father DUFFY. This bill does not give any minimum, but I am introducing this, Senator, with one other point in view that I am not very familiar with. But if provisions are made on a single list for the whole Army, these men who enter when they are ripe for entering, at 28, we will say, are on a footing with men who enter, perhaps, from a medical college at 23; and if they are promoted on the same level all the way up they will always be five years older than the man of the same rank in the Medical Corps. I believe provisions are made, under certain conditions, for matters of that kind.

Senator FLETCHER. What examination do they have now?

Father DUFFY. Chaplain Axton, or some of these Regular Army men, will have to talk about that. I am not familiar with the details, but I just want to give my point of view, as instructor of men for the church, that I would not want them to come in too early.

Senator FLETCHER. I think you are mistaken in the suggestion that all of the men now in will be continued. The provision simply is, as to those men who have seen service, the age limit will not exclude them from being eligible.

Bishop McDOWELL. That is all; that is the provision.

Father DUFFY. That is an obiter dictum on my part. The part I had in mind particularly was that practically, with men like the two bishops here, for example, who represent religious organizations, and neither of them, I think, were appointed very young men, just ordained, to the Army, and I, as a teacher in a seminary, would not recommend the lower age, so the chaplains would probably be entering the service at an older age than young men coming out of West Point or out of the medical schools.

The CHAIRMAN. I am not so sure about the medical schools. While it is perfectly true about men coming out of West Point, they go in as second lieutenants, while the chaplains enter as first lieutenants. As I remember, Medical Corps men must be graduates of a medical school of a prescribed standing, then must service as internes in a hospital for at least one year before they are eligible to take the Army medical examination. I imagine the average medical school will graduate him at about 23, and then he would probably average 24, would he not?

Father DUFFY. I think probably they would now.

The CHAIRMAN. Then, adding a year in the hospital would bring him up to 26. I do not believe there would be a very big spread.

Chaplain AXTON. Would you like the exact figures?

The CHAIRMAN. I would.

Chaplain AXTON. The average age of 14 senior major, Medical Corps, upon entrance to the Army, was 29. That was their age at entrance. Average of 14 senior chaplains, because we have 14 senior chaplains, was 29.

The CHAIRMAN. They went right along together?

Chaplain AXTON. Yes. There is quite a disparity there between them and the chaplains. The average age of the chaplains on entering the Army was 37.

The CHAIRMAN. On entering the Army?

Chaplain AXTON. On entering the Army; yes. I bring this up in connection with this single list, because it is quite vital that some consideration be given there.

Father DUFFY. The two years' initiation, I think, is a good idea; try the men out and, if they are not qualified, drop them quietly—send them back where they belong.

The CHAIRMAN. Would you suggest, then, putting in a minimum age?

Father DUFFY. No; I am simply introducing this, Senator, with a view to a discussion on one point on which I am not so well informed—this question about constructive service. I do not think there is anything else that appeals to me. I read a late series of recommendations made by the chaplains' committee, but they do not come up here under discussion.

The CHAIRMAN. There is one thing you perhaps could discuss if you care to. That is this matter of promotion. The committee, I think it is fair to say, has in mind—is leaning very strongly—toward the establishment of the single list for promotion in the Army; but that that shall not apply in all its principles, by any means, to the Medical Corps, they being in a peculiar category, and it is very difficult to put the Medical Corps officers and dilute them into a single list for the entire Army.

It may turn out that the committee will decide in its report to leave the Medical Corps the only corps in the Army, exclusive, possibly, of the chaplains' corps, if we decide to have one, with a permanent commissioned personnel standing off by itself.

Then comes the question how we shall recommend promotions in that separate branch. If we were to have a separate corps of chaplains and should decide that it would rather complicate the single list of the whole Army by trying to work the chaplains into that single list, with this question of constructive service, and the fact, also, that they come in as first lieutenants instead of second lieutenants and are older than the line officers when they first come into the Army, what, then, would be the best method of providing for promotion of chaplains within their corps? Would it be by seniority or by selection, or a combination of selection and seniority? That point is bound to become important later, assuming that we have the corps. Have you any ideas as to what kind of promotion would be the best in the corps of chaplains?

Father DUFFY. I think it is to avoid trouble—it is not the ideally best one, but to avoid trouble—seniority is the best, especially if you have about 250 to deal with, or something less than 500, you get the complication of men feeling they are passed over on account of church affiliations; and there is room left, if this thing goes through, to select men, not by seniority but as chaplains in chief, or to the association of chaplains, to this higher temporary rank, on account of their positions for the two years or so they hold these positions. That is not mentioned here, but that is the idea spoken of—to have a chaplain chief with two associates, or to have three. Those men could be selected, not by seniority but on a basis of fitness—fitness to hold those positions. But I think for permanent positions it is safer to let it go by seniority. There would be less chance of trouble.

The CHAIRMAN. Have you any further observations to make?

Father DUFFY. Nothing that has not already been said. I quite agree with everything that has been said.

STATEMENT OF FATHER LEWIS J. O'HERN, C. S. P

The CHAIRMAN. Will you state your title, Father, and your assignments?

Father O'HERN. My position is that of executive secretary to the Most Rev. Patrick J. Hayes, the archbishop of New York, who is the ecclesiastical superior of the Catholic chaplains of the Army and the Navy.

The archbishop asked me to present his compliments to the committee, to express his regret at not being able to be present to-day. He had fully intended to be here were the meetings held on Wednesday, as first scheduled, but important engagements in New York prevented his being here to-day, and he has asked me, therefore, to present his views concerning the status of chaplains in the Army and the proposed legislation concerning them, as follows:

ARCHBISHOP'S HOUSE,

452 Madison Avenue, New York, November 20, 1919.

Requested to express my views concerning the status of chaplains in the Army and the proposed legislation concerning them, I beg to observe the following:

1. I am in full sympathy with the idea of a chaplain corps, since it makes the chaplain an organic part of the Army and not a tolerated supernumerary with indefinite duty and undetermined place.

2. I favor the passage of the Capper bill. The main provisions of the proposed legislation are along the right line. Veteran chaplains, with the exception of the emergency over-age men, should receive the same consideration accorded to all other veteran officers.

3. Insignia of rank, if necessary, as argued by many chaplains in the service, for proper recognition on the part of officers and men, should be granted, provided the uniform be made very distinctive in singling out the chaplains, with the "cross" for Christian and the "star" for Jewish chaplains. If the uniform is more clerical than at present, it would prevent chaplains becoming too "military" posing as officers to the detriment of their religious influence.

4. Moral training in the Army will avail but little if the religious sanction is not respected, encouraged, and provided for. Therefore, all moral training should be exclusively in the hands of chaplains, who should be advised to see to it that the soldiers under their charge be provided with clergymen of their respective religious beliefs?

5. School for chaplains is desirable if conducted on far different lines from the one at Camp Zachary Taylor. To make a good Army chaplain, it seems shocking to degrade him, from a position enjoyed by his religious calling, to

the level of an ordinary soldier. West Point and Annapolis are conducted on a high plane of dignity and decency.

School should not be necessary as a test for obtaining a commission; all of this should be determined by the examining board before candidates enter the service. The purpose of school is for training and discipline.

6. Revivals or retreats for chaplains is one of the best of recommendations. It affords the chaplain a time for prayer and meditation, under their own religious auspices.

Certainly the experience which I have had during the war with our chaplain body as a whole has been most encouraging and edifying. The chaplains have done splendid work and probably their place in the Army will be recognized now as it never has before. I stand ready to give my assistance in every way possible toward the amelioration of the chaplain in the Army of to-day and the future.

Very sincerely, yours,

PATRICK J. HAYES,
Archbishop of New York, Catholic Chaplain Bishop.

STATEMENT OF CHAPLAIN JOHN T. AXTON, UNITED STATES ARMY.

The CHAIRMAN. You have been in the Regular service?

Chaplain AXTON. I have been chaplain since July 25, 1902.

I first wish to express my opinion as being in hearty accord with all that has been said concerning the general principles of the Capper bill, which is up for consideration. No further argument from me is necessary concerning the necessity for the formation of the corps. Organization is essential for the success of anybody, anywhere, and with 250 chaplains, without guidance, we would go back into the old provincialism that existed before the war, and our chaplains would rust out in places where they might be sent.

We need supervision of chaplains by chaplains; we need inspection of chaplains by chaplains; we need instruction of chaplains by chaplains if we are going to progress.

I was examined for appointment by a board of line officers entirely. Most other chaplains who are here, if examined at all, were examined in the same way; therefore the chaplains, as a whole, are in no way responsible for the success or failure of religious work in the Army. We throw the responsibility back upon the line officers, who chose us for the positions we occupy, and then left us without adequate guidance.

Some of the provisions of the Capper bill need slight modifications, in my opinion. The very first, for instance. We would like a senior chaplain, to fall in line with all else that goes of a military nature. I am firm in the conviction it can be carried through successfully with two associate chaplains.

Bishop Brent spoke of his experience overseas with a large body of chaplains. At the port of embarkation, where I was on duty, we had 166 chaplains and had no friction whatever. They were controlled and handled, and were of all sectarian denominations, and yet on great fundamental verities we were there to do all we could for the welfare of the men; so I would modify that provision by having a senior chaplain, who would serve, perhaps, on the general staff for a period of two years, and which would at once give him proper authority and standing.

The CHAIRMAN. Where were you stationed?

Chaplain AXTON. At the port of New York.

I would not try to enact into law which says they are representing anybody. I take it for granted nobody would be selected by the War Department who would dare to improperly do the job that was committed to the board that you would constitute under such legislation. So I would recommend, in that first paragraph, that he be detailed for a given period of time as a senior chaplain, with proper associates, and the grade that would give him the standing he would require to have among 250 other chaplains.

I think that provision which segregates on the grades on a percentage could easily be written into any bill that might be prepared by this committee for the general control of the Army. It is altogether on a percentage basis, whether you have 250 or 100 chaplains; the percentage would be just the same, and I think that it would be far better than that Senate measure, 2715, which provided a flat number of chaplains in each grade. It permits it to fluctuate with the size of the Army up or down, so I very much favor that fourth section, that provides a certain percentage. That certain per cent in the field-officer grade is put there advisedly; 32 per cent in the Medical Corps have field-officer grade. In the Navy, 50 per cent of all their chaplains have field-officer grade. We felt as though that would be presumptuous, entirely, that we could not fit men, so many men of high grades, in positions of sufficient responsibility to justify our asking for that. We want to ask for nothing in this measure that would seem to be calling for advancement of individuals. We want to be very fair in the matter of selecting a sufficient percentage of men in the high grades that would qualify for their position.

The merit provision is very essential, yet if the agitation growing now for a process of elimination in the entire Army shall become law, that probationary period will automatically become worked out, even in the Regular Army bill, for, as I understand, its proposition is one by which, at the end of a given period, or periods, there shall be a certain study of the men with a view of elimination of the unfit. If that is not to be done, we should have some plan by which men may be honorably separated from the service if they should prove to be round pegs in square holes; they must not be wedged too tightly into the holes.

I should like to dwell just a little bit on the question as to how you would handle the matter of promotion. In the present corps, captains are advanced to the grade of major by selection. The law requires that a man shall have been commended for exceptional efficiency in the performance of his duty as a chaplain. I will sit down with any fair-minded man and analyze all of the promotions that have been made to the grade of major by selection, and will venture to demonstrate to him that it was on the basis of fitness that those men passed to the place where they now stand. There may be one or two exceptions, but, by and large, the scheme of selections for chaplains above the grade of captain has had a splendid effect in stimulating men to fine endeavor, in keeping men steadily on their jobs in places where they might have gone to rust, except for the fact that efficiency had to do with their advancement in the service. It might be coupled with some feasible scheme of seniority and selection, being united. I do not know how that would be done, but

above the grade of captain I certainly stand flatly and squarely on the system that is now in vogue of advancing chaplains to that grade by selection.

The CHAIRMAN. The suggestion that has been made with a great deal of emphasis, I find, on asking Army officers about it, is that all the officers in the Army shall annually be classified, within their several grades, by appropriate boards into three classes. Class A, those found fit for promotion to the next higher grade; Class B, those not yet fit; and Class C, those who must be eliminated.

Therefore, if such a system were instituted or installed, it would amount to just this: You would have selection to an eligible list for promotion, Class A.

Chaplain AXTON. That would be very fair, sir.

My judgment, based upon what has already occurred in the War Department, and its treatment of Army chaplains, so far as the law permitted them to advance us, would be that that could be worked out satisfactorily.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, about the single list, and the relation of the Corps of Chaplains to it.

Chaplain AXTON. Yes, sir. I would like to call attention to this fact: That the average age at which the 14 senior chaplains now in the Army entered the service was 37. The average age to-day of the 14 senior chaplains of the Army is 57, and they are majors. The average age at which the Medical Corps men, with whom some promotions have been made to put up in classification, by two years of constructive service, the average at which they have entered is 29. The average age of their 14 senior majors to-day is 43. Note the disparity in age here. The average age of the middle 14 majors of the Medical Corps is just the same, 29 at entrance, but their average age now, with promotion, is only 31. Inordinate and unusual promotion came just at the outbreak of the war. There are no Medical Corps men in the grade of captain with whom our captains can be classified. They are all passed on to the grade of majors.

Fourteen senior captains of the Army entered at the age of 35, and their average age to-day is 52. It would hardly be fair, gentlemen, to classify these men, who have had college and seminary experience, and whose entrance into military service as chaplains was based upon a scale in examination of 1,000—400 points of which were on experience in pastoral work and teaching, two-fifths of all the qualifying features of the men who entered the service as a chaplain under the old régime had to be experience, and this line of work, therefore, being scarcely fitted to classify him exactly with the Medical Corps. If construction service is to be allowed, they ought to be classified on some other basis.

I am advised in the Navy they have five years of constructive service allowed all those who came in from civil life, but it proved unsatisfactory, and, if I am correctly informed, the system has been abolished.

The CHAIRMAN. do not know about the Navy.

Chaplain AXTON. I think that is so; I am not quite certain about that.

Senator FLETCHER. Are there a good many chaplains now holding commissions?

Chaplain AXTON. One hundred and eleven, I think in the regular service, and some 66 retained.

The CHAIRMAN. Of the emergency?

Chaplain AXTON. Yes, sir; of the emergency men.

Senator FLETCHER. One hundred and seventy-seven?

Chaplain AXTON. One hundred and seventy-seven actually holding commissions now.

Senator FLETCHER. I presume that is where Father Duffy got his idea. I had not observed it before. Section 3 says:

That the President is hereby authorized to appoint, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, chaplains in the Corps of Chaplains, at the rate of (including those chaplains now holding commissions) one for each twelve hundred.

That would continue the present chaplains?

Chaplain AXTON. They must be commissioned in the Regular Army, sir. That verbiage has to be changed there. The language is not right. The scheme for one 1,200 would enter fairly into any bill you might write for the general organization of the Army. Then it would fluctuate with the increase or the decrease.

The CHAIRMAN. I am still a little puzzled about this promotion part.

You say you fix the number of chaplains in each grade according to the list of percentages?

Chaplain AXTON. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. And you can never have more than 5 per cent in the highest grade, that of colonel. How old do you estimate the officer will be when he reaches the grade of colonel?

Chaplain AXTON. There will be none now who will be under 53 or 54, I should judge, who have reached the grade of colonel. If you have 250 and give 5 per cent the grade of colonel, they would be at least 53 or 54 years of age.

The CHAIRMAN. What do you think in the future would be the average age of entrance into the service?

Chaplain AXTON. I am hopeful it will be close to the 35-year age you have passed there as the maximum age, between 33 and 35. Undoubtedly Father Duffy is right, that it requires men of poise and balance, who have had some experience outside, if you want us to do our best work, and it should not be over 35, lest we get too many misfits beyond that age.

The CHAIRMAN. Of course, then, you can never equalize rank with age, as compared with other services?

Chaplain AXTON. No, sir; you can not, not on chaplains. I am fortunate in having come in when very young, but some of these older men would suffer terribly if given only two years of constructive service. Very many of our chaplains are 42 or 43 years of age, and they have done splendid work for the service. You will find Radcliffe, for instance, 43 when he entered the service, or 42. If I put him on the single list and he got only two years' constructive service, it would not be right. I have in the office where I am one chaplain who has four college degrees, who entered the service the same day as a member of his parish in the Medical Corps. The member of his parish is a lieutenant colonel and this man is a captain, some five or six years away from promotion, and they entered

the same day and from the same parish, this man being archdeacon in the parish at the time he entered; and that is the difference in their grades now.

The CHAIRMAN. Then would you have an entirely separate mode of promotion for the chaplains?

Chaplain AXTON. I think that would be the most logical, reasonable, and fair method to work it out.

Senator FLETCHER. Selection in each grade?

Chaplain AXTON. Unless you get a system of elimination in the whole Army that would be applied and write the chaplains into the law.

The CHAIRMAN. The system I cited a while ago would be applicable to everybody.

Chaplain AXTON. I think so. It looks to me very reasonable.

The CHAIRMAN. One big pool of officers, either for the Medical Corps or the chaplains?

Chaplain AXTON. I think I could quote for you the fact that we had a board of chaplains assembled here by the War Department, that met for some two weeks in Washington, and who took the advice of men who knew about chaplains, and their report was, "We are not favorable to the single list of promotion."

The CHAIRMAN. They meant they were not favorable to including the chaplains in a single list?

Chaplain AXTON. A single list to include the chaplains, yes, sir; unless, of course, this disparity of age could be properly provided for, and legislation wiser than ours would have to solve it; and we could not find anybody who could solve the problem or suggest how it could be worked out.

Senator FLETCHER. You would not favor promotion by seniority?

Chaplain AXTON. I am afraid we would not be able to get rid of some men that will fall down. In that number of men there are bound to be some men who are misfits, temperamental unfit for the service, who ought in some honorable way be separated from the service.

The CHAIRMAN. The proposal is those officers who find themselves in class C, and who under this proposal must be eliminated, shall, if their service proves to have been honorable and faithful, be retired with pay?

Chaplain AXTON. I saw that, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. If their service has not been honorable and faithful, and their being in class C is due to that fact, then they be discharged.

Chaplain AXTON. After 10 years' service a percentage of pay?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes. In other words, an officer serving 15 or 20 years, who proves unfit or who can not keep up with the game, would not be thrown out on a hard world without a little retirement pay.

Chaplain AXTON. As I understand, under 10 years of the service it would be the intent to give him one year's pay?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes; on the theory that having been in the service so short a time he could go out again into civil life.

Chaplain AXTON. And refit himself?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Has your work increased much as the result of taking over the welfare activities?

Chaplain AXTON. No, sir; we are at the ports of embarkation, where our activities are gradually closing. Camp Mills and those places are going out of existence, but I know in those camps where chaplains are serving the weight of responsibility on them is becoming greater and greater. I had the pleasure recently of looking over the reports of 100 Army chaplains, and those reports indicate that these men are just moving up into the new responsibility, since the War Department is gradually placing on them more and more responsibility.

The CHAIRMAN. It seems to me like a splendid possibility.

Chaplain AXTON. I think there is nothing comparable to that which is in store for the Army chaplain.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, in addition to what might be termed purely religious work of the chaplains, under this new scheme of things, he also states his appropriate part in cooperating with men in their club life, in these buildings that were formerly Y. M. C. A. buildings, and their educational efforts, and their recreational activities?

Chaplain AXTON. Yes, sir; that is expected. That has always been done by live chaplains.

The CHAIRMAN. It is very interesting.

Bishop McDOWELL. May I ask, first, that Dr. White be permitted to read to you, or leave with you, certain testimonials from Gen. Pershing and others, just as you wish? If you will have them read, we shall be glad to read them; if not, we shall be glad to leave them.

I should like to hear Bishop Brent speak for himself, and Father Duffy and all others, touching the question of the chaplain's equipment, if the bishop will.

SUPPLEMENTAL STATEMENT OF BISHOP CHARLES HENRY BRENT.

Bishop BRENT. Mr. Chairman and gentlemen, one of the most important things in our reconstruction is that chaplains should be given facilities. At various times in the past, after seeing the lack of equipment in the Philippines, for instance, we represented to the War Department the absolute need, and we used this argument, that it was as unfair to the chaplains to be sent out without any equipment as it would be to a quartermaster. The chaplain has certain tools, and those tools really are essential.

In addition to that, we had untold difficulty in getting proper places for the chaplains to have religious services, and I think this is especially important, in connection with such posts as Fort McKinley that there should be a building that is provided for the specific purpose of religious services.

Those two things, the equipment and the building, ought in some way to be incorporated in any plan that is made for the development of the chaplain's life and work.

The CHAIRMAN. I assume, Bishop, when you have a corps of chaplains, with either a single or a triple head, that the corps, as a corps, will have a day in court at the War Department, and that the War Department may be persuaded by those very heads of corps of chaplains to recognize the necessities you have just described.

Bishop McDOWELL. Yes; and we want it here, also, Senator, because we want it in the deed.

The CHAIRMAN. In other words, you advance that as an additional argument for the creation of the corps?

Bishop McDOWELL. Yes; Senator.

The CHAIRMAN. It is something like our proposal now that we shall have a chief of Infantry, a chief of Cavalry, a chief of Field Artillery, as part of the organization of the armed branches, and that chief shall be here to boom his branch, in order that that particular branch shall receive attention.

Bishop McDOWELL. Do you wish Secretary White to read these communications?

The CHAIRMAN. I think they can be put in the record, Bishop. Some of us, I know, are familiar with Gen. Pershing's ideas on this.

**STATEMENT OF REV. GAYLORD S. WHITE, SECRETARY GENERAL
COMMITTEE OF ARMY AND NAVY CHAPLAINS, 105 EAST
TWENTY-SECOND STREET, NEW YORK CITY.**

Mr. WHITE. If the committee please, I shall be very glad to read them. There are two letters I should like to read just one paragraph from.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well. You may go ahead.

Mr. WHITE. I went last summer, at the instance of our chairman, to see how the chaplains were functioning on the other side, and I had a wonderful amount of testimony as to the splendid record the chaplains made throughout the war, and Gen. Pershing wrote this letter, of which I propose to read a single clause, as follows:

Under the efficient leadership of Bishop Brent and his assistants, a strong organization was developed, which assured the most effective individual effort, and also a proper correlation of the work of all. The activities of the Army chaplains in France extended from the base port to the firing line. They had the opportunity of affecting in the most intimate way the morale of the organizations to which they were attached, and of this opportunity they took full advantage. Their work as a whole was characterized by untiring zeal, marked disregard of danger, and deep devotion to duty. By their influence, teachings, and example they did much to maintain the high moral standard of the American soldier.

Gen. Liggett, in command of the Third Army of occupation, wrote a letter, from which I quote a single sentence:

The character of the personnel in the chaplain service is the important consideration, and the chaplain's effectiveness depends so largely on his personal influence and the respect with which he is regarded. Any organization of the service (the simpler the better) should concern itself primarily with adequate provisions for the wise selection and supervision, so that this invaluable part of the military establishment may fulfill its important function.

(The papers referred to are here printed in full, as follows:)

IN THE INTEREST OF THE ARMY AND NAVY CHAPLAINS.

A LETTER TO THE SECRETARY OF WAR FROM THE GENERAL COMMITTEE ON ARMY AND NAVY CHAPLAINS, THE GENERAL WAR-TIME COMMISSION OF THE CHURCHES, AND THE FEDERAL COUNCIL OF THE CHURCHES OF CHRIST IN AMERICA.

To the honorable NEWTON D. BAKER,
Secretary of War, Washington, D. C.

SIR: Speaking in the name of the Protestant churches of America as represented in the general war-time commission of the churches and the general committee on Army and Navy chaplains, we beg respectfully to lay before you

the following matters as expressing our mature judgment concerning the things which will make for efficiency in the chaplain service in the Army:

1. We urge most earnestly upon you as of first importance that in plans for the reorganization of the Army adequate provision be made for a chaplain corps in harmony with the general practice of the Army. It is our conviction that this is fundamental if men of the best type are to be attracted to the office of chaplain as a vocation.

2. We respectfully urge upon you that provision be made at the earliest possible date for promotion of chaplains on more just terms than at the present, in order that chaplains performing important functions may have grades in keeping with their responsibilities and that those serving long and faithfully may have adequate recognition.

3. We earnestly protest against any reduction in the proportion of chaplains to officers and enlisted men. The bill "to organize and increase the efficiency of the Regular Army" (H. R. 14560), which we understand to represent the conclusions of the War Department, would have the effect of making the proportion of chaplains to officers and enlisted men approximately 1 to 2,000. We believe a grave mistake would be made if the present proportion of 1 to 1,200 were decreased.

In bringing the above matters formally to your attention,

First. We beg to submit that experience in the present war has demonstrated the need of organization of the chaplains. The chaplain in the days before the war, as a regimental officer, was seldom brought into contact with other chaplains, and was associated only with the comparatively small number of troops of the command to which he was assigned. It was left to him to devise plans of work as he could, his duties in the Army Regulations being only generally defined. Not only is he formally recognized by the Government as the head of the religious work for the soldiers of his unit, but with the concentration of troops in the training camps and in the field and with the development of a unique system of warfare work, which one would expect to be continued in some form in the future of the Army, the opportunities and responsibilities of the chaplain have been greatly enlarged.

Again the need of proper cooperation between all the chaplains in a given camp or cantonment seems obvious, if their work is to be properly done and confusion and waste of effort avoided. Only through the organization and coordination of resources on a scale hitherto undreamed of was the winning of the war made possible. Why should the chaplain service in this country be the only unorganized and uncoordinated service in the Army? In France the need of organization was recognized months ago and the headquarters board of chaplains was appointed by Gen. Pershing, but at home where the need was, we believe, equally great nothing has been done. We are aware that this matter has been under consideration by the War Department and we most earnestly urge that action be taken as speedily as possible looking to the creation of an organization of the chaplains.

Second. With reference to the questions of promotion we submit, further, that it is a manifest injustice to require a chaplain to serve seven years as first lieutenant before being eligible to a captaincy. We note with pleasure the memorandum issued by you on January 25, authorizing "promotions in the Medical, Chaplain, and other Corps of the Army as are within the tables of organization and are necessary to confer rank commensurate with authority exercised or work to be done under such tables."

We would respectfully inquire whether this would permit promotion of chaplains up to and including the grade of colonel. We believe that chaplains should be eligible to attain this grade and that a fair proportion of chaplains should be allowed to each grade from first lieutenant to colonel. We wish it to be clearly understood, however, that we are not interested in rank for its own sake but because, in any part of the military establishment, for the efficient performance of duty rank must be proportionate to the responsibility involved.

As you are aware, Mr. Secretary, the churches of America have given freely of many of their ablest ministers to the service of the Army. They have sought through our committee to cooperate with you in the great work that you have been called to do. They are vitally concerned in the moral and spiritual welfare of the men whom the chaplains serve. They hope many of the chaplains who have shown special fitness will apply for commissions in the permanent Army. They feel, however, that this will be the case only if the chaplain service is so organized as to give opportunity for effective work. For

REORGANIZATION OF THE ARMY.

this reason they will await with keenest interest whatever statement you may be willing to make in regard to the propositions which we place before you.

Very respectfully, yours,

WILLIAM F. McDOWELL,
Chairman.

GAYLORD S. WHITE,
Secretary.

ALFRED HARDING,
WALLACE RADCLIFFE,
E. O. WATSON.

For General Committee on Army and Navy Chaplains.

ROBERT E. SPEER,
Chairman.

WM. LAWRENCE,
Vice Chairman.

WM. ADAMS DEAN,
Secretary.

F. H. KNIEBELS,
JOHN R. MOTT.

For General War-Time Commission of the Churches.

ALBERT G. LAWSON,
Chairman Administrative Committee.

CHARLES S. MACFARLAND,
General Secretary.

For Federal Council of the Churches of Christ in America.

SECRETARY BAKER'S REPLY.

WAR DEPARTMENT,
Washington, March 7, 1919.

DEAR BISHOP McDOWELL: I beg leave to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of March 3, signed by yourself and your associates in the Federal Council of Christ in America and making certain specific recommendations with reference to the place of the chaplains in the permanent organization of the Army. These suggestions are most welcome at the present time, as we are engaged upon a general study of Army organization, and I can assure you for them a most careful consideration.

Cordially, yours,

NEWTON D. BAKER,
Secretary of War.

Bishop WILLIAM F. McDOWELL,
937 Woodward Building, Washington, D. C.

AMERICAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCES,
OFFICE OF THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF,
Paris, August 16, 1919.

Rev. GAYLORD S. WHITE,
Royal Palace Hotel, 8 Rue de Richelieu, Paris.

MY DEAR MR. WHITE: I have received your letter of July 29, asking me to give you a brief statement regarding the place that chaplains held in the American Expeditionary Forces and the part they played in the war.

Under the efficient leadership of Bishop Brent and his assistants, a strong organization was developed, which assured the most effective individual effort and also a proper correlation of the work of all.

The activities of the Army chaplains in France extended from the base ports to the firing line. They had the opportunity of affecting in the most intimate way the morale of the organizations to which they were attached, and of this opportunity they took full advantage. Their work as a whole was characterized by untiring zeal, marked disregard of danger, and deep devotion to duty. By their influence, teachings, and example they did much to maintain the high moral standard of the American soldier.

Sincerely, yours,

JOHN J. PERSHING.

ARMY OF OCCUPATION,
THIRD UNITED STATES ARMY,
OFFICE COMMANDING GENERAL,
June 28, 1919.

MY DEAR DR. WHITE: Referring to our recent conversation, I am glad to repeat what I said with reference to the work of the chaplains in the American Expeditionary Forces. My observation of the chaplains' activities in the forward areas, in the leave areas, and in the Services of Supply is that they have accomplished a great deal of good and have given material assistance in sustaining the morale of the troops and cultivating a wholesome atmosphere under circumstances of peculiar difficulty. During the months following suspension of hostilities they have cheerfully and effectively assisted in the important task of school education for soldiers.

The chaplain has a unique opportunity, and by force of character and devoted ministrations to the men with whom he is assigned to service he can establish relations of confidence and accomplish results which are reflected in the efficiency of the organizations.

The character of the personnel in the chaplain service is the important consideration, as the chaplain's effectiveness depends so largely on his personal influence and the respect with which he is regarded. Any organization of the service—the simpler the better—should concern itself primarily with adequate provisions for wise selection and supervision, so that this invaluable part of the Military Establishment may fulfill its important function.

Very sincerely, yours,

H. LIGGETT,
Lieutenant General, United States Army.

DR. GARDNER WHITE.

1559 CENTRAL AVENUE,
Indianapolis, October 29, 1919.

Col. JOHN B. ROSE,
Seventy-first Regiment Armory, New York.

DEAR SIR: Replying to your favor of the 22d instant, regarding the organization of a chaplain's auxiliary of the National Guard Association. I regret to report that I did not have the privilege of serving with the Third Pennsylvania during the late war. Several years ago it became necessary for me to resign from the Pennsylvania National Guard; consequently, when the United States entered the war, though I applied to the President for a commission as chaplain, I was unable, on account of age, to secure an appointment. The best I could do was to take a commission from the Red Cross as chaplain of base hospital 32, with which I served in France until the autumn of 1918.

I suppose, therefore, that I am not eligible for membership in the chaplains' auxiliary, but, as an old chaplain, I beg to express my interest and my hope that the auxiliary will be formed. If former chaplains should be eligible, my record can be obtained from the Second Pennsylvania, with which I served for a number of years, and from the Third Pennsylvania, with which I was connected for a short period.

Very truly yours,

JOSEPH M. FRANCIS,
Bishop of Indianapolis.

ST. MARY'S RECTORY,
Troy, N. Y., October 27, 1919.

Col. JOHN S. ROSE,
Seventy-first Regiment Armory, New York City, N. Y.

DEAR COLONEL: Your letter of October 22, 1919, is at hand and contents noted.

I am indeed delighted to find that there is afoot an organization, at the present time, such as you speak of in your letter. It has been a much-wanted factor in our National Guard of the State of New York.

We felt its want most particularly at the time of our last entrance into service. I do not feel that in the history of military activities in the United States there was ever proven to the greater satisfaction of our citizens the necessity and advantage of the chaplains' work than in the emergency just ended. They truly proved their work to be the helpful hand-maid of military

training and efficient assistance to all; from the very head of our forces to the latest commissioned second lieutenant.

Man with a realization of his duties to God best knows his duty to his country; man faithful in the performance of his duties to God is best fitted to meet his Creator, and can do it without fear; in short, this we may say, that the lad who serves God best fears death least, and when a man is not afraid to die he makes an ideal soldier.

A conscientious chaplain can and will, not only by word and precept, but by example, instill into his men qualities of a type such as will keep them morally straight and decent, and render them better fitted for the exalted service imposed upon a man in our American forces; its complement will be found in that it renders them capable on their return to civil life of taking their places in the community and amongst their associates as useful, helpful, honest, and upright citizens.

I, therefore, earnestly and heartily endorse the movement of which you speak, and assure you of my cooperation and support in so far as my humble efforts will allow me.

With every best wish for success and thanking you for your kindness in remembering me, I am, sir,

Very sincerely, yours,

FRANCIS A. KELLEY.

SUPPLEMENTAL STATEMENT OF BISHOP WILLIAM F. McDOWELL.

Bishop McDowell. Mr. Chairman and gentlemen: I want, on behalf of all those who have been present to-day and who have also been represented by us who are here, to thank you and your associates of the committee for the very gracious hearing you have given us.

The people of the country, the fathers and mothers of the country who furnish the boys for the Army, whether those fathers and mothers are always themselves religious or not, are tremendously concerned about the moral and spiritual and religious life of the Army in which their sons are. I think that no one thing that your committee can do will more hearten the people of the country with reference to such Army as we may have than the creating of the right kind of provision for the moral life of the Army.

We are very grateful to you for the privilege which you have given us of presenting these views and of leaving these papers relating to this subject.

Furthermore, Mr. Chairman and gentlemen of the committee, we will be very happy to answer any calls you may make upon us at any time with reference to this matter or anything else affecting the welfare of the United States Army.

The CHAIRMAN. We are very glad to have had you, Bishop. It has all been very interesting.

Bishop McDowell. We had one question raised, as to whether or not in the establishment of the corps the matter of denominational differences entered in. I should like to say that my friend and colleague, Father O'Hearn, and I worked together, and he has been interested in the Catholic end of the thing for a great many years, and I wish to say, there is nothing in it.

The CHAIRMAN. I have a letter here from the Chief of the Militia Bureau, Gen. Carter, commenting on the so-called National Guard bill, introduced by Senator Frelinghuysen, which I think it wise to include in the record.

WAR DEPARTMENT,
MILITIA BUREAU,
Washington, December 11, 1919.

HON. JAMES W. WADSWORTH, Jr.,
*Chairman Committee on Military Affairs,
United States Senate.*

MY DEAR SENATOR: Pursuant to request made during my hearing before your committee, I am submitting herewith for your consideration my ideas in regard to Senate Bill No. 3424, introduced by Senator Frelinghuysen. The principal items of new legislation carried by the bill are in regard to the National Guard Council, the National Guard Bureau, and compulsory physical training in schools.

It is believed that to place the development of the National Guard under any other than trained officers of the Regular Army, who are in touch with the needs of the Federal Government, in entire sympathy with the development of the guard to the end that it may be a useful Federal agency, would be a decided step backward. Your attention is invited to the fact that the National Guard was under the entire control of the States and of National Guard officers from the time of the Revolution until approximately 1903—a period of 127 years—and that during that period there was little in its history to commend it as a military asset to the Federal Government. In 1898, records of the National Guard, or Organized Militia, show it to have been composed of organizations varying in strength, with diverse uniforms and equipment, and composed of men the great percentage of whom were physically unfit for military service. There was nothing like uniformity in clothing, equipment, organization, or anything else necessary in the maintenance of a modern army.

From 1903 until 1917 the National Guard has been more or less under the control of a Federal bureau administered by a Regular Army officer. The progress during this régime has far exceeded that made while the States had control of this force. The 17 divisions of the National Guard which fought overseas in the recent World War are evidence of what has been accomplished by the supervision of regular officers over a force which for 127 years of our history had proved nothing but a disappointment. We have only to look back to those years immediately preceding the assumption of this control by the Regular Establishment to see the field training period a week of debauchery and idleness; the military benefit derived from such encampments was absolutely nil. A visit to any of the recent camps of the National Guard under Federal control will show that a vast amount of military work is now accomplished during these periods which were formerly devoted to a riotous life and a general good time.

The provisions of the bill under consideration, with respect to the National Guard council, place 48 National Guard officers, one from each State, in such a position as to menace the authority and usurp the functions of the Secretary of War.

The records of the Militia Bureau conclusively demonstrate the pernicious influence of the meddling of individual States in the perfecting of a Federal military organization. The provisions of the bill with respect to the National Guard council and the National Guard bureau were evidently drawn up with a desire to give to National Guard officers a greater voice in the control of the Nation's military affairs. It is believed that the provisions of the bill would result in further divorcing the interests of the Regular Army and the National Guard, and would tend to lack of cooperation, jealousy and intrigue, and would remove from the National Guard the helpful influence of those regular officers who are now earnestly working for its proper development. It is believed that provision for the detail of a small number of National Guard officers to the General Staff of the Army would give to the National Guard the opportunity that they desire in formulating military policies, and would tend to cooperation, mutual understanding, and increased efficiency in both services.

My experience as Chief of the Militia Bureau has convinced me that one of the greatest obstacles to efficiency in the National Guard is the failure of States to appoint or elect properly qualified military men as adjutants general of the States. It is believed that this could be eliminated to a very great extent by authorizing the Secretary of War, upon the request of a governor, to detail an officer of the Army to act as the adjutant general of a State.

With respect to compulsory physical training in schools, your attention is invited to the fact that public schools are entirely under State control, and the Federal Government is without power to prescribe the curriculum or to enforce a requirement for physical or other special training in these schools. The cost of the arrangement as outlined in the bill would be stupendous as compared with the military benefit to be derived from the training received.

It is believed that the provisions of the act of June 3, 1916, are the best ever made in the interest of the development of the National Guard. Under its application for a little more than a year the National Guard furnished 12,123 officers and more than 367,000 enlisted men, organized into 17 divisions for service overseas. This law has not yet been thoroughly tried out, but its merit is shown in the results obtained. It would seem the part of wisdom to maintain the good features of that act and to modify those features which during its application have been found to be imperfect or deficient.

I would call your attention to the letter of the Secretary of War dated September 30, 1919, to the chairman of the Committee on Military Affairs, United States Senate, upon the subject of "Amendments to the act of June 3, 1916—the national defense act." This letter sets forth the changes which, in the opinion of this bureau, should be adopted at the present time.

I believe it to be proper to invite your attention to the fact that the great amount of complaints presented to your committee at the hearings upon this bill are due to feelings of hostility, unfair treatment and injured feelings which arose after the National Guard was drafted into the Federal service, during the time when the Militia Bureau had no control over them, and were the result of a hasty preparation for war, when the interests of the Government and not the feelings of individuals had to be given first consideration. The Militia Bureau in the past has striven faithfully to carry out the provisions of the laws enacted by Congress and sympathizes with those members of the National Guard who conceive that they have received unjust treatment during their Federal service. The establishment of a National Guard bureau will not eradicate the faults complained of nor prove a remedy for the regrettable individual instances brought to the attention of your committee during its hearings.

In conclusion, I desire to call your attention to some of the inconsistent and apparently unconstitutional provisions of this bill.

Section 14 provides that vacancies shall be filled on the nomination of certain military commanders. The appointment of officers of the militia is reserved to the governors of States by the provisions of Article I, section 8, of the Constitution of the United States.

Sections 23 and 24 direct issues to be made without providing the means of procurement.

Section 36 provides payment for each drill attended by an enlisted man of the National Guard of 25 per cent of the initial monthly pay of enlisted men of corresponding grades in the Regular Army, making it incumbent upon the Federal Government to pay the National Guardsman for five drills in any one month 25 per cent more than it pays the regular soldier for an entire month's work.

Section 36 provides for replacements in National Guard units in time of war from the State or Territory from which the units are drafted. This is entirely impracticable and would insure confusion, delay, and great expense.

Section 40 prescribes the particular officers who shall be appointed by the President, a usurpation of his constitutional function. It also endows the National Guard council with power to control the tactical organization of Federal forces in time of war.

There are numerous provisions in the bill which provide for the employment of National Guard officers and Reserve officers in an active capacity with full pay of their grade. Since presumably these men would find a continuing necessity for their employment, the result would be a large addition to the annual Federal pay roll, and, as I have pointed out above, a very small increase in the military preparedness of our citizens.

Very truly, yours,

J. MCL. CARTER,
Major General, G. S., United States Army,
Chief, Militia Bureau.

STATEMENT OF COL. JOHN H. FRAINE, NORTH DAKOTA NATIONAL GUARD, GRAFTON, N. DAK.

The CHAIRMAN. Colonel, will you give your name and title?

Col. FRAINE. I am colonel of the First North Dakota Infantry, National Guard. I enlisted in the National Guard of Dakota Territory in August, 1884. I served continuously with it since in every grade, except lieutenant. I have been in command of the regiment for the last 12 years; served the Federal Government in the Philippines in 1898 and 1899 as a major in command of a battalion. On the Mexican border in 1916 and 1917, and in the European war until I returned in July, 1919, going there in December, 1917, in command of the First North Dakota, which became the One hundred and sixty-fourth Infantry.

The CHAIRMAN. What division was that?

Col. FRAINE. The Forty-first, the one that was broken up.

The CHAIRMAN. One of them?

Col. FRAINE. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. We would be glad to have your observations, Col. Fraine?

Do I understand, in part, that you represent the adjutant general of the State?

Col. FRAINE. Perhaps it would be better for me to state how I came here, Senator. The adjutant general of the State called me up last Saturday night and told me to come to Washington, to get in touch with Col. Gillette, the chairman of the Legislative Committee of the National Guard Association, for the purpose of appearing before this committee; but I have been unable to see Col. Gillette, or any member of the committee, so that I do not represent the committee. My views may not be the views of the committee, and it is only fair to say that.

I presume the adjutant general of the State of North Dakota sent me here because he knows my views, and he perhaps thinks I have some. He has known me a great many years.

The CHAIRMAN. We shall be glad to have your observations on any of the legislation pending here, or anything connected with it.

Col. FRAINE. The matter under consideration is Senate bill 3424, isn't it?

The CHAIRMAN. That is one of them; yes.

Col. FRAINE. Briefly, I may say that when I arrived here and received a copy of this bill I read it and I find many good things in it, many things that appeal to me, particularly the divorcing of the guard from the control of the Regular Army, and particularly, again, the maintenance of the citizen army in its identity in time of war, the keeping of the officers of the organization with the men and the men with the officers, the officers who have to come home and account to their neighbors and friends for the boys they took away. Those are the two particular things I find advantageous in this bill. It is not as comprehensive a bill as I had hoped to find. I had hoped that the legislation here contemplated the scheme of national defense, based on a citizen army, as it must be based on a citizen army, but as this bill does not contemplate that, I presume that I have not much to say on that subject.

The CHAIRMAN. If you have observations to make or convictions to utter on that we would be glad to have them.

Col. FRAINE. I thank you. I believe in universal compulsory military training. I believe the reliance of this country at all times in case of war must be on a citizen army, and I believe that reliance will be poorly placed unless it is placed on a trained citizen army. I believe that citizen officers, of training and capacity, can train and lead and handle the men in the citizen army better than the Regular Army officers can do so. I think they understand the men better, enter into their minds to a greater extent, and do better work with them, accomplish better results.

I believe also that, while there is a difference of opinion throughout the country in relation to compulsory military training, if it is properly presented to the people, it will appeal to them. There seems to be a confusion in the minds of many people between compulsory military training and compulsory military service.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes; there is a very grave confusion.

Col. FRAINE. They do not realize that training and service are two different things. They object to taking their boys away and putting them in the Army under officers they know nothing about, for a lengthy period, or for any great length of time, interfering with their schooling or other arrangements they have made for their training for their life's mission, but I believe they can be convinced that military training of the young men of this country, beginning, say, at the age of 18, for three months each summer, or two and one-half months, whatever can be gotten in during the school vacation, and then the local drill once a week during the time between the camps, will be not only a fine thing for the men, but is a necessary supplement to the education the public schools are giving them to-day, and I believe they will not only be convinced it is a good thing, but that it will be heartily welcomed if it is properly presented to them. In any case I have talked to them, and I have done a great deal of talking in my country, they nearly all come to the conclusion that that is the proper thing.

Of course, we have an element that does not believe in training or service or anything else that seems to cost them anything, but I am now talking of the great mass of the people of this country, who want to see this country live, and its institutions continue.

The CHAIRMAN. You think it would have a good effect in ways other than military, do you?

Col. FRAINE. Oh, indeed, yes, sir. I think it is a necessary part of the boy's education. It teaches him to stand on his two feet and look a man square in the eye and say "Yes, sir" and "No, sir," something our public schools do not teach him. It teaches him to obey. It teaches him to discipline himself; it teaches him hygiene. It gives him self-respect.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you notice that effect in the troops you commanded or came in contact with during the war?

Col. FRAINE. Yes, sir; very much. And it was the universal remark on our return from each of my tours of duty that the parents and friends of the men I had brought back were outspoken in their praise in the difference in the appearance and the conduct of their boys. They said they were better men; they had matured; they looked

better; they walked better; and they were better; and I know they were.

The CHAIRMAN. There is no question about that.

Col. FRAINE. I do not know of any other remarks I have to make.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you care to comment in any detail on the guard bill? Do you believe in the National Guard council?

Col. FRAINE. Yes; I think so. I am not altogether convinced that a council of that size is necessary, but, Mr. Chairman, I am for anything that lets the National Guard get an opportunity to work out its own salvation and get sympathetic treatment once; then if they do not succeed they never again can be heard to complain.

I have been in the National Guard 34 years. It has been a continual and everlasting struggle. I have spent my time and my money and my efforts in the endeavor to train young men, so that when this country should need them they would be able to render intelligent service, and the assistance we have had from the War Department has been less than nothing; it has been discouraging.

To-day we can not have a guard in our State because the minimum requirement of the War Department is 100 men to a company, an impossibility in our small towns. Sixty-five was previously the minimum. We can do that, and then when a call comes our graduates in sufficient numbers come to us to fill us up to the maximum. There never has been a call when my organization has not been filled to the maximum with my old men. There never has been a time when I could maintain a minimum of 100 men to a company.

Senator NEW. From your answer to that question I take it that you feel that the platoon system, proposed by the War Department, does not meet the requirements.

Col. FRAINE. I do not know what the War Department proposes in the platoon system, Senator, but I assume they suggest we can have a platoon in this town and another one in that town, and so on?

Senator NEW. That is it.

Col. FRAINE. It hardly meets the requirements; no, sir. We must have a company where it can have the advice, counsel, direction, and control of the company commander. A company commander in the National Guard, to be the right kind of a man, has got to be some man. He has to have qualities that the ordinary man has not, and we have to pick them slowly.

If a platoon lives in this town in our State and another at a great distance, because our towns are wide apart, the company commander can not, except at great expense of time and trouble, see his platoons. And he knows nothing about how that platoon is getting on, while he may know about this one. I think we could get 65 men in these towns, and with the filling up you have got your company, and they know their officers. You have got to have an officer over them. A little town has not always an officer in it fit to command.

The CHAIRMAN. What efforts have been made thus far in North Dakota for reconstituting its guard?

Col. FRAINE. There have been none, sir, except discussions between those older officers interested in the guard, because we realize the impossibility. It is useless to start with the minimum of 100. We can not do it. Our towns are small. The largest town in the State has not 25,000 population. The town that I live

in has 2,400; still that town turned out two full companies for this war, and all men who had had training in that one National Guard company that we have maintained there for 34 years. In the Spanish-American war we sent one full company from there; and when some other companies were short at camps, I sent up and got more. I could have had 400 from there at that time.

Our men come back. We make them love the regiment; they have a pride in it. That pride can be kept up by a provision in this bill, which is that the National Guard shall serve together. It was destroyed in this war. My men were taken from me. I lost 2,600 men in one day; they were taken to another organization. They were good men, of course, or they would not have taken them; but they never had the pride in the organizations that they went to that they had in the one they left, and have not to-day.

Senator NEW. They went reluctantly?

Col. FRAINE. They went, of course.

Senator NEW. And to a strange company?

Col. FRAINE. Yes; and under strange officers, and to-day they will say their one regret is that they could not have service together.

It is contrary to the teaching of all military doctrine. The hardest thing to get and maintain is esprit de corps. Every effort should be bent toward creating it, but it was absolutely destroyed. Men were issued like mules or shoes. A man never knew what organization he would belong to. My officers and men were in every organization in France and Germany, and they, without exception, made good, but they all had their regret at not having served with the regiment.

The CHAIRMAN. Your regiment became a replacement regiment?

Col. FRAINE. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you believe the creation of a National Guard Council, reporting direct to the Secretary of War, would result in more or less friction between the guard and the regulars?

Col. FRAINE. I do not think it would result in friction at all, sir. I think perhaps a wrong impression prevails as to the feeling between the National Guard and the regulars. We start out with the proposition originally that the National Guard had the idea that the Regular Army was perfect; that the officers and men knew their business and knew it thoroughly; that we had a small but very effective Regular Army. Most of us have come to the conclusion that that is 50 per cent true—the Army was small. Our experience with them was such as to find that the very things we had to do were the things they would not let us do. We have no feeling against them, but we do object to being used the way we have been used. We are perfectly willing to let them go ahead and be professional soldiers, study and work to perfect themselves; form the plans, and we will work them out; we will help; we will do anything we can; but we know that we can handle our own men better than they can, and we know what we need.

I have many friends amongst the Regular Army officers. I have associated with them for years. Personally, they are likable, gentlemanly, courteous men, but as a class they sure have a contempt for the National Guard, and show it.

The CHAIRMAN. What experience came to your personal attention that led to that view?

Col. FRAINE. That would be hard to repeat.

The CHAIRMAN. Just the general atmosphere?

Col. FRAINE. Senator, one does not treasure the incidents, you know, and does not remember them. I could hardly relate them; but I presume if I thought a minute or two I could think of a good many. At any rate, I got the impression, and I am not the only one who received it. Yes, I can think of one now. By the way, the officer himself is here at the Walter Reed Hospital, that I am going to mention.

An officer of mine, a machine gun commander, was sent on S O S call to a Regular division. The call came down to send two officers up to that division who could teach indirect laying of machine guns; and this officer and one other from the National Guard was sent up to that machine gun brigade. That was about February, 1918. Some six weeks afterwards an inspector was up there and found fault with the training of that brigade, and the major instructor, the Regular Army officer of the school, was sent for, and he went up to investigate, and found these two officers, instead of being allowed to instruct that brigade, were being carried on the rolls as militia officers under instruction, and they had never been given an opportunity to teach one single thing. That captain is here in Washington. He is pretty badly smashed up, and he has been at the Walter Reed Hospital ever since he came back last spring.

The CHAIRMAN. They did not use them for the purposes for which they were desired?

Col. FRAINE. No, sir; not at all, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. What do you think about this provision in the bill which seeks to install training in the schools?

Col. FRAINE. I am not thoroughly convinced that you will get your money's worth out of it. I am for training boys any time and all the time; but, in the first place, the teaching you get in the school is only close order stuff; it is not the start, really; it is disciplinary, it is true, but it is not the start in training for an infantryman. An infantryman must know more than any other soldier in the Army; he has got to be more highly trained. And, moreover, the teachers generally, the school people, are opposed to the Army idea. They are opposed to training. That you will find to be true all over the country, even in schools where the Government is paying money and requiring military training. I am now talking of the agricultural colleges. They do it, it is true, but it is perfunctory, and they do it with a reservation.

Senator FLETCHER. Is it not very difficult to carry on military training at the same time they are pursuing their other courses?

Col. FRAINE. It is if you limit the school hours to the same number of hours they have now, because they have plenty to do in academic training. Moreover, you should have these young men right under you. They see the teacher every day, and some way they have not got that way of impressing themselves that the natural trainer of men has.

Senator NEW. It is true, is it not, that the Government has no such relation to the schools, no contract that would permit of that training being carried on directly under governmental supervision?

Col. **FRANE**. At the agricultural colleges there is an officer in each case, but I have talked with a number of those officers and they tell me that they do not get sympathetic treatment from the college authorities.

The **CHAIRMAN**. From the faculty?

Col. **FRANE**. From the faculty. They are given the men, it is true, but they do not get the encouragement that they should get if they are going to get results. I think it does good, but I do not think it does as much good as the money paid them warrants.

The **CHAIRMAN**. That might be the danger in this thing, it would be good in some ways and bad in others, and no way the Federal Government could make it good in all respects?

Col. **FRANE**. Yes, sir.

The **CHAIRMAN**. Have you any other observations to make, Col. **Frane**?

Col. **FRANE**. No, sir; I think not. I shall be glad to answer any questions at all that I can answer.

The **CHAIRMAN**. What do you think about giving the National Guard representation on the General Staff?

Col. **FRANE**. You mean by one officer, or something of that kind?

The **CHAIRMAN**. By an appropriate number of officers, distributed through the whole General Staff at Washington, so that they would be represented, and their views would be heard in every staff decision made by the several committees and subcommittees of the General Staff?

Col. **FRANE**. That might be all right, sir. That was the idea I had at first. This matter of a council is entirely new to me. I would be for anything that would take us out of direct control of the Militia Bureau.

Senator **FLETCHER**. Suppose you had representation on the Militia Bureau?

Col. **FRANE**. I do not think that would do. I think we can work out our own salvation. The best thing to do would be to have us work out our own salvation.

Senator, we must start with the idea that our men are different than the men in the Regular Army. We must admit that. We get our young men from the best families in the country, full of pep and vinegar, and the Regular Army gets its men largely, I do not mean entirely, but very largely, from the class of men who have given up the struggle for life; they go to them with an empty belly. They are frequently refugees from justice. They are not the type of men we have in the National Guard.

Now, these officers have been trained in teaching that kind of men, and they get the impression that all men are just like them, and our men can not be used that way. We have got a different type of men to deal with entirely.

The National Guard officer is a thing by himself. He is an altruist. He has generally gone into this thing, usually as a result of reading, at some time in his life, whereby a conviction has grown up that every country has a war every generation, and that some one ought to do what they can to train young men to render intelligent service, and he knows; he enters into the minds of these young men, he knows all about them, knows their families. He has got to be a man of

standing in his community; he has got to be a man of substance, or he can not put up the necessary funds, sometimes. He has to be a man of force; he has to be a man of zeal; he has to be a man of industry; he has got to take his time from his own business, making his own living. The conditions are so different that the Regular Army officer does not appreciate them at all.

Frequently we have inspecting officers attached to the State that do get in contact with us, and without exception all I have ever known have exclaimed with wonder at the National Guard officer. They realize, but the men who get to be on the General Staff in charge of the Militia Bureau do not know anything about it. They are tackling a subject they know nothing about.

The CHAIRMAN. I think there is a large measure of truth in that. I once heard a Regular Army officer, the inspector instructor of the National Guard in one of the biggest States, now pretty well up in the service, say it took a good deal better man to be a captain in the Guard than a captain in the Regulars, because he has to be so many things a captain in the Regulars can not be.

Col. FRAINE. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. He has got to be a good recruiting officer, first; he has got to go in and persuade the men to enlist.

Col. FRAINE. He has got to look after property, and there is no string on the property, and the shirts and shoes do disappear. If you go through this country, through the National Guard, and the National Army, I venture to say you will find a very strong feeling against the Regular Army; and if you investigate you will find it built up because of the acts of the Regular Army and the actions of the Regular Army officer toward the National Army and the National Guard.

Senator FLETCHER. You think there were discriminations, beyond any question?

Col. FRAINE. I was convinced of it, sir. I think I could hardly feel otherwise when 75 per cent of the National Guard colonels were sent home. They are not all as bad as that. It was all right for a lieutenant or a captain, but from major up they had an awfully hard time. There were not any Regular Army officers below major, so the captains and the lieutenants had a better time, but from top to bottom there was a feeling of uncertainty, of unease, that militated against a man's usefulness; from the top to the bottom of the Army. I was there 20 months, and that is the result of my observations. I do not say that because I was sent home; I was not. I think I was the last National Guard colonel to come home.

Senator FLETCHER. Did you receive promotion?

Col. FRAINE. Oh, no; no National Guard colonel gets a promotion. I was lucky to live through.

The CHAIRMAN. I know two or three who did.

Col. FRAINE. Who got promotion?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes; over there.

Col. FRAINE. Indeed, I had not heard of any.

The CHAIRMAN. Col. Sherburne, Massachusetts; Col. Debevois, New York, was made brigadier general of Infantry over there. Those two I happen to know.

Col. FRAINE. Was that the New York division?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Col. FRaine. That would be different. You see, New York had a division by itself over there.

Senator THOMAS. Massachusetts had not.

Col. FRaine. No; Massachusetts did not. That was a New York division.

The CHAIRMAN. Col. Sherburne got his brigadier generalship and was given a brigade in the Sixth Division, so the promotion was not in the division.

Senator FLETCHER. I think Col. Blanding, of Florida, received promotion.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes; he was made brigadier general in the New York division. That is three I know of.

Col. FRaine. Well, I had not heard of them. I had heard of none.

The CHAIRMAN. Have you any other observations to make?

Col. FRaine. No, sir. I do hope that something will be done, as I say, to give the National Guard an opportunity to work out its own salvation, and preferably by universal compulsory military training.

The CHAIRMAN. I am glad to hear you voice that.

Senator FLETCHER. You have been around somewhat over the country. How do you find the sentiment toward this universal training?

Col. FRaine. This seems to be about the sentiment: We have a certain class of people who do not want anything in the way of army; do not want any training; do not want to serve; do not want anything except what they can get out of the country. They are the people who are making trouble all the while. There are others who do not want their boys taken away; they are willing everybody else should serve, but they do not want their boys to serve. There are others who have got the subjects of military training and service in time of peace mixed up; but, generally speaking, the people to whom it is explained what service means and what training means, and the question is put up to them, "Well, your boy would serve anyway in time of war, would he not?" "Oh, yes." "Well, don't you want every other boy to serve, or do you want them to get out, as some of them did in this war?" "Why, we want them all to serve." "Then, the thing is to train them all?" "Yes."

The great majority of the well-thinking, well-meaning citizens of this country would welcome a compulsory military training bill, I believe. There might be some protests, at first, on the part of some. You could not pass any legislation without it, but the body of the people would welcome it, I believe.

(Whereupon, at 4.30 o'clock p. m., the subcommittee adjourned until Wednesday, December 17, 1919, at 2.15 o'clock p. m.)

REORGANIZATION OF THE ARMY.

WEDNESDAY, DECEMBER 17, 1919.

UNITED STATES SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON MILITARY AFFAIRS,
Washington, D. C.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to adjournment, at 2.15 o'clock p. m., in the committee room, Capitol, Senator James W. Wadsworth, jr., presiding.

Present: Senators Wadsworth (chairman), New, Frelinghuysen, Fletcher, Sutherland, and Thomas.

Also present: Mr. Allan A. Tukey, chairman of special committee on military policy of the American Legion, Omaha, Nebr.; Mr. Milton J. Foreman, Chicago, Ill.; Mr. Thomas W. Miller, chairman national legislative committee, the American Legion, Delaware; Gen. J. F. O'Ryan.

STATEMENT OF MR. ALLAN A. TUKEY, CHAIRMAN SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON MILITARY POLICY OF THE AMERICAN LEGION, OMAHA, NEBR.

The CHAIRMAN. Gentlemen, the members of the military policy committee of the American Legion have returned to us to-day to continue a discussion of the question that has been before us for so long.

Have you got any additional statements prepared, gentlemen, or any that you desire to make or leave?

Mr. TUKEY. Yes, sir; I have the following statement to make to the committee:

That a Regular Army be maintained only of sufficient size to adequately care for our outlying possessions and provide a force for interior garrisons and coast defense.

That the policy of Universal Training for the youth of the Nation is a prerequisite of good citizenship and should consist of a degree of military training sufficient to insure an organized force for the protection of the Nation when needed. It should include education in the fundamentals of our form of Government and the rights and responsibilities of citizenship to the end that the mind as well as the body may respond to the needs of the Nation in times of peace as well as in times of war.

That this training shall be taken by the youth of the Nation in their eighteenth, nineteenth or twentieth years, and shall be for a

period of not less than four and not more than six months during the first year, to be followed by a two weeks' training period each year for two years.

That the men subject to the training may as an equivalent for the foregoing take their training in properly supervised federalized National Guard organizations.

That the training of the Citizen Army be under the control of its own officers.

That the Citizen Army shall not be used for military purposes in time of peace, except in the case of National Guard organizations.

That officers of the Regular and Citizen Army shall be subject to examination and test to determine their fitness for their rank and for promotion and that officers found inefficient or unfit for promotion be removed.

That the powers vested in the President of the United States and the Secretary of War be exercised by them and not delegated to others.

That the War Department General Staff of the Army be liberalized by an admixture of citizen officers.

We recommend that military training in high schools and colleges be encouraged.

We favor the continuance of training camps for the training and education of officers to serve with the citizen army.

We recommend that the Air Service be made a separate department and considered as a combat branch of the Army.

That the citizen army should be organized into corps, divisions, and smaller units composed in each case of officers and men who come from the same State or locality and preserving local designations as far as practicable, and should be assigned to definite units while training.

The selection and training of men for the citizen army should be under the local control and administration of its own officers, subject to general national regulations.

Senator SUTHERLAND. Is that a resolution?

Mr. TUKEY. This whole statement is practically a paraphrase of our resolutions as passed, elaborated on in some little particulars.

Senator FLETCHER. What do you mean there by National Guard organizations federalized?

Mr. TUKEY. If you will permit me, I will have Col. Foreman explain our idea in that respect.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you care yourself to enlarge upon this statement, or do you desire Mr. Foreman to do so?

Mr. TUKEY. There are several points in this you may want enlarged on, and I suggest that Mr. Foreman speak of the National Guard end of it.

Senator THOMAS. There is one suggestion there that is humanly impossible of performance; that is, that the President of the United States and the Secretary of War shall personally exercise the duties which would rest upon them. They would not be able, by working every moment of every hour of every day during their terms of office, to attend to more than 2½ or 3 per cent.

Mr. TUKEY. It is our idea, sir, that the President should be the actual Commander in Chief of the Army of the United States; should in fact be that.

Senator SUTHERLAND. He might be the actual Commander in Chief of the Army of the United States and then it be necessary for him to delegate a great majority of the duties appertaining to that one position.

Mr. TUKEY. Yes, sir.

Senator THOMAS. So that part of the program I do not think is possible of adoption.

The CHAIRMAN. That probably could not be expressed in legislation, anyway, Senator.

Senator THOMAS. No; it could not.

The CHAIRMAN. It is already in the Constitution.

Senator THOMAS. But, independently of that, the physical impossibility of the task is obvious. Personally I should like to see it done. I do not believe in delegation of authority.

Mr. TUKEY. That is our idea; we would like to see it done.

STATEMENT OF MR. MILTON J. FOREMAN, CHICAGO, ILL.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Foreman, we shall be glad to hear from you.

Mr. FOREMAN. The last time this committee of the American Legion appeared before the committee of the Senate a question arose as to in what manner the neighborhood influences exerted in developing military enthusiasm and patriotic endeavor could be maintained. At that time the discussion was that local organizations should be formed. At that time the question of the National Guard was touched upon, and I am rather in a dual capacity here, because I appear here as a member of the military policies committee, and I have also been in the National Guard for 25 years.

After the committee meeting the committee of the American Legion discussed the matter very fully, and they came to the conclusion that from every point of view, practical as well as military and patriotic, that the National Guard organizations should be maintained. When the term "Federalized National Guard" is used, it is used in the sense as it was used under the national defense act, namely, a National Guard organized under regulations passed by the Congress, trained in accordance with the training laid down for the Regular Army, and in a measure maintained by the United States. That act attempted to extend Federal control over the National Guard as fully as it could.

It is suggested by the committee that the National Guard organizations in the several States be permitted, up to the extent now authorized by the national defense act, that those organizations be used as an auxiliary, or as an equivalent for equivalent training of a man. We are impressed with the belief that the opposition to universal military training will arise very largely, or to a very large extent, from people who believe that it makes them bear an economic and a financial loss and who are unable to mentally visualize the resultant benefits of that. We believe that if the National Guard is permitted to train men through the local organization under a supervision to be fixed by a regulation, that much of the opposition to universal training might disappear.

It is proposed that there shall be actual equivalent given in these National Guard organizations for the training that is given in the

field, as, for example, if it is determined that universal training shall cover four months, that a number of hours of training in National Guard organizations, which shall be equal to it, should be determined and should be enforced; that within the areas, the administrative and military areas, whether it be a company, or corps, or a division, it shall be the business of the corps or the divisional commander to cause that instruction to be supervised and enforced.

We are of the opinion that the National Guard organizations of the United States occupy a very warm place in the hearts of the people in the localities in which they live. I know that in Illinois there is a very active movement amongst the men from whom we look for the better things of reorganizations to retain the National Guard. Therefore the opinion of the committee of the American Legion is that the very best results would be achieved if a training period were adopted that is not too oppressive and that the National Guard be permitted to be used as an auxiliary for alternative training. Men could then have their choice. Many men, perhaps, would choose to get through with their training at once; other men, as I say, because of financial and economic arrangements, would decide to take it in homeopathic doses and devote their evenings to it, as it is done in night schools in the cities where they can not go to a day school.

The records of the National Guard divisions of organizations in the late war, I think, demonstrated that whatever opinions we may have had about the system that enthusiasm, the loyalty to organization, the loyalty to home, and the belief of our neighbors in us and our duty to our State and to our locality made the organizations fully as creditable as any other organizations that were in the field.

May I digress one moment? Much of the difficulty, sir, in my opinion, that arises from the National Guard situation comes from the interpretation of National Guard laws, militia laws, by unfriendly minds. Men who fundamentally do not believe in the system and who are apt to construe not in the manner, perhaps unconsciously—I have no criticism to offer—but who unconsciously construe it in a manner which is not entirely helpful, instead of developing in the strongest sense the entire legal possibilities of the legislation.

I think every commanding officer will bear me out in saying that any interpretations and any orders that have been from time to time issued have made it very difficult for National Guard organizations to be made and has made it very hard to continue the training. We believe, therefore, that whatever organization of the United States Government is given the charge of the training it should be very largely—at least one-half—under the control or charge or domination of citizen soldiers, and that, in a certain sense, while the National Guard should always be Federalized, should be a part of the United States Army, it should be so handled, controlled, and taught that it would feel encouraged and not feel as though, as we often have, that they are doing something that is not appreciated and that the difficulties are being made greater. For that end it might be possible to require direct touch between some officer or officers who are chosen from the citizen force to interpret the acts and the laws and the achievements of the National Guard.

Senator FLETCHER. Do you think that training ought to be compulsory?

Mr. FOREMAN. Yes, sir. A man should be required to take his training at one place or the other.

Senator FLETCHER. What ages do you suggest?

Mr. FOREMAN. Well, from 18 to 21 should be compulsory any way. Men will stay in the organizations longer than that because of the associations and friendships. In my regiment, which I am reorganizing now, I have men who have been in for 15 years. I have been in 25 years, but I am not normal.

Senator NEW. You said something a little while ago to the effect that you thought, as I understood you, that the man who failed to take his training in the regular cantonment should be required to devote an equal number of hours to service with the National Guard.

Mr. FOREMAN. To get an equivalent training.

Senator NEW. Did I get that right?

Mr. FOREMAN. Yes, sir; to get an equivalent training. If he fails to get the equivalent training. If he fails to get the equivalent training in the National Guard or fails to obtain his drill or instruction, he should be immediately trained in the field. He should not be permitted to avoid it.

Senator NEW. Then, Colonel, one moment; I want to get that perfectly clear in my mind. Your idea is that he should be given the option to join the National Guard organization and that if he fails to do that, then he shall be required, by law, to take an equal amount of training under Federal supervision?

Mr. FOREMAN. Yes, sir; and if he fails during a time he is a member of the National Guard to take his instruction continuously, then, after a certain period, he should become liable to the training under the citizen army.

Senator THOMAS. He should either fish or cut bait?

Mr. FOREMAN. That is right, sir.

Senator FRELINGHUYSEN. Do you propose that the first period of training shall be four months of intensive training?

Mr. FOREMAN. That is what was proposed. I merely used that as a symbol.

Senator FRELINGHUYSEN. Take that as the period for the universal service of a boy 19 years old. That would be four months of practically six hours per day?

Mr. FOREMAN. Yes, sir.

Senator FRELINGHUYSEN. That would be 720 hours of training?

Mr. FOREMAN. Yes.

Senator FRELINGHUYSEN. How do you propose to equalize that in National Guard training, where the National Guard drill once a week three hours and drill six months each year, where the extreme limit in one year would be practically 75 hours of training? How can you equalize it? You would have to keep the boy in the National Guard for four years, to equalize the training of the same number of hours.

Mr. FOREMAN. Our idea was an equivalent training. The different branches of the service require a different amount of training. For example, in the hours given a National Guard man, he goes to his

target range during the summer months practically every Saturday and Sunday until he fires his maximum. That would be added in hours. He has a tour of duty every summer. That tour of duty could be made—I know employers in Chicago are perfectly willing—that tour of duty could be made two or three weeks, three weeks if necessary, and they are perfectly willing.

Senator SUTHERLAND. At camps?

Mr. FOREMAN. Yes, sir; and camp maneuvers every summer, two or three weeks, and they are willing to pay their employees and to give them their vacations besides. Even to-day I think the merchants and manufacturers are having a meeting in Chicago, as the result of several meetings, to take final steps to bring their men into the National Guard; and they have all stated they would give them sufficient vacations in summer, with pay, and with their normal vacation, so it would make no difference whether it is two or three weeks, and in that manner I think we could probably give the equivalent amount of training with a reasonable time.

The National Guardsmen would not have a good many things to do which they would have to do in cantonments. They would have no kitchen police, and their hours could be devoted exclusively to training. In any one branch of the service very much of the work is school-room work; in the artillery there is a great deal of it, and much of it is done Saturdays. In my old Cavalry regiment a great many of them worked Sunday. It is surprising how much time the men are willing to give up to a thing they really like. And I think that three years—four at the outside—would suffice to give a man all the training that he needed, an equivalent amount of training; and I think the men that would come to the National Guard would willingly give that time two or three years.

The CHAIRMAN. As I understand it, Colonel, you would limit the number of men in the National Guard just as they are limited to-day under the national-defense act?

Mr. FOREMAN. I understand that is the view of the committee.

The CHAIRMAN. Of your committee.

Mr. FOREMAN. Yes, sir. That is the view of the committee, is it not, Mr. Tukey?

Mr. TUKEY. Yes, sir.

Mr. FOREMAN. The number provided for by the national-defense act?

Mr. TUKEY. I do not know that the committee has put any definite number, but there would be a limit.

Mr. FOREMAN. I do not recall, though.

Of course there is a physical limit; there is automatically a physical limit; they are regulated by the matter of armories and all that sort of thing makes them self-regulating. But I have been very much impressed, gentlemen, in my own city, by the number of men who would be actively opposed to military training if it interfered with any part of their working life, yet who would be perfectly willing to take the training otherwise.

The supervision of training and the inspection, too, outside of the National Guard, as in the limits of the various areas, should be also under the corps or divisional commander and his staff, as the case might be. The organization of the National Guard should conform, as far as practicable, to the organization of the organized reserve.

The question of appointment of officers is one which was touched upon, and the thought was expressed that perhaps it might be found desirable to issue the same commission to all officers, which could be done by the President of the United States upon recommendation of the governors.

The CHAIRMAN. In other words, you would have the National Guard officers Reserve officers as well?

Mr. FOREMAN. Yes, sir. I see no reason why it should not be.

The CHAIRMAN. Would you suggest that that be made a condition precedent to their receiving Federal recognition as Guard officers?

Mr. FOREMAN. I am under the belief that if National Guard organizations are supported and maintained they ought to be subjected to the call of the President at any time necessary to use them; and I think, therefore, if they hold their commissions from the President of the United States, he probably would have fuller control over them than otherwise.

There is one more thing, repeating what I have said here before. There is nothing that would stimulate and maintain military spirit or desire of military training spirit as much as the daily, nightly, weekly association of men in their armories. It is a club for them, and even though they are not at drill, in my old regiment there was a quarter of the regiment present every night, in spite of the fact that it was not their normal drill night. I believe it is sociologically a splendid thing, because it gives occupation to young men, interests young men; gives employment for their activities and energies, which might be directed in much worse manner, and it gives to the chap who has not club membership and who has not a large circle of acquaintances an opportunity to meet his fellows and associate with them, and it affords an interest which is highly useful.

Senator NEW. Let me revert a moment to what you said a short time ago, about making the officers reserve officers and keeping them under the control of the President. I notice here, in the suggestions which Mr. Tukey submitted, the following:

That the powers vested in the President of the United States and the Secretary of War be exercised by them and not delegated to others.

Has that reference to this matter? If not, just what is meant by that?

Mr. FOREMAN. I am not the author of that phrase, but I think it is directed to the single control of the General Staff. That is just my guess.

Mr. TUKEY. I think you have guessed about right, sir.

Senator NEW. That is just what I wanted to bring out.

The CHAIRMAN. You have mentioned the General Staff, and that leads me to ask another question. I think among the recommendations, you say that citizen officers should form a part of the General Staff?

Mr. FOREMAN. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you care to enlarge on that, sir?

Mr. FOREMAN. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. I regard it as most important.

Mr. TUKEY. I might enlarge on it a little, Senator. We are not prepared to say what actual percentage of citizen officers are neces-

sary on the War Department General Staff. We think there should be an admixture of citizen officers. I think, however, that on any branch or committee of the General Staff which has directly to do with the training, with the commissioning of officers, with laying down any regulations that have to do with the citizen army, that citizen officers should be represented on that branch or committee, have a percentage of at least one-half.

The CHAIRMAN. And would you apply that same principle to any committee of the General Staff with troops that draw special regulations applicable to the corps area or divisional area?

Mr. TUKEY. Yes, sir; if that was a corps or division of the citizen army.

The CHAIRMAN. Would you recommend merging National Guard units into the tactical organizations of the citizens army, or would you organize the units of the National Guard into National Guard units of a greater size?

Mr. TUKEY. That is a matter which we have not gone into. It is a detail that is a matter of regulation, a detail of administration.

The CHAIRMAN. Have you any method to suggest for the means of selecting citizen officers for service on the General Staff?

Mr. TUKEY. We have no definite means. I can read you one thing we have drawn up here.

Mr. FOREMAN. May I make one suggestion?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Mr. FOREMAN. The qualification cards, whatever officer served during the war, in this war, a great many of the officers went to staff college. There are some general officers who have distinguished themselves by their administrative and other knowledge. I think for the beginning, the first men that were appointed, their qualifications could be easily discovered, from the records of the War Department and the qualification cards would show what training they have had and what duties they have performed, and, in view of the fact that most of us were under the command of Regular Army officers, there is no danger of being overmarked.

The CHAIRMAN. In this discussion of the General Staff, I think it is well to remember one or two things. We have had some unfortunate frictions, which everybody is acquainted with, and the subcommittee of the Military Affairs Committee of the Senate has gone into that pretty carefully and has had drawn up tentatively, applicable mostly to the Regular Service, so called, a scheme by which officers of the Army may be detailed to General Staff duty only after they have secured a position upon an eligible list. The initial eligible list would, of course, have to be started arbitrarily, and our thought had been that it would be wise and practical that the initial eligible list for General Staff duty—and this would apply to any sort of army you raised—that the initial eligible list should be composed of men who, prior to the German war, had graduated from the staff-school system of the Army, and been recommended upon graduation from the staff-school system as qualified for duty as a chief of staff or commander of the division or for duty with the General Staff; and that, in addition to those, there should be placed upon the initial eligible list officers whose records in this war showed them fitted for General Staff duties. The hope of the committee was that by establishing an eligible list and having it continue year after year,

we would bring to the service of the General Staff, both at Washington and with troops, men who were actually educated for that duty, with great advantage to themselves, capable of performing it, thus doing away with a good deal of the friction and misunderstandings, largely due to ignorance of some officers, ignorant of what General Staff duties mean.

Do you think this could be fitted in with the general scheme?

Mr. TUKEY. Yes, sir; I do. That is along the same lines with the French system carried out to-day?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes; practically.

Mr. TUKEY. But may I ask if citizen officers would be eligible to the various schools and staff colleges?

The CHAIRMAN. They certainly would. I think it is fair to say, even at this stage of the proceedings, that this subcommittee has determined to open up all the facilities of the Regular Service to the citizen officer, from top to bottom, and permit him to reach—whether he is a Guard officer or some other kind of citizen soldier—permit him to reach, within reasonable bounds, of course, all facilities provided by the Regular Establishment and to reach any length.

Mr. TUKEY. Is it your idea that if there should not be enough citizen officers on that eligible list to form whatever proportion is determined of the General Staff that they would be temporarily appointed for service on the General Staff, whether or not they had qualified for the eligible list?

The CHAIRMAN. The subcommittee had not reached a decision upon that point. That is why I asked you if you had any suggestions to make regarding the selection of citizen officers, be they Guard officers or otherwise, for service on the General Staff. I think it would be unfair to require for the future that no citizen officer could serve upon the General Staff unless he went through the whole education system of the Regular Service. It would result, I am sure, that very few citizen officers could pass the time to do it. It would take many months, indeed, it might take some years. So that I do not think that qualification should be imposed upon them with rigidity.

Mr. TUKEY. It is not possible to think that there are quite a number of citizen officers who are qualified by their business or profession to handle certain branches of the General Staff work, and not thereby be available for the General Staff?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, but our ambition is to have citizen officers in all branches of the General Staff, not merely in a branch where a civilian happens to be well suited, but in all branches.

Mr. MILLER. Right there, Senator, it seems to me there are enough citizen officers of the line who have gone through this war, not only holding staff positions, but who have had line experience, to form an initial list for the General Staff, and on that point—and I think my colleagues will agree with me—a man to become a General Staff officer should have had line experience in most cases, because if an officer has not had line experience and is not able to appreciate the troubles of the regimental or company commander and the men under him, he is going to give out orders and make trouble for those people when the time comes.

The CHAIRMAN. I do not anticipate any difficulty in making up your initial list. The thing I am looking forward to is the situation 10 or 15 years from now, when the great body of citizen officers who

have come out of this war, and who are thoroughly well qualified for service on the General Staff, will be stepping off the stage.

Mr. MILLER. Right on that point, if you continue training camps, for the training and education of officers, as we have advocated, you will be able to have an eligible list of experienced young officers coming out, who can be picked out for General Staff duties, but they should go through the training camps, in practically all the cases, unless there is a specialist wanted here or there, like a Gen. Atterbury, or people we have mentioned before.

The CHAIRMAN. I anticipated you would have some suggestion of that sort, even if you have not gone into detail. Of course something must be devised, and my personal opinion is it must not be as severe as might be imposed upon members of the Permanent Establishment, otherwise I think you might defeat the purpose you have in view—that is, bringing all elements interested in the military game together, and to make them work together.

Mr. FOREMAN. May I make a suggestion? Col. Davis is here. He commanded a combat regiment, and he has given a great deal of study to the military problems, and we should like to have the committee have the benefit of his suggestions, would we not, Mr. Tukey?

Mr. TUKEY. Yes, we would. He is not a member of our committee.

The CHAIRMAN. We will be glad to hear from you, Col. Davis.

STATEMENT OF COL. ABEL DAVIS.

The CHAIRMAN. What was your unit, Colonel?

Col. DAVIS. I commanded the One hundred and thirty-second Infantry.

The CHAIRMAN. What division?

Col. DAVIS. The Thirty-third Division.

I want it understood that whatever I might say does not in any way bind the committee of the American Legion; that, while I am a member of the American Legion, I have not the honor of being a member of the committee, and am expressing my own individual views, and the views of National Guardsmen who had the opportunity of serving in the war; and who are now interested in the general question of the military policy of our country.

I take it that possibly the gentlemen of the committee would like to have me address myself to the question of the National Guard, as it might affect the military policy, and, of course, I should be delighted to answer any questions that might be propounded.

Senator NEW. Before your regiment was taken into the Federal service it was a National Guard regiment of Illinois?

Col. DAVIS. Yes, Senator; it was a National Guard regiment of Illinois.

Senator NEW. The Second Illinois?

Col. DAVIS. The Second Illinois Infantry; that is right, sir.

Senator NEW. Of Chicago?

Col. DAVIS. Of Chicago; yes, sir.

There are two main reasons in my mind why the question of the National Guard should be made a part of the general question of the military policy of the United States. The States in the Union have, and insist on having, military forces which are available for

State purposes, and still, speaking from my personal experience of over 20 years as a National Guardsman, I know it is out of the question to try to get young men to volunteer for the services in any military organization on any other basis except one that in case of war, or any other national disturbance, they will have an opportunity to serve their Nation, and to that extent there is always a greater pride in the Nation as a whole than there is in the local State. That has been my theory, and has been the theory of a good many of the people, and we found out by practical experience during the war that that was the actual practice, that when the National Guard regiments were called in the service, and were either in the training camps in this country or in France, an effort was made by the States to get men to volunteer for purely State purposes, it was made clear that they would not be available for Federal purposes, except under the general provisions of the draft law, which may draw them in there, these men did not want to do it, and they never want to do it; they do not want to do it in time of peace or in times of war.

I think we may take, as far as the States are concerned, that they can not have any military establishment as a State institution on any other basis except service to the country at large, as well as to the States.

I know, as well as you gentlemen of the committee know, of the many legal principles that prevail as to Federal and State service and constitutional provisions, and, because of that, we have rather been considering it along practical lines, and it is the belief of a good many of us that in framing national legislation for the Military Establishment cognizance should be taken of the fact that Congress has the right to create armies and raise troops for all national purposes; and that the National Guard, as a Federal institution, be created under the particular power of Congress, and that some practical means and ways may be devised, and I shall be glad to suggest the conditions, if I may, a little later on, whereby the State authorities in times of necessity for State matters may use these Federal troops—call them national guard or national army—for State purposes, but the main idea is that no troops, whether they are to be used for State or national purposes, will be of any avail unless in the beginning the troops and the training and equipment, and such matters, are under Federal supervision; and he is not a loyal national guardsman who pleads for any kind of a National Guard except the one which is a Federal force, built on the highest possible lines; and, as far as possible, just as efficient, certainly in certain lines, as is the Regular Establishment. That is the general basis, the general attitude, and the general view of the loyal national guardsman.

So that I present the case of the State as the first reason for incorporating the idea that the National Guard should be a part of any general scheme of military policy for the United States.

Along national lines, we have tried to be practical in that, too. We have heard a good deal for some time in the way of discussion of the proposition of universal military training and universal military service. I may be repeating a thought which is entirely too well known to you gentlemen, but the difficulty of that has been the definition—what was meant by that and what is wanted.

We all agree it will be a good thing for the country, that it will be a good thing for the young men of the country, if, during the years of 19, 20, or 21, they get some sort of military training.

Objections have been heard on all sides, and the last objections I heard were on board ship, coming from France to America, when I had the distinguished pleasure of having Members of Congress aboard the ship, and we talked informally; and they said if I was to make any contribution, or any of us who had been in service were to make any contributions, to any proposition of working out some idea of national defense, we must take into consideration that, at least in some quarters, among our own people, there is a very strong objection to a policy, a method of training the youth, and that possibly that objection is so strong that Congress will not be able to pass the necessary legislation.

Senator THOMAS. If that sentiment was strong enough to affect the elections, it would be conclusive, would it not?

Col. DAVIS. That was the idea some Members of Congress gave me. They also gave me the idea that the convictions of those people to whom they tried to speak were so sincere that it was not within the power of the Members of Congress to overcome it.

Senator THOMAS. There is a very sincere opinion, or conviction, against as well as one for compulsory training, is there not?

Col. DAVIS. Yes, sir. So if the contribution is to be made in that direction, by way of a suggestion, it is this, that the middle road be pursued at this particular time. Say to the young men of the country, by legislation, that some training must be had; say to them that there is a machinery provided—the cantonment, the plan, the officers, the system of training by the Federal Government—and that unless he voluntarily serves in the National Guard, or in the citizen army—call it whatever you please; I am not at all particular about names—that the Government will make him take a certain amount of training.

Now, there is a compromise even of that last statement. I had in mind that Congress may want to say, after consulting with the Military Establishment, what number of young men should be trained throughout the country each year. If there is an objection to the compulsory universal system of training, Congress may not find that it will meet the situation by saying that each year a certain number of young men shall be trained, let us say 500,000 young men, and I, for one, am not at all certain that we shall be able to train all of the young men of the country immediately after such legislation should come into effect; and I believe we will do much better if we try out that system gradually, so it is my belief that military training should not be a universal system in the sense that every young man, at a certain age, upon this law becoming effective, shall receive training, but that Congress, after consultation with all the necessary departments, including the War Department and all others, shall say what that number shall be. We will say, arbitrarily, it shall be 500,000. It may be it should be a greater or lesser number, and that each congressional district shall make its contribution exactly along the same lines that each district and each State has made its contribution in times of war.

What will happen? You will eliminate the objection which is made by those who oppose universal training that you have taken

everyone; you have taken only a small number, comparatively, out of the industrial, the commercial, or the educational pursuits of any State or community. Now then, you say to the young man, "The only way by which you can avoid being drafted into this course of training, the only way by which you can avoid being made to take it, whether you are ready for it or not, is to enlist in the National Guard."

If you have the sort of National Guard that I have tried to describe, one for which the course of training is prescribed, and the sort of course of training which fits into the standards as they exist at this time, or as you shall prescribe at this time, and you say to the young man and even to the regimental commander, "Unless you have given the young man certain training which meets that standard, that training shall not be to the young man's credit, and he will have to go into training camp anyway."

Do you not see how that at once would raise that standard, and in my opinion you at once eliminate the objection—and I, for one, do not have it—you eliminate the objection to a system which, while compelling every young man to take the training, as he ought to do, that it might, either as a matter of fact or in the minds of some people, disturb your industrial or educational or commercial situation throughout the land, and by working in a system of universal training, I mean a system of military training, and I am purposely omitting the word "universal" in view of the explanation I made—by combining military training with a system of National Guard, it seems to me you give the States what they want; you eliminate the objection of taking every young man into it; you make it possible to handle both the young men that go to the training camp, as well as the National Guard regiments, before you create for yourself a huge piece of work and a huge machinery, and no one realizes that any better than one who has taken a part in training a limited number of young men at the outbreak of the war. My regiment was called into service the very day on which war was declared, and we have increased the regiment from a peace to a war footing, even to a regiment and a brigade or a division, and we know what it has taken us to do in the way of work to establish the scheme and to try it out and find out which is right and which is wrong, and with all the confidence which the Nation has in Congress to reduce to writing a system, I take it you gentlemen, more than anyone else, realize the difficulties which are before you to create the sort of system which you can say will work out successfully.

It is for that reason that I am urging a limited try out of this matter of military training in the entire country, and that limited try out be on the basis of growing, and for my purpose it is immaterial whether you make the number 300,000 or 500,000 or a million. I would prefer to make the number smaller for the first year. Then you try out just the difficulties which exist in getting these young men into the cantonments; the matter of handling them is no longer a theoretical task, but a practical task, and while you are doing that you are doing another thing for the State and the Nation. You are building up not only a crowd of young men who are trained—and here I came to another important point—but a crowd of young men who have had the benefit of organizational training.

As a National Guardsman, I know better than any officer in the Regular Army what the weaknesses of the National Guard have been in the past, for I have been a party to those weaknesses and have practiced them; still the strong thing about the National Guard when war came on was that the War Department, which has never befriended the National Guard, and I am not complaining along personal lines, for I have been treated very well indeed, and better than I deserved, notwithstanding the fact that the War Department always in the past looked upon the National Guard as a necessary evil, has not said they are brothers in arms and wanted to help them and build them up; they have always in a sense been kicking them; and "I am an inspector and instructor; I am doing it because I have to; I have no interest either as an inspector or instructor."

Notwithstanding that, when the crucial hour came and men were needed in the organizational training of the National Guard it was the biggest asset that the Army had. Within two hours after we were told to go we brought a regiment; it might have been ever so inefficient, but we had the men, we had the noncommissioned officers, we had the lieutenants, the captains, the majors, and the colonels, who then, under the guidance of a professional man, could improve and did improve themselves in a way that made them an effective force in France; but there was back of that all that organizational training which they had had year after year, night after night, on the rifle range and at these maneuvers that lasted only eight days. True it was not enough, but there was that strength that organizational training alone could give.

In our own State we could not produce a complete division. We produced two Infantry brigades, some Artillery regiments; but take the State of New York, and the States in the northeast, in addition to what we had in our State they had divisional organizations. There was someone there who could speak for every unit in that particular division.

Now, I say, if you adopt in your plan of legislation the scheme which I have suggested you give one more force, one more element to the Army and the military forces of the State which you do not get by the mere profession of training, by the school men; for it is one thing to train them; it is another thing when you need them to get them together and mold them into units, and mold them into an army; for even trained young men are not an army.

They have referred to civilians as a mob. You may refer to a great big crowd of trained young men as a trained mob, and a mob it is, and remains a mob and is not an army until such time as you unite it under officers who understand coordination and their relation to each other, and I say, though it may be along limited lines in providing the legislation for the National Guard—and when I use the word "federalized" I only mean to pay a compliment, after all, to the efficiency of the professional Army, we mean a federalized National Guard that would have for its standard of efficiency our own great Regular Army.

THE CHAIRMAN. Do I understand you to advocate, as Col. Foreman does, that the National Guard be part of the training scheme?

Col. DAVIS. Yes, sir.

THE CHAIRMAN. But still remain under the militia clause of the Constitution?

Col. DAVIS. Shall be under the clause of the Constitution which gives power to Congress to create armies.

The CHAIRMAN. Under the Army clause of the Constitution?

Col. DAVIS. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Then your suggestion is, and that has been made before to this committee from several sources, that we have but one Army?

Col. DAVIS. That we have the one citizens' Army; that the young men that go to the training camps, and those that are outside the regular service, that you call reserve officers, and those that constitute the National Guard, shall be your citizen Army; and, in addition to that, of course you have your Regular Army.

The COURT. Of course if you organize one force under the Army clause of the Constitution, it contemplates one Army of the United States. You can divide them into two categories, the permanent personnel, say the regulars, and the part time or reserve personnel, which would be the troops you have been discussing.

Col. DAVIS. That is the idea, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Then is it your suggestion that the governors of the States be given the right under the statute to call for the assistance of the troops stationed within their borders?

Col. DAVIS. That the troops stationed within the borders of a given State may be called upon by the governor, or you may give that power to the ranking officer, who is commissioned by the Federal Government, to aid the State authorities, whenever it is necessary to preserve the public tranquillity or preserve order or law.

The CHAIRMAN. I am a great believer, as you are, in preserving the esprit as a unit, and cherishing it.

Under your scheme, how would you perpetuate it, as it were, your own regiment, the Second Illinois, and have it continue to be known as the Second Illinois and have it occupy its present armories?

Col. DAVIS. That is, of course, a practical question. Eliminating one or two States, there is not any State in the Union that I know of at the present time that has the necessary or the required equipment for the training of its troops. Some agency will have to charge itself with that responsibility. From the selfish-interest standpoint now, as a man who would like to see the National Guard go on and live and be an aid in the future as it has been in the past, I should like to see the Federal Government assume responsibility for building armories in the States, for these reserve troops, which touch all reserve troops, both in times of peace and war.

It is my further belief that any State, and I can certainly speak for the State of Illinois, would cooperate in building armories, if it would be understood that the armories would be used by troops organized under Federal legislation.

In the city of New York, the chairman of this committee knows well, the city itself built and maintained those armories, and I doubt very much if either the city or the State of New York would ever change its policy regarding its armories, because it is getting more efficient forces than it has had under the old system, remembering all the time that the cities and the States would have in time of need the use of these double troops.

It seems to me it is a practical question which will be solved when the general scheme is understood.

The CHAIRMAN. Had you ever given any consideration to the suggestion that the President be authorized to organize within the citizens' army special units, composed of officers and men who volunteer to undertake an additional obligation in time of peace; that is, the obligation to respond to the call of the governor of the State to suppress disorders or to respond to the call of the Federal Government in what might be termed minor expeditionary undertakings, which would be so small as not to necessitate the mobilization of the entire citizen army?

Col. DAVIS. May I ask the Senator a question, if that is intended as a paper organization or as a permanent organization?

The CHAIRMAN. An actual organization.

Col. DAVIS. An actual organization?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes; composed of men of the citizens' army, who are still subject to the training of the citizens' army but who will volunteer to join special units maintained within the citizens' army, thus subject to the additional obligation of certain kinds of service in time of peace.

Col. DAVIS. May I answer it in this way?

When we were called into the Federal service in 1916 for the Mexican border, we were obliged to spend a good deal of our time during our service there—and more time after we were out of the service—on the question of the different sets of oaths which the War Department proposed to our men, and our men finally were willing to swear, without any provocation, because they had sworn so many times so many different allegiances.

The CHAIRMAN. They were willing to swear to anything?

Col. DAVIS. To anything at any time.

Senator THOMAS. Or about anything?

Col. DAVIS. Or about anything. The analysis of it all is that the man when he goes into the service really does not analyze and scrutinize the situation as much as we are scrutinizing it at the present hour. He does not want to have this general thing in mind, that he is going into service, not as a State policeman—that is obnoxious to the average man—and I want to say I am a loyal son of Illinois, and it would be obnoxious to me to feel that I am devoting a good deal of my time in training young men and commanding them to act simply as a police force. I am willing to uphold the dignity of my State, but just along the strict lines of a policeman's work I do not want to do it, and my men do not want to do it, and the only reason why they are willing to keep on working in the National Guard is because of the belief that they have, and I have, that if another opportunity presents itself where the citizen army is required, that my men and I can be of better service by being an organized force than in any other way; so, in answer to your question, Senator, I can say it seems to me as though it were all a question of the machinery to be provided by legislation. Just give us a force which can be used for both State and Federal purposes.

From my experience with my men, and that should be taken into account, I do not have any misgivings that my men will go. They are delighted to take an oath, which, in substance, will say when the

President of the United States needs them, they will respond, for, in my judgment, that is the real incentive for the willingness to go into the service. In other words, if it is limited to State allegiance, and it is not made certain in advance that they are a part of the Federal force, I do not think that the young men would want to go into the National Guard, or by whatever other name we may want to designate it.

Senator FLETCHER. Do you think you would have any difficulty in keeping your regiment together?

Col. DAVIS. You mean the regiment which served in France with me?

Senator FLETCHER. Yes. What is its status now?

Col. DAVIS. I should be glad to answer that question.

Senator FLETCHER. Just for the purpose of illustrating.

Col. DAVIS. I shall be glad to answer it. Of course, as the Senator well knows, the calling in of the National Guard into the Federal service wiped the National Guard out of existence, so that upon our return from France, and upon being mustered out of the service, we were neither in the Federal nor in the State service. The State machinery was wrecked when we went into the Federal service; and before they let me out of the Federal service I had to make a statement, upon my word as a gentleman, that I thoroughly wrecked my State machinery and my regimental machinery; that I let every officer go, and every man, and turned over my records; and that there was nothing left of me; so that we found ourselves in our State—as I presume others found themselves in other States—without any State organization; and the governor has asked Col. Foreman and myself and others in our State who served during the war to make an effort to reorganize our regiments.

There is not any difficulty in getting the officers to agree to go into some other sort of service. They are perfectly willing to go into a National Guard organization. My judgment is they would prefer it, because it would keep up this esprit and the traditions of the regiment in which they served during such a memorable occasion as the World War.

As far as the enlisted men who served are concerned, I am sympathetic with their attitude. They consider themselves to some degree as graduates of the school of enlisted men, particularly privates. They say they have been put to the best test there is for a soldier, educated on the battle field, and they say their conduct has been satisfactory—and they have the right to say it—so they say they do not feel there is any reason why they should go into service now, which means beginning at the bottom again—the manual of arms, foot movements, and all those other things. They say, "We have done our share of it; we ought not to be expected to do that." But they are all perfectly willing to take appointments as officers or noncommissioned officers to help some other young men to learn something about the military game.

I think that it is a mistake to feel that the men are not coming back into the service because there was any dissatisfaction during the time they have been in the service. It is rather on the other theory—of feeling they have graduated from the grammar school and do not want to be sent back there again.

Senator FLETCHER. Will there be any difficulty in getting new material to take their places?

Col. DAVIS. In my judgment, there will not. Col. Foreman was asked at one time after we had left the border what was the greatest difficulty in the service. The answer was that every other day an inspector would come and tell us what our status was; finally came and would not approve his pay roll, because he had no status at all; still, he had men who had their equipment and rifles on their shoulders and were ready to meet the Mexicans if they had to. That is the trouble now. You fix our status and we will have no difficulty in getting the men.

Senator FLETCHER. In reference to your plan about training, I have just one question there. It seems to me the weakness there would be the difficulty in selecting. Suppose we say we will have 300,000 men this year. Would you not have trouble to pick out those men, to select them?

Col. DAVIS. My theory of that is, and I will give it for what it is worth, that Congress should provide that some department of the Government—I am not particular which one it is—determine the number of men required from each congressional district, and that those young men be registered anyway—this question of registration and physical examination is a good thing as a beginning for the system, which, some say, may want to call every young man into actual service, and among those who have registered and passed the physical examination, let there be drawn by lot the required number in each congressional district, which is a fair way, it seems to me. In discussion the question of legislation we have heard from time to time, linked up with that military training and the high schools and colleges—we have heard that proposal. I have heard all the arguments for and against it; and it seems to me as though meeting the general situation which I tried to describe of supplementing every extent possible the training of the young men if we can not by legislation get universal military training, that we ought to take advantage of the existence of high schools and colleges.

It has been urged as an objection that the Federal Government, as such, has not any supervision over high schools and State colleges and private colleges, and therefore could not bring about any results from the standpoint of required and uniform training. It appears to me the answer to it is this: That if in drawing legislation for the military policy of our Government Congress prescribes what sort of training in college or in high schools will do away with the necessity of taking a course of compulsory training, that that meets all the objections which are raised regarding lack of power in the hands of Congress to regulate in any way any of the educational institutions of the country which are not Federal institutions.

Senator THOMAS. In other words, a system of compulsory training might be effectuated by giving to objectors the right to have children undergo a certain prescribed course of training in the schools?

Col. DAVIS. You are right. That is my idea, sir.

Senator THOMAS. I think that is one of the best suggestions that has been made.

The CHAIRMAN. Of course, Colonel, that is open to this objection: A good many of the people who would object to the standard or formal form of training can not send their sons to college.

Col. DAVIS. May I answer that, sir?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Col. DAVIS. We say to the poor man that he has the same opportunity for avoiding the effect of compulsory training; he has the same advantages of having his son get the military training by letting his son join the National Guard. What the student gets in college by way of the required amount of training, the son of the man who can not send him to college, can get that in the National Guard without any expense to him, or without any loss of time.

The CHAIRMAN. I think of another phase of it. The men who receive their training in college would not belong to any organized unit of the citizens' army, would they?

Senator THOMAS. I understand the suggestion, Mr. Chairman, to apply to high schools and common schools as well as it is to be applied to colleges.

Col. DAVIS. May I answer that, sir?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Col. DAVIS. It strikes me that when we get to reducing to words a scheme of training that many hurdles will have to be overcome before we come to the question of how the young men that are being trained shall be organized and into what units. They will be receiving training in a certain camp; the division will be geographical, rather than any military division of units; when the man is through with his training in the camp, I take it that he will be assigned to some reserve unit, reserve company, battery, or regiment. The young man who, while at high school or college, receives his military training along lines which meet the requirements of the Federal Government will likewise be assigned to a unit, company, battalion, or regiment, with this additional proviso, that if he has made a satisfactory showing and is so reported by the military instructor, who again must meet the requirements set out by the Federal Government, that that particular young man will be the first to be considered for a noncommissioned officer or a commissioned officer in the reserve army.

I have a further thought, that in connection with training such a large number of young men we will require a great number of officers; that some of these graduates of universities, in particular, will have had a sufficient elementary training and the required collegiate training so they may go to West Point, or to some similar institution, for a postgraduate course, and in that way we will have another way of providing the increased number of officers with which to train and officer this large Army; so I am very much in favor of high schools and colleges as another means of producing the required number of officers, bearing in mind always there should be a postgraduate course in a particular military institution, like West Point.

Senator SUTHERLAND. Some of these schools already offer military courses quite similar to and almost up to the standard—some claim they are fully up to the standard of the instruction given at West Point?

Col. DAVIS. I can speak for the University of Chicago, that there the response of the student body in the course of and along military lines has been highly satisfactory.

Senator SUTHERLAND. I refer to schools like Culver and the Virginia Military Institute.

Col. DAVIS. Yes; those are very satisfactory, indeed. My idea is that one going to a school of that sort should not be obliged to take another course of training in some encampment.

The CHAIRMAN. The members of the committee have enjoyed hearing your statement.

Are there any other observations you gentlemen wish to make?

**SUPPLEMENTARY STATEMENT OF MR. MILTON J. FOREMAN,
CHICAGO, ILL.**

Mr. FOREMAN. May I make just one observation?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, sir.

Mr. FOREMAN. I think one of the most important things that confronts us now is the preservation of the experience which we bought in the service. I think not to take the fullest advantage of that, not to preserve it in some form of organization, is a wastefulness that never could be justified.

In the Artillery we were months and months training for combat. They turned out my regiment, that was considered sufficiently good to serve with four different base divisions. Now, if those men will come back to the localized organization, the National Guard organization, the men will come back in large numbers, the noncommissioned officers will come back, the officers will come back; they will train new men. I am not particularly anxious to see all my regiment made up of men who served in France. I want to see, though, the men who were the best gunners, the officers, the technical men, the men who knew maps and instruments, knew how to lay a gun and take a gun down, I want to see those men kept together and teach it to these young fellows that come in, and I think in no way can we preserve what we learned and what we paid a high price for, except through organizations that men will join, with a tradition for loyalty and for companionship, and I think if these organizations are encouraged and brought together, that we will hold together our technical branches of the service in a way that can in no manner be improved upon.

SUPPLEMENTARY STATEMENT OF MR. ALLEN TUKEY.

The CHAIRMAN. You had something further to say, had you, Mr. Tukey?

Mr. TUKEY. Yes, sir. Of course, the Senator understands our committee in this National Guard proposal has not gone anywhere nearly as far as the colonel and with definite suggestions. We have merely suggested a compromise along the line of equivalent training in the National Guard.

I have a couple of definite paragraphs which I should like to bring to your attention.

After the initiation of the system of military training, no person should be admitted to a military academy until after completing the prescribed military course of military training with credit, and in such manner as to secure a recommendation as to military aptitude and efficiency.

The idea behind that is that the young man that is going to military academy will profit greatly, we think, by taking his training with

the rest of the men from his locality, and going through the prescribed course before being assigned to the military academy. It is the question of getting in touch with the citizen army.

Senator THOMAS. I think an equally good reason for that would be that that requirement would help the general scheme of military training?

Mr. TUKEY. Yes, sir.

There is one more definite paragraph. The one hundred and nineteenth article of war should be amended so as to provide that, especially in the event of assignments especially made by the President, the relative rank of all officers in the same grade should be based on length of active service in that grade.

I might say, by way of explanation, that the one hundred and nineteenth article of war now provides that the officer in the Regular Establishment ranks any citizen officer, regardless of length of service in that grade. We think the rank should be based on the length of service in the grade he holds.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee is familiar with the absurdities of that situation, and I think I can assure you the committee is going to cure that.

Mr. TUKEY. If there is any further elaboration you desire of the first statement we made we would be glad to go into it further.

Senator THOMAS. Mr. Chairman, I have a communication from a lawyer, a member of the bar of my city, who is opposed to military training, and I ask that it be put in the record.

The CHAIRMAN. That may be inserted in the record, Senator.

DENVER, COLO., December 12, 1919.

HON. CHARLES S. THOMAS,

United States Senate, Washington, D. C.

DEAR SIR: I notice with regret that the military authorities are still clamoring for and seeking to enforce universal military training. As a citizen of this State, with two sons in the service during the recent war, one of whom is now dead, I wish to urge you to work and vote against such a proposition. There are many reasons that I could urge against it, but I will mention only a few:

1. To take a young man away from his work in which he is engaged and put him in a camp for a year or even six months means that he will grow away from the business in which he was engaged; that when he returns to civil life his place will be filled by another man and he will have to shift to find a new place, and he is very much more unfitted for it than he was before he left for the military camp. I personally know numbers of young men who entered the service during this World War with the promise that their places would be open when they returned, but now that they are back they are told their places are satisfactorily filled and that they will have to wait for an opening.

2. The idleness which necessarily comes to the men in a military camp unfits them for a business or professional life and makes them dissatisfied with the steady grind which they are called upon to undergo outside of the military camp.

3. The immoral influences growing out of and in connection with the herding together of great numbers of men without the moral restraints of the family and home are very strong and lead to excesses and dissipation as soon as the men can get outside of the camp limits, which are always surrounded by a gang of vultures and harpies, ready to prey upon and to plunder the thoughtless young man.

4. I am opposed to the vast expenditure of money that will be required to keep up such a military program. If I am correctly informed, more than 60 per cent of the income of the National Government for many years before the World War began was used in maintaining the small Army and Navy

which we had and in paying pensions to the veterans of 1865 and the injured and disabled of the Spanish-American War.

Just as sure as to-morrow's sun rises a military program in this country will have no other results than it had in Germany. I think it wicked and diabolical to make the sacrifice of life and money necessary to overthrow militarism in Germany and then establish it in this country.

I think these views represent those of a large majority of the people whom I meet in church and lodge and in social circles in my daily intercourse, and as a representative of the people of the State I think you should be advised of our feelings in the matter.

Thanking you for your attention to this subject, I remain,

Yours, respectfully,

JOHN HIPP.

The CHAIRMAN. I notice you recommend here that the Air Service remain a separate department and considered as a combat branch of the Army. Do you think it should be placed under a separate and new head; or that it shall be a separate department within the War Department?

Mr. TUKEY. By a resolution at our Minneapolis convention, the committee reported a recommendation that the United States Air Service be made a separate and distinct department of our system of national defenses, under the control of a member of the President's Cabinet appointed for that purpose alone.

Our committee has not been emphatic in the latter point. There is no doubt that there are strong arguments in favor of the resolution as passed from the commercial end of the Air Service and the commercializing and utilizing of it commercially. There is, furthermore, no question that, as an arm, the Air Service should be part of any particular unit, and we feel that while the Air Service is a combatant group, it should be organized as a distinct arm, the same as the Infantry or the Artillery.

The CHAIRMAN. You are probably familiar with the fact that this committee has already reported Senator New's bill, which creates a new department, but does not give its head a place in the Cabinet.

Senator SUTHERLAND. It, of course, provides that it shall cooperate with both the Navy and the Army; to be assigned to both branches and be entirely under the command of both branches?

Mr. TUKEY. Yes, sir.

We have one other suggestion, that the original vacancies created in the permanent commissioned personnel should be filled by selection among qualified veterans of the war. That would include both citizen soldiers and men who had served as part of the permanent Army during the war.

The CHAIRMAN. That is, the vacancies in the permanent personnel?

Mr. TUKEY. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee had in view a provision to this effect, that at least one-half of the vacancies created by this act in the permanent commissioned personnel should be selected from among veteran citizen officers of the war.

Mr. TUKEY. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. You would not urge that every vacancy be filled in that way, would you?

Mr. TUKEY. I do not believe we would bear down on that very hard; no, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Because there might be some positions in the commissioned personnel requiring a special technically educated man, who might not have been in the war. I simply mention that to show how the committee's mind is running, and seeing to it that veteran citizen officers shall have a wide open opportunity to take part in the military activities of the country, either in the permanent or the temporary military personnel.

Mr. TUKEY. Has your committee yet agreed on this one matter, of commissioning veterans of the war who have not now commissions, in the reserve corps?

The CHAIRMAN. We have not had that point up for decision.

Mr. TUKEY. We merely suggest that veterans of the war now in civil life should be entitled to initial appointment in the reserves, which includes the National Guard as outlined, in the grade held by them, if they are honorably discharged from the military service, or any higher grade their abilities have demonstrated they are entitled to in their active service overseas.

The CHAIRMAN. Do I understand you would give them that appointment as a matter of right?

Mr. TUKEY. Yes, sir. Of course they would not hold that appointment unless they were efficient in the grade in which they were commissioned.

Senator SUTHERLAND. Would you put a time limit on that? You would not leave that absolutely indefinite as to time, would you?

Mr. TUKEY. You mean in which they were allowed to accept the commission?

Senator SUTHERLAND. Yes.

Mr. MILLER. Yes; it would seem reasonable that some time limit should be put on it.

The CHAIRMAN. What age limit would you suggest?

Mr. TUKEY. The age limit regarding what, Senator?

The CHAIRMAN. The commissioning of people to fill original vacancies in the permanent commissioned personnel, for instance?

Mr. TUKEY. We have no definite suggestion on that, except that it would only seem reasonable that their ages should somewhat coincide with the ages of the permanent officers in their grade.

Mr. FOREMAN. Some of us hope you will not bear down too strongly on that.

The CHAIRMAN. Have you any suggestions to make about promotion of officers?

Mr. TUKEY. We have no suggestions on which we intend to fight or anything like that. The suggestion of classifying the officers by grades, A, B, and C; class A being those eligible to promotion, and in which class they should be promoted by file up to the grade of colonel; class B being those not considered at present eligible for promotion; and class C, those to be eliminated.

The CHAIRMAN. That is the suggestion that has been made before?

Mr. TUKEY. Yes, sir. We do not think, however, that any officer, either in the permanent or reserve personnel, should be promoted until he has made an affirmative demonstration of his capacity to perform the duties of the next higher grade.

STATEMENT OF MAJ. GEN. J. F. O'RYAN.

The CHAIRMAN. Gen. O'Ryan, would you give us the benefit of your advice on some of these things?

The General has appeared before the committee before this and made some very definite, constructive suggestions, which are somewhat parallel to what the committee of the Legion has made, and the committee of the Legion has suggested some modifications in his original plan, and perhaps the General would be willing to comment on them.

We take advantage of your presence here, General, to ask you to speak on this very short notice.

Gen. O'RYAN. I followed the testimony of Col. Davis with a great deal of interest, and I am in accord with practically everything he says.

The alternative method of service is a new suggestion to me. I had not heard that before, and it may be a method that would obviate criticism from some sources, at least, toward compulsory military training, and for that reason I am inclined to think that it might be a desirable plan.

In reference to the one army, I missed the point of that. You asked Col. Davis a question about the one army. As I understood the question, it was whether his plan would call for two armies or one army; then I think you stated your own idea to be there should be, of course, but the one army, but divided necessarily into subdivisions or classes which composed that army. That is my own idea. I see no objection whatever in the organization of a national army, to provide that that army shall be composed of subordinate groups, for the reason illustrated by the character of service required by our Regular Army as compared with the character of service required or to be required of a citizen army.

Almost everything that concerns those two forces presents problems that differ. Therefore, I see no objection, from the standpoint of military organization, to contemplating a national army that is composed of what might be termed subordinate armies, so long as they are tied together at the top.

We have an illustration of that in the existence of the Marine Corps, which operated as a part of the American Expeditionary Forces, and we have an excellent example of it in the British Army, carried to an extreme that surprised us, as Americans, who were with them, because there they had the Canadian Army, the Australian Army; they had the Indian Army—all separate and distinct from the Imperial British Army. Not only distinct in relation to their rules and regulations, methods, customs, and habits, but they differed even in the matter of uniform, and those differences were jealously guarded and preserved; and yet when it came to executing the missions for which the armies exist in war, they functioned, so far as we could observe, very efficiently, and we were told by numbers of officers that they functioned much better than if they had been in all their details one army. It was pointed out that that was true because of the rivalry, based upon competition, that existed among these various groups, and also because in a country that is large it is impossible to apply to one group customs, habits, and methods that might

effectually be applied to another; the difference being based upon many considerations—habits of the people of the particular locality, their traditions, and all that sort of thing.

I gathered from Col. Davis's testimony that he advocates one army in the sense that the Army of the United States should be composed of the Regular Army, for the purposes that he mentioned, and a citizen army, which, in turn, would be divided into three classes—boys in active, intensive training; the National Guard of the United States, as a Federal force; and the third class, those who were graduates of the training camps and not absorbed by the National Guard.

The CHAIRMAN. But organized into reserve units?

Gen. O'RYAN. Organized into reserve units; yes.

The CHAIRMAN. What effect, do you think, would be had upon the guard under this proposal of the Legion committee by which a young man would be given his choice of taking his training in the guard or what might be termed Federal cantonments?

Gen. O'RYAN. Well, as I have said, it is a new proposition, and I do not know that I have any crystallized opinion. I would say, offhand, that it would seem to be practicable in being worked out.

I was interested in the distinction that one of the Senators brought out by his question to be made between the word "equal" and the word "equivalent" in relation to what was to be considered an equivalent of the intensive training of the training camp. If by "equivalent" is meant such a character and duration of service in the National Guard as will produce a soldier having equal value to that produced by the training camp, then I would say that that test is not to be measured by the number of hours employed—obviously not, because the Government would have a very much better asset in the man who was a part of the organizational effort of the guard than the Government would have in the case of the man who was merely the graduate of a training camp and then thrust into an organized reserve, or even a part reserve.

I think one thing to be kept in mind in relation to that catalogue of training, which has intervening periods for digestion, is illustrated by the fact that the training camp is apt, the more intensive its work may be, to produce a graduate who is crammed with more than he has had an opportunity to digest. I think the ideal system, if we could bring it about, would be to require a moderate period of training for every young man, and then to put them into the citizen army or National Guard, whatever you are going to call it.

We know from observing the products of training camps, as compared with the products of the other system and the man who has had both, that the man who is started right and then is carried along by the system of giving periodical instruction and training stores away a great deal more of knowledge that is usable and is speedily get-at-able and becomes habitual than the man who gets a lot of intensive training and then is put absolutely on his own. I think that is true, because discipline is not a fund of information; it is rather a state of mind, a state of mind that has become automatic to the influence of habit and of atmosphere; and so there is involved in the training of the soldier an element that can not be ignored and for which there is no substitute—that is, the element of time—

because in order to bring about discipline we must bring about a physiological as well as a psychological change in his mind, and that takes time; and so at the end of three years in a well-trained guard organization we find that men do obey automatically; we find that men, even with the existence in their companies of a small nucleus of very efficient noncommissioned officers, take on the earmarks of the professional soldier. They are tremendously efficient.

The trouble with the National Guard in the past has been that it has varied so widely in its standards and in its methods, and therefore in its efficiency. It rates from efficiency down to conditions that are worse than no organization at all, because the men have become accustomed to doing things in an improper way.

Senator FLETCHER. General, what authority or power would the governors of the different States have over any portion of this army that you speak of? You speak of one army now, in certain divisions, a subordinate army divided into three. Where do the governors come in on that plan?

Gen. O'RYAN. I think, Senator, so far as I have been able to observe in the 21 years of service I have had and conferences with guard officers all over the country, that the governors of the States are really not interested in anything, in any of the legal aspects of the guard, except the right to use it, and so I think a very important part of this legislation is to vest in the Federal Government the power to train, because unless they have the power to train in time of peace, no form of organization, no matter how ideal it may be, will produce efficiency at the outbreak of war.

Now, in answer to your question, more specifically, I think there should be written into the law a provision that the troops stationed in any State be subject to the call of the governor of that State for the suppression of insurrection. That, by the way, is, as I understand it, a right that exists under the statute and Federal laws at the present time, in relation to any Federal troops that the State may call on the President, through its legislature, if in session, if not, by call of the governor, upon representation that the authority of the State, the power of the State, is insufficient to suppress insurrection, that it may call for the use of Federal troops.

Senator FLETCHER. Would that have anything to do with the officering of this guard?

Gen. O'RYAN. I have very strong views about the officering, and I do not think what was said about the methods of selecting officers, which I understand to relate to the Regular Army only, should apply to those forces. I think the suggestion is very simple, in relation to your citizen army, at least. So far as your divisions are concerned, that is to provide the system that we had in the American Expeditionary Forces and which was a system that we had had in New York State for about four and one-half years before the war. It provides that all promotions are made, not on seniority, but upon recommendations of the regimental commander, who is the man, when all is said and done, who is responsible for the efficiency of the regiment.

As a check against abuses, that recommendations must have the approval of the brigade commander, then if the division commander approves it, it becomes the division commander's nomination.

In our State the power of the governor is limited by law. He can appoint upon that nomination, but if he refuses to appoint, he can not originate anything. It is kept within the military service, and therefore based upon military reasons only. And so I see no difficulty in extending that principle in relation to your citizen army, by providing an additional officer, into the hierarchy of approval, for example, by providing that all nominations for promotion of original appointment within a State shall have the approval of the governor of that State, entirely pro forma; nevertheless, if at some time in the future there was tendency of overcentralization of power, and it is a bad power, in relation to the appointment of thousands of officers all over the country, there would be no fear that such overcentralization of power might vest somewhere in one man, or in a group of men of the Federal Government, because there would be, as a safeguard, the requirement that these officers, their nominations, would not have the approval of the governor. I see no objection to that.

Senator FLETCHER. How does your adjutant general of the State function in connection with that organization?

Gen. O'RYAN. Well, frankly, I think that the adjutants general, a percentage of them, will oppose any plan that lessens their authority. I think that is human nature.

Senator FLETCHER. This legislation would practically eliminate the adjutant general of the State, would it not?

Gen. O'RYAN. It might or it might not, depending upon—there was one suggestion we heard made, that the adjutant general of the State be, by the provisions of this act, designated a Federal disbursing officer and commissioned with the grade of brigadier general in the Citizen Army. Frankly, I believe the suggestion was made to influence their hostility toward any form of legislation which, in the absence of such provision, might be construed as leaving them out.

Senator FLETCHER. That would make them, then, Federal officers?

Gen. O'RYAN. That would make them dual officers, appointed by the governor as adjutant general of the State, under the State constitution, and with which this legislation would not be concerned, and then as Federal officers, by virtue of holding the position of State adjutant general, they would then be commissioned brigadier general, in this National Army, charged with the duties of the disbursing officer for that territory.

Senator FLETCHER. You would take some chance about getting the proper adjutants general, because in some States they are elected, and in some States they are appointed by the governors, and sometimes it is more or less political?

Gen. O'RYAN. Yes, sir; but the point is, no matter what they were, they could not affect the training of this Citizen Army, if you organize it under the Army provision of the Constitution.

Senator FLETCHER. Unless they have to do with the officering of this Army.

Gen. O'RYAN. Of course, under this system of suggested promotion, or suggested system of promotion, they would have no connection with it. The adjutant general of New York has no voice in the selection of officers of the New York division.

The training, it seems to me, is one of the most important features to be considered; and if you organize any citizen force under the

militia provisions of the Constitution, you thereby divest the central authority of the power to train. It seems to me also that from the standpoint of all interests of citizen soldiers, that the Army provision of the Constitution is the one to organize under, because most of them have criticisms to make of the past policy of the Regular Army in relation to citizen soldiers, and yet, by objecting to the Army clause of the Constitution, they make it impossible for Congress to provide them with an overhead which would treat them with sympathy, because under the militia provisions of the Constitution, the President has no power to appoint officers who are militia, that power being preserved in the States.

He has no power, as some officers claim, to detail officers to serve as an overhead, because the detailing of officers, I believe, would in effect, be calling them forth, and he can only call forth officers or men or organizations which have the militia status for the purposes named in the Constitution, to repel invasions, suppress insurrections, and execute the laws, and, of course, the execution of the laws would not be contemplated by such a detail, at least I do not think it would. I assume that executing the laws means to execute them by force of military power, so I do not see how, under the militia provisions of the Constitution, it is possible for Congress to give the National Guard, or any other citizen force, a sympathetic overhead composed of regular officers and guard officers of this force, unless you create it under the Army clause of the Constitution, where the President has the power to appoint the officers by the methods proposed in the bill, and where he has the power, through his subordinates, to enforce training.

Senator FLETCHER. That organization you feel could be used in the same way as the State militia?

Gen. O'RYAN. Yes, sir. I think there are some slight differences of opinion about it, but most of the lawyers that I have talked to believe that it is entirely within the power of Congress in creating an army to create any kind of an army, and to prescribe in unlimited fashion the purposes for which that army may be used, subject only to the requirement of the Constitution that when it is used its command is vested in the President; and so I think if you write into the law a provision that the forces stationed within a State may be used upon the call of the governor of the State to maintain order therein, it does not mean that the governor takes command and divests the President of his functions as commander in chief; it merely means that the governor, having made the call, the officer upon whom the call is made executes the mission, but he does it as a Federal officer.

The other alternative that was discussed to provide for the State's use of a federally organized force is the one referred to by Senator Wadsworth, that the whole or a part of the force of State organizations are permitted by the Federal Government to undertake a subordinate or subjective obligation to the State in which they are stationed; I think that is sound legally, but I see many difficulties, in a practical way, because it immediately establishes two kinds of citizen soldiers, and the average man is not undertaking any more obligation than he has to undertake, so the tendency would be to enlist in those organizations that did not have the double obligation.

I do believe it most important that the scheme of legislation be worked out so that we do not duplicate the citizen soldier force. That is one of the great difficulties to-day. If you make a completely federalized force, with no relation whatever to the State, you do not solve this question, because you leave outside the bulwarks, you leave to the National Guard, or to the organized militia, whatever you are going to call it, and you leave a force with traditions, power, strength back of it, which each year will come to Congress and, in rivalry with the newly created Federal force, secure appropriations and get them. But if you build the edifice in such a manner that this one force will do both jobs, and it has shown its capacity to do both, you will have created an organization along economic lines.

I believe, for example, that the armories, the rifle ranges, the stables, the camp grounds, and military properties generally owned by the States, or by subdivisions of States and now used by the Guard, approximate more than \$200,000,000 in value—I believe that all of them can be made available, will be made available without question, to the National Guard if it is reorganized as under the Army provision of the Constitution. I think it will all come through as a matter of course. If the Guard is satisfied, the States are satisfied.

The only thing the State is interested in, when you get all through, is: Do we have the use of these troops to keep order in our State?

The CHAIRMAN. You would prefer, then, the suggestion of the Legion committee, which would still maintain the National Guard under the militia clause, but make it a part of the machinery for compulsory training?

Gen. O'RYAN. I understood your idea, Mr. Tukey, to be that you would organize the National Guard under the Army clause of the Constitution?

Mr. TUKEY. Yes, sir.

Gen. O'RYAN. And I understood Col. Davis's suggestion to be that. We are all agreed on that.

The CHAIRMAN. I had gathered an entirely different impression.

Mr. TUKEY. We may have suggested at one time or another, Senator, that some provisions which might apply to be under the militia clause, be written into the law, but our idea has been right along a federalized National Guard under the Army clause of the Constitution.

The CHAIRMAN. I have been a little confused on that, and that, of course, is the great question at issue here, and I have gathered from what Col. Foreman had said that it was the recommendation of your committee that the National Guard units be continued in their present status, under the terms of the national-defense act, under the militia clause, but that they could not and would not be given Federal assistance or Federal recognition unless they established the course of training prescribed by the Federal Government.

Mr. TUKEY. I may have gotten the committee wrong. I will ask Col. Foreman what his idea is.

Mr. FOREMAN. Well, the question was raised here, Senator, as to how the States could be prevented from raising troops under their constitutional power.

The CHAIRMAN. They can not be prevented; they can only be persuaded.

Mr. FOREMAN. They can be persuaded. Now, the question of whether these troops would be raised under the militia clause of the Constitution or under the power to raise armies was just incidentally discussed in the committee; but the question is a legal one as largely as a military one. Manifestly, if they can be raised under a power to raise armies, and if the governors of States can still have the power to use the troops for internal use, if they are necessary, and if the local character of the organizations, the home character, can be preserved, then let them be raised under the power to raise armies; but if those essentials can not be preserved, then we have got to do it under the other method.

The CHAIRMAN. Under your method you would have your system of compulsory military training operate in both?

Mr. FOREMAN. Absolutely, sir.

The proposition is there should be an alternative method offered, and through National Guard organizations men might be permitted to take their training in an independent plant instead of being required to take the intensive training which would take a chunk out of their year; but one or the other they must take; and in the event a man fails to take his training through the National Guard sources, he becomes automatically liable for the other service, and in order to enforce an honest administration of that requirement, whatever authority is placed over the training of a particular area should have the observance, surveillance, and supervision of the training of the National Guard organizations.

Senator FLETCHER. In any case, you would mix up your Federal Government with the State militia, and still give the Federal Government power to control them with reference to training and service and that sort of thing?

Gen. O'RYAN. I do not know whether I got the question, Senator, but the national-defense act goes a long ways toward requiring certain forms of training anyway, and the only question now is the enforcement of it. My opinion has been that the National Guard can be effective very easily, and by requiring them to comply with the law and the regulations, or taking the support away from them, and I doubt whether any States have the right to supply the troops by themselves entirely; and when men know they have got to do one or the other thing, it will not be a hard thing to have them comply with the regulations.

Mr. FOREMAN. I think the question is somewhat academic. I think under your plan, somewhere, Senator, authority has got to be vested, whether the two forms of service join at the top, as Gen. O'Ryan suggests, or whether they are absolutely absorbed all the way through, I think is a matter of discussion. I am not sure he is not right. But certainly the area commanders, who have charge of the training of men, in the intensive training, should also prescribe and supervise the other training.

The CHAIRMAN. The installment training?

Mr. FOREMAN. The installment training; yes, sir.

Gen. O'RYAN. I think, Senator, there are people in the guard who object to the Army provision of the Constitution—that is, to organizing under the provision, and who recommend the present law,

a continuation of it, the continuance of the guard under the militia provisions, basing their point of view not upon military principles, but upon their fear of the obligation of rules and regulations by the Regular Army.

And I think that any consideration of this subject which pays no attention to the human side of the problem will miss out.

There has been a great deal of criticism of the Regular Army by the reserve corps and the National Guard. We have been familiar with it long before the war. I know of many cases where that criticism was justified in one sense and not justified in another. I mean that I recall many instances of intense, bitter criticism of the treatment accorded the guard by the War Department, upon the theory that what was prescribed or what was refused or denied, or what was done, was done with malice, with intent to injure the guard. I know that, while that may have been justified even to that extent in some cases, in a great many cases the action complained of was the result of a failure to understand the conditions which affect the guard, the difference in the service, and was not intentional. But, however that may be, there are many officers who object to the change that all these officers here are urging, because they feel that it would be a grand opportunity for exploitation of the citizen soldier by those whom they call the professionals.

I think there is something in that fear. I think that the ground for that fear will gradually disappear. Some of the most loyal National Guardsmen in the country are regular officers, if I might make that paradoxical statement. They are regular officers who have served with the Guard, who have been part of it, have got affection for it, and believe in it, but they are usually the officers of 45 years of age or under, or thereabouts, but the policy at the top very frequently has been one of hostility. They do not believe in it, and have not believed in it, and sincerely so. And, of course, an organization can not develop confidence in itself, esprit, under that kind of guidance or leadership.

What was accomplished on the border and in the war abroad was done in spite of those obstacles, and with the help of the other class of regular officers I have referred to.

I think under a proper organization all that will cure itself, but there is even now some bad sledding ahead unless Congress protects the citizen army from even a possibility of a continuance of that attitude that I have referred to.

Senator FLETCHER. Have you read the bill presented by Senator Frelinghuysen, the National Guard bill, which provides for a National Guard Council, and giving it very extensive control?

Gen. O'RYAN. I do not see how, if that is the bill I read through, I do not see how it can be done constitutionally, to provide any kind of an overhead, whether it is a council, or by whatever means that is done, if that force has a militia status. I do not see how the President can ever appoint officers, because when all is said and done our militia—or how he can even detail it from the body of the militia, because to detail them, he gives them an order, and he can not constitutionally give an order to an officer of the militia except for the reasons enumerated in the Constitution, which are three only and do not include training.

To my mind many of the aims sought in this, the so-called National Guard bill, are sound and desirable, but I do not see how they are possible of accomplishment under that provision of the Constitution.

Senator FLETCHER. It practically separates the National Guard from all other branches of the Army; gives separate control and all that to the National Guard Councils?

Gen. O'RYAN. If they were tied together at the top, we have that situation, as I have stated in the British Army, we have it in the Marine Corps, and the Navy, but I do not see that it can be done constitutionally—if the Guard is constituted as a militia force.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you not think, General, the most effective way of affording protection to the citizen soldier from exploitation is to give him, under the statute, adequate representation in the overhead for the whole force?

Gen. O'RYAN. Yes; I have heard several discussions on that subject. By representation, do you mean, on the General Staff?

The CHAIRMAN. On the General Staff.

Gen. O'RYAN. Of course, the powers of the General Staff are mostly duties rather than powers. They study, consider, and when all is said and done they recommend to the authority to whom they make their recommendations. That authority is the Chief of Staff, who may, if he so selects, not even read the recommendation, but may act as his own wishes dictate. And so that plan is based upon the theory that the intermingling of officers from the Regular Army and the National Guard, or citizens' army, would result in conclusions which would be harmonious conclusions, conclusions which, in the long run, in most every case there would be almost unanimity of opinion. I believe that is so; I know that from experience, that the Regular officers and the Guard or Reserve force do not vote on these things when they get together and discuss them on the basis of groups from one part of the Army and one from another. They discuss them on the merits, and almost every case that I recall the conclusion is in no way affected by the interests of one or another group, but it is after that recommendation gets into the hands of the Chief of Staff as to what is to happen then that we are concerned.

The CHAIRMAN. How could the citizen army be protected at that point?

Gen. O'RYAN. It seems to me that they should be protected the same as the Marine Corps is protected, the way the Australian corps is protected in the British Army, and the Canadian corps, by having its own overhead, and to insure uniformity in those things which are essential where uniformity is essential by the intermingling. This would be your liaison in the General Staff.

For example, the administration, discipline, training of the citizen army would be under the head of the citizen army department and his assistants. The training of the Regular Army would be under the Chief of Staff of the Regular Army, or by whatever name he might be done. Then your liaison would be what, in the German Army, is called the great general staff.

The CHAIRMAN. If you will excuse us, we have to be absent for a few minutes to answer roll call.

(Following recess.)

The CHAIRMAN. I cut you off, General, in the middle of a sentence.

Gen. O'RYAN. You asked me how I would suggest providing for an overhead, using a nonmilitary term for a moment, for the citizen army, in order to safeguard that force from action that would be unfriendly. I think it difficult to answer that question offhand. This, however, occurs to me: We have in the divisional organizations its own divisional general staff, the division being, of course, commanded by the divisional commander. In the corps we have the general staff. They run to divisions, composing the corps, but do not interfere unnecessarily with those duties and prerogatives that pertain to the division commander and the subordinate staff groups. I visualize them going on up until we come to the field army, and in a citizen army so large as the one proposed there would of course be one or more field armies, each having its general staff group; then to top the whole of the citizen army force I would have a general staff group, tied in with a similar general staff group from the Regular Army, who would, by a proper percentage of representation, constitute what one of the officers referred to as the War Department's General Staff; that is, the general staff which in the German Army is called the great general staff, or the superior general staff.

The other plan would be to have no general staff groups in the citizen army higher than the tactical; that is, to have no superior general staff of the citizen army as a department by itself, but to protect its interests by giving the general staff of the Army field powers greater than it now possesses, and that could only be done by provisions which would limit the existing authority of the Chief of Staff.

There are two different methods of proceeding. If we got the result I do not know that one would be preferable to the other.

The CHAIRMAN. I think an examination of the act passed on the recommendation of Secretary Root years ago, the original General Staff act, will disclose the fact that it was not contemplated that the Chief of Staff should exercise so much power as has been exercised at various times since. We gather the impression in this committee that power has been exercised and increased from time to time in the office of the Chief of Staff largely because we did not have the trained General Staff.

Gen. O'RYAN. Of course it is a very difficult thing, even if the law exists in the statute, for an officer who is subordinate to one occupying a position like the Chief of Staff, to raise his voice against any act of the Chief of Staff. That is one difficulty.

The CHAIRMAN. That is inherent in all military practice, I imagine?

Gen. O'RYAN. Yes; I guess it is.

The CHAIRMAN. Suggestion has been made to the committee, and the committee has had it drafted into legislative language, which might be deemed to bear on that very subject. The proviso reads something like this. I have not a perfect draft before me.

That whenever any plan, proposal, or recommendation involving legislation by the Congress, affecting the national defense or the reorganization of the Army [and the term "Army" includes the whole Army, citizen as well as Regular] is presented by the Secretary of War to Congress, or to one of the

committees of Congress, the same shall be accompanied by a study prepared in the appropriate division of the War Department General Staff, including its comments and recommendations relative to such plan, together with such pertinent comment for and against the plan as may be made by the Secretary of War, Chief of Staff, or individual officers of the divisions, War Department General Staff, in which the plan was prepared, all to be subject to the one qualifying clause: "When not incompatible with the public interest."

Gen. O'RYAN. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Of course, that would only involve cases where the General Staff has been contemplating matters which would involve internal legislation, broad policies of national defense, or the reorganization of the Army. Of course, the term "reorganization of the Army" would go down to and include pretty nearly everything you want to include in the matter of the organization of the Army.

Gen. O'RYAN. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. That would at least open the door of the General Staff so that the Congress and the public, the citizen soldier and everybody else could look in and get both sides of the case if there were two schools of thought within the service, General?

Gen. O'RYAN. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you think that a healthy idea?

Gen. O'RYAN. I should think so, yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Do the members of the committee wish to ask Gen. O'Ryan any further questions? If not, General, we are very much obliged to you.

SUPPLEMENTAL STATEMENT OF MR. ALAN TUKEY.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Tukey has one more thing he wanted to call to our attention.

Mr. TUKEY. I believe it is proper to read a resolution which our convention passed regarding control of relative rank for nurses. It is as follows:

Whereas during the great war, members of the Reserve Army Corps worked hand in hand with those of the medical profession, assuming full responsibility for their particular duties in cooperation with them, sharing equally in danger and discomfort:

Resolved, That the American Legion use its efforts to further the passage of a bill for absolute rank for nurses with opportunity for promotion; and that similar provision be made for the nurses of the United States Navy.

The CHAIRMAN. That is very properly laid before this committee. We already have it under consideration. Does that finish all you wish to say?

Mr. TUKEY. I have not much to say on that question, because I have not come prepared. I do understand, however, that quite a few members of the Medical Corps in the Army have come out affirmatively on the proposition, and among whom I believe has been the head of the Medical Department of the A. E. F., and quite a group of assistants and subordinates. As a patient in the hospital, I can say individually that I am very strong for that. I spent 10 months in the hospital, and there is no question in my mind that the nurses should have relative rank.

The CHAIRMAN. That is a very interesting and important suggestion. We are glad to have had it from you.

(Whereupon, at 5 o'clock p. m., the subcommittee completed its hearings on Army reorganization legislation.)

